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 United Nations forces of bacterial warfare (*continued*) 135

Chairman: Mr. F. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium).

**Question of impartial investigation of charges of
 use by United Nations forces of bacterial war-
 fare (A/2406, A/C.1/L.66, A/C.1/L.67, A/C.1/
 L.68) (*continued*)**

[Item 24]*

1. Mr. Manu AMATAYAKUL (Thailand) said that, since Thailand had participated in the United Nations action in Korea to repel aggression, the accusation lodged by the Soviet Union against the United States of having waged bacterial warfare entailed an implicit charge against Thailand. Thailand had acceded to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and it would have been inconceivable for it to accept the use of germ weapons in an action in which its armed forces were directly involved.

2. Use of bacterial devices would have come immediately to the attention of the Thailand component of the United Nations armed forces and would have been duly reported to its Government. Thailand was therefore in the position to endorse categorically the statements of the United Nations Command to the effect that the charges of the use of bacterial weapons were a tissue of fabrications.

3. Use had been made of fake confessions of imaginary participation in germ warfare extorted from defenceless prisoners of war captured by the North Koreans and Chinese Communists. In the war against communist aggression in Korea there had been enough instances of valour and gallantry among men fighting for what they knew to be the right cause. But once these men were made captives, it was only natural that even the most courageous might lose complete control of themselves and make statements for which they could not be held responsible. The miracle was not that the Communists succeeded in extorting the few confessions they did obtain but rather that they were unable to break more human beings yet. The assertions to the contrary of the Soviet Union representative collapsed when one examined the nature of the testimony of repatriated prisoners of war telling of the treatment meted out to them by their captors. The Soviet representative had said that such testimony was obtained from the Americans by their own military

authorities under duress. But a study of the document circulated by the United States delegation showed that a great part of the testimony came from Americans who had miraculously succeeded in defeating the efforts of their captors and had persisted in their refusal to sign any fake confessions, so that they certainly had no retaliation by court martial to fear on their return to the United Nations side.

4. Under those circumstances, the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.67) was a mere stratagem calculated to obscure the facts and to justify the propaganda campaign on the alleged use of bacterial warfare. His delegation would therefore vote against the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.68). If the USSR was truly interested in eliminating weapons of mass destruction, it was necessary to see what safeguards it would be willing to accept. Consideration of that point was clearly a matter for the Disarmament Commission.

5. Mr. ECHEVERRI CORTES (Colombia) said that his country like many others was opposed to the use of bacterial weapons. Colombia had signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and had joined four other delegations in submitting draft resolution A/C.1/L.68 because it considered that the Disarmament Commission would thus be enabled to examine the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.67).

6. It should be stressed that the Unified Command had never used bacterial warfare for the very simple reason that it would have been impossible to infect any area without exposing the soldiers on both sides to the infection, especially as the fighting in Korea had taken place at very close quarters and there were large numbers of prisoners who could have been carriers of infection.

7. For that reason, and for the reasons stated by the United States and Cuban representatives, the Colombian delegation was convinced that the USSR's charges were merely a pretext for creating ill will towards the States unjustly accused of having made use of a method of warfare prohibited by international law. The Colombian delegation would therefore vote against the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.67).

8. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that when the question had first been raised by the United States at the seventh session the Ukrainian and other delegations had justifiably proposed (590th meeting) that representatives of North Korea and China should be invited to state their views so that the United Nations could consider the matter in an impartial manner. However, the United States had opposed that invitation. The question had then been examined in a one-sided and biased manner in violation of the Charter. It had been clear even at that time that the United States did not want an impartial investigation. It was interested only in developing its slanderous propaganda against the USSR.

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

9. At the present session, the United States sought to deceive public opinion by using statements by released prisoners repudiating their previous testimony. In the first place, it should be noted that many of those statements showed that the prisoners had not been subject to coercion during their captivity. With regard to certain prisoners' repudiation of their previous confessions, due regard should be paid to their fear of punishment for having revealed United States methods of warfare, especially as the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Wilson, had stated that soldiers making statements while prisoners of war would be subject to the provisions of military law. The statements by released prisoners were therefore a mere propaganda manoeuvre.

10. International tension had been decreasing for some time. The United Nations should therefore invite all States who had not yet done so to accede to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. If the Assembly issued such an appeal, it would undoubtedly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Geneva Protocol had become an important instrument of international law imposing political and moral obligations on States. Those who argued that it had lost some of its significance failed to recognize the facts; during the Second World War even the fascist States had not dared to violate the Protocol. The argument that the Protocol had lost some of its significance must be regarded as evidence of a desire to evade the obligations it imposed. The USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.67) was designed to prevent such dangerous action and the Ukrainian delegation would therefore vote for it.

11. Mr. Y. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the delegations representing countries which had taken part in the Korean war were seeking to justify the United States methods by repeating the fairy story that the war had been waged by the United Nations, when it was common knowledge that the war had been carried on by the United States under the flag of the United Nations. The arguments put forward were merely slanders, intended either to distort the meaning of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.67), or to prove that the confessions of the United States airmen had been extorted from them under duress. Yet, as the Polish, Byelorussian and other delegations had shown, United States newspapers had themselves admitted that the treatment of prisoners of war by the North Koreans and the Chinese had been in keeping with the Geneva Convention of 1949. Moreover, the American airmen taken prisoner had denied that they had been subjected to coercion. Colonel Frank H. Schwable had admitted that he had never been directly threatened with violence. The slanderous allegations of the United States that the testimony given while in captivity had been obtained under duress were shown to be mere fabrications.

12. Colonel Schwable had attempted to explain his testimony by saying that he had been subjected to an organized system of pressure. However, he himself had stated that the pressure had consisted of trying to convince him that the Korean war had been launched by South Korea with the support of the United States, that the delay in signing an armistice had been the result of the intransigence of the United States and that the United States had used particularly cruel methods of warfare. Plainly the so-called system of moral pressure had amounted merely to telling the

truth. There was therefore no need to dwell on the spuriousness of the argument that the American airmen had been forced to believe facts that were true.

13. Colonel Schwable had also claimed that he had made his statement, while in captivity, with the object of serving his country. That argument was not to be taken seriously. Nobody had ever considered that untruthful statements jeopardizing the honour of a country could be of service to that country. The United States military authorities had played the wrong card with their "faked testimony" and had failed utterly. Moreover, it was interesting to note that the idea of "faked testimony" had been put forward by the United States authorities even before the prisoners returned. For example, *The New York Times* on 8 September 1953 had indicated that the returning prisoners might render a service to their country and had explained how they should conduct themselves in repudiating the testimony they had given and in slandering the North Korean and Chinese authorities.

14. In the face of a difficult situation, the United States had been forced to use the statements of four unknown airmen who claimed to have been tortured while in captivity and to have refused to give testimony. It was not surprising that the United States had been able to find a number of persons, who were prepared, under the influence of the campaign of hatred against North Korea and communist China, to give slanderous testimony in order, presumably, to render a service to their country. That campaign of hatred was in full swing in the United States. The prisoners of war were being used in the United States to revive the cold war. "Brain-washing" was being done by means of political pressure of the kind that had made McCarthy notorious. Slanderous statements were being made regarding so-called communist imperialism, which was a contradiction in terms. The United States representative had gone so far as to distort completely the meaning of Lenin's statement on morality. He had taken words out of context and had disregarded the fact that Lenin had attached the greatest importance to ethics and morality in the new Soviet society.

15. Some representatives had stated that the Government of North Korea and the Chinese People's Republic had opposed an impartial study of the matter. Those statements were untrue. In fact those Governments had on several occasions requested the United Nations for an opportunity to take part in the debates on the question. Those requests had remained unanswered and the representatives who now claimed that North Korea and China had opposed an impartial study were the very ones who had rejected their request to take part in the debate. Moreover, experience had shown that when the United Nations adopted a resolution affecting France, for example, and the French delegation had not taken part in the debate, the French Government had refused to implement it. Why then should a different solution be adopted in a similar case? In any case, it was clear that the United States, not North Korea or China, had prevented an impartial study of the question.

16. The USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.67) would help to strengthen international peace and security by consolidating the principle whereby Member States pledged themselves not to engage in bacterial warfare. The opponents of the draft resolution made use of contradictory arguments. Some of them claimed that

it had been introduced in order to divert attention from the statements of the released American airmen, while others claimed that the draft resolution was not new. The Greek representative, for example, had argued (650th meeting) that the value of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 had been very much weakened by the reservations made by the USSR. He appeared to forget that the right of a government to make reservations to a convention at the time of ratification had been long established. Moreover, those reservations in no way impaired the validity of the Protocol. Finally, other States had made identical reservations, among them the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Iceland, Iraq, India, Czechoslovakia and the Netherlands.

17. The opponents of the USSR draft resolution were seeking to attain their ends by devious means. They proposed that the draft resolution should be transmitted to the Disarmament Commission. It would be remembered, however, that it was the Soviet Union which had proposed consideration of the question by the Commission and asked that bacterial warfare should be prohibited and that appropriate steps should be taken to that end. Yet its proposal had been rejected by those who now proposed that the new USSR resolution should be transmitted to the Disarmament Commission. The five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.68) was obviously an attempt to shelve the USSR draft resolution permanently.

18. The USSR delegation considered that the General Assembly should take a decision with regard to bacterial warfare. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 was a far-reaching instrument which should be binding on all civilized peoples. The recommendation which the Assembly should adopt did not necessitate any further investigation. The action involved, though simple, was important to the maintenance of international peace and security. In any event, it was unnecessary to refer the question to the Disarmament Commission. The USSR delegation therefore hoped that its draft resolution would be supported by the First Committee.

19. Dr. MAYO (United States) reserved the right to reply later to the statements made by the Ukrainian and USSR representatives. He wished to state, however, that the USSR had once again proved that the big lie was part of communist technique. It was reported that twenty-one cinemas in Moscow were currently showing a film called *Silver Dust* in which the villains were all Americans plotting horrors against the USSR. As the film industry in the USSR was a government monopoly, that production was directly traceable to the Soviet Government itself. For many years, that government had been conducting a campaign of hatred against the United States. The Prime Minister of the USSR, Mr. Malenkov, had stated on 15 March 1953 that the USSR intended to pursue a peaceful policy. In August, he had made a statement to the effect that there was no outstanding issue which could not be settled peacefully between the USSR and the United States and had added that his Government continued to stand for the peaceful co-existence of the two systems. Nevertheless, in direct contravention of those solemn statements, the new campaign of slander was being launched by the USSR against the United States. By persisting in such propaganda, the Government of the USSR was digging still deeper the gulf of distrust between the two countries.

20. Mr. Y. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that, during the four years he had spent in the United States, dozens of films slandering the Soviet Union had been shown. That fact showed where the responsibility for conducting a campaign of hatred really lay. He reserved the right to reply later to the United States representative's statement.

21. Mr. KYROU (Greece), in reply to the USSR representative, said that in his previous statement he had stressed that the USSR reservations to the Geneva Protocol had been similar to those made by France and the United Kingdom; he had also said that the USSR did not have the right to demand the ratification of the Protocol until it withdrew its charges, charges which would suggest that those reservations had been made for other purposes.

22. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the USSR representative, like all other members of the Committee, had the right to reply at a subsequent meeting. In the meantime, he would open the discussion of the draft resolutions before the Committee.

23. Mr. M. S. WILLIAMS (United Kingdom) read the five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.68) and reminded representatives of his delegation's statement at the 649th meeting to the effect that the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.67) had been submitted in order to distract attention from the refusal of the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to submit the charges to impartial investigation, from the absurdity of the allegations themselves and from the brutal methods used to extract the confessions. The USSR draft resolution would be more appropriately discussed by the Disarmament Commission.

24. The value of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 must obviously depend upon the good faith of the signatories. The United Kingdom had ratified the Protocol and would scrupulously observe it. Nevertheless, certain governments had signed the Protocol with reservations; the Soviet Union, like the United Kingdom, had stipulated that if it were attacked by a State with bacterial weapons, it would reserve the right to retaliate in like manner. For two years, the Soviet Union had falsely accused the United States of using bacterial weapons. Thus, it had only to declare that its opponents were using bacterial weapons to be released from its obligations under the Protocol. It would therefore seem apparent that only a limited security could be assured by the mere signing of such an instrument.

25. The proper course was for this matter to be considered in the Disarmament Commission. There, it should be possible to work out some plan for the control of all weapons of mass destruction, including bacterial weapons. Such a plan would be far more effective than a simple prohibition supported by no control system. If the Soviet Union genuinely desired to ban bacterial warfare it would have ample opportunity to prove its good intentions in the Commission.

26. The United Kingdom delegation asked, under rule 130, that the five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.68), which was in the nature of a procedural motion, should be voted upon before the Soviet draft resolution. If the five-Power draft resolution were approved it would obviously be inappropriate for the Committee

to prejudge whatever decision the Disarmament Commission might wish to take, by voting on the substance of the Soviet draft resolution.

27. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico) pointed out that resolution 706 (VII) was still in force. Hitherto, the accusers had refused to allow the commission of investigation provided for in that resolution to carry out its task. As long as they refused, the charges must be regarded as absolutely false. The Mexican delegation would therefore abstain from voting on the USSR draft resolution. It would, however, vote for the five-Power draft resolution, because it considered that it was for the Disarmament Commission to deal with any problems relating to the regulation of armaments.

28. Mr. Hsioh-Ren WEI (China) stated that he would vote against the USSR draft resolution and for the five-Power draft. The USSR proposal was a diversionary tactic by the USSR and, moreover, was an indirect attempt to bring about the censure of the United States by the General Assembly. Moreover, the reservations made by the USSR to the Geneva Protocol had destroyed the purposes of that instrument, since under those reservations whenever the USSR wanted to employ bacterial warfare it would manufacture false accusations. As a member of the Disarmament Commission the USSR could present concrete proposals to that body, but the Assembly could not accept mere declarations and paper agreements. If the USSR was sincere in its desire to prohibit bacterial warfare, it should immediately withdraw its reservations to the Geneva Protocol and accept the necessary safeguards to ensure effective elimination of the use of bacterial weapons. The Chinese delegation would support the five-Power draft resolution and shared the United Kingdom representative's view that that text should be voted on first, in view of its procedural character.

29. Mr. PEREZ PEROZO (Venezuela) said that his Government had never lent credence to the charges against the United Nations forces in Korea, both because of the moral qualifications of the sixteen Member States which had taken part in the joint action and because of the communist Governments' refusal to accept an impartial investigation. It had had other reasons too for holding to that view. He had therefore hoped that a draft resolution would be submitted declaring the charges false. He was sorry that that had not been done. That being so, he would vote for the five-Power draft resolution, as he believed that the USSR draft resolution came within the purview of the Disarmament Commission.

30. Mr. NINCIC (Yugoslavia) observed that his Government, as a signatory to the Geneva Protocol, was obviously prepared to ask States which had not done so also to accede to it. The context in which the USSR proposal had been submitted, however, was apt to give it a far broader significance than its wording would suggest. It would condemn a country without proof and without impartial investigation. Indeed, it was even doubtful whether that proposal was in order in connexion with the agenda item before the Committee. He hoped that no vote would be taken on it; if it was put to the vote, he would abstain.

31. He would have voted for the five-Power draft resolution had he not felt that it prejudged the Disarmament Commission's decisions and even any decision the Assembly might take on that body's future

work. He would therefore abstain on that draft resolution also.

32. Mr. ABDEL-RAZEK (Egypt) said that he was sorry that some sections of the Press should have construed the silence of the representatives of the African and Asian group during the debate as a sign of timidity towards the Soviet bloc or as an expression of displeasure at the attitude of certain Powers with regard to the Tunisian and Moroccan questions. Like the other members of the African and Asian bloc, his country's objective was solely freedom, peace and prosperity. Actuated by such concepts of impartiality and conciliation, his country had agreed to become a member of the commission for investigation set up by General Assembly resolution 706 (VII). It had hoped that the proposed investigation would have been accepted by all and would have reached such conclusions as would have consolidated peace and good relations among nations. The debate which had just occurred had, however, taken such a course that the Egyptian delegation had thought it better to remain on the side lines, and it would abstain on both the draft resolutions. It earnestly hoped that the atmosphere would clear soon and that the peace negotiations in Korea would be successful.

33. Mr. Y. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that the reservations made to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 by several States had strengthened rather than weakened its value and scope, as he had said in a previous statement. The United Kingdom representative's argument in that connexion could not be taken seriously.

34. The good intentions of the USSR, to which the United Kingdom representative had referred, were directed to the benefit of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which contained a clause to the effect that parties to it must urge all States to sign or ratify it. The USSR had submitted many proposals in the League of Nations for the strengthening and expansion of the scope of the Protocol, as could be seen from the report of the Committee of Twelve (A/AC.50/3) established by General Assembly resolution 496 (V).

35. It had taken a similar position in the Security Council and the Disarmament Commission the previous year. Its recent efforts had been opposed by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and certain other States. The USSR delegation now deemed it necessary that the matter should be considered by the General Assembly, but it seemed clear that the position of those countries' representatives remained the same as it had been in the previous year. The sole aim of the proposal to transmit the USSR draft resolution to the Disarmament Commission was to bury it. The General Assembly had every reason to take a decision on that draft resolution, the more so as it dealt with a subject that required neither investigation nor further study.

36. With regard to the United Kingdom representative's proposal that the five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.68) should be voted on first, the contention that it was of a procedural nature was groundless. The five-Power draft was a substantive one; the Soviet draft (A/C.1/L.67), having been submitted first, should be voted on first, under rule 130 of the rules of procedure. The five Powers were trying to defer consideration of the subject in order to prevent a decision

being taken. For several years the United States and certain other States backing it had refused to take specific steps to prohibit the use of the atomic weapon and other weapons of mass destruction. The effect of that opposition had been to delay the solution of the question of prohibiting bacterial weapons. But the Geneva Protocol of 1925, an international agreement signed by forty-eight States, already existed and formed part of the international law binding on all civilized nations. Thus, the argument that the absence of a decision to prohibit the atomic weapon prevented the General Assembly from taking a decision of the prohibition of the bacterial weapon was untenable. The Assembly must invite States which had not acceded to the Geneva Protocol or, having acceded, had not yet ratified it, to do so, without waiting for a settlement of the other points. Actuated as it was by these considerations of principle, the Soviet Union delegation was pressing for the vote to be taken on its draft resolution first, as it had been submitted first.

37. The CHAIRMAN said that under the rules of procedure it was for the Committee itself to decide whether to vote on draft resolutions in an order other than that in which they had been submitted.

38. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia) thought that the five-Power draft resolution should be put to the vote first. He shared the regret of the Venezuelan representative that the Committee had not received a draft resolution condemning as false the charges that United Nations forces had used bacterial weapons. The USSR draft resolution was not intended to achieve a decision on the necessity for acceding to the Geneva Protocol but to divert the attention of the Committee from the falseness of the charges made by the USSR. If that draft resolution was put to the vote first, his delegation would vote against it.

39. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland), supporting the USSR draft resolution, expressed his conviction that the Assembly, if it accepted the draft, would be acting in conformity with the principles of the Charter. An appeal to the countries which had not yet done so, to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 would have very valuable results in the present circumstances. During the debate, members of the Committee had spoken of everything except bacterial warfare. For example, the United States representative had sought to prove that the depositions made by American officers concerning their participation in bacterial warfare had been extorted from them under duress. The efforts of the United States representative had completely failed and he had been compelled to revive an old story of atrocities, dating from 1951, which was already recognized as completely false.

40. The Polish delegation saw no objection to the proposal to refer the Soviet Union draft resolution to the Disarmament Commission. The wisest plan, however, would be to adopt the Soviet Union proposal since it would strengthen the work of the Disarmament Commission and, at the same time, would confirm General Assembly resolution 41 (I) taken in 1946 concerning the absolute necessity for prohibiting all weapons of mass destruction.

41. To allege, as the Australian representative had done, that the purpose of the USSR draft resolution was vicious, was to undermine the belief of peoples in the ability of the United Nations to prohibit weapons

of mass destruction. The same representative had regretted that the charges made by the Soviet Union had not been condemned as false, but had opposed an impartial investigation by voting against the proposal to invite representatives of the Chinese People's Republic and the Democratic Republic of Korea to take part in the discussion and in the investigation.

42. The allegation that the Soviet Union draft resolution was directed against the United States should also be refuted. It neither mentioned nor condemned any State and its only aim was to secure recognition of the necessity for prohibiting the use of bacterial weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. It was true that the United States was one of the countries which had not yet ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925. That could not be explained, as certain delegations had sought to do, on the grounds of technical difficulties. In that connexion, he would merely remind representatives that in 1926 Senator Tyson had stated in the United States Congress that the idea of rejecting one of the most efficient weapons that the United States possessed appeared absolutely absurd to him. It should also be stressed that the withdrawal of the Geneva Protocol from the United States Senate to which it had been submitted for ratification had coincided with discussion of an appropriation of \$6,000,000 for the purpose of developing bacterial weapons. Major General Waitt, Chief of the Chemical Corps of the United States Army, had stated in that connexion that the potentialities of bacterial warfare were of the same order as those of the atomic bomb, and that it had the additional advantage of not destroying material. Those two statements could only increase the suspicion that certain States were preparing bacterial weapons for the purpose of using them in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and other international conventions.

43. The adoption of the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.67) would not prevent the Disarmament Commission from dealing further with the matter within the general framework of the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations had encountered great difficulties in drafting new conventions on such prohibition. It was surely better in those conditions to strengthen an existing instrument which had proved useful during the last twenty years.

44. The United Kingdom proposal to give priority to the five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.68) was merely an attempt to extricate delegations from the embarrassing position of having to take a stand for or against an appeal to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol. The exception to the rule that draft resolutions should be put to the vote in the order in which they had been submitted concerned only exceptional cases where it was necessary to give priority to a given draft resolution. Such a necessity had not arisen in the present discussion and the general rule laid down in rule 130 of the rules of procedure should be followed. Any other procedure would constitute an attempt to avoid a vote which would demonstrate that certain delegations were in favour of developing and using bacterial weapons and not of prohibiting them. He called upon members of the Committee to support the USSR draft resolution which would allow a constructive result to be achieved from a debate in which attempts had been made to sow hatred against certain peoples, particularly the peoples of North Korea and China.

45. Mr. DAVID (Czechoslovakia) thought that rule 130 of the rules of procedure should be strictly applied and that the USSR draft resolution should be put to the vote first. That order of voting was desirable not only for procedural reasons, but because the USSR draft resolution responded to the desires of all civilized nations and the aspirations of all peace-loving peoples. The arguments against that draft resolution put forward by certain delegations were intended to allow the use of procedural manoeuvres to shelve it after it had been referred to the Disarmament Commission. The Czechoslovak delegation considered that the use of bacterial weapons should be prohibited. It would therefore press for a vote to be taken on the Soviet Union draft first and would also vote for the draft resolution itself.

46. Mr. MAZA (Chile) stressed that the gist of the question before the Committee was that the United Nations armed forces had been charged with the use of bacterial weapons in Korea; that those charges had been supported by statements by the enemy authorities and depositions by captured United States airmen; that those airmen, on their return, had stated that their testimony had been extorted from them; that the USSR had submitted a draft resolution inviting all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol, a proposal intended to censure the United States; and, finally, that communist China and North Korea had refused to co-operate in an impartial investigation of the charges. In that connexion he noted that no one, not even a prisoner, had ever accused his country of his own free will. A traitor to his country or to his country's allies remained a traitor whether he was a prisoner or not. A political assembly was not legally competent to rule on a matter which should be the subject of an impartial investigation.

47. In the circumstances, an invitation to certain countries to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol could not be a proper remedy for the horrors to which reference had so often been made during the discus-

sions. The five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.68) should be adopted by the Committee if there was genuine desire to throw light on the difficult problems involved and to punish the guilty parties.

48. Mr. CHAVES (Paraguay) felt that the only purpose of the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.67) was to cast suspicion on certain countries, especially the United States, by charging it with using methods of war prohibited by international law. From the beginning, world public opinion had been convinced of the falsity of those charges. It should be stressed that the accusers had systematically refused, both in the Security Council and the General Assembly, to allow any international and impartial investigation. The inevitable conclusion was that the Communists, while making charges, were attempting to prevent the truth from being revealed. The world was shocked and indignant at the methods used to extract confessions from the prisoners of war. After the cases of Cardinal Mindszenty, Mr. Oatis, the newspaper correspondent, and others, it knew the methods of mental and physical torture used by the Communists. The USSR draft resolution should be studied against that sinister background. Its purpose was to divide, confuse and cast discredit on the United Nations action against the aggressor. His delegation would therefore vote against the draft resolution and for the five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.68).

49. Mr. SARPER (Turkey) considered that, if the debate about the false charges of bacterial warfare resulted in the adoption of the Soviet draft resolution, it would be tantamount to a condemnation of the United Nations. His delegation would vote against it if it was put to the vote. The five-Power draft resolution should be voted on first as it raised a previous question. The Committee could vote on the USSR draft only if the five-Power draft resolution was rejected.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.