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MEETING

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Chairman: Mr. F. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium).

Election of the Vice-Chairman

[Item 5]*

1. The CHAIRMAN thanked the Committee for the honour it had conferred on both his country and on him by calling upon him to preside over its deliberations. In particular he thanked the representative of France for nominating him and the representative of Brazil for seconding his nomination. He paid tribute to his predecessor Mr. Muniz, the representative of Brazil, and introduced the secretary of the Committee, Mr. Protitch, Principal Director of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs.

2. He invited the Committee to elect its Vice-Chairman.

3. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) nominated Mr. Urrutia (Colombia).

4. Mr. WEBB (New Zealand) supported the nomination.

Mr. Francisco Urrutia (Colombia) was elected Vice-Chairman by acclamation.

5. Mr. URRUTIA (Colombia) thanked the members of the Committee, and in particular the representatives of France and New Zealand for the confidence they had placed in him.

Election of the Rapporteur

[Item 5]*

6. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to elect its Rapporteur.

7. Mr. DE PIMENTEL BRANDAO (Brazil) nominated Mr. Thors (Iceland).

8. Mr. COTE (Canada) supported the nomination.

Mr. Thor Thors (Iceland) was elected Rapporteur by acclamation.

9. Mr. THORS (Iceland) thanked the Committee for the honour bestowed on his country. He emphasized that the aim of the Committee's work was to seek a basis for agreement and conciliation.

Order of discussion of agenda items (A/C.1/742 and A/C.1/743)

10. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the political climate, which had become milder in recent months, had given rise to new hopes. Nevertheless, the results so far achieved were decidedly precarious. Risks and dangers existed which might again plunge the world into a critical situation. The Committee was faced with a twofold task: to attempt to realize the hopes and to banish the dangers.

11. In accordance with rule 98 of the rules of procedure the Committee was to decide the order of priority of the items on its agenda. He invited members to express their views.

12. Mr. ECHEVERRI CORTES (Colombia) felt that since the political conference on Korea was to meet on 28 October 1953 there was no reason why the Committee should discuss the Korean question before that conference met. Such problems as the unification of Korea and the organization of free elections in that country should be considered and settled at that conference, and should not be discussed by the United Nations in the meantime. Moreover, there was nothing to prevent the Committee from changing at the appropriate moment, if necessary, the order of the items to be discussed by it. His delegation proposed the following order:

1. The question of Morocco;
2. The Tunisian question;
3. Question of impartial investigation of charges of use by United Nations forces of bacterial warfare;
4. Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Government of the Republic of China: report of the Government of the Union of Burma;
5. Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission;
6. Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations;
7. The Korean question: (a) report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea...

13. Mr. KYROU (Greece) unreservedly supported the Colombian representative's proposal for the reasons set forth by him, and also because the Committee was bound, with regard to the Korean question by the General Assembly's decision of 22 September 1953 (440th plenary meeting). Moreover, if the international situation continued to improve, the Committee would be able to give the Korean question a higher place in the order of priority.

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

14. If the Committee adopted the Colombian proposal, it should allow a few days to intervene before it took up the consideration of the Moroccan question, in order to enable delegations to prepare for that debate.

15. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), while recognizing the importance of such questions as those of Morocco and Tunisia, held that they could not be considered in isolation but must on the contrary be allotted their proper place in the framework of the international situation. During the discussions in the General Committee the Soviet delegation had already expressed its misgivings concerning certain rumours according to which the Korean question was to be relegated to the end of the agenda. At that time the request for the inclusion in the agenda of a supplementary item relating to the Secretary-General's note on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 711 C (VII) (A/2480) had been attacked as pointless on the ground that there was nothing to prevent the First Committee from considering that report when the Korean question was discussed. The Colombian proposal justified those misgivings. No doubt preparations were being made to ask for further delays later, on all kinds of pretexts. The argument that discussion of the Korean question should be deferred until it could be seen how matters developed in connexion with the political conference was baseless, because everyone knew that at the present time the convening of the conference had been complicated by the fact that the Governments of the People's Republic of China (A/2469) and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (A/2476 and Corr.1) had stated in their respective replies to the Secretary-General that they could not accept the General Assembly's resolution 711 A and B (VII) on the matter and had put forward counter-proposals which in their view offered a better guarantee of success.

16. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 711 C (VII) the Secretary-General had submitted a note on the replies from the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. The Soviet delegation, like many others, was of the opinion that to refuse to consider the note which the Secretary-General had been instructed to submit would be to refuse to recognize that many of those who had voted for that resolution had not anticipated that the Secretary-General's note would be passed over.

17. If the preliminary questions were not settled, there would not only be no hope of success for the conference, but there would not be any imaginable prospect that it would even meet. In those circumstances, if there were no political conference at all, the Colombian proposal could not be justified on the ground that the political conference should not be impeded. The most important need of all was to remove the obstacles in the way of the conference. There would perhaps be some who would allege that that opinion was expressed for the purposes of propaganda, but that was far from true; the Soviet delegation in trying to remove those obstacles had no other aim in view than to safeguard the interests of peace. The attitude of those who wished to wait and see what happened was purely negative. The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France had stated that they realized those obstacles should disappear, but they were not doing anything to that

end. They were adopting what might be described as an attitude of non-resistance to evil, or were trying to treat the United Nations as a sleeping beauty.

18. Those same representatives, like other members of the group of the sixteen Powers, had stated that the political conference itself could decide on its own membership. He wondered, however, on what instructions those representatives would act at the political conference, and whether there were instructions permitting them to express their agreement with the proposals of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. It appeared that there were none, since the United States representative at the meeting of the General Committee (88th meeting) had not thought fit to reply to the question put to him by the Soviet representative and had let it be understood that the instructions of the United States representative at the political conference would be based directly on the General Assembly resolution of 28 August 1953 (711 A (VII)). In those circumstances it was impossible to imagine how the present difficulties could be overcome.

19. Moreover, the representative of Colombia, while stating that the Committee was not obliged to take up the Korean question since the conference was to convene on 28 October, had forgotten that there were obstacles preventing the convening of the conference and that the Committee should do everything possible to remove those obstacles. However, he proposed, on the contrary, that the Committee do nothing and in the meantime discuss the questions of Morocco and Tunisia.

20. The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France had said in the Security Council¹ that those questions were not within the competence of the United Nations. The Greek representative had even claimed that they were not urgent. It was apparent that those Powers had changed their minds for reasons of opportunism.

21. For all those reasons the USSR delegation insisted that the first item on the agenda should be the Korean question. However, there was another reason in favour of the Soviet Union's point of view, namely, the repeated statements of Syngman Rhee and his supporters that South Korea would seek to unify the whole country by force unless the political conference reached positive results in ninety days.

22. The Charter required the United Nations to intervene in situations of that kind. The USSR proposal on "Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations" was closely linked with the situation in Korea. Even if it should not be placed at the top of the list, it should at least be discussed immediately after the Korean question. Some persons would claim that it merely contained proposals that had been submitted before and rejected on several occasions. However, that was a specious argument. If the Committee had followed such a course of reasoning at its seventh session, it would have refused to discuss again proposals on the Korean question which had not produced positive results at the previous session, and there would have been no armistice. Moreover, the new Soviet proposals presented not only certain familiar aspects but also new aspects organically linked with

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Seventh Year*, 574th and 575th meetings.

those. It was important that the Committee should study them as soon as possible in order to lessen international tension. The urgency of the question was illustrated by the agreement recently concluded between the United States of America and the Fascist Franco Government, an agreement known to be directed against the USSR. The Soviet proposals ought therefore to be made the second item on the agenda.

23. The letter from the President of the General Assembly (A/C.1/742) made excellent suggestions regarding the order of the other items on the Committee's agenda, and the USSR delegation supported it wholeheartedly.

24. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia) said that the Committee must first decide two points: one, whether to place the Korean question first on the agenda, and two, if it decided not to do so, whether it was competent to decide at a later stage to discuss the Korean question whenever it saw fit.

25. No one denied that the Korean question was urgent and important, as the USSR representative had declared. However, the delay in convening the political conference was due chiefly to the reply of the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans to the United Nations proposal. It might well be asked whether they had some hidden intention to prevent the convening of the conference before 28 October, in order to be able to claim later that the provisions of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement had lapsed and had thus ceased to govern the conference and its composition. Nevertheless, the fact remained that the United Nations had appointed its representatives and that the only thing left to be done was for the other party to name its representatives. However, nothing had been done to that effect so far. In the circumstances the USSR representative's basic argument seemed to turn against him, since the other party alone could solve the difficulties which stood in the way of the meeting of the political conference.

26. The USSR attitude was obviously intended to renew the discussion in the General Assembly in order to encourage dissensions and reap from them all possible political advantage.

27. The United States had recently addressed communications to the Chinese Communists (A/2483) and the North Koreans (A/2488). Those communications had so far remained unanswered, and the Australian delegation saw no reason to study the Korean question again until a reply had been received. Then only would it be advisable to consider whether the proposals on the political conference adopted by the General Assembly should be amended.

28. For those reasons the Australian representative was willing to support the Colombian proposal, with the following reservations. According to rule 122 of the rules of procedure, if the Colombian proposal were adopted it could only be amended later by a two-thirds majority. The Australian delegation felt, however, that the priority of this agenda item should be alterable by a simple majority of the members present and voting. It was therefore submitting an amendment to that effect, not only for the reasons stated but also in order to prevent the communist Governments of China and North Korea from claiming that the Committee had deliberately prevented itself from discussing the Korean question before 28 October.

29. The CHAIRMAN thought that the Australian proposal was not an amendment properly speaking. In his opinion it defined the scope of the decision which the Committee would take regarding the place on the agenda to be allocated to the Korean question. Unless the Australian proposal raised any objections, therefore, it would be regarded as incorporated implicitly in the Committee's decision.

30. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) wished to emphasize that the Chairman's statement did not imply any decision with regard to the Australian amendment, since the wording of the amendment had not yet been submitted to the Committee in writing.

31. The CHAIRMAN said that the matter was obviously one for the Committee to decide.

32. Mr. BADAWI (Egypt) supported the proposal to give priority to the Moroccan and Tunisian questions, of which he stressed the importance and urgency. He also agreed with the Greek representative that the discussion should be postponed for a few days, since the heads of the delegations particularly concerned with those problems, not expecting that the agenda would be altered, had not yet arrived. While awaiting their arrival, the Committee could consider another item on the agenda.

33. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) said that the agenda proposed by the representatives of Colombia and Greece would be satisfactory to his delegation. Every possible effort had been made to allow the Communists to play their indispensable part in preparing for the future political conference. Unfortunately they had, in reply to a proposal concerning the date and a selection of three possible meeting-places, first changed their position with regard to the composition of the conference and then engaged in dilatory tactics with the purpose of bringing about a reconsideration of the decisions taken a month before. To provide every possibility of success, the United States Government had even proposed to the opposite side that a representative should be sent to make direct contact with the communist negotiators. The offer had been rejected by the representative of the Soviet Union without even troubling to consult the Chinese Communists.

34. The Korean question had been very thoroughly debated recently, and it therefore seemed inappropriate to start a debate on Korea in the United Nations while negotiations were still pending. If further developments so required, that item could always be discussed earlier.

35. A second agenda item which might well be postponed was the complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Government of the Republic of China. The United States delegation had reason to believe that the present situation would very shortly change. It might therefore be hoped that the tension now prevailing in that area would soon decrease.

36. The new item proposed by the Soviet Union being directly related to the question of disarmament, the Colombian proposal rightly placed it immediately after the consideration of the report of the Disarmament Commission.

37. The United States delegation saw no objection to granting the Egyptian representative's request that the debate on the Moroccan and Tunisian questions should be deferred for some days.

38. Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) expressed his delegation's full support of the Soviet proposal that priority should be given to the Korean question. While fully recognizing the urgency of the Moroccan and Tunisian questions, there could be no denying that in the present international situation the peaceful and final settlement of the Korean conflict remained the most urgent problem. There were grounds for wondering why the representative of Australia, who had admitted the exceptional importance of that question, was trying to represent the Soviet proposal as a tactical manoeuvre. The conclusion of the armistice did not settle the entire Korean problem. There were other problems before the First Committee, such as the achievement by peaceful means of the unification and economic rehabilitation of Korea. The existence of a resolution (711 A (VII)) adopted in the face of opposition from the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China, relating to the convening of a bilateral political conference, did not exempt the General Assembly at its present session from the obligation to continue its work for the settlement of the Korean problem. The Assembly's responsibility was all the more obvious since it would have to examine new documents, such as the Secretary-General's note (A/2480) and the cables from the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (A/2469 and A/2476 and Corr.1).

39. In submitting its proposal, the Colombian delegation appeared to have forgotten that the question of the political conference had not been settled with the full agreement of both parties. When the Soviet Union had proposed the inclusion of the question of the political conference on Korea in the agenda of the current session, certain delegates had opposed it, pointing out that there was already a Korean question on the agenda which would make possible the consideration of all aspects of that problem. Now, however, an effort was being made to find new arguments which would make it possible to defer the solution of the problem. The success of the political conference could, however, be ensured only by an immediate consideration of the disputed issues.

40. The Polish delegation would also support the Soviet proposal to place the question of measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations second on the agenda. That proposal was founded on the postulate that the conclusion of an armistice in Korea would make concerted measures possible on all questions which were at the present time straining relations between peoples. The consideration and adoption of the Soviet proposal would create an atmosphere of confidence which would facilitate the settlement of the other questions on the agenda.

41. Mr. UNDEN (Sweden) recalled that his delegation had voted in favour of the Soviet proposal to place the Korean question on the agenda. The General Assembly ought to make clear that it had not delegated all its powers to the sixteen countries which had participated in the defence of South Korea. Inasmuch as the General Assembly had decided to study the report

of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which might serve as a basis for further and more general discussions, and inasmuch as the Secretary-General might furnish additional information which would call for a fresh debate, the Swedish delegation considered it premature to reopen now the debate on the Korean question and useless to place it on the agenda. It also thought that the Committee should await the reply from the Central Government of the People's Republic of China to the communication addressed to it recently by the United States on behalf of the sixteen Governments. It was understood that if changes occurred calling for intervention by the First Committee, the agenda could be changed.

42. Mr. DAVID (Czechoslovakia) gave his unreversed support to the Soviet proposal. Though the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement was in itself a great success for certain peace-loving nations, the United Nations still had a decisive part to play in the final settlement of the problems arising from it. According to the Armistice Agreement a political conference was to be held not later than 28 October 1953. Steps should be taken at once to create a climate favourable to its success. Owing to the belligerent attitude of Syngman Rhee, there was a particularly urgent need for the settlement of related questions. Only a successful outcome of the political conference could prevent the resumption of hostilities in Korea, and it was the duty of the General Assembly to proceed forthwith to remove any obstacles which might from the outset prove fatal to the success of the impending talks. That was why it was important for the First Committee to consider the problem at once.

43. On the other hand, there was the question whether the General Assembly intended to examine the cables addressed to it by the Chinese communist and North Korean Governments, which quite rightly stressed the importance of the part to be played by the Asiatic countries in the political conference. The success of that conference depended to a large extent on the participation of those States. A group of countries under the leadership of the United States was opposing the examination of the question by the General Assembly. If the Assembly refused to consider the proposals contained in the Chinese and Korean cables, the conclusion might be drawn that, contrary to the provisions of the Charter, the United Nations preferred to set aside a problem which it ought to settle. Such an attitude would also be contrary to the provisions of resolution 711 C (VII) in which the General Assembly implicitly expressed a wish to examine the replies of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China concerning the membership of the political conference.

44. The General Committee, after considering the Soviet proposal to place an additional item on the agenda, had rejected it (88th meeting) on the ground that the Korean question was already included in the agenda. It was now proposed to postpone consideration of that question to a date later than 28 October, that is, after expiration of the period required for the convening of the political conference. Such an action, which would be contrary both to the Charter and to decisions taken by the General Assembly, evidently had no other object than to wreck the political conference.

45. With regard to the membership of the conference, it could not be expected, in the atmosphere of tension at present prevailing between the belligerents, that the sixteen States which had fought under the flag of the United Nations would modify the terms of General Assembly resolution 711 A (VII). It was therefore logical for the General Assembly to discuss the composition of the conference. The Assembly's authority was all the more necessary because the aggressive statements of Syngman Rhee would make the work of the conference more difficult. If under pressure of the United States Government's attempts to impose its own views, which reflected the desire of certain warmongering circles to resume the war in Korea, the General Assembly wilfully ignored the views of the People's Republic of China, there would be no chance of reaching an equitable solution and the prestige of the United Nations would suffer considerably. It was for those reasons that the Czechoslovak delegation insisted that the Korean question should be placed first on the First Committee's agenda.

46. The Czechoslovak delegation also agreed with the Soviet proposal that the item entitled "Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations" should be considered as soon as possible. Such a proposal, which would make it possible to prohibit unconditionally the use of weapons of mass destruction, and which would lead to the reduction by one-third of the conventional armaments and armed forces of the five permanent members of the Security Council, would be a step towards consolidating international peace. The Soviet proposals would also make it possible to avert the threat to all peace-loving States caused by the creation of a huge network of military bases in the territories of many countries, and to condemn the war propaganda organized by certain ruling circles for the purpose of arousing hatred amongst the peoples.

47. The United Nations would thus have an opportunity to prove to the world that its activity was truly directed above all to the consolidation of international peace and security in conformity with the Charter.

48. U MYINT THEIN (Burma) said that because of the breaking-off of the discussions at Bangkok his delegation had hardly any hope of a favourable development of the situation between the Governments of the Republic of China and the Union of Burma. He therefore asked the representative of the United States not to propose that the item concerning the Union of Burma be relegated to the end of the agenda. Furthermore, this question seemed to be the only one on the agenda likely to be settled rapidly.

49. Mr. LODGE (United States of America), speaking on a point of order, pointed out to the Burmese representative that under the proposal before the Committee the Burmese item would be fourth and not last on the agenda.

50. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) urged that priority should be given to the Korean question and to the question concerning measures designed to avert the threat of a new world war and reduce tension in international relations, questions which reflected most pressing aspects of international relations at the present time. No one was surprised that some countries were attempting to prevent consideration of these questions. The delegations of the same countries had succeeded before,

during the sixth session, in preventing any discussion of the Korean question, even though it had been on the agenda.

51. The Australian representative had attempted to blame the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea for the difficulties encountered in convening the political conference. In fact a number of delegations, including that of Australia, had attempted to prevent the General Assembly from re-examining the proposals contained in the telegrams sent by the Governments of the People's Republic of China and of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, that the conference should be a round-table conference with a larger membership including Burma, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Soviet Union. Those same delegations had opposed the inclusion in the agenda of the Secretary-General's note concerning the implementation of resolution 711 C (VII). The General Assembly should ensure that the political conference was organized in such a way as to enable a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem, on which the maintenance of peace in the Far East depended.

52. For those reasons the Ukrainian delegation supported the Soviet Union proposal.

53. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) recalled that, while speaking (440th plenary meeting) on the report of the General Committee, he had said that he did not consider it advisable to discuss the Korean problem first. Indeed, he was persuaded that a public discussion at the moment would certainly not be conducive to a settlement. If, arising out of the discussions which had taken place last August and very recently in the General Assembly, someone had any constructive proposals to make, it would be quite as simple to submit them through normal diplomatic channels as speedily as possible. At all events, it was to be hoped that Mr. Vyshinsky had not meant that the political conference would not meet. That would be a very serious and lamentable proposition. If, as it seemed, Mr. Vyshinsky wished to know or discuss publicly the instructions which might be given to the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France at the political conference, he could surely use the ordinary diplomatic channels. The Soviet Union representative's rejection of the two proposals submitted by the representative of the United States in the General Committee (88th meeting) was sufficient argument against discussing that matter in public at all, at least for the time being. A public debate especially at certain difficult stages, far from helping the settlement of a question, often retarded it.

54. The United Kingdom delegation therefore considered that, without excluding the possibility of a debate on that question at a later stage, it was not in the interest of peace to discuss that question as the first item on the agenda. It was of course understood that if this item were placed at the end of the list it might, if the need arose, be moved up. The United Kingdom delegation approved the proposal of the delegation of Colombia, amended if necessary in the light of the suggestions of the Australian delegation.

55. Mr. BADAWI (Egypt) proposed, as an amendment to the Colombian proposal to place the Moroccan and Tunisian questions first on the agenda, that debate on them should be postponed for about ten days.

56. The CHAIRMAN stated that, when the Committee had decided on the order of the items, he would make a proposal corresponding to the Egyptian one. Therefore, he asked the representative of Egypt, in order to avoid any confusion, to withdraw his proposal for the moment.

57. Mr. WEBB (New Zealand) thought it desirable that the political conference should begin as soon as possible. He would regard discussion of the Korean question as urgent only if he feared that the conference might not be held. If a delegation wished to transmit new documents or proposals, the ordinary diplomatic channels remained open. A repetition of the discussion that had taken place in the General Assembly during the preceding month might harm the political conference which was due to open on 28 October. For these reasons, the New Zealand delegation would support the Colombian proposal, subject to the amendment suggested by the Australian representative.

58. Mr. POPOVIC (Yugoslavia) considered that the question under consideration was both procedural and political, but mainly political. The basic attitude of the Yugoslav delegation was that the role of the United Nations could not be that of one military, political or ideological group pitted against another, but that of a universal organization charged with the task of safeguarding peace through collective measures.

59. During the discussion in the General Committee the Yugoslav representative had stated (88th meeting) that the Korean question should be given due priority in the discussion of the First Committee. No one was actually opposed to a public discussion; the only issue for the moment was when it should take place. Assuredly, none of the governments concerned would decide to assume responsibility for a postponement of the conference. For that reason the Yugoslav delegation, which did not see any danger in re-examining the question in the General Assembly, considered that the Assembly ought to continue to follow the progress of the Korean question directly and to try to exert its influence toward achieving a positive solution. The Yugoslav delegation did not insist that the Korean question should be placed first on the agenda, but considered it unusually important and insisted that it should be assigned a place befitting that importance.

60. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that to the weighty arguments which the head of the USSR delegation had advanced in support of his proposals, should be added the fact that world opinion considered it extremely important that the work of the political conference should be successful. The position defended by the United States in denying participation in the political conference to the representatives of neutral States was contrary to the conception generally held in all parts of the world. The First Committee and the General Assembly itself would be well advised to resume consideration of the question of Korea.

61. The Committee's attention should also be drawn to the provocative statements of Syngman Rhee, who, according to *The New York Times* of 28 September 1953, had officially announced his intention to resume the fighting if the political conference did not succeed within ninety days in its task of unifying Korea.

62. The Byelorussian delegation therefore thought that the Korean question should have priority on the agenda. It was also of the opinion that the second

place should be given to the item proposed by the USSR. The importance of that item was obvious, since its purpose was to prevent a new war of which millions of human beings would be victims.

63. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) protested against the statement made by the Australian representative and repeated by the United States representative that the replies received from the People's Republic of China (A/2469) and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (A/2476 and Corr.1) would annul paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement. That paragraph did not provide that the United Nations should renounce its rights under the Charter. The General Assembly was obviously entitled to present recommendations, as indeed it had done to both sides in its resolution of 28 August (711 (VII)). Thus the General Assembly had intervened: it had given its opinion on the way in which the political conference should be organized. Those were the views of the United Nations, and the fact that the sixteen States were not the only ones interested in the political conference made it still more necessary to consider any divergency of opinion on the organization of the conference. It was absurd to say that the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea were employing tactics designed to eliminate paragraph 60. First, the Assembly was not prevented by paragraph 60 from making recommendations; and secondly, the General Assembly, which had indeed made recommendations, had even received the replies to them drawn up by the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. Furthermore, there existed a report to the General Assembly on that matter, and nothing should hinder the Assembly from considering the question as a whole and not merely the composition of the political conference.

64. The USSR delegation proposed that the question of Korea should be considered immediately as a whole. It could not be claimed, therefore, that the USSR delegation wished to eliminate or change paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement. Nor could it be claimed that to discuss the whole question would be to pre-judge the issue. When Mr. Lodge said that the Soviet Union had rejected the proposals made to the representatives of communist China and North Korea to meet and discuss where the conference should be held, he was making a mistake. The fact was that the USSR had only expressed its opinion; and, so long as the two States exclusively concerned in the matter had not replied, it could not be said that the proposal had been rejected. It had also been argued that the problem of Korea should not be discussed so long as negotiations were in progress. At present, however, there were no negotiations in progress. The proposal that the Committee should adopt an agenda with the reservation that it could be modified later if necessary proved the weakness of the position of its sponsors. A proposal of that kind would make it possible to come back every day to the same question of procedure.

65. In the opinion of the USSR delegation priority should properly be given to a problem which, whatever might be said, was more important and more urgent than the others. When Mr. Lloyd asserted that for the Committee to adopt the Soviet proposal would mean that diplomacy was bankrupt because, according to him, public discussions were less effective than

conversations behind the scenes, it could be asked why the General Assembly had been discussing the matter for two and a half years. Mr. Vyshinsky felt that public debates produced as good results as secret negotiations: to oppose them consistently would be proof of bad faith.

66. Finally, the representative of the USSR stated that his delegation had never thought of discussing the powers or instructions given to the American representatives at the political conference. The USSR delegation did, however, wonder how it could be suggested that the political conference should study its own composition, and how that suggestion could be reconciled with General Assembly resolution 711 A (VII) in which the composition of the conference had already been determined. If the two parties were

to be empowered to agree on the composition of the conference, the representatives of the United States, France and the United Kingdom should say that they had no objection to that.

67. In short, the USSR delegation could not accept the view that the conference should decide its own composition, and was accused of hindering the convening of the conference. But the USSR was neither the People's Democratic Republic of Korea nor the People's Republic of China. When the USSR delegation asked the Committee to consider the replies of those two Governments, it was accused of trying to torpedo the political conference. To argue thus really did require a great deal of duplicity.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.