



**Tuesday, 24 November 1953,  
at 3 p.m.**

**New York**

**C O N T E N T S**

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**Chairman: Mr. F. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium).**

**Measures to avert the threat of a new world war  
and to reduce tension in international relations  
(A/2485/Rev.1 and A/2485/Add.1) (*con-  
tinued*)**

[Item 73]\*

1. Mr. LODGE (United States) said that the charges levelled against the United States by the USSR representative were so stale and showed such an ignorance of American realities that there was no point in replying to them. When, however, that representative accused the United States Government of exacerbating international tension, it was well to examine objectively the record of the last few years in relation to that subject. Such an examination would reveal that the United States had persistently tried, for example, to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the German problem. When it had become clear, after six sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers, that the Soviet Union would not agree to the unification of Germany, the western Powers had been compelled to proceed with the unification of their three zones. While the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany had represented the greatest degree of unification possible in 1949, the western Powers had repeatedly tried to induce the Soviet Union to agree to the reunification of Germany in freedom. On 25 May 1950, the three western High Commissioners had proposed a meeting with the Soviet Control Commission with a view to preparing for general elections throughout Germany. The Soviet commission had not replied to that proposal, nor had it replied when on 10 October 1950 the High Commissioners had renewed the proposal, transmitting a resolution on the subject by the Federal Diet.

2. Between 5 March and 21 June 1951 the Deputies of the western Foreign Ministers had held seventy-three meetings with the Deputy of the Soviet Union Foreign Minister, without even reaching agreement on an agenda for a Foreign Ministers' conference.

3. On 20 December 1951, the General Assembly had set up a commission to investigate whether conditions in Germany were such as to permit the holding of free elections throughout the country. The Soviet authorities had steadfastly refused to co-operate with the commission. During 1952 the western Powers had ex-

changed four notes with the Soviet Union, asking it to agree to discuss preparations for all-German elections. In reply, the Soviet Union had insisted on the absolute necessity of working out a peace treaty for Germany. It had been obvious that no discussion of the matter could be contemplated without the presence of the true representatives of the German people, who could be chosen only by means of free elections.

4. On 15 July 1953, the three western Foreign Ministers had decided, after consulting Chancellor Adenauer, to propose once again a four-Power conference to discuss the German and Austrian problems. The Soviet Union's response to the three separate proposals sent to it on 15 July, 2 September and 18 October, made it abundantly clear that it had no desire for an understanding on the German problem. In its note of 3 November 1953, for example, it declared that an all-German Government, formed by agreement between the Federal Republic and the authorities of the Soviet zone, must be set up before all-German elections could be held; it insisted that progress on the ratification of the European Defence Community treaty should be suspended; and it made the convening of a conference on Germany contingent upon the admission of the so-called Peoples' Republic of China, to a meeting on the question of international tensions. The western Powers, however, had not made their proposals for negotiations dependent upon any special conditions.

5. Despite the obvious reluctance of the Soviet Union Government, the western Powers had renewed their previous proposal in their note of 16 November 1953, in the conviction that negotiations on Germany and Austria would improve the chances of establishing real peace in the world.

6. With regard to the Soviet representative's description of the economic crisis in the United States and the wretched living conditions which, he said, existed in the free world, it would be interesting to know why, in that case, whenever aircraft, stolen trains or improvised armoured cars pierced the Iron Curtain, their point of origin was always in Soviet territory.

7. During the preceding week the First Committee had adopted a resolution (A/C.1/L.88) reaffirming the competence of the Disarmament Commission. In spite of that resolution the Soviet Union representative had again submitted three disarmament proposals to the First Committee. Since that Committee had already rejected the first two Soviet proposals, the United States delegation considered that it ought likewise to reject the disarmament proposals submitted by the Soviet Union under that item of the agenda.

8. Nevertheless it was to be pointed out in connexion with paragraph 4 of the operative part of the Soviet draft resolution (A/2485/Rev.1), which condemned the propaganda being conducted in a number of coun-

\* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

tries with the aim of inciting hatred among nations, that it was certainly possible to find among the various media of information in the United States every possible attitude towards the Soviet Union, ranging from hatred to slavish praise: the American Press was a free Press. Things were often said in the Press or on the radio with which many Americans disagreed. The experience of the last ten years had aroused in many Americans a fear of Soviet imperialism as a danger to their safety and was the reason why the majority of Americans and the greater part of the Press viewed the ruling circles in the Soviet Union with something less than affection. The best means of bringing about a change of attitude in the American Press would be for the Soviet Union to change its policy. However, anyone in the United States who did not approve of his local newspaper's attitude to the Soviet Union could buy the *Daily Worker*, which was a faithful translation of *Pravda*. He could also listen to the Moscow radio and read the Soviet Union representative's speeches which were printed in all American papers. In the United States everyone was free to learn the views of every other country in the world.

9. The position of the Soviet citizen was quite different. If he went to the cinema that week, he would certainly see a film called *Silvery Dust*, which was being shown in twenty-one Moscow cinemas. It was a melodrama of money-lust, brutality and crimes committed entirely by Americans, showing the capitalists of the New World carrying out experiments with radioactive materials on human guinea pigs. If the Soviet citizen went to the theatre, he would probably see such plays as *The Jackals* or *Guardian Angel from Nebraska*, with plots along the same lines as that of *Silvery Dust*. If he bought a newspaper, the Soviet citizen might read in the *Literary Gazette* a description of the mediaeval tortures used in United States prisons, or he might look at the anti-American cartoons in *Krokodil* or learn from *Pravda* that Colorado beetles had been dropped in Czechoslovakia from United States aircraft in order to bring starvation to the people of that country. According to a teacher's guide published in Romania, the teacher must acquaint the children with basic communist principles and inculcate in them a hatred for the bourgeois school of the past. He must, according to *Pravda*, published in the Ukraine, reveal to his pupils the whole truth about the extreme poverty and lack of rights of the people in capitalist countries, about the enemies of their motherland, the Anglo-American imperialists, and their crimes against toiling humanity.

10. There was nothing in the Soviet Union to counteract that type of hate propaganda. There were no free newspapers or radio stations. The Soviet Government had devoted considerable efforts to ensuring that the only picture of the United States available to the Soviet public was the one turned out by the party propaganda machine. Even religion was directed exclusively to the purposes of the State. The arrest and impending trial of the Polish Cardinal Wyszynski was a proof of that regrettable fact. Thus each year the Iron Curtain was becoming heavier.

11. The General Assembly, which did not like campaigns of hate, had on many occasions expressed its opinion, more particularly in resolution 110 (II) of 3 November 1947. Unfortunately what was lacking was not United Nations resolutions, but a desire on the

part of the Soviet Union to live up to the spirit of those resolutions.

12. In December 1949, in its "Essentials of peace" resolution (290 (IV)), the General Assembly had called upon every nation to remove the barriers which denied to peoples the free exchange of information and ideas essential to international understanding and peace. In November 1950, the General Assembly, in its resolution 381 (V), had condemned propaganda against peace, reiterating the principles already developed.

13. Those resolutions put the question of propaganda in its proper perspective. The United States had supported all of them and every recommendation contained in them. They were still operative and nothing further was needed in the way of resolutions. What was needed was a desire to live up to the spirit of those resolutions.

14. The United States delegation would vote against the Soviet draft resolution in all its parts since the first three operative paragraphs merely revived proposals which the Soviet Union had made on numerous occasions and which the General Assembly had found to be unsound. Paragraph 4 likewise revived a matter with which the General Assembly had frequently dealt.

15. The United States still hoped that the day would come when the campaign of hatred would cease, but as long as it went on there was no choice but to recognize the fact.

16. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) noted that the new Soviet proposal reintroduced the idea of the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the one-third reduction in armaments. There could be no doubt that the proposal, like its predecessors, should be referred to the Disarmament Commission.

17. Furthermore, if it were true, as Mr. Vyshinsky himself had admitted, that a declaration on the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon would be nothing more than a moral obligation, and that the problem would not really be settled until some international legal instrument was established proclaiming that prohibition was the guarantee of control, the Committee must reject paragraph 1 of the operative part of the Soviet draft (A/2485/Rev.1). If it only revived a matter on which the Committee had already taken a decision, it was superfluous. If, on the contrary, it was a new proposal, the attitude of the Soviet Union was extremely dangerous because it implied that the establishment of a legal instrument was impossible. There was no other solution than the legal prohibition of the atomic weapon and international control over that prohibition. To say that prohibition and control would cease to be urgent because a moral condemnation of atomic weapons would in some vague terms have been pronounced, would be to run the risk of misleading world public opinion in a dangerous manner. For that reason alone, it was impossible to adopt paragraph 1 of the Soviet draft resolution.

18. Mr. Belaúnde then took up the consideration of paragraph 3, which was a protest against the military bases recently established by the western Powers. The establishment of those bases, however, was no more than the expression of a very clear recognition on the part of those Powers, of the perils to which Europe was exposed. Contrary to the statements made by Mr. Vyshinsky, international tension had existed before the bases were established, and it was that tension

which had created the need to build up a defence system.

19. It was interesting to study how that tension had arisen and how it had developed. While it was true, as Mr. Vyshinsky had said, that the conclusion of an Armistice Agreement in Korea had been a sign of the reduction in tension in international relations, it was nevertheless certain that the easing of tension itself resulted from Europe's decision to defend itself against any attempt at aggression.

20. Immediately after the war the European countries had been exhausted and the economic situation had been serious both in Europe and in the Soviet Union. The latter, however, had been able to occupy new territories. In the West as in the East, the military machines had been very large but whereas the United States' only purpose had been to disarm, the Soviet Union had increased its military might both at home and in the territories it had annexed. Moreover, certain European countries had experienced great difficulties in establishing a government. Germany, had no longer existed as a state. France and Italy had been compelled to admit the Communists, that was to say, the fifth column, into their governments. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had been led by a powerful government able to act with the efficiency of a totalitarian régime. To those facts could also be added the far-reaching changes which had occurred in the United States after the death of President Roosevelt and in the United Kingdom as a result of the elections. In the Soviet Union nothing had changed. It should also be noted that the right of criticism, an attribute of democratic nations, while essential as a brake on attempts at absolutism, nevertheless diminished the efficiency of the executive power. In addition, there had been the personality of Stalin himself who had represented an undeniable attraction for a great many people. Considering the matter from another aspect, it should not be forgotten that the European countries had been absorbed in the reconstruction of their devastated territories. And face to face with those problems there had been the United States Government which had had no political experience of Europe and the Soviet Union which had been concerned with Europe for more than a century and a half. Russia, pan-slavist after having been pan-marxist, was attempting, according to tradition, to find outlets to the Adriatic and to subjugate the Balkans.

21. To have a clear picture of the post-war situation, another psychological factor should also be borne in mind: the confidence which the democratic countries had placed in the San Francisco Charter. Though the USSR had been a signatory to the Charter, the provisions of which might be described as a vision of the future, it had in fact been concerned politically only with the realities of the moment. Thus, the USSR maintained a maximum military force and kept annexed countries, despite the treaties it had signed with them, in the role of satellites. In 1948, the Convention of 1921, which set up the international status of the Danube, was denounced and replaced by a new diplomatic instrument which excluded the influence of the great Powers with the exception of the Soviet Union. Western influence had come to an end in that part of Europe.

22. Next had come the threat to Greece, the "sovietization" of Eastern Germany and the maintenance of a garrison in Austria despite a treaty signed with the

country. From 1947 to 1949 the international tension had been appalling and it had been feared that the USSR would invade Europe.

23. In the face of such a tense situation, the threatened countries, as was natural and inevitable, united. To Europe, which the Soviet Union preferred to starve, the United States proposed the Marshall Plan. Greece and Turkey were defended. The Treaty of Brussels organized an alliance of European nations. European peoples gradually came to realize the need for a true union, a concept which had taken shape in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

24. Far from increasing international tension the North Atlantic Treaty, the Treaty of Brussels and the European Recovery Programme had helped to ease it by providing the USSR with an example of an objective and reasoned policy of resistance to possible invasion. In the French Chamber of Deputies, Mr. Robert Schuman had recently mentioned the fact that the Berlin blockade had been lifted a few days after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty.

25. During that time in Asia the Soviet Union had shown its intention of keeping Manchuria and Port Arthur. It had opposed the unification of Korea which it had demanded should be divided. Then came aggression. Could anyone still doubt who was responsible for international tension? However, men had not shed their blood in Korea merely for the cause of Korean independence. Thanks to their sacrifice, the armistice which had been concluded had held out hopes of a new policy on the part of the Soviet Union. Indeed, an easing of international tension was to be observed since the death of Stalin, not because of a change in communist ideology, but because of a change in the economic and military situation.

26. The Congress of Vienna, because it set up a barrier in the way of Russia's political expansion particularly in Crimea, had ensured forty years of peace in Europe. Useful lessons could be drawn from those events.

27. Substituting the right of peoples to self-determination for the concept of the divine right of kings, the democratic world had seen free elections held in the Netherlands, Greece and Italy where all contentious issues had been solved in freedom. But what was even more important, the law of the Charter had been imposed above all else as the supreme legal instrument. That instrument had been intended to bring about an atmosphere of conciliation and harmony and if it had not done so, the blame could in no instance be laid at the door of the United Nations.

28. In a recent speech Marshall Voroshilov had referred to the USSR's policy with respect to Asia. China had been described as a powerful bulwark of the oppressed peoples of the East in their struggle for freedom, democracy and true independence. But there were truly independent governments in Asia and they had no need of a new saviour, who would in fact be nothing but a conqueror. In the face of such statements it was necessary to affirm the need for a policy of defence based on respect for the law and for the principles of the Charter, with hostility towards none, to bring about the unity of Europe and to establish legal control of atomic weapons: these were the means of guaranteeing peace in the world. A weak Europe would revive tensions and increase the risk of aggression.



29. Mr. Belaúnde then considered what were in his opinion the elements of a true peace.

30. The first element was the attainment of a reasonable equilibrium, without antagonism and without aggressive intentions.

31. An increase of international trade would also be a factor of primary importance. It would have been interesting for the Soviet Union to submit a proposal to that effect. How could anyone speak of the peaceful coexistence of the communist system and the western capitalist system if there was no exchange of ideas between the two? Why should the exchange of technical and scientific information not be increased?

32. Lastly, peace demanded above all the cessation of ideological and religious persecutions. Yet those persecutions had recently been resumed in Poland, a nation which was for Latin America a symbol of the defence of individual and national liberties. Why must the Polish Government imprison the clergy and destroy the religious hierarchy, in a desire to substitute a hierarchy of the State? Opposition to religious persecution was the duty not merely of a particular sect, but of all men of goodwill concerned with spiritual values.

33. Mr. Belaúnde realized that he was recommending a policy of resistance, a defensive policy which was always difficult to apply when it had to be confined to passive resistance and must avoid any increase of tension. Such a policy could succeed for two reasons, first, because the West's aim was to achieve peace and economic progress, and secondly, because the acts of those governments were controlled by public opinion and were subject to moral laws, and because the principles of the Charter were respected. That was why the policy of resistance was maintained within the limits imposed by reason and without any animosity.

34. As the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs had said, that policy of resistance should not prevent the States who practiced it from reaching an understanding with Russia. There must be a return to the old policy of contacts and some area of agreement must be sought, in a spirit of understanding and generosity and, as the Vice-President of India had said, the world should not give up hope of spiritual change in the Soviet Union. But why was there such a distance between Russia and the western world when on the battlefield where the defeat of Hitler had been accomplished all the combatants had been brothers? In order to revive that fraternity, the Soviet Union must give up its psychosis of domination, which had created international tension. It must return to the Charter of the United Nations and give heed to world public opinion.

35. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/2485/Rev.1) was a comprehensive programme likely to renew confidence between the great Powers and meet the aspirations of the working masses, which were awaiting the end of the armaments race. The cessation of hostilities in Korea was already a preliminary success and should be consolidated in order to reduce international tension. It was in that spirit that the Soviet note of 3 November to the United States, the United Kingdom and France had proposed the calling of a conference of the five Foreign Min-

isters. On 13 November, Mr. Molotov had noted at a Press conference that public opinion welcomed that constructive proposal.

36. However, certain American quarters had reacted quite differently. Mr. Eisenhower himself had asserted that the Soviet proposal was negative and that the Soviet Union did not really want such a meeting. The facts showed, however, that the Soviet Union, in its notes of 4 August, 28 September and 3 November 1953 had already raised the question of such a conference, which was designed to strengthen peace and security. Nevertheless, Mr. Dulles in his statement of 9 November had given the signal for attacks by the reactionary Press by referring to unacceptable "Soviet demands".

37. Mr. Dulles' aim, as was clearly shown in the western notes of 16 November, had been to ensure failure of the proposal to hold a conference. Likewise on 19 November (671st Meeting) Mr. Wadsworth had flown in the face of the facts by refusing to acknowledge the possibilities of a reduction in tension offered by the Soviet proposal.

38. It was therefore not surprising that in the First Committee the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Dominican Republic, Canada and Uruguay had attempted to shift the blame for the prevailing international tension on to the Soviet Union, while Mr. Belaúnde had tried to find in history proof that the Soviet Union had practiced a policy of expansion.

39. Fortunately, however, the whole world knew that the Soviet proposal contained in the present draft, as well as the efforts directed at the peaceful unification of Germany and the solution of the Korean problem, were in keeping with a Soviet tradition of long standing: the famous decree issued by Lenin on peace, the Soviet proposals at the Geneva Conference and disarmament projects submitted in 1926 to the League of Nations. Unfortunately, it was to the interest of certain circles that the tension should become worse: that was why the invitation sent to the three Powers to attend a conference of the five Foreign Ministers had been rejected. Yet, nothing was more necessary for a relaxation of international tension than the restoration of China's legitimate rights.

40. In view of the increase of armaments in the capitalist countries, the Soviet Union was submitting a draft resolution (A/2485/Rev.1), which in the first paragraph of its operative part proposed unconditional prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and asked the Security Council to take immediate measures with a view to instituting a strict international control. Indeed, the Soviet Union had from the outset proposed to the Atomic Energy Commission the prohibition not only of the use but also of the production and stockpiling of atomic weapons, so that a new source of energy should be used only to further the welfare of the world. But at the same time the Soviet Union was aware that strict international control was essential. The proposed control organ would therefore have the right to carry out inspections continuously, without, however, being able to interfere in the domestic affairs of States.

41. Faced with the Soviet proposals, the ruling circles of the United States, which were pursuing a policy of force and domination had caused American diplomacy

to confuse the issue of the prohibition of atomic arms. For that purpose it had been proposed to examine another question, the establishment of a control organ which would deliver all atomic undertakings into the hands of the big American trusts. That had been the case with the Baruch plan of 1946, which was merely an American political weapon designed to hamper prohibition and supervision. Already on 3 June 1952 the American weekly *Look* had recognized that the plan was based on incorrect ideas. But the United States adhered to it and proposed to defer any decision on prohibition, by means of a plan of disclosure in five stages, while the American services were being supplied with all the information they required. It was true that Mr. Kyrrou had asserted (671st meeting) that the prohibition of arms of mass destruction was not urgent, thus acting as the spokesman of American reactionary circles. But world public opinion had declared itself in favour of the proposal in paragraph 1 of the operative part of the Soviet draft.

42. The magnitude of the arms race in the United States could be seen from an article in the publication *U. S. News & World Report* of 3 July 1953, which reported that \$US9 billion was invested in the atomic industry. Similarly, Mr. Wilson had said on 12 May that he was in favour of a strengthening of atomic artillery and *The New York Times* of 8 June 1953 had reported that the Atomic Energy Commission had approved a programme of expansion.

43. Thus, the United States was refusing to heed the clamour of the peoples, who wanted an easing of international tension and, having lost its atomic monopoly, it stopped at nothing in order to preserve its hegemony. Mr. Bedell Smith had said in June 1953 that it was important for United States diplomacy to maintain United States supremacy in the atomic field. On 12 October 1953, the weekly magazine *Life*, describing stockpiles of atomic weapons, both strategic and tactical, had cynically stated that they would make it possible to effect savings in the cost of killing an enemy, a cost which amounted to \$US10,000 in Korea. But to do that, according to *Life*, people must decide to use atomic weapons.

44. The United States was anxious to maintain supremacy in atomic weapons and to have a bombing force enabling it to wage atomic war in any part of the world.

45. Some American personalities were no less cynical than the Press. The physicist Oppenheimer, writing in the magazine *Foreign Affairs* in June 1953, had stated that the United States had always wanted to enjoy full freedom to use the atomic bomb. Such barbarous statements emphasized the urgency of prohibiting weapons of mass destruction. On the one hand, public opinion had declared itself and, on the other, prohibition was the only way for control to have any point. The fact that the United States did not share that view showed that it wanted to continue to produce atomic weapons.

46. Paragraph 2 of the operative part dealt with the reduction of the armed forces of the five permanent members of the Security Council by one-third within one year. The armaments race imposed an increasingly heavy financial burden on the peoples. To justify them by alleging a threat from the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies was nothing but a preposterous fable.

47. The figures on the United States armed forces were significant: size of the army, 4 million men, plus 2 million in the reserve and the National Guard, with a cost of upkeep amounting to \$US12,900 million; air force, one million men, 133 wings, 25,000 aeroplanes and a budget of more than \$US11 billion; navy, a million men and a budget of \$US9,400 million. The fact that two-thirds of the American armed forces were made up of the air force and the navy proved the falsity of the United States assertion that they were merely defensive forces. The fact that the United States air force had a budget ten times higher than in 1948 showed that it had aggressive intentions. In the same spirit the United States was attempting to pressure the six countries of Europe into ratifying the treaty setting up a European army, which was to include twelve divisions from Western Germany. Already manœuvres and the building of bases showed that those forces were on a wartime footing, ready to go into action against the Soviet Union.

48. In the circumstances, it was not surprising that the United States, the United Kingdom and France were against the USSR plan for the reduction of armaments, and wanted to substitute for it a proposal to legalize armies which they did not intend to reduce. On 28 October 1953, Mr. Eisenhower had still been emphasizing the progress of the United States air force, and Mr. Wilson had been telling a committee of the Senate in June 1953 that the United States intended to increase its armed forces.

49. Most brazen of all was the attempt to make the Soviet Union responsible for the armaments race when it was the Soviet Union which had submitted a practical and concrete proposal for disarmament. Mr. Kyrrou had criticized the USSR text as only a member of the Atlantic bloc could. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was still ready to consider the question of disarmament. Moreover, only the negative position of the United States had brought about the inertia of the Disarmament Commission during 1953.

50. With regard to paragraph 3 of the operative part, military bases destroyed the sovereignty and independence of the countries on whose territories they were established. Moreover, the fact that they were so close to the borders of the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies showed that they were not defensive in nature. On 15 March 1953, the *New York Herald Tribune* had reviewed the bases recently constructed and had pointed out that by the end of the year, the United States would have 125 new bases. In that connexion, Mr. Kyrrou had claimed that the agreement concluded by his country with the United States was purely defensive and had been conceived in the spirit of Article 52 of the Charter. But the Soviet Union, in its note to Greece on 26 October 1953, had pointed out that those measures amounted to preparation for a new war and that they could not be said to be defensive because nobody was planning to attack Greece. Greece's action in placing its bases at the disposal of a foreign Power was therefore a threat of war in the Balkans and could only increase international tension.

51. It was true that Mr. Kyrrou had quoted Professor Kelsen to the effect that the North Atlantic Treaty was regional. But the Soviet Foreign Minister had already showed that NATO was a violation of the Charter and the truth of his statement had been

recognized by the head of the legal section of the Foreign Office. In a recent report and in one of his books, Mr. Beckett had admitted that NATO was not regional. Similarly, the Swiss publication *Die Friedenswarte*, in an article going back to 1950, had held that NATO was not a regional treaty since, in view of the ties between the United States and the United Kingdom, it could drag the entire Commonwealth and all of America into a war.

52. Thus the entire system built up at Potsdam to prevent another German aggression was being destroyed. Moreover, because of its aggressive nature NATO was a violation of the United Nations Charter. Finally, it contravened the treaties of alliance France and the United Kingdom had concluded with the Soviet Union.

53. A very characteristic proof of the aggressive nature of NATO was the recent agreement whereby Franco, the former ally of Hitler, was now allied with the Atlantic bloc and had placed naval and air bases at the disposal of the United States. The *New York Herald Tribune* had already stated on 10 October that construction work was about to begin and Mr. Wilson had given the Secretary of the Air Force full powers to deal with the matter. A sum of more than \$US200 million had been temporarily provided.

54. Not only in Europe, but in the Near East and in the Far East, the United States policy of military bases was meeting resistance on the part of the people, for they understood that the bases were for aggressive purposes and threatened their national sovereignty, as well as international peace and security.

55. With regard to paragraph 4 of the operative part of the draft resolution, it was to be noted that certain groups feared a reduction of international tension and, to prevent it, they indulged in unrestrainedly slanderous attacks against the peace-loving States in order to set up a war psychosis. For example, in the *Journal-American* of 4 February 1953, General Wedemeyer had advocated an all-out attack on China, the breaking-off of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and the exclusion of the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies from the United Nations. The purpose of such propaganda was to mask aggressive plans which revealed themselves in the setting-up of blocs and military bases, and in the cold war. On 5 October 1953 *The New York Times* had announced the setting-up of a new body to strengthen psychological warfare propaganda. Likewise, on 21 September 1953 the *New York Herald Tribune* had referred to plans for the so-called liberation of Soviet territory from the Urals to Kamchatka: American reactionary forces were thus endeavouring to put into effect plans for domination over other peoples which would share the same fate as the Hitlerite and Japanese adventures. On 31 March 1953 the periodical *The Reporter* had drawn attention to the favourable view of psychological warfare in Washington. It was now a question of "liberating", and no longer of "containing", in order to wrest the initiative from the opposing camp. In that way American ruling circles were preparing public opinion for war. On 26 January 1953, William Jackson, a banker, had been appointed chairman of a committee to intensify various cold-war activities, especially espionage and sabotage. Needless to say, the pretext

of a threat of Soviet aggression, to which the Peruvian representative had referred, was being used to frighten the peoples.

56. In point of fact, war propaganda was quite simply a violation of resolution 110 (II) of 3 November 1947, and men of sincerity were demanding that it should be stopped.

57. The United States, United Kingdom, Canadian, Greek, Uruguayan and Peruvian representatives had stated that the Soviet proposals were not new. That did not mean that they were not practical, however, or that they did not acquire increasing importance with every year that passed, even though the Anglo-American majority systematically rejected them. Present circumstances made the adoption of the proposals more necessary than ever, and his delegation supported the Soviet draft resolution (A/2485/Rev.1), which was designed to avert the threat of a new world war.

58. Mr. SCHNEITER (France) pointed out that the Soviet draft resolution differed very little from the proposals that had already been rejected by the General Assembly by 45 votes on 19 January 1952 (363rd plenary meeting). Bringing up the texts which the General Assembly had considered unacceptable was, unfortunately, not the way to contribute to a reduction of international tension.

59. The Soviet proposals fell into two parts: three points relating to disarmament and a fourth relating to propaganda.

60. The Polish delegation had withdrawn its draft resolution at the seventh session in order to enable a unanimous vote to be recorded on the necessity of concluding an armistice in Korea. He wondered whether Mr. Vyshinsky might not also be able to withdraw his proposal so that the five abstentions on the resolutions concerning disarmament would be converted into affirmative votes at the plenary meeting. The conversations advocated in the draft resolution adopted by the First Committee (A/C.1/L.88) should yield favourable results, and the French Government, whose only desire was to facilitate them, would be happy to receive the small committee in Paris.

61. The proposals relating to atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces came within the purview of the Disarmament Commission, which would consider the Soviet proposals, among others.

62. In regard to propaganda, France had always upheld the principle of freedom of information and free dissemination of news at the United Nations and had been the originator of the Convention on the International Right of Correction. But what was important above all else was that there should be freedom of expression in all countries.

63. The truth was that the Soviet draft resolution primarily pursued propaganda aims.

64. France needed peace after two world wars. It was also anxious to ensure its security and reserved the right to conclude alliances. Without forgetting the role recently played by the Soviet army, France did not forget the aid extended to it by Great Britain and the United States; from that fact it had accordingly drawn certain conclusions which were reflected in the North Atlantic Treaty. When the security of

a country had been ensured, however, the peace of the world must be stabilized by eliminating the risks of aggression, whatever their nature. To sum up, the goodwill and sincerity of the great Powers should be translated into action; it was not enough to submit draft resolutions. There were some problems for which it should be easy to find a solution, regardless of how slight a desire there was to reach a settlement. He mentioned the Austrian question by way of an example. On 20 December 1952 the General Assembly had adopted a resolution on Austria (613 (VII)). That country, the nazis' first victim, had a single government and was not divided into zones. Nevertheless, more than 300 meetings of the Foreign Ministers had been held without achieving any results. He wondered whether the Soviet Government considered the presence of its armies in Vienna necessary to the maintenance of peace. The United Nations must redouble its efforts on behalf of the Austrian people.

65. His Government took the view that each problem should be solved separately: it had hailed the Korean Armistice and would do everything in its power to end the conflict in Indochina. Once the centres of conflagration had been extinguished, the difficulties resulting from the World War would still have to be settled.

66. His delegation had been gratified to hear the Peruvian and Uruguayan representatives' appeal for peace.

67. Whilst it was for an international organization to consider all controversial issues, and for the Security Council to settle disputes, special situations should be dealt with by special conferences and through special contacts. It was therefore regrettable that in the matter of Germany and Austria many invitations had been refused.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.