



Chairman: Mr. Narciso G. REYES (Philippines).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Brito (Brazil), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 41

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(continued):

(a) Report of the Trade and Development Board
[A/8403/Add.1 (part II), A/8415/Rev.1; A/C.2/270
and Corr.1]

1. Mr. DE RIVERO (Peru) said that the third session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), to be held in Santiago in April-May 1972, was of the utmost importance. In its resolution 2725 (XXV), the General Assembly had clearly defined the objectives and nature of the third session. In order to fulfil its central role in the implementation of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade (General Assembly resolution 2626 (XXV)), UNCTAD should concentrate its discussions on two key areas: firstly, the Conference was to review the progress made in and to seek further implementation of the policy measures as agreed upon within the context of the International Development Strategy, to reach agreement on issues which had not been fully resolved in the Strategy, to seek new areas of agreement and widen existing ones and to evolve new concepts and seek agreement on additional measures. That task was also emphasized in the International Development Strategy, which gave UNCTAD special responsibility for reviewing progress achieved in implementing the Strategy and attaining goals beneficial to the developing countries. In that connexion, the third session of UNCTAD should instruct the Trade and Development Board to define and keep under constant review the indicators for assessing progress in the implementation of policy measures.

2. The second key area on which the third session of UNCTAD should concentrate, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2725 (XXV), was the question of taking steps to vitalize and reform UNCTAD's institutional machinery so as to strengthen its negotiating role; the Secretary-General of UNCTAD should be given greater flexibility to initiate consultations with Member States and appropriate arrangements should be made to strengthen UNCTAD's activities in connexion with world public opinion.

3. The third session of UNCTAD should provide an opportunity to initiate implementation of the policy

measures in favour of the developing countries requested in the Strategy and in UNCTAD's recommendations. For that goal to be achieved, it was essential for the developed countries to enter into consultations and negotiations and to seek solutions in accordance with the Declaration and Principles of the Action Programme of Lima recently adopted by the Group of 77 (A/C.2/270 and Corr.1). The Lima Declaration supplemented the objectives of the Charter of Algiers and was an important statement of the developing countries' aims. The Declaration established fundamental principles on which the position of third world countries would be based on identified problems which could not continue to be considered from a purely economic standpoint, particularly since international events made it increasingly difficult to assess the economic problems of the developing countries in isolation from political factors.

4. The guiding principle of the Declaration was that the primary responsibility for development rested upon the developing countries themselves: those countries should carry out the necessary reforms in their social and economic structures and ensure participation of their peoples in the process and the benefits of development. At the same time, however, the Declaration stressed the imperative necessity for the international community to fulfil its obligation to build a more just international social and economic order within a time-bound action programme through the adoption by the developed countries of economic policies designed to achieve a fairer and more rational international division of labour. The Group of 77 also emphasized the sovereign right of every country freely to dispose of its natural resources in the interests of the economic development and well-being of its own people. The countries of the third world considered that any external political or economic measures or pressure brought to bear on the exercise of that right was a flagrant violation of the principles of self-determination and non-intervention set forth in the United Nations Charter and, if pursued, could constitute a threat to international peace and security. In short, the developing countries sought the discontinuance of certain undesirable policies, such as the arms race, colonialism, racial discrimination, *apartheid* and foreign occupation, which contributed to economic and social under-development.

5. The Lima Declaration also stressed the need for the developed countries to adhere to certain basic principles in their relations with the developing countries: strict observance of the standstill in regard to tariffs; the implementation of special measures in favour of the least developed among the developing countries and of the land-locked developing countries; the responsibility of the international community to eliminate any impediments to growth and development in order to attain collective economic secu-

riety; the full participation of developing countries on the basis of equality in decision-making concerning the reform of the world trade and monetary system; the promotion of a massive transfer of operative technology; the reservation for the developing countries of an increasing and substantial share in all invisible operations; and the recognition of the right of the developing countries to dispose of marine resources within the limits of their national jurisdiction, taking duly into account the development and welfare needs of their peoples. The latter principle had recently been recognized in the General Assembly by the People's Republic of China.

6. The Lima Meeting had not revealed conflicts between the developing countries; rather, they had sought to reach agreement on and to overcome certain difficulties arising from the present level of their development which were due to historical circumstances often alien to the developing countries and derived from the economic imperialism which was responsible for the current international division of labour. The Lima Meeting, which had recognized the justified concern of the least developed countries, had marked the beginning of a greater degree of understanding and co-operation between the developing countries which would be of advantage to all.

7. At the Lima meeting, the developing countries had assessed the policies applied by the developed countries since the Ministerial Meeting of Algiers and had concluded that the objectives laid down in the Charter of Algiers had been attained only to a small extent. The economic and social position of the developing countries continued to deteriorate alarmingly. In the developed countries, *per capita* income had increased by more than \$650 since 1960, whereas the corresponding figure for the developing countries was only \$40. Over the same period, the developing countries' share in world trade had declined from 23.3 per cent to 17.6 per cent. External indebtedness had increased steadily and by the end of the 1960s had reached approximately \$60,000 million. Furthermore, the developing countries were suffering from an outflow of capital through invisible transactions and earnings on foreign investments.

8. Recent international events, such as the world monetary crisis and the economic reprisals which the developed countries had taken or were likely to take against each other, were a serious threat to the development of the developing countries, international economic co-operation and the success of the Second Development Decade. The international monetary crisis was producing a situation which jeopardized the basic principle of international economic co-operation, namely, the participation of all States on a basis of equality in decisions affecting the economic and social development of members of the international community. It was extremely important that the Second Committee should voice its opinion on the matter.

9. Although the objectives of the Charter of Algiers had not been fully realized and despite the current world financial difficulties, the Group of 77 had reaffirmed their faith in international co-operation for development, as enshrined in the United Nations Charter and in the practical expression of that co-operation—UNCTAD—which was the

main forum of the United Nations system for trade and development. The Group of 77 had also expressed their conviction that the third session of UNCTAD would provide a fresh opportunity for a collective effort on the part of the international community to implement the Declaration, Programme and Plan of Action of Lima. The developing countries, which hoped that the developed countries would study the Declaration with care, felt that their claims were justified and would provide a sound basis for consultations and negotiations at the third session of UNCTAD and elsewhere. It was to be hoped that the industrialized countries would approach the third session of the Conference in a constructive manner so that a repetition of the bitter dialogue between developed and developing countries would be avoided and that at the session progress would be made towards promoting international economic co-operation for development.

10. Mr. JURASZ (Poland) recalled that the Declaration of the second Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 thoroughly analysed the fundamental causes of the low rate of economic growth of the developing countries. His delegation shared the faith of those countries in international co-operation for development and their conviction that the third session of UNCTAD would provide a fresh opportunity to make a collective and determined endeavour to correct effectively the adverse situation that confronted the developing countries. Poland had reached a new stage in its economic development, thanks to the efforts and sacrifices of the entire Polish nation following the Second World War, and planned to participate actively in the third session of UNCTAD.

11. Greater attention should be paid to the development of economic co-operation between the socialist countries and countries with different socio-economic systems. He cited UNCTAD statistics illustrating the vast unexplored potential for such co-operation, particularly in the field of international trade.

12. Although it was not until the 1960s that economic relations between the socialist countries and the developing countries had begun to expand, trade between those two groups of countries had tripled during that period and was continuing to grow. Moreover, in 1970 more than 2,000 students from the developing countries were pursuing studies in Poland and over 600 Polish experts had been dispatched to those countries under bilateral and multi-lateral agreements. The personnel policies of certain international organizations restricted the number of Polish experts in those countries.

13. Poland wished to co-operate further with the developing countries on the basis of principles acceptable to the parties concerned. With a view to establishing a new international division of labour, it was prepared to consider the elaboration of a joint policy for long-term economic co-operation; the assurance of increased access of imports on preferential terms from developing countries to Poland's markets under its long-term economic plans; assistance to the developing countries in elaborating economic development plans; and the possibility of increasing the production in Poland of certain commodities of special interest to the developing countries.

14. Recognizing the importance to developing countries of exports of primary products, Poland was prepared to support international conferences on raw materials and to study the possibility of negotiating long-term contracts with developing countries for the importation of certain commodities, while at the same time possibly limiting its own production in certain well-defined cases. Poland would also assist in the development and exploitation of natural resources and the training of specialists. Poland had considerable experience in mining which it was sharing with countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It could also share its experience in fishing and the building of fishing vessels. It was also prepared to grant preferential treatment to exports of primary products from the developing countries.

15. Poland also recognized the need to increase exports of manufactures from developing countries and was thus ready to enter into negotiations with a view to enabling them to expand their industrial capacity; to encourage them to produce goods for which there was a substantial demand in Poland and possibly other socialist countries; to import manufactured goods under agreements, in partial repayment of credits; to conclude technical co-operation agreements to expand and improve production in agreed industrial sectors; and to conclude scientific and technical co-operation agreements to facilitate the transfer of technology. There was also room for expanded use of scientific research institutes and building enterprises, increased exchange of scientific and technical information and the transfer of licences for the utilization of patents and know-how. Similarly, questions of financing and credit could also be discussed.

16. Like all the socialist countries, Poland had long favoured economic co-operation with all countries, irrespective of their socio-economic systems. Such relations must be based on respect for the differences between those systems, the elimination of all types of discriminatory trade practices, and the principles of equality and mutual advantage. Once those prerequisites had been fulfilled, the future development of trade and economic relations between East and West would depend essentially on economic factors.

17. He cited statistics indicative of a substantial increase in trade between the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Western European countries between 1960 and 1968 and emphasized the importance of increasing exports from the former to the latter. The accelerated development of East-West trade required the full liberalization of the trade policies of Western European countries and developed countries outside of Europe, and the elimination of existing quotas and of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Changed patterns of production in Poland and other socialist countries required a significant increase in exports of manufactures from those countries—particularly machinery and capital goods—to Western Europe. That called for further co-operation in industry between Poland and the countries of Western Europe.

18. Co-operation was also necessary on matters of financing and credit. As a member of CMEA, Poland had encouraged the expansion of international credit and the gradual multilateralization of its trade and payments and

favoured expanded co-operation with Western countries in matters of financing and credit. The rapid rate of increase of exports from the developed capitalist countries to socialist countries showed that the latter did not limit access to their markets. Expanded East-West trade could promote the more rapid economic development of both parts of Europe, which in turn required a new international division of labour in the industrial sphere among the countries of Eastern and Western Europe and further specialization and industrial co-operation within Europe.

19. Poland also looked forward to increased economic co-operation with such developed countries as the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.

20. Lastly, in the context of preparations for the third session of UNCTAD, his delegation would give favourable consideration to the positive and realistic aspirations and proposals in the final document of the second Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77.

AGENDA ITEM 45

Review and appraisal of the objectives and policies of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade: report of the Secretary-General (continued)* (A/8387/Rev.1; A/8403, chap. V; A/C.2/L.1152/Rev.1, A/C.2/L.1182/Rev.1, A/C.2/L.1189; E/5040)

21. Mr. CAVIGLIA STARICCO (Uruguay), speaking on behalf of the sponsors, introduced the revised draft resolution (A/C.2/L.1152/Rev.1) and drew attention to a number of drafting changes and amendments incorporated therein.

22. The first two preambular paragraphs had been included at the suggestion of the representative of the Philippines and referred to two important resolutions adopted by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly on the mobilization of public opinion. The third preambular paragraph recalled the provisions of paragraph (84) of the International Development Strategy. A new sixth preambular paragraph had been added at the suggestion of the representative of the Philippines.

23. With regard to the operative part of the revised draft resolution, paragraph 1 was self-explanatory. Paragraph 2 took up the provisions of the operative part of the original text, to which it added a specific reference to the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. On the one hand, UNDP was closely involved in the implementation of the Strategy and, by virtue of the fact that it had permanent representatives in nearly all Member States of the United Nations, was ideally suited to collaborating in programmes aimed at mobilizing public opinion. UNESCO, on the other hand, would be able to disseminate information through its many educational programmes and could thereby have a decisive and direct influence on youth, a vital sector which should be made fully aware of the objectives and policies of the United Nations.

* Resumed from the 1412th meeting.

24. Mr. GIBSON PARKER (Director, Centre for Economic and Social Information), in response to a request from the representative of the Sudan, submitted a progress report on developments in the field of information since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2567 (XXIV) in December 1969.

25. The programme prepared in 1969 by the Centre for Economic and Social Information (CESI) and outlined in a report¹ had been applied against a highly unfavourable background of public opinion both in the industrialized and in the developing countries. Events since the proclamation of the Second Development Decade had seriously diverted attention from development in the affluent world and, in the developing world, had produced a certain disenchantment and disillusion. He quoted a report from a reputable academic authority in one of the great affluent countries to the effect that development studies at universities had suffered a sharp reversal in support and popularity, an indication that other preoccupations had begun to sap away the interest and the will which had been evident in the affluent countries a few years before. The trend suggested that it was more necessary than ever to follow the directive, endorsed in General Assembly resolution 2567 (XXIV) that the mobilization of public opinion for development was mainly the responsibility of national bodies. It was increasingly evident, therefore, that international information services must work in the closest possible co-operation with national Governments.

26. In response to a recommendation contained in the 1969 report, the Governments of some 50 Member States had designated senior information officers to maintain contact with CESI. He appealed to those Governments which had not so far nominated an appropriate official to do so in the interests of all development information programmes and projects. Two meetings of those officers had already taken place and two other meetings were scheduled for 1972. An important item on their agenda was the establishment or reinforcement of national bodies designed to mobilize public opinion and known as National Commissions for the Second Development Decade. To be effective, it was recommended that those National Commissions should comprise a Government component, a non-governmental component, and important representatives of the mass media. Approximately 20 such commissions were either fully functioning or in the organizational and planning stage, that of the Netherlands having been the first to be formed and one whose programme was perhaps the most advanced. It was hoped that 50 commissions would be established or in an organizational stage by the end of 1972 and that they would become a vital force in the mobilization of public opinion.

27. With regard to the recommendation contained in paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2567 (XXIV) regarding the co-ordination of activities in support of the Second Development Decade, the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination had approved the establishment of a Programme Committee of CESI in which all members of the United Nations family participated. He believed that the Programme Committee, which met twice a year to discuss programmes and projects in the field of develop-

ment, could eventually become a nucleus where joint planning of all major information activities in the field of economic and social development could take place.

28. He then turned to some of the specific points raised by the representative of the Sudan. Under a project entitled "Leadership Symposia", CESI planned a series of meetings to be held initially in North America and subsequently in various industrialized countries of Western Europe. The first symposium had been held in Boston in May 1971 and a second was scheduled for St. Louis in December 1971. Four more in the series were to be held in major United States and Canadian cities prior to their introduction into Europe. Regarding its series of briefing papers, CESI's publications programme had been heavy and had included contributions from prominent personalities on a wide range of developmental subjects. Although it was impossible to determine the impact of the publications programme, the fact that Governments of Member States had translated CESI publications into five languages other than the three in which they originally appeared was an indication of their usefulness.

29. The question had also been raised of field trips for journalists. In view of the mass media's general lack of concern with the day-to-day evolution of the development process, CESI had undertaken to organize visits by prominent economic editors from the industrialized world to the developing continents, in order to bring to the notice of those who controlled the media in the affluent world the complexity of that process and its interdependent nature. Three such visits had already taken place and a fourth was planned for the early part of 1972. As to the film series referred to in the 1969 report, CESI had, in conjunction with various organizations of the United Nations family, helped to finance a series of three-hour long films on development problems, intended mostly for audiences in the industrialized world. Those films, which had now been completed, had been warmly received by important international non-governmental organizations.

30. Early in 1972, CESI planned to produce a newsletter under the title "Development Forum", containing news of economic and social development, for distribution among national commissions, parliamentarians, non-governmental organizations, etc.

31. He announced that CESI was arranging to hold next March in Geneva a "North-South Encounter", which would involve a discussion on issues of substance relevant to the third session of UNCTAD. The participants would be prominent personalities from Ministries of Finance and Planning in the developing countries, and some 18 eminent economic editors from the industrialized world.

32. In conclusion, he noted that one of the most important components of public opinion was youth which, before the end of the decade, would be in positions of influence and in control of development policies. In the belief that informed public opinion must begin in school, one of CESI's most important activities had been to encourage youth movements for development. In future years, in company with the appropriate organizations of the United Nations system, it proposed to make a special effort in the field of education for development, which was

¹ A/AC.141/L.11.

perhaps the key to the effective mobilization of public opinion.

33. Mr. DO RIO-BRANCO (Brazil) said that, although his delegation considered that the General Assembly should bear the main responsibility for conducting the over-all review and appraisal, it did not consider that the discussion of the institutional arrangements adopted by the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 1621 C (LI) should be reopened. He would therefore confine his remarks to the question of review and appraisal as a whole. The entire system should be based on two essential premises. In the first place, review and appraisal must be carried out by those very intergovernmental fora where negotiations concerning new areas of agreement were also conducted; the Strategy would thus be transformed into a series of negotiated agreements, which would give it the necessary impetus, particularly at the sectoral level. Secondly, the process must remain the prerogative of Governments, since the Strategy was an expression of their political will.

34. Review must be a continuous effort at double-checking. Current trends must be checked against desirable objectives, as measured by the global and sectoral targets; actual action must be checked against required action. Moreover, the Strategy was an integrated programme with a time-dimension, namely, the target dates relating to trade and development. Review and appraisal were therefore essential to ensure that the political and economic premises of the Strategy were constantly re-evaluated in the light of new facts, new requirements and perhaps new obstacles.

35. With regard to the levels at which evaluation was to be conducted, paragraph (80) of the Strategy was perfectly clear concerning the national level. He wished to stress, however, that it was the sovereign right of each developing country to establish, strengthen or reorganize its internal plan evaluation machinery: standardization was incompatible with different national and regional circumstances and socio-political approaches. Moreover, review at the national level should be regarded not as a pre-condition, but as a supplement to review at the international levels. At the regional level, it would appear that the only question was that of co-ordinating the various programmes of the different organs. His delegation considered that the vital stage of the review process was the sectoral level, where a fusion of the reviewing and negotiating procedures was essential and where the key policy measures of the Strategy were still subject to reservations and restrictive interpretations, mainly by developed countries; it was essential that negotiations should be pursued, and that could only take place in the competent international organizations; accordingly, stress should be laid on UNCTAD's role in setting up and conducting its own review and appraisal procedures to deal with its increased responsibilities deriving from the Strategy. The complexity of UNCTAD's tasks in that connexion were recognized in General Assembly resolution 2725 (XXV), which invited the Conference at its third session to reassess the role of UNCTAD against that new background, and the second Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 had advanced a series of proposals with a view to strengthening the negotiating role of UNCTAD through long-term and short-term measures.

36. Finally, at the global level, it seemed to be undeniable that the General Assembly, as the supreme body of the

United Nations, bore the over-all responsibility for final decisions on the conduct of the review exercise at all levels. The Economic and Social Council, in accordance with the role assigned to it by the Charter, would serve as a communication channel between the Assembly and the various bodies with which the Council was linked; but that co-ordinating role should not cause the Council to overlook findings of sectoral reviews undertaken independently by UNCTAD and UNIDO, which were directly linked to the Assembly by their constitutional charters.

37. His delegation had some misgivings about the establishment of the review machinery as it was described in the Secretary-General's report (E/5040). In the first place, paragraph 34 of the report gave a biased interpretation of General Assembly resolution 2641 (XXV): since the Assembly recalled its earlier decision, in paragraph (83) of the Strategy, to carry out the over-all appraisal, to state that the Council was to have "the pre-eminent role in the process of over-all review" and to add that the so-called pre-eminent role of the Council was recognized by General Assembly resolution 2641 (XXV) was a clear exaggeration with far-reaching political implications which the Brazilian delegation firmly rejected. The report completely ignored the need for the review process to be organizationally linked with negotiations on the key areas of the Strategy which were still open to improvement, thus minimizing the vital role of the sectoral level of evaluation and disregarding the increased responsibilities of UNCTAD. If that dynamic element was lost, review would be nothing but an *a posteriori* identification of data and problems which would have already been transformed into policies and facts and probably into obstacles to the implementation of the Strategy.

38. Secondly, the report did not take into account the time dimension of the Strategy, which was one of its most significant features.

39. Thirdly, paragraphs 41 to 44 also conveyed an exaggerated interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Strategy. It was stated in paragraph 42 that the Secretary-General would receive relevant detailed information related to review and appraisal from Governments and intergovernmental bodies, including results of the reviews at the national, regional and global sectoral levels, and it was further suggested that the Secretary-General should prepare a single report summing up the information received from all different levels and containing recommendations on the future direction of policy and action. To confer such all-powerful functions on the Secretariat would completely upset the delicate balance of authority between intergovernmental bodies, including the General Assembly, and international secretariats, and the review exercise would be deprived of all political significance if it were confined to alternatives pre-selected by the international technocracy.

40. Fourthly, the annex to the report contained a list of indicators for monitoring performance in respect of the various elements of the Strategy. It was difficult to fragment a Strategy which was an organic entity, made up of interrelated economic and social measures and relying on the convergent action of the developed and the developing countries. While there was a practical need for an analytical approach, care should be taken to avoid unnecessary

compartmentalization which would tend to obscure the view of the Strategy as a global process. It therefore seemed erroneous to classify its elements according to whether the developing countries, the developed countries or the international community were to take certain measures. The same applied to the creation of additional abstract subdivisions, which amounted to removing the functional interdependence between measures which belonged to the same conceptual group. His delegation was in favour of re-grouping the main elements according to the policy areas outlined in the Strategy, such as international trade, financing and science and technology, and then putting side by side, in each area, the elements relating to the developing and the developed countries, so that the organic connexion between the two was kept intact.

41. With regard to the specific elements and indicators suggested it was disturbing to note that no less than 40 units of observation related to action by developing countries and only 17 to the developed countries and that an unduly large number of items related to social and assistance activities, in contrast to those directly concerned with the acceleration of economic development. There were also some significant omissions from the list, for instance, with regard to paragraph (35) of the Strategy. The Secretariat should revise that list, and it was clearly desirable to entrust UNCTAD and UNIDO with the task of devising indicators for those elements of the Strategy falling under their jurisdiction. It was to be hoped that the third session of the Conference would consider those indicators which related to trade and development, as a factor of UNCTAD's review and appraisal exercise.

42. With regard to the biennial reviews, the Second Committee would undoubtedly be faced with problems of the organization of its work. A welcome tendency had emerged for the Committee to study in depth reports which it had formerly dismissed as routine matters; but it was to be hoped that the various reports on appraisal activities at the sectoral and other levels could be treated in an integrated manner by the Assembly, and for that time was essential. Accordingly, the Assembly should decide forthwith to reserve for the Committee, at the outset of work at biennial review sessions, the necessary time for serious and substantive appraisal work.

43. Mr. ZELAYA (Nicaragua), after emphasizing the urgent need to close the gap between the wealthy and disadvantaged nations, recalled that the Joint Statement of the second Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 reaffirmed the belief that that could be accomplished only with the full and effective participation of the peoples of the developing countries in the processes and benefits of development. Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1152/Rev.1 was timely, non-controversial and merited the unanimous support of all delegations. Proper planning and co-ordination could ensure that it would be implemented within an acceptable level of expenditure.

44. Reliance on purely quantitative indicators of growth did not accurately reflect the development process, and thus increased discrepancies both within and among States and undermined the foundations of the United Nations. It was therefore imperative to create an informed public opinion which would generate the will to make whatever

adjustments were necessary to ensure the development of all peoples in a spirit of co-operation and solidarity. Peace required the guarantee of equal opportunity, both within States themselves and among nations.

45. The creation of a public opinion conducive to the effective implementation of the Strategy required fundamental changes in educational systems in order to transform them into true instruments of development. Education must adapt to the changing nature of society and must not be used to protect the *status quo*. Misuse of education, and increasing unemployment among the educated, had created a disenchantment with education even in countries where it had been considered the key to success.

46. The draft resolution was thus most welcome, particularly since it called for efforts on the part of UNESCO, which had made great strides during the past 20 years. A creative and flexible approach to qualitative, rather than mere quantitative, development required the formulation and implementation of programmes involving the behavioural sciences, technology and education.

47. Mr. DE SILVA (United Nations Economic, Scientific and Cultural Organization) noted that operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.2/L.1152/Rev.1 made specific mention of UNESCO's role in carrying out the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade. UNESCO was fully aware of its responsibilities in that regard and had already taken a number of important steps to promote the development effort. Resolution 1.101 of the General Conference envisaged a number of methods for the advancement of education and contained a specific reference to the Second Development Decade. General Conference resolution 1.102 emphasized the importance of helping member States to expand and improve their educational systems and thus make a major contribution to the achievement of the goals of the Second Development Decade. In resolution 1.131, the General Conference recognized the need to establish an International Commission on the Development of Education. The Commission would shortly complete its report, which would cover a period of 20 to 30 years and recommend a global strategy for education; the report would first be submitted to the administrative organs of UNESCO and then to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. General Conference resolution 1.322 was designed to help young people to participate in social and economic development, in furthering international peace and co-operation and in defending human rights, and to promote the assumption of responsibility by young people at the local, national and international levels. Youth was a vital factor not only in economic expansion but also in social change.

48. The importance of mobilizing public opinion in support of the objectives of the Second Development Decade was emphasized in General Assembly resolutions 2567 (XXIV) and 2626 (XXV). In the former resolution, it was stated that information from international sources would have to be aimed primarily at strengthening the sense of interdependence and partnership implicit in the concept of the Second United Nations Development Decade. In the text attached to the latter resolution, it was said that the role of the organizations of the United Nations system

would be to assist the various national information media, in particular by supplying adequate basic information from which those media might draw both substance and inspiration for their work. UNESCO convened a number of regional conferences at the ministerial level with the aim of helping Member States to establish educational and scientific policies tailored to the needs of the Development Decade. UNESCO would co-operate to the full with other organizations in the United Nations system in disseminating development information within the limits of its available resources. UNESCO's approach would therefore represent the sectoral contribution to the global efforts. Subject to respect for national sovereignty, UNESCO would help Member States which requested assistance to establish appropriate information policies. However, it would continue devoting some of the issues of its periodicals like the *UNESCO Courier* and *Impact of Science on Society* to development and it would also maintain its world-wide distribution of publications relating to the tasks of the Second Development Decade, for instance the recent publication *Approaches to the Science of Socio-Economic Development*.

49. It was in that light that UNESCO would interpret the provisions of operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.2/L.1152/Rev.1. As always, UNESCO looked forward to receiving guidance and directives from the General Assembly on general development policies. When considering its programme and budget for 1972-1973 and its mid-term programme for 1973-1974, the Executive Board would be informed of the General Assembly's views and would attempt to take them into account in determining the future orientation of UNESCO's programmes.

50. The CHAIRMAN announced that the delegations of Malaysia and Honduras had become sponsors of draft resolution A/C.2/L.1182/Rev.1.

51. Mr. ČABRIĆ (Yugoslavia) said that, since it was generally acknowledged that the International Development Strategy was not a perfect document, the United Nations must think in terms of improving and supplementing it in the light of future developments. Thus, it had been decided to elaborate special measures in favour of the least developed among the developing countries, and similar problems would no doubt be encountered in the future. Accordingly, ensuring a more effective review and appraisal of the Strategy might be even more important an undertaking than the formulation of the Strategy itself. All were aware that, owing to existing relations in the international community, it had been impossible to reach a consensus on the implementation of the Strategy, which had been left to the moral and political judgement of Member States: that was why the over-all undertaking of accelerating the solution of the development problems of the developing nations largely depended on the review and appraisal process.

52. A spirit of partnership and understanding was the only means of achieving the objectives and policies of the International Development Strategy, and in order to create the conditions and atmosphere of co-operation and partnership, the developing countries must be convinced of the political willingness of the developed countries to exert the maximum efforts towards the fulfilment of their commit-

ments. Indeed, the developing countries had accepted the compromise text of the Strategy only because of its dynamic character and on condition that negotiations would be continued in search of new areas of agreement and the extension of existing areas, the embodying of new concepts and agreement on additional measures.

53. The review and appraisal process was therefore not a work of analysis and research, but had as its main objective, in the words of paragraph (79) of the Strategy, to identify short-falls in the achievement of the goals and objectives of the Decade and the factors which accounted for them and to recommend positive measures, including new goals and policies as needed. Thus, the process was inextricably linked with the continuing work of existing machinery in different sectors, and it was most important to establish adequate procedures at the sectoral level, especially in UNCTAD and UNIDO.

54. Where the over-all review and appraisal was concerned, his delegation fully endorsed the role assigned to the General Assembly, and particularly the Second Committee, in operative paragraph 8 of draft resolution A/C.2/L.1182/Rev.1 and also the role at the expert level of the Committee for Development Planning, provided for in paragraph (83) of the Strategy and defined more precisely in paragraph 5 (i) of draft resolution A/C.2/L.1182/Rev.1. Because of these provisions and other changes introduced into the original draft, his delegation wished to become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution.

55. Mr. VAZHNIK (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the socialist countries had consistently upheld the thesis that the most important prerequisite for the economic and social advancement of the developing countries was the improvement of the international situation, the elimination of hotbeds of aggression, the cessation of the arms race and the abandonment of the threat or use of force in the solution of controversial international questions. It had been the vast expenditures of the United States of America on the war in Indo-China, on assistance to the Israeli aggressors, on the maintenance of its bases in foreign territories and on the support of reactionary régimes that had caused that country's vast balance-of-payments deficit and had finally triggered the monetary crisis.

56. The socialist countries also firmly supported those who protested against all attempts to palliate that crisis at the expense of the developing and other countries. That was why his delegation to the Second Committee had frequently stressed the need for all States, large and small, to solve the problems of international security together; the decisions of the twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union contained excellent bases for such joint programmes. Socialist societies, which were not economically based on the arms race, were pursuing a policy of respect for the interests of their partners and of fraternal assistance to the developing countries in their efforts towards economic independence. The Byelorussian SSR fully participated in those efforts, as could be seen from its contribution recently announced at the UNDP Pledging Conference.

57. In the light of those considerations, his country was in favour of a review and appraisal procedure which would

promote the economic independence of the developing countries, would secure them the maximum benefit from their natural resources and would lead to genuinely fair international trade, to the elimination of the adverse effects of the instability of the capitalistic world market on their economies and to the communication to those countries of the achievements of science and technology. Since everything was ultimately decided by the working masses, all national economies must be planned in accordance with social justice and with a view to broadening the participation of the masses in decision-making. Furthermore, as it was stated in the joint statement of eight socialist countries,² the developing countries had an inalienable right to material compensation from the former colonial Powers and from the capitalist States which were still exploiting the human and natural resources of Asian, African and Latin American countries.

58. Although the review and appraisal process was complex, it should be borne in mind that a large number of international bodies had for a long time been collecting and processing data on economic, social and scientific development at the national, regional and international levels and had acquired considerable experience in that work, including analytical methods. That experience would no doubt be drawn upon by the Economic and Social Council in its review and appraisal activities, which would of course be based on national statistical services. A number of complex methodological problems would have to be solved, such as the choice of indicators giving a complete picture of the level of economic development reached in a given country or region. Furthermore, it was essential to carry

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 42, document A/8074.

out a global review and appraisal at the sectoral level; that task properly belonged to the Economic and Social Council, which should be assisted by other organs, such as the Committee for Development Planning. His delegation considered that, since the members of that Committee were highly qualified experts and could call upon the collaboration of the Secretariats of the United Nations and other organizations in the system, there was no need to enlist the help of outside experts.

59. Turning to draft resolution A/C.2/L.1182/Rev.1, he expressed his delegation's view that the reference to "new goals and policies" in operative paragraph 3 (i) was unnecessary. His delegation also supported the third Ghanaian amendment (A/C.2/L.1189), proposing the deletion of operative paragraph 6. The contradiction between operative paragraphs 7 and 9 should be eliminated and the role of the Economic and Social Council as the principal organ concerned should be clearly stated. All work on review and appraisal should be carried out by the existing staff of the United Nations Secretariat.

60. In conclusion, the success of any undertaking depended mainly on practical, day-to-day activities, not on the number of organs involved. The principal factors in the successful implementation of the Strategy were the strengthening of peace and security, practical measures for the realization of the progressive principles of international trade laid down at the first session of UNCTAD, consolidation of the inalienable sovereignty of the developing countries over their natural resources and the execution of economic and social reforms.

The meeting rose at 7 p.m.