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C O N T E N T S

	<i>Page</i>
The question of Morocco (<i>continued</i>)	31

Chairman: Mr. F. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium).

**The question of Morocco (A/2406 and Add.1,
A/C.1/L.60) (*continued*)**
[Item 57]*

1. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) said that many representatives could well understand the story of the occupation and the movement for the liberation of Morocco because they had had similar phases in their own history, when their people had been fighting for independence. In the Americas, people could remember the revolutions associated with the names of Washington, Bolivar and San Martin. In Asia and Africa, many people could remember the days when they had had, like the Moroccan representatives today, to sit as spectators while the League of Nations or the United Nations was dealing, directly or indirectly, with their respective causes.
2. The colonial countries had affirmed for decades that all those Asian and African peoples had not been fit for independence, while the dominated peoples did not believe such affirmations. The Moroccan people knew, as others had known before them, that independence had never been granted to a people, but had to be won by the force of arms.
3. The Charter of the United Nations, however, was a means to promote an orderly evolution towards emancipation, thereby saving the colonizer and the colonized the destruction and bloodshed attending the birth of liberty.
4. The Assembly was today confronted with these alternatives: it would either fulfil its mission effectively in assisting such an orderly evolution, or it could choose to discuss the question and then wrap itself in a cover of domestic jurisdiction or inaction. His delegation had chosen the first course with a view to replacing domination by free international co-operation.
5. The Syrian delegation was especially concerned with the Moroccan question because Morocco constituted a part of the Arab homeland with Syria as one of its other component parts. Thirty years ago, as the result of intertwined colonial processes, practically all that Arab homeland had been under one form of domination or another, but today more than half of it had been liberated. The future pointed toward the rebirth of Morocco as an Arab nation seeking to replace foreign domination by free international co-

operation with a view to contributing abundantly, as it had done in the past, to the civilization and culture of mankind.

6. In view of the strong ties of friendship binding the French and Syrian peoples, the Syrian delegation felt it its duty towards Morocco, France and its obligations under the Charter to contribute, in an objective manner, to the solution of the Moroccan question. If that attitude was understood by the French representatives, the Syrian delegation would be gratified. Otherwise, it would seek satisfaction in the fact that that attitude was understood and appreciated by a sizable sector of French public opinion and by men like Mr. Mitterrand, the French cabinet minister, who had resigned in protest against the policy of his Government towards Morocco.

7. Colonialism in general and particularly French colonial policy in Morocco was a malady which affected some great colonial Powers. The symptoms of that malady could be detected in French bloodshed beyond the seas, in the dilapidation of the treasures of its creativeness and toil and in internal dissensions and international tensions in a world already burdened with explosive problems.

8. Mr. Zeineddine sincerely regretted the absence of the French delegation. He would have preferred to think that France, true to its traditions, would have invited a free discussion of the problem so as to unveil the truth. Similarly, he would not have thought that those States which had brought the Czechoslovak question, the Iranian oil problem, the Cardinal Mindszenty case, the Korean question and many other questions to the United Nations, would be using various criteria for judging the scope of the Charter. Moreover, he would have liked to see the United Kingdom and the United States open the way in the Security Council for an investigation of the Moroccan situation in order to ascertain the truth. But that method was refused because of political opportunism and expediency. Surely, such a policy could not gain French adherence to NATO. Moreover, the issue was not only a French-Moroccan one. It was between France and fifteen Asian-African countries whose people had seen in the attitude of the Security Council a tendency to draw matters of national liberation and international justice into the vortex of the cold war. For that reason the people of those countries wondered about the efficacy of the United Nations and the sanctity of the Charter.

9. His delegation was disturbed that France, the United Kingdom and some others opposed the idea of the United Nations dealing with matters concerning national movements. It was also disturbed by the attitude of the United States which seemed to turn the United Nations into a forum for the discussion of such matters, but without the possibility of practical and tangible action even within the limits imposed by

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

the Charter. Those delegations seemed to forget that the United Nations was an Organization of States which met each year to harmonize international relations, and that it was the only substitute for the battlefield. The Charter was an international treaty under the terms of which countries had assumed mutual obligations which must be respected.

10. No one could really explain the fact that France and its supporters invoked domestic jurisdiction. Indeed, domestic jurisdiction, as the representative of the United Kingdom had implied (630th meeting), was one of the essential provisions of the Charter. However, there were two other relevant considerations. The first was that the question as to whether a matter was one of domestic jurisdiction or not could not be determined by an individual Member State, but only by the decision of the collectivity of Member States. It would be a dangerous precedent for an individual Member State to disagree with the decision of the majority. The second consideration was that the question of international competence in the Moroccan case had already been settled by the Assembly itself when it had discussed and taken a decision on the question.

11. The representative of Syria recalled that the Moroccan question was over half a century old. It had been born out of the colonial policies which had led colonial Powers to the path of expansion and ultimately, to a world war. In the light of such experiences, the Charter had made self-determination, instead of domination, a prerequisite for peace. At the time when European countries had extended their domination over most of Asia and Africa, Morocco alone had remained unsubmerged by the colonial tide. That fact had been indicative of the homogeneity of the Moroccan people, the astuteness of their foreign policy and the ability of Moroccan ambassadors in the various capitals of the world. In this connexion, mention should be made of the fact that Morocco was one of the first nations to recognize United States independence after Washington had made it a realization.

12. In 1904, however, France and the United Kingdom had taken an important step towards the *Entente cordiale* by agreeing that the former would introduce so-called reforms in Morocco and the latter would do likewise in Egypt. The course of events had made the destinies of those two Arab countries parallel. The issue of "reforms" had been the object of an international treaty and continued to be the central international issue of the Moroccan problem. During the growing Anglo-French harmony under the *Entente*, the German Kaiser declared that Germany was also interested in introducing reforms in Morocco. As a result of the international tension thus created, the Moroccan Government took the initiative in convoking an international conference which resulted in the Act of Algeciras of 1906. The object of that treaty was twofold. First, its object was to introduce non-political reforms in Morocco on a triple basis: (a) the sovereignty and independence of Morocco, (b) its territorial integrity and (c) its economic independence on a basis of equality. Secondly, its object was to associate the thirteen signatory Powers and to replace the secret Anglo-French *Entente* by a large community of nations. Again, the question of reforms was the central international issue and the object of the Act of Algeciras. No one could deny that from 1906 on those reforms were of an international character. Further-

more, the Act of Algeciras which was a multilateral, international treaty was neither repealed nor contested; it continued to be operative and to govern the present situation. Another multilateral treaty, to which France was a party, had been signed in 1945 at San Francisco. The Charter of the United Nations, though not dealing particularly with Morocco, influenced fundamentally the Moroccan situation by emphasizing and strengthening the sanctity of international treaties such as that of Algeciras, and by proclaiming the right of self-determination of peoples, the equality of nations and international justice, and the international responsibility of Member States in questions which are not essentially within their own domestic jurisdiction. Similarly, an international trend toward liberation had taken shape thereby freeing six hundred million people and putting an end to colonial imperialism. Such was the course of history which some countries refused to accept.

13. In the midst of events evolving out of the signing of the Act of Algeciras and the Charter of the United Nations there were two events worth noting, the Treaty of Fez of 1912 with the object of introducing reforms, and the deposition and banishment of the Sultan, Mohammed V, in September 1953, two days before the opening of this session, thereby enabling France to introduce so-called reforms not contemplated either by the Act of Algeciras nor by the Treaty of Fez. Those reforms, as the representative of Pakistan had asserted (629th meeting), amounted to modifying the whole international régime in Morocco, changing its status as a sovereign but protected State to a status which made of Morocco a colony in the French Union or empire. Thus, reforms had been the object of the treaty of 1904, of the intervention of the German Kaiser, of the Act of Algeciras of 1906, of the Treaty of Fez of 1912, and finally, new kinds of reforms had been imposed in 1953. Those unending and self-generating reforms constituted a confusing term which had been devised to conceal a policy of expansion, domination and oppression.

14. It was essential to analyse the extent of mutual obligations incurred by the parties to the Treaty of Fez of 1912. A close scrutiny of that treaty would reveal the following facts: (1) The treaty had been engendered by force; (2) The treaty, assuming that it was valid, did not extinguish Morocco as a sovereign State distinct from France; (3) The rights conferred upon France in Morocco derived from an international treaty, thereby negating the principle of French domestic jurisdiction in the case; and (4) The Treaty of Fez was only a link in the chain of international treaties related to the question. In the matter of reforms, its object and limitations were the same as those set forth in the principle of the Act of Algeciras. Moreover, the International Court of Justice, in its judgment rendered on 27 August 1952, had declared that the establishment of the French protectorate over Morocco by the Treaty of Fez did not involve any modification of the three principles of the Act of Algeciras.

15. The intervention of the United Nations in the Moroccan crisis was essential in order to bring about an orderly evolution through the process of real negotiation between Morocco and France. It was all the more necessary because the Act of Algeciras and the Treaty of Fez had no fixed time-limit. Therefore, the Treaty of Fez should last only the length of time

necessary to attain its objectives. Those objectives comprised the inauguration of a régime in Morocco based on internal order and security, thus making it possible to introduce reforms and to ensure the economic development of Morocco. The Treaty of Fez could not be eternal and should not be kept in force if its objectives were attained, nor if France pursued a policy directly opposed to those objectives. In the latter case, the very actions of France would constitute a reason for terminating the Treaty. However, should differences arise, as in the present situation, on the interpretation and attainment of those objectives, it would become the duty of both France and Morocco to solve those differences through discussion and negotiation. But when the two parties, or one of them, refused to negotiate, then the United Nations should try to bring about negotiations between them and arrange a time-limit. That was one of the reasons which led the thirteen Arab-Asian States to submit the draft resolution A/C.1/L.60.

16. France was undertaking actions and practising policies in Morocco in contravention to the spirit and letter of its treaty obligations. The first important step in French policy in Morocco was "pacification", a policy of occupation and direct rule. In that connexion, it should be recalled that when the French forces had in 1912 imposed on the Sultan the Treaty of Fez, it did not mean that the Moroccan people had acquiesced in the policy of occupation. Actual fighting had continued almost uninterruptedly for twenty-three years, obliging France to use several army divisions, as it did in 1926. Moreover, the fact that the Moroccan people had never acquiesced in French rule had been conceded by General Guillaume, the present French Resident-General in Morocco. The Moroccan people would not accept a political order unless it had a strong moral basis. That complex of "nationhood" and moral belief was the indication of a dynamic and dangerous factor in the present situation. Moreover, France should not have the illusion that Morocco was now curbed into final submission. If, as France had asserted, Morocco was completely pacified, then what was the need of an ever increasing police and military force, of measures equivalent to martial law which had been there for forty years, of the suppression of all liberties and the building of fortifications throughout Morocco? Was it on account of communism, a term so dear to the Americans? There was no communism in the Moroccan movement. The obvious reason was that incidents were happening daily so that gaols were filled with thousands of Moroccans; even the Sultan had lately been banished. In view of the gravity of the situation, it was ridiculous to hear some representatives imply that the discussions in the United Nations might incite the Moroccan population to disorderly actions.

17. The French forces in Morocco were not soldiers of the free world helping to maintain the policy of "collective security" in case of a world conflict. They were forces designed to help protect French interests in Morocco from the Moroccans. Moreover, the French civil and military comptrollers constituted the real authority in Morocco. Their command was upheld by the French army everywhere; they were organized in a hierarchy up to the Resident-General, who after the last reforms, would not be leaving any possibility of action to the Moroccan throne nor to the central Moroccan Government in their own home affairs. The

present régime of direct rule in Morocco was not only contrary to the Treaty of Fez but it prevented the country from developing the political machinery necessary for self-government mentioned in the United Nations Charter as the ultimate objective for dependent territories.

18. Another example was the over-burdening of the Moroccan budget by the cost of a double administration: a Moroccan one, which was only for show, and the real French one. Since the salaries of French officials constituted the greatest part of the budget, the Moroccan taxpayer was supporting an administrative set-up bent upon a policy of domination. Thus, the Moroccan people saw their budget drained to such an extent that there was no possibility of constructive measures of an economic, social or cultural nature. What little remained was used to support constructive measures intended to serve the French settlers. That policy of direct rule, lavish spending and so-called pacification might have enriched Morocco, but it had surely reduced to poverty the Moroccan people.

19. French policy in Morocco was also leading to the disruption of Moroccan unity and the undermining of its existence as a nation and of its Arab culture.

20. Moroccan national unity had been in existence from the ninth century until the advent of French rule in the nineteenth century. Indeed, French national unity and that of many other countries was much more recent and of less solid substance than that of Morocco. When the Arabs had migrated to Morocco in the seventh and eighth centuries, they had blended with the Berbers and other races in Morocco thereby forming one nation. That unity was due to two main factors: first, the intermingling, from the beginning, of Arabs and non-Arabs and their adoption of a common language, culture and law and secondly, the possession of a common heritage thirteen centuries old. Thus, today, Arabs and Berbers were practically indistinguishable except in some isolated localities. Even the notorious El-Glaoui was himself of Arab-Berber descent; that was also true of the Sultan and of millions of people. Indeed, there was more like-mindedness among the Moroccan people in their thinking, habits, religion, history, customs, language and other aspects of their life than in most other countries.

21. To judge from French policy in the last four decades, it would appear that France was faced with the choice either of replacing its colonial policy by one of free international co-operation, or seeking to undermine the existence of Moroccan as a nation, its unity and culture in order to ensure domination. Though the choice was a hard one, France had resorted to a policy which today proved to be wrong, inexpedient and impracticable. Mr. Zeineddine wished to discuss that policy and thereby explain some points of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.60).

22. On 11 September 1914, Morocco was arbitrarily divided into so-called Arab and Berber regions in order to encourage local tendencies, as opposed to the common life of the nation. Moreover, the Berber areas had to be de-Islamised and returned to the practice of pre-Islamic customs. That policy had continued for about fifteen years but had not been adequate to break the unity of the Moroccan people. Accordingly, the notorious Berber *dahir* had been proclaimed in 1930. In accordance with that decree, the Berber

population had been removed from Islamic jurisdiction and France had begun to establish purely Berber schools in which no Arabic was taught, though no general Berber language had ever existed before. Moreover, though the Berbers were Muslims, Islamic education was forbidden in almost all Berber schools which were taught mainly in French. The real reason behind the Berber decree was not the furthering of Berber interests but of French interests. Moreover, French educational policy in Morocco had been aimed at artificially isolating the Berber population and bringing them closer to the French tradition and language. This interpretation had been supported by Professor Gaudefr y Demombynes, an educational consultant to the French authorities in North Africa. Furthermore, it was significant that the so-called Berber regions were offering today the largest number of members of the Independence Movement, since the number of those from the so-called Berber regions gaoled or exiled was relatively greater than those from so-called non-Berber regions. Finally, it was interesting to note that wide military operations had had to be undertaken a few weeks ago concerning Beni Snassen and Tadla of the so-called Berber regions.

23. Another attempt to divide the country had been made by the creation of three types of regions, namely, civil, military and forbidden regions, thereby restricting the free circulation of the Moroccan people.

24. A further effort at breaking the unity of Morocco had been undertaken by encouraging and subsidizing fraternities to undertake schismatic activities. Those activities had been organized into a movement under the apparent leadership of the notorious Kettani, friend of El-Glaoui. Kettani and his movement had been declared non-Muslim by the highest religious authorities in all the world including that of El Karawiyeen in Fez and Al-Azhar in Cairo. He had also been condemned as a *Murtad* which in Muslim law was punishable with death. Such was the nature of those who had been portrayed as the pillars of belief. The famous French author Bourdet had written in the July issue of the *Temps Modernes* that those fraternities had been supported and subsidized by the French administration in Morocco because they constituted an element of division in the country. Professor Louis Massignon, a consultant on North African affairs was of the same opinion. The importance of those fraternities was not a religious one; their importance would become clear when one realized that they were little more than an element in the new pattern of government.

25. Finally, little if any, effort was being made to educate the Moroccan people, whereas much was being done for the French residents at the expense of the Moroccan taxpayer. Moreover, the educational process regarding Moroccans tended strongly towards assimilation by France. But the Moroccan people had reacted in a constructive manner to the dangers of such an educational policy. They had opened private schools financed by voluntary contributions. Until lately, all those schools had been closed by the authorities so that peace might reign in Morocco undisturbed by enlightenment. That national culture which was so heavily attacked was the Arab culture which had thrown its light on the darkness of the Middle Ages and helped create the European Renaissance.

26. Turning to the present pattern of government in Morocco, Mr. Zeineddine recalled the information presented to the Committee during the seventh session about the French residents, the caids and pashas, the revolt against the Sultan and the religious fraternities. He proposed to bring those elements together and present the situation as a whole.

27. After twenty-seven years of occupation, the French residents numbered only 125,000. Since World War II, however, they had increased to 425,000, about four per cent of the inhabitants of Morocco. The policy of French settlement had been officially instituted and was aided by various state measures. The colonists were favoured by the tax policy, paying only fifty per cent of the land tax while a Moroccan paid it in full. Thus, the settlers contributed only about five per cent of the budget. On the other hand, over fifty per cent of the expenditure from the Moroccan budget was on behalf of the French residents. They were assured of legal, administrative and financial facilities for the expropriation of land. Beginning first with public lands and those belonging to Muslim foundations and educational institutions or those which had no clear title, they had eventually begun expropriating private property. The result was that about twenty per cent of the good land was owned by about 6,000 Frenchmen. Any concessions for subsoil exploitation went mainly to the French and many high officials had an interest in those riches. The settlers enjoyed family allowances, social security and trade union rights which were denied to Moroccans who had to accept low wages and even the equivalent of forced labour. In education and health expenditures the French residents also received advantages. Eighty-two per cent of the funds for housing were used for the benefit of the French residents who constituted only four per cent of the populace and it should be remembered that the Moroccans provided ninety-five per cent of the tax money.

28. Some individual Moroccans who were friendly to the authorities received some left-over advantages. The French-created local chieftains and administrators and the heads of religious fraternities whom Mr. Zeineddine described as "the newly created feudals", received some share. The most notorious of these was El-Glaoui, the so-called leader of the Berbers. He was in fact only a government official who had become fabulously rich in office. His activities were notorious throughout North Africa and had been condemned as non-Muslim by the highest authorities of the Muslim world. Doctors of law in various Muslim communities had given authoritative opinions that he should be condemned to death. He was, however, a staunch friend of France, particularly of Marshal Juin whose policy had created many minor figures of a similar nature. In the years 1950 and 1951, there were recruited about 270 men who were made governors of districts or sub-districts and were called pashas or caids. The only qualification required of those officials was subservience to the Resident-General; knowledge, experience and loyalty were of no importance. The objections of the Sultan to those reforms had made him a prisoner in Corsica.

29. A mutual interest to exploit Morocco had developed between the French residents, the newly created feudals, and the heads of fraternities and was safeguarded by a large police force and army, measures tantamount to martial law and the suppression of

liberties and human rights. The French residents, however, were not satisfied and thought of instituting a régime similar to that in the Union of South Africa. They recognized, however, the fundamental difference in the situation. First, they were relatively few in number and were not Moroccans and secondly, they thought in terms of a separate state with a French army of occupation. They sought full political power in Morocco for their own ends.

30. The French residents had organized and to some extent were armed. They had amassed huge sums of money and conducted a strong lobby in Paris. They enjoyed real power in Morocco because the French officials were among their number and the Resident was, for all practical purposes, the executor of their policies. They were not Moroccan citizens, neither did they pursue the interests of France. They sought only their own privileges. In consequence, there had arisen a special system of government which was neither that of France as a state nor of the Moroccans as a people. The objective of the system was to maintain the privileges and interests of the residents, to increase their number, to destroy the existence of Morocco as a nation, its culture and to gain the support of a few Moroccans. Its practical programme had been carried out almost completely by the machinery of direct rule and military occupation. In their memorandum of 17 December 1952, the French residents had proposed the deposition of the Sultan. He had been deposed. They had proposed the removal of the heir to the Sultan. He had been removed. They had proposed an increase in the powers of the Resident-General. Those powers had in effect been increased. They had proposed implementation of the French plan of reforms. That had been put into effect after the deposition of the Sultan. Those reforms had no connexion with the interests of France or of Morocco but only of the French residents. There was no question of the consent of the governed.

31. The Sultan had long tried to act as a moderating power between the developing system of government and the discontent of his people. Moroccans had repeatedly presented proposals for real reform on which all Moroccan parties had agreed. Though the advocates of the plans might be in gaol, the plans themselves remained the guiding light of the Moroccan people. Under pressure from France and the French residents, the Sultan had had the choice of subjugating his throne to the new system or being removed. He refused to choose and called upon the French in a series of memoranda to negotiate a solution. Influenced by the residents, the French Government turned a deaf ear. The Sultan proposed a democratic representative régime with adequate guarantees for the acquired interests of the residents, but France refused because its policies were in the grip of the residents. The Sultan, however, continued his attempts at negotiations. Then an abortive revolt was staged at Fez in 1951. Efforts were made to force the college of *ulemas* to depose the Sultan, but the entire college upheld him. There followed another so-called revolt staged mainly by officials and civil servants with the support of para-military forces attached to the French troops. There was in fact no popular revolt. It was staged by the Resident-General in order that he might act as arbiter between the Sultan and El-Glaoui and to furnish an excuse to remove the Sultan. The responsibility of France was admitted by Edgar Faure, the

Minister of Finance, and by François Mitterrand, another cabinet minister, who had resigned in protest.

32. Whatever authority France had in Morocco was derived from international treaties. They contained nothing which authorized political changes. Only the social, economic and cultural reforms specifically mentioned in the treaties could be introduced and even they could be implemented only by the Sultan. The Sultan had sacrificed his throne to oppose the so-called reforms. He continued, however, to be the legitimate sovereign of all Morocco and was still recognized as such in the Spanish zone.

33. The reforms had been described by the representative of Pakistan (629th meeting) but, in that connexion, certain facts should be noted. Under the new régime the votes of the councils were assured by the fact that the French residents had fifty per cent of the seats while the remainder went mainly to their followers. The councils were consultative in nature and were controlled as to the subject of their discussions. Legislative and executive powers had been vested in a special authority composed of the Conseil restreint and the Council of Viziers and Directors which were appointed by and were subservient to the Resident-General. Under such a régime, neither the Moroccan throne and the people on the one hand, nor France on the other hand, exercised any authority; the authority was in the hands of the French residents. The obligations of the treaties and even of the United Nations Charter had been of no avail.

34. Some Members of the United Nations held that such measures were to be condoned or at any rate, felt that no action should be taken. The real reason for such views was not because there was a question of domestic jurisdiction but because those Members wanted to support colonialism. Another excuse given for inaction was that the Moroccan crisis had ended with the removal of the Sultan. In the past, too, it had been maintained that the Moroccan crisis had been brought to an end by various measures and treaties. But the crisis had never ended because it was not merely a crisis; it was a struggle of a people for freedom and liberty. Under the Charter, Member States have an obligation to assist peoples in their development toward self-government. To bring about such a development in Morocco there must be an end of repression, lifting of martial law and the establishment of representative institutions in which the people might freely express their opinion. Negotiations with France were also necessary.

35. France had not respected the treaties; it could no longer invoke them. But even those treaties did not limit the action proposed in the draft resolution presented by Syria jointly with twelve other nations (A/C.1/L.60) the text of which Mr. Zeineddine read to the Committee. The sponsors invited examination of the draft resolution and were prepared to explain their views on its specific provisions. The case of Morocco affected directly those thirteen nations. The danger in the present situation was the feeling of inaction and lethargy which had been insinuated into the Assembly by certain great Powers. The draft resolution, however, was in the hands of the Committee. On its decision depended the authority of the United Nations and the orderly development towards international co-operation based on the right of self-determination of peoples and on international justice.

36. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) recalled that the leader of his delegation in the general debate (436th plenary meeting) had made clear the New Zealand approach to the question of competence and had stated that it was difficult to determine where domestic jurisdiction ended and the Assembly's competence began. The question was one both of law and of fact. Not all speakers seemed to have paid sufficient regard to the facts in the present case. By its support of the General Assembly resolution on Morocco (612 (VII)), New Zealand had agreed that the Assembly had a measure of competence. Morocco could not be regarded as a dependent territory, in the usual sense, despite the cession of certain attributes of sovereignty under the Treaty of Fez. At the seventh session, the New Zealand view had been that the facts justified discussion and the adoption of a resolution calling upon the parties to continue negotiations. That resolution represented a constructive and permissible approach. Facts justifying that approach still existed: Moroccan nationalist aspirations on the one hand and French interests and responsibility on the other.

37. The question was what the Assembly could usefully do. At the previous session, a moderate and helpful resolution had been adopted which expressed confidence that France would endeavour to further the fundamental liberties of the people of Morocco, expressed the hope for continued negotiations and appealed for restraint. The resolution did not go beyond those matters deliberately. It made no attempt to set a time-limit for the granting of independence. The evolution of democratic institutions was a slow and difficult process. The analogy drawn by the representative of Pakistan was not very satisfactory for there was no great similarity between the Indian and Moroccan situations. But it should be recalled that even after many years the final settlement between the various groups in India was not reached without difficulty, sufferings and danger. Nor could it be agreed that the Moroccan case was simpler. It differed geographically as well as racially in forms of government. Before the entry of the French into Morocco, the latter had been little more than a group of anarchic feudal territories constantly at war. Its present unity was the result of French efforts. New Zealand was confident that France would continue to strengthen the development towards democracy in Morocco.

38. The resolution adopted at the seventh session (612 (VII)) refrained from intervening between France and Morocco. The New Zealand delegation continued to feel that such interference would be outside the Assembly's competence. It was disappointing that the hope for continuing negotiations had not been fulfilled and that events had led to the deposition of the Sultan whose sovereignty and personal security were guaranteed by the Treaty of Fez. The nature of the complaint had therefore altered somewhat. If those events had not taken place, and if there had been normal negotiations, the New Zealand delegation would have considered any discussion inadvisable. However, there was the question of what useful measure could be taken. If the Assembly's attempts to prove helpful had not been successful, that did not justify direct interference. It was a matter for argument whether any new resolution would be useful. If further proposals were submitted, the matter could be reconsidered but the thirteen-Power draft resolution just presented (A/C.1/L.60) was clearly unacceptable. Its

sponsors noted that the previous resolution had not so far been "implemented", which was not an appropriate expression in connexion with the text of that resolution. It then proceeded to make more radical recommendations. It used the term "true representatives" but the Assembly had no sure means of deciding who they might be, and to use such a term would lead to endless controversy. The draft resolution would also set a time-limit for granting complete independence. The Assembly itself had recognized the difficulties in that connexion at the seventh session when it had rejected the terminology used by the sponsors of the draft resolution relative to bringing about self-government in Morocco. There was no change in the situation which would justify the Assembly not only in recommending independence, but also in specifying a time-limit.

39. It could not be agreed that if the Assembly adopted no new resolution it would be a retrograde step or a moral defeat. The New Zealand delegation did not believe that the Assembly could do more than reaffirm its hopes; but even if they were not embodied in a resolution, the existing resolution would lose none of its moral force.

40. The absence of the French representative was regrettable for it deprived the Committee of knowledge of essential facts. In previous debates Mr. Munro had expressed the hope that the Committee would act in such a way as to increase the confidence of France in its moderation and sense of responsibility. He had expressed the belief that no political principle could be pressed without regard for its timeliness, the legitimate interests of a great Power or without regard for the interests of peace and stability. Without believing that the existence of a threat to the peace had been established, New Zealand recognized the importance of protecting the area of Morocco from aggression, which meant that both before and after the establishment of self-government there should be a government strong enough not to be a lure to an aggressor or to be the victim of internal dissension.

41. In the opinion of the New Zealand delegation, the Assembly had already done what it could usefully do. To try to do more might well endanger what had already been accomplished. In examining any proposals put forward the New Zealand delegation would be guided by Article 1, paragraph 4 of the Charter which stipulated that the United Nations would be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations.

42. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) said that his delegation regretted no less than the delegation of New Zealand the absence of the French representative. He had, however, produced facts from official French sources to substantiate his contentions. It was from a French source that he would give an answer to the statement made by the representative of New Zealand concerning the condition of affairs in Morocco before the French occupation. Mr. Zeineddine then proceeded to quote from an official report of Marshal Lyautey, the first Resident-General, in which he had compared the anarchy elsewhere in North Africa with the order, stability and civilization of Morocco.

43. With regard to the suggestion that it was too soon to consider the new French reforms, Mr. Zeineddine argued that those reforms which would introduce a new system of government under which France would give up its authority to the French residents

but not to the Moroccans, should not be allowed to crystallize and so become more difficult to change. It was proper to consider them since they were the culmination of a long process and were not reforms authorized under the treaty.

44. Regarding the true representatives of the Moroccan people, there were two possible solutions. Elections could be held to establish a democratic régime. Or, those leaders who had made themselves known and were clearly supported by the people could be found as readily in Morocco as they had been in Syria, India, Indonesia and elsewhere. It would perhaps be best to organize a referendum.

45. The representative of New Zealand had said that there would be no moral defeat if the previous resolution were upheld. However, in view of the removal of the Sultan, that resolution was no longer adequate and had been rendered inoperative. New measures were required because the situation had deteriorated.

46. With regard to defence against aggression, Mr. Zeineddine observed that there was virtual martial law in Morocco for no apparent reason. If it was a question of protection against forces coming from a distance, why should a large French army be tied down in Morocco, unable to participate in measures for collective security.

47. The CHAIRMAN stated that the list of speakers was closed and that the following representatives were inscribed:

India, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Czechoslovakia, Union of South Africa, United States, Liberia, Afghanistan, Yemen, Burma, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Bolivia, Syria, Argentina, Norway, Pakistan, Mexico, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Israel, Sweden, Guatemala, Peru, Dominican Republic, China, Lebanon and Egypt.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.