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Chairman: Mr. F. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Francisco Urrutia (Colombia), Vice-Chairman, presided.

Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations (A/2485/Rev.1 and A/2485/Add.1) (*continued*)

[Item 73]*

1. Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) stressed the importance attached to the USSR proposal by his country, which had been the first victim of Hitlerite aggression and felt it had particular reason to draw the attention of the United Nations to the dangers involved in the current armaments race. The Polish people, having restored their devastated country at the cost of great exertions, were now engaged in the development of its economic potential, and ardently desired peace, so that they could pursue their peaceful task undisturbed. The USSR draft resolution was the more timely in view of the many signs that the forces of aggression were trying to aggravate the international tensions still persisting in spite of the hopes which had been inspired by the conclusion of an armistice in Korea.

2. The United States representative and his supporters had asserted that President Eisenhower's speech of 16 April 1953 was an effort on the part of the United States to improve the international atmosphere. But although there had been some reference in that speech to the need for strengthening peace and reducing armaments expenditure, there had been nothing to show any desire on the part of the United States Government to participate in the solution of international problems in a spirit of co-operation and understanding, or to renounce the policy of strength. Since that time, indeed, events had shown some tendency to aggravate the causes of tension. The United States had continued the armaments race and had prevented the adoption of any decisions favourable to a settlement of the Korean problem. In Korea itself, the United States representatives were placing obstacles in the way of the application of the Armistice Agreement, in particular in connexion with the repatriation of prisoners of war. They stubbornly maintained their refusal to allow the admission to the United Nations of the legitimate representatives of the great Chinese

people, but they continued to arm the Taiwan clique. They were planning to supply the latter with warships, probably in order to enable them to attack peaceful merchant vessels—such as the Polish ship *Pretza*, which was still in their hands, together with its crew—with even greater success.

3. The United States continued to exert pressure on the European countries to hasten the incorporation of Western Germany in the aggressive Atlantic Treaty system. It was trying to remilitarize Japan, against the wishes of the Japanese people. Mr. Nixon, Vice-President of the United States, had said a few days ago that the United States had been mistaken in bringing about the disarmament of Japan after the Second World War—a statement which the United States Secretary of State had supported.

4. In addition, the leaders of the United States had rejected the Soviet proposals for the solution of the main problems by negotiation.

5. That being so, it would be useful to analyse in detail the USSR draft resolution (A/2485/Rev.1). The main proposal was for unconditional prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. That prohibition was essential if international tension was to be reduced, the danger of war removed and peace secured. It was the more essential in view of the fact that development of the production of such weapons took priority in the United States rearmament programme. As the *New York Times* had reported quite openly on 21 October 1953, the United States chiefs of staff would not be basing their plans on atomic weapons, if they thought their Government was planning to reach agreement with the Russians on the prohibition of that weapon. The schemes of people who imagined that atomic weapons could be employed with impunity must be foiled. And such persons existed, as could be seen from the cynical utterances of Mr. Gordon Dean, who had until recently been Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. On page 120 of his book *Report on the Atom*, Mr. Dean had written that while the napalm bomb was a terrible weapon, there were no international curbs on its use, and that he therefore thought there would be no opposition to the tactical use of the atomic weapon. The prohibition of such weapons would undoubtedly be an important step towards the reduction of international tension, and would be proof to the peoples of the world that the United Nations appreciated their desires and needs.

6. In addition, the United States was expanding its armed forces and its production of conventional weapons. According to a report published by the National Planning Association on 25 October 1953, armaments expenditure, which totalled \$US55,000 million for the current year, might reach the figure of \$US70,000 to 75,000 million in 1956. The beneficiaries

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

of the armaments race were the American monopolies, which were anticipating profits amounting to about \$US43,000 million in 1953. The richest profits were netted by undertakings which were direct suppliers of military orders; in 1952 the General Motors profits had been 10 per cent higher than in 1951 and those of Curtiss Wright 31 per cent higher. The leading role played by the monopolies in American politics and the participation of their representatives in the United States Government made the reasons for the inflexible opposition of the ruling circles in the United States to any concrete plan of disarmament very clear.

7. The armaments race was a very heavy burden for the American people: taxes were rising while purchasing power was falling. From 1941 to 1952 federal taxes had risen from \$US7,227 million to \$US62,128 million. The index of prices of consumer goods had risen from 1950 to 1952 by 10 per cent and the price of food by 13 per cent. In 1952 the United States had devoted one-fifth of the total national income to armaments.

8. In the European Atlantic bloc countries, rearmament was causing inflation and reducing standards of living. The industrial crisis, the effects of which had first been felt in light industry, was now extending to heavy industry: in France the index of industrial production had been seven points lower in the first quarter of 1953 than in the corresponding period of last year. In Italy the index of employment had been lower in 1952 than in 1948. That situation had led to a lowering of the standard of living in the countries referred to. The United States was not only unconcerned over that situation, but even found it financially advantageous: the *New York Herald Tribune* of 26 October 1953 had said that money furnished by American taxpayers would be used in order to buy military power at various points around the Iron Curtain at a lower price than that which would be incurred by the maintenance of American armed forces. Similar calculations had been made by Mr. Lodge, in an article published in the magazine section of the *New York Times* of 22 November 1953. The rearmament of the Atlantic bloc countries also had detrimental effects on the under-developed countries; the fall in the market prices of raw materials reduced their income, thereby increasing their payment difficulties and compelling them to restrict their imports and consequently lower the standard of living of their people.

9. The discussions on disarmament which had been held in the United Nations for the last eight years, for example those which had taken place during the consideration of that item by the First Committee, had shown very clearly that the United States was opposed to any reduction of armaments. Despite the protests of world public opinion, the United States insisted on the adoption of its plan of expansion of armaments and armed forces. The Soviet proposal for the reduction by one-third of the armed forces of the five great Powers was therefore of particular importance. As Mr. Molotov had said on 13 November 1953, there was no problem more urgent than that of disarmament and the cessation of the armaments race.

10. The true objectives of the United States in connexion with the establishment of military bases around the USSR and the other peoples' democracies had been revealed by a number of persons, including the United States Secretary of Defense, who had said, according

to a report in the *New York Times* of 20 October 1953, that from its network of military bases the United States could launch an attack against the USSR.

11. There were such bases in the Scandinavian countries, Western Europe, Africa and Asia. United States diplomats had recently been active in concluding agreements permitting the United States to set up bases in the Near and Middle East. With reference to the United Kingdom representative's remark (673rd meeting) that such bases were always established with the full agreement of the countries concerned and were undoubtedly profitable to them economically, he recalled that the report, dated 2 January 1953, of the sub-committee on overseas bases of the Senate Armed Services Committee stated that United States representatives abroad had been obliged in some cases to exert pressure in order to obtain concessions.

12. Neither the USSR nor the peoples' democracies could remain indifferent to such clearly aggressive preparations. Poland, for one, felt that it was the duty of the United Nations, under the Charter, to recommend that the Security Council should take effective measures to eliminate those bases.

13. Professor Kelsen, who had recently been invoked by the Greek representative, had written in February 1951 in the book entitled *Recent Trends in the Law of the United Nations*, that if, in view of the North Atlantic Treaty, the war in Korea, the continuation in office of the Secretary-General and the "Uniting for peace" resolution (377 (V)), the organization of collective security was not in line with the old principles of United Nations law, the answer was *ex iniuria ius oritur*. Consequently, the Greek representative's thesis that the North Atlantic Treaty and agreements concerning military bases were in accordance with the Charter rested only on the premise that law was born of lawlessness. The Polish delegation, like many others, adhered to the principle that *ex iniuria ius non oritur*.

14. The rearmament of Western Germany constituted a major threat to Europe in particular and to peace in general. The Polish people was particularly aware of it, having in the course of its history been the victim of German militarism many times. Aggressive groups in Germany were conducting a campaign of hatred against Poland and other countries which had borne the German yoke. If their plans, directed by Hitler's former generals, came to fruition, those groups, headed by Adenauer, would establish a new German *Reich*, at the expense not only of Eastern Europe, but also of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, and so on. The German problem should be solved on the basis of the Potsdam agreements. In its notes, in particular in that of 3 November 1953, the USSR had stressed again that it was ready to take part in conversations with a view to finding a solution of international problems, in particular the question of re-establishing a united, democratic and peaceful Germany. The western Powers, however, were refusing to open such negotiations. The United States representative had, at the preceding meeting, pretended to be in favour of negotiating, but his proposals—which he had termed constructive—consisted solely in asking for so-called free elections instead of trying to bring about the unification of Germany and the creation of a united and democratic German Government and German State. That opinion was shared by many western

European statesmen. It was stated in the *New Statesman and Nation* of 21 November 1953 that the three western Powers had in fact prevented the conference from being held by setting prior conditions which they had known to be unacceptable. The article accused the western Powers of resorting to a hitlerian manoeuvre in ascribing to the adversary the dubious tactics they used themselves. Now that preparations were being made for the Bermuda Conference, the United States had increased its pressure on the United Kingdom and France to ratify the Bonn and Paris agreements. As the Paris correspondent of the *New York Times* had written on 18 November 1953, that policy had provoked a violent reaction on the part of the various political groups in France, including deputies of the right.

15. In notes dated 19 November 1953 the Polish Government had drawn the attention of the Governments of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark and Norway to the dangerous consequences of ratifying treaties providing for the remilitarization of Western Germany, had stated that all the countries bordering on Germany should redouble their efforts to prevent the rebirth of German militarism and imperialism, and had emphasized that its action was motivated only by a sincere desire for a stable peace in Europe.

16. No one would be convinced by the argument that, before measures for disarmament were taken, an atmosphere of international trust must be brought about. He asked how such an atmosphere was to be created when the ruling circles of the United States used the atomic bomb as a threat and spread fear by claiming that the country was in danger of being attacked. The slanderous and lying propaganda broadcast by the Voice of America and the Voice of "Free Europe" increased existing tensions and brought about a climate favouring preparations for another war.

17. At the preceding meeting, the United States representative had done his best to represent the United States as a land of freedom and democracy. On the contrary, the outstanding features of the political life of the United States were the growth of fascism and the suppression of freedom of expression. The General Council of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America—an organ to which no suspicion could possibly attach—had stated in a letter to the *New York Times* on 3 November 1953 that some congressional investigations had come to resemble the inquisition and that great words such as love, peace, justice, charity and mercy and the ideas which underlay them had become suspect. According to the *New York Times* of 26 June 1953, the American Booksellers Association had stated that private groups and governmental organs were, *inter alia*, trying to prevent the sale of certain books and to disseminate lists of suspect books and authors.

18. Slanderous and defamatory propaganda should be condemned, since it aggravated the cold war and served as preparation for a real war. The speech of the Peruvian representative at the preceding meeting belonged in that category. He had sought to defend the peoples of Poland and Czechoslovakia not against imperialist forces or the rebirth of German militarism, but against tried and true friends of those States. If he had been sincere, he would not have attempted to defend persons who were working against the interests of the Polish people.

19. The representative of Peru had also expressed pity for certain members of the Polish Catholic Church and had demanded an answer. The answer given by the representative of the Dominican Republic on 23 November 1953 (673rd meeting) should have been sufficient: no one in Poland was being subjected to persecution because of his religious beliefs, his convictions or his ideas. Believers enjoyed full freedom of religious practice. But no one in Poland was free to make war propaganda or to spy for the United States on pretext of religion. Believers were able to distinguish between some members of the clergy who engaged in criminal activities with a view to the rebirth of German militarism, in obedience to the orders of the Vatican and the United States, and the overwhelming majority of priests who condemned those members. The Polish Episcopate had clearly stated that it opposed any use being made of the Catholic religion and the Catholic Church for political purposes contrary to the interests of Poland by foreign groups seeking to exploit the religious beliefs of the population.

20. Some representatives, including the representative of Greece, had pretended to consider the USSR representative's statement a mere repetition of old propaganda. That attitude was all the more astonishing as those same representatives accepted a constant repetition of such expressions as "the Soviet danger", "the defence of the West against the Eastern threat", "the Iron Curtain", and so on, which were pure libel.

21. The desire of peoples for peace was not new, and the purpose of the USSR proposals was to satisfy it. Consequently, they dealt with problems which were not new, but which as yet had not been solved. There was, on the other hand, a certain change in the international atmosphere which was new, and which opened up prospects of solving the most important problems. All the peoples of the world wished contentious matters to be settled by means of negotiation. The USSR proposals (A/2485/Rev.1) indicated concrete steps that should be taken in that direction. Their adoption would give hope of peaceful settlement not only of the problems mentioned in them, but of other equally important ones, including the German problem and those of the Far East. It would hold out before mankind the prospect of an economic renaissance and of a development of trade and cultural relations, and give under-developed countries hope of improving their position.

22. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that since the end of the Second World War, the USSR and the countries supporting it had endeavoured to avert the threat of a new war and to strengthen international peace and security, whereas the United States had created international complications threatening the security of nations. Thus, the USSR had repeatedly submitted proposals designed to relieve international tension, with the conviction that there were no international disputes that could not be settled by peaceful means, provided the parties to such disputes showed goodwill.

23. Yet there was serious doubt that the United States and the western Powers in general had that spirit of goodwill. At the present session of the General Assembly, the United States and the United Kingdom representatives had succeeded in having the USSR proposal which was of manifest urgency and importance placed at the end of the agenda. They now claimed that the proposals were not new and would do nothing

to bring about a relaxation in international tension. The Greek representative had even maintained that they had been submitted solely for propaganda purposes and that they should be rejected out of hand.

24. While it was true that some of those proposals had been submitted at earlier sessions, the fact that they had not been adopted only proved that the forces of aggression stubbornly tried to oppose any measures for strengthening international peace and security. Moreover, the decisions which the General Assembly had previously taken under United States pressure did not reflect the desires of the peoples of the world which in each case had supported the USSR proposals. The rejection of those proposals had certainly been an encouragement to trouble-makers and had given new impetus to the armaments race. The promptness with which the United States and the western States had refused to examine the USSR proposals revealed the hidden motives of the ruling circles of the United States and the hypocritical nature of the protestations of United States political leaders regarding the peaceful intentions of the United States.

25. Some speakers had pointed out that the United States continued to develop its armaments, notwithstanding the conclusion of the Korean armistice agreement, which showed that the war in Korea had been used by the rulers of the United States merely as a pretext to put the western world on a war footing. The reactionary circles of the United States wished to increase international tension in order that relations between the United States and the USSR might deteriorate further. A new wave of propaganda was sweeping the United States; much was again being made of the military threat of the USSR for the purpose of influencing public opinion and obtaining additional allocations for military purposes. Acting along those lines, the United States delegation had submitted to the General Assembly slanderous proposals regarding the prisoners of war allegedly still being held in the USSR, the so-called forced labour in the USSR and atrocities claimed to have been committed against United States prisoners of war. It was significant that the United States journalist James Reston should have written in the *New York Times*, with reference to that anti-Soviet propaganda, that the United States wished to create an atmosphere of distrust and fear of the might of the USSR so as to obtain further credits for armaments.

26. The United States delegation had tried to deny that United States policy was aggressive. It had cited President Eisenhower's statement of 16 April 1953 in which he had said that the United States desired peace and disarmament. Yet the United States Government had taken no practical measure to that end. On the contrary, it had intensified the armaments race and had developed the aggressive power of NATO. The report of the President of the United States to Congress on 16 August 1953 on the mutual security programme emphasized that the United States supply of armaments to the free world had increased by two-thirds during the first half of 1953 as compared with the second half of 1952. Thus the purpose of the United States policy was to increase military preparations for purposes hostile to the Soviet Union.

27. Attempts had however been made to pass those preparations for aggression off as measures for the defence of the free world. However, the establishment

of air and naval bases in Greenland, Iceland, near the North Pole, in Morocco, Spain, Greece, the Middle East and elsewhere could hardly be explained away as United States defence measures. According to the weekly *U.S. News & World Report*, the United States was supposed to have 109 military bases outside its territory. If the secret bases were added, the total number of installations abroad was several hundred. Over half of the total number of United States soldiers and sailors were stationed outside United States frontiers. While every State was entitled to defend its frontiers, the policy of the United States and the NATO States had nothing to do with defence. United States Senators Morse and Long, after visiting some sixty United States bases abroad, had stated in a report to the Senate that the inhabitants of the States on the territories of which the bases were being erected were dissatisfied, and the neighbouring States were disturbed. In that connexion, Senator Long had drawn the Senate's attention to the legitimate concern that the people of the United States would feel if the Soviet Union, for example, had constructed air bases that might accommodate bombers in Canada, Bermuda and Mexico, and if it had sent large military forces to those countries.

28. The United Kingdom representative had claimed (673rd meeting) that the establishment of military bases by one State on the territory of an ally did not impair the latter's independence and sovereignty. He had further added that the construction of those bases promoted economic and technical progress. Naturally, the United Kingdom representative could not prove his statement, for there was no proof. The Press of the Scandinavian States, for example, had clearly reflected the attitude of the population, in declaring that in Denmark and Norway, United States pressure had not been able to overcome national resistance to the construction of military bases and the occupation of the country by foreign troops. The newspaper *Le Monde* had noted that, in order to construct the air base of Nouasseur in Morocco, 6,000 Arabs had had to be evicted from a particularly fertile region. As a result of the construction of bases in Japan that country's rice production had dropped considerably. In short, it was easy to show that instead of promoting economic and technical progress, the establishment of air bases always had harmful results.

29. The agreement of 12 October 1953 between Greece and the United States was also aggressive in nature. The Greek representative had endeavoured (671st meeting) to prove the contrary by citing Article 52 of the Charter relating to regional arrangements and by basing himself on the interpretation of that article given by Goodrich and Hambro and by Kelsen. In point of fact, Goodrich cited an Egyptian amendment that had been rejected at San Francisco after having been approved by the Preparatory Commission. The amendment had stipulated that regional arrangements could be made between permanent groups of States belonging to a given geographical region, having linguistic, cultural, historical or spiritual traits in common, or having common interests. Obviously, Greece and the United States did not belong to the same geographical region or have a common culture, language or history. While it was equally true that Kelsen stated in his commentary that geographical proximity was not necessary if States were bound by a common interest to develop international peace and security, that interpretation would be unacceptable as

it did not define the concept of common interest. What was more, it was dangerous as the United States claimed to have common interests with all States on the territories of which it wished to erect bases. Lastly, Article 52 referred to the peaceful settlement of local disputes. Obviously, there could not be any local conflict between Greece and the United States. Consequently, the Greek representative had not proved that the agreement between his country and the United States was a regional agreement. Mr. Kyrou's statements on the subject of NATO were also mistaken. The members of NATO were united only by their plans of aggression and conquest. There was no need to refute the statement that the agreement between Greece and the United States was a friendly act towards the USSR, for the erection of military bases near the frontiers of the USSR could hardly be so regarded.

30. It must be remembered that General Twining, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, had stated that the network of American bases in Morocco, Spain, the Balkans and the Middle East would make it possible to round out the strategic striking force of the United States. Those aggressive plans were also echoed in the American Press. The *New York Times* of 19 October 1953 had spoken of using the armed forces of Turkey against the USSR, the *New York Herald Tribune* of 12 November had envisaged the establishment of bases in Pakistan as a means of strengthening the United States position against the USSR. The newspaper had added that those bases might serve not only as a starting point for attacks against the USSR, but also as landing fields for bombers which, having set out from the Thule base, had attacked the USSR after flying over the North Pole. On 11 November, the *New York Times* had expressed the view that the USSR proposals would result in the suicide of the free world and it had affirmed that peace must be maintained by force.

31. It had been asserted that the aim of the USSR proposals was to bring about the unilateral disarmament of the free world. That contention had already been refuted, and the alleged superiority of the Soviet Union in conventional armaments was being used as an excuse for not accepting the USSR proposals. Lastly, Admiral Radford had stated on 13 November that the United States might reduce their land forces by providing for the use of atomic weapons on a large scale. That was why the *New York Times* had expressed the view that the United States should avoid all negotiations which might result in the control of atomic energy. Clearly, therefore, the United States was opposed to the USSR proposals for the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and the establishment of strict international control over that prohibition, the reason for its opposition being that it wanted to be able to use atomic weapons in a preventive attack upon the USSR.

32. In his last speech, the representative of the United States had quoted (674th meeting) an article, three years old, from *Pravda* published in the Ukraine and had tried to prove that the Ukraine had engaged in a campaign of hatred against the ruling circles in the United States. He had not understood that the hatred was directed not against any particular circles, but only against an imperialist and aggressive policy. The representative of the United States had claimed, on the other hand, that the campaign against the USSR and

the peoples' republics was the outcome of freedom of speech in the United States. It would, however, be impossible to quote articles in the United States bourgeois Press attacking the aggressive policy of that country and demanding the prohibition of atomic weapons. It must be added that the slander engaged in by the United States Press against the USSR was part of a broad campaign of hatred which was reflected even in the United States Congress.

33. The USSR proposals were particularly realistic and urgent. They represented minimum measures and bore witness to the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union. If the United States was really not pursuing aggressive purposes, it could prove that that was so by adopting every one of those proposals. The Ukrainian delegation presumed that the United States would understand that the foreign policy of the United States was a serious obstacle to international co-operation and must inevitably lead to war. The Ukrainian delegation would therefore vote for the USSR proposals.

34. Mr. ARZE QUIROGA (Bolivia) said that once more the First Committee had before it a question closely connected with that of disarmament. By its resolutions 190 (III) and 377 A (V), the Assembly had already laid down the principles by which disarmament and the preservation of peace should be governed.

35. The USSR proposals amounted to an appeal to the great Powers for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, and to a request for the prohibition of military bases abroad and the adoption of definite measures to put an end to the propaganda of hatred against other States.

36. The problem of disarmament had been dealt with at each session of the Assembly in succession, but hitherto the result had only been failure. The proposals for putting an end to the campaign of hatred were interesting from the moral point of view. The USSR thought, however, that the propaganda was the cause of the hatred, whereas it seemed rather to be its effect. The deep roots of hatred and distrust must be sought in ignorance or forgetfulness of the moral principles by which the West had been guided for two thousand years. The problem facing the twentieth century was to place material force, if not at the service of justice, at any rate at the service of peace and security in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. To lessen the harmful effects of such propaganda, it would sometimes be useful to restrict the public nature of United Nations debates. The world could not return to the methods of secret diplomacy, but certain items, particularly those dealing with disarmament, should be debated at closed meetings so as to prevent recourse to propaganda which might be contrary to the aim of peace.

37. The USSR proposal for the avoidance of war propaganda would in fact result in a series of restrictions being placed on civic freedom and was obviously unacceptable to the States of the West.

38. Lastly, so far as Europe was concerned, it was undeniable that that part of the world displayed a spiritual unity which had not yet found its political form. Geographically, it was a peninsula of Asia. The continent of Asia was directly or indirectly controlled by the USSR. The population of Europe was with justifi-

cation attempting to defend itself against the growing strength of its eastern neighbours. At all events, its defensive attitude was legitimate and was a step in the

direction of the formation of the United States of Europe.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.