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*Chairman: Mr. Roberto URDANETA ARBELÁEZ (Colombia).*

**Intervention of the Central People's Government  
of the People's Republic of China in Korea  
(continued)**

[Item 76]\*

**SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE GROUP ON CEASE-FIRE  
IN KOREA (A/C.1/645)**

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representative of the Republic of Korea took his seat at the Committee table.*

1. Mr. PEARSON (Canada) recalled that the representative of Norway, on 3 January 1951 (419th meeting), had asked whether the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea had given any consideration to the problem of what principles would have to be laid down as basis for possible negotiations subsequent to the envisaged establishment of a cease-fire. The Group was now in a position to make a statement on that question, and that statement was contained in the Group's supplementary report (A/C.1/645).

2. Agreement on a statement of that kind was not an easy task. Anything the Group proposed naturally had to be in accordance with the principles of the Charter and with previous resolutions of the General Assembly on Korea (112 (II), 195 (III), 293 (IV) and A/1435). The statement had to be realistic enough to have a good chance of being accepted by those concerned, without being disloyal to previous obligations. Also such a statement had to recognize the relationship between a cease-fire and a political settlement and the importance of proceeding from one stage to another with a minimum of delay but with an understanding that one stage was dependent on the other. Above all, any statement of principles should be aimed at removing fears, suspicions and distrust. It was in that spirit that the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea had approached that task. The statement of the Group dealt in a broad way with principles only and with a programme based on those principles. There were many details which would have to be filled in later. The representative of

Canada assumed that, if the First Committee approved those principles in some formal way, they would then be transmitted to the Peking Government for its consideration.

3. Mr. Pearson, after having read to the Committee the supplementary report of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea (A/C.1/645) added that the Group shared the feelings of many others that there was a very real danger of the armed conflict in Korea spreading over the whole of the Far East, if it was not quickly brought to an end. That would result in a third world war with all its dire consequences. To prevent such a catastrophe, supreme efforts had to be made, involving, first of all, the stopping of the fighting in Korea; the establishment of a united and democratic Korea and a peaceful settlement of other Far Eastern problems. The representative of Canada concluded by stating that it might well be that nothing less than a conference of the governments concerned, under the auspices of the United Nations, could bring an agreed solution of Far Eastern problems.

4. Mr. STABELL (Norway) considered that the war in Korea differed in important respects from all previous wars. On one side stood the North Korean aggressor, assisted by the forces of the People's Republic of China; and on the other side there were the forces of the Republic of Korea, resisting that aggression with the aid of the United Nations troops which had been sent to defend the principles of the Charter. Despite that novel feature of the Korean war, it was nevertheless a war attended by death and destruction affecting combatants and non-combatants alike. Under those circumstances, it was imperative that the United Nations, like any single government involved in a war, should make every effort to arrive at an honourable and peaceful settlement. Such an effort should not be regarded as appeasement. Even though the cablegram of 23 December 1950 (A/C.1/643, annex) from the People's Republic of China to the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea did not leave much hope for a peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict, the United Nations should continue its earnest search for an honourable peace.

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

5. Mr. Stabell considered that the supplementary report of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea constituted a valuable contribution to the joint efforts of the United Nations. The report also expressed very clearly the general objectives of the United Nations in regard to Korea and related matters, and the stages by which they could be progressively achieved through peaceful negotiations. The Norwegian delegation saw no reasonable ground upon which these principles could be rejected by the People's Republic of China, if its aim was, as professed, the achievement of a peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict.

6. The representative of Norway concluded by suggesting that the principles stated by the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea should be embodied in a draft resolution, which could then, if adopted by the General Assembly, be communicated to the People's Republic of China.

7. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) regretted the lack of co-operation shown by the Peking authorities towards the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea and contrasted it with the attitude of the Unified Command, which had supplied precise information on the measures to be taken in order to ensure a cease-fire. However, the Committee was now dealing with the very principles of a truce and the arrangements which it would make possible. In that respect, he deplored the efforts of certain delegations who were trying to distract the attention of the Committee from those subjects.

8. Referring to the statements of the representatives of Poland (420th meeting), and of the USSR (421st meeting), Mr. Chauvel declared that the repeated charge of United States aggression in Korea was both absurd and mendacious. The facts were, he said, that on 24 June 1950, the forces of North Korea had crossed the 38th parallel and had thereby created a breach of the peace; that any action taken as a result of decisions of the Security Council had been United Nations, not United States, action; and that the Peking Government had given political, economic and military aid to the North Korean aggressors.

9. The representative of France added that he would not have repeated these well-known facts, had it not been impossible to pass over in silence affirmations which were contrary both to reality and to common sense.

10. Referring to the cablegram of Mr. Chou En-lai (A/C.1/643, annex), Mr. Chauvel commented that the proposals contained therein were such that all outstanding questions would have to be settled by the complete acceptance of the Chinese demands before a cease-fire could be brought about. That would mean, first of all, that a political agreement must precede a cessation of hostilities; that is to say, Peking would reserve for itself the possibility of exerting pressure upon the negotiators by means of the action of Chinese "volunteers". That would mean, secondly, that the evacuation of Korea by the United Nations forces, the evacuation of Formosa—and since that island was not occupied, the representative of France supposed that what was meant was a definition of its legal status—and the admission of the representatives of Peking to the United Nations, were prior conditions to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Thirdly, those proposals would mean that the evacuation of Korea must be carried out with-

out any guarantee or control by the United Nations, and even without its presence there.

11. It was difficult to understand what part negotiations would play in such an arrangement. All outstanding questions, according to those proposals, would have to be settled by the complete acceptance of the Chinese terms.

12. After that, Korea would be left to the tender mercies of the North Koreans and their friends. Thus, the North Koreans, the original aggressors and the Peking authorities who had come to their aid, would enjoy advantages which they would have been unable to achieve by other means and could then turn to other enterprises. The United Nations could not agree to such an undertaking. It could not, without renouncing its very existence, betray the troops fighting in Korea as a result of the decision taken by the Security Council on 25 June 1950<sup>1</sup> and fail in its loyalty to those who had died.

13. However, the United Nations was not averse to entering into negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict. Since 25 June 1950, the Security Council had made known its intention of avoiding any action which might prejudice the achievement of an independent and unified Korea. In that connexion, Mr. Chauvel recalled the joint draft resolution<sup>2</sup> submitted to the Security Council when Chinese troops entered North Korea. That draft resolution stated that the United Nations would respect the Chinese-Korean frontier and would protect the legitimate interests of China. The draft resolution had been vetoed<sup>3</sup> by the USSR representative, and it was only after some amendments had been made that it was submitted to the First Committee (A/C.1/638).

14. The other questions to be settled in the Far East could be dealt with after a cease-fire had been established in Korea. In that connexion, the representative of France declared that his delegation supported the initiative taken by the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea. He concluded by urging that the principles laid down in the supplementary report of the Group should be formally submitted for the approval of the First Committee and the General Assembly, and should thereafter be transmitted to the Peking authorities. He hoped that the Peking Government would realize the gravity and importance of that action, and take advantage of that occasion to restore peace and order in the Far East.

15. Sir Benegal RAU (India), speaking as the representative of India, wished to make some comments, particularly on paragraph 5 of the supplementary report of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea (A/C.1/645). After reading that paragraph, Sir Benegal said that, as far as the island of Taiwan (Formosa) was concerned, the phrase "in conformity with existing international obligations" meant, to him, on the basis of the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations. That had always been India's position and was the understanding of that phrase held by his delegation.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 15.*

<sup>2</sup> See document S/1894/Rev.1.

<sup>3</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 72 (530th meeting).*

16. Secondly, any draft resolution by way of implementing the principles should provide concurrently for the establishment of the body mentioned in paragraph 5 as well as for a cease-fire, it being understood that if there was no cease-fire, implementation of the principles would become impracticable and the proposed body would be unable to function. Accordingly, in the view of his delegation, the opening words of paragraph 5, "As soon as agreement has been reached on a cease-fire . . ." were unnecessary.

17. Sir Benegal Rau was of the opinion that the body to be set up under paragraph 5 should be small.

18. The representative of India recalled that, on 12 December 1950, twelve Asian delegations had introduced a draft resolution (A/C.1/642) which very closely approximated paragraph 5 and other paragraphs of the supplementary report of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea. Sir Benegal Rau announced that the sponsors of the twelve-Power draft resolution had under consideration presenting it again to the Committee in a revised form, at an appropriate time.

19. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom) expressed gratification that the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea had been able to formulate the principles presented in the supplementary report. He thought that the formulation of these principles was necessary. Even if Peking should not accept them, the fact of their circulation and their approval by the First Committee would at least make it clear that the United Nations was prepared to go to the utmost limit in the way of concessions to a government which, although it was flouting the authority of the United Nations, professed its desire to enter the Organization.

20. Sir Gladwyn felt that those principles had set out in clear and reasonable terms the conditions which should be borne in mind for establishing a cease-fire in Korea, to be followed immediately by negotiations on Korea and related issues in the Far East. It was a matter of importance that these principles were put formally on record; that would give the Peking Government one more chance to show whether it was prepared to accept a peaceful solution of the Korean dispute. That government had so far insisted on the withdrawal of foreign troops, and considered that that was all that was necessary for a peaceful settlement. Paragraph 3 of the principles provided for the progressive withdrawal of all foreign troops, and as his delegation understood it, the Peking Government had never disputed that the term "non-Korean armed forces" included equally all Chinese volunteers.

21. If the objectives of the Peking Government were what it said they were, then it was clear that those objectives would be achieved by the adoption of those principles. If the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China were to repeat that Taiwan (Formosa) concerned it more than Korea, then again it must be clear to that government that the specific mention of Formosa as a matter for discussion in a small group in which Peking would be represented, and the suggestion that the matter would be settled in accordance with existing international obligations, represented the only possible way for Peking to achieve what some people thought were its legitimate ambitions in Formosa. Finally, if the Central People's Government

of China sincerely desired to be admitted to the United Nations, it had to abide by the principles of the United Nations Charter, instead of trying to rush the door.

22. Sir Gladwyn Jebb hoped that the Peking authorities would realize where their real interests lay. For that reason, the United Kingdom delegation would welcome the adoption of the principles by the First Committee and their transmission to Peking. Any delay caused by that action would be justified by the possibility of achieving a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Korea. A break with China at that time would lead to circumstances in which even further lives would have to be sacrificed. To find a solution to save lives could not be called appeasement, since there was nothing dishonourable in the principles submitted by the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea.

23. If, nevertheless, the present offer of a cease-fire to be followed by negotiations was rejected by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, then the fighting in Korea would continue; the United Nations would not abandon its principles. On behalf of the United Kingdom delegation, Sir Gladwyn Jebb asserted that the United Kingdom would go on fighting in Korea in the absence of an honourable solution. In that connexion, he recalled a statement to that effect which had been made by the British Prime Minister in Washington on 6 December 1950.

24. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) stated that the Government of the United States of America felt that the United Nations had to face the facts of the Chinese communist aggression against Korea and against the forces of the United Nations. In the view of his delegation, the free world could not afford to accept that situation without demonstrating its united will to resist aggression. Only by such a demonstration could the confidence of the peoples of the world in the principles of collective security be maintained. The immediate problem before the Committee was what means should be chosen in order to advance towards that objective.

25. The United States Government had given sincere support to the efforts of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea. Those efforts had been rebuffed by the Chinese communist régime. However, the Group believed that a new effort should be made, and it was supported by a substantial number of the Members of the United Nations in that respect. The United States was interested in maintaining the strength of the United Nations by promoting the unity of the Members who were genuinely dedicated to the support of the collective security system. In view of that fact, Mr. Austin would vote in favour of the statement of principles of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea (A/C.1/645) and for its transmittal to Peking.

26. Mr. Austin concluded that enough time should be allowed to transmit the principles of the Group to the Peking Government and to receive its reply. He felt, however, that a limitation of time was important in the present situation.

27. Mr. LIMB (Republic of Korea) expressed appreciation for the sincere efforts of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea. He felt concerned that there had been talk of re-establishing the 38th parallel or that another line would be drawn leaving a buffer zone of Korean

territory under the effective control of the communist aggressor. He considered that such an agreement would be a betrayal of the essential and age-long unity of the Korean nation, and a serious defeat of the programme advocated by the United Nations, besides encouraging the aggressive designs of international communism. It would leave the situation dangerously unsettled. Large and constantly alert forces would be needed to face the threat of a new attack. Korea would be neither independent nor united.

28. The withdrawal of the United Nations forces from Korea would be tragic, leaving 30 million Koreans at the mercy of their enemy. In the recent occupation of South Korea, the communist armies had put to death over 30,000 persons. That was only an indication of what would be the fate of the Korean people, if the enemy were allowed full freedom to carry out its designs. In the city of Seoul, out of a population of 1,500,000 only 200,000 inhabitants were left; and they stayed there only because they had lost their last chance to flee. Abandonment of the 30 million people of Korea to the communist aggressor was utterly unthinkable. Such an action would greatly undermine the confidence of other peoples in the United Nations.

29. Many people were pessimistic about the possibility of carrying on the fight in Korea to a successful conclusion. That defeatism was in itself a contribution to defeat. The Korean people would fight determinedly for their freedom, if they were given the weapons to fight with. They would continue their struggle to the bitter end.

30. Mr. Limb then considered the argument to the effect that the democratic world should avoid being drawn into an extended conflict in Korea and reserve its strength for use in Europe or elsewhere. His government considered that that view, apart from being disastrous for Korea, was fraught with grave danger for the free world everywhere. It was in Korea that the manifest design of international communism to conquer the peoples of the Far East had, for the first time, been brought to at least a temporary halt. Where was a stand to be made if not in Korea? The union of the endangered peoples of the world could exist only on the basis of the assumption that all were equally vital to the defence of freedom. If the communist strategy was to divide the forces of freedom into two fronts, that strategy could not be defeated by mere withdrawal, which would result in attacks elsewhere in the Far East. Ultimately, the free world would have to choose between surrendering the entire Orient or making a stand somewhere. Collective action for the security of all free nations was the free world's only hope for salvation.

31. It had been proved that collaboration with the communists could be accomplished only at the point of communist guns; and any further show of civility would render great disservice, not only to the United Nations but also to the courageous men on the battlefield. Paying tribute to the valour of the United Nations forces, Mr. Limb declared that every day of hesitation by the General Assembly placed a heavier handicap on the arms and spirit of those forces. The representative of the Republic of Korea read a communication that he had just received from an official source in Korea to illustrate the impact upon the United Nations forces

of the delay in reaching a decision regarding the Chinese aggression.

32. After having reiterated that the tide of the war could be turned by arming a million Koreans eager to defend their country, Mr. Limb recalled the stand taken by the United Nations in June and December 1950 against the communist aggression in Korea. In the view of his government, the best solution was to stand where the battle was engaged. Retreat would undermine the confidence necessary for victory, and would benefit only the foe. No nation wished to be a battlefield, but the Korean people would accept that fate gladly rather than seek to escape from it at the cost of being abandoned to communist savagery.

33. The time and the place to fight for world freedom had been determined on 25 June 1950 by the attack launched by the communist empire. Every honourable means of settling the conflict had been patiently explored by the free world, which had offered the aggressor peace, had promised him immunity from any punishment and had lavishly assured him of its good will. At that very time, however, the aggressor had made his intentions plain beyond any shadow of a doubt by attacking the United Nations and Korean forces. It was clear that, if peace was still to be won and if the enemy was to be deterred from the awful course of total war, that could only be done by convincing the aggressor that the free nations of the world would stand together in their own defence, rather than by permitting him to believe that he could still pick them off one by one.

34. One great advantage offered by Korea, which some other time and place might not offer in equal degree, was the unmistakable clarity of the moral issues. Under every provocation, and in the face of naked aggression, the free world had repeated over and over again its strong desire to salvage peace at almost any price. However, the price demanded now was death not only to Korea, but to the United Nations and to the very foundation of mutual confidence upon which any alliance of freedom must be based. It was indeed strange that, while fighting the aggressor in Korea, as a result of having been attacked by him, the United Nations hesitated to label him an aggressor. The simple preliminary step of calling the Chinese communists the aggressor should have been taken long before.

35. Failure to brand the Japanese as aggressors in 1931 had emboldened Hitler to launch his aggression. The memory of Munich was a compelling warning. There was no profit in trying to re-enact 1931, 1939 or Yalta. Trading justice to serve expediency or attempting to sell principles to buy peace would invariably produce the same kind of result. The great authority and prestige earned in Korea by the United Nations since June 1950 could not be thrown away. The world expected the United Nations to call an aggressor an aggressor.

36. Mr. EBAN (Israel) welcomed the outline of principles made by the representative of Canada on behalf of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea. Recalling his statement (420th meeting) of his delegation's view concerning the points to be included in a comprehensive statement of United Nations objectives in the Far East, Mr. Eban observed that those points all appeared to be



satisfactorily embodied in the Group's statement of principles. The precision of the formulation of paragraph 5 of that statement was especially gratifying. Recalling his delegation's references to the obligations of the United Nations to assist the rehabilitation of Korea and of all States, both within and without the United Nations, to respect the integrity of the reconstituted State of Korea, the representative of Israel said that it was his understanding that those principles were by no mean excluded from consideration because they were not specifically referred to at the present stage.

37. Everything argued in favour of a renewed attempt to halt the bloodshed and to seek an honourable solution, in the spirit of the Charter, for the political problems of Korea and the Far East.

38. The General Assembly should adopt a resolution endorsing the statement of principles submitted by the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea. It would then be appropriate for the President of the General Assembly to arrange for the transmission of that resolution to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. Despite the disappointment to which expression had already been given, the delegation of Israel hoped that the Government of the People's Republic of China would seize that historic opportunity to illustrate its attitude to world peace, and to ensure an early and peaceful settlement of those questions in which its national interest was so closely engaged.

39. Mr. SARPER (Turkey) stated that his delegation would vote in favour of the principles formulated by the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea to make it perfectly clear that every effort had been made to reach a peaceful and honourable solution of the Korean question. Should that last effort fail, no one would have any difficulty in clearly identifying those responsible for the bloodshed, misery and suffering in Korea.

40. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed, with regard to the so-called principles formulated by the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea, that his delegation found itself in an unfavourable position since, unlike some delegations, it had not been acquainted with those principles prior to the meeting. The representative of the USSR therefore reserved his right to return to the matter at a subsequent meeting.

41. However, some delegations had become rather accustomed to being placed in an unfavourable position in the various organs of the United Nations. Thus, the representatives of the Syngman Rhee régime had slandered free and independent peoples who refused to be the slaves of United States imperialism and to become defenders of United States aggression in Korea while the representatives of North Korea, owing to the attitude of the United States and the Anglo-American bloc, had been deprived of the elementary right of stating their point of view in the United Nations. The basic legal principle of granting a hearing to both parties to a dispute had been systematically and grossly violated by the Organization. The Anglo-American bloc had deprived the representatives of the Korean people of that right, and the Government of the People's Republic of China, though it was proposed to brand that government as an aggressor, had not been permitted to state its views in the General Assembly or to partici-

pate in the work of the United Nations. On the other hand, the puppet who represented the Kuomintang group had been allowed to usurp the seat of the legitimate government of China in the United Nations. American *diktat* was replacing the principles of international law and made it possible to formulate any accusation whatsoever since those accused had been refused a hearing.

42. Though the representative of the United States seemed to take for granted the culpability of one of the parties, none of the evidence establishing the nature of the aggression and the identity of those who had perpetrated it had been refuted. The facts were on record and were known to the peoples of the world. The aggression in Korea had been committed by the United States of America, and had been launched prior to the imposition on the Security Council of a resolution<sup>4</sup> designed to camouflage that aggression. Moreover, that resolution had been imposed without the granting of a hearing to the representatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and the legitimate representative of China. Thus, not only had the ruling circles of the United States been guilty of an act of aggression in Korea but they had also chosen to flout the most fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations, such as the principle set forth in Article 32, that both parties to a dispute or a situation must be heard.

43. Turning to the supplementary report of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea (A/C.1/645), the representative of the USSR observed that, while the question of a cease-fire had been stated clearly, it was apparent that the authors of that report had preferred a vague and ambiguous wording of the other parts. The use of the word "needless" in paragraph 1 implied that, in certain cases and to a certain extent, the loss of life and destruction of property could be justified and that those losses could be normal. The Group was consequently opposed only to the needless destruction of life and property. Mr. Malik reiterated his delegation's opposition to any and all bloodshed or destruction of life and property, and remarked that the United Nations had at its disposal facts and evidence about who had actually been responsible for destroying life and property.

44. The American aggressors in Korea aimed at total destruction and devastation, and wanted to transform the country into a desert. Document A/C.1/644 showed how American troops used blackmail and threats to force the inhabitants of cities to flee south to be subsequently machine-gunned and shot. In that connexion, the representative of the USSR cited an Associated Press dispatch reporting an American general's order to "kill everything that moves". The best way to stop the bloodshed would be to withdraw the foreign troops engaged in aggression and to put an end to the execution of the United States military doctrine of destruction and devastation of every region which had to be abandoned.

45. Analysing paragraph 3 of the Group's statement (A/C.1/645), the representative of the USSR considered that it would permit the United States Command to retain in Korea as many of its troops as it wished, for as long as it wished. Cases of withdrawals by "appropriate stages" which had lasted for scores of years

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 15.

were well known. The conclusion of peace treaties had been deliberately delayed to allow United States forces to remain on the territories of a number of States. Thus, the principles set out by the State Department with respect to the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan made it clear that the United States of America, far from withdrawing its forces from that country, was seeking pretexts to maintain troops there forever. The same conclusion applied to paragraph 4 of the statement, which would enable the United States Command to invoke the pretext of the maintenance of peace and security in Korea to keep its troops there as long as it deemed fit.

46. The delegation of the USSR could not support the proposals of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea. As the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States of America had made clear, the conditions to be submitted to the Government of the People's Republic of China contained nothing new in substance. At the same time, the statements of the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France clearly indicated that the Group's proposals were an ultimatum, accompanied by threats. Such proposals could not serve as the basis for a peaceful settlement.

47. Charges concerning aggression supposedly committed by the Government of the People's Republic of China were devoid of foundation, as were the attempts to represent as aggression the participation of Chinese volunteers in Korea. In that connexion, the representative of the USSR recalled numerous authorities on international law cited previously by Mr. Vyshinsky (412th meeting). While the Chinese volunteers were acting under the command of the military authorities empowered by the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea to prosecute the struggle against the aggressors, the interventionist forces of the United States of America were under the command of American generals, although it was true that the latter had draped themselves in the mantle of the United Nations. The presence in Korea of all the colonial Powers, under the leadership of the United States, showed that the aggressive alliance of the North Atlantic was directing its efforts not only against the USSR but also against the national liberation movement of the peoples of Asia. Aggression was not only being directed against the Korean people but against China. The island of Taiwan (Formosa) had been occupied by American forces, which had also systematically bombed Chinese territory. "Proposals" submitted under such circumstances, and accompanied by threats of an increase in such action, hardly constituted a basis for the peaceful settlement of any question, whatever it might be.

48. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile), recalling the pessimism of his delegation (416th meeting) regarding the results to be expected from the first cease-fire proposal, stated that the facts had proved his delegation correct in its belief that the aggression against Korea was a part of the USSR's total strategy and under its control. The USSR representative, in demanding the immediate withdrawal of all non-Korean forces from Korea prior to any cease-fire arrangement, had made it clear that his government demanded the abandonment of the United Nations action in defence of the principles of collective security against flagrant aggression

and, in effect, the abandonment of all possibility of avoiding the complete and total absorption of a nation of more than thirty million inhabitants by the USSR, operating through communist China.

49. Although prepared to accept the statement formulated by the Group, the delegation of Chile was pessimistic about the fate of that statement, since the USSR representative's statement evidenced that the latter was determined to maintain his negative attitude. The allegations repeated by the representative of the USSR created the impression that the reply from Peking had already reached the Committee. It was unlikely that that reply would differ from the opinion voiced by the representative of the USSR.

50. Nevertheless, the reasons adduced by various representatives on the Committee were compelling, and a resolution based on the principles formulated by the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea should be approved by the Committee as the final effort to achieve a peaceful settlement of the situation resulting from the aggression which communist China had launched against the United Nations in Korea. A categorical, clear-cut, and unequivocal rejection of those principles would be more than sufficient to eliminate from the minds of even the most optimistic any hope that communist China and the USSR really desired to settle the Korean problem in an honourable manner and in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

51. The representative of Chile could not agree that condemnation of aggression by the United Nations without any material action following it would result in a serious loss of United Nations prestige. If the proposed action failed, the United Nations was bound at least to express its clear-cut condemnation of aggression, and to state explicitly who was the aggressor in the present case.

52. If the Organization restricted itself to bowing down before *faits accomplis*, it would obviously be serving the interests of those who sought political and ideological advantage in the threat of a new war. The United Nations constituted a moral force in the world. Its material power depended upon the Member States and, at the present juncture, the international community might not be able to give the United Nations the material force demanded by world public opinion, perhaps because aggression was threatened in all parts of the world. The conscience of the international community was becoming more mature and the moral force of the United Nations might convert its feeling of responsibility into a material force. World opinion could understand that, but it would never understand an abandonment by the United Nations of its basic, essential principles. If the moral force of the Organization was to be preserved, its resolutions could not be accommodated to *faits accomplis* brought about by violence. The final effort envisaged as a result of the proposals of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea would add to the moral force of the Organization, and it was to be hoped that that effort would achieve the success hoped for by the world.

53. Mr. TSIANG (China), recalling that his country had participated in two world wars and knew from experience how bitter were their fruits, supported the emphasis placed upon the duty of the United Nations

to exhaust every possible resource of peace-making. He noted that paragraph 3 of the Group's supplementary report did not provide specifically for United Nations supervision of elections. Such an omission was a retreat from the previous resolution—the General Assembly's resolution of three years ago (112 (II))—and from the fundamental principles of the Charter. The lack of provision for the withdrawal of North Korean forces from south of the 38th parallel was an even more serious omission. The crossing of that parallel by the North Korean forces had created the crisis and had been condemned by the Security Council as an act of aggression. The Council had demanded such a withdrawal, and an omission of that point was also a retreat from principles which might have the most serious consequences. It would mean delivering South Korea, in part or in whole, to communist control, and the kind of free or democratic election to be expected under such circumstances could be imagined.

54. The actual implementation of paragraph 3, as it stood, might mean the total abandonment of Korea to communist control. Mr. Tsiang observed that if paragraph 5 of the statement was a promise to pay, it would mean an abandonment of United Nations principles in advance. If the text did not mean such a promise, Mr. Tsiang feared that the fresh attempt to achieve a peaceful settlement in Korea would prove as disappointing as previous ones.

55. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) stated that, while his delegation had had no opportunity to make a thorough study of the supplementary report of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea, several objections appeared evident from a preliminary study. As the delegation of Poland had pointed out, the success of any attempt to arrive at a peaceful settlement in Korea must be based on the principle of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and on that of the recognition of the principle of self-determination of nations, as applied to the Korean people. The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China (A/C.1/643, annex) had expressed its readiness to discuss a peaceful settlement of the problem of Korea as well as of all outstanding Far Eastern problems on condition of the recognition of those principles, which had been embodied in the USSR proposal (A/C.1/640) supported by the delegation of Poland (415th meeting).

56. Unfortunately, those two principles had not been taken into consideration by the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea, whose supplementary report called for a cease-fire first and negotiations later, thus fully embodying the position of the United States of America while failing to give due consideration to the People's Democratic Republic of Korea or of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. As the delegation of Poland pointed out, in the existing situation in the Far East, such a procedure would benefit one side only and had been submitted and supported by the United States only for the purpose of gaining military advantages.

57. American aggression had not been limited to the aggression against Korea, but had also been directed against China with the occupation of Taiwan (Formosa) and aerial bombardments of Chinese territory. All those acts of aggression derived from the same source and had to be treated jointly. Only the with-

drawal of foreign troops could create a situation in which a peaceful settlement could be made possible by the Korean people themselves. The report of the Group omitted that point and merely referred to "appropriate stages", without a definite date or any definite means for the withdrawal of foreign troops. The United Nations could not be a party to the establishment in Korea of a practice similar to that by which the colonial Powers had maintained troops in the territory of other nations despite agreements and treaties for their withdrawal. In effect, the Group's report contained no new elements.

58. If a final peaceful settlement on all outstanding issues in the Far East was to be reached, full recognition had to be given to the needs and purposes of the national liberation movements which had taken place in Asia in the last few decades. The time of easy colonial conquest had ended. The war in Korea was not of a novel character; it was a typical colonial war of conquest conducted in the most cruel and destructive manner possible, in order to establish the fact that Korea must be a desert if it could not be an American colony. That fact could not be obscured by censorship or threats against journalists.

59. The statements of various representatives had created an atmosphere which spoke very strongly against the supplementary report of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea. Those statements made it very clear that the proposal had been submitted not to achieve a settlement but to serve as an ultimatum. In the light of those statements, particularly those of the representative of the Syngman Rhee régime, and of spokesmen for the United States of America within and without the United Nations, and in the light of the attitude of the President of the United States of America as expressed in his message of 8 January 1951 to the United States Congress, it was clear that the ambiguous principles contained in the supplementary report were designed to win a military advantage for the United States by playing on peaceful sentiments.

60. The depth of hypocrisy reached had been demonstrated by the statement of the representative of an administration forced upon the Korean people who had called for further aggression and for further destruction. That régime, which was responsible for the whole war, for untold cruelties and murders, now called upon the Committee to continue and widen that war.

61. Turning to the statement of the representative of France, the representative of Poland observed that the problem of courtesy had not been referred to when it had been decided to refuse to hear the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or when the representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China had waited for days to be permitted to state his case before the First Committee. Nor had any lack of courtesy been perceived when the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China had been refused its rightful seat. Yet, a nation firmly stating its case and its readiness for a peaceful settlement was considered discourteous. Similarly, the representative of France considered the statement of certain realities to be intimidation, while the pressure which had been applied to France to break off normal economic relations with China was apparently regarded as a diplomatic action.

62. As for the statement of the United Kingdom representative, who had employed certain threats, it must be understood that there could be no bargaining on certain points flowing from the factual situation, from the principles of the Charter, and from certain international obligations, as well as from basic premises of international law.

63. It could not be said that the Chinese nation and government had ambitions in Formosa (Taiwan) since it had sovereign rights there. To speak of it in such terms meant accepting the United States view that Formosa was not legitimate Chinese territory. In the same way, the United Kingdom representative, whose government maintained diplomatic relations with China, had referred to the possibility of the admission of China to the United Nations as if it were a bargaining point. The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China had expressed its desire (A/1123) to occupy its legitimate seat in the United Nations more than six months before the American aggression in Korea. Yet, in the preparation of future aggression, a majority had been formed to prevent the Central People's Government from occupying its rightful seat.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 3.

64. The People's Government of China was a neighbour of Korea and was being threatened by a hostile force which had been supporting and assisting the régime of Chiang Kai-shek in the full knowledge that only a war in the Far East could make possible the return of the Kuomintang clique to the mainland. The interest of the Central People's Government in Korea and in the settlement of all pending Far Eastern questions was, therefore, perfectly legitimate and its views on such matters were supported by the 475 million Chinese who had made possible its victory over the Chiang Kai-shek régime.

65. The Committee, if it honestly desired to reach a successful conclusion, must avoid the traps prepared by the United States of America. The Committee must heed the views of the legitimate government of China rather than statements such as that of the representative of the Syngman Rhee administration, who had discussed Yalta without realizing that that agreement had made the victory of the United Nations possible and had been a stepping-stone to the creation of the Organization.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.