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CONTENTS

Chairman: Mr. José María RUDA (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEM 71

Consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (A/5470 and Add.1 and 2, A/C.6/L.528, A/C.6/L.530, A/C.6/L.531 and Corr.1, A/C.6/L.535, A/C.6/L.537, A/C.6/L.538 and Corr.1, A/C.6/L.535, A/C.6/L.537, A/C.6/L.538 and Corr.1, A/C.6/L.539) (continued)

1. Mr. QUINTERO (Panama) said that the main aspects of the question before the Committee had been so exhaustively discussed in the past few weeks that there was a danger that the general debate would lose its vitality and interest unless future speakers made an effort to shed new light on the task of the Sixth Committee, to help to find a generally acceptable procedure and to define, even if in general terms, their delegation's position. The delegation of Panama would try to observe those conditions.

2. The delegation of Panama considered that when the General Assembly, in resolution 1815 (XVII), had decided upon the study under debate, it had not intended that the Sixth Committee should proceed beyond that study to the codification of the principles in question or to the preparation of a draft code embodying those principles, and indeed it would have been wrong to impose such tasks on the Sixth Committee, which was unfitted for them by the nature of its membership, its structure, and its method of operation.

3. That was not to say, however, that the conclusions of that study should not be formulated in any particular manner. On the contrary, the Committee's task was to make the recommendations stated in Article 13 of the Charter and in the opinion of the delegation of Panama, the study should consist of an interpretation of the principles. The Panamanian delegation fully shared the view of the representative of the United States (808th meeting) that the General Assembly and other United Nations organs could, by action within their competence, authoritatively interpret the Charter. Interpreting a document as fundamental as the United Nations Charter did not mean trying to divine the innermost wishes and motives of its original authors on every matter, however, but simply trying to harmonize its provisions with present and future realities so as to bring about its progressive development, and, hence, its continuing applicability.

4. The delegation of Panama, after due consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the possible form to be given to the Sixth Committee's study, considered that the best presentation would be a declaration made through a General Assembly resolution. Such a declaration could be similar in form to the draft Declaration on the rights and duties of States [1] put forward by Panama in the Sixth Committee in 1946, but he did not mean with a similar content. Fears had been expressed that a draft declaration of a general nature might suffer the same fate as the Panamanian draft declaration, and might never materialize into a General Assembly resolution, but there had been a number of recent examples of declarations of a general nature which had become very important General Assembly resolutions, such as the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The delegation of Panama felt that any declaration adopted should not repeat, and still less amend, the provisions of the Charter, and that no action should be taken lightly or in haste. The two draft resolutions (A/C.6/L.538 and Corr.1 and A/C.6/L.539) before the Committee had only just been submitted, and the delegation of Panama would give its views on them at a later date, after due consideration.

5. The delegation of Panama thought, like the representative of Chile, that the four principles before the Committee fell naturally into two pairs of complementary principles. Thus, the principle of the sovereign equality of States and the principle of non-intervention were complementary, as were the principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of force and the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes.

6. Of the four principles under consideration, the most important was the principle of the sovereign equality of States. In the past, many erroneous views had been held on the nature of the notion of sovereignty, and much of the resistance to the progressive development of international law was due to a refusal to accept the logical consequences of the principle of the sovereign equality of States. Certain States still clung to the old order of international relations, which was based on the domination of some States by others, and resisted its replacement by the new order, which was based on the co-operation of all the countries of the world and could only become a reality if the principles on which it was based were adequately developed and amplified.

7. The principle of non-intervention, as already stated, was complementary to that of the sovereign equality of States. Although Panama shared the views on non-intervention expressed in article 15 of the

[1] A/285.

Charter of the Organization of American States, [2] it considered that even the full and comprehensive terms of that article could be improved on. The wording of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter was rather general and vague, but, far from being a hindrance, that should constitute a further incentive for the necessary interpretation, clarification and development of the true spirit of the United Nations Charter regarding non-intervention.

8. The principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations was, in the opinion of the delegation of Panama, precisely and clearly stated in the United Nations Charter, and there were no grounds whatever for the interpretation given to Article 51 of the Charter by one delegation, which had tried to prove that that Article did not rule out the new and dangerous idea of preventive self-defence. The idea of preventive self-defence could easily be used as a cloak for aggression, and nothing in Article 51 could be regarded as authorization for such measures. Panama's attitude to the question of the definition of aggression was clearly illustrated by the draft definition of aggression which it had put forward, jointly with Iran, at the ninth session of the General Assembly, but which had unfortunately been the victim of all sorts of delaying tactics, so that the question of the definition of aggression had finally been shelved until 1965.

9. As far as the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes was concerned, Panama, as a State which possessed no force but that of the law, could but express its enthusiasm for the progressive development and codification of that principle, although it wished to emphasize that any peaceful settlement based on the application of unequal treaties or treaties concluded under pressure was to be condemned as a threat to friendly relations and co-operation among States.

10. Although Panama was one of the countries which had taken part in the original drafting of the United Nations Charter, it fully shared the views of the newer States, which considered that they should have a chance to participate in the development of the provisions of the Charter to take account of the changes which had taken place in the world since 1945. As one representative had pointed out, the Charter had been drafted by fifty States, most of them European or Latin American, and it had now to be applied to one hundred and eleven States, the majority of which were newly-independent African or Asian States. International law could not consist of the imposition of rules by some States on others. It had to be democratized if it was to govern the lives of all peoples and constitute a set of rules for all the countries of the world: that was to say, all countries must participate in its development and all must accept its finally agreed provisions. It was therefore fitting that the Sixth Committee should set up a suitably representative working group to commence work as soon as possible and present the Committee with a full study which could serve as a basis for the completion of its task, and it was fitting that the process of the democratization of international law should be begun immediately in the Sixth Committee itself.

11. Mr. DE WINTER (Belgium) said that his delegation would refrain from discussing the use of force and non-intervention in order not to prolong the debate unduly. In dealing with the sovereign equality of States, moreover, it did not propose to make a detailed analysis of the subject, but merely to help determine the nature of the task imposed on the Committee by resolution 1815 (XVII) and the best method of carrying it out. Firstly, without going into all the possible interpretations, the general scope had to be defined. There were certain differences of view on the general principle of the sovereign equality of States which it might not be possible or even necessary to eliminate at the present stage. In his statement at the 802nd meeting, for example, the representative of Czechoslovakia had said that the sovereign equality of States was one of the recent principles of general international law and in support had referred to the Declaration by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China, issued after the Moscow Conference of 1943, in which, he had said, the term "sovereign equality" had been used for the first time. That view was not shared by certain other representatives; at the 821st meeting, for example, the representative of Italy had described sovereign equality as the oldest of the four principles under study. The importance of such differences must not be minimized, since any attempt to establish precise rules regarding a principle of law presupposed substantial agreement on its general nature. Nevertheless, it would not be the Committee's main task to arrive at a general definition of the principles under study. If it wished to do constructive work, it must necessarily face a series of concrete questions, as an examination of the two components of the idea of "sovereign equality" would show.

12. As far as equality was concerned, it certainly corresponded to a tangible reality and was to be found in many international instruments. As subjects of law States were equal in the possession of certain rights and competences, just as they had certain international obligations. But in dealing with equality as a principle one must not allow the positive aspects to blind one to the existence of restrictions. As the representative of Italy had pointed out, such communities as the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community had waived the principle of equality to a certain extent by adopting a weighted voting system. In the United Nations itself, moreover, the sovereign equality of Member States established as a principle in the Charter was limited by the special powers given to the Security Council as the body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. It would be recalled that in the discussion of certain recent issues various Members had insisted, against the view of the majority, that certain powers exercised by the Assembly should be reserved to the Council, where they occupied a privileged position.

13. A similar situation existed with regard to the notion of sovereignty. Like that of equality it had a real content and had proved its worth as a legal tool. It was quite understandable that newly independent countries should eagerly invoke it in their desire to establish a solid legal basis for the economic, political and social system through which they wished their development to take place. But as an idea sovereignty was constantly changing and was tending to lose some of its absoluteness. Without going into the effects of the great African, American and European organizations, one could note the continuing debate on the meaning of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. In the context of decolonization, the newly independent countries attached special importance to a restrictive interpretation of that pro-

[2] United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 119 (1952), No. 1609.

vision. But in general there was a trend towards a correlative approach to the articles on sovereignty and the provisions on human rights, which should be given close attention in the Committee's study.

14. The international organizations were a factor of particular significance and affected the legal machinery governing friendly relations and co-operation among States. The role of international organizations in the modern world was brought out clearly in texts such as those cited by the representative of Czechoslovakia at the 802nd meeting, when he had insisted on the right of States to become members of organizations in which they had a legitimate interest. It was not clear, however, whether he had meant that every State should enjoy the right to join any such organization and itself decide on its admission. The existence of any international organization surely implied certain fundamental rules which were its justification and which any Member State must respect if it was to be admitted to take part in its work. The importance of the question was illustrated by the debates which had taken place in the United Nations on participation in regional organizations. The Charter itself laid down conditions for admission despite the fact that the United Nations was by its nature meant to be a universal organization. There was the preliminary question of whether a particular community was a State or not. Even if recognized as such and admitted, moreover, a State could still under certain circumstances be suspended or expelled. He welcomed the fact that the implications of the phenomenon of international organizations were now recognized even by those who had long asserted that only States were the subject of international public law. Their importance was too evident for universality to be an overriding end.

15. In conclusion, he stressed the willingness of his delegation to play a constructive part in fulfilling the task before the Committee and urged the need for tolerance as a prerequisite for success.

16. Mr. BLIX (Sweden) said that with respect to the principle of the sovereign equality of States, he would refer members of the Committee to his delegation's statement in the Committee on 14 November 1962 and to his Government's comments in document A/5470/Add.2. A distinction must be made between equality as a political ideal and as a juridical principle. The political ideal of equality implied an effort to reduce and ultimately eliminate the gap between the industrialized and developing areas of the world, and it would serve little purpose to seek to establish a rigid framework of legal rules for the achievement of that ideal. The juridical principle that under customary international law States had equal rights and obligations had had great significance in the past and was still of importance. It might be, however, that diviations from that principle, in the form of various weighted voting formulas adopted under special agreements, were nowadays of greater practical interest than the principle itself. Such deviations had often opened up new areas for friendly co-operation between States and progressive development might be more easily brought about by practical experience of specific cases than by the formulation of abstract principles.

17. His Government had long favoured efforts to develop procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. It considered that all the various procedures enumerated in Article 22 of the Charter should be re-examined. It was glad to note that the General Assembly had recently approved the report of the Preparatory Committee on the International Co-operation Year (A/5561), which included a proposal that the Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 1928-1948, published by the United Nations in 1949 [3] should be brought up to date. It welcomed that proposal, which would help to reveal how much could be achieved by modernization of the existing machinery for peaceful settlement, although the difficulties encountered might be due less to the inadequacy of the machinery than to the lack of a desire to use it. In the course of the debate it had been said that States should be free to choose the most appropriate means for settling their disputes, but he hoped that did not indicate opposition to the prior conclusion of agreements under which certain methods of settlement were automatically available. If a dispute arose between two States, they always remained perfectly free to agree upon any method of settlement they considered appropriate, regardless of any agreement they might have reached in that connexion before the dispute. Such prior agreements never limited the freedom of the parties in any specific case. Their purpose was to provide methods of settlement for cases where the parties did not agree upon an ad hoc procedure. Thus two Members of the United Nations were always free to settle a dispute between them by direct negotiation or through some kind of mediation, but if they failed to agree, neither State could prevent the other from submitting the matter to the United Nations, for by acceding to the Charter they had both agreed to submit to the Organization's rules. The Charter was but one of many useful agreements that established machinery in advance for the settlement of disputes. Some of those agreements, unlike the Charter, were limited to disputes between two States or groups of States or to specific kinds of disputes. An important category of such agreements provided for settlement through judicial means, and one of the principal agreements in that category was the Statute of the International Court of Justice together with the optional clause on the submission of disputes. His delegation would urge wider adherence to that clause. It was glad the United Kingdom had withdrawn an important reservation to its acceptance and noted the desire of the United States Government to follow suit. The judicial settlement of disputes, especially for smaller States, eliminated the danger, always present in direct negotiation, that the strength of the other party would exert undue influence. Nowhere was the juridical principle of equality of States better respected than in an international tribunal. Differences between States in their interpretation of the precepts of international law should not be allowed to constitute an obstacle to wide acceptance of the optional clause or other judicial means of settling disputes. The Swedish delegation shared the Polish representative's view that there was a single comprehensive system of international law and his opposition to those who advanced ideas of an inter-bloc law or an anarchy of diverse contending orders. It was just such an all-embracing system of international law that the International Court could serve to develop—not a Western or Eastern or any other particular international law. It had already played an important part in interpreting, and thereby developing and modernizing international law, but it would have a greater opportunity to do so if more disputes were brought before it. It was true that an individual judge could not altogether escape the influ-

[3] United Nations publication, Sales No.: 49.V.3.

ence of his own legal background. That might even be desirable, since many cases required that some members of the Court be familiar with one national legal system or another. The wide experience of international legal relations gained by the judges and the fact that they represented all legal systems and geographical regions were sufficient guarantees that their judgements would bear an international stamp.

18. His delegation's support for wider use of the International Court of Justice did not imply a lack of interest in other judicial, or indeed non-judicial, means of settling disputes. Arbitration tribunals had done much to develop international law by their awards and might sometimes offer a more convenient method of settlement than the International Court. States which for some reason were still unwilling to submit disputes to the International Court might enter into prior agreements on arbitration by tribunals, whose composition they would determine bilaterally.

19. His delegation's approach to the study of the four principles was pragmatic rather than dogmatic and was based on the long-term interests of the international community. While the ultimate aim of the Committee's study was codification and development, the methods of achieving that aim must be appropriate. Before the substance of the four principles had been thoroughly discussed, it would be inappropriate to decide that the outcome should be a declaration and equally inappropriate to rule out such a possibility. A flexible approach was required. Universal agreement on codification and development would be valuable not only on broad questions of principle, but also on limited points and problems. His delegation had therefore been interested by the Netherlands proposal (803rd meeting) for consideration of the idea of a fact-finding body, a very limited proposal, but one that might prove constructive. It was important that the Committee should give attention to such proposals.

20. If an inter-sessional committee was to be set up, its work would be greatly facilitated if the Secretariat were to prepare an impartial analysis of the principles under discussion, based on the practice of the United Nations and other international organizations and on the position taken by individual States both in general statements and with respect to concrete instances. Such a study had been called for earlier by his delegation, which therefore welcomed document A/C.6/L.537 as a useful beginning in that direction. Reference was made in that document to the declarations of various countries on the principles of peaceful coexistence set forth in the Agreement between India and the People's Republic of China of 1954. On behalf of the Danish delegation and his own, he suggested that those declarations, or relevant extracts from them, might be reproduced and circulated by the Secretariat.

21. Mr. JACOVIDES (Cyprus) observed that the Committee had a unique opportunity to play a major role in the progressive development and codification of international law, provided that it applied itself to making constructive recommendations, under the authority granted it by Article 13 of the Charter. A resolution embodying those recommendations would reflect the general opinion of the Committee, and its adoption by the General Assembly would entitle it to universal respect.

22. His delegation was convinced that the newly-independent States realized that it would be both morally wrong and politically inexpedient to repudiate the existing rules of international law merely because they had not helped to create them or because some of them ran counter to their national interest. However, if the notion of vital national interest was not to overshadow that of international legal obligation and if international law was to make a greater contribution to co-operation among States, respect for international law should be fully reflected in law-making processes. The rule of law was more than a reaffirmation of the status quo and international law should be both flexible and adaptable.

23. It was clear from Article 1, paragraph 1 and from Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter that Member States were called upon to settle disputes arising in their international relations not only on the basis of international law, but also on the basis of justice. In accordance with Article 33, they were free to choose from among a variety of means of settlement. Negotiations as the most appropriate method in relations between sovereign States was the most frequent practice; however, if the parties hardened in their positions, that particular means obviously had limitations. Inquiry, mediation and conciliation were useful instruments for arriving at pacific solutions and arbitration, provided it was genuinely impartial, could be effective once agreement had been reached on the functions and powers of the arbitrator.

24. With regard to judicial settlement through the International Court of Justice it should be noted that if the rule of law among nations was to acquire real meaning, the Court's jurisdiction should be universal and its decisions enforceable. At the present stage of imperfect development of the international community and since the Court's jurisdiction continued to be based on consent, there were relatively few international disputes submitted to the Court for adjudication. Moreover, although international law was never intrinsically incapable of providing a decision on the basis of the law regarding the respective rights of the parties to a dispute brought before such an international tribunal, there were situations where a strict application of the letter of the law might produce a result inconsistent with universally recognized notions of justice. To illustrate the point, he cited the decision handed down by the United States Supreme Court in 1856 in the Dred Scott v. (John F. A.) Sanford case where a pronouncement of the Court on the basis of the law had been followed by a civil war, fought partly in order to determine once again the very issues which the Court had already decided. His delegation agreed with the late Judge Lauterpacht that, within the international sphere, courts could not properly assist the cause of peace by solving conflicts of political importance and by assuming functions which were essentially of a legislative nature. Such situations should be settled either outside the courts or, if brought before a tribunal, that tribunal should be empowered to exercise the functions of an equity tribunal. It should be noted that Article 38, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice envisaged the possibility of a decision ex aequo et bono, provided the parties agreed thereto.

25. The question of the composition of the International Court of Justice had some bearing on the reluctance of States to submit disputes to the Court for judicial settlement. It was not sufficient to cite the provisions of the Statute (Articles 2 and 20) which ensured the impartiality and independence of the individual judges, or to argue that the recent addition of an

African judge guaranteed full representation "of the main forms of civilization and of the principle legal systems of the world" (Article 9). There was still an impression among Governments that political considerations arising from a particular judge's country of origin affected the position he adopted, even though there had been clear cases in which a judge had concurred in a judgement adverse to the arguments presented by his own Government. The delegation of Cyprus wished to see greater confidence placed in the International Court and felt that that could more easily be achieved if there were no room for doubt that a given decision had been reached impartially and without reference to political or other extra-legal considerations.

26. The reluctance of States to submit disputes to the International Court for settlement might also be explained by their inability to predict the Court's decision with any reasonable degree of certainty. The decision in the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case[4/] illustrated the point. Moreover, in some cases such as the Corfu Channel case,[5/] the Court's position had represented a liberal interpretation of existing international law, while in others, it had been more conservative. The clarification, more precise elaboration and codification of the law might well encourage more frequent recourse to the Court.

27. Another factor which discouraged such recourse was the absence of specific means of enforcing the Court's decisions. The recourse to the Security Council provided under Article 94 of the Charter, particularly in view of the voting complications in that body, did not constitute a reliable enforcement method.

28. The various factors he had cited applied to a more limited extent to the advisory jurisdiction of the International Court. Subject to the reservations he had expressed, his delegation would also welcome a strengthening of that jurisdiction.

29. Apart from the judicial organ of the United Nations, however, the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General could each play a vital part in the peaceful settlement of disputes, as had been recognized in General Assembly resolution 1301 (XIII). The Security Council's functions in that regard had remained largely unfulfilled owing to the operation of power politics and of the veto. But the experience of the General Assembly had been more rewarding: on the basis of a dynamic interpretation of Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter, the Assembly had helped to achieve peaceful solutions in cases where the Security Council had been paralysed by the veto. Furthermore, the Secretary-General, either in person or through special representatives or fact-finding teams, had been of incalculable assistance in ascertaining facts, clarifying positions and moderating disputes of an explosive nature. His functions in that respect went beyond the exercise of good offices, for as an official responsible only to the Organization who did not seek or receive instructions from any Government or authority external to it, he possessed an impartiality and moral authority which afforded him a unique position in the peaceful settlement of disputes, as demonstrated by the events of October 1962. States which might mistrust the motivations of the political bodies of the United Nations and might hesitate to bring a dispute before the International Court could confidently ask the Secretary-General to assist them, particularly in cases involving the application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, the recent United Nations Declaration on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (resolution 1904 (XVIII)). Moreover, in the view of the delegation of Cyprus, the Secretary-General was empowered under the Charter to recommend the peaceful settlement of disputes precisely in order not to have to invoke his power under Article 99 to bring matters likely to threaten peace to the attention of the Security Council.

30. The principle of the sovereign equality of States was a fundamental doctrine of international law. Independence was a question of degree and there was a great difference between external and internal independence, but as the representative of Cyprus had stated at the 822nd meeting, a State could not contract out of its sovereignty and independence while still purporting to be a sovereign and independent State. The principle of the de jure equality of States had been effectively reaffirmed by the Latin American countries in a succession of conventions, resolutions and declarations and was embodied in Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Charter. It had perhaps been stated most lucidly in article 5 of the draft Declaration on the rights of States adopted by the International Law Commission in 1949.[6/] It found practical expression in the "one State, one vote" system of the General Assembly. Unlike the special voting procedure of the Security Council, that system had proved effective and there was no valid reason to replace it by any system of weighted or qualified voting.

31. The principle of sovereign equality had special relevance to the phenomenon of unequal treaties. Indeed, the analogy drawn with private law in cases of the invalidation of contracts conclufed under duress should apply to international agreements concluded when two or more parties were in an unequal bargaining position.

32. On the other hand, sovereignty should not be invoked to prevent the United Nations from dealing with matters which were the legitimate concern of the Organization. As Mr. Rossides had said at the 1235th plenary meeting of the General Assembly a clear distinction should be drawn between the concept of absolute sovereignty as between States and that of qualified sovereignty in relation to the United Nations. The distinction should be made in all areas of legitimate concern to the Organization, even though they were not directly related to the maintenance of peace and security. Indeed, according to George M. Abi-Saab, in his address on "The Newly Independent States and the Scope of Domestic Jurisdiction", (see 1960 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law), that position had been consistently taken by the newly independent States. It was not incompatible with the principle of sovereign equality or with Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter. With regard to the latter, it was important to note the progress made in the development of the principle of non-intervention by means of interpretation. The various organs of the United Nations, and particularly the General Assembly, had progressively limited the application of the exception of domestic jurisdiction

4/ See Fisheries case, Judgment of December 18th, 1951: I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 116.

5/ See Corfu Channel case, Judgment of April 9th, 1949: I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4.

6/ See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1949.

in issues relating to the respect of human rights, the emancipation of Non-Self-Governing Territories and the principle of self-determination. That approach was fully in keeping with the spirit of the times and it was interesting to note that the United Nations had recently dealt with a question of human rights in a non-member State and its action had not been regarded as an infringement of the Sovereignty of that State. Indeed, the 111 Member States had created in the United Nations a world authority which possessed an objective international personality, and it was in relation to that authority that national sovereignty had to be qualified.

33. The delegation of Cyprus would urge the Committee to endeavour to complete its work on the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in time for 1965, the International Co-operation Year. Without prejudging the form which the document worked out by the Committee might take, it was convinced that a clear formulation of the principles, endorsed by the General Assembly, would provide a useful standard of a declaratory nature and as such, a significant step towards a world community governed by the rule of law. Cyprus was grateful to the Secretariat for the valuable documentation it had provided (A/C.6/L.537).

34. Mr. STAVROPOULOS (Legal Counsel), replying to several procedural points raised during the debate, assured the Sixth Committee that any special committee established for the purpose of dealing with the item under discussion would have the assistance of the Secretariat. It would be feasible for the committee to hold meetings beginning about 20 August 1964 until the first week of the nineteenth session of the Assembly. If those meetings were held at Headquarters, the costs both to the United Nations and probably to delegations would be minimal. Replying to the representatives of Sweden and Denmark, he noted that the supplementary document which they had requested of the Secretariat would be published.

35. Mr. MOLINA (Venezuela), reverting to the discussion at the 823rd meeting regarding the procedure for dealing with the draft resolutions before the Committee, pointed out that while the Latin American co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.6/L.539 would be happy to hear the views of the various members of the Committee on draft resolution A/C.6/L.538 and Corr.1 and A/C.6/L.539, as suggested by the representative of Ghana (823rd meeting), they were acutely aware of the time factor and it was for that reason that they felt the urgency of consultations between the two groups of sponsors with a view to reaching agreement on a consolidated text.

36. Mr. DADZIE (Ghana) said that after consultation with the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.6/L.538 and Corr.1, his delegation was prepared to accept the procedure suggested by the Chairman and the representative of Iraq, namely, to convene a meeting of consultation of the two groups of sponsors for that purpose.

37. Mr. BENJELLOUN (Morocco) proposed that such a meeting should be held immediately following the close of the Committee's meeting and that it should decide which members of the Committee, outside the sponsoring groups, should be invited to assist in the elaboration of the joint draft.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.

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