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ASSEMBLY**

**FIFTH SESSION**

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**FIRST COMMITTEE 433rd**

**MEETING**

*Saturday, 27 January 1951, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Lake Success, New York*

**CONTENTS**

	<i>Page</i>
Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea ( <i>continued</i> ) .....	563

*Chairman:* Mr. Roberto URDANETA ARBELÁEZ (Colombia).

**Intervention of the Central People's Government  
PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC  
OF CHINA (A/C.1/653) (*continued*)**

[Item 76]\*

REPLY DATED 17 JANUARY 1951 FROM THE CENTRAL  
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA  
(A/C.1/653) (*continued*)

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representative  
of the Republic of Korea took his seat at the Commit-  
tee table.*

1. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia) recalled that the action of the United Nations in Korea had been based on the Security Council resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950<sup>1</sup> and General Assembly resolution 376 (V) of 7 October 1950. While the immediate aim of the action was to call to order the North Korean aggressor and to establish a united, democratic and independent Korea, the ultimate aim was collective security and the maintenance of world peace. In the discharge of that task, the United Nations forces, after crossing the 38th parallel, had been confronted with large numbers of well-equipped and well-organized Chinese troops which had eventually forced a withdrawal of the United Nations forces. The situation created a threat to world peace.

2. For that reason, a number of Members of the United Nations had felt the necessity of advocating a different approach to the Korean question, with the same aim in view as that of the earlier action of the United Nations, the aim of collective security and the maintenance of world peace. The new approach was also based on recognition of the fact that, on the Korean and other Far Eastern problems, the major Powers were on opposite sides of an extremely dangerous dividing line; the objective was, therefore, to bring about negotiations among the major Powers with a view to eliminating that division.

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year*, Nos. 15 and 16.

3. The Asian and the Middle Eastern States Members of the United Nations had assumed that task. Together they had drafted a resolution recommending that the representatives of governments, including the five major Powers, should, as soon as possible, meet and make recommendations for a peaceful settlement of existing issues in the Far East. That a cease-fire had to take place first was considered a matter of course. Unfortunately, it appeared that the draft resolution containing a recommendation for a cease-fire, together with a recommendation for a conference of the major Powers to negotiate existing issues, would not carry the necessary majority in the First Committee. Consequently, the original draft resolution had been split up into two drafts. The first draft resolution (A/C.1/641) concerning the cease-fire had been accepted by the First Committee (417th meeting). The second draft resolution (A/C.1/642), subsequently amended (A/C.1/642/Rev.1), was still pending.

4. As a result of the adoption of the cease-fire resolution, the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea had been formed, and it had elaborated the five principles (A/C.1/645) transmitted to the Central People's Government of China. A reply had been received and had later been amplified in the clarifications sought by the members of the Commonwealth countries and communicated to the First Committee by the representative of India (429th meeting). Subsequent clarifications made by the People's Republic of China to the Indian Ambassador in Peking had already been published by the Press. There was a growing conviction that the reply of the People's Republic of China regarding a cease-fire and a solution of the Far Eastern problems came closer to the Group's five principles than had originally been thought. However, there still existed a need for further clarification and possible amplifications.

5. The situation called for speedy action utilizing the possibilities that were offered by the acceptance of the five principles and the reply from Peking, and the amplifications that were available to the Committee. With that in view, the twelve countries of Asia and the

Middle East had revised their original draft resolution (A/C.1/642) and submitted the revised version to the Committee on 24 January 1951.

6. In revising the draft resolution, the sponsors had given the seven participants in the conference the greatest latitude so that they would be enabled to find the most suitable and effective procedure for arriving at a solution. No reference to any specific procedure was incorporated. During the course of the debate, however, it had become clear that there was a widely felt need for outlining in more detail the subsequent phases of such a conference. In that regard, the originators of the draft resolution were considering the suggestions put to the Committee by the representatives of Canada and Israel (432nd meeting) and others.

7. Referring to General Rómulo's remarks regarding the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia (429th meeting), Mr. Palar said that, while he remembered with gratitude the action of that Conference, he would remind the representative of the Philippines that the United Nations had not acted on the basis of the New Delhi resolution,<sup>2</sup> which condemned one of the parties as an aggressor, or on the basis of the Security Council resolutions, which had not been complied with, but had chosen the way of negotiations, for the sake of peace. Mr. Palar added that he had himself earlier (428th meeting) referred to the Indonesian case only to point out that, to achieve a peaceful solution of an existing military conflict, it was not essential to have a cease-fire first. In the last stages of the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia, Mr. Palar said, both parties had decided to negotiate while hostilities were in full progress.

8. Mr. COSTA DU RELS (Bolivia) said that, for the third time in his life, he was witnessing a drama in the field of international co-operation based on collective security. The principle of collective security had first been formulated in the Covenant of the League of Nations and later in the Charter of the United Nations.

9. The principle of collective security had first been put to an acid test in 1932 when the League of Nations had sent the Lytton Commission to Manchuria. While entrusted with the task of exploration and inquiry, the Commission had been forced to negotiate with the aggressor and show a spirit of conciliation. Japan had been declared an aggressor, but Article 16 of the Covenant of the League had not been applied, because of the differences among the Members of the League.

10. A few years later, fascist Italy had attacked and conquered Ethiopia, and that action had virtually put an end to the League of Nations and the principle of collective security. Now, for the third time in a generation, the grave question of collective security had arisen and it had been placed before the First Committee of the General Assembly.

11. Mr. Costa du Rels did not think it necessary to repeat what had been established, namely, that North Korea was an aggressor. However, the representative of the USSR had said (431st meeting) in all solemnity that the United States had committed aggression

in Korea. The Bolivian representative regarded the USSR assertion as an affront. The troops of the United States and other Member States of the United Nations had been fighting in Korea as an international police force in order to uphold the principles of the Charter. When the United Nations forces had been on the point of accomplishing their task, communist Chinese troops had entered North Korea, at first in the guise of volunteers but later even casting aside that mask.

12. The flagrant aggression of communist China raised the question whether the provisions of the Charter should be applied or whether a commission, similar to the Lytton Commission, should be appointed. The Bolivian delegation had no doubt that the United States draft resolution (A/C.1/654) was the most logical answer to the Chinese aggression. However much Mr. Costa du Rels admired the efforts made by the representatives of India and Canada, he wondered whether through an excess of goodwill and pacific approaches the United Nations might not be undermined, and the mistakes of 1931 and 1935 be repeated.

13. The aggression in Korea was in fact the continuation of a religious war, which had begun in 1917 with the accession of Lenin to power. It was a genuine challenge put forth by international communism to the peace-loving countries of the world. In the circumstances, it was essential to declare communist China an aggressor. The absence of such a declaration would be viewed by Peking as a sign of weakness and submission to the conditions put forward by them. Once that action had been taken, no effort would be spared to permit certain States and certain delegations to make approaches with a view to achieving an armistice and perhaps even peace in Asia in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

14. Mr. Costa du Rels concluded by stating that his delegation would vote in favour of the United States draft resolution, and reserve its right to support, at a later stage, any proposal for a peaceful solution of the Korean conflict.

15. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) reaffirmed the support of his delegation to the counter-proposals (A/C.1/653) submitted by the Central People's Government of China. His delegation considered that they constituted a full programme of action covering every aspect of the Far Eastern problem and that they were based upon the principles of international law and the Charter. Those proposals covered the principle of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and the possibility of granting to the Korean people the right to decide their own fate. The Central People's Government had also submitted a proposal regarding the composition of the proposed conference, and had expressed a desire to enter into negotiations immediately. He therefore felt that if the majority in the First Committee was really concerned with the establishment of peace in the Far East, it would find nothing to reject in the counter-proposals.

16. He pointed out that the representative of the United States had already pledged that the United States troops would be withdrawn from Korea after the achievement of a peaceful settlement. That pledge coin-

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Fourth Year, Supplement for January 1949, document S/1222.

cided with the proposal submitted by the People's Republic of China for the withdrawal of foreign troops. Similarly, the United States had declared its intention of withdrawing its forces from the island of Taiwan (Formosa) and from Taiwan's territorial waters as soon as stability had been established in the Far East. If that promise were accepted at its face value, the Committee would find that it also was in accordance with the proposals of the People's Republic of China. However, the United States did not intend to adhere even to the principles approved by the First Committee. That had been further clarified by the many official and unofficial declarations made recently by the United States in various governmental organs as well as before the First Committee. The summary rejection of the Chinese counter-proposals by the United States through the statement of 17 January by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, as well as subsequent propaganda emanating from several United States sources, showed that the United States had never intended to enter into negotiations, or that, if such negotiations were to begin, the intention was to put forward unacceptable conditions in the way of holding any conference.

17. Mr. Katz-Suchy announced that his delegation would support with certain reservations the revised twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/642/Rev.1) submitted by the Asian countries. It was supporting that draft resolution in order to exhaust all possibilities of peaceful settlement, in spite of the fact that the draft resolution did not cover all the outstanding issues and was limited in its nature. The delegation of Poland felt that the calling of a conference with a view to elucidation would serve as a preliminary step for a peaceful settlement of Far Eastern problems. At the same time, his delegation would also support the two USSR amendments (A/C.1/655). As regards amendment 2, his delegation was of the opinion that no place of meeting should be fixed without consultation and without the agreement of all those who would participate in the conference, particularly the representatives of the Central People's Government of China. His delegation also felt that to entitle the draft resolution "Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea" would not help to achieve agreement, since the aim of such a title was to divert attention from the real issues in Korea and to prepare for intervention and war against the Central People's Government of China.

18. Mr. Katz-Suchy added that there was no basis for accusing the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China of aggression or even of participation in the Korean conflict. Despite all the accusations, no delegation had been able to prove those charges of intervention. No international body had ever been asked to act on such baseless accusations.

19. The delegation of Poland considered that the Central People's Government of China had made it clear that the Chinese volunteers had gone to Korea on their own initiative to express their solidarity with the Korean people in their suffering and struggle. Moreover, those volunteers realized that the interests and security of the People's Republic of China required that a puppet régime under the control of a hostile Power should not be established beside its frontiers.

20. Moreover, the question of volunteers was not a new question in international law. The action of volunteers had never been considered as an act of intervention by a State; and the question of the numbers of volunteers involved did not change the situation.

21. Mr. Katz-Suchy pointed out that during the Spanish Civil War several thousand volunteers from his country, after facing many hardships on their way from Poland to Spain, had participated in the cause of democracy, and no one had raised the issue of intervention. Similarly, the history of volunteers in the American War of Independence was quite well known. The Chinese people had direct interests in Korea, having close ties of friendship with the Korean people. That fact had been well recognized by many members of the Committee when they had wished to take precautions at the time of General MacArthur's drive towards the 38th parallel. It was also recognized by Mr. Walter Lippman, a leading American journalist. On the other hand, the United States was thousands of miles away from Korea and yet it wished to have its forces in Korea in the interests of security.

22. Mr. Katz-Suchy further stated that his delegation would strongly oppose the United States draft resolution (A/C.1/654) before the Committee. His delegation considered it to be a dangerous draft resolution, the aim of which was to spread the war. It appeared that there was a division even among those members who supported the draft resolution; as a result, its real significance was being minimized and the claim made that it would not hamper negotiations towards a peaceful settlement. The foolishness of such an approach was evident. Never in the history of international negotiations had negotiations been preceded by a condemnation.

23. If the draft resolution was not so important, then what, Mr. Katz-Suchy asked, was the explanation for the enormous pressure being exerted by the highest authorities of the United States in order to have it adopted? The Senate, the President, almost everybody had exerted pressure in order to create a majority in favour of that draft resolution. It was rather unusual in international affairs for the parliament of a State to call upon the United Nations to adopt a draft resolution condemning another State as an aggressor.

24. Mr. Katz-Suchy added that several representatives, when speaking on that draft resolution, had intimated their hesitation to vote in its favour—especially the representatives of the United Kingdom (431st meeting) and Canada (432nd meeting). In those two statements, one would find a full condemnation of the United States draft resolution as untimely and fraught with danger. They, however, had clung to the last paragraph, which they well knew had been inserted in the draft resolution for their benefit, in order to enable them to justify their action. They had expressed fear, however, that it might constitute a difficulty in the negotiations.

25. It was clear from the statement of Mr. Pearson that he fully realized the implications of the third paragraph of the United States draft resolution. He wanted assurance that the powers of the Unified Command would not be enlarged, the war would not be spread

and operations would not be extended. The approval of that paragraph, however, would leave supporters of the resolution completely at the mercy of the United States military command, which spoke openly of extending the war into China. The preparations for war against China were no longer a secret; American journalists and military officers had openly spoken about them. Taiwan (Formosa), which was by all international agreements considered to be an integral part of China, had been occupied even before the Chinese volunteers had entered Korea, for the purpose of using it as a military base. Besides the occupation of Taiwan, aggression had been committed by the bombardment of towns and the destruction of life and property in areas within the Chinese borders. Those acts on the part of the United States would also be condemned as aggression by the definition of the aggressor that had been approved by the Security Committee of the League of Nations in May 1933,<sup>3</sup> as had been recalled in the First Committee by the representative of the Dominican Republic (428th meeting). After those acts of aggression had been committed, an *ex post facto* justification was sought through that paragraph of the draft resolution. He therefore seriously invited the attention of delegations to the implications of the paragraph both for the United Nations and for their own countries.

26. Mr. Katz-Suchy further stated that several delegations had followed what might be described as middle-of-the-road tactics; that is, while paying lip-service to peace, they had pledged their support to the United States draft resolution. In that regard, he especially referred to the statement of the representative of Israel (432nd meeting). Throughout the debate, the Israel representative had supported the principle of cease-fire first, but in his statement on 26 January, he had even gone to the extent of attempting to apply the illegal machinery of the so-called Acheson plan, which had been devised for the purpose of substituting for the Security Council an organ which would be subservient to the policy of the United States. Similarly, the representative of Israel had tried to confuse the issue of the draft resolution submitted by the Asian States.

27. Mr. Katz-Suchy said further that a new point had been raised: the matter of the Lytton report,<sup>4</sup> in connexion with which the Philippine representative (429th meeting) had tried to cast Mr. Stimson as the defender of the rights of China. It must be recalled that, at that time, there had been a division between the interests of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Far East. Mr. Stimson, however, had not opposed the Lytton report. Indeed, according to *The Gathering Storm*, the first volume of Mr. Churchill's memoirs of the Second World War and according to Mr. Stimson's memoirs entitled, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, Mr. Stimson had not only supported that proposal but had had to press for its acceptance.

28. The position of the United States in the Far East in those times had been rather peculiar. Mr. Katz-

Suchy cited *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (page 1058) concerning a conversation with Mr. Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador, on 7 November 1941, to the effect that the United States had invited Japan to establish a "Monroe Doctrine" in Asia similar to that maintained by the United States in connexion with Latin America.

29. It could, of course, be explained that Providence had led the United States to do such things, in the same way as President McKinley, in 1899, had stated that Providence had placed the Philippines in the hands of the American people. Probably God had decided to place Formosa and perhaps Korea in those hands.

30. Mr. Katz-Suchy had no intention of discussing the references made by several representatives to war and violence. Statements such as those of the representative of Chile, who always saw the workings of some mysterious communist movement behind every trouble, were self-explanatory. The position that must constantly be kept in mind was that there was a conflict in the Far East causing loss of life and destruction; that the possibility of a peaceful solution existed; and that one of the interested parties—interested because of its geographical position and because of what it represented in the Far East—had declared its readiness to enter into negotiations which had as their final aim the restoration of stability in the Far East.

31. Despite attempts to misconstrue it, the position adopted by the Central People's Government of China spoke for itself, and stood with the many statements made by that country in reply to the Committee, as well as with the counter-proposals it had submitted and the further explanations given as a result of the conversations carried out between Member States and that government.

32. The First Committee had the choice of continuing with peace efforts and establishing machinery, based on sound and sincere principles, which would achieve peace, or of engaging in action disastrous to the Organization by approving a draft resolution which would give a free hand to men whose responsibility was being doubted, not only in China, but in all the rest of the world, including the capital of the United States.

33. Mr. JOOSTE (Union of South Africa) recalled that, at the time the supplementary report of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea (A/C.1/645) had been discussed, he had explained (423rd meeting) that fundamentally the attitude of his government towards the conflict in Korea was concerned with the maintenance of the authority of the United Nations in the prevention of aggression and the preservation of peace. He had also indicated that the system of collective security constituted the genesis of the United Nations, and that the future effectiveness of the Organization as an instrument of that system was what would justify the continued support for it. However, as he had made clear, his government also recognized and subscribed to the principle that international disputes should be settled by peaceful means and not by force, wherever and whenever possible. That principle was fundamental in the Charter and was complementary, not contradictory to the system of collective security.

34. His delegation's support of the cease-fire proposals had therefore not been inspired by any weakening of its

<sup>3</sup> See League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Report of the Committee on Security Questions, Conf. D/C.G. 108, published in *Conference Documents, Vol. II*, p. 679 (Series League of Nations, 1935.IX.4).

<sup>4</sup> See League of Nations, Appeal of the Chinese Government, Report by the Commission of Enquiry (Lytton report). C 663 M320 1932 VII.

adherence to the system of collective security, which system must continue to be a corner-stone in the policy of the free world if civilization was to survive, but had been motivated exclusively by the principle of peaceful settlement consistent with the principles of the Charter and the system of collective security, and by his delegation's firm belief that all avenues offering such a settlement should be explored. He stated that that approach had been used by all those who had supported the cease-fire proposal, who had kept faith with the United Nations and who had sought to achieve the objective of establishing a united, free and independent Korea, without extension of the conflict or unnecessary continuation of it.

35. Those motives had been misrepresented of course, and endeavours had been made to implant suspicion in the minds of the Peking Government. All had been aware of the probable effect of that irresponsible and reprehensible conduct upon the policies of communist China, as also of the many serious doubts concerning the usefulness and prospects of success of any further approach to Peking.

36. While his delegation had never entertained extravagant hopes as to the immediate outcome of efforts to achieve a pacific settlement of the Korean dispute, it had believed that the desire for peace was universal and that the authorities of communist China could therefore be dissuaded from the dangerous course upon which they had embarked. His delegation had therefore not been prepared to accept failure as a foregone conclusion.

37. The reply since received from Peking was unacceptable both in content and in tone. The delegation of the Union of South Africa had been impressed by the analysis of those who contended that the subsequent so-called elucidation from Peking indicated that the latter was moving away from its original intransigent position; but, while not disposed to underestimate the significance of that welcome development, he must state that the interpretation had been so evasive as to afford little further clarification on the reactions and policies of Peking. A further response from Peking might, of course, serve to bring greater clarity, and so lead to an acceptable basis for negotiation.

38. The door to such negotiation remained open as far as the United Nations was concerned, as previous speakers had made clear, provided agreement was possible without a surrender by the United Nations of principles which were fundamental and could not be abandoned. It was clear, however, that until such time as the Organization's objectives in Korea had been achieved, or at least until a cease-fire had been arranged, the United Nations must continue its effort to resist aggression, regardless of the question whether the aggressor was being assisted from without.

39. As for the true nature of the intervention in Korea of Chinese communist forces, Mr. Jooste found it difficult to believe that any country which considered itself threatened from abroad would seek to resist that threat by merely allowing its nationals to operate of their own volition, or that hundreds of thousands of so-called volunteers, fully trained, equipped and organized, could cross a frontier without the specific sanction and support of their government. It must be concluded that those forces were operating under the

authority of Peking and that, since nobody disputed the fact that those forces were assisting North Korea in its aggression on South Korea, Peking itself was participating and was guilty of aggression. The South African delegation must therefore support the simple statement of fact to that effect contained in the United States draft resolution.

40. Mr. Jooste could not agree that a formal declaration that communist China was itself engaged in aggression might militate against a peaceful solution of the problem. He could not see how acceptance of the United States draft resolution could close the door to peaceful negotiation. He quoted the words of the Prime Minister of South Africa, who had consistently counselled against precipitate action, to the effect that nobody doubted that communist China had been guilty of aggression and that he did not think that China itself doubted the fact.

41. Moreover, while it was being argued, on the one hand, that the Organization should refrain from recognizing Chinese communist intervention in Korea for what it was, those supporting Chinese intervention had never hesitated to accuse the United Nations of aggression and had gone far beyond the limits of restraint, and of fact. The sense of responsibility which characterized the factual and unprovocative text put forward by the United States delegation could therefore only be commended.

42. Fully conscious of its responsibilities in the matter, the South African delegation supported the United States draft resolution, the final paragraph of which clearly reaffirmed the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities and the achievements of United Nations objectives by peaceful means. If peace was the desire of communist China, those who feared the consequences of accepting that draft resolution could not have given full weight to the purport and possibilities of that paragraph. In that connexion, Mr. Jooste stated that the programme suggested by Mr. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada (432nd meeting), contained much that was constructive. Mr. Jooste urged that the three-man committee proposed in that paragraph should not wait for a suitable opportunity to use its good offices, but that consideration should be given to allowing it to take the initiative. It could communicate with the Peking authorities to ascertain the intentions of the latter and set in motion the procedures listed by Mr. Pearson.

43. Regarding the eighth paragraph of the United States draft resolution, Mr. Jooste agreed with the representative of New Zealand (431st meeting) that it was too restrictive. He would have preferred a re-draft, either along the lines suggested by that representative or to the effect that the proposed *ad hoc* committee should be requested to consider and submit proposals for such further action by the United Nations as should, in its view, be taken. The question of subsequent action was one requiring the most careful consideration, and the First Committee should not commit itself to a course of action the exact consequences of which it could not foresee. Having condemned Chinese aggression in Korea, the Committee should exhaust the possibilities of peaceful negotiation before starting to formulate additional measures.

44. However, in view of the fact that the United States draft resolution was not intended to close the door to further negotiation, and in view of the indisputable facts of the Korean situation, the delegation of the Union of South Africa would vote affirmatively on the United States draft resolution as a whole. In conclusion, Mr. Jooste associated his delegation with the tributes paid to the United States for its sincere efforts to uphold the authority of the United Nations.

45. ATO GACHAOU ZALLAKA (Ethiopia) stated that the question under discussion was of vital importance as regards the maintenance of the principles of the United Nations and of the Charter, and the effective upholding of the principles of collective security.

46. Ever since the United Nations had declared North Korea to be the aggressor, Ethiopia had offered troops to aid the victim.<sup>5</sup> His country was of the opinion that, if the great majority of the United Nations did not all fight together, the measures taken by the Organization against aggression would be fruitless. In that connexion, he recalled the ineffectiveness of measures taken by the League of Nations with regard to Italian aggression against Ethiopia because of the lack of unity among the Members of the League and the subsequent bad faith on the part of certain countries in the application of sanctions. Calling attention to the restraint with which that situation had compelled his Government to act, the Ethiopian representative urged that all means of agreement, if any remained, be taken and exhausted to avoid repetition of that sad experience. Should the Committee judge that the moment had come for each Member to face up to its obligation, however, only the road indicated by the Charter could be followed. His country would loyally fulfil all the undertakings imposed upon it by the Charter.

47. The Ethiopian delegation would support the United States draft resolution with the reservations and modifications suggested by the representatives of the United Kingdom (431st meeting) and Canada (432nd meeting).

48. Mr. MALIK (Lebanon) declared that it was obvious that the world was deeply agitated by the problem under discussion. The Committee faced a great crisis and the issues were staggering in their complexity and possible implications. The fact, however, that every government had given the matter its most serious and responsible consideration, and that positions had not been arrived at hastily or lightly, was encouraging. No government could be too careful or cautious in determining its position when the issues were so grave.

49. Mr. Malik considered that the following six basic issues had emerged from the debate:

(a) The question of the prestige and authority of the United Nations. There was no doubt that all wished to maintain that, though there was some disagreement regarding the results to be expected from various courses of action suggested.

(b) The whole problem of whether the system of collective security was or was not to work. That system was at stake, and it was obvious that the first purpose of the Organization must be to maintain it so that all

countries, especially the small ones, could rely upon help in time of need.

(c) The fear that the war in the Far East might spread. That fear had been present in the minds of all and he was certain that every government or delegation, whatever the course it advocated, had acted with the aim of preventing the conflict from spreading.

(d) The active collaboration of the Asian countries in facing the problem at issue.

(e) The question of the unity of the free world. Nothing should be allowed to weaken that unity. In Mr. Malik's opinion there was no need to fear that nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom would fall out, or that the democratic free world would break up if and when the final challenge were made. What caused the greatest anxiety was the fear that the apparent weakening of that unity might mislead would-be aggressors into believing that the time was ripe for aggression.

(f) The fact that the great struggle of the current age between totalitarianism and freedom, between communism and democracy, determined and coloured all other problems. The problems of Korea and other Far Eastern problems were but incidents in the great ideological struggle.

50. Turning to the United States draft resolution (A/C.1/654) before the Committee, Mr. Malik stated that the basic hurdle that all must face sooner or later was formulated in the third paragraph of that text. Once that question had been faced, the other issues such as cease-fire, negotiations, stages or machinery could easily be settled and included in either of the two draft resolutions. Analysing the possible attitudes that could be taken towards that third paragraph, Mr. Malik concluded that it could be denied that communist China had engaged in aggression, or the issue could be avoided by non-participation in the vote. A third course would be to abstain. In that case, one interpretation might be that the delegation abstaining honestly did not know whether aggression really had occurred; the other interpretation might be that, while aggression had occurred, it was not prudent to say so at that stage. The last course would be to vote in favour of the paragraph and face the consequences of such a declaration.

51. The Lebanese delegation believed that there was no incompatibility between the two draft resolutions and that it could vote for both in good conscience.

52. The twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/642/Rev.1) of which the Lebanese delegation was a co-sponsor, insisted on negotiations and would set up machinery for the achievement of a peaceful settlement. Mr. Malik believed that such questions as that of the cease-fire could easily be accommodated in the text of that draft resolution, once the basic issue of the third paragraph of the United States draft resolution had been faced. If and when the time came to vote upon the United States draft resolution, he would vote in favour of it since the only possible attitude to take was to recognize that such aggression had occurred.

53. Referring to the attitude taken by his Government on the Korean question and its modest contribution to the efforts of the United Nations in Korea, Mr. Malik

<sup>5</sup> See document S/1896.

explained that, if it was considered that aggression had occurred in June 1950, it must follow that aggression had also occurred in October or November of that year. Aggression was aggression, whether undertaken by a small or a major Power, whether it was a local affair or involved the peace of the whole world. The question of collective security also entered into the matter. While many Members of the United Nations could rely upon regional arrangements for such security, others, who belonged to no system apart from the United Nations, would be exposed to danger should the Organization disintegrate.

54. The United States of America was an indispensable part of the system of collective security. Nothing must be done to discourage the people of the United States from taking vigorous interest in and giving leadership to the Organization. In view of the role of the United States in supporting the United Nations in the Far East, it would be very difficult for a country supporting collective security not to do everything in its power to avoid such discouragement.

55. For those reasons the Lebanese delegation would press for a vote on the twelve-Power revised draft resolution, but would also vote in favour of the United States draft resolution should it be put to the vote.

56. Regarding the second paragraph of the United States draft resolution, Mr. Malik thought that it would be difficult to say that the Government of the People's Republic of China had rejected "all" proposals. The phraseology of the twelve-Power draft resolution "noting the reply" might be used, or if that formula were held to imply some degree of approbation, it might be possible to use words such as "having received". The last two paragraphs of the United States draft resolution were crucial. It might be worth while to explore the suggestion of the representative of Israel (432nd meeting) that the order of those paragraphs should be reversed. What was important was that if the action envisaged in the last paragraph should produce any results, that envisaged in the penultimate paragraph must surely be suspended. Whatever the wording used, it should be made clear that, while the procedure of peaceful negotiation was going on, every effort would be made to ensure fruitful results.

57. In conclusion, Mr. Malik disagreed with the Polish representative's fears concerning the possible consequences of the adoption of the United States draft resolution. The Australian (430th meeting), New Zealand (431st meeting) and other representatives had made it clear that no one would be authorized to do anything not already authorized by existing resolutions of the United Nations. A solemn declaration to that effect by the United States representative would remove any possibility of doubt on that point.

58. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) stated that his Government appreciated the motives which had inspired the submission of the revised twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/642/Rev.1). He believed that nearly all the members of the Committee were determined to bring to an end the situation in the Far East, continuance of which was likely to endanger the maintenance of world peace and security. The only exceptions were the representatives of the Soviet bloc who could

not speak in the Committee without giving vent to their hatred of all the free countries of the world, and in particular of the United States of America. Save for the role of those few members, the debate in the Committee had been of remarkable benefit to the cause of world peace and to the cause of arresting aggression, of preventing its spread and of discouraging its renewal.

59. The world was awaiting the answer to two grave questions confronting the Committee. One was whether the United Nations was capable of pronouncing a moral judgment in accordance with the obvious facts; the other question was whether it was capable of formulating measures and means for taking collective action based on those facts and on that judgment. Mr. Austin shared the Lebanese representative's faith in the Committee, whose debate had resulted in such a consolidation of unity that only a very small minority would not share in that unity once the Committee's deliberations were concluded. The necessity of that unity was made apparent every time a single member of the minority of five spoke and explained why there must be unity and collective security.

60. The differences that existed concerned the methods which would lead to the agreed objective, namely the restoration of peace. While there might be a dozen different methods equally good in the estimation of the originator, it was the duty of the Committee to come to agreement. In that connexion Mr. Austin recalled that a few days previously (430th meeting) he had asked whether the United Nations should put itself in a position of a suppliant before a transgressor and make further appeals to him. His Government felt strongly that the United Nations should face the fact that its efforts to find a peaceful solution up to that time had been rejected. If the word "all" in its context, in the second paragraph of the United States draft resolution, was an obstacle to unity, a solution would be simple, though any change would have to be submitted to the other countries which had participated in originating the idea of the draft resolution submitted by his delegation.

61. Though time had not been wasted, and a great increase in unity had been achieved, the moment for decision and for making unity correspond to the facts had come. The facts of the case were that Chinese communist armed forces had entered Korea and attacked the forces of the United Nations in the last week of October. Throughout the three months since then, the United Nations had striven to find a peaceful solution and had therefore avoided facing the issue presented to it. The United Nations had shown extraordinary forbearance and had proved its will for peace beyond any doubt. In the view of the people and Government of the United States, the circumstances did not justify further delay in naming the aggressor. The United States opposed any further United Nations action which would avoid facing the long overdue decision to recognize formally that the Chinese communists were aggressors in Korea and to take suitable action.

62. For those reasons, his delegation opposed the revised twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/642/Rev.1) and would vote against it if it were pressed to a vote. Mr. Austin urged the Committee to consider most seriously the effect of such a vote on the moral

position and prestige of the United Nations, so eloquently alluded to by the representative of Lebanon. Even if the revised twelve-Power draft resolution were amended to overcome his delegation's objections, which were not unimportant, Mr. Austin would still oppose it for those reasons. He reiterated that the group to be set up under the last paragraph of the United States draft resolution would be free, immediately upon the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly, to use its good offices to obtain the objectives aimed at by the Asian and Arab group. If it appeared desirable, the Assembly of course could give suitable guidance to that group. The questions involved would present themselves in a different light once the United Nations had faced and surmounted the central issue.

63. Noting the Canadian (432nd meeting) and Lebanese representatives' statements to the effect that it was not the intention of the United States draft resolution to give the Unified Command any authority which it did not already possess, Mr. Austin stated that that was likewise the view of his Government. As for doubts concerning the penultimate paragraph, under the terms of which a committee—which, as the representative of Australia had pointed out (430th meeting), would really be an *ad hoc* body—would be requested, as a matter of urgency, to consider additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea and to report thereon to the General Assembly, Mr. Austin stated that that body would of course take account in its work, and particularly in its report, of any results which might be achieved by the good offices group in the direction of a cessation of hostilities and a peaceful solution of the Korean question. The report of that *ad hoc* body would be fully discussed in the General Assembly. It would be for the Assembly, not the *ad hoc* body, to make recommendations regarding proposals made by the latter or any other recommendations which the General Assembly might see fit to adopt. In other words, that paragraph of the draft resolution in no way departed from the normal procedure of the General Assembly, nor did it introduce any new elements into the situation. Its adoption would not commit any Member to any particular measure.

64. Regarding the suggestion of the Israel delegation (432nd meeting) that the eighth paragraph of the United States draft resolution should be dropped or amended so that the *ad hoc* committee would take no action until a further effort towards a peaceful solution

had been tried and had failed, Mr. Austin pointed out that that was the effect of that paragraph according to the normal understanding of the language. The eighth and ninth paragraphs were complementary: if the good offices group reported satisfactory progress towards a peaceful settlement, then the *ad hoc* committee on collective measures would withhold its report.

65. It was not true that the adoption of the United States draft resolution would slam the door on a peaceful settlement. The promotion of peace was the primary objective of that proposal, as it was of the United Nations action in Korea.

66. Moreover, had it not been for the new aggression, the whole problem would have been finished and settled. A careful reading of the United States draft resolution made it clear that the door would always remain open for Chinese communists to cease their attack on United Nations forces, and permit the achievement, by peaceful means, of United Nations objectives in Korea. Nor would the appointment of the *ad hoc* committee referred to in the eighth paragraph in any way hinder a peaceful settlement. Indeed, it was the fervent hope of his Government that the work of that committee would help to convince the Peking régime and others responsible for the situation that the Peking régime should agree to an honourable peace.

67. Obviously the *ad hoc* body, which would be a realistic committee performing realistic tasks, would follow carefully the action of the United Nations forces in Korea and the military situation. Equally obviously, it should and would take into account the efforts of the good offices group established under the last paragraph, and also any clear indication that the Peking régime had had a change of heart and wished to live by the principles of the United Nations Charter. Furthermore, in considering the report of the *ad hoc* committee, the General Assembly would take into full account any progress made by the good offices group in its efforts to bring about a cease-fire and a peaceful settlement. There was no reason not to put the *ad hoc* committee to work immediately. If the good offices group continued to be unsuccessful in its efforts, time would not have been lost. If, on the other hand, it should be able to report hopeful progress or success, certainly no damage would have been done by the activity of the *ad hoc* committee.

The meeting rose at 2.50 p.m.