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C O N T E N T S

| | <i>Page</i> |
|--|-------------|
| Tribute to the memory of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdul Rahman Al Faisal Al Saud of Saudi Arabia | 179 |
| Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (<i>continued</i>) | 179 |

Chairman: Mr. F. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium).

Tribute to the memory of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdul Rahman Al Faisal Al Saud of Saudi Arabia

1. The CHAIRMAN said it was his painful duty to announce the sad news of the death of King Ibn Saud. He paid a tribute to the King as one of the outstanding figures in the Arab revival movement, and asked the Saudi Arabian representative to convey the feelings of sympathy of the First Committee to the royal family and to the Government and people of Saudi Arabia.

The Committee observed one minute's silence in memory of H.M. King Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdul Rahman Al Faisal Al Saud.

2. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) said that he would convey the First Committee's expression of condolence to the new King, His Majesty Saud el Saud.

3. Mr. LODGE (United States), on behalf of his delegation, joined in the tribute to the King, whose role in the renaissance of the Near East had already become a legend and whose loss would be keenly felt by the United States, which had very close ties with Saudi Arabia.

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2444, A/C.1/L.72) (*continued*)

[Item 23]*

4. Mr. LODGE (United States). On the initiative of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, the General Assembly had by its resolution 502 (VI) set up the Disarmament Commission, the third report (DC/32) of which expressed strong hope in the future. Since an armistice had been concluded in Korea, the United States hoped that in spite of the Soviet Union's discouraging note of 3 November 1953, the Soviet leaders would yet give concrete indications that they actively desired to reduce international tension.

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

5. In his inaugural address, President Eisenhower had declared the readiness of his Government to join in a common effort to remove discord among the nations so as to make possible drastic reductions of armaments. He had further said that the sole requisites for such effort were an honest desire to secure peace and the establishment of methods by which every participating nation would prove its good faith in carrying out its pledge. Similarly, in his statement of 16 April 1953, the President had spoken at length regarding disarmament, saying that as progress towards just political settlements on specific issues strengthened world trust, it would be possible to proceed concurrently with the next work, the reduction of the burden of armaments weighing on the world. The Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, addressing the General Assembly (434th plenary meeting) had reaffirmed the desire of the United States to achieve limitation and control of all categories of armaments.

6. Both the President and the Secretary of State of the United States had emphasized that their Government's recognition of the need for certain political settlements did not mean that until such progress was achieved it was unwilling to develop a programme of disarmament and, particularly, proceed with the preliminary technical work. Clearly, no comprehensive and balanced disarmament programme could be put into effect until world tensions had been reduced by settlement of some of the major political issues between the Soviet Union and the free world; but it was equally clear that agreement on such a disarmament programme would in its turn help to reduce those international tensions. That conception was reflected in the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.72).

7. President Eisenhower had pointed out that the settlement of political issues and agreement upon a comprehensive and safeguarded disarmament programme would enable the world to devote its energies to aiding the under-developed areas and stimulating world trade. The United States Government was prepared to ask its people to join with other nations in devoting a substantial percentage of the savings achieved by disarmament to a fund for world reconstruction. That concept was set forth in the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution.

8. More than forty resolutions on disarmament had been presented in the United States Congress in the preceding year. On 29 July 1953, the United States Senate had adopted a resolution asking the President to make known the sense of the Senate's views on the matter to the United States and to the heads of State of the nations of the world with the request that their people should be informed of its contents (DC/31). In that document the United States Senate emphasized that the people and Congress of the United States desired peace and the achievement of a system under

which armaments would become unnecessary except for the maintenance of order. It affirmed that it was the constant aim of the United States to seek agreements for enforceable limitation of armaments, in accordance with the principles set out in the President's address of 16 April 1953, to the end that a greater proportion of the world's productive capacity might be used for the well-being of mankind.

9. The desires of the American people were also reflected in the fact that various private organizations had been concerned with disarmament and had urged the Government to pursue its efforts.

10. President Eisenhower had said that no nation possessed a perfect and unchanging formula for disarmament. At the seventh session of the General Assembly the USSR had not presented a resolution which called for the old and often-rejected one-third reduction of armed forces and armaments and Mr. Vyshinsky had even voted for most parts of resolution 704 (VII) although those parts described the objectives of the Disarmament Commission in terms which had not previously been supported by the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the draft resolution now presented by the Soviet delegation (A/2485/Rev.1) revived the old concept—so many times rejected by the General Assembly—that weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited by mere declaration instead of as the result of an enforceable system of international control. Moreover, the USSR draft resolution recommended once again that the five major Powers should reduce their armed forces by one-third within one year, a concept repeatedly turned down by the General Assembly because of its unfairness to those nations which, like the United States, had materially reduced their armaments at the end of the Second World War. The USSR draft resolution also protested against the establishment of certain military bases without at the same time offering international inspection of communist air bases under its own flag and in other countries. The USSR draft condemned what it called war propaganda while it was silent on the fact that the Communist Party all over the world under direction from Moscow sought to overthrow peaceful governments by violence.

11. At the 658th meeting the USSR representative had taken the same stand that his delegation had taken in the Disarmament Commission, that the Soviet Union would explain its proposals for international control after they had been accepted; in other words, the debate would take place after the vote.

12. Mr. Vyshinsky's scheme was to create a moral—he called it a "juridical"—obligation to cease production of atomic weapons and prohibit their use without any ability to ensure that those obligations would be honoured. But in spite of Soviet promises the prohibition of atomic weapons was a matter so deeply affecting the security of nations that it could be put into effect only if there were safeguards to protect against a violation.

13. The Soviet Union held that the United States' efforts to increase its strength were in conflict with its position on disarmament. The United States' position, however, was quite clear; as President Eisenhower had stated on 16 April 1953, the amassing of Soviet power had compelled free nations to develop weapons capable of inflicting instant punishment upon any aggressor and had convinced them that as long as a threat to freedom persisted, they must remain armed.

14. The headlong disarmament of the United States after the Second World War was well-known. The President of the United States continued to emphasize that free nations had no aggressive purpose whatever. In conformity with the pledge made by Secretary Dulles on 17 September, the United States was prepared to dedicate itself to all efforts in the Disarmament Commission to achieve agreement. That would be possible if the Soviet Union concretely demonstrated a desire to negotiate honestly on the various disarmament issues.

15. Disarmament was impossible without international security and in any case required proper safeguards. So long as the USSR wished to impose its ideas on the rest of the world and so long as it lived in baseless fear that the rest of the world sought to destroy its idea, communist imperialism would continue the subversion of peaceful governments by violence, mendacious propaganda on the germ warfare model, and even the promotion of actual warfare as in Korea and Indochina. Proper safeguards for conducting disarmament could take place only when the Iron Curtain no longer existed so that the world would know what those countries were doing, in the same way as those countries could know what the free world was doing. In the matter of both international security and safeguards for disarmament the answer lay with the USSR.

16. The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.72 sought to promote a goal which was supported by the Soviet Union and which was, according to the terms of resolution 704 (VII), to prevent war and release the world's human and economic resources for the purposes of peace. In spite of everything there was still hope.

17. Mr. VON BALLUSECK (Netherlands) said that while an improvement of international relations could promote disarmament, the obverse was equally true; consequently, preparations should be begun concurrently in both spheres. An armistice had already been achieved in Korea, and if the political conference could convene and make headway the danger of war might well recede.

18. At the same time, there was no reason to lose hope with respect to other major issues such as the German problem, since a modest initial success might lead to broader agreement.

19. In disarmament, it was necessary to begin at the beginning, by technical preparation, which was the only means of attaining the political objective of increased security. Unfortunately, as had just been seen, the USSR persisted in its desire to begin by the prohibition of the most powerful weapons. But no nation would be willing to scrap its most powerful weapons, as long as it felt that its security might be threatened by other kinds of weapons. In other words, an atmosphere of confidence and peace must be created by seeking to solve less formidable problems in the field of lesser weapons.

20. Mr. Vyshinsky had said that as a matter of course, prohibition and international control had to be simultaneous; that in itself was quite correct. But if only the so-called conventional armaments remained, the weaker parts of the world would be in an intolerable situation, in view of the present lack of equilibrium in that field. For that reason, the proposals of the Soviet Union were impracticable from the start.

21. As was clearly admitted in General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) which had been adopted by a majority of forty-two votes, the process suggested by the Soviet Union had to be reversed. It was necessary to consider from the outset plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification. Other aspects of the disarmament problem could doubtless be examined at the same time. Thus the three great Western Powers had submitted to the Disarmament Commission specific proposals (DC/10 and DC/12) for the numerical limitations of the armed forces and armaments of the five great Powers which were in no way meant to be rigid or complete. But the Soviet Union had systematically refused to treat those proposals on their own merits, and had maintained that the only possible way to make progress was to begin at the wrong end by the abolition of atomic and hydrogen weapons—which could actually only be carried out at a latter stage—and the reduction of all existing armed forces by one-third. The latter part of the proposal, a hardy perennial, was completely unrealistic and unfeasible. It would obviously be impossible to establish what and how much one-third of armed forces and armaments exactly meant, as long as it was not clear what every nation actually possessed. Furthermore, there would have to be adequate machinery for control. Even then, the new situation would leave the forces of the major Powers totally unbalanced, and the world would not feel any more secure.

22. Mr. Vyshinsky seemed to take serious objection to the hypothesis that disarmament, as well as the lessening of international tension, could proceed only step by step. His scheme likewise provided for successive stages, with the only difference that those would go from high to low, whereas under resolution 502 (VI) they would go from low to high. The foundations must be laid before installing the roof.

23. It was therefore necessary to start creating an atmosphere of confidence, by finding technical solutions for the less important weapons and for the concurrent systems of international control. Such a course would also provide useful experience. Similarly, the organization of peace and security had to be built up in separate sections, which could be unified at the final stage. Moreover, the endeavours in those two complex fields had to go hand in hand, in order that progress in either might provide a stimulus for the other.

24. The Netherlands delegation was sympathetically inclined with regard to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.72, the sponsors of which represented a fair cross-section of the membership of the United Nations Organization, with the exception of the Soviet orbit. Efforts to reach agreement on disarmament should be made concurrently with progress in the settlement of international disputes. It went without saying that every civilized nation would rejoice, if the reduction of armaments and the resultant international security enabled peoples to direct their energies towards peaceful purposes. The Netherlands delegation therefore welcomed the idea embodied in the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the resolution, which expressed the hope that the savings achieved could be made available as additional means to fortify world conditions conducive to peace, through financial assistance in the under-developed areas of the world. The question of the international fund to which the

draft resolution referred was being studied in the Second Committee, but it was also of interest to the First Committee, since the economic development of those areas would be a contribution to world peace and security. That being so, the question should be placed openly within the framework of the United Nations, which would necessitate a modification in the wording.

25. Furthermore, since want created a danger to internal stability and security, economic development and national defence were part of the same problem. Consequently, the conception of an international fund was of such importance that its realization should not be made entirely conditional upon certain achievements in the field of disarmament. It could very well be that such a condition was not in the minds of the sponsors of the draft resolution, and the statements made on behalf of the United States following that of the United Kingdom (658th meeting) had already given a degree of encouragement. Nevertheless, fourth paragraph of the preamble could be made more explicit. Perhaps the sponsors might prefer to review the text of that paragraph themselves.

26. Subject to that one reservation, the Netherlands delegation was in great sympathy with the draft resolution A/C.1/72. The Disarmament Commission should continue its efforts, and the major Powers in particular should seek the basis of a solution of the problem which, if unsolved, would sooner or later threaten the very existence of mankind.

27. Mr. ANDERSEN (Denmark) considered that the statesmen of the world should not lose patience, even though no progress could be reported hitherto. For peoples, even though they understood the necessity for their sacrifices, looked forward to a situation where their resources could be used more fruitfully. In addition, an agreement on armaments and an abolition of all weapons of mass destruction would, if adequately supervised by an efficient international control organ, contribute to the stability of peaceful international relations. It was lack of confidence among nations which was the source of the present armament situation. That was the vicious circle which the United Nations had to break. The Danish Government and political parties sincerely hoped the Organization would succeed.

28. Notwithstanding the present deadlock, some recent events, such as the cessation of hostilities in Korea, had created a more propitious atmosphere which the United Nations should utilize. All nations, big or small, were equally concerned in solving problems on which their fate depended. At present, indeed, no nation could safeguard its future by standing alone. The horrors of a new war could be averted only by honest co-operation, regardless of social systems. It was in that spirit that Denmark had co-sponsored the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.72).

29. The two problems which had to be considered concurrently were the easing of political tension and, simultaneously, the finding of agreement on practical steps to be taken in order to verify and reduce armaments. It was indeed regrettable that the informal conversations between the heads of States, suggested by Sir Winston Churchill and supported by the Danish political parties and by a meeting of the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers, had not yet become a reality. In that way it might have been possible to break the dead-

lock which hindered negotiations on all the essential problems, including disarmament. The Committee would remember that two years ago such private conversations between the representatives of the great Powers had proved valuable in more than one respect. Consequently, it was to be hoped that the present debate would pave the way for further negotiations of that kind on a realistic basis.

30. The results which might be obtained in the political field could have an important influence on the social, economic and cultural development of the less-developed areas of the world. The Danish Government and political parties pledged themselves to seek the consent of their parliamentary representatives to devote a portion of the savings thereby achieved to an international fund, in addition to the contributions already made by Denmark.

31. The world was rich enough for all to have a happy life, provided all peoples united in positive, tolerant and peaceful co-operation.

32. Mr. URRUTIA (Colombia) observed that some Latin-American representatives had been surprised that Brazil, Chile and Colombia had co-sponsored a draft resolution which, in the fourth paragraph of its preamble, seemed to make the establishment of an international fund dependent upon the prior operation of the disarmament programme. Those three countries had considered that the creation of such a fund would neither delay nor interrupt any other programmes under examination or already in operation, and the United Kingdom and United States representatives had made unequivocal statements to that effect. Since, however, the wording of the fourth paragraph was ambiguous, the position of the Brazilian, Chilean and Colombian delegations should be made clear.

33. As the Netherlands representative had stated, the Second Committee was studying the immediate establishment of an international fund. But, by a coincidence, the United States delegation had opposed such immediate establishment, and had submitted to the Second Committee a text with the same wording as the fourth paragraph of document A/C.1/L.72. Indeed, the operative part of the United States draft resolution (A/C.2/L.204) provided that the Members of the United Nations should request their peoples when sufficient progress has been made in international supervised world-wide disarmament, to devote a portion of the savings achieved through such disarmament to an international fund, within the framework of the United Nations to assist development and reconstruction in under-developed countries.

34. The three delegations would therefore readily consider any suggestion that might clarify the fourth paragraph of the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.72), which they had never regarded as implying the postponement of other programmes.

35. In a country like the United States, it was possible to devote 70,000 million dollars a year to armaments, without affecting other production. Consequently, the news that the creation of a permanent fund of 250 million dollars, which was less than 0.25 per cent of the United States armament budget, was to be postponed had created a poor impression in Latin America. Furthermore, articles had appeared saying that the proposal made in the Second Committee would lead to the setting up of an international fund

totalling one-thousandth of the estimated expenditure on armaments of the highly industrialized countries in the year 1954.

36. Consequently, the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution should not be construed as indicating any acceptance by the three delegations of a postponement of the establishment of an international fund, notwithstanding the parallel drawn with the proposal now before the Second Committee. During the Second World War, price control had cost the Latin-American countries thousands of millions of dollars. The least that could have been expected was that economic development programmes would bring some compensation for their sacrifices. But at the end of the war it had been decided that priority had to be given to the devastated areas. And now it was being said that as there was danger of war the money had to be used for armaments. Latin America appeared to be marking time.

37. In view of the explanations given by the United Kingdom and United States representatives, it might be advisable to amend the fourth paragraph so as to distinguish it from the text before the Second Committee.

38. Having thus explained the position of the Latin-American delegations, the Colombian delegation reserved its right to speak again on the draft resolution.

39. Mr. DU TOIT (Union of South Africa) shared the concern felt by many other representatives over the fact that so little progress had been made in the field of disarmament. Disarmament was primarily the responsibility of the great Powers as the problem could not be solved unless there was complete agreement among them.

40. The small Powers, however, asked to be heard and appealed to the great Powers to make every effort to reach a solution so that the peoples could maintain their faith in the United Nations as an agency for the preservation of world peace.

41. Because of the lack of agreement among the great Powers on the problem of disarmament, a number of small and medium-sized States had concluded regional defence alliances. That was not a denial of the goal of disarmament, but simply the result of the failure of disarmament. The small Powers could hardly be accused of harbouring aggressive intentions, since they had the most to lose in case of war. They could less well afford the destruction and loss of manpower caused by war than the great Powers.

42. The Union of South Africa had been obliged to embark on a defence programme owing to the increase of international tension and of threats to the peace. It would welcome a relaxation of that tension, for, in addition to improved prospects of peace, that would bring relief from the heavy burden of armament.

43. Consequently, the South African delegation particularly welcomed the wording of paragraph 3 of the operative part of the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.72). It supported the draft resolution as a whole, while noting that the fourth paragraph of the preamble was identical with a paragraph in a resolution considered by the Second Committee (A/C.2/L.204), on which his delegation had already stated its views.

44. Mr. BENITES VINUEZA (Ecuador) noted that the anxiety caused by the armaments race had not

lessened and that both sides had again put forward the same arguments, without prospect of any progress. While it was obvious that the problem must be solved primarily by the great Powers, heed should be paid to the small States which also defended the universal heritage and culture and which, like Ecuador, had always upheld the view that disputes between nations must be settled by peaceful methods.

45. He wished to make two preliminary remarks. The first was that the armaments race not only meant an increase in the offensive or defensive weapons at the disposal of the great Powers, but also had its repercussions on the less powerful States. The burden of armaments was not felt equally by all States. The defence system of the small Powers laid on them a financial burden which was sometimes greater than their economy could stand. The under-developed countries were therefore particularly handicapped; that was another reason why they should be heard. In addition, the accumulation of armaments, especially in regions where there was potential discord, constituted an added threat to the peace. Any solution of the problem of the regulation and balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces should therefore take into account the need to eliminate that added danger of aggression.

46. His second point was that the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.72) was neither realistic nor useful, since it made assistance to under-developed countries contingent upon disarmament, which unhappily was a distant goal. It would be preferable to recognize on the contrary that aid to under-developed States was particularly urgent because peace was threatened, since in the struggle between the democracies and the totalitarian regimes the best weapon of the latter was not munitions but the despair of the masses who had nothing to lose. Since there were still unexploited sources of materials in the world, an international programme of increased production and reconstruction would be as necessary as a disarmament programme. Therefore, without criticizing the draft resolution as a whole, his delegation was opposed to the spirit of the fourth paragraph of the preamble.

47. He recalled the questions examined by the Disarmament Commission. With regard to the reduction of conventional armaments, the USSR delegation had as in the past proposed a uniform reduction of the armaments of the great Powers by one-third, whereas the Western Powers proposed that armaments should be reduced to fixed levels to be established. Where the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction was concerned, the USSR proposed that prohibition should be decreed before methods of supervision were established, which amounted to proposing an obligation without providing for sanctions if it was not fulfilled. Lastly, with regard to the control of atomic energy, any solution had been made impossible by the obstacle which the USSR had raised when it invoked the concept of sovereignty. The situation had not changed during the past year. Consequently, the problem should be referred to the Disarmament Commission, so that the latter might study new plans and propose new solutions.

48. The destructive power of atomic weapons had, it would seem, diminished the likelihood of their being used and had therefore made possible the co-existence of two antagonistic political and economic systems. At

the present critical moment in history, it was fortunate that the conscience of mankind had become strong enough to influence the action of chiefs of State.

49. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that instead of an exchange of views between the great Powers on the problem of disarmament, representatives were listening rather to a series of monologues which could never lead to a closer understanding.

50. It was obvious that there could be no disarmament until a psychological change took place in the USSR. It was true that there had been a recent easing of international tension owing to economic progress in that country. The Peruvian representative had already stated that the armaments race was incompatible with a healthy economy, both in the Western Powers and in the USSR. A report by Mr. Beria had drawn attention to the economic difficulties of the USSR and Mr. Malenkov, in one of his speeches, had described the serious danger with which Soviet economy was faced. He had since adopted a policy directed at repairing the harmful effects on the economy of the country, caused by the armaments race. That new economic policy had led to an easing of tension and it was to be hoped that that would continue.

51. Nevertheless, some unfavourable factors remained; in particular, the psychological factor which drove those who had power not only to keep it but to increase it. Since in the political system of the Soviet Union there seemed to be no factors to arrest that tendency, the factor of political psychology was particularly dangerous.

52. Disarmament by the Western Powers had been one of the results of the establishment of a system of collective security at San Francisco. They had felt at the time that the maintenance of the *status quo* in Europe was the best political settlement. The USSR, however, had wished to surround itself by a belt of friendly States which would protect it against any attacks on its political and territorial integrity. That was the explanation for the shifting of the Polish frontier, the annexation of the Baltic States, the Soviet intervention in the Balkans, the continued occupation of Vienna and Berlin, the position of Czechoslovakia, Germany and other countries. Soviet policy with regard to those countries had given rise to distrust and rearmament on the part of Western States.

53. Rearmament had reached frightening proportions. It had been claimed that the destructive power of atomic weapons had prevented the outbreak of a third world war. In his view, it was rather to be feared that the armaments race had intensified the competition between the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and possibly other countries. Moreover, even if the destructive power of atomic weapons did in fact serve as a brake, the danger remained that the power to use those weapons might fall into the hands of a self-willed and bellicose person.

54. His delegation therefore felt that the United Nations should study methods of rousing the conscience of mankind by bringing home to it the danger hanging over its head. The present feeling of insecurity bred hatred and mutual distrust and the causes of friction were growing daily. In particular the people of the USSR must learn that the Western people wanted harmony and co-operation.

55. In addition to the economic progress which had taken place in the USSR and which might lead to a

better understanding, a change in the legal and moral viewpoint of States was needed. In 1951, at the sixth session of the General Assembly, the majority of Member States had recognized the principle that the prohibition of atomic weapons must go hand in hand with a system of strict control and effective inspection. The USSR had, however, opposed permanent inspection on the grounds of the principle of sovereignty. It had opposed a system of constant and unlimited control. While sovereignty was sacred, it was subject to a universal order. International law, as it developed, respected the concept of sovereignty, but altered the system of relations among States by gradually drawing nearer to the idea of an international entity. Without a strict control system, the prohibition of atomic weapons was obviously a Utopian dream. Consequently, the USSR would have to change radically its legal views with regard to disarmament. As long as there was no indication that those views were evolving and that the USSR was ready to accept an effective inspection system and full international control, any verbal prohibitions which it might propose would be inaccept-

able. Furthermore, it was obvious that a solution of the disarmament problem could not be found through a purely mathematical formula which would place the USSR in a privileged position. For all those reasons, the Peruvian delegation would support the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.72).

56. As the Netherlands, Colombian and Ecuadorian representatives had pointed out, the fourth paragraph of the preamble should be amended so that assistance to under-developed countries would not be necessarily subordinated to disarmament. It was true that the great Powers must give first thought to their defence; but the appearance of new armaments might bring about changes in defence needs and reduction in military credits. He therefore hoped that the paragraph would be amended so that its next text would be less rigid.

57. The CHAIRMAN read out the list of speakers, which he declared closed.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.