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*Chairman:* Mr. Roberto URDANETA ARBELÁEZ (Colombia)

**Priority to be given to item 76 of the General  
Assembly agenda (*concluded*)**

1. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) said that his delegation would vote for the French proposal in pursuance of the attitude it had adopted in the Security Council, where the Yugoslav delegation<sup>1</sup> had maintained that Korea was the main problem and that the problem of Taiwan (Formosa) and other associated issues were of secondary importance. The Asian events, with which the United Nations had been concerned for a period of five months, had begun in Korea, which continued to be the scene of military operations. The Committee should not, however, forget the question of Taiwan; its solution might help to solve the Korean problem. The Yugoslav delegation, which had suggested in the Security Council<sup>2</sup> that there might be discussions between the parties concerned on the subject of Taiwan, would make the same suggestion, if it seemed appropriate, to the First Committee.

2. On the subject of Korea, the Yugoslav delegation supported the appeal of the thirteen Asian nations that the forces coming down from North Korea should stop at the 38th parallel. That appeal would constitute the best means of preventing the conflict from spreading. The world well knew that the problem of the unification of Korea could not be solved by force, and that such a course could only lead to a general war. Having disapproved the invasion of South Korea and also the decision to pursue the North Koreans beyond the 38th parallel, the Yugoslav delegation was of the opinion that a grave error would be made by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China if it did not respond to the thirteen-nation appeal.

3. Mr. ROBERTS (Union of South Africa) stated that, while the normal procedure would be to complete

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 72*, 530th meeting.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

a discussion which had been begun, there were precedents to the contrary, and the Committee was competent to alter the order of discussion in an important case. The question before the Committee was the procedural one of the urgency and importance of the item and not a substantive one of its merits, although during the discussion there had been a tendency to deal with the merits of the case. The South African delegation which was satisfied that the new item was of critical importance and that the French proposal was appropriate, would therefore vote for that proposal.

4. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the proposal of France (408th meeting, paragraph 5) that the Committee give priority to the consideration of item 76 of the General Assembly agenda.

*The proposal was adopted by 42 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions.*

5. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that the vote confirmed the fact that the majority followed the Anglo-American bloc, which was prepared to encroach upon the rights of other delegations when it suited its convenience. The delegation of the USSR protested against the Committee's illegal decision.

**Intervention of the Central People's Government  
of the People's Republic of China in Korea**

[Item 76]\*

INVITATION TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC  
OF KOREA TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSION

6. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) moved that the representative of the Republic of Korea be invited to sit at the Committee table.

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

7. Mr. KYROU (Greece) seconded the motion. He recalled that the representative of the USSR had asserted in the General Committee (74th meeting) and the General Assembly (319th plenary meeting) that no facts were available. It would therefore be appropriate to invite a representative of the country so directly concerned with the events now occurring to participate.

8. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that his delegation had maintained from the beginning that it would be wrong to include item 76 in the agenda because the question was an artificial one designed to camouflage the intervention of the United States of America in Korea. There was no such thing as intervention on the part of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. The delegation of the USSR accordingly considered that it would be wrong to invite South Korean representatives to participate in the discussion, particularly because they would be unable to give an objective picture.

9. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that his delegation had already expressed (408th meeting) the view that the inclusion of item 76 in the agenda was illegal and violated both precedents and the principles of the Charter. The delegation of Poland therefore disagreed with the United States proposal to invite a representative of South Korea to participate. Moreover, the régime of South Korea consisted of fascist reactionaries, propped up on American bayonets, who had committed aggression against the People's Democratic Republic of Korea.

10. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the motion of the representative of the United States of America to invite the representative of the Republic of Korea to sit at the Committee table.

*The motion was adopted by 48 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions.*

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representative of the Republic of Korea took a seat at the Committee table.*

#### GENERAL DISCUSSION

11. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) stated that the General Assembly (319th plenary meeting) had asked the Committee to consider, as an urgent and important question, the intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea. The known facts plainly showed that the question under discussion was the most important and urgent ever to come before the United Nations. The critical situation demanded wise and courageous decisions to preserve the peace. Much could be won by staunchness and unity; everything could be lost by indecision.

12. The forces of the United Nations had been attacked by Chinese communist armies and had suffered reverses; but that did not mean that hopes for peace and collective security were in retreat. The United Nations had acted in Korea to defend the rights of a small country to liberty, and the world had rejoiced when the United Nations had taken a stand on behalf of the weak against aggression. The Members of the

United Nations had acted freely, without fear or greed, to defend Korea and the United Nations. The forces of the United Nations had repulsed the aggressor and could have restored independence to the Korean people. The General Assembly had established machinery to unify, rehabilitate and rebuild Korea; and the symbol of the United Nations as a defender of small nations burned brightly on the world horizon. Then Chinese communist forces had intervened on a large scale and pushed back the forces of the United Nations, which had regrouped and advanced again. That advance had collided with a full-scale Chinese communist offensive, which had plainly been long prepared and which led to a withdrawal of the United Nations troops.

13. The facts had demolished the fiction that those Chinese forces consisted of volunteers. Clearly, they constituted a centrally directed army, organized and equipped for war by a great national effort. The pretence that they were volunteers should be evaluated in the light of the following intelligence. There was strong reason to believe that the following Chinese communist formations had entered Korea: the 71st and 72nd divisions of the 24th Chinese communist Army; the 77th Division of the 26th Army; the 81st Division of the 27th Army; the 94th Division of the 32nd Army; the 111th Division of the 37th Army; and the 58th Division. The following units, representing nearly 60,000 troops, had been more positively identified: the 70th Division of the 24th Chinese communist Army; and the 79th and 80th divisions of the 27th Army. The following formations, representing about 200,000 troops, had been definitely identified: the 59th, 60th and 89th divisions of the 20th Chinese communist Army; the 112th, 113th, and 114th divisions of the 38th Army; the 115th, 116th and 117th divisions of the 39th Army; the 118th, 119th and 120th divisions of the 40th Army; the 124th, 125th and 126th divisions of the 42nd Army; the 148th, 149th and 150th divisions of the 50th Army; and the 196th, 197th and 198th divisions of the 66th Army. The foregoing did not refer to any formations north of the Yalu River.

14. The representative of the USSR, on behalf of his government, had stated on the previous day (319th plenary meeting), that there had been no intervention by the armed forces of the Central People's Government and that that government had not sent and was not sending any troops of the People's Republic of China into Korea. The Committee could judge for itself the credibility of that statement of the representative of the USSR.

15. The arguments advanced by spokesmen of Peking and the Soviet Union seeking to justify the actions of so-called volunteers, should cause grave concern. The representative of the USSR had asserted (319th plenary meeting) that the Chinese communists had gone to succour their brethren and that there was therefore no reason for protesting. That had been an attempt to justify organizing a communist uprising, sending in troops called volunteers, and then claiming that the international community had no right to aid the victim. That new doctrine was a dangerous weapon in the arsenal of Soviet imperialism and should be rejected.

16. The Committee should consider the motives of the Peking régime in attacking the United Nations,

despite the efforts to demonstrate to it that neither the United Nations nor the United States had any aggressive intentions. That fact was so plain that it was only possible to conclude that the Peking régime had acted against the interests of the Chinese people on behalf of Soviet imperialistic policy in Asia.

17. The representatives of Member States, in the discussion on the present question, would undoubtedly make clear the desire of their peoples to live in peace with the Chinese people, and the hope that the latter would no longer be deceived and forced into serving the aims of the Government of the USSR. The Committee should so act that those who had attacked the principle of collective security would realize their error and withdraw. Time still remained for that course. If those who had been challenging the United Nations thought that the latter would abandon its principles in the face of force, then they were tragically mistaken. The United Nations would not swerve from its purpose of freeing Korea and would not renounce its decision to make aggression impossible.

18. The Government of the United States had joined with the governments of Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway and the United Kingdom in presenting the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/638. That draft resolution was substantially the same as the one (S/1894) which had been introduced in the Security Council by those six Powers on 10 November and had been vetoed by the representative of the USSR on 30 November,<sup>3</sup> and still reflected sound United Nations policies.

19. The draft resolution (A/C.1/638) was directed to the following objectives: (1) to assure the security of the United Nations forces in Korea; (2) to secure the withdrawal of armed forces assisting the North Korean aggressors; (3) to localize the conflict; (4) to bring the fighting to a speedy conclusion on the basis of the principles of the United Nations; and (5) to give assurances that the United Nations had no purposes which might be hostile to Korea's neighbors.

20. Only after the present question had been settled could other matters relating to the peace and security of Asia be dealt with.

21. The overwhelming vote of the First Committee in favour of the joint draft resolution should demonstrate to the Peking régime that the vast majority of countries desired peace. If that régime had failed to heed the votes of the nine members of the Security Council who had supported the draft resolution, it should be shown what was the opinion of the Committee. It should be made clear that force was not a basis for negotiations. Members of the United Nations should act quickly and together to show their determination to preserve peace. The United Nations had been formed to keep the peace, but the events of the last few months had shown that it was ready to meet aggression. The Organization was ready to move slowly and explore every avenue towards a settlement, but threats of force should not be brandished too long. The Committee should show that the United Nations was united for peace and would remain so.

22. General ROMULO (Philippines) stated that, in October, the General Assembly (294th plenary meeting), had reaffirmed the Security Council's condemnation of North Korea for aggression against the Republic of Korea. The Committee at present was confronted by armed intervention by troops of communist China against United Nations forces. The conflict was unlike any with which the United Nations had dealt in the past, for the intervention was directed not against one country alone but against the United Nations. It was therefore clear that the situation carried with it the menace of total war. The General Assembly would surely bring to the discussion a sense of the mortal danger facing mankind unless the United Nations acted swiftly and clamly to avert that danger.

23. Because of its proximity to the scene of hostilities, the Philippines had a particular awareness of the danger. Nevertheless, the danger was common to all and could spread rapidly if nothing were done.

24. In the present crisis, the Committee should calmly consider the facts on which it must base its judgment. The facts concerning the aggression of North Korea had already been given in the General Assembly, which had adopted the resolution condemning the North Korean régime and setting up measures for the unification and rehabilitation of Korea. A programme had been established for reconstruction, and United Nations forces had crossed the 38th parallel to effect unification. The United Nations and its military commander in the field had given assurances that the Manchurian frontier and the interests of China would be respected. Proof of the genuineness of those assurances had been given when the United Nations forces which had reached the Changjin Reservoir had refrained from doing anything to interrupt the supply of power to Manchuria. The Peking Government should not doubt that the United Nations kept its word. Despite those assurances and the actions proving their sincerity, hundreds of thousands of Chinese communist troops had crossed the border to fight the forces of the United Nations.

25. The General Assembly had called upon the First Committee to pass judgment on those facts. The case was clear. The situation resulting from the intervention of communist China had become so grave that the denial of the charge was a hollow mockery. The pretence that the troops were volunteers was a mere fiction which the Peking Government could not expect the world to believe. The very way in which the representative of Peking had spoken<sup>4</sup> of those troops betrayed their character, for governments normally disavowed persons who had volunteered for service in a foreign army and in some cases even deprived them of citizenship. The Peking Government had found it unnecessary to make any pretence. The forces were well organized and equipped, evidently part of the regular army. The excuse offered by Peking was that its forces had gone to aid the Koreans in freeing themselves from the imperialist domination of the United States of America.

26. That was no more than the standard propaganda of the USSR, designed to conceal the menace of Soviet imperialism. Accusations of so-called American imperialism could be made in Russian only, for no Chinese

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Nos. 63 and 72, 521st and 530th meetings.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 69, 527th meeting.

who was aware of the long friendship of the peoples of China and the United States could repeat those statements without realizing that he was repeating Russian propaganda. The United States was one Power which had never been at war with China, and which had consistently championed the cause of China against its traditional enemies—Japan and Russia. There was a long history of United States aid to China in its adversity.

27. The United States, General Rómulo recognized, had not been altogether guiltless of imperialism for, at the end of the nineteenth century, it had not proved immune to the temptation of the era of expansion. The United States had lacked the experience and traditions, however, which would have made it adept in imperialism. One adventure, which had brought the United States to the Philippines had thus initiated a relationship of some forty years. However, that relationship had not fitted into the classical pattern of imperialism. The United States had taught the Philippine people the procedures and technique of self-government, had built educational institutions and had developed Philippine national pride. Moreover, the United States had never made money out of the Philippines. Even the troops stationed there had been supported by the United States Treasury. In 1916, the United States Congress had given the Philippines the then unprecedented promise of independence. In 1935, the Congress had passed a law providing for the drawing up of a constitution and for Philippine independence in 1946. The war in the Pacific had tested the relationship between the Philippines and the United States. Almost alone among the dependent territories, the Philippines had remained loyal to the administering Power.

28. In 1946, when the Philippines had been prostrated by the devastation of war, the United States had fulfilled its pledge of independence. That act had occurred at the peak of United States power, when postponement would have been understandable in the light of the economic disorganization of the Philippines. The United States could have concealed any designs upon Asia and could have justified its conduct because it had agreed to recognize the claims of the Soviet Union to southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles and to special status in Manchuria with respect to ports and railways, in order to persuade the Soviet Union to join in the war against Japan. Nevertheless, the United States had fulfilled its pledge. While the Soviet Union had been staking out its claims in China and had been stripping Manchuria, the United States had been giving aid to devastated nations, including China, and had set up a programme to rehabilitate the Philippines.

29. The contrast between the conduct of the United States and the USSR served to refute the charge of

United States imperialism in Asia. The significance of that contrast would not be lost on the peoples of Asia, including the Chinese people. There had been significance too in the support given by the United States to Indonesia in gaining its independence, while the USSR had stood idly by because it could not make political capital out of a peaceful settlement. The United States had given billions of dollars since the war to the needy of all nations, to aid under-developed countries and to strengthen the post-war world economy. In contrast, the USSR had refrained from co-operating in international programmes of an economic, social and cultural nature.

30. By setting the Philippines free, the United States had inaugurated a pattern of Asian independence. Independence had soon followed for India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia. Against that record should be set the record of the USSR, which after the war had swallowed up Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and had chained down nearly all the States on its eastern frontier. While the United States enjoyed friendly relations throughout North and South America, the USSR was feared by its neighbors in Europe and Asia.

31. General Rómulo was sure that the peoples of Asia, particularly the Chinese people, would not long be deceived. Although the Chinese people were not free and could not learn the facts, the Committee should act on the assumption that they could reach an understanding with the Chinese people and persuade them that their interests would be served, though not the selfish interests of the USSR, by negotiations to settle the conflict in Korea. The Chinese people were not the enemy. It was in that spirit that the Philippines had joined twelve other nations in an appeal to the Peking Government.

32. The Committee now had before it the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/638), which contained virtually the same terms as those in the proposal which had been made in the Security Council. The Philippine Government concurred in the substance of the draft resolution, for it believed it necessary to exhaust all possibilities of peaceful negotiation.

33. Mr. YOUNGER (United Kingdom) observed that the Committee had just heard the first presentation of evidence of intervention, and that delegations might wish to consider the statement before addressing the Committee. As no other representative had expressed the desire to speak, he moved that the meeting adjourn.

*It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.