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COMMUNICATION DATED 31 MAY 1962 FROM THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF  
THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON  
DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
DISARMAMENT COMMISSION FORWARDING THE INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT  
OF THE CONFERENCE COVERING THE PERIOD 14 MARCH TO 1 JUNE 1962

62-12476

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We have the honour to forward herewith, on behalf of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, an interim progress report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. This report, covering the Conference deliberations for the period 14 March to 1 June 1962, is transmitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI).

V.A. Zorin (USSR)  
Co-Chairman

Arthur H. Dean (USA)  
Co-Chairman

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# CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

Private  
ENDC/42

31 May 1962

ENGLISH

Original: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

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## Report to the United Nations

### Disarmament Commission

The Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at the request of that Conference, transmit herewith to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 1722 (XVI) the following interim progress report on the conference deliberations for the period March 14, 1962 to June 1, 1962.

#### I. Organization of the Conference

##### A. Participants of the Conference

Pursuant to agreement between the USSR and the United States, as endorsed by General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, which approved the composition of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee, representatives of the following nations took part in the Conference: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

##### B. Agreements on Procedural Arrangements

1. The Conference in its first meeting on March 14, 1962, adopted certain procedural arrangements (ENDC/1)\*. Those arrangements included, inter alia, provision for the chairmanship of the meeting to rotate daily, in English alphabetical order, among all members of the Committee, and for permanent co-chairmanship of the Committee comprised of the representatives of the USSR and the USA, whose function is to consult with each other, with the Chairman of the incoming meeting, as well as with other delegations as desirable, with the aim of facilitating both the formal and informal work of the Conference.

2. Pursuant to the desire of the Conference expressed in its third meeting on March 16 agreement was reached by the Co-Chairmen on a Procedure of Work which was endorsed on March 23, 1962 (ENDC/1/Add.1) by the Conference. The Procedure of Work provided, inter alia, that:

(1) In its plenary sessions, the Committee should pursue, without delay, its primary objective of reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament;

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\* All conference documents referred to in this Report are attached hereto as Annex I.



(2) Concurrently with the elaboration of agreement on general and complete disarmament in the plenary committee, and not to the detriment of this elaboration, a committee of the whole has been set up for the consideration of various proposals on the implementation of measures aimed at: the lessening of international tension; the consolidation of confidence among States; and facilitating general and complete disarmament.

(3) Informal meetings of the Committee should continue to consider, as appropriate, in an informal manner, under existing arrangements matters before the committee and matters concerning the further organization of its work.

3. In the sixth meeting of the plenary on March 21, 1962, it was decided that a Subcommittee comprised of the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States should be established to consider the question of a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests and to report to the Conference.

## II. Plenary Deliberations

1. The Conference opened on March 14, 1962 and began its substantive deliberations on the following day. There have been 46 Plenary sessions held since the Conference opened. The Foreign Ministers of the following States took part during the opening period of the conference: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the Defence Minister of India.

2. In its Plenary meetings the Committee has been considering in accordance with the established procedure, the Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union on March 15, 1962 (ENDC/2\*), the United States Programme for General and Complete Disarmament of September 25, 1961 (ENDC/6\*), the US Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World of 18 April, 1962 (ENDC/30), and other proposals which have been made, in the light of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of September 20, 1961 and General Assembly Resolution 1722 (XVI) of December 20, 1961. The Committee will continue its work on the preparation of a Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament.

3. The Committee has discussed in its Plenary meetings the Preamble to the Treaty, Part I, and Stages I and II, including treaty provisions on disarmament, on control and on maintenance of international peace and security.

On April 16, at the request of the Committee the Co-Chairmen submitted to the Committee a working draft Preamble to the Treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/L.11/Rev.1). This working draft and the alternative language it contained were accepted by the Committee ad referendum to Governments.

On the instruction of the Committee the Co-Chairmen have presented a preliminary working draft of Part I of the Treaty. Work on this draft is continuing.

4. In the course of its Plenary discussions the Committee has held a series of sessions on the problem of discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests in connexion with the work of the Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons tests.

5. Discussion of the item Cessation of War Propaganda took place in the plenary sessions.

### III. Committee of the Whole

1. The first meeting of the Committee of the Whole was held on March 28, 1962. The Committee has met 8 times.

2. The Committee of the Whole discussed at its meetings the item Cessation of War Propaganda. The Committee of the Whole continues its work.

### IV. Informal meetings

1. The first informal meeting of the Committee was held on March 19, 1962. The Committee has held 7 informal meetings. Such meetings have been convened when the Committee believed that a free discussion on a less formal basis would best serve to advance the work of the Conference.

2. In its informal meetings the Committee discussions have dealt with the general problem of disarmament and the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests.

### V. Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests

1. The Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests has held 18 meetings. It began its deliberations with consideration of the proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom for a Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests (ENDC/9) and of the proposal made by the Soviet Union on November 28, 1961 (ENDC/11).

2. Subsequently, on April 16, the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the UAR in the 21st Plenary meeting submitted a Joint Memorandum containing suggestions and ideas which they commended to the three nuclear powers for consideration in the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests (ENDC/28). In its statement on April 19, 1962 (ENDC/32) the Soviet Government expressed its willingness to consider the proposals set out in the Memorandum as a basis for further negotiations. The United Kingdom and the United States accepted the Joint Memorandum as one of the bases for negotiations.

3. Work on this problem is continuing in the Subcommittee.

#### VI. Conference Documents

Transmitted herewith as Annex II to this report is a list of all documents and verbatim records of the plenary meetings of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee, of the Committee of the Whole and the Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. Copies of these documents have been or are in course of being circulated to all Members of the United Nations.

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Agreement on procedural arrangements

ENDC/1

Addendum to ENDC/1

ENDC/1/Add.1

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:  
Treaty on general and complete disarmament under  
strict international control (Draft of the Union  
of Soviet Socialist Republics)

ENDC/2\*

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:  
Memorandum of the Government of the Union of  
Soviet Socialist Republics on disarmament  
negotiations in the Eighteen Nation Committee

ENDC/3\*

United States of America:  
Declaration on disarmament:  
A programme for general and complete disarmament  
in a peaceful world

ENDC/6\*

United States of America:  
Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General  
and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World

ENDC/30  
+ ENDC/30/Corr.1

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and  
United States of America:  
(Working Draft)  
Draft Preamble of the Treaty on General and  
Complete Disarmament (in a Peaceful World)

ENDC/L11/Rev.1

United Kingdom and United States:  
Draft treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear  
weapon tests

ENDC/9

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:  
Statement by the Soviet Government, dated  
27 November 1961 in connexion with the  
resumption of negotiations on the discontinuance  
of nuclear weapon tests and text of a draft  
agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear and  
thermo-nuclear weapon tests.

ENDC/11

Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria,  
Sweden and the United Arab Republic:  
Joint Memorandum

ENDC/28

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:  
Statement by the Soviet Government dated  
19 April 1962 (on the Eight Power Joint Memorandum  
ENDC/28)

ENDC/32

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AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS

Adopted at 1st Meeting of the  
Conference on 14 March 1962

1. Nature of Meetings

All meetings will be private, except when otherwise agreed by the participating States.

2. Time of the Meetings

There will be one meeting a day from 10.00 A.M. to 1.00 P.M. Mondays through Fridays unless otherwise agreed. If experience proves that this time creates difficulties for any delegation, the matter may be raised again for further discussion.

3. Publicity and Communiqué

Publicity by or on behalf of the Committee will be limited to the agreed communiqué following each meeting. The draft communiqué will be prepared by the Chairman and approved by the participating States. Normally, it will refer to the chairmanship of the meeting; the title of any new documents tabled; agreements reached; the time of the next meeting; and, when required, the release of Committee verbatim records and documents.

4. Languages and Records

The official languages of the Committee will be English, French, Russian and Spanish. There will be simultaneous interpretation into each of those languages, and verbatim records will be provided in the four languages. Any member may speak in his own language provided he makes available simultaneous interpretation into an official language. Normally, verbatim records will be made available after a delay of two weeks for public use through the United Nations Secretariat at Geneva and New York unless otherwise decided.

5. Seating and Chairmanship

Delegations will be seated in English alphabetical order, with two members of each delegation at the table. Two seats shall be reserved for the Secretariat on either side of the Chairman of the meeting.

The Chair will be rotated daily in English alphabetical order among all members of the Committee. The Permanent Co-Chairmen of the Committee will be the Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. The Chairman of the incoming meeting will normally consult with the Co-Chairmen of the Committee regarding the next day's business. The Co-Chairmen will consult with each other and other delegations as desirable with the aim of facilitating both the formal and informal work of the conference.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

PRIVATE  
ENDC/1/Add.1

28 March 1962

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

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PROCEDURE OF WORK

Adopted at 8th meeting of the conference  
on 23 March 1962

1. In its plenary sessions, the Committee should pursue, without delay, its primary objective of reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament. The Committee will consider the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament of March 15, 1962, the United States programme for general and complete disarmament of September 25, 1961, and other proposals which have or may subsequently be made, in the light of the Statement of Agreed Principles of September 20, 1961 and General Assembly Resolution 1722(XVI) of December 20, 1961.
  2. Concurrently with the elaboration of agreement on general and complete disarmament in the plenary committee, and not to the detriment of this elaboration, a committee of the whole will be set up by the plenary committee for the consideration of various proposals on the implementation of measures aimed at: the lessening of international tension; the consolidation of confidence among states; and facilitating general and complete disarmament. Meetings of this committee of the whole should not, normally, be held on days on which the plenary is scheduled.
  3. Informal meetings of the full committee should continue to consider, as appropriate, in an informal manner, under existing arrangements matters before the committee and matters concerning the further organization of its work. Informal meetings should, normally, be held on days on which no plenary meeting is scheduled.
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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:  
TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT  
UNDER STRICT INTERNATIONAL CONTROL  
(DRAFT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS)

P R E A M B L E

The States of the world,

acting in accordance with the aspirations and will of the peoples,

Convinced that war cannot and must not serve as a method for settling international disputes, especially in the present circumstances of the precipitated development of means of mass annihilation, such as nuclear weapons and rocket devices for their delivery, but must forever be banished from the life of human society,

Fulfilling the historic mission of saving all the nations from the horrors of war,

Proceeding from the fact that general and complete disarmament under strict international control is a sure and practical way to fulfil mankind's age-old dream of ensuring perpetual and inviolable peace on earth,

Desirous of putting an end to the senseless waste of human labour on the creation of the means of annihilating human beings and of destroying material values,

Seeking to direct all resources towards ensuring the further growth of welfare, and socio-economic progress in all countries in the world,

Conscious of the need to build relations among States on the basis of the principles of peace, good-neighbourliness, equality of States and peoples, non-interference, and respect for the independence and sovereignty of all countries,

Reaffirming their dedication to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty, and to implement forthwith general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

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\* Supersedes the document issued under the symbol ENDC/2, on 15 March 1962.

PART I. GENERAL

Article 1.

Disarmament Obligations

The States parties to the present Treaty solemnly undertake:

1. To carry out, over a period of four years, general and complete disarmament entailing:

The disbanding of all armed forces and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever;

The prohibition, and destruction of all stockpiles, and the cessation of the production of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, biological and radiological weapons;

The destruction and cessation of the production of all means of delivering weapons of mass destruction to their targets;

The dismantling of all kinds of foreign military bases, and the withdrawal and disbanding of all foreign troops stationed in the territory of any State;

The abolition of any kind of military conscription for citizens;

The cessation of military training of the population and the closing of all military training institutions;

The abolition of war ministries, of general staffs and their local agencies, and of all other military and para-military establishments and organizations;

The elimination of all types of conventional armaments and military equipment, and the cessation of their production, except for the production of strictly limited amounts of agreed types of light firearms for the equipment of the police (militia) contingents to be retained by States after the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament;

The discontinuance of the appropriation of funds for military purposes, whether from State budgets or from organizations or private individuals.

2. To have, at their disposal, upon completion of general and complete disarmament, only strictly limited contingents of police (militia) equipped with light firearms, and intended for the maintenance of internal order and for the discharge of their obligations with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, under the United Nations Charter and under the provisions of Article 37 of the present Treaty.

3. To carry out general and complete disarmament simultaneously, in three consecutive stages, as is set forth in Parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty. Transition to a subsequent stage of disarmament shall take place after adoption by the International Disarmament Organization of a decision confirming that all disarmament measures of the preceding stage have been carried out and verified, and that any additional verification measures, recognized to be necessary for the next stage, have been prepared and can, when appropriate, be put into operation.

4. To carry out all measures of general and complete disarmament in such a way that at no stage of disarmament could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security would be ensured equally for all States parties to the Treaty.

## Article 2.

### Control Obligations

1. The States parties to the Treaty solemnly undertake to carry out all disarmament measures, from beginning to end, under strict international control, and to ensure the implementation in their territories of all control measures set forth in Parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty.

2. Each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure.

3. To implement control over disarmament, an International Disarmament Organization including all States parties to the Treaty shall be established within the framework of the United Nations. It shall begin operating as soon as disarmament measures are initiated. The structure and functions of the International Disarmament Organization and its bodies are laid down in Part V of the present Treaty.

4. In all countries parties to the Treaty the International Disarmament Organization shall have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way as to ensure the adequate representation on it of all three existing groups of States.

This staff shall exercise control, on a temporary or permanent basis, depending on the nature of the measure being carried out, over the compliance by States with their obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and their production and to reduce or disband their armed forces.

5. The States parties to the Treaty shall in good time submit to the International Disarmament Organization such information about their armed forces, armaments, military production and military appropriations as are necessary to carry out the measures of the corresponding stage.

6. Upon completion of the programme of general and complete disarmament the International Disarmament Organization shall be kept in being to maintain supervision over the implementation by States of the obligations they have assumed, so as to prevent the re-establishment of the military potential of States in any form whatsoever.

Article 3.

Obligations to Maintain International Peace and Security

1. The States parties to the Treaty solemnly confirm their resolve in the course of and after general and complete disarmament;

(a) to base relations with each other on the principles of peaceful and friendly co-existence and cooperation;

(b) not to resort to the threat or use of force to settle any international disputes that may arise, but to use to these ends the procedures provided for in the United Nations Charter;

(c) to strengthen the United Nations as the principal institution for the maintenance of peace and for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

2. The States parties to the Treaty undertake to refrain from using the contingents of police (militia), remaining at their disposal upon completion of general and complete disarmament, in any manner other than for the safeguarding of the internal security of States or for the discharge of their obligations to maintain international peace and security, under the United Nations Charter.

PART II. FIRST STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE  
DISARMAMENT

Article 4

First Stage Tasks

The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the first stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the simultaneous elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and of all foreign military bases on alien territories, to withdraw all foreign troops from these territories, and to reduce their armed forces, conventional armaments and their production, and military expenditures.

CHAPTER I

Elimination of the Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Military Bases on Alien Territories, and Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from those Territories. Control over such Measures

A. Means of Delivery

Article 5

Elimination of Rockets Capable of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. All rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons, of any calibre and range, whether strategic, operational or tactical (except for strictly limited numbers of rockets to be converted to peaceful uses), as well as pilotless aircraft of all types shall be eliminated from the armed forces, and destroyed. All launching pads, silos and platforms for the launching of rockets and pilotless aircraft, other than those pads that will be retained for peaceful launchings under the provisions of Article 15 of the present Treaty, shall be completely demolished. All instruments for the equipment, launching and guidance of the above mentioned rockets and pilotless aircraft shall be destroyed. All underground depots for such rockets, pilotless aircraft and auxiliary facilities shall be demolished.

2. The production of all kinds of rockets and pilotless aircraft, and of the materials and instruments for their equipment, launching and guidance referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be completely discontinued. All enterprises, or workshops thereof, engaged in their production shall be dismantled; machine tools and equipment specially and exclusively designed for the production of such items shall

be destroyed; the premises of such enterprises, as well as general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. All proving grounds for tests of such rockets and pilotless aircraft shall be demolished.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to above in Paragraphs 1 and 2.

4. For the peaceful exploration of space the production and testing of appropriate rockets shall be allowed, provided that the plants producing such rockets, as well as the rockets themselves, will be subject to supervision by the inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

#### Article 6

##### Elimination of Military Aircraft, Capable of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. All military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Military airfields serving as bases for such aircraft, repair and maintenance facilities, and storage places at these airfields shall be rendered inoperative or converted to peaceful uses. Training establishments for crews of such aircraft shall be closed.

2. The production of all military aircraft referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be completely discontinued. Enterprises, or workshops thereof, designed for the production of such military aircraft shall be either dismantled or converted to the production of civil aircraft or other peaceful items.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to above in Paragraphs 1 and 2.

#### Article 7

##### Elimination of All Surface Warships, Capable of Being Used as Vehicles for Nuclear Weapons, and Submarines

1. All surface warships, capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons, and submarines of any class or type shall be eliminated from the armed forces, and destroyed. Naval bases and other installations for the maintenance of the above warships and submarines shall be demolished or dismantled and handed over to the merchant marine for peaceful uses.

2. The building of warships and submarines referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be completely discontinued. Shipyards and plants, wholly or in part designed for the building of such warships and submarines, shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful production.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to above in Paragraphs 1 and 2.

#### Article 8

##### Elimination of All Artillery Systems, Capable of Serving as Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. All artillery systems, capable of serving as means of delivery for nuclear weapons shall be eliminated from the armed forces, and destroyed. All subsidiary instruments and technical facilities designed for controlling the fire of such artillery systems shall be destroyed. Surface storage places and transport facilities for such systems shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. The entire non-nuclear stock of munitions for such artillery systems, whether at the gun site or in depots, shall be completely destroyed. Underground depots for such artillery systems, and for the non-nuclear munitions thereof, shall be destroyed.

2. The production of the artillery systems referred to above in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be completely discontinued. To this end all plants, or workshops thereof, engaged in the production of such systems shall be closed or dismantled. All specialized equipment and machine tools at these plants and workshops shall be destroyed, the remainder being converted to peaceful uses. The production of non-nuclear munitions for these artillery systems shall be discontinued. Plants and workshops engaged in the production of such munitions shall be completely dismantled, and their specialized equipment destroyed.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to above in Paragraphs 1 and 2.

##### B. Foreign Military Bases and Troops in Alien Territories

#### Article 9

##### Dismantling of Foreign Military Bases

1. Simultaneously with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under Articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty, which have army, air force or naval bases in foreign territories, shall dismantle all such bases,

both the principal and the reserve bases, as well as all depot bases of any designation. All personnel of such bases shall be evacuated to their national territory. All installations and armaments existing at such bases and coming under Article 5-8 of the present Treaty, shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall be destroyed on the spot in accordance with Article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the territory of the State which owned the base.

All installations of a military nature at such bases shall be destroyed. Living quarters and subsidiary installations of foreign bases shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the States on whose territory they are located.

2. The measures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be fully applicable to those military bases that are used by foreign troops even though legally they may belong to the State on whose territory they are located. The said measures shall also be implemented in regard to those army, air force and naval bases that have been set up under military treaties and agreements for use by other States or groups of States, regardless of whether any foreign troops are present at these bases at the time of the conclusion of the present Treaty.

All previous treaty obligations, decisions of the organs of military blocs, and any rights or privileges pertaining to the establishment and use of military bases in foreign territories, shall become invalid and unrenovable. The granting henceforth of military bases for use by foreign troops, and the concluding to this end of any bilateral or multilateral treaties and agreements shall be prohibited.

3. The Legislatures and Governments of the States parties to the present Treaty, shall enact legislation and promulgate decrees to ensure that no military bases to be used by foreign troops are established in their territory. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.

#### Article 10

##### Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from Alien Territories

1. Simultaneously with the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under Articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty which have troops, or military personnel of any nature, in foreign territories, shall withdraw all such troops and personnel therefrom. All armaments, and all installations of a military nature, which are located at points where foreign troops are stationed, and which come



under Articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall be destroyed on the spot under Article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the territory of the State withdrawing its troops. Living quarters and subsidiary installations formerly held by such troops or personnel shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the States on whose territory such troops were stationed.

2. The measures set forth in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be fully applicable to foreign civilians employed in the armed forces, or engaged in the production of armaments or any other activities serving military purposes on foreign territory.

The said persons shall be recalled to the territory of the State whose citizenship they hold, and all previous treaty obligations, decisions by the organs of military blocs, and any rights or privileges pertaining to their activities, shall be invalidated and unrenovable. The future dispatching of foreign troops, military personnel, or the said civilians, to foreign territories, shall be prohibited.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the withdrawal of troops, the destruction of installations, and the transfer of the premises referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article. The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to exercise control also over the recall of the civilians referred to in Paragraph 2 of this Article. The legislation and decrees referred to in Paragraph 3 of Article 9 of the present Treaty, shall include provisions prohibiting the citizens of States parties to the Treaty from serving in the armed forces or from engaging in any other activities for military purposes in foreign States.

## CHAPTER II

### Reduction of Armed Forces, Conventional Armaments and Military Expenditures. Control Over Such Measures

#### Article 11

#### Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments

1. In the first stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be reduced to the following levels:

The United States of America -- 1,700,000 enlisted men, officers and civilian employees;

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — 1,700,000 enlisted men, officers and civilian employees.

.....  
(Agreed force levels for other States parties to the Treaty shall be included in this Article).

2. The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out primarily through the demobilization of personnel released as a result of the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories, as provided for in Articles 5-10 of the present Treaty, and chiefly by way of the complete disbandment of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilized.

3. All released conventional armaments, military equipment and munitions of the disbanded units shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and subsidiary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. Conventional armaments and equipment intended for reserve forces shall also be destroyed.

All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

4. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control at places where troops are disbanded and released conventional armaments and military equipment destroyed, and shall also verify the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

#### Article 12

##### Reduction of Conventional Armaments Production

1. Proportionately to the reduction of armed forces, as provided for in Article 11 of the present Treaty, the production of conventional armaments and munitions not coming under Articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, shall be reduced. Such reduction shall be carried out primarily through the elimination of enterprises engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions. These enterprises shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises, and general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the measures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article.

## Article 13

### Reduction of Military Expenditures

1. The States parties to the present Treaty shall reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and the discontinuance of their production, to the dismantling of foreign military bases and withdrawals of foreign troops from alien territories, as well as to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and to the reduction of the production of such armaments as provided for in Articles 5-12 of the present Treaty.

The funds released through the implementation of the first-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. At the same time a certain portion of the funds, thus released, shall be diverted to economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures, referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article, through its financial inspectors, to whom the States parties to the Treaty undertake to grant unhindered access to the records of central financial offices concerning the reduction of the budgetary allocations of States in connexion with the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign military bases and the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, including the relevant decisions of their legislative and executive bodies on this subject.

## CHAPTER III

### Measures to Safeguard the Security of States

## Article 14

### Restriction of Displacements of the Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons

1. From the very beginning of the first-stage and until the final destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons under Articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, the placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of any special devices capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, the leaving of their territorial waters by warships, and the flying beyond the limits of their national territory by military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, shall be prohibited.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over compliance by the States parties to the Treaty, with the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article. The States parties to the Treaty shall provide advance information to the International Disarmament Organization about all launchings of rockets for peaceful purposes, as provided for in Article 15 of the present Treaty, as well as about all flights of military aircraft within their national frontiers and movements of warships within their territorial waters.

#### Article 15

##### Control Over Launchings of Rockets for Peaceful Purposes

1. The launching of rockets and space devices shall be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the implementation of the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article through the establishment of inspection teams at the sites for peaceful rocket launchings who shall be present at the launchings and shall thoroughly examine every rocket or satellite before their launching.

#### Article 16

##### Prevention of the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons

The States parties to the Treaty, possessing nuclear weapons, undertake to refrain from transferring control over nuclear weapons and from transmitting information necessary for their production to States not possessing them.

The States parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons undertake to refrain from producing or otherwise obtaining nuclear weapons and shall refuse to admit the nuclear weapons of any other State into their territories.

#### Article 17

##### Prohibition of Nuclear Tests

The conducting of nuclear tests of any kind shall be prohibited. (If such prohibition is not implemented under other international agreements by the time this Treaty is signed).

Article 18

Measures to Strengthen the Capacity of the  
United Nations to ensure International  
Peace and Security

1. To ensure that the United Nations is capable of effectively protecting States against threats to or breaches of the peace, all States parties to the Treaty shall, between the signing of the Treaty and its entry into force, conclude agreements with the Security Council by which they undertake to make available to the latter armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, as provided for in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.

2. The armed forces provided under the said agreements shall form part of the national armed forces of the corresponding States and shall be stationed within their territories. They shall be kept up to full strength, equipped and prepared for combat. When used under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, these forces, commanded by the military authorities of the corresponding States, shall be placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

CHAPTER IV

Time-limits for Measures of the First Stage  
Transition from First to Second Stage

Article 19

Time-limits for Measures of the First Stage

1. The first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be initiated six months after the Treaty comes into force (under Article 46 of the present Treaty), within which period the International Disarmament Organization shall be set up.

2. The duration of the first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be 15 months.

Article 20

Transition from First to Second Stage

In the course of the last 3 months of the first stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the results of the implementation of the first-stage measures of general and complete disarmament with a view to reporting on them to the States parties to the Treaty, as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

PART III. SECOND STAGE OF GENERAL AND  
COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Article 21.

Second Stage Tasks

The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the second stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as the further reduction of their armed forces, conventional armaments and their production, and military expenditures.

CHAPTER V.

Elimination of Nuclear, Chemical,  
Biological and Radiological Weapons. Control  
over such Measures

Article 22.

Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

1. (a) Nuclear weapons of all kinds, types and capacities shall be eliminated from the armed forces, and destroyed. Fissionable materials extracted from such weapons, whether directly attached to the troops or stored in various depots, shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for the direct reestablishment of weapons and they shall form a special fund for peaceful uses, belonging to the State which previously owned the nuclear weapons. NON-nuclear components of such weapons shall be fully destroyed.

All depots and special storage spaces for nuclear weapons shall be demolished.

(b) All stockpiles of nuclear materials intended for the production of nuclear weapons shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for direct use in nuclear weapons, and shall be transferred to the above-mentioned special funds.

(c) Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures to eliminate nuclear weapons referred to above in Sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Paragraph.

2. (a) The production of nuclear weapons, and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes shall be completely discontinued. All plants, installations and laboratories specially designed for the production of nuclear weapons or their components shall be eliminated or converted to production for peaceful purposes. All workshops, installations and laboratories for the production of the components of nuclear weapons at plants that are partially engaged in the production of such weapons, shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes.

(b) The measures for the discontinuance of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes referred to above in Sub-paragraph (a), shall be implemented under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to inspect all enterprises which extract raw materials for atomic production or which produce or use fissionable materials or atomic energy.

The States parties to the Treaty shall make available to the International Disarmament Organization documents pertaining to the extraction of nuclear raw materials, to their processing and to their utilization for military or peaceful purposes.

3. Each State party to the Treaty shall, in accordance with its constitutional procedure, enact legislation on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and on amenability under the criminal law for any attempt at its re-establishment by individuals or organizations.

#### Article 23.

##### Elimination of Chemical, Biological and Radiological Weapons

1. All kinds of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, whether directly attached to the troops or stored in various depots and storage places shall be eliminated from the arsenals of States and destroyed (neutralized). Simultaneously all instruments and facilities for the combat use of such weapons as well as all special devices and facilities for their storage and conservation shall be destroyed.

2. The production of all kinds of chemical, biological and radiological weapons and of all means and devices for their combat use, transportation and storage shall be completely discontinued. All plants, installations, and laboratories that are wholly or in part engaged in the production of such weapons, shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes.

3. The measures referred to above in Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be implemented under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

CHAPTER VI

Further Reduction of Armed Forces, Conventional Armaments and Military Expenditures. Control over such Measures

Article 24.

Further Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments

1. In the second stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be further reduced to the following levels:

The United States of America	-	One million enlisted men, officers and civilian employees;
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	-	One million enlisted men, officers and civilian employees.

.....

(Agreed force levels for other States parties to the Treaty shall be included in this Article).

The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out primarily through the demobilization of personnel previously attached to the nuclear or other weapons subject to elimination under Articles 22 and 23 of the present Treaty, and chiefly by way of the complete disbandment of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilized.

2. All released conventional armaments, military equipment and munitions of the units being disbanded shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and subsidiary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.



All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

3. As in the implementation of such measures in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control at places where troops are disbanded and released conventional armaments and military equipment destroyed, and shall also verify the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

Article 25.

Further Reduction of Conventional Armaments  
Production

1. Proportionately to the reduction of armed forces, as provided for in Article 24 of the present Treaty, the production of conventional armaments and munitions shall be reduced. Such reduction shall, as in the first-stage of general and complete disarmament, be carried out primarily through the elimination of enterprises engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions. These enterprises shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises and general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses.

2. The measures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 26.

Further Reduction of Military Expenditures

1. The States parties to the Treaty shall further reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the destruction of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons, and the discontinuance of their production, as well as to the further reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and to the reduction of the production of such armaments as provided for in Articles 22 through 25 of the Treaty.

The funds released through the implementation of the second-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. At the same time a certain portion of the funds, thus released, shall be diverted to economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. Control over the measures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article 13 of the Treaty. Financial inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall also be granted unhindered access to records concerning the reduction of the budgetary allocations of States in connexion with the elimination of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

#### CHAPTER VII

##### Measures to safeguard the Security of States

##### Article 27.

##### Continued strengthening of the Capacity of the United Nations to ensure International Peace and Security

The States parties to the Treaty shall continue to implement the measures, referred to in Article 18 of the present Treaty, regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council for use under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter.

#### CHAPTER VIII.

##### Time-limits for Measures of the Second Stage. Transition from Second to Third Stage.

##### Article 28.

##### Time-limits for Measures of the Second Stage.

The duration of the second stage of general and complete disarmament shall be 15 months.

Article 29.

Transition from Second to Third Stage

In the course of the last three months of the second stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the results of the implementation of this stage.

Measures pertaining to the transition from the second to the third stage of general and complete disarmament shall be similar to those for the first stage, as provided for in Article 20 of the present Treaty.

PART IV. THIRD STAGE OF GENERAL AND  
COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Article 30.

Third Stage Tasks

The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the third stage of general and complete disarmament, to fully disband all their armed forces and thereby to complete the elimination of the military machinery of States.

CHAPTER IX.

Completion of the Elimination of  
the Military Machinery of States.  
Control over such measures

Article 31.

Completion of the Elimination of  
Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments

1. With a view to completing the process of the elimination of armed forces the States parties to the Treaty shall disband the entire personnel of the armed forces which remained at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of disarmament. The system of military reserves of each State party to the Treaty shall be completely abolished.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall destroy all armaments, military equipment and munitions, whether held by the troops or in depots, that remained at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of the Treaty. All military equipment which cannot be converted to peaceful uses shall be destroyed.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the disbanding of troops, and over the destruction of armaments and military equipment, and shall control the conversion of transport and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc. to peaceful uses.

The International Disarmament Organization shall have access to documents pertaining to the disbanding of all personnel of the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty.

Article 32.

Complete Cessation of Military Production

1. Military production at factories and plants shall be discontinued with the exception of the production of agreed types and quantities of light firearms for the purposes referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the present Treaty. The factories and plants, subject to elimination, shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and the premises, general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. All scientific research in the military field at all scientific and research institutions and at designing offices shall be discontinued. All blueprints and other documents necessary for the production of the weapons and military equipment subject to elimination, shall be destroyed.

All orders placed by military departments for the production of armaments, military equipment, munitions and material with national or foreign Government-owned enterprises and private firms, shall be annulled.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the measures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article 33.

Abolition of Military Establishments

1. War ministries, general staffs, and all other military and para-military organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States parties to the Treaty shall be abolished. The States parties to the Treaty shall:

(a) demobilize all personnel of these institutions and organizations;

(b) abrogate all legislative acts, rules and regulations governing the organization of the military effort, and the status, structure and activities of such institutions and organizations;

(c) destroy all documents pertaining to the planning of the mobilization and the operational deployment of the armed forces in time of war.

2. The entire process of the abolition of military and para-military institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 34.

Abolition of Military Conscription  
and Military Training

In accordance with their respective constitutional procedures the States parties to the Treaty shall enact legislation prohibiting all military training, abolishing military conscription and all other forms of recruiting the armed forces, and discontinuing all military courses for reservists. Simultaneously all establishments and organizations dealing with military training shall be disbanded, as provided for in Article 33 of the present Treaty. The disbanding of all military training institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 35.

Prohibition of the Appropriation of Funds for  
Military Purposes

1. The appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form, whether from government bodies or private individuals and public organizations, shall be discontinued.

The funds released through the implementation of general and complete disarmament shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction or complete abolition of taxes on the population, and the subsidizing of the national economy. At the same time a certain portion of the funds, thus released, shall be diverted to economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. To organize control over the implementation of the provisions of this Article, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access to legislative acts and budgetary documents of the States parties to the present Treaty.

CHAPTER X.

Measures to safeguard the Security of  
States and to Maintain International Peace

Article 36.

Contingents of Police (Militia)

1. To maintain internal order, including the safeguarding of the frontiers and of the personal security of citizens, and to ensure compliance with their obligations in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter, the States parties to the Treaty shall be entitled to have, after the complete abolition of armed forces, strictly limited contingents of police (militia), equipped with light firearms.

The strength of these contingents of police (militia) for each State party to the Treaty shall be, as follows:

.....  
.....

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall be allowed to manufacture strictly limited quantities of light firearms intended for such contingents of police (militia). The list of plants producing such arms, their quotas and types for each party to the Treaty shall be specified in a special agreement.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over compliance by the States parties to the Treaty with their obligations with regard to the restricted production of the said light firearms.

Article 37.

Police (Militia) Units to be made available to  
the Security Council

1. The States parties to the Treaty undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council, on its request, units from the number of contingents of police (militia) retained by them, as well as to provide assistance and facilities, including rights of passage. The placing of such units at the disposal of the Security Council shall be carried out under the provisions of Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. To ensure that urgent military measures may be undertaken, the States parties to the Treaty shall maintain in a state of immediate readiness that part of the police (militia)

contingents which is intended for joint international enforcement action. The size of the units which the States parties to the Treaty undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council, as well as the areas where they are stationed, shall be specified in agreements to be concluded by the States parties to the Treaty with the Security Council.

2. The command of the units referred to in Paragraph 1 shall be made up of representatives of the three principal groups of States existing in the world on the basis of equal representation. The commanding body shall decide on all questions by agreement among its members representing the three groups of States.

Article 38.

Control over the Prevention of the  
Re-establishment of Armed Forces

1. The police (militia) contingents retained by the States parties to the Treaty after the completion of general and complete disarmament shall be under the control of the International Disarmament Organization which shall verify the reports by States concerning the areas where such contingents are stationed, their strength and armaments in every such area, and concerning all movements of substantial contingents of police (militia).

2. For purposes of control over the prevention of the re-establishment of armed forces and armaments, abolished as a result of general and complete disarmament, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access at any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the Treaty.

3. The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to institute a system of aerial inspection and aerial photography over the territories of the States parties to the Treaty.

CHAPTER XI.

Time-limits for Measures of the Third Stage

Article 39.

The third stage of general and complete disarmament shall be completed over a period of one year. During the last three months of this stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the results of the implementation of the third-stage measures of general and complete disarmament, with a view to reporting on them to the States parties to the Treaty, as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.



PART V. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE  
INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

Article 40.

Functions and Main Bodies

The International Disarmament Organization, to be set up under Paragraph 3 of Article 2 of the present Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Organization", shall consist of a Conference of all States parties to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Conference", and a Control Council, hereinafter referred to as the "Council".

The Organization shall deal with questions pertaining to the supervision of compliance by States with their obligations under the present Treaty. All questions connected with the safeguarding of international peace and security, which may arise in the course of the implementation of the present Treaty, including preventive and enforcement measures, shall be decided on by the Security Council in conformity with its powers under the United Nations Charter.

Article 41.

The Conference

1. The Conference shall comprise all States parties to the Treaty. It shall hold regular sessions at least once a year, and special sessions which may be convened on decision by the Council or at the request of a majority of the States parties to the Treaty with a view to considering matters connected with the implementation of effective control over disarmament. The sessions shall be held at the Headquarters of the Organization, unless otherwise decided by the Conference.

2. Each State party to the Treaty shall have one vote. Decisions on questions of procedure shall be taken by a simple majority, and on all other matters by a two-thirds majority. In accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty, the Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

3. The Conference may discuss any matters pertaining to the measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and may make recommendations to the States parties to the Treaty and to the Council on any such matter or measure.

4. The Conference shall:

- (a) Elect non-permanent members of the Council;
- (b) Consider the annual, and any special, reports of the Council;
- (c) Approve the budget recommended by the Council;
- (d) Approve reports to be submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;
- (e) Approve amendments to the present Treaty in accordance with Article 47 of the present Treaty;
- (f) Take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the Conference for this purpose by the Council;
- (g) Propose matters for consideration by the Council and request from the Council reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Council.

Article 42.

The Control Council

1. The Council shall consist of:

- (a) The five States permanent members of the United Nations Security Council;
- (b) ... (number) other States parties to the Treaty elected by the Conference for a period of two years.

The composition of the Council must ensure proper representation of the three principal groups of States existing in the world.

2. The Council shall:

- (a) Direct in practice the measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament; set up such bodies at the Headquarters of the Organization as it deems necessary for the discharge of its functions; establish procedures for their operation, and devise the necessary rules and regulations in accordance with the present Treaty;
- (b) Submit to the Conference annual reports and such special reports as it deems necessary to prepare;
- (c) Be in constant touch with the United Nations Security Council as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; periodically inform it of the progress achieved in the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and promptly notify it of any infringements by the States parties to the Treaty of their disarmament obligations under the present Treaty;

(d) Review the results of the implementation of the measures included in each stage of general and complete disarmament with a view to reporting on them to the States parties to the Treaty, and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;

(e) Recruit the staff of the Organization on an international basis, so as to ensure that the three principal groups of States, existing in the world, are adequately represented. The personnel of the Organization shall be recruited from among those persons who are recommended by the Governments and who may or may not be citizens of the country of the recommending Government;

(f) Prepare and submit to the Conference the annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Organization;

(g) Elaborate instructions by which the various control elements must be guided in their work;

(h) Make timely analysis of incoming reports;

(i) Request from States such information on their armed forces and armaments as may be necessary for control over the implementation of the disarmament measures, provided for by the present Treaty;

(j) Perform such other functions as are envisaged in the present Treaty.

3. Each member of the Council shall have one vote. Decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be taken by a simple majority, and on other matters by a two-thirds majority.

4. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. The Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure and shall be authorized to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

#### Article 43.

##### Privileges and Immunities

The Organization, its personnel and representatives of the States parties to the Treaty shall enjoy in the territory of each State party to the Treaty such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of independent and unrestricted control over the implementation of the present Treaty.

Article 44.

Finances

1. All the expenses of the Organization shall be financed from the funds allocated by the States parties to the Treaty. The budget of the Organization shall be drawn up by the Council and approved by the Conference in accordance with Paragraph 4(c) of Article 41 and Paragraph 2(f) of Article 42 of the present Treaty.
2. The States parties to the Treaty shall contribute funds to cover the expenditures of the Organization according to the following scale: .....  
.....  
(The agreed scale of contributions shall be included in the present Article).

Article 45.

Preparatory Commission

Immediately after the signing of the present Treaty the States represented on the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee shall set up a Preparatory Commission with the task of taking practical steps to establish the International Disarmament Organization.

PART VI. FINAL CLAUSES

Article 46.

Ratification and Entry into Force

The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the Signatory States in accordance with their constitutional procedures, within a period of six months from the date of the signing of the Treaty, and shall come into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification with the United Nations Secretariat by all the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as by those States that are their allies in bilateral and multilateral military alliances, and by .....  
..... (number) non-aligned States.

Article 47.

Amendments

Any proposal to amend the text of the present Treaty shall come into force after it has been adopted by a two-thirds majority at a Conference of all States parties to the Treaty, and ratified in accordance with their constitutional procedures by the States referred to in Article 46 of the present Treaty.

Article 48.

Authentic Texts

The present Treaty done in the Russian, English, French, Chinese and Spanish languages, each being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the United Nations Secretariat, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the Signatory States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed the present Treaty.

Done at .....

.....

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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
Memorandum OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF  
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS  
IN THE EIGHTEEN NATION COMMITTEE

I.

In accordance with the instructions of the United Nations General Assembly, the Eighteen Nation Committee is starting negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government is not regarding these negotiations merely as one of the many routine meetings which have taken place in the past in various committees, subcommittees and commissions, but without achieving any positive result. The Soviet Government's position is based on the view that the negotiations in the Eighteen Nation Committee constitute a qualitatively new stage in the consideration of the disarmament problem, a stage which should result in its practical solution.

Mankind has always placed on disarmament its best hopes for the maintenance and consolidation of peace. But never before has disarmament been so vitally necessary as it is today. At the present time, when such momentous advances have taken place in military technology, when States possess thermonuclear weapons of immense destructive capacity and powerful means for their delivery, the destiny of the nations largely hinges on the solution of the disarmament problem. The weapons of mass destruction already stockpiled are sufficient to cause the annihilation of hundreds of millions of human beings. At the same time the arms race is continuing and at a rapidly increasing pace. Although in the past the arms race invariably led to world wars entailing untold suffering and distress for the peoples, today it is fraught with even more catastrophic consequences.

In the circumstances, it is the supreme duty of States finally to reach agreement on disarmament. If they do so, the nations will be saved from the imminent threat of a devastating thermonuclear war, and the whole course of international events will take a turn for the better. If, on the other hand, no agreement is reached on disarmament, mankind will face dangers such as it has never known in its entire history. It is in these terms that the question is posed today.

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\* Supercedes the document issued under the symbol FNDC/3, on 15 March 1962

Can the disarmament problem be solved?

The Soviet Government unhesitatingly replies in the affirmative. Yes, the problem of disarmament can be solved, provided, of course, that all States strive to that end, and especially those States which possess the most powerful armed forces and armament.

Moreover, thanks to the efforts of the peace-loving nations, some preparatory work for the solution of the disarmament problem has already been done. In particular, the tireless efforts to expound the general and complete disarmament proposals put forward by Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, at the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1959, have yielded results. It is now widely recognized by States that disarmament must be general and complete and that the threat of a new world war cannot be eliminated through any partial and unco-ordinated measures, particularly as negotiations on such measures raise the difficult problems of control and the preservation of the balance of forces at a time when States continue to possess powerful ballistic and nuclear weapons. On 20 December 1961, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution calling for early agreement on general and complete disarmament. The United Nations General Assembly agreed on and approved basic principles for disarmament, which state the need for a radical solution of this problem through the elimination of all the armed forces and armaments of States within strictly defined time-limits.

Regarding negotiations in the Eighteen Nation Committee as a new, particularly responsible and undoubtedly difficult stage in the endeavour to achieve general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Government proposed that the work of the Committee should begin at the summit level with the participation of the Heads of Government (or State) of the countries represented in the Committee. The Heads of Government, who enjoy the fullest confidence of the peoples and who possess the broadest powers can more easily overcome fixed ideas and hardened positions which are the legacy of past disarmament negotiations. The peoples are entitled to expect that, in the disarmament negotiations, the leaders primarily responsible for State policy as a whole should display the wisdom, perspicacity and courage which are so indispensable to the attainment of agreement.

Though, unfortunately, it did not prove possible to reach agreement on starting the Committee's work at the summit level, it is of positive significance that the exchange of views between the leaders of States has revealed general agreement on the importance that the disarmament talks in the Committee are assuming. Of no less importance is the present general recognition of the personal responsibility of the Heads of Government or State for the success of the talks and of the need for the direct participation of statesmen at the highest level in the work of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee.

The Soviet Government intends, in all circumstances, to do its utmost to ensure that the negotiations which have just opened on general and complete disarmament yield fruitful results.

## II.

The Soviet Government believes that the work of the Disarmament Committee should from the outset be concentrated on the fulfilment of the main task assigned to it by the United Nations General Assembly, namely, the achievement of early agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. With a view to facilitating and expediting the Committee's efforts to discharge this task, the Soviet Government is submitting for its consideration a draft Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. In so doing, the Soviet Government is motivated by the view that, given the existence of general agreement regarding the aims and principles of disarmament, the Committee's work should be as specific and business-like as possible, otherwise the negotiations will again slide in to the wellworn track of theoretical discussions which produce no practical results.

The peoples are not interested in negotiations on disarmament as such, or in new programmes and other documents proposing half-way measures. Many such programmes and documents have been drawn up in the past and have not resulted in any progress. The peoples are interested in the final outcome of the negotiations, namely, in agreement and a Treaty on general and complete disarmament.

In submitting its draft Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control for the Committee's consideration, the Soviet Government expresses the hope that it will serve as a basis for an early and constructive solution of this problem in the interests of all nations.



In accordance with the agreed principles for disarmament, the Soviet Government has defined in the draft Treaty the basic obligations of States with respect to measures of disarmament and control at each of the three stages. The Soviet Government proposes that the whole process of disarmament should be effected within a period of four years.

Attaching great importance to the need for the early removal of the threat of thermonuclear war which hangs over mankind, the Soviet Government has provided for the implementation of major effective measures to that end at the first stage of disarmament. Such measures are the complete elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets, including military rockets of any range, military aircraft, surface warships and submarines, artillery installations, and all other systems capable of being used for the delivery of nuclear weapons;

the complete dismantling of all military bases in foreign territory, including rocket, air, naval and all other foreign military bases;

the withdrawal of all troops from foreign territory, regardless of whether such troops are occupation forces or are stationed in foreign territory on the basis of any bilateral or multilateral agreements.

These first-stage disarmament measures are indissolubly interconnected and must, therefore, be carried out during one and the same period of time.

It is a matter of common knowledge that the Soviet Union possesses the most advanced vehicles in the world for the delivery of nuclear weapons to their targets. These are powerful long-range and super long-range rockets capable of delivering many-megaton nuclear warheads to any point on the globe. If the Soviet Union agreed to the elimination of these means of delivery in the first stage of disarmament, it would be voluntarily renouncing the military advantage, it at present possesses. However, guided by the desire to achieve a prompt solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament and of banishing war, the Soviet Government is ready to take such a step and proposes that the elimination of all vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons should be carried out in the first stage, together, of course, with the dismantling of all military bases in foreign territory and with the withdrawal of foreign troops from such bases.

The execution of these measures would in fact preclude a nuclear attack by one group of States against another, even though nuclear weapons would still remain at the disposal of States.

The Soviet Government also attaches great importance to achieving a substantial reduction in the threat of war in general - and not merely of nuclear war - in the very first stage of general and complete disarmament. It is a fact that nuclear weapons did not exist during World War I, while in World War II they were used by the United States against Japan only at the very end of the war, when its outcome had already been decided. Thus, tens of millions of human beings perished in the two World Wars as a result of the use of conventional, not nuclear, armaments. This is a point that should not be forgotten.

In order greatly to diminish the danger of military conflict between States from the outset of the disarmament process, the Soviet Government proposes in its draft Treaty that the strength of the armed forces of States should be considerably reduced in the first stage and that corresponding reductions should be made in conventional armaments. The Soviet Government is in favour of reducing the strength of the armed forces of the USSR and the United States to 1.7 million men and of reducing the armed forces of other States to levels to be agreed on. Such a reduction would greatly diminish the danger of war and, more particularly, the capacity to unleash local wars in any part of the world, and will, in general, have a beneficial effect on the entire international situation.

In the second stage of disarmament the draft Treaty, submitted to the Committee by the Soviet Government, provides for the complete prohibition of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other types of weapons of mass destruction, together with the termination of their production and the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons. Thus, when the second stage is completed, mankind will forever be released from the danger of the use by any State of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time the Soviet Government proposes that in the second stage armed forces and conventional armaments be further considerably reduced. The proposed maximum force levels for the USSR and the United States at this stage, will be 1 million men, with levels for other States which will have to be agreed upon. The implementation of this measure will result in the States possessing relatively small armies by the end of the second stage.

Needless to say, even after the second stage has been completed, the problem of removing the threat of war will not have been completely solved, since there will be no guarantee against a resumption of the arms race. Only the implementation of the third-stage measures can provide such a complete guarantee.

In the third stage the draft Treaty provides for the elimination of all remaining armed forces and conventional armaments, and for the complete cessation of military production and appropriations for military purposes. In this stage War Ministries, General Staffs, and military training institutions will be abolished, all laws on military conscription and other legislation concerning the recruitment of the armed forces will be abrogated, and all military courses and other forms of military training for citizens will be prohibited.

The implementation of the third-stage measures will result in States no longer having any means of waging war, and in the war danger being finally abolished. To maintain internal order the States will have at their disposal only strictly limited agreed contingents of police, or militia, equipped with light firearms.

The carrying out of general and complete disarmament will result in the release of substantial material resources and funds which are at present spent by States on the maintenance and development of the military machinery. These resources can then be directed towards developing the peaceful economy of States, and rapidly raising the standard of welfare and culture of the nations.

The Soviet Government believes that part of the funds, released in the process of disarmament, must be diverted to economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. This would considerably help in overcoming the backwardness of those countries due to their exploitation by the colonial Powers. The portion of the funds provided for such assistance will be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty and must be written into the text of the Treaty on general and complete disarmament.

New prospects will open up for international economic co-operation between States. Mankind will enter into an era of unprecedented development of peaceful and friendly relations between States, when the possibility of any military conflicts between them will be completely ruled out.

III.

In the draft Treaty on general and complete disarmament proposed by the Soviet Government, and in all other previously submitted Soviet proposals on disarmament, an important place is given to questions of control. The Soviet Government bases itself on the fact that the institution of strict and reliable international control is an essential guarantee of, and an indispensable condition for, the successful implementation of general and complete disarmament. The position of the Soviet Government on control is prompted, above all, by the desire to ensure the confidence of the parties to the Treaty that general and complete disarmament is being carried out by all honestly and in good faith, and that no State is evading compliance with its obligations in regard to disarmament measures.

For the purpose of exercising control over the implementation by States of their Treaty obligations, the draft Treaty provides for the establishment of an International Disarmament Organization comprising all States parties to the Treaty. This Organization is to start operating as soon as disarmament measures are initiated. The representatives of the States parties to the Treaty will periodically meet in Conference to consider matters arising in the course of the implementation of control over disarmament. A Control Council composed of the representatives of the socialist countries, of the countries participating in Western military alliances, and of non-aligned countries will serve as the permanent organ of the International Disarmament Organization. In the countries parties to the Treaty the International Disarmament Organization will have its internationally recruited personnel, including inspectors, who will be guaranteed the possibility of verifying without hindrance the implementation of the disarmament measures.

In considering the functions, powers, and method of work of the International Disarmament Organization, the Soviet Government came to the conclusion that there is no need to introduce into it the unanimity principle or the veto, and that it could be agreed that decisions would be taken by an appropriate majority. In this connexion the Soviet Government took due account of the nature of the tasks of the International Disarmament Organization, namely, to verify compliance by States with their Treaty obligations, to note the completion of the measures included in a particular stage, and to submit relevant reports to the States, and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.

It goes without saying that the International Disarmament Organization will not and cannot be entrusted with any functions involving the execution of preventive or enforcement measures in regard to States. The business of the International Disarmament Organization is to establish facts. If in connexion with those facts the need should arise of taking action to safeguard peace and security, this would, as heretofore, be exclusively within the competence of the Security Council which is the sole body empowered to take such action by the United Nations Charter.

In working out concrete measures for control over disarmament the Soviet Government thoroughly weighed all the aspects of the matter and consistently adhered to the principle that at each stage the extent of control should strictly conform to the extent and nature of the disarmament measures carried out in each stage. Such an approach makes it possible on the one hand, to ensure strict and rigorous verification of the implementation by States of each agreed disarmament measure, and, on the other hand, does not prejudice in any way the interests of the national security of States. It will be the implementation of disarmament measures, and not the armed forces and armaments retained by States at any given stage, that will be subject to control. This is quite sufficient for effective verification of the implementation by States of the disarmament measures.

The contentions, sometimes made, that there can be no certainty that States are honouring their disarmament obligations if only the fact of the reduction of armed forces and armaments is verified, are completely groundless. Actually, even today one side does not know for sure the quantities of armaments and armed forces possessed by the other side. In the course of disarmament both sides will at each stage reduce their armed forces in agreed proportions which will, without question, diminish the danger of a military conflict, even though the quantities of armed forces and armaments retained by States will not be verified. From stage to stage the quantities of armed forces and armaments belonging to States and remaining outside the sphere of control, will decrease. After the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament control will become unrestricted and comprehensive because then the States will no longer have anything to hide from one another, since all armed forces will have been disbanded and all armaments destroyed.

The draft Treaty prepared by the Soviet Government provides for the extension of international control -- stage by stage -- to those elements of the military machinery of States which are subject to elimination at the corresponding stages of disarmament. In the first stage it will be the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets, foreign military bases and foreign troops in alien territories, because it will be these components of the military machinery of States that are to be subject to elimination during the first stage. In the second stage it will be the nuclear weapons themselves, and other types of weapons of mass destruction. In the third stage it will be central and local military institutions, military training establishments, etc.

As regards armed forces and conventional armaments the draft Treaty takes account of the fact that during the first and second stages they will be merely reduced, while their complete elimination is slated for the third stage. That is why control in the first two stages is proposed over the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, and not over those forces and armaments that will be retained by States. In the third stage armed forces and armaments are to be completely eliminated, and therefore control over the implementation of this measure will assume a comprehensive nature.

The degree of reliability of the concrete measures of control, proposed by the Soviet Government, will be seen already from the manner in which it is planned to implement control over the elimination, in the first stage, of the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets.

The appropriate articles of the draft Treaty provide that the International Disarmament Organization will have adequate means and facilities for the establishment of control over the elimination of rocket weapons, military aircraft, warships, submarines, and other means which may be used as nuclear weapons vehicles. To these ends the draft Treaty provides for the presence of international inspectors during the destruction of all types of delivery vehicles, at airfields and in ports, and during the destruction of rocket launching sites. At the same time international control is to be instituted over those enterprises which were previously engaged, wholly or in part, in the production of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, in order to prevent the clandestine resumption of their production.

These control measures will embrace all the processes of the elimination of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, and will provide for access by the International Disarmament Organization, and its inspectors, to objectives essential for purposes of effective verification, and will ensure that no one will be able to evade compliance with his obligations in respect of a specific disarmament measure.

Similarly, the draft Treaty elaborated by the Soviet Government defines the implementation of control over all other disarmament measures.

After the accomplishment of all measures relating to general and complete disarmament the International Disarmament Organization will continue to supervise compliance by States with their obligations, and will be able to send inspection teams to any point within the territory of the States. The necessary control will also be exercised over the strength, armament, and location of the police (militia) of each country.

The Soviet Government hopes its proposals on strict international control over general and complete disarmament will basically prove acceptable to all who sincerely desire to solve the disarmament problem.

It goes without saying that, should any other proposals regarding the arrangements and forms of control over any disarmament measure be put forward during the negotiations, the Soviet Government will give them the most careful attention. It is clear from repeated statements of the Soviet Government that it is ready to accept any proposals of the Western Powers on control over disarmament if those Powers accept the Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet Government is convinced that if all the members of the Disarmament Committee seek agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control, and not the establishment of control over armaments, the Committee will not find it difficult to agree on controls.

#### IV.

The draft Treaty on general and complete disarmament prepared by the Soviet Government provides not only for controls, but also for other measures to ensure international peace and the security of States under conditions of general and complete disarmament.

Disarmament itself will, of course, be the best method of ensuring the peace and security of States. When the means of waging war have been destroyed, when States have neither armies nor armaments, no-one will be able to unleash war, no-one will be able to resort to force or the threat of force in international relations.

General and complete disarmament would, for instance, preclude the repetition of anything similar to the perfidious attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 or the surprise attack by the Japanese militarists on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941. Living in a world without armies and without weapons, people will learn of surprise attacks only from history books.

Any attempt by any party to evade compliance with the disarmament obligations it has assumed in order to secure military advantages for itself will be exposed by the control organs. This very fact would have a sobering effect on anyone who might contemplate infringing the Treaty on general and complete disarmament. On the completion of general and complete disarmament, the control organs will exercise supervision to ensure that no State re-establishes its armed forces.

If, in the course of the implementation of general and complete disarmament, any State or group of States were to take aggressive action, the powers of the Security Council under the Charter of the United Nations would be quite adequate to put an end to such action. As we know, these powers of the Security Council are defined in Chapter VII of the Charter, which provides for such action to check aggression as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

With a view to safeguarding peace and security as fully as possible during the process of general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Government has provided in its draft Treaty that measures should be taken in the first stage of disarmament to improve the capacity of the United Nations to preserve international peace and security in accordance with Chapter VII of its Charter. The Soviet Government is in fact proposing that States should negotiate agreements with the Security Council under Article 43 of the Charter of the United Nations. The idea is that the armed forces made available under those agreements will form part of the national armed forces of the States concerned and will be stationed within their territories. These armed forces will be kept fully up to strength and will be equipped and prepared for combat. They will be made available to the Security Council, on its call, under Article 42 of the Charter of the United Nations.



The Soviet Government proposes that the same method of recruiting and utilizing international armed forces should also be retained in the second stage of disarmament. When the elimination of the armed forces and armaments of States is completed in the third stage, international forces under the Security Council will be formed, whenever necessary, from the contingents of police (militia) retained by States.

The international armed forces of the Security Council will be under an appropriate command, both during disarmament and after its completion. Since the employment of the armed forces of the Security Council will constitute a serious and crucial measure, it is necessary to ensure that these forces cannot be used by any State or group of States to the detriment of the independence and national sovereignty of other States. To that end, the Soviet Government proposes that the command of the international armed forces of the Security Council should be formed on the basis of equitable representation of the three groups of States -- the socialist States, the Western countries which are members of military blocs, and the neutral countries -- and that decisions should be taken by agreement among them.

Only if this principle is strictly observed in establishing the command of the international armed forces of the Security Council will all States have a reliable guarantee that these forces will be used in the interests of peace. Any other approach to the solution of this problem will make the establishment of international armed forces impossible.

Having regard to the insistence of the Western Powers upon additional measures to ensure international peace and security in the course of general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Government has agreed to include a number of such measures in the draft Treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet Government proposes to prohibit, from the outset of the first stage (pending the final destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons) the placing into orbit or the stationing in outer space of special devices capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, as well as movement beyond the limits of their territorial waters by warships and flights beyond the limits of their national territory by military aircraft capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons. This measure is designed to make it extremely difficult for one State to attack another with nuclear weapons during the period when the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons is in progress. With that same end in view, provision is made for an agreement that,

from the outset of the implementation of disarmament, rockets and space devices will be launched for peaceful purposes only and that international control will be instituted over the observance of this obligation by States.

The Soviet Government also considers it advisable that, already in the first stage of disarmament, States possessing nuclear weapons should undertake to refrain from transferring control over nuclear weapons or transmitting information necessary for their production to States not possessing such weapons, while the latter States, in their turn, should refrain from producing or otherwise obtaining nuclear weapons and refuse to permit such weapons to be stationed in their territories.

Preparation of the draft Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control has strengthened the Soviet Government's conviction that the great objective of general and complete disarmament is capable of achievement if it forms the basis of the policy of all States, especially of those which possess the most powerful armed forces and armaments.

Believing that the Disarmament Committee should from the outset proceed to frame and negotiate a treaty on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Government, as it has repeatedly stated is of the opinion that it would be useful to carry out forthwith without waiting for the completion of negotiations on the Treaty, a number of measures which would contribute to the relaxation of international tensions and to the strengthening of confidence among States, and would thus facilitate the achievement of agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet Government considers that such measures should include, first and foremost, the cessation of all nuclear tests. This has long been a pressing problem and the peoples have been awaiting its solution for many years.

A final solution to the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests can be found only within the framework of general and complete disarmament. When all nuclear weapons have been destroyed and when a system of international control precludes resumption of the manufacture of such weapons, there will be nothing to test. Moreover, under conditions of general and complete disarmament, when States have no armed forces whatever, no-one would be tempted to carry out nuclear weapons tests, since there would be no incentive to do so. It is also

obvious that, with the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the problem of control over the cessation of nuclear weapons tests will solve itself. The draft Treaty on general and complete disarmament prepared by the Soviet Government contains appropriate provisions prohibiting all nuclear tests as early as the first stage.

At the same time, the Soviet Government believes that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests can be reached here and now, without waiting for the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. This is the purpose of the proposals made by the USSR Government on 28 November 1961 which provide for the immediate prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, and for the exercise of mutual control through the national detection systems of States. This is a serious proposal based on facts and on scientific advances. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom themselves stated a few months ago that national systems of detection are quite adequate to register all nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. Moreover, all the nuclear tests so far carried out, whether in the atmosphere, under water or in outer space, were registered by national systems of detection.

With regard to underground nuclear tests, we know that they, too, can be detected by national systems of detection, a fact which has been borne out by practical experience. Bearing in mind, however, that the Western Powers consider national systems of detection inadequate for the detection of underground nuclear explosions, the Soviet Government proposes that a moratorium should be imposed on such explosions until an appropriate control system has been developed and that that system should form an integral part of the international system of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet Government has every reason to believe that these proposals would not place any State in a position of advantage nor impair the national security of States, and would at the same time fully ensure the prompt solution of the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests.

In this connexion, the Soviet Government cannot but express its regret that at the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests the United States and the United Kingdom did not show any readiness to discuss the USSR proposals on this matter on a business-like basis. Furthermore, the United States and the

United Kingdom are conducting a succession of underground nuclear tests, while their Governments have announced a forthcoming series of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. It is obvious that such actions by the Western Powers can only serve to accelerate the nuclear arms race with all its dangerous consequences for peace and for human health.

The Soviet Government once again urges all nuclear Powers to consider the responsibility which will devolve on those who continue to delay the solution of the problem of the prohibition of nuclear tests. The Soviet Government is, as always, ready to come to an early agreement on this matter.

The Soviet Government also believes it necessary to discuss the possibility of carrying out certain measures aimed at easing international tension, strengthening confidence among States and promoting general and complete disarmament. The proposals of the Soviet Government on such measures are contained in the Memorandum of the Soviet Government which was submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 26 September 1961. The Soviet Government is gratified to note that some of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its sixteenth session, for instance, the resolution proposing that Africa should be considered as a denuclearized zone, have the same aim in view as the proposals made by the Soviet Government in that Memorandum.

The Soviet Government is prepared to consider any other constructive proposals which may be introduced by any State for measures to ease international tension.

Negotiations on measures to ease international tension, strengthen confidence among States and promote general and complete disarmament should not divert the attention of members of the Committee from the execution of their principal task, which is to draw up and negotiate a Treaty on general and complete disarmament. Indeed, the measures to promote general and complete disarmament are intended to facilitate the solution of this problem, not to supersede it or relegate it to a subordinate position.

The problem of general and complete disarmament was first submitted for the consideration of all States two and a half years ago on the initiative of the Soviet Union. Since that time, the Soviet Union has consistently striven to achieve a practical solution of this most acute contemporary problem. The Soviet Union is not alone in this; it has been and is supported by the socialist countries and by all peace-loving States.

The Soviet Government had no wish to reopen the past or to bring up the question of who is to blame for the artificial barriers raised to the attainment of agreement on disarmament. If all the participants in the negotiations, the Western Powers included, are now really prepared to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament, there are good prospects for the Committee's work though many difficulties still stand in the way of the solution of the disarmament problem.

It is the duty and responsibility of the members of the Disarmament Committee to justify the hopes of the peoples for an early solution of the disarmament problem. General and complete disarmament can and must become a reality.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT: A PROGRAMME FOR GENERAL  
AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD \*\*

The Nations of the world:

Conscious of the crisis in human history produced by the revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divided by serious ideological differences;

Determined to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of the arms race and to create conditions in which all peoples can strive freely and peacefully to fulfil their basic aspirations;

Declare their goal to be: a free secure, and peaceful world of independent States adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world where adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations; a world where there shall be a permanent state of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and where the resources of nations shall be devoted to man's material, cultural and spiritual advance;

Set forth as the objectives of a programme of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world:

- (a) The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force;
- (b) The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order.
- (c) The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to ensure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations;
- (d) The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

\* Supersedes Document LIDC/6, issued on 16 March 1962

\*\* also issued as Document A/4891 on 25 September 1961.

Call on the negotiating States:

- (a) To develop the outline programme set forth below into an agreed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole programme has been achieved;
  - (b) To this end to seek to attain the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date;
  - (c) Also to seek - without prejudice to progress on the disarmament programme - agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form a part of that programme;
- Affirm that disarmament negotiations should be guided by the following

principles:

- (a) Disarmament shall take place as rapidly as possible until it is completed in stages containing balanced, phased and safeguarded measures, with each measure and stage to be carried out in an agreed period of time.
- (b) Compliance with all disarmament obligations shall be effectively verified from their entry into force. Verification arrangements shall be instituted progressively and in such a manner as to verify not only that agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.
- (c) Disarmament shall take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the security of any State, whether or not a party to an international agreement or treaty.
- (d) As States relinquish their arms, the United Nations shall be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international co-operation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.
- (e) Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next shall take place as soon as all the measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and effective verification is continuing and as soon as the arrangements that have been agreed to be necessary for the next stage have been instituted.

Agree upon the following outline programme for achieving general and complete disarmament:

STAGE I

A. To Establish an International Disarmament Organization:

(a) An International Disarmament Organization (IDO) shall be established within the framework of the United Nations upon entry into force of the agreement. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for the effective verification of the disarmament programme.

(b) The IDO shall have: (1) a General Conference of all the parties; (2) a Commission consisting of representatives of all the major Powers as permanent members and certain other States on a rotating basis; and (3) an Administrator who will administer the Organization subject to the direction of the Commission and who will have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to assure effective impartial implementation of the functions of the Organization.

(c) The IDO shall: (1) ensure compliance with the obligations undertaken by verifying the execution of measures agreed upon; (2) assist the States in developing the details of agreed further verification and disarmament measures; (3) provide for the establishment of such bodies as may be necessary for working out the details of further measures provided for in the programme and for such other expert study groups as may be required to give continuous study to the problems of disarmament; (4) receive reports on the progress of disarmament and verification arrangements and determine the transition from one stage to the next.

B. To Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:

(a) Force levels shall be limited to 2.1 million each for the United States and USSR and to appropriate levels not exceeding 2.1 million each for all other militarily significant States. Reductions to the agreed levels will proceed by equitable, proportionate, and verified steps.

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reductions shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the States party to the agreement have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.



- (c) The production of agreed types of armaments shall be limited.
- (d) A Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Experts Commission shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of CBR weapons stockpiles and the halting of their production.

C. To Contain and Reduce the Nuclear Threat:

- (a) States that have not acceded to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons shall do so.
- (b) The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped.
- (c) Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, agreed initial quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons purposes.
- (d) Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to appropriate safeguards to be developed in agreement with the IAEA.
- (e) States owning nuclear weapons shall not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any such nation the information or material necessary for their manufacture. States not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufacture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other States, or seek or receive information or materials necessary for their manufacture.
- (f) A Nuclear Experts Commission consisting of representatives of the nuclear States shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

D. To Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:

- (a) Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished in each step by transfers to depots supervised by the IDO of vehicles that are in excess of levels agreed upon for each step. At specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the vehicles that have been placed under supervision of the IDO shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(b) Production of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be discontinued or limited.

(c) Testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be limited or halted.

E. To Promote the Peaceful Use of Outer Space:

(a) The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited.

(b) States shall give advance notification to participating States and to the IDO of launchings of space vehicles and missiles, together with the track of the vehicle.

F. To Reduce the Risks of War by Accident, Miscalculation, and Surprise Attack:

(a) States shall give advance notification to the participating States and to the IDO of major military movements and manoeuvres, on a scale as may be agreed, which might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce countermeasures. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale and time span of the event.

(b) There shall be established observation posts at such locations as major ports, railway centres, motor highways, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.

(c) There shall also be established such additional inspection arrangements to reduce the danger of surprise attack as may be agreed.

(d) An international commission shall be established immediately within the IDO to examine and make recommendations on the possibility of further measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication.

G. To Keep the Peace:

(a) States shall reaffirm their obligations under the United Nations Charter to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force - including nuclear, conventional, or CBR - contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

(b) States shall agree to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.

(c) States shall use all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of disputes and shall seek within the United Nations further arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and for the codification and progressive development of international law.

(d) States shall develop arrangements in Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a United Nations peace force.

(e) A United Nations peace observation group shall be staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be dispatched to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.

#### STAGE II

A. International Disarmament Organization:

The powers and responsibilities of the IDO shall be progressively enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II.

B. To Further Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:

(a) Levels of forces for the United States, USSR, and other militarily significant States shall be further reduced by substantial amounts to agreed levels in equitable and balanced steps.

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be further reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Stage II reduction process, the parties have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) There shall be further agreed restrictions on the production of armaments.

(d) Agreed military bases and facilities wherever they are located shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses.

(e) Depending upon the findings of the Experts Commission on JBR weapons, the production of CBR weapons shall be halted, existing stocks progressively reduced, and the resulting excess quantities destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

C. To Further Reduce the Nuclear Threat:

Stocks of nuclear weapons shall be progressively reduced to the minimum levels which can be agreed upon as a result of the findings of the Nuclear Experts Commission; the resulting excess of fissionable material shall be transferred to peaceful purposes.

D. To Further Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:

Further reductions in the stocks of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be carried out in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage I.

E. To Keep the Peace:

During Stage II, States shall develop further the peace-keeping processes of the United Nations, to the end that the United Nations can effectively in Stage III deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations:

(a) States shall agree upon strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to assure that the United Nations will be able effectively to protect States against threats to or breaches of the peace.

(b) The United Nations peace force shall be established and progressively strengthened.

(c) States shall also agree upon further improvements and developments in rules of international conduct and in processes for peaceful settlement of disputes and differences.

STAGE III

By the time Stage II has been completed, the confidence produced through a verified disarmament programme, the acceptance of rules of peaceful international behaviour, and the development of strengthened international peace-keeping processes within the framework of the United Nations should have reached a point where the States of the world can move forward to Stage III. In Stage III, progressive controlled disarmament and continuously developing principles and procedures of international law would proceed to a point where no State would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened United Nations Peace Force and all international disputes would be settled according to the agreed principles of international conduct.

The progressive steps to be taken during the final phase of the disarmament programme would be directed toward the attainment of a world in which:

- (a) States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations Peace Force.
  - (b) The United Nations Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning.
  - (c) The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the United Nations Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.
  - (d) The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all States under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.
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**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

Private

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Outline of Basic Provisions of a  
Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament  
in a Peaceful World

OUTLINE OF BASIC PROVISIONS OF A  
TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT  
IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

In order to assist in the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the United States submits the following outline of basic provisions of such a treaty. The Preamble of such a treaty has already been the subject of negotiations and is therefore not submitted as part of this treaty outline.

A. Objectives

1. To ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) general and complete disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Taking into account paragraphs 3 and 4 below, to provide, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:

(a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

(b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons;

(c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;

(d) Abolition of the organizations and institutions designed to organize the military efforts of states, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions;

(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures.

3. To ensure that, at the completion of the program for general and complete disarmament, states would have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

4. To ensure that during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament, states also would support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations Peace Force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments necessary to ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms.

5. To establish and provide for the effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations for the purpose of ensuring that all obligations under the disarmament program would be honored and observed during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament; and to this end to ensure that the International Disarmament Organization and its inspectors would have unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

### B. Principles

The guiding principles during the achievement of these objectives are:

1. Disarmament would be implemented until it is completed by stages to be carried out within specified time limits.

2. Disarmament would be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any state or group of states gain military advantage, and so that security would be ensured equally for all.

3. Compliance with all disarmament obligations would be effectively verified during and after their entry into force. Verification arrangements would be instituted progressively as necessary to ensure throughout the disarmament process that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded.

4. As national armaments are reduced, the United Nations would be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to ensure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international cooperation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.

5. Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next would take place upon decision that all measures in the preceding stage had been implemented and verified and that any additional arrangements required for measures in the next stage were ready to operate.

### INTRODUCTION

The Treaty would contain three stages designed to achieve a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. The Treaty would enter into force upon the signature and ratification of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and such other states as might be agreed. Stage II would begin when all militarily significant states had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied. Stage III would begin when all states possessing armed forces and armaments had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied. Disarmament, verification, and measures for keeping the peace would proceed progressively and proportionately beginning with the entry into force of the Treaty.



STAGE I

Stage I would begin upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would be completed within three years from that date.

During Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To reduce their armaments and armed forces and to carry out other agreed measures in the manner outlined below;
2. To establish the International Disarmament Organization upon the entry into force of the Treaty in order to ensure the verification in the agreed manner of the obligations undertaken; and
3. To strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace through the measures outlined below.

A. ARMAMENTS

## 1. Reduction of Armaments

a. Specified Parties to the Treaty, as a first stage toward general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, would reduce by thirty per cent the armaments in each category listed in subparagraph b. below. Except as adjustments for production would be permitted in Stage I in accordance with paragraph 3 below, each type of armament in the categories listed in subparagraph b. would be reduced by thirty per cent of the inventory existing at an agreed date.

b. All types of armaments within agreed categories would be subject to reduction in Stage I (the following list of categories, and of types within categories, is illustrative):

(1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000 kilograms or greater; missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometres or greater, together with their related fixed launching pads; and submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles having a range of 300 kilometres or greater.

(Within this category, the United States, for example, would declare as types of armaments: the B-52 aircraft; Atlas missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Titan missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Polaris missiles; Hound Dog missiles; and each new type of armament, such as Minuteman missiles, which came within the category description, together with, where applicable, their related fixed launching pads. The declared inventory of types within the category by other Parties to the Treaty would be similarly detailed.)

(2) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 15,000 kilograms and 40,000 kilograms and those missiles not included in category (1) having a range between 300 kilometres and 5,000 kilometres, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(3) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 2,500 and 15,000 kilograms. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(4) Surface-to-surface (including submarine-launched missiles) and air-to-surface aerodynamic and ballistic missiles and free rockets having a range of between 10 kilometres and 300 kilometres, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(5) Anti-missile missile systems, together with related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(6) Surface-to-air missiles other than antimissile missile systems, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(7) Tanks. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(8) Armoured cars and armoured personnel carriers. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(9) All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of 100 mm. or greater. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(10) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater of the following classes: Aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyer types and submarines. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

## 2. Method of Reduction

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the reduction of armaments would submit to the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration respecting inventories of their armaments existing at the agreed date.

b. The reduction would be accomplished in three steps, each consisting of one year. One-third of the reduction to be made during Stage I would be carried out during each step.

c. During the first part of each step, one-third of the armaments to be eliminated during Stage I would be placed in depots under supervision of the by UNOG Library

International Disarmament Organization. During the second part of each step, the deposited armaments would be destroyed or, where appropriate, converted to peaceful uses. The number and location of such depots and arrangements respecting their establishment and operation would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

d. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in a Treaty annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing reduction and would provide assurance that retained armaments did not exceed agreed levels.

### 3. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

a. Production of all armaments listed in subparagraph b. of paragraph 1. above would be limited to agreed allowances during Stage I and, by the beginning of Stage II, would be halted except for production within agreed limits of parts for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments.

b. The allowances would permit limited production in each of the categories of armaments listed in subparagraph b. of paragraph 1. above. In all instances during the process of eliminating production of armaments:

(1) any armament produced within a category would be compensated for by an additional armament destroyed within that category to the end that the ten per cent reduction in numbers in each category in each step, and the resulting thirty per cent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved; and furthermore

(2) in the case of armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 15,000 kilograms or greater and of missiles having a range of 300 kilometres or greater, the destructive capability of any such vehicles produced within a category would be compensated for by the destruction of sufficient armaments within that category to the end that the ten per cent reduction in destructive capability as well as numbers in each of these categories in each step, and the resulting thirty per cent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved.

c. Should a Party to the Treaty elect to reduce its production in any category at a more rapid rate than required by the allowances provided in subparagraph b. above, that Party would be entitled to retain existing armaments to the extent of the unused portion of its production allowance. In any such instance, any armament so retained would be compensated for in the manner set forth in sub-paragraph b.(1) and, where applicable, b.(2) above, to the end that the ten per cent reduction in numbers and, where applicable, destructive capability in each category in each step, and the resulting thirty per cent reduction in Stage I would be achieved.

d. The flight testing of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.

e. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

#### 4. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine unresolved questions relating to means of accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. In light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

### B. ARMED FORCES

#### 1. Reduction of Armed Forces

Force levels for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to 2.1 million each and for other specified Parties to the Treaty to agreed levels not exceeding 2.1 million each. All other Parties to the Treaty would, with agreed exceptions, reduce their force levels to 100,000 or one per cent of their population, whichever were higher, provided that in no case would the force levels of such other Parties to the Treaty exceed levels in existence upon the entry into force of the Treaty.

#### 2. Armed Forces Subject to Reduction

Agreed force levels would include all full-time, uniformed personnel maintained by national governments in the following categories:

- a. Career personnel of active armed forces and other personnel serving in the active armed forces on fixed engagements or contracts.
- b. Conscripts performing their required period of full-time active duty as fixed by national law.
- c. Personnel of militarily organized security forces and of other forces or organizations equipped and organized to perform a military mission.

#### 3. Method of Reduction of Armed Forces

The reduction of force levels would be carried out in the following manner:

- a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing reductions would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating their force levels at the agreed date.

b. Force level reductions would be accomplished in three steps, each having a duration of one year. During each step force levels would be reduced by one-third of the difference between force levels existing at the agreed date and the levels to be reached at the end of Stage I.

c. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the reduction of force levels and provide assurance that retained forces did not exceed agreed levels.

#### 4. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing reductions would agree upon appropriate arrangements, including procedures for consultation, in order to ensure that civilian employment by military establishments would be in accordance with the objectives of the obligations respecting force levels.

### C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

#### 1. Production of Fissionable Materials for Nuclear Weapons

a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons.

b. This measure would be carried out in the following manner:

(1) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration listing by name, location and production capacity every facility under their jurisdiction capable of producing and processing fissionable materials at the agreed date.

(2) Production of fissionable materials for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons would be limited to agreed levels. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization periodic declarations stating the amounts and types of fissionable materials which were still being produced at each facility.

(3) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared facilities and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared facilities.

2. Transfer of Fissionable Material to Purposes Other than Use in Nuclear Weapons

a. Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would each transfer to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons an agreed quantity of weapons-grade U-235 from past production. The purposes for which such materials would be used would be determined by the state to which the material belonged, provided that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

b. To ensure that the transferred materials were not used in nuclear weapons, such materials would be placed under safeguards and inspection by the International Disarmament Organization either in stockpiles or at the facilities in which they would be utilized for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. Arrangements for such safeguards and inspection would be set forth in the annex on verification.

3. Transfer of Fissionable Materials Between States for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

a. Any transfer of fissionable materials between states would be for purposes other than for use in nuclear weapons and would be subject to a system of safeguards to ensure that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

b. The system of safeguards to be applied for this purpose would be developed in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

4. Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to seek to prevent the creation of further national nuclear forces. To this end the Parties would agree that:

a. Any Party to the Treaty which had manufactured, or which at any time manufactures, a nuclear weapon would:

(1) Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons to a state which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before an agreed date;

(2) Not assist any such state in manufacturing any nuclear weapons.

b. Any Party to the Treaty which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before the agreed date would:

(1) Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over any nuclear weapons;

(2) Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any nuclear weapons.

## 5. Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions

a. If an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons test explosions and providing for effective international control had come into force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, such agreement would become an annex to the Treaty, and all the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by the obligations specified in the agreement.

b. If, however, no such agreement had come into force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, all nuclear weapons test explosions would be prohibited, and the procedures for effective international control would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

## 6. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine remaining unresolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles. In the light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning nuclear weapons stockpiles.

### D. OUTER SPACE

#### 1. Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Orbit

The Parties to the Treaty would agree not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction.

#### 2. Peaceful Cooperation in Space

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support increased international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space in the United Nations or through other appropriate arrangements.

#### 3. Notification and Pre-Launch Inspection

With respect to the launching of space vehicles and missiles:

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which conducted launchings of space vehicles or missiles would provide advance notification of such launchings to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization together with the track of the space vehicle or missile. Such advance notification would be provided on a timely basis to permit pre-launch inspection of the space vehicle or missile to be launched.

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would conduct pre-launch inspection of space vehicles and missiles and would establish and operate any arrangements necessary for detecting unreported launchings.

#### 4. Limitations on Production and on Related Activities

The production, stockpiling and testing of boosters for space vehicles would be subject to agreed limitations. Such activities would be monitored by the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification.

### E. MILITARY EXPENDITURES

#### 1. Report on Expenditures

The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization at the end of each step of each stage a report on their military expenditures. Such reports would include an itemization of military expenditures.

#### 2. Verifiable Reduction of Expenditures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine questions related to the verifiable reduction of military expenditures. In the light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would consider appropriate arrangements respecting military expenditures.

### F. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

In order to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to the following measures:

#### 1. Advance Notification of Military Movements and Manoeuvres

Specified Parties to the Treaty would give advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization. Specific arrangements relating to this commitment, including the scale of movements and manoeuvres to be reported and the information to be transmitted, would be agreed.

#### 2. Observation Posts

Specified Parties to the Treaty would permit observation posts to be established at agreed locations, including major ports, railway centres, motor highways, river crossings, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces. The number of such posts could be progressively expanded in each



successive step of Stage I. Specific arrangements relating to such observation posts, including the location and staffing of posts, the method of receiving and reporting information, and the schedule for installation of posts would be agreed.

3. Additional Observation Arrangements

The Parties to the Treaty would establish such additional observation arrangements as might be agreed. Such arrangements could be extended in an agreed manner during each step of Stage I.

4. Exchange of Military Missions

Specified Parties to the Treaty would undertake the exchange of military missions between states or groups of states in order to improve communications and understanding between them. Specific arrangements respecting such exchanges would be agreed.

5. Communications between Heads of Government

Specified Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of rapid and reliable communications among their heads of government and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Specific arrangements in this regard would be subject to agreement among the Parties concerned and between such Parties and the Secretary-General.

6. International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War

The Parties to the Treaty would establish an International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War as a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization to examine and make recommendations regarding further measures that might be undertaken during Stage I or subsequent stages of disarmament to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of communications, or surprise attack. Specific arrangements for such measures as might be agreed to by all or some of the Parties to the Treaty would be subject to agreement among the Parties concerned.

G. THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

1. Establishment of the International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would be established upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would function within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Treaty.

## 2. Cooperation of the Parties to the Treaty

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to cooperate promptly and fully with the International Disarmament Organization and to assist the International Disarmament Organization in the performance of its functions and in the execution of the decisions made by it in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

## 3. Verification Functions of the International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would verify disarmament measures in accordance with the following principles which would be implemented through specific arrangements set forth in the annex on verification:

a. Measures providing for reduction of armaments would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization at agreed depots and would include verification of the destruction of armaments and, where appropriate, verification of the conversion of armaments to peaceful uses. Measures providing for reduction of armed forces would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization either at the agreed depots or other agreed locations.

b. Measures halting or limiting production, testing, and other specified activities would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization. Parties to the Treaty would declare the nature and location of all production and testing facilities and other specified activities. The International Disarmament Organization would have access to relevant facilities and activities wherever located in the territory of such Parties.

c. Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded and that activities limited or prohibited by the Treaty were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided by the International Disarmament Organization through agreed arrangements which would have the effect of providing that the extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the Parties to the Treaty of possible violations. This might be accomplished, for example, by an arrangement embodying such features as the following:

(1) All parts of the territory of those Parties to the Treaty to which this form of verification was applicable would be subject to selection for inspection from the beginning of Stage I as provided below.

(2) Parties to the Treaty would divide their territory into an agreed number of appropriate zones and at the beginning of each step of disarmament would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the total level of armaments, forces, and specified types of activities subject to verification within each zone. The exact location of armaments and forces within a zone would not be revealed prior to its selection for inspection.

(3) An agreed number of these zones would be progressively inspected by the International Disarmament Organization during Stage I according to an agreed time schedule. The zones to be inspected would be selected by procedures which would ensure their selection by Parties to the Treaty other than the Party whose territory was to be inspected or any Party associated with it. Upon selection of each zone, the Party to the Treaty whose territory was to be inspected would declare the exact location of armaments, forces and other agreed activities within the selected zone. During the verification process, arrangements would be made to provide assurance against undeclared movements of the objects of verification to or from the zone or zones being inspected. Both aerial and mobile ground inspection would be employed within the zone being inspected. In so far as agreed measures being verified were concerned access within the zone would be free and unimpeded, and verification would be carried out with the full cooperation of the state being inspected.

(4) Once a zone had been inspected it would remain open for further inspection while verification was being extended to additional zones.

(5) By the end of Stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty.

#### 4. Composition of the International Disarmament Organization

##### a. The International Disarmament Organization would have:

- (1) A General Conference of all the Parties to the Treaty;
- (2) A Control Council consisting of representatives of all the major signatory powers as permanent members and certain other Parties to the Treaty on a rotating basis; and

(3) An Administrator who would administer the International Disarmament Organization under the direction of the Control Council and who would have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to ensure effective and impartial implementation of the functions of the International Disarmament Organization.

b. The General Conference and the Control Council would have power to establish such subsidiary bodies, including expert study groups, as either of them might deem necessary.

#### 5. Functions of the General Conference

The General Conference would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

- a. Electing non-permanent members to the Control Council;
- b. Approving certain accessions to the Treaty;
- c. Appointing the Administrator upon recommendation of the Control Council;
- d. Approving agreements between the International Disarmament Organization and the United Nations and other international organizations;
- e. Approving the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;
- f. Requesting and receiving reports from the Control Council and deciding upon matters referred to it by the Control Council;
- g. Approving reports to be submitted to bodies of the United Nations;
- h. Proposing matters for consideration by the Control Council;
- i. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations;
- j. Approving amendments to the Treaty for possible ratification by the Parties to the Treaty;
- k. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty or disarmament in general.

#### 6. Functions of the Control Council

The Control Council would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

- a. Recommending appointment of the Administrator;
- b. Adopting rules for implementing the terms of the Treaty;
- c. Establishing procedures and standards for the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and maintaining supervision over such arrangements and the Administrator;
- d. Establishing procedures for making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by verification arrangements;

- e. Considering reports of the Administrator on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements;
- f. Recommending to the Conference approval of the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;
- g. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations;
- h. Recommending to the Conference approval of certain accessions to the Treaty;
- i. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty or to disarmament in general.

7. Functions of the Administrator

The Administrator would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

- a. Administering the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and serving as Chief Executive Officer of the International Disarmament Organization;
- b. Making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by the verification arrangements;
- c. Preparing the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;
- d. Making reports to the Control Council on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements.

8. Privileges and Immunities

The privileges and immunities which the Parties to the Treaty would grant to the International Disarmament Organization and its staff and to the representatives of the Parties to the International Disarmament Organization, and the legal capacity which the International Disarmament Organization should enjoy in the territory of each of the parties to the Treaty would be specified in an annex to the Treaty.

9. Relations with the United Nations and Other International Organizations

a. The International Disarmament Organization, being established within the framework of the United Nations, would conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It would maintain close working arrangements with the United Nations, and the Administrator of the International Disarmament Organization would consult with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on matters of mutual interest.

b. The Control Council of the International Disarmament Organization would transmit to the United Nations annual and other reports on the activities of the International Disarmament Organization.

c. Principal organs of the United Nations could make recommendations to the International Disarmament Organization, which would consider them and report to the United Nations on action taken.

NOTE: The above outline does not cover all the possible details or aspects of relationships between the International Disarmament Organization and the United Nations.

H. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS  
FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

1. Obligations Concerning Threat or Use of Force

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake obligations to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force of any type -- including nuclear, conventional, chemical or biological means of warfare -- contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

2. Rules of International Conduct

a. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study by a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization of the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament.

b. The Parties to the Treaty would refrain from indirect aggression and subversion. The subsidiary body provided for in subparagraph a. would also study methods of assuring states against indirect aggression or subversion.

3. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

a. The Parties to the Treaty would utilize all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of all disputes which might arise between them and any

other state, whether or not a Party to the Treaty, including negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, submission to the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, or other peaceful means of their choice.

b. The Parties to the Treaty would agree that disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty which were not settled by negotiation or by the International Disarmament Organization would be subject to referral by any party to the dispute to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties concerned agreed on another mode of settlement.

c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study under the General Assembly of the United Nations of measures which should be undertaken to make existing arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature, more effective; and to institute new procedures and arrangements where needed.

#### 4. Maintenance of International Peace and Security

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support measures strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to improve its capability to maintain international peace and security.

#### 5. United Nations Peace Force

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to develop arrangements during Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a United Nations Peace Force. To this end, the Parties to the Treaty would agree on the following measures within the United Nations:

a. Examination of the experience of the United Nations leading to a further strengthening of United Nations forces for keeping the peace;

b. Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter;

c. Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force in Stage II, including definitions of its purpose, mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control, training, logistical support, financing, equipment and armaments.

6. United Nations Peace Observation Corps

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support the establishment within the United Nations of a Peace Observation Corps, staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be despatched promptly to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or a breach of the peace. Elements of the Peace Observation Corps could also be stationed as appropriate in selected areas throughout the world.

I. TRANSITION

1. Transition from Stage I to Stage II would take place at the end of Stage I, upon a determination that the following circumstances existed:
  - a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage I had been carried out;
  - b. All preparations required for Stage II had been made; and
  - c. All militarily significant states had become Parties to the Treaty.
2. During the last three months of Stage I, the Control Council would review the situation respecting these circumstances with a view to determining whether these circumstances existed at the end of Stage I.
3. If, at the end of Stage I, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of Stage I would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.
4. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances still did not exist, the question would be placed before a special session of the Security Council; transition to Stage II would take place upon a determination by the Security Council that the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist.



## STAGE II

Stage II would begin upon the transition from Stage I and would be completed within three years from that date.

During Stage II, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stage I;
2. To reduce further the armaments and armed forces reduced during Stage I and to carry out additional measures of disarmament in the manner outlined below;
3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage II; and
4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace through the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force and through the additional measures outlined below.

### A. ARMAMENTS

#### 1. Reduction of Armaments

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had during Stage I reduced their armaments in agreed categories by thirty per cent would during Stage II further reduce each type of armaments in the categories listed in Section A, subparagraph 1.b of Stage I by fifty per cent of the inventory existing at the end of Stage I.

b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures for the reduction of armaments during Stage I would submit to the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration respecting the inventories by types, within the categories listed in Stage I, of their armaments existing at the beginning of Stage II. Such Parties to the Treaty would during Stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by sixty-five per cent in order that such Parties would accomplish the same total percentage of reduction by the end of Stage II as would be accomplished by those Parties to the Treaty which had reduced their armaments by thirty per cent in Stage I.

#### 2. Additional Armaments Subject to Reduction

a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration respecting their inventories existing at the beginning of Stage II of the additional types of armaments in the categories listed in subparagraph b. below, and would during Stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by fifty per cent.

b. All types of armaments within further agreed categories would be subject to reduction in Stage II (the following list of categories is illustrative):

- (1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of up to 2,500 kilograms (declarations by types).
- (2) Specified types of unarmed military aircraft (declarations by types).
- (3) Missiles and free rockets having a range of less than 10 kilometers (declarations by types).
- (4) Mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of less than 100 mm. (declarations by types).
- (5) Specified types of unarmoured personnel carriers and transport vehicles (declarations by types).
- (6) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater which had not been included among the armaments listed in Stage I, and combatant ships with standard displacement of less than 400 tons (declarations by types).
- (7) Specified types of non-combatant naval vessels (declarations by types).
- (8) Specified types of small arms (declarations by types).

c. Specified categories of ammunition for armaments listed in Stage I, Section A, subparagraph 1.b., and in subparagraph b. above would be reduced to levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage II.

### 3. Method of reduction

The foregoing measures would be carried out and would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in Stage I, Section A, paragraph 2.

### 4. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of armaments in the specified categories except for production, within agreed limits, of parts required for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments.

b. The production of ammunition in specified categories would be reduced to agreed levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage II.

c. The Parties to the Treaty would halt development and testing of new types of armaments. The flight testing of existing types of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.

d. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

#### 5. Additional Measures

a. In the light of their examination during Stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting such weapons:

(1) The cessation of all production and field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

(2) The reduction, by agreed categories, of stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction to levels fifty per cent below those existing at the beginning of Stage II.

(3) The dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of all facilities engaged in the production or field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

c. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that retained levels of chemical and biological weapons did not exceed agreed levels and that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.

### B. ARMED FORCES

#### 1. Reduction of Armed Forces

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures providing for reduction of force levels during Stage I would further reduce their force levels on the following basis:

(1) Force levels of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to levels fifty per cent below the levels agreed for the end of Stage I.

(2) Force levels of other Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures providing for the reduction of force levels during Stage I would be further reduced, on the basis of an agreed percentage, below the levels agreed for the end of Stage I to levels which would not in any case exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of Stage II.

b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures providing for the reduction of armed forces during Stage I would reduce their force levels to agreed levels consistent with those to be reached by other parties which had reduced their force levels during Stage I as well as Stage II. In no case would such agreed levels exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of Stage II.

c. Agreed levels of armed forces would include all personnel in the categories set forth in Section B, paragraph 2 of Stage I.

## 2. Method of Reduction

The further reduction of force levels would be carried out and would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in Section B, paragraph 3 of Stage I.

## 3. Additional Measures

Agreed limitations consistent with retained force levels would be placed on compulsory military training, and on refresher training for reserve forces of the Parties to the Treaty.

## C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

### 1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In the light of their examination during Stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake to reduce in the following manner remaining nuclear weapons and fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons:

a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the amounts, types, and nature of utilization of all their fissionable materials.

b. The Parties to the Treaty would reduce the amounts and types of fissionable materials declared for use in nuclear weapons to minimum levels on the basis of agreed percentages. The foregoing reduction would be accomplished through the

transfer of such materials to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. The purposes for which such materials would be used would be determined by the state to which the materials belonged, provided that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

c. The Parties to the Treaty would destroy the non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons from which fissionable materials had been removed to effect the foregoing reduction of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons.

d. Production or refabrication of nuclear weapons from any remaining fissionable materials would be subject to agreed limitations.

e. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

f. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the verification annex to the Treaty, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.

## 2. Registration of Nuclear Weapons for Verification Purposes

To facilitate verification during Stage III that no nuclear weapons remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty, those Parties to the Treaty which possessed nuclear weapons would, during the last six months of Stage II, register and serialize their remaining nuclear weapons and would register remaining fissionable materials for use in such weapons. Such registration and serialization would be carried out with the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with procedures which would be set forth in the annex on verification.

## D. MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES

### 1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses agreed military bases and facilities, wherever they might be located.

### 2. Method of Reduction

a. The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measures and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures.

#### E. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

In the light of the examination by the International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War during Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Parties to the Treaty would also consider extending and improving the measures undertaken in Stage I for this purpose. The Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be undertaken during and after Stage II.

#### F. THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II through an extension of the arrangements based upon the principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 of Stage I.

#### G. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

##### 1. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

a. In light of the study of peaceful settlement of disputes conducted during Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to assure the just and peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.

b. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to accept without reservation, pursuant to Article 36, Paragraph (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the compulsory jurisdiction of that Court to decide international legal disputes.

##### 2. Rules of International Conduct

a. The Parties to the Treaty would continue their support of the study by the subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization initiated in Stage I to study the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of procedures whereby rules recommended by the subsidiary body and approved by the Control Council would be circulated to all Parties to the Treaty

and would become effective three months thereafter unless a majority of the Parties to the Treaty signified their disapproval, and whereby the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by rules which had become effective in this way unless, within a period of one year from the effective date, they formally notified the International Disarmament Organization that they did not consider themselves so bound. Using such procedures, the Parties to the Treaty would adopt such rules of international conduct related to disarmament as might be necessary to begin Stage III.

b. In the light of the study of indirect aggression and subversion conducted in Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements necessary to assure states against indirect aggression and subversion.

3. United Nations Peace Force

The United Nations Peace Force to be established as the result of the agreement reached during Stage I would come into being within the first year of Stage II and would be progressively strengthened during Stage II.

4. United Nations Peace Observation Corps

The Parties to the Treaty would conclude arrangement for the expansion of the activities of the United Nations Peace Observation Corps.

5. National Legislation

Those Parties to the Treaty which had not already done so would, in accordance with their constitutional processes, enact national legislation in support of the Treaty imposing legal obligations on individuals and organizations under their jurisdiction and providing appropriate penalties for noncompliance.

#### H. TRANSITION

1. Transition from Stage II to Stage III would take place at the end of Stage II, upon a determination that the following circumstances existed:

a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage II had been carried out;

b. All preparations required for Stage III had been made; and

c. All states possessing armed forces and armaments had become Parties to the Treaty.

2. During the last three months of Stage II, the Control Council would review the situation respecting these circumstances with a view to determining at the end of Stage II whether they existed.

3. If, at the end of Stage II, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of Stage II would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

4. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances still did not exist, the question would be placed before a special session of the Security Council; transition to Stage III would take place upon a determination by the Security Council that the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist.



### STAGE III

Stage III would begin upon the transition from Stage II and would be completed within an agreed period of time as promptly as possible.

During Stage III, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stages I and II;
2. To complete the process of general and complete disarmament in the manner outlined below;
3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage III and of continuing verification subsequent to the completion of Stage III; and
4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace during and following the achievement of general and complete disarmament through the additional measures outlined below.

#### A. ARMAMENTS

##### 1. Reduction of Armaments

Subject to agreed requirements for non-nuclear armaments of agreed types for national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all armaments remaining at their disposal at the end of Stage II.

##### 2. Method of Reduction

a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements that would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

b. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that retained armaments were of the agreed types and did not exceed agreed levels.

##### 3. Limitations on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities.

a. Subject to agreed arrangements in support of national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and subject to agreed arrangements in support of the United Nations Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would halt all applied research, development, production, and testing of armaments and would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses all other facilities for such purposes.

b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

c. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

#### B. ARMED FORCES

##### 1. Reduction of Armed Forces

To the end that upon completion of Stage III they would have at their disposal only those forces and organizational arrangements necessary for agreed forces to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and that they would be capable of providing agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would complete the reduction of their force levels, disband systems of reserve forces, cause to be disbanded organizational arrangements comprising and supporting their national military establishment, and terminate the employment of civilian personnel associated with the foregoing.

##### 2. Method of Reduction

a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that the only forces and organizational arrangements retained or subsequently established were those necessary for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and to protect the personal security of citizens and those for providing agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace Force.

##### 3. Other Limitations

The Parties to the Treaty would halt all military conscription and would undertake to annul legislation concerning national military establishments or military service inconsistent with the foregoing measures.

#### C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

##### 1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In light of the steps taken in Stages I and II to halt the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons and to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal,

would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful use all facilities for production of such weapons, and would transfer all materials remaining at their disposal for use in such weapons to purposes other than use in such weapons.

2. Method of Reduction

a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that no nuclear weapons or materials for use in such weapons remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty and that no such weapons or materials were produced at undeclared facilities.

D. MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES

1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities.

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses the military bases and facilities remaining at their disposal, wherever they might be located, in an agreed sequence except for such agreed bases or facilities within the territory of the Parties to the Treaty for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

2. Method of Reduction.

a. The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measure and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses during Stage III would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measure at declared locations and provide assurance that there were no undeclared military bases and facilities.

E. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE

1. Reporting Requirement

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting research and development of military significance subsequent to Stage III:

a. The Parties to the Treaty would report to the International Disarmament Organization any basic scientific discovery and any technological invention having potential military significance.

b. The Control Council would establish such expert study groups as might be required to examine the potential military significance of such discoveries and

inventions and, if necessary, to recommend appropriate measures for their control. In the light of such expert study, the Parties to the Treaty would, where necessary, establish agreed arrangements providing for verification by the International Disarmament Organization that such discoveries and inventions were not utilized for military purposes. Such arrangements would become an annex to the Treaty.

c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to appropriate arrangements for protection of the ownership rights of all discoveries and inventions reported to the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with subparagraph a. above.

## 2. International Co-operation

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support full international co-operation in all fields of scientific research and development, and to engage in free exchange of scientific and technical information and free interchange of views among scientific and technical personnel.

## F. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

### 1. Improved Measures

In the light of the Stage II examination by the International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such extensions and improvements of existing arrangements and such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be taken during and after Stage III.

### 2. Application of Measures to Continuing Forces

The Parties to the Treaty would apply to national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens those applicable measures concerning the reduction of the risk of war that had been applied to national armed forces in Stages I and II.

## G. INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity (1) to verify the measures undertaken in Stage III through an extension of arrangements based upon the principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 of Stage I so that by the end of Stage III. when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty; and (2) to provide continuing verification of disarmament after the completion of Stage III.

H. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS  
FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

1. Peaceful Change and Settlement of Disputes

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to provide a basis for peaceful change in a disarmed world and to continue the just and peaceful settlement of all international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.

2. Rules of International Conduct

The Parties to the Treaty would continue the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament in the manner provided in Stage II and by any other agreed procedure.

3. United Nations Peace Force

The Parties to the Treaty would progressively strengthen the United Nations Peace Force established in Stage II until it had sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no state could challenge it.

I. COMPLETION OF STAGE III

1. At the end of the time period agreed for Stage III, the Control Council would review the situation with a view to determining whether all undertakings to be carried out in Stage III had been carried out.

2. In the event that one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that such undertakings had not been carried out, the agreed period of Stage III would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended for a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of completing any uncompleted undertakings. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that such undertakings still had not been carried out, the question would be placed before a special session of the Security Council, which would determine whether Stage III had been completed.

3. After the completion of Stage III, the obligations undertaken in Stages I, II and III would continue.

GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL STAGES

1. Subsequent Modifications or Amendments of the Treaty.

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to specific procedures for considering amendments or modifications of the Treaty which were believed desirable by any Party

to the Treaty in the light of experience in the early period of implementation of the Treaty. Such procedures would include provision for a conference on revision of the Treaty after a specified period of time.

2. Interim Agreement

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such specific arrangements, including the establishment of a Preparatory Commission, as were necessary between the signing and entry into force of the Treaty to ensure the initiation of Stage I immediately upon the entry into force of the Treaty, and to provide an interim forum for the exchange of views and information on topics relating to the Treaty and to the achievement of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

3. Parties to the Treaty, Ratification, Accession and Entry into Force of the Treaty

a. The Treaty would be open to signature and ratification, or accession by all members of the United Nations or its specialized agencies.

b. Any other state which desired to become a Party to the Treaty could accede to the Treaty with the approval of the Conference on recommendation of the Control Council.

c. The Treaty would come into force when it had been ratified by \_\_\_\_ states, including the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and an agreed number of the following states: \_\_\_\_\_

d. In order to assure the achievement of the fundamental purpose of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the Treaty would specify that the accession of certain militarily significant states would be essential for the continued effectiveness of the Treaty or for the coming into force of particular measures or stages.

e. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to exert every effort to induce other states or authorities to accede to the Treaty.

f. The Treaty would be subject to ratification or acceptance in accordance with constitutional processes.

g. A Depository Government would be agreed upon which would have all of the duties normally incumbent upon a Depository. Alternatively, the United Nations would be the Depository.

4. Finance

a. In order to meet the financial obligations of the International Disarmament Organization, the Parties to the Treaty would bear the International Disarmament Organizations expenses as provided in the budget approved by the General Conference and in accordance with a scale of apportionment approved by the General Conference.

b. The General Conference would exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the International Disarmament Organization.

5. Authentic Texts

The text of the Treaty would consist of equally authentic versions in English, French, Russian, Chinese and Spanish.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

PRIVATE

ENDC/30/Corr.1  
25 April 1962

Original: ENGLISH

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Corrigendum to the document entitled:  
Outline of Basic Provisions of a  
Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament  
in a Peaceful World

- (1) Page 6 - paragraph 3.b.(2), line 3:  
Change the word: "vehicles"  
by the word: "armaments".
- (2) Page 28 - Stage III, A. 2., a. line 1:  
Change the word: "measures"  
by the word: "measure".

edc.62-897



CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

PRIVATE  
ENDC/L.11/Rev.1  
17 April 1962  
Original: ENGLISH  
RUSSIAN

Working draft proposed by the  
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
AND  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Draft Preamble of the Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament (In a Peaceful World)

Note: Single parentheses indicate US proposals not agreed to by the USSR.

The States of the World:

1. Acting in accordance with the aspirations and will of all the peoples;
2. Reaffirming their dedication to the aims and principles of the UN Charter;
3. Desiring to create conditions in which all people can strive freely and peacefully to fulfill their just aspirations;
4. Conscious of the threat to mankind posed by the arms race, especially in view of the development of nuclear, rocket and other modern weapons of mass destruction;
5. Convinced that war can no longer serve as a method of settling international disputes and must forever be banished from the life of human society;
6. Determined that this and succeeding generations should be free from the scourge of war and the dangers of the arms race;
7. Convinced that disarmament must be general and complete under strict and effective international control and that such disarmament must be accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter;
8. Convinced that general and complete disarmament under strict international control is a sure and practical way to fulfill mankind's age-old dream of ensuring perpetual and inviolable peace on earth;
9. Desiring to end forever the heavy burden placed on mankind by the diversion of human and material resources to the creation of the means of annihilating human beings and of destroying material and cultural values;

10. Seeking to direct all resources towards ensuring further economic and social progress in all countries in the world and ensuring that the resources of nations shall be devoted to man's material, cultural and spiritual advancement;

11. Convinced that the resources released by general and complete disarmament will enhance the capacity of states so disarmed to contribute to the economic and cultural development of all countries and peoples of the world and contribute to greater co-operation among them;

12. Conscious of the need to build relations among states on the basis of the principles of peace, good neighbourliness, equality, non-interference, and respect for the independence and sovereignty of all states;

13. Desiring to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and international law can be maintained;

14. Affirming that to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament (in a peaceful world) it is important that all states abide by existing international agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful means;

15. (Declaring their goal to be a free, secure, and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common standards of international conduct, a world where change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter;)

16. Have resolved to conclude the following treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control (in a peaceful world).

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

PRIVATE

ENDC/9

21 March 1962

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND  
AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DRAFT TREATY ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

At the request of the Delegations of the United Kingdom and of the United States document GEN/DNT/110, dated 18 April 1961, and addenda 1 to 3 thereto, issued earlier as General Assembly document A/4772 and addendum 1 thereto, is attached and circulated as a document of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

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PRIVATE

GEN/DNT/110

18 April 1961

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

CONFERENCE ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests \*

Submitted by the Delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States  
at the 292nd meeting of the Conference

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\* Incorporates GEN/DNT/110/Corr.1 issued in English only.

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Preamble

The Parties to this Treaty

Pursuing the aim of reducing international competition in armaments and in the development of new weapons of war.

Endeavoring to take a practical step towards the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, including the eventual elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons under effective international control and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

Desirous of bringing about the permanent discontinuance of nuclear weapon test explosions;

Recognizing that the establishment and continuous operation of effective international control is essential to the achievement of this objective;

Hoping that all other countries will also join in undertakings not to carry out nuclear weapon tests and to ensure the satisfactory operation of that control throughout the world;

Confident that a discontinuance of such tests under effective control will make possible progress toward agreement on measures of disarmament

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Obligations to Discontinue

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes, subject to the provisions of this Treaty and its Annexes:

A. to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of nuclear weapon test explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and

B. to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of nuclear weapon test explosions anywhere.

2. The obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article shall apply to all nuclear weapon test explosions except those underground explosions which are recorded as seismic events of less than magnitude 4.75.

Article 2Establishment of Control Organization

1. For the purpose of assuring that the obligations assumed in this Treaty are carried out by the Parties, there is hereby established a Control Organization, hereinafter referred to as "the Organization", upon the terms and conditions set forth in this Treaty and the Annexes thereto.

2. Each of the Parties agrees to cooperate promptly and fully with the Organization established under paragraph 1 of this Article and to assist the Organization in the discharge of its responsibilities pursuant to the provisions of this Treaty and the provisions of any agreements which the Parties shall have concluded with the Organization.



Article 3

Elements of Control Organization

1. The Organization established under Article 2 of this Treaty shall consist of: a Control Commission, hereinafter referred to as "the Commission" a Detection and Identification System, hereinafter referred to as "the System"; a Chief Executive Officer, hereinafter referred to as "the Administrator"; and a Conference of Parties to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as "the Conference"

2. The Headquarters of the Organization shall be located at Vienna.

Article 4  
Composition of Control Commission\*

1. The Commission shall consist of the following Parties:

A. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, as original Parties to this Treaty and

B. Eight other Parties to the Treaty elected by the Conference as follows: Three Parties associated with the USSR; two Parties associated with either the United Kingdom or the United States; three Parties not associated with any of the original Parties.

2. The Parties referred to in paragraph 1 B of this Article shall be elected and shall serve for a period of two years; they shall be eligible for re-election.

3. The Parties elected to the first elected Commission shall serve from the time of their election until the end of the third regular session of the Conference. The Parties elected at the third regular session of the Conference, and those elected biennially thereafter, shall serve from the end of the Conference at which they were elected until the end of the Conference which elects their successors.

4. Each member of the Commission shall have one representative.

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\*The above revised text is submitted in the context of the statements made by the United States and United Kingdom Representatives at the 274th, 286th, and 289th meetings, to the effect that the United States and United Kingdom Governments are prepared to accept the above text provided expressly, and not otherwise, that agreement is reached by this Conference upon a control system which is reliable, rapid and effective - such as is set forth in other articles and annexes of the present draft treaty proposal - and provided that agreement is reached upon all other treaty articles and annexes.

Article 5

Parties or Other Countries

Associated with the Original Parties

The determination whether a Party or other country is at any time to be regarded for the purposes of this Treaty as associated with any of the original Parties shall be made by the Preparatory Commission or by the Commission. However, in any case in which advice is jointly tendered by the three original Parties, the determination shall be made in accordance with that advice.

Article 6

Functions of the Control Commission

1. The Commission shall establish procedures and standards for the installation and operation of all elements of the System, and shall maintain supervision over the System to ensure its timely installation and effective operation in accordance with the terms of this Treaty and its Annexes. The Commission shall determine, after consultation with the Parties concerned, the extent to which existing launching, tracking, and data receiving and transmission facilities should be used in the installation and operation of the satellite systems.

2. A. The Commission shall appoint the Administrator; this appointment shall require the concurring votes of the original Parties.

B. (i) Subject to the approval of the Commission in each case, the Administrator shall appoint five Deputy Administrators, including one First Deputy Administrator who shall act in place of the Administrator in case of absence or vacancy.

(ii) Approval by the Commission of the appointment of the First Deputy Administrator shall require the concurring votes of the original Parties.

(iii) Appointment by the Administrator of two Deputy Administrators shall be made upon the recommendation, or with the approval of the Government of the USSR; appointment of the two other Deputy Administrators shall be made upon the recommendation, or with the approval, of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States.

C. The term of office of the Administrator shall be a period of three years. The initial term of office of the First Deputy

Administrator shall be a period of two years; subsequently, the term of office of the First Deputy Administrator shall be a period of three years. The term of office of the other Deputy Administrators shall be a period of three years.

D. The Administrator and the Deputy Administrators shall be eligible for reappointment. An Administrator or Deputy Administrator appointed to fill a vacancy which has occurred before the expiration of the term provided for by this Article shall hold office only for the remainder of his predecessor's term but shall be eligible for reappointment.

3. The Commission shall establish procedures for disseminating to all Parties and interested scientific organizations data produced by the System.

4. The Commission shall submit to the Conference an annual report and such special reports as the Commission deems necessary on the operation of the System and on the activities of the Commission and the Administrator in carrying on their respective responsibilities. The Commission shall also prepare for the Conference such reports as the Organization may make to the United Nations.

5. Except for the location of the Headquarters of the Organization, the Commission shall decide upon the location of components' of the System. Such decisions shall be taken in agreement with the Party exercising jurisdiction or control over the territory on which the component is to be located. If any location recommended by the Commission should be unacceptable to the Party concerned, the Party shall provide, without undue delay, an alternative location which in the judgment of the Commission meets the requirements of the System, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and its Annexes.

6. The Commission shall lay down permanent flight routes, for use by special aircraft sampling missions, over the territory under the jurisdiction or control of each Party. Such flight routes shall be laid down in agreement with the Party concerned and in accordance with the standards set forth in Article 7 of Annex I. If a permanent flight route which the Commission desires to lay down should be unacceptable to the Party concerned, the Party shall provide, without undue delay, an alternative route which in the judgment of the Commission meets the requirements of the System.

7. The Commission may conclude agreements with any State or authority to aid in the carrying out of the provisions of this Treaty and its Annexes.

8. The Commission shall ensure that the most effective and up-to-date equipment and techniques are incorporated in the System and, to this end, shall ensure that an adequate research and development program is carried out.

9. The Commission shall establish procedures for the implementation of Article 13 on detonations for peaceful purposes.

10. In addition to the functions referred to in the preceding paragraphs of this Article, the Commission shall perform such other functions as are provided for in this Treaty and its Annexes.

Article 7

Procedures of the Control Commission

1. The Commission shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously.
2. The Commission shall meet at such times as it may determine, or within twenty-four hours at the request of any member. All members shall be notified in advance of meetings of the Commission. The meetings shall take place at the Headquarters of the Organization unless otherwise determined by the Commission.
3. The Commission shall adopt its own rules of procedure including the method of selecting its chairman.
4. Any Party to the Treaty which does not have a representative on the Commission may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Commission whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Party are specially affected.
5. Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Treaty, decisions of the Commission shall be made by a simple majority of the members present and voting. Each member of the Commission shall have one vote.

Article 8

The Conference

1. The Conference consisting of representatives of Parties to this Treaty shall meet in regular annual session and in such special sessions as shall be convened by the Administrator at the request of the Commission or of a majority of Parties to the Treaty. The sessions shall take place at the Headquarters of the Organization unless otherwise determined by the Conference.

2. At such sessions, each Party to the Treaty shall be represented by not more than three delegates who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. The cost of attendance of any delegation shall be borne by the State concerned.

3. The Conference shall elect a President and such other officers as may be required at the beginning of each session. They shall hold office for the duration of the session. The Conference, subject to the provisions of this Treaty, shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Each Party to the Treaty shall have one vote. Decisions on budgetary matters shall be made pursuant to Article 15 and decisions on amendments pursuant to Article 23. Decision on other questions, including the determination of additional questions or categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a simple majority of the Parties to the Treaty present and voting.

4. The Conference may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of this Treaty or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in this Treaty and may make recommendations to the Parties or to the Commission or to both on any such questions or matters.

5. The Conference shall:

A. elect States to serve on the Commission in accordance with Article 4;



- B. consider the annual and any special report of the Commission;
- C. approve the budget recommended by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 15;
- D. approve reports to be submitted to the United Nations as required by any relationship agreement between the Organization and the United Nations or return them to the Commission with the recommendations of the Conference;
- E. approve any agreement or agreements between the Organization and the United Nations or other organizations as provided in Article 17. or return such agreement with its recommendations to the Commission for re-submission to the Conference;
- F. approve amendments to this Treaty in accordance with Article 23.

6. The Conference shall have the authority:

- A. to take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the Conference for this purpose by the Commission;
- B. to propose matters for consideration by the Commission and request from the Commission reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Commission.

Article 9

Administrator and International Staff

1. The Administrator shall be the chief executive officer of the System and the head of the staff of the Organization. He shall be responsible to the Commission and, under its supervision, shall carry out its policy directives. He shall have executive responsibility for the installation and operation of the System under procedures and standards established by the Commission. He shall provide to the Commission such advice, reports and assistance as the Commission may request.

2. The Administrator and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions concerning the performance of their duties from any authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their status as international officials and employees responsible only to the Organization. Each Party undertakes to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the Administrator and staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties.

3. Except as otherwise provided in this Treaty, the Administrator shall appoint, organize and direct the staff of the Organization in accordance with the following provisions:

A. The staff shall include such qualified scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required to carry out the functions of the Organization with the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence and integrity.

B. The staffing of individual components of the System shall be designed so as to ensure maximum operating efficiency.

C. In keeping with the foregoing stipulations, the staff of the Organization shall be recruited on as wide a geographical basis as possible from personnel recommended by, or acceptable to the governments of the countries of which they are nationals and acceptable to the Administrator, subject to the following provisions:

(1) The permanent administrative, scientific and technical staff of the Headquarters of the Organization shall, as a whole and at all levels, be composed in equal proportions of nationals of the USSR,

nationals of the United Kingdom or the United States, and nationals of other countries. In cases where deputies, other than the Deputy Administrators, to senior officials of the Organization Headquarters are appointed, a national of the USSR shall have a deputy who is a national of the United Kingdom or of the United States, and a national of the United Kingdom or the United States shall have a deputy who is a national of the USSR.

(ii) In land control posts situated on territory under the jurisdiction or control of any of the original Parties, the scientific and technical staff of each post shall be composed in equal proportions of nationals of the USSR, nationals of the United Kingdom or the United States, and nationals of other countries. In the appointment of nationals of other countries, preference shall be given, subject to other provisions of sub-paragraph C of this Article, to nationals of countries exercising jurisdiction or control over territory upon which control posts are to be established.

(iii) In land control posts situated on territory under the jurisdiction or control of Parties other than the original Parties, no more than one-third of the scientific and technical staff of each post shall be composed of nationals of the country exercising jurisdiction or control over the territory on which the control post is situated.

(iv) The supporting and auxiliary staffs of each land control post shall, wherever possible, be composed of nationals of the country exercising jurisdiction or control over the territory on which the control post is located.

(v) The scientific and technical staffs of control posts on ships or in areas not under the jurisdiction or control of sovereign states and the members of the staff of the Organization selected by the Administrator for the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article 11 of Annex I shall be composed in equal proportions of nationals of the USSR, nationals of the United Kingdom or the United States, and nationals of other countries.

(vi) The chief or acting chief of each control post shall be a national of a country other than that exercising jurisdiction or control over a territory on which the control post is situated. If the country exercising jurisdiction or control over such territory is associated with an original Party, the chief or acting chief of the control post shall be a national of other than such original Party or a country associated with it.

(vii) The chief or acting chief of each control post situated on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the United States or the United Kingdom shall be a national of the USSR the chief or acting chief of each control post situated on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the USSR shall be a national of the United States or the United Kingdom.

(viii) The scientific and technical staffs of on-site inspection groups shall be composed of technically qualified personnel who are not nationals of the country exercising jurisdiction or control over the territory in which the event under investigation may have occurred. The Party exercising jurisdiction or control over such territory may designate one or more observers to accompany the inspection group.

(ix) The scientific and technical staff of any on-site inspection group despatched to conduct an inspection on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the USSR shall be composed of nationals of the United States or the United Kingdom the scientific and technical staff of any on-site inspection group despatched to conduct an inspection on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the United States or the United Kingdom shall be composed of nationals of the USSR.

(x) The USSR or the United Kingdom and the United States may authorize the Administrator to depart from the requirements of sub-paragraphs (i) through (ix) above, insofar as they concern the appointment of their respective nationals to scientific and technical staff positions, either in favor of the nationals of another Party or other Parties or without restriction. In each case, the original Party or Parties concerned shall

furnish the Administrator in writing with the authorization, including the period of its duration. Notwithstanding the authorization made under this paragraph, the nationals so appointed shall be considered, for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (v) to be nationals of the original Party authorizing the departure.

(xi) In making appointments under sub-paragraphs (i), (ii), (iii) and (v), the Administrator shall ensure that the administrative, scientific and technical staff of the Headquarters of the Organization, and the scientific and technical staff of each control post, shall be so composed that the total number of nationals of the USSR and of countries associated with it shall be equal to the total number of nationals of the United States and the United Kingdom and of countries associated with either of them.

(xii) Any adjustment to the proportions in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (v) above, which may be unavoidable for practical reasons, shall be kept to the minimum, and a compensating adjustment shall, whenever possible, be made elsewhere in the System.

D. Regulations governing the appointment, remuneration and dismissal of staff shall be approved by the Commission.

4. The Administrator shall prepare for the Commission the budget estimates of the Organization.

5. The Administrator shall develop and arrange for the execution of a program of research and development for the continuing improvement of the equipment and techniques used in all components of the System, and shall from time to time make recommendations to the Commission regarding improvements to be incorporated in the System. The program may, with the approval of the Commission, include detonations performed to test the effectiveness of the System. Any nuclear detonations for this purpose shall be conducted under the procedures set forth in Article 13.

6. The Administrator shall prepare recommendations for approval by the Commission regarding:

A. specific sites for all components of the System

- B. specific flight patterns for routine air sampling flights;
- C. the number and base location of inspection groups;
- D. the equipping of all components of the System and the standards and specifications which equipment to be used therein must meet.

7. A. When special aircraft sampling missions are undertaken, the Administrator shall appoint two qualified members of the Organization staff to accompany each aircraft as technical operators. The technical operators shall, in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of Annex I, verify the execution of the agreed flight plan; operate the sampling equipment; direct sampling operation; make appropriate arrangements for the safe delivery to the Organization of the samples collected; and report on the mission to the Administrator.

- B. (i) The technical operators shall not be nationals of
  - (a) any Party exercising jurisdiction or control over territory in which the event under investigation may have occurred, or of
  - (b) any original Party which may be associated with the Party in paragraph 7 B (i)(a) of this Article, or of
  - (c) any Party which may be associated with any original Party to which paragraphs 7 B (i)(a) or 7 B (i)(b) of this Article may refer;

nor, subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph B (ii), shall they be nationals of any Party exercising jurisdiction or control over territory in the air space over which samples may be taken.

(ii) On flights investigating events which may have occurred in territory under the jurisdiction or control of the USSR, the technical operators shall be nationals of the United Kingdom or the United States. On flights investigating events which may have occurred in territory under the jurisdiction or control of the United Kingdom or the United States, the technical operators shall be nationals of the USSR.

C. Any Party exercising jurisdiction or control over territory in which the event under investigation may have occurred or in the air space over which samples are to be taken may designate an observer to accompany the technical operators on the flight.

8. The Administrator shall determine when special aircraft sampling missions are required in accordance with the terms of Article 7 of Annex I and shall have authority to order the despatch of such missions. For missions whose purpose is the collection of samples over the territory of a Party or Parties, the Administrator shall select routes from among the permanent flight routes laid down by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article 6; before despatch of the mission, the Administrator shall notify all Parties over whose territories it will fly and shall inform them of the routes selected.

9. The Administrator shall forward to the Commission within twenty-four hours after receipt all reports submitted to him by inspection teams and special aircraft missions, together with any relevant data and analyses.

10. The Administrator shall encourage and facilitate the participation by personnel of components of the System in programs of basic scientific research, to the extent that such participation would not interfere with their primary duties.

11. In addition to the functions referred to in the preceding paragraphs of this Article, the Administrator shall perform such other functions as are provided for in this Treaty and its Annexes.

Article 10

On-Site Inspection of Seismic Events

1. A. The Administrator shall certify immediately by public notice at the Headquarters of the Organization whenever he determines that an event eligible for on-site inspection in accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of Annex I has occurred. This certification shall include a specification of the time of origin and location of the seismic event, the area eligible for inspection (hereinafter referred to as the "certified area"), and the data and analysis upon which the determination of eligibility was made. The Administrator shall make every effort to make this certification within seventy-two hours after the occurrence of the event.

B. Whenever the Administrator is informed through the Organization that a seismic event of seismic magnitude of 4.75 or above which is located by the System has occurred, and if the event is not immediately rendered ineligible for on-site inspection in accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of Annex I, he shall <sup>immediately</sup> make public at the Headquarters of the Organization all data relating to such a seismic event which could be of assistance

(i) to any Party exercising its right to request an on-site inspection under paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, or

(ii) to the Commission in its decision whether to issue a directive under paragraph 4 of this Article.

The Administrator shall make every effort to make this data public within seventy-two hours after the occurrence of all events referred to in this sub-paragraph, except for those events which have subsequently been found ineligible for on-site inspection in accordance with sub-paragraphs 3 C and 3 D of Article 8 of Annex I.

2. A. If any portion of the certified area lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of any of the original Parties, the Administrator shall immediately despatch an inspection group to carry out an on-site inspection of such portion of the certified area in accordance with Annex I, provided that:

(i) The USSR requests the inspection of such portion of the certified area which lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of



the United Kingdom or the United States, and the current annual number of inspections for the Party liable to inspection is not exhausted, or

(ii) The United Kingdom or the United States requests the inspection of such portion of the certified area which lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of the USSR and the current annual number of inspections for the USSR is not exhausted, and

(iii) The request for inspection is made to the Administrator not later than fifteen days after the Administrator has made public all data relating to the seismic event in question, as specified in paragraph 1 B of this Article.

B. An original Party requesting an on-site inspection pursuant to this paragraph shall simultaneously inform the other original Parties.

3. A. If any portion of a certified area lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a Party other than an original Party, any Party may, not later than fifteen days after the Administrator has made public at the Headquarters of the Organization all data relating to the seismic event in question as specified in paragraph 1 B of this Article, request the Commission to direct an on-site inspection of such portion of the certified area.

B. The Commission shall consider and decide upon any such request within forty-eight hours after its receipt. If a certified area lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of more than one Party, other than an original Party, the Commission shall make a separate decision as to the inspection of that portion of the certified area on the territory of each Party concerned. If the current annual number of inspections of the Party liable to inspection is not exhausted, and if the Commission decides that the request to direct an on-site inspection

should be complied with, the Commission shall direct the Administrator to carry out an on-site inspection of the certified area lying in that Party's territory in accordance with Annex I.

C. If any portion of a certified area lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a Party represented on the Commission, that Party shall not participate in the decision as to the inspection of such portion of the certified area.

D. If any portion of a certified area lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a Party associated with an original Party, that original Party and Parties associated with it which are represented on the Commission shall not participate in the decision as to the inspection of such portion of the certified area.

4. A. If any portion of a certified area lies in an area not under the jurisdiction or control of any sovereign state, the Administrator shall decide whether to undertake an on-site inspection. The Administrator shall notify the Commission of his decision whether to undertake an on-site inspection and shall make every effort to do so within seventy-two hours after the occurrence of the event. After the Administrator notifies the Commission that he has decided to undertake an on-site inspection, he shall proceed to have the inspection carried out unless he is otherwise directed by the Commission within forty-eight hours of such notification.

B. The Commission may direct the Administrator to inspect a certified area not under the jurisdiction or control of any sovereign state, if the Administrator has not already proceeded to do so, not later than fifteen days after the Administrator has made public at the Headquarters of the Organization all data relating to the seismic event in question as specified in paragraph 1 B of this Article.

C. All on-site inspections under this paragraph shall be carried out in accordance with Annex I.

5. The number of on-site inspections which may be carried out in territory under the jurisdiction or control of each of the original Parties,

pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article, shall be twenty inspections in each annual period.

6. A The number of on-site inspections which may be carried out in each annual period in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a Party other than an original Party, pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, shall be, with respect to each such Party, two, or such higher number as the Commission may, after consultation with the Party, determine by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting.

B. Pending the determination of a Party's number by the Commission, the provisional number for that Party shall be one inspection in each annual period for each 500,000 square kilometers or remaining fraction thereof of territory under its jurisdiction or control, except that for each Party the provisional number shall be at least two inspections in each annual period. Inspections carried out under a Party's provisional number shall be deducted from the number subsequently determined for that Party for the annual period in which such inspections were initiated. In the case of acceding Parties, the Preparatory Commission shall, after consultation with such Parties, promptly recommend, for subsequent approval by the enlarged Preparatory Commission an appropriate number of inspections to be carried out in each annual period within territory under the jurisdiction or control of such Parties.

7. The number of on-site inspections for each Party shall be reviewed by the Commission within three years after this Treaty enters into force and annually thereafter. In light of each such review, which shall take full account of practical experience in the operation of the System and of measures taken to maintain or improve its effectiveness, the Commission may fix revised numbers, provided that no number (A) shall be less than two, (B) nor less than twenty per cent of the average annual number of events of seismic magnitude 4.75 or above which are located by the System in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 8 of Annex I, provided that when criteria for the identification of seismic events eligible for on-site inspection are agreed, no less than thirty per cent of the events remaining unidentified after the application of such criteria, occurring in territory under the jurisdiction or control of the Party to which the number relates. Such average annual number shall be based on data from control posts and research programs

undertaken by the Commission in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 for a period prescribed by the Commission.

8. The liability of a Party to on-site inspections pursuant to paragraph 2 or 3 of this Article shall commence from the date on which the Treaty enters into force for that Party. The annual period in which the number of on-site inspections for each Party may be carried out shall commence on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter on the anniversary of that date in each succeeding year. In the case of a Party which deposits its instrument of ratification or acceptance after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, the number of on-site inspections which may be carried out in territory under its jurisdiction or control in the period remaining before the next anniversary of the date of entry into force of the Treaty shall bear the same proportion to its number determined in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Article, as that period bears to one year, but shall not be less than two. If the number of on-site inspections calculated in accordance with the preceding sentence includes a fraction, that fraction shall, if it is smaller than one-half, be disregarded, or, if it is one-half or greater, be regarded as equivalent to one.

9. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Article, the Commission may direct the Administrator to carry out on-site inspection in territory under the jurisdiction or control of any Party either at the request of such Party or pursuant to an agreement made by such Party prior to or subsequent to signature of the Treaty. Inspections carried out under this paragraph shall not be deducted from a Party's number. Inspections carried out pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall take priority over inspections carried out under this paragraph.

10. The Administrator shall make available to all Parties to the Treaty within twenty-four hours after receipt all reports submitted to him by on-site inspection groups, together with any relevant data and analyses.

Article 11

Installation and Operation of the System in Parties' Territories

Each of the original Parties and all other Parties to this Treaty agree to accept on territory under their jurisdiction or control components of the System which is established on the basis of the "Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests" of August 20, 1958, the "Report of the Technical Working Group on the Detection and Identification of High-Altitude Nuclear Explosions" of July 15, 1959, and the "Conclusion of Technical Working Group II Regarding Possible Improvements of Techniques and Instrumentation" of December 18, 1959, and shall be installed and shall operate in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and its Annexes.

Article 12

Undertakings Concerning Co-operation with the System

1. Each of the Parties undertakes to assure that adequate and expeditious transportation is available from the point of entry, or within its territory, to the site of any element of the System or any area where an on-site inspection is to be conducted.

2. Each of the Parties undertakes to enter into appropriate arrangements with the Commission for the utilization of existing meteorological and commercial aircraft flights over ocean areas for routine air-sampling purposes.

3. Each of the Parties undertakes to enter into appropriate arrangements with the Commission to have aircraft immediately available for special flights, carried out pursuant to the provisions of Article 9 and Article 7 of Annex I, over territory under its jurisdiction or control or to permit such special flights by aircraft forming part of the System.

4. Each of the Parties undertakes to enter into appropriate arrangements with the Commission for the utilization of existing weather or geophysical exploration vessels for use as components of the System.

5. Each of the Parties undertakes to give inspection groups, despatched pursuant to the provisions of Article 10, immediate and undisputed access to the area in which an on-site inspection is to be conducted, to refrain from interference with any operation of an inspection group and to give such groups the assistance they may require in the performance of their mission.

6. Each of the Parties undertakes to enter into appropriate arrangements with the Commission: for the design, construction, and provision of necessary satellite vehicles; for the provision and use of launching sites and launching vehicles; for the establishment and

operation of stations to track satellites and to receive and analyze data from such satellites; and for the establishment and carrying out of a research program to measure background levels in space and to develop the necessary equipment and techniques to put effective space monitoring control systems into operation.

Article 13

Detonations for Peaceful Purposes

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to detonate, or assist others in the detonation of, nuclear devices for peaceful purposes only in accordance with the provisions of this Article. The detonations carried out pursuant to the provisions of this Article shall not be regarded as a violation of Article 1.

2. A Party intending to carry out or assist in such a detonation shall provide the Commission, at least four months in advance of the proposed detonation date, with a plan containing the following information.

- A. The date, site and purpose of the proposed detonation;
- B. The procedure it will follow to comply with paragraph 4 of this Article;
- C. The expected yield of the device;
- D. The measures to be taken to ensure that there will be no substantial fallout outside the immediate vicinity; and
- E. The measurements to be taken and any experimentation to be conducted therewith.

3. Within two months after the receipt of the plan, the Commission shall authorize the Party to proceed with, or assist in, the proposed detonation, unless the Commission shall find that such detonation would not be carried out in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article. If, as a result of observations at the proposed site, the Commission determines that there is a lack of compliance with paragraph 4, it shall immediately so notify the Party planning to conduct or assist in the detonation. The Party shall thereupon refrain from carrying out or assisting in the detonation until notified by the Commission that it has determined that the detonation will be carried out in accordance with paragraph 4.

4. Each of the original Parties shall be given an adequate opportunity at a designated inspection site to inspect externally and internally any nuclear device to be detonated pursuant to this Article and to examine detailed drawings of the device, provided that such detailed drawings may not be reproduced



or taken away from the inspection site. The device to be detonated shall, after inspection and reassembly, be under the continual surveillance of members of the Organization staff until detonation.

5. Members of the Organization staff shall, in addition to maintaining surveillance of the device to be detonated, observe all preparation for, and the actual firing of, the device and shall at all times have unrestricted access to the vicinity of the detonation to ensure that the device employed is the one provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article.

6. Representatives of the original Parties shall be given adequate opportunity to accompany and to participate with members of the Organization staff in the exercise of their functions under paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article.

7. The Commission may, with the concurring votes of the original Parties, provide for any other system of safeguards to ensure that nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes are carried out in accordance with the objectives of this Treaty.

Article 14

Periodic Review of the System

1. Three years after the coming into force of this Treaty, the Commission shall review the System established under this Treaty in order to:

A. evaluate its effectiveness for verifying compliance with the obligations set forth in Articles 1 and 13 of this Treaty;

B. determine in the light of experience and scientific progress whether any specific improvements should be made or new elements added to the System;

C. consider such measures to improve or maintain the effectiveness of the System as may be proposed by any Party to the Treaty in the light of experience in the operation of the Treaty.

2. The System may be reviewed by the Commission annually thereafter for the same purpose upon request of the Conference or any of the original Parties.

Article 15

Finance

1. Annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Organization shall be submitted to the Commission by the Administrator. After receipt of these estimates, the Commission shall submit a proposed budget to the Conference. The Conference may approve the budget as submitted or return it to the Commission with recommendations. If the budget is returned, the Commission shall then submit a further budget to the Conference for its approval.

2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Parties in accordance with a scale fixed by the Conference on the basis of recommendations submitted by the Commission as part of each annual budget. The annual contributions of the USSR and the United States shall be equal.

3. Any Party desiring to pay its assessments, in whole or in part, by supplying materials, services, equipment or facilities shall make its offer in writing to the Commission. Within ninety days after receipt of the offer, the Commission shall determine whether to accept the offer, in whole or in part, and shall notify the Party of its decision. The Commission shall not accept such an offer unless the materials, services, equipment or facilities offered by the Party meet the standards prescribed by the Commission and are readily usable.

4. Subject to the rules and limitations approved by the Conference, the Commission shall have the authority to exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the Organization without, however, imposing on the Parties to this Treaty any individual liability in respect of a loan or loans entered into pursuant to this authority.

5. Decisions of the Commission and of the Conference on all financial questions shall be made by a majority of those present and voting. However, decisions by the Commission on the scale of contributions to be recommended and on the total amount of each annual budget shall require the concurring votes of the original Parties.

Article 16

Privileges and Immunities

The privileges and immunities which the Organization, its staff and the representatives of Parties shall be granted by the Parties and the legal capacity which the Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of the Parties, shall be as set forth in Annex II of this Treaty.

Article 17

Relationships with Other International Organizations

1. The Commission, with the approval of the Conference, is authorized to enter into an agreement or agreements establishing an appropriate relationship between the Organization and the United Nations.

2. The Commission, with the approval of the Conference, shall arrange for the Organization to be brought into an appropriate relationship with any international organization which may in the future be established among any of the Parties to this Treaty to supervise disarmament and arms control measures.

Article 18

Annexes

The Annexes to this Treaty form an integral part of this Treaty.

Article 19

Parties to the Treaty

1. The essential Parties to this Treaty shall be:

A. the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, referred to herein as the "original Parties";

B. Any other State whose adherence is decided by the Commission to be necessary for the achievement of the fundamental Treaty purpose of securing an effectively controlled permanent discontinuance of nuclear weapon test explosions on a world-wide basis or to permit the installation of elements of control as required by the provisions of Annex I. If any State which is proposed to be the subject of a decision in accordance with the preceding sentence is associated with an original Party for the purposes of this Treaty, that original Party and any State associated with it for the purposes of this Treaty shall abstain from voting in the decision.

2. The signature and ratification or the acceptance of this Treaty by all the States designated in paragraph 1 A and any State whose adherence is decided to be necessary in accordance with paragraph 1 B shall be required for the fulfillment of the provisions of this Article.

3. Any other State desiring to adhere, whose adherence the Preparatory Commission or the Commission decides would contribute to the achievement of the purposes of this Treaty, may become a Party.

Article 20

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance and Entry into Force

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature by the states referred to in paragraph 1 A of Article 19. The signatory states shall become Parties to this Treaty by deposit of instruments of ratification.

2. Instruments of ratification and instruments of acceptance by states adhering pursuant to paragraphs 1 B and 3 of Article 19 shall be deposited with the Government of \_\_\_\_\_, hereby designated as Depositary Government.

3. Ratification or acceptance of this Treaty shall be effected by states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

4. This Treaty, apart from Annex III, shall enter into force when all the original Parties have deposited instruments of ratification thereof.

5. The Depositary Government shall promptly inform all signatory states of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification and of each instrument of acceptance and the date of entry into force of this Treaty. The Depositary Government shall promptly inform all Parties of the dates on which states become Parties to this Treaty.

6. Annex III of this Treaty shall come into force on the day after this Treaty shall have been signed by the original Parties.



Article 21

Registration

1. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Government pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Agreements between the Organization and any Party to this Treaty or any other State or public international organization shall be submitted for registration by the Commission with the United Nations.

Article 22

Duration

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the inherent right of a Party to withdraw and be relieved of obligations hereunder if the provisions of the Treaty and its Annexes, including those providing for the timely installation and effective operation of the control system, are not being fulfilled and observed.

Article 23

Amendments

Amendments to this Treaty and its Annexes shall enter into force for all Parties to the Treaty when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Conference and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Parties to this Treaty, including all the original Parties.

Article 24

Authentic Texts

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Government. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Government to the Governments of the other signatory States and to the Governments of States which become Parties to this Treaty pursuant to paragraphs 1 B and 3 of Article 19.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE at \_\_\_\_\_, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_,  
one thousand nine hundred and sixty-one.

ANNEX I

DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM

Part I -- DESCRIPTION

Article 1

The System established in this Treaty shall include the features set forth herein which are derived from the "Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests" of August 20, 1958, the "Report of the Technical Working Group on the Detection and Identification of High Altitude Nuclear Explosions" of July 15, 1959, and the "Conclusion of Technical Working Group II Regarding Possible Improvements of Techniques and Instrumentation" of December 18, 1959.

Article 2

1. The System shall, when completely established and unless otherwise decided in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, consist of the following components: A headquarters, regional offices, land control posts and ship-based control posts, systems of satellites, radiochemistry laboratories, air and water sampling facilities, on-site inspection facilities, and communications facilities. Upon recommendation of the Administrator, the Commission may decide, with the affirmative votes of the original Parties, to add components as may be appropriate for detecting and identifying nuclear explosions.

2. The general characteristics of the System shall be as follows:

A. The land control posts shall be uniformly equipped with apparatus for the collection of radioactive debris and for the recording of acoustic waves, seismic waves, electromagnetic signals, fluorescence of the upper atmosphere, visible light, and cosmic noise absorption.

B. A number of control posts situated on islands or near the shore lines of oceans shall be equipped, in addition to the methods mentioned in paragraph 2 A of this Article, with apparatus for the recording of hydroacoustic

waves. Certain control posts in areas not covered by existing weather stations (e.g. Southern Hemisphere) shall include meteorological equipment and personnel necessary to obtain data on air mass movements in order to predict the course of any air mass suspected to contain debris from nuclear explosions.

C. Control posts located on ships, which shall be stationed within specified ocean areas, shall be uniformly equipped with apparatus for the collection of radioactive debris and for the recording of hydroacoustic waves, fluorescence of the upper atmosphere and visible light. The methods of recording electromagnetic signals and cosmic noise absorption may also be used on ships at the discretion of the Administrator.

D. Aircraft and vessels for air and water sampling operations shall be suitably equipped with apparatus for the collection of radioactive debris from the air and from the water.

E. On-site inspection groups shall be appropriately manned and equipped to carry out on-site inspections to determine the nature of unidentified events which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions.

F. Satellites in terrestrial and solar orbits shall be suitably equipped with apparatus for recording delayed and prompt gamma rays, X-rays, neutrons, and electrons trapped in the earth's magnetic field.

G. Suitably located ground stations shall be equipped to launch, track and to transmit to and receive data from satellites.

## Part II -- COMPONENTS

### Article 3

#### Headquarters

1. The Headquarters of the Station shall include directorates for Administration, for Supply, for Technical Operations and for Field Operations. Technical Operations shall be comprised of a Research and Development Center and a Data Analysis Center which shall include a Central Radiochemical Laboratory. Field Operations shall be comprised of a Central Inspection Office, a Communications

Center and an Operations Center which shall include a Weather Center. Administration shall include offices for Finance and Personnel; and Supply shall include offices for System Construction and for Supply and Maintenance.

2. The Research and Development Center shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities to conduct, either directly or by contract, research and development programs for developing and improving equipment and techniques for detection and identification of nuclear explosions.

3. The Data Analysis Center shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities for evaluating all data received from components of the System. All data from the components of the System shall be reported directly to the Data Analysis Center, whose functions shall include:

- A. To analyze all data received from all components of the System.
- B. To determine and report strictly on the basis of this analysis the time and place of occurrence and the magnitude or equivalent yield of:
  - (i) an event for which the data is sufficient to establish its nature as a nuclear explosion.
  - (ii) an event which is identifiable on the basis of the data as a natural geophysical disturbance.
  - (iii) an event which is not identifiable on the basis of the data as natural and which therefore could be suspected of being a nuclear explosion.

C. To examine continuously the work of the components of the System to ensure the maintenance of a high degree of technical proficiency.

4. The Central Radiochemical Laboratory shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities to perform radiochemical and physical analyses of samples received from control posts, ships, aerial sampling centers or other components of the System. The Central Radiochemical Laboratory shall analyze the samples for fission products and other nuclides to confirm the origin of the debris as being from a nuclear detonation as opposed to some

other type of nuclear reaction. In addition, the Central Radiochemical Laboratory shall review for accuracy the findings of these components of the System concerning the characteristics and age of any nuclear debris involved. The Central Radiochemical Laboratory shall also be responsible for developing test procedures for use at field laboratories as required to ensure uniformity in analysis and measurement techniques throughout the System.

5. The Central Inspection Office shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities to direct on-site inspection of events which cannot be identified as natural events and which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions. The Central Inspection Office shall organize and maintain inspection groups on an alert basis and shall be responsible, when so directed, for the dispatch of these groups to areas designated for inspection as soon as possible following notification by the Administrator. For these purposes the Central Inspection Office shall be responsible for:

A. Rapid development of a plan for movement of the inspection group to the area of the event in consultation with the Party or Parties exercising jurisdiction or control over territory in which the inspection is to take place;

B. Rapid movement of inspection personnel and equipment to the area;

C. Direction of the inspection groups and for the conduct of the inspection in the suspect area, including provisions for additional staff, equipment and supplies deemed necessary by the inspection group.

6. The Communications Center shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities to ensure rapid and reliable communications with control posts, ships, aerial sampling centers, regional offices, and satellite tracking stations. "Rapid and reliable communications" is defined as such a communications network as will ensure an exchange of accurate and complete messages with any of the components of the System within eight hours.

7. The Operations Center shall have the necessary professional staff and



facilities to control all field operations, excluding on-site inspection. The Operations Center shall control the launching and positioning of satellites, as well as the movement of aircraft, vessels, equipment and personnel which are deployed for the purpose of conducting air and water sampling operations. It shall maintain complete and current information on the operational status of each component of the System, including aerial sampling flights over the oceans and over territories under the jurisdiction or control of Parties to this Treaty. The Operations Center will ensure that steps are taken to maintain all components of the System at all times in a high state of operational readiness to perform their assigned functions.

8. The Weather Center shall have the necessary professional staff and facilities to prepare forecasts of air mass trajectories from any point at which a nuclear explosion is suspected to have occurred for use in vectoring aerial sampling flights to intercept these air masses. The Weather Center shall be provided by wire or radio with weather data from existing national weather networks under the control of the Parties. Appropriate arrangements shall be made for other national or international networks to supply weather data to the Weather Center by wire or radio. In addition, the Weather Center shall be provided with weather data from special weather detachments established in accordance with paragraph 2 B of Article 2 of this Annex.

#### Article 4

##### Regional Offices

1. Regional Offices shall be established as the Commission determines to be necessary for the effective administration and operation of the System.

2. Each Regional Office shall perform the following functions:

A. Provide logistic support to and administrative supervision over components of the System operating in its region;

B. Provide necessary support and administrative assistance to inspection groups operating in its region;

C. Maintain liaison with national and local authorities in its region in connection with its performance of the above functions and in particular to ensure the expeditious transportation and local support of inspection groups.

Article 5

Land Control Posts

1. The network of control posts shall, when completely established include at least 170 land control posts. Unless otherwise determined under paragraph 2 below, the spacing between control posts shall be about 1700 kilometers in continental aseismic areas, about 1000 kilometers in continental seismic areas, and between 1000 and about 3500 kilometers in ocean areas.

2. The number of control posts to be installed in the USSR, United Kingdom and United States shall be as specified in Article 17 of this Annex. Except for the number of control posts to be installed in the USSR, United Kingdom and United States, the Commission shall determine, on the basis of the foregoing standards of spacing, the number of control posts to be installed in other territories under the jurisdiction or control of the original Parties and all territories under the jurisdiction or control of Parties other than the original Parties to the Treaty. With the approval of the Commission and of the Party concerned, the control posts may be arranged in an alternative distribution within territory under the jurisdiction or control of a Party if, in the view of the Commission, such a redistribution will result in an improvement in the capabilities of the System.

3. Specific sites for control posts shall be selected in a manner to give the maximum over-all capability to the System. The siting of individual control posts shall be determined primarily on the basis of the seismic requirement. However, in the event that two or more suitable seismic sites are found in the desired areas, a final selection of the location of the control posts shall be made with due consideration of siting requirements of the other methods

of detection set forth in Article 2 of this Annex. In the event that no control post location fulfilling seismic requirements is found that permits satisfactory operation of other detection equipment as set forth in this Annex, the Administrator may direct the installation of such equipment at a more favorable location. In the event that after a control post is established, the background seismic noise increases above acceptable limits due to human or other activity, the Administrator, after consultation with the Party, may direct that the control post may be moved to another location.

4. All land control posts shall maintain continuous operation of apparatus for the collection of radioactive debris and for the recording of fluorescence of the upper atmosphere, visible light, cosmic noise absorption, acoustic waves, seismic waves and electromagnetic signals. Control posts situated on islands or near the shore lines of oceans shall, in addition, maintain continuous operation of apparatus for the recording of hydroacoustic waves. In addition, equipment may be operated at certain land control posts to track and to transmit to and receive data from satellites.

#### Article 6

##### Ship-Based Control Posts

1. The network of control posts shall, when completely established, include a system of ship-based control posts, which shall be employed in ocean areas which do not contain suitable islands. There shall be a sufficient number of ships to maintain a capability for continuous operation of four stations each in the North Pacific and South Pacific Oceans and one station each in the North Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

2. Ship-based control posts shall maintain continuous operation of apparatus for the collection of radioactive debris and for the recording of hydroacoustic waves, fluorescence of the upper atmosphere and visible light. Equipment for recording electromagnetic signals and cosmic noise absorption may also be used on ships at the discretion of the Administrator.

Article 7

Air and Water Sampling Operations

1. Daily routine air sampling flights shall be conducted at several different altitudes over ocean areas in approximately a north-south direction near the sides of continents, as well as in the center of remote ocean areas such as the Central Pacific the Indian Ocean west of Australia and the North Atlantic Ocean, for the purpose of detecting nuclear explosions by the method of collecting radioactive debris.

2. Special aircraft sampling flights shall be conducted to search for a possible radioactive cloud for the purpose of collecting samples of radioactive debris within two to five days after the date of origin of the debris. Special sampling flights shall be initiated whenever fresh radioactive debris has been detected by a routine air sampling flight or by a control post or when acoustic signals recorded at control posts establish the time and position of a possible explosion in the atmosphere. In each instance, the flight routes of the aircraft shall be selected on the basis of meteorological trajectory forecasts from the location of the suspected event, and the aircraft shall search at several different altitudes.

3. Special aircraft flights undertaken over territory under the jurisdiction or control of Parties shall be conducted, on instruction of the Administrator in accordance with Article 9 of the Treaty, over permanent flight routes as set out by the Commission in accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty. Such permanent flight routes shall be laid down in advance in such number and geographical location that, according to meteorological data, interception of any cloud containing radioactive debris will be assured within two to five days of the suspected event. Sampling aircraft to be used over territory under the jurisdiction or control of Parties shall be located in or near permanent flight routes and shall be maintained in a high state of operational readiness to conduct the sampling flights directed by the Administrator.

4. Special aircraft flights over ocean areas shall be conducted from aircraft sampling centers distributed uniformly throughout the Northern and Southern Hemispheres. When the area to be covered by such flights is remote from any one of the centers, operations will be staged out of the nearest air field, and necessary supplies which cannot be procured locally will be air-lifted from the nearest center.

5. Water sampling operations, by ships and/or aircraft, shall be conducted for the purpose of collecting samples of water suspected of containing radioactive debris whenever hydroacoustic signals recorded at control posts establish the time and position of a possible underwater explosion. Suitably equipped aircraft and/or vessels shall be deployed in such a manner that water sampling operations can be conducted at the site of the event within four days after such operations are directed by the Administrator.

6. A. Radiochemical laboratories shall be located at each of the aerial sampling centers established in accordance with paragraph 4 above. Laboratories at aerial sampling centers shall be equipped to carry out all the necessary radiochemical analytical techniques required to determine the presence of fresh debris and to ascertain the date of origin of the debris with a precision consistent with the most modern radiochemical dating techniques. This shall be done by using as many dating techniques as sample-size and age of the debris permit.

B. Upon termination of a sampling flight, samples shall be assayed by suitable instruments, for example gamma spectrometers. Samples shall be divided in equal parts. One part shall be sent to the nearest radiochemical laboratory, and the other part shall be sent to the Central Radiochemical Laboratory for further analysis with an indication as to which are suspected of containing fresh fission products.

C. Water samples shall be assayed by suitable instruments as soon as practicable following sample collection, and those samples suspected of

containing fresh fission products shall be divided in equal parts. One part shall be sent to the nearest radiochemical laboratory and the other to the Central Radiochemical Laboratory for analysis.

Article 8

Criteria for On-Site Inspection of Seismic Events

1. A seismic event which is located by the criteria in paragraph 2 of this Article and which is determined to be of seismic magnitude 4.75 or greater shall be eligible for on-site inspection unless rendered ineligible for inspection by the fulfillment of any of the criteria in paragraph 3 of this Article.

2. A seismic event shall be considered to be located when seismic signals, whose frequencies, amplitudes, durations, and velocities are consistent with those of the waves from earthquakes or explosions, are recorded at a sufficient number of control posts to establish the approximate time and position of the event. This requires at least four clearly measurable arrival times of identifiable phases which are mutually consistent to within plus or minus three seconds. These four consistent arrival times must include P-wave arrival times at three different control posts.

3. A located seismic event shall be ineligible for inspection if, and only if, it fulfills one or more of the following criteria:

A. its depth of focus is established as below sixty kilometers;

B. its epicentral location is established to be in the deep open ocean, and the event is unaccompanied by a hydroacoustic signal consistent with the seismic epicenter and origin time;

C. it is established to be a foreshock of a seismic event of at least magnitude 6 which has been clearly identified as an earthquake by the criteria in sub-paragraphs A and B above. For this purpose a "foreshock" is defined as one of a sequence of earthquakes which occurs less than forty-eight hours before the main shock and which has an epicenter within ten kilometers of the epicenter of the main shock;

D. it is established to be an aftershock of a seismic event of at least magnitude 6 which has been clearly identified as an earthquake by the criteria in sub-paragraphs A and B above. For this purpose, an "aftershock" is defined as one of a sequence of earthquakes which occurs less than one week after the main shock and which has an epicenter within ten kilometers of the epicenter of the main shock.

4. In cases where adequately precise regional travel time curves are available, and where consistent arrival times are available from control posts surrounding the epicenter, that is, from control posts at least one of which lies in every possible 90-degree sector around the epicenter, the area eligible for inspection will be 200 square kilometers. In cases where adequately precise regional travel time curves are not available, or where data from control posts lying in every possible 90-degree sector around the epicenter are not available, an area of 500 square kilometers shall be eligible for inspection. The area eligible for inspection shall be chosen so as to have the highest likelihood of containing the epicenter.

5. The basic data for all criteria shall be obtained from control posts.

6. Within three years after the entry into force of this Treaty and annually thereafter, the Commission shall review the provisions of this Article.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 23, the Commission may at any time, with the concurring votes of the original Parties, amend the provisions of this Article. Such amendments shall be binding on all Parties to this Treaty.

Article 9

A Seismic Event Equal to or Greater than Magnitude 4.75

1. "A seismic event equal to or greater than magnitude 4.75" is a seismic event whose apparent magnitude  $M$  as measured by the formula  $M$  equals  $Q$  plus  $\text{LOG}(A/GT)$  is equal to or greater than 4.75 at one-half or more of the control posts which measure the quantity "A" and which are located at distances greater than 16 degrees and less than 90 degrees from the epicenter. The symbols in the formula  $M$  equals  $Q$  plus  $\text{LOG}(A/GT)$  are defined as follows:

A. "A" is one-half of the maximum peak positive to negative amplitude (displacement), expressed in microns in the record of the first five cycles of the P waves made by a short-period vertical-component seismograph with characteristics which will permit operation of single seismometers at quiet stations with magnification greater than ten to the sixth power at the frequency of peak response. "A" is measured if it exceeds three times the arithmetical mean of the ten greatest peak amplitudes of the noise oscillations recorded during the preceding two minutes. Noises, the periods of which differ from the signal period by not more than one and one-half times, are counted. The noise amplitude and period are determined by the same procedure as for the signal.

B. "T" is the time, measured in seconds, between the first of the peaks used in determining "A" and the next following peak of the same sign.

C. "G" is the steady state magnification of the seismograph at period T.

D. "Q" is given as a function of distance in the following table:



DISTANCE	Q	DISTANCE	Q	DISTANCE	Q
16 Degrees	5.9	41 Degrees	6.5	66 Degrees	7.0
17	5.9	42	6.5	67	7.0
18	5.9	43	6.5	68	7.0
19	6.0	44	6.5	69	7.0
20	6.0	45	6.7	70	6.9
21	6.1	46	6.9	71	6.9
22	6.2	47	6.9	72	6.9
23	6.3	48	6.9	73	6.9
24	6.3	49	6.8	74	6.8
25	6.5	50	6.7	75	6.8
26	6.4	51	6.7	76	6.9
27	6.5	52	6.7	77	6.9
28	6.6	53	6.7	78	6.9
29	6.6	54	6.8	79	6.8
30	6.6	55	6.8	80	6.7
31	6.7	56	6.8	81	6.8
32	6.7	57	6.8	82	6.9
33	6.7	58	6.8	83	7.0
34	6.7	59	6.8	84	7.0
35	6.7	60	6.8	85	7.0
36	6.6	61	6.9	86	6.9
37	6.5	62	7.0	87	7.0
38	6.5	63	6.9	88	7.1
39	6.4	64	7.0	89	7.0
40	6.4	65	7.0	90	7.0

Article 10

Inspection Groups

1. Inspection groups shall be established and maintained to conduct on-site inspections as directed by the Administrator. They shall be based at a number of locations sufficient to insure prompt arrival and logistical support at the site of any unidentified continental or maritime event. Inspection groups shall be responsible for the collection and preliminary evaluation of evidence concerning the nature of the event in question. They shall remain in the inspection area until recalled by the Administrator.

2. Each inspection group shall be staffed with scientific, technical and other personnel qualified to perform the duties required in the conduct of an on-site inspection.

3. Each inspection group shall, when dispatched, conduct any inspection directed by the Administrator in a prompt and efficient manner and shall be authorized to:

- A. Establish a local base of operations.
- B. Establish and maintain communications with its permanent base, the Central Inspection Office, and, as required, other components of the System.
- C. Consult with local officials and individuals.
- D. Conduct low-altitude aerial inspection of the area eligible for inspection, utilizing such techniques as may be necessary for this purpose, including, but not limited to, photographic, electromagnetic, magnetic, infrared and radioactivity surveys.
- E. Conduct surface and subsurface inspection in the area eligible for inspection for all evidence which may in any way relate to the nature of the event, utilizing such techniques as may be necessary for this purpose, including, but not limited to, drilling for radioactive samples for scientific analysis.
- F. Utilize such other means of investigation on site as would be likely to produce relevant data.

4. Each inspection group shall submit to the Administrator periodic progress reports during the course of any inspection and a final report upon the conclusion of the inspection operation. Copies of these reports shall be sent to the Party or Parties exercising jurisdiction or control over the territory in which the inspection is being or has been carried out.

5. Each inspection group shall have available for its use the technical apparatus and facilities necessary for the performance of a prompt and efficient inspection operation. Such apparatus and facilities shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

- A. Portable seismographs for recording aftershocks, geophysical equipment for seismic profiling, detection equipment for locating metallic articles, radiation detectors, equipment for collecting radioactive samples on the surface, drilling equipment for obtaining underground radioactive samples, portable laboratory equipment for field radiochemical analysis, and photographic equipment.

B. Appropriate surface and air transport for rapid movement to an inspection area along routes prescribed by the host country, and for the operation and logistics of the inspection group.

C. Appropriate aircraft for the conduct of low-altitude aerial reconnaissance of the inspection area for evidence of the nature of the event in question.

D. Appropriate vessels for the conduct of inspection of maritime events.

E. Technically suitable and reliable communications equipment to establish and maintain contact with its permanent base of operations, the Central Inspection Office, and, as required, other System components.

#### Article 11

##### High Altitude Systems

1. The high altitude systems, which are based upon the recommendations contained in the "Report of the Technical Working Group on the Detection and Identification of High Altitude Nuclear Explosions", of July 15, 1959, are established for the purpose of providing, when in effective operation, a level of capability not less than that estimated by the Technical Working Group in sections A and B of their Report. The techniques and instrumentation for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions at high altitudes shall comprise apparatus installed at control posts and ground stations as specified in Articles 2, 5 and 6 of this Annex, together with satellite systems.

Satellite systems shall be so positioned in orbits as to provide maximum capability for detecting nuclear explosions as follows:

A. One or more satellites (trapped-electron satellites) placed in an appropriate terrestrial elliptical orbit and suitably instrumented with counters for recording electrons trapped in the earth's magnetic field. A satellite shall be replaced when it can no longer record or transmit the required data to ground stations.

B. At least six satellites (far-earth satellites) placed in terrestrial orbits at altitudes of more than 30,000 kilometers so as to be continuously

outside the earth's trapped radiation belts. Three of the satellites shall be nearly equally spaced in the same orbital plane, and three satellites shall be similarly placed in a second orbital plane positioned at approximately right angles to the first. Each satellite shall be suitably equipped with instruments for recording prompt and delayed gamma rays, X-rays, and neutrons. A satellite shall be replaced when it can no longer record and transmit to ground stations the required data from any three of the four methods of detection as set forth in this sub-paragraph. In addition, satellites shall be replaced when the System

(i) no longer provides complete surveillance of the earth, or

(ii) no longer provides surveillance in all directions in space lying outside the orbits of the System's component satellites by means of the X-ray detection method from at least three satellites.

C. At least four satellites (solar satellites) placed in appropriate solar orbits and suitably equipped with instruments, including those for recording X rays. A satellite shall be replaced when it can no longer record and transmit to ground stations the required data on X-ray signals.

2. Each satellite requiring replacement shall be replaced as rapidly as possible.

3. Each satellite shall carry apparatus for verifying the performance of its equipment. Each satellite shall be inspected immediately prior to launching to ensure its instruments meet the detection requirements and that the satellite includes nothing which might interfere with the performance of its equipment. After inspection, the launching of each satellite shall be observed. This inspection and the subsequent observation of the launching of the satellite shall be performed by members of the staff of the Organization selected by the Administrator in accordance with the principles set forth in sub-paragraph 3 C (v) of Article 9.

Part III - DATA REPORTING AND EVALUATION

Article 12

1. All components of the System shall immediately examine all records obtained. When data which meet criteria established by the Headquarters of the System are observed, they shall be reported by wire or radio to the Data Analysis Center. All components of the System shall provide additional data to the Center upon its request. In addition, all original data and records obtained by all components of the System shall be forwarded expeditiously to the Headquarters of the System. Reliable electronic transmission of data and frequent collection of records and materials by aircraft shall be incorporated in the reporting system.

2. The equipment at control posts, ships, satellite tracking and data transmitting and receiving stations, and air and water sampling centers shall be examined periodically by technical personnel from the Headquarters of the System for the purpose of ensuring the validity of the data transmitted from these components to Headquarters.

Part IV -- SUPPORT FACILITIES

Article 13

Communications

The System shall have rapid and reliable communications between its components and Headquarters and shall have the right to install, maintain and operate communications facilities, including radio networks, using existing channels when they are suitable for this purpose. The network must be capable of ensuring an exchange of accurate and complete messages between the Headquarters and any component of the System within eight hours. Provisions shall be made for the receipt of standard time signals by all components of the System which record geophysical data. Provisions shall also be made for transmission to the System Headquarters of all weather data required by the Weather Center as set forth in paragraph 8 of Article 3 of this Annex.

Article 14

Supplies and Services

1. The System Headquarters shall manage resources of the System for supplies and services by such means as: establishing procurement, construction and transportation criteria; publishing instructions for operation and maintenance of equipment; receiving and processing supply and maintenance reports from the elements of the System and establishing specification and performance standards for equipment.

2. The System Headquarters shall ensure that technical equipment meets required performance standards before authorizing acceptance of the equipment for use in the System.

3. Maximum use shall be made of sources of supply of non-technical equipment indigenous to the area where facilities of the System are located. Support equipment and supplies shall be locally procured where possible by the Regional Offices or control posts.

Article 15

System Phasing

The controls provided for in this Treaty shall be progressively extended, and the components of the System installed in three phases, in order to achieve and ensure world-wide compliance with the obligations of this Treaty. The sub-phases of Phase I shall begin within three months after the Treaty enters into force. Sub-Phase I-A shall be completed within two years after the Treaty enters into force. Sub-Phase I-B shall be completed within four years after the Treaty enters into force. Phase II shall begin within one year after the Treaty enters into force, and shall be completed within five years after the Treaty enters into force. Phase III shall begin within two years after the Treaty enters into force and shall be completed within six years after the Treaty enters into force. Each control post and each other facility shall be put into operation, in whole or in part, as it is installed, and the System shall be fully operational within six years after the Treaty enters into force. The Commission may, however, decide, with the affirmative votes of the original Parties, to postpone add to, or refrain from establishing any part of Phases I, II and III.

Article 16

Phasing of Headquarters

The Headquarters of the System shall be established at the beginning of Phase I and shall be expanded through Phase I and subsequent phases as required to provide effective administration and operation of the System.

Article 17

Control Post Phasing

Land control posts and control posts on ships shall be established as follows:

	Phase I		Phase II	Phase III
	A	B		
USSR	9	9	-	-
U.S.	6	4	-	-
U.K.	1	-	-	-
Oceanic Islands	20	-	16	24
Ships	10	-	-	-
Australia	-	-	4	3
Asia (Non-USSR)	-	-	21	-
Europe (Non-USSR)	-	-	3	-
North America and Greenland	-	-	14	-
Africa	-	-	7	9
South America	-	-	6	10
Antarctica	-	-	-	4
	<u>46</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>50</u>

Article 18

Aircraft Sampling Phasing

Aircraft sampling facilities shall be established and made fully operational within two years after the Treaty enters into force.

Article 19

Satellite Systems Phasing

Subject to the provisions of Article 11 of this Annex, satellite systems shall be installed as follows:

	Phase I		Phase II	Phase III
	A	B		
Trapped Electron Satellites	1	-	-	-
Far-Earth Satellites	-	6	-	-
Solar Satellites	-	-	-	4
	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>4</u>



Article 20

Inspection Group Phasing

Inspection groups shall be established from the beginning of Phase I. A sufficient number of groups shall be maintained to carry out inspections at any time in the numbers which, in accordance with the terms of this Treaty and its Annexes, may currently be required.

Article 21

Communications Phasing

A survey of communications requirements shall be performed at the beginning of each phase. Elements of the communications system shall be timed to be operational so as to ensure rapid and reliable communications for each control post or other component of the System as soon as such post or other component becomes operational.

Annex II

Privileges and Immunities

Article 1

Definitions

In this Annex:

(1) The expression "representatives of Parties to this Treaty" includes representatives on or to any organ of the Organization established under the provisions of this Treaty, including the Conference, together with the members of their official staffs.

(2) The expression "representatives of Parties to this Treaty on the Control Commission" includes all members of the official staffs of such representatives except those whose duties are clerical. For the purpose of this Annex such clerical personnel shall be deemed to come within the class of persons referred to in sub-paragraph (1) of this Article.

(3) The expression "members of the Organization staff" includes the Administrator and all the employees of the Organization.

(4) The term "expert" shall mean an individual performing a mission on behalf of the Organization either at the headquarters of the Organization or in the territory of a Party to this Treaty.

(5) The term "host government" shall mean the government of the country in which the headquarters of the Organization is located.

Article 2

Juridical Personality

A. The Organization shall possess juridical personality. It shall have the capacity (a) to contract, (b) to acquire and dispose of property, (c) to institute and defend legal proceedings.

B. The Organization may provide for suitable identification of ships and aircraft employed on the official service of the Organization.

Article 3

Property, Funds and Assets

A. The Organization, its property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case the Commission, on behalf of the Organization, has expressly waived this immunity, but such express waiver of immunity shall not extend to any measure of execution or detention of property.

B. The premises of the Organization shall be inviolable. The property and assets of the Organization, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action.

C. The archives of the Organization and all documents belonging to it or held by it or by its staff or experts on its behalf shall be inviolable wherever located.

D. The Organization, without being restricted by financial controls, regulations or moratoria of any kind, may, subject to the obligation to give effect as far as is practicable to representations made to it by any Party, exercise the following rights:

- (1) To hold currency of any kind and operate accounts in any currency;
- (2) To transfer its funds freely from, to, or within any country Party to this Treaty and convert any currency held by it into any other currency.

E. The Organization, its assets, income and other property shall be:

- (1) Exempt from all direct taxes except those taxes which are in reality a charge for specific services;
- (2) Exempt from all customs duties, prohibitions and restrictions on imports and exports in respect of articles imported or exported by the Organization for its official use; articles imported under such exemption shall not be disposed of, by sale or by gift, in the country into which they are imported except under conditions approved by the Government of that country;
- (3) Exempt from all customs duties, prohibitions and restrictions on imports and exports in respect of its publications.

F. The Organization shall be exempt from taxes imposed directly on its expenditure transactions but not exempt from those taxes which are in reality a charge for specific services.

Article 4

Communications

A. Each Party shall take appropriate steps necessary to ensure that its domestic and international telecommunication services accord to telecommunications of the Organization treatment at least equal to government telecommunications with respect to priority of transmission, and accord these telecommunications higher priority, i.e., special priority as accorded to the United Nations Organization in emergencies, when requested, and that rates charged shall be no higher than minimum government rates. Postal communications shall be handled in the most expeditious manner possible.

B. No censorship shall be applied to the official correspondence and other official communications of the Organization.

C. The Organization shall have the right to use codes known to all Parties and to despatch and receive by courier or in sealed bags only official correspondence, other official communications, and objects intended for official use. Such couriers and sealed bags shall have the same immunities and privileges as diplomatic couriers and bags.

D. Nothing in paragraphs B and C of this Article shall be construed to preclude the adoption of appropriate security precautions to be determined by agreement between a Party and the Organization.

Article 5

Representatives of Parties to this Treaty

A. Representatives of Parties to this Treaty on the Control Commission shall enjoy, in the territory of the host government, the same privileges and immunities as the host government accords diplomatic envoys accredited to it.

B. Representatives of Parties to this Treaty on the Control Commission shall enjoy, while present in the territory of another Party in the discharge of Commission duties, the same privileges and immunities as the Party accords diplomatic envoys accredited to it.

C. Representatives of Parties to this Treaty shall enjoy, while present in the territory of the host government and while in the territory of another Party in the discharge of their official duties and during their journey to and from the place of meeting, the following privileges and immunities:

- (1) Immunity from arrest, detention or any legal process with respect to words spoken or written and acts done by them in their official capacity;
- (2) Inviolability for all their official papers and documents;
- (3) The right to use codes, couriers, and sealed bags in communicating with their Governments, their staffs and with the Organization;
- (4) The same exemption in respect of themselves and their spouses from immigration restrictions, aliens' registration and national service obligations as is accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;
- (5) The same facilities with respect to currency or exchange restrictions as are accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;
- (6) The same immunities and facilities with respect to their personal baggage as are accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;
- (7) The right to import free of duty their furniture and effects at the time of first arrival to take up their posts in the territory of a Party and, on the termination of their functions there, to re-export such furniture and effects free of duty; furniture and effects so imported shall not be disposed of, by sale or by gift, in such territory except under conditions approved by the Government thereof.

D. A representative to whom this Article applies shall, during any period when he is present in the territory of another Party for the discharge of his duties, be exempt from taxation on his official salary and emoluments, and where the legal incidence of any other form of taxation depends upon residence, any such period shall, for the purposes of determining his liability to taxation, be treated as not being a period of residence in that territory.

E. The Administrator shall communicate to the Parties concerned the names of the representatives and members of their official staffs to whom paragraph B of this Article applies and the probable duration of their stay in the territories of such other Parties.

F. The privileges and immunities accorded under paragraphs A, B, and C are not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves, but in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in connexion with the Organization. Consequently, a Party not only has the right, but is under a duty

to waive the immunity of its representatives and their staffs in any case where, in its opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the purposes for which the immunity is accorded.

G. The provisions of paragraphs A to E above shall not require any Party to grant any of the privileges or immunities referred to therein to any person who is its national or any person who is its representative or is a member of the staff of such representative.

#### Article 6

##### Organization Staff and Experts

A. The Administrator and the deputies of the Administrator shall be accorded the privileges and immunities normally accorded to diplomatic envoys.

B. All other members of the Organization staff shall be accorded the following privileges and immunities:

(1) Immunity from arrest or detention whenever assigned to a control post, an inspection group, or a routine or special flight; and at all times immunity from arrest, detention or any legal process with respect to words spoken or written and acts done by them in the performance of their official functions;

(2) The same facilities with respect to currency or exchange restrictions as are accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;

(3) The same immunities and facilities with respect to their personal baggage as are accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;

(4) The same exemption from immigration restrictions, aliens' registration and national service obligations for themselves, their spouses and members of their immediate families residing with them and dependent on them as is accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;

(5) The same repatriation facilities in time of international crisis for themselves, their spouses and members of their immediate families residing with them and dependent on them, as are accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;

(6) The right to import free of duty their furniture and effects at the time of first arrival to take up their posts in the territory of a Party and, on the termination of their functions there, to re-export such furniture and effects free of duty; furniture and effects so imported shall not be disposed of, by sale or by gift, in such territory except under conditions approved by the Government thereof.

C. Every expert performing a mission for the Organization either at the headquarters of the Organization or in the territory of a Party shall be accorded the following privileges and immunities:

- (1) Immunity from arrest or detention;
- (2) Immunity from legal process in respect to words spoken or written and acts done by him in the performance of his official functions;
- (3) The same exemption from immigration restrictions, aliens' registration and national service obligations as is accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;
- (4) Immunities and privileges specified in items (2) and (3) of paragraph B of this Article.

D. Every member of the Organization staff and every expert shall be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to him by the Organization.

E. The Administrator shall keep the Parties currently informed as to each individual to whom any of the foregoing paragraphs of this Article is applicable. A Party shall always be entitled to notification of the name and responsibility of any such individual before his arrival for official duties in the territory of that Party, so that it may have an opportunity to comment to the Administrator upon the proposed assignment of such expert or member of the Organization staff.

F. Privileges and immunities are granted to members of the Organization staff and to experts in the interests of the Organization and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The Administrator shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity of any such individual in any case where the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the Organization. In the case of the Administrator his immunity may be waived by the Commission provided the Commission finds the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the Organization.

G. The provisions of paragraphs A to D inclusive above shall not require any Party to grant any of the privileges or immunities referred to therein to any person who is its national, except:

(1) Immunity from arrest, detention or any legal process with respect to words spoken or written and acts done by him in the performance of his official functions for the Organization;

(2) Facilities with respect to currency or exchange restrictions so far as necessary for the effective exercise of his functions.

#### Article 7

##### Abuses of Privileges

A. The Organization shall at all times cooperate with the appropriate authorities of Parties to facilitate the proper administration of justice, secure the observance of police regulations, and prevent the occurrence of an abuse of the privileges and immunities set out in this Annex.

B. If any Party considers that there has been an abuse of the privilege of residence in its territory or of any other privilege or immunity granted by this Annex, the following procedure shall be adopted:

(1) In the case of an abuse by the Administrator, consultations shall be held between the Party and the Commission to determine the action to be taken.

(2) In the case of an abuse by any individual referred to in paragraphs (1) or (2) of Article 1, the Party which considers that there has been an abuse may, after consultation with the Party whose representative is concerned and in accordance with the diplomatic procedure applicable to diplomatic envoys accredited to the former Party, require the representative to leave its territory.

(3) In the case of an abuse by any individual referred to in paragraphs B and C of Article 6, the Party which considers that there has been an abuse may, after consultation with the Administrator and, in the event of disagreement, with the Commission, require the Administrator to arrange for an immediate replacement.

#### Article 8

##### Laissez-Passer

A. Members of the staff of the Organization and experts on missions on behalf of the Organization shall be entitled to use a special laissez-passer procedure modelled on the United Nations laissez-passer procedure, to be evolved by the Administrator pursuant to regulations approved by the Commission.



B. Parties shall recognize and accept the Organization laissez-passer issued to members of the staff of the Organization and to experts on missions on behalf of the Organization as valid travel documents.

C. Members of the staff of the Organization and experts travelling on the Organization laissez-passer on the business of the Organization, shall be granted the same facilities for travel as are accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions.

Article 9

Interpretation and Supplementary Agreements

A. The provisions of this Annex shall be interpreted in the light of the functions with which the Organization is entrusted by this Treaty and its Annexes.

B. The provisions of this Annex shall in no way limit or prejudice the privileges and immunities which have been, or may hereafter be, accorded to the Organization by a State by reason of the location, in the territory of that State, of the headquarters or other components and agencies of the Organization. The Organization may conclude with any Party or Parties agreements supplementing the provisions of this Annex, so far as that Party or those Parties are concerned.

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Annex III

The Preparatory Commission

A. A Preparatory Commission, consisting of one representative from each of the original Parties to this Treaty, shall come into existence on the day after this Treaty shall have been signed by all the original Parties. The Preparatory Commission shall remain in existence until the Control Commission has been elected in accordance with Article 4 of this Treaty.

B. Except as provided in Section E of this Annex, the Preparatory Commission shall take decisions by agreement among the three original Parties, adopt its own rules of procedure, meet as often as necessary and determine its own place of meeting. It shall appoint an executive secretary and such staff as shall be necessary, who shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as the Preparatory Commission may determine.

C. The expenses of the Preparatory Commission may be met by a loan provided by the United Nations or by advances from governments. The repayment of loans shall be included as an item in the budget for the Control Organization's first financial period. The Preparatory Commission shall make the necessary arrangements with the appropriate authorities of the United Nations for repayment of the loan. Advances from governments may be set off against assessments of the governments concerned levied in accordance with the provisions of Article 15.

D. Pending deposit of instruments of ratification of the Treaty by all the original Parties, the Preparatory Commission shall:

1. conduct preliminary technical studies and consultations with regard to the location, installation, and equipping of control posts and other components of the Control Organization, including:

(a) geological and topographic map studies of the geographical areas of the world where control posts are to be located;

(b) consultations with technical representatives of the original Parties for the purpose of adopting standard construction designs for control posts and regional offices and of choosing types of equipment for each of the methods of detection;

(c) studies of the surveys which will be required for selecting sites for control posts and other components;

(d) studies of communication requirements;

(e) consultations with the original Parties for equipping and utilizing their aircraft for routine flights and vessels to be stationed in accordance with the Treaty and its Annexes;

(f) studies of requirements for standard time transmission and reception to ensure accurate relative time at all control posts and other components of the Control Organization.

2. Draw up detailed requirements and regulations for the staffing of the Organization and invite applications for posts to be filled during the initial operations of the Organization;
  3. Draw up requirements and invite applications for the post of Administrator;
  4. Recommend the site in Vienna of the permanent headquarters of the Organization; draw up recommendations for the provisions of a headquarters agreement defining the status of the Organization and its rights and relationship with the host country;
  5. Draw up detailed plans for the day-to-day technical and administrative operations of the Organization;
  6. Draw up for submission to the Conference the budget for the Organization's first financial period and a recommended scale of assessment;
  7. In conjunction with the United Nations, initiate the preparation of a draft agreement which would be in accordance with Article 17 of this Treaty;
  8. Make arrangements for the convening of the first Conference, to be held not later than six months from the date instruments of ratification have been deposited by all the original Parties.
- E. 1. On the day after deposit of instruments of ratification of the Treaty by all the original Parties, or as soon thereafter as possible, the Preparatory Commission shall be enlarged, to consist of one representative from each of the original Parties to this Treaty and one

representative from eight other states, chosen by agreement between the three original Parties from among those states which at that time have deposited instruments of ratification of the Treaty.

2. The Preparatory Commission thus enlarged shall exercise the powers conferred upon the Control Commission by the Treaty, in accordance with the procedures therein specified for the Control Commission. After the Preparatory Commission has been enlarged and pending the appointment of the Administrator, the executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission shall exercise the powers conferred upon the Administrator by the Treaty.

3. Pending the enlargement of the Preparatory Commission pursuant to paragraph (1) of this Section, the Preparatory Commission shall continue to exercise only those functions listed in Section D of this Annex.

PRIVATE

GEN/DNT/110/Add.1  
31 May 1961

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

CONFERENCE ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

Alternative Texts of Paragraphs 5 and 7  
of Draft Article 10 (GEN/DNT/110)  
Submitted by the Delegations of the United Kingdom  
and the United States at the  
313th meeting of the Conference

.....

5. A. The number of on-site inspections which may be carried out annually in territory under the jurisdiction or control of each of the original Parties, pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article, shall be between twelve and twenty, in each annual period as set forth in paragraph 8 of this Article, depending upon the number of underground events of seismic magnitude of 4.75 or above occurring in the territory of the original Party, located by the System in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 8 of Annex I. If the number of such events occurring within one year is one hundred or more, the number of on-site inspections which may be carried out during that year shall be twenty. If the number of such events occurring within the year is sixty or less, the number of on-site inspections which may be carried out during that year shall be twelve. If the number of such events occurring within the year is less than one hundred but greater than sixty, the number of on-site inspections which may be carried out during that year shall be twenty per cent of the number of such seismic events. If the number of on-site inspections calculated in accordance with this sub-paragraph includes a fraction, that fraction shall be disregarded.

B. If any portion of the certified area lies in territory under the jurisdiction or control of an original Party, the event, for the purpose of determining in accordance with sub-paragraph 5 A the number of on-site inspections which may be carried out in territory under the jurisdiction or control of that original Party, shall be deemed to have occurred in territory under its jurisdiction or control.

.....

.....

7. The number of on-site inspections for each Party shall be reviewed by the Commission within three years after the Treaty enters into force and annually thereafter. Each such review shall take full account of:

- A. Practical experience in the operation of the System and of measures taken to maintain or improve its effectiveness;
- B. Any criteria for the identification of seismic events eligible for on-site inspection which may be established; and
- C. Any amendments to paragraph 2 of Article 1 of this Treaty.

In the light of such review, the Commission, with the concurring votes of the original Parties, may fix revised numbers.

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PRIVATE

GEN/DNT/110/Add.2

30 August 1961

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

CONFERENCE ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

Addendum to Article 6 of the  
Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (GEN/DNT/110)  
Submitted jointly by the Delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States  
at the 338th meeting of the Conference

Add the following as sub-paragraph E of paragraph 2

E. The Administrator or the First Deputy Administrator shall be subject to removal from office by the Commission if, as a result of a failure on his part to comply with the requirements of paragraph 1 or 2 of Article 9 of this Treaty or for any other reason, the Commission decides that it no longer has confidence in him. Any such decision, and the exercise of the power of removal, shall require the concurring votes of seven members of the Commission."

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PRIVATE

GEN/DNT/110/Add.3

30 August 1961

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

CONFERENCE ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

Revised sub-paragraph (viii) and (ix), paragraph 3 C of Article 9 of the  
Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (GEN/DNT/110)

Submitted jointly by the Delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States  
at the 338th meeting of the Conference

.....

(viii) The scientific and technical staff of an on-site inspection group shall be composed of technically qualified personnel who are not nationals of the country exercising jurisdiction or control over the territory in which the event under investigation may have occurred. If the country exercising jurisdiction or control over such territory is an original party or is associated with an original party, the scientific and technical staff of the inspection group shall be composed of nationals of countries other than such an original party or states associated with it. The party exercising jurisdiction or control over such territory may designate one or more observers to accompany the inspection group.

(ix) At least one-half of the scientific and technical staff of an on-site inspection group despatched to conduct an inspection on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the USSR or countries associated with it, including the leader of the group, shall be nationals of the United States of America or the United Kingdom or countries associated with either or both of them. At least one-half of the scientific and technical staff of an on-site inspection group despatched to conduct an inspection on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the United States of America or the United Kingdom or countries associated with either or both of them, including the leader of the group, shall be nationals of the USSR or countries associated with it.

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Private

ENDC/11

22 March 1962

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Statement by the Soviet Government dated 27 November 1961  
in connexion with the resumption of negotiations on the  
discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests

and

text of a draft agreement on the discontinuance of  
nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapon tests\*

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\* Also issued as document Gen/DNT.122 on 11 December 1961

Statement by the Soviet Government in connexion with the  
resumption of negotiations on the discontinuance of  
nuclear weapon tests

The Soviet Government is firmly and consistently upholding the cause of general and complete disarmament. This problem has been placed before the peoples of our planet by the whole course of historical development. In our time, when States have at their disposal monstrous means of destruction and annihilation, concern about the life and welfare of present and future generations is inextricably bound up with the struggle for general and complete disarmament. There is now no other way out for humanity but to throw the whole war machine on to the scrapheap and create a world without armies and armaments. Otherwise the devastating tornado of nuclear missile warfare will overtake the peoples of the world, and then in a matter of minutes, not only will individual cities and inhabited places disappear from the face of the earth, but also entire countries may be laid waste.

The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, after analysing the present international situation in all its aspects, confirmed with the utmost conviction that the preservation of peace in our time is a practical and feasible task. The true and sure path to this goal lies through the realization of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Soviet Union believes in the force of ideas, and not in the force of weapons. It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet Government proposes that all armaments, conventional and thermo-nuclear, be thrown into the deepest part of the ocean.

There can be no doubt that if the matter had depended only on the Soviet Union the problem of disarmament would have been solved long ago: armies would have been disbanded, stockpiles of arms eliminated and their production stopped. But it is obvious that the Soviet Government cannot solve this problem on its own, in isolation from the actual international situation, when the aggressive NATO bloc is feverishly increasing its armed forces, improving its armaments and openly threatening us with war. In these circumstances the Soviet Government could not and cannot ignore its own security interests and those of all peace-loving States.

The Soviet Union is compelled to seek a solution of the disarmament problem through agreement with the Western Powers, who in fact, unfortunately, still have no desire for this. The Soviet Union believes, however, that this state of affairs cannot go on for ever. Sooner or later the Western Powers, if they are not just bent on self destruction, will be forced to agree to general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction that the idea of general and complete disarmament, put forward by N.S. Khrushchev at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, enjoys the widest support throughout the world, even though the Western Powers are evading the conclusion of an appropriate agreement. A certain hopeful element is the submission by the Soviet Union and the United States of America of a Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations for consideration at the present session. The Soviet Government assumes that the present session of the General Assembly will, as may be hoped, adopt on the basis of this Statement a resolution on the resumption of negotiations on the whole of the questions relating to general and complete disarmament and the establishment of a body within which these negotiations will be conducted.

Agreement on general and complete disarmament will also remove the difficulties regarding the establishment of a system of international control. The Soviet Government has repeatedly stated that it is prepared to accept any control proposed by the Western Powers, if they will agree to general and complete disarmament.

In the conditions when there will be neither armaments nor armies, States will have no grounds for fear that control may be used for espionage and intelligence purposes. In a completely disarmed world, control will become a means of verification alone, and will be really effective and comprehensive.

With the achievement of general and complete disarmament, the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests will be solved automatically, since nuclear weapons themselves will have been destroyed and, consequently, States will have no need for testing and, indeed, nothing to test.

The Soviet Government is convinced that precisely this path ensures the most reliable solution of the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests for all time.

The Soviet Government, in steadfastly striving to achieve the primary aim, namely, general and complete disarmament, considers that the utmost use must be made of all means and opportunities that would facilitate the achievement of this aim. Proceeding precisely from this premise, it has agreed to the resumption of negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, and has sent its representative to Geneva with instructions to try once again to reach agreement on this question with the representatives of the Western Powers.

The Soviet Government has given careful study to the question of resuming negotiations at Geneva and, above all, to the means of making them succeed. Do the peoples need yet another fruitless conference? They have a right to expect and justly demand concrete and positive results.

It may be asked whether there is a way out of the situation that has arisen. Yes, there is. The Soviet Government has reached the conclusion that a new approach to the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is now necessary, one which would eliminate the difficulties and obstacles which have hindered agreement in the past.

The whole experience of the three-year negotiations at Geneva shows that they could not fail to reach a deadlock because our partners were trying to secure for themselves unilateral advantages to the detriment of the security interests of the other side. This in the end blocked a solution of the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests. On such a completely discredited basis it is, of course, impossible to achieve the discontinuance of nuclear tests, especially now when the Member States of the NATO bloc are going at full steam along the path of military preparations and threatening to reply to the conclusion of a German peace treaty by resort to war.

The question arises whether it is still possible in the situation which has come about to solve the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear tests so as to take a practical step towards the achievement of the main task -- general and complete disarmament.

Yes, it is possible.

With this end in view, the Soviet Government submits for examination by the Governments of the Western Powers the following proposal: to conclude immediately an appropriate agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, that is, in these environments where the implementation of control is not fraught with any serious technical difficulties.

The fulfilment of these obligations could be reciprocally verified with success and sufficient reliability by the already existing national technical systems. It is well known that national systems of detection have hitherto successfully coped with their tasks and that in practice no nuclear test, whether carried out by the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom or France, has remained unrecorded or undetected by them.

The President of the United States, Mr. J. Kennedy, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. H. MacMillan, spoke of this practical possibility of exercising control in their joint statement of 3 September 1961, in which, as is well known, they proposed the prohibition of nuclear tests in the atmosphere while relying "on existing means of detection", which, in their opinion, are completely adequate and do not need any additional international machinery. This approach proposed by the leading statesmen of the United States and the United Kingdom could be extended also to nuclear weapon tests under water and in outer space, since the possibilities of control over such tests are also not limited in any way from the technical point of view and could certainly be realized by the already existing national systems of detection. Moreover, the whole world would also keep a vigilant watch on the observance of an agreement of the Powers not to conduct nuclear tests, and that, too, would be a very important restraining factor.

In regard to underground nuclear weapon tests, the Soviet Government is of the opinion that States should undertake not to conduct such tests until agreement is reached on a system of control over underground explosions as a constituent part of an international system of control over the implementation of a programme of general and complete disarmament.

The method proposed by the Soviet Union for the solution of the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests would make it possible, without delay, to save mankind from all nuclear explosions and at the same time it would not place any State in a position of advantage, nor would it cause any detriment to the safeguarding of the national security of States. Such an approach would completely dispel all the suspicions that have legitimately been aroused in connexion with the wide opportunities for using the envisaged control system for intelligence purposes.

It goes without saying that an agreement by all nuclear States not to conduct any kind of nuclear tests while the negotiations are going on would contribute to the success of the negotiations. The Soviet Government, although it has carried out considerably fewer nuclear weapon tests than the United States, the United Kingdom and France, is nevertheless prepared to give such an undertaking, if the other States do likewise.

The Soviet Government also considers that the time has come to include France in the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. It is time to put an end to this double game of the Western Powers, in which some members of NATO negotiate on the prohibition of testing while others with the tacit approval of their allies continue to explode and develop nuclear bombs, thereby reinforcing the military potential of the NATO bloc.

Obviously, if any of the Western Powers, including France, start to carry out nuclear tests, then the Soviet Union will again be confronted with the necessity of drawing the appropriate conclusions.

Wishing to guide into a practical channel the negotiations that are about to begin in Geneva, the Soviet Government has prepared a draft agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons tests, which it submits for consideration by the Western Powers.

The Soviet Government expresses its confidence that the proposals it is introducing provide a practical opportunity for the prompt achievement of agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and will help to create a favourable atmosphere for the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, the relaxation of international tension, and the strengthening of peace.

Draft Agreement on the Discontinuance of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons Tests

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic,

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament which would abolish for all time the threat of an outbreak of war, put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear and thermonuclear weapons,

Believing that the renunciation by States of the testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would facilitate the achievement of agreement on general and complete disarmament,

Have for these purposes agreed as follows:

Article 1

The States Parties to this Agreement solemnly undertake not to conduct tests of any kind of nuclear or thermonuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space or under water.

Article 2

For the purpose of exercising mutual supervision of compliance with the undertaking contained in Article 1 of this Agreement, the States Parties to this Agreement shall use their national systems of detecting nuclear and thermonuclear explosions.

Article 3

The States Parties to this Agreement undertake not to conduct any underground tests of nuclear weapons until they have agreed together on a system of control over such tests as a constituent part of an international system of control over compliance with an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Article 4

This Agreement shall enter into force immediately upon its signature by the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, and shall be open for adherence to it by all States.

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**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

PRIVATE

ENDC/28

16 April 1962

Original : ENGLISH

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BRAZIL, BURMA, ETHIOPIA, INDIA, MEXICO,  
NIGERIA, SWEDEN, UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Joint Memorandum

1. The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference, deeply distressed that no agreement has as yet been reached concerning a ban on nuclear weapon tests, address an earnest appeal to the nuclear powers to persist in their efforts to come as soon as possible to an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests for all time.

The eight delegations are convinced that in making this appeal they are speaking not merely on behalf of their own countries but for an overwhelming world opinion, since nuclear tests are now the concern of all peoples and all nations.

2. They note that, in spite of the existing differences within the sub-committee on a nuclear test ban treaty, there are also certain areas of agreement. They think they have the right to expect that these areas will be further explored and extended and in this connexion commend to the consideration of the nuclear powers the following suggestions and ideas.

3. They believe that possibilities exist of establishing by agreement a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis. Such a system might be based and built upon already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions, or if more appropriate, on certain of the existing posts designated by agreement for the purpose together, if necessary, with new posts established by agreement. The existing networks already include in their scientific endeavours the detection and identification of manmade explosions. Improvements could no doubt be achieved by furnishing posts with more advanced instrumentation.

4. Furthermore, the feasibility of constituting by agreement an International Commission, consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries together with the appropriate staff might be considered. This Commission should be entrusted with the tasks of processing all

data received from the agreed system of observation posts and of reporting on any nuclear explosion or suspicious event on the basis of thorough and objective examination of all the available data. All parties to the treaty should accept the obligation to furnish the Commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event. Pursuant to this obligation the parties to the treaty could invite the Commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt.

5. Should the Commission find that it was unable to reach a conclusion on the nature of a significant event it would so inform the party on whose territory that event had occurred, and simultaneously inform it of the points on which urgent clarification seemed necessary. The party and the Commission should consult as to what further measures of clarification, including verification in loco, would facilitate the assessment. The party concerned would, in accordance with its obligation referred to in paragraph 4 above, give speedy and full co-operation to facilitate the assessment.

After full examination of the facts, taking into account any additional data furnished to it as suggested above, the International Commission would inform the parties to the treaty of all the circumstances of the case and of its assessment of the concerned event.

The parties to the treaty would be free to determine their action with regard to the treaty on the basis of reports furnished by the International Commission.

6. The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic urge the nuclear powers earnestly to consider the suggestions put forward above, as well as other possible suggestions, so as to save humanity from the evil of further nuclear tests.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

PRIVATE

ENDC/32

19 April 1962

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Statement by the Soviet Government dated 19 April 1962

On 16 April 1962 eight neutralist States, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, submitted a Joint Memorandum on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests for consideration by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. After making a careful study of this Memorandum, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to state the following.

The Soviet Government has attached and continues to attach great importance to a solution of the question of discontinuing all nuclear weapon tests. The reaching of an agreement on this question would be a great contribution to the cause of maintaining and consolidating peace and would meet the most earnest hopes and aspirations of all peoples.

With the conclusion of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, a definite barrier would be placed in the path of the nuclear arms race, which is fraught with grave dangers for universal peace, a situation of greater confidence would be brought about in relations among States, and the solution of the main problem - the question of general and complete disarmament - would be substantially facilitated. With the discontinuance by all States of nuclear weapon tests, there would be an end to contamination of the atmosphere and the surface of the earth by radio-active substances which are harmful to the health of human beings.

The Soviet Government and the Soviet people have these aims close at heart. Moved by the desire to bring about a speedy solution of the question of discontinuing nuclear tests, the Soviet Government has approached the Western Powers many times with concrete proposals to this effect. On 28 November 1961, at the negotiations on the discontinuance of tests, the Soviet Government submitted its draft agreement, on the basis of which it would be possible to put an end to all nuclear weapon tests for ever. For control over compliance by States with their obligations under an agreement, the Soviet Government proposed the use of national systems of detecting nuclear explosions, which States already have at their disposal.

In the light of the latest achievements in science and technology, the adequacy of national systems of detection does not and cannot give rise to the slightest doubts on the part of those who are really concerned to ensure reliable control over the discontinuance of tests. In this case, practice and experience entirely corroborate theory. After all, it is a fact that all nuclear explosions conducted so far, whether by the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom or France, have been recorded by national systems of detection in various countries - no other systems have existed or exist up to now. Nor do underground nuclear explosions constitute an exception in this respect. Very convincing in this connexion was the detection of the underground nuclear explosion, recently conducted in the Soviet Union, by the United States Atomic Energy Commission - and not by means of any international control or the despatch of inspection teams into USSR territory, but exclusively by means of national systems. This means that the United States has at its disposal detection systems which are adequate for recording underground nuclear explosions, however far from the United States these explosions were carried out. The Soviet Union also has such detection systems at its disposal, as have many other States.

The Soviet Government, true to its policy of peace and reducing international tension, has not relaxed for a single day its efforts in the struggle for a positive solution to the problem of discontinuing nuclear weapon tests, and during the work of the Eighteen Nation Committee the Soviet Government has more than once reaffirmed its readiness to sign, any day or any hour, an agreement which would put an end to nuclear explosions for ever and which, at the same time, would not jeopardize the national security interests of either side.

However, the Soviet Government is compelled to note with deep regret that, despite its efforts, despite the efforts of many other peace-loving States, despite the fervent desire of millions and millions of people to put an end to nuclear weapon tests, this question remains unsettled.

Why? Only because of the negative attitude of the Western Powers and, first and foremost, the United States. Now everyone realises that the policy of the United States and its allies in the NATO military bloc is directed not towards the discontinuance but towards the continuance of tests. The whole world is now living under the threat of a further large-scale series of United States atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons in the area of the Pacific Ocean, which has already been announced for all to hear by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom and which will inevitably intensify the nuclear arms race.

Trying somehow to cover up their dangerous policy, to divert the attention of the peoples from the actions of those who intend to increase still further the tempo of nuclear competition, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom state that it is impossible to agree to the discontinuance of nuclear tests unless a wide-spread system of international control is established. But what purposes would be served by such a system, if one takes into account that it is absolutely unnecessary for verifying the fulfilment by States of their obligations under an agreement? An exhaustively clear answer to these questions was given by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, in his message of 12 April 1962 to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Macmillan, in which he emphasized that it was a question of giving an opportunity to the organs of NATO to have their own agents in our territory under the pretext of international control, and in addition to military bases and troops stationed near the frontiers of the Soviet Union, to obtain our permission to carry on intelligence work in the territory of our own country. But the Soviet Union will never agree to this.

These are the facts. If we are to call things by their proper names, then it must be quite definitely stated that the Western Powers have now led the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests into an impasse.

The proposal of the eight neutralist States on the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests, submitted in the Eighteen Nation Committee on 16 April 1962, represents a serious attempt to lead the negotiations out of this impasse. There can be no doubt that this desire arises from the sincere concern of the neutralist States in connexion with the situation which has arisen.

Although not all the propositions in the Joint Memorandum of the eight States are equally clear, nevertheless it represents a constructive contribution, since it takes into account in a realistic manner the existing possibilities for a speedy solution of the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

The Joint Memorandum suggests that control on the discontinuance of nuclear tests should be carried out by means of national networks of observation posts, that for the selection and processing of the data obtained at these posts it is sufficient to set up an International Commission consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, and that the question of inviting the Commission for the purpose of verifying in loco the circumstances of the occurrence of any particular suspicious events should be decided by the States themselves. All these propositions undoubtedly deserve attention and could be a useful basis for reaching agreement on the discontinuance of all nuclear tests.

The proposals of the eight neutralist States completely shatter the myth of the Western Powers that it is impossible to conclude an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests without establishing an extensive system of international control, under cover of which the military staffs of the NATO countries would like to plant a wide-spread network of espionage on the territories of the peace-loving States. Now nothing remains of this myth.

The Soviet Government has come to the conclusion that the submission by the neutralist States of their proposals on the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests gives rise to new hope for the solution of this question in the interest of all peoples.

For its part, the Soviet Government expresses its willingness to study the proposals set out in the Memorandum of the neutralist States as a basis for further negotiations. Thus the Soviet Government gives a positive answer to the appeal of the Governments of the States sponsoring the Joint Memorandum and will continue its efforts to achieve as quickly as possible an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests for ever.

It is obvious that fruitful negotiations on the discontinuance of tests cannot be conducted to the thunder of nuclear explosions. Therefore, the Soviet Government is of the opinion -- since this is the only way the spirit and sense of the proposals made by the neutralist States can be interpreted -- that now that these proposals hold out new prospects for the negotiations and for the attainment of agreement, it becomes even more important for the nuclear Powers to give a voluntary undertaking not to set off nuclear explosions while the negotiations are in progress. The Soviet Government confirms its readiness to give such an undertaking if the Western Powers will do likewise.

The next few days must show the turn events are to take -- whether towards an agreement to end nuclear weapon tests or towards further nuclear tests in the atmosphere. This depends entirely on the governments of the United States and its allies. The Western Powers now have an opportunity to demonstrate in practice that they will not obstruct the settlement of the urgent problem of ending tests. The peoples of the world will never forgive them if this opportunity is missed.

The Soviet Government appeals to the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to listen to the voice of reason and to take the course of reaching agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests for all time.

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19 April 1962

CHECK-LIST OF DOCUMENTS  
ISSUED BY THE CONFERENCE AND ITS SUBSIDIARY ORGANS  
(14 March 1962 - 31 May 1962)



SECTION I - DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE

Part A Verbatim records of the Conference /ENDC/PV. - Series/

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
1st meeting to 46th meeting	14 Mar. 1962	ENDC/PV.1
	to 31 May 1962	to ENDC/PV.46

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Part B Documents of the Conference /ENDC/- Series/

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Agreement on procedural arrangements	14 Mar. 1962	ENDC/1
Addendum to ENDC/1	28 Mar. 1962	ENDC/1 Add.1
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control (Draft of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)	15 Mar. 1962  (corrected version { 19 Mar. 1962	ENDC/2  ENDC/2* } )
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Memorandum of the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on disarmament negotiations in the Eighteen Nation Committee	15 Mar. 1962  (corrected version, { 19 Mar. 1962	ENDC/3  ENDC/3* } )
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Statement by the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, A.A. Gromyko, at the meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, on 15 March 1962	15 Mar. 1962	ENDC/4
<u>ibid</u>	19 Mar. 1962	ENDC/4 Rev.1
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America Joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations	19 Mar. 1962	ENDC/5

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
United States of America Declaration on disarmament: A programme for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world	16 Mar. 1962  (corrected version, 19 Mar. 1962	ENDC/6  ) ENDC/6*)
United States of America 1. Message of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.S. Khrushchev, dated 7 February 1962; 2. Message of President Kennedy to Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.S. Khrushchev, dated 14 February 1962; 3. Message of President Kennedy to Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.S. Khrushchev, dated 25 February 1962; 4. Letter of President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk, dated 13 March 1962.	16 Mar. 1962	ENDC/7
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1. Message from Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to Mr. John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America, and Mr. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, dated 10 February 1962. 2. Message from Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to Mr. John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America, dated 21 February 1962. 3. Message from Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to Mr. John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America, dated 3 March 1962.	19 Mar. 1962	ENDC/8
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America Draft treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.	21 Mar. 1962	ENDC/9

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Sub-committee on a treaty for the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests - Interim report (see ENDC/SC.1/PV.1 and 2)	22 Mar. 1962	ENDC/10
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Statement by the Soviet Government dated 27 November 1961 in connexion with the resumption of negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and text of a draft agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear and thermonuclear weapon tests.	22 Mar. 1962	ENDC/11
Procedure of work of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee recommended by co-Chairmen.	23 Mar. 1962	ENDC/12
United States of America Text of an address by the President of the United States made on 2 March 1962, entitled: "Nuclear testing and disarmament".	23 Mar. 1962	ENDC/13
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 26 September 1961 on measures to ease international tension, strengthen confidence among States and contribute to general and complete disarmament.	24 Mar. 1962	ENDC/14
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Letter from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the United Nations Acting Secretary-General concerning an Address by the World Council of Peace, and text of the Address.	24 Mar. 1962	ENDC/15
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Letter, dated 27 March 1962, from the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, transmitting a Memorandum from the Government of the German Democratic Republic.	27 Mar. 1962	ENDC/16
Canada Statement by the Honourable Howard Green, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, in the 18-Member Disarmament Conference, Geneva, March 27 1962.	28 Mar. 1962	ENDC/17

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
United States of America: outline of provisions of a basic treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world (Preamble)	4 April 1962	ENDC/18
Canada: An Outline Review. USSR and USA Disarmament Proposals	4 April 1962	ENDC/19
<u>ibid</u>	6 April 1962	ENDC/19/Rev.1
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Message of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations Commission on Disarmament on the Question of the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, dated 3 April 1962	5 April 1962	ENDC/20
<u>ibid</u>	9 April 1962	ENDC/20/Rev.1
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Letter dated 5 April 1962 from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, enclosing an appeal to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament from the World Congress of Women for Disarmament	6 April 1962	ENDC/21
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America: Letter dated 6 April 1962 from the Co-Chairman of the Conference to the Special Representative of the UN Acting Secretary-General transmitting an Appeal from Women of 10 Countries and a Petition from American Women	6 April 1962	ENDC/22
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Message from Mr. N.S. Khrushchev to Mr. H. Ikeda, Prime Minister of Japan	9 April 1962	ENDC/23

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
United Kingdom and United States: Joint Statement by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan to Chairman Khrushchev dated 9 April 1962	11 April 1962	ENDC/24
United Kingdom: Message from Prime Minister Macmillan to Chairman Khrushchev, dated 10 April 1962	11 April 1962	ENDC/25
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Letter dated 12 April 1962 from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, enclosing messages from the West German Women's Movement for Peace to the members of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament	13 April 1962	ENDC/26
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Message from Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in reply to Mr. H. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom	16 April 1962	ENDC/27
Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic: Joint Memorandum	16 April 1962	ENDC/28
United States of America: Questions submitted by the Delegation of the United States with respect to the Eight Power Joint Memorandum (ENDC/28)	17 April 1962	ENDC/29
United States of America: Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarma- ment in a Peaceful World	18 April 1962	ENDC/30
United States of America: Corrigendum to the Document ENDC/30	25 April 1962	ENDC/30 Corr.1
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America: Letter dated 16 April 1962 from the Co-Chairmen to the Special Representative of the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations transmitting a public statement of the President of Yugoslavia concerning the resumption of nuclear tests	18 April 1962	ENDC/31

<u>Title of Document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Statement by the Soviet Government dated 19 April 1962 (on the eight power Joint Memorandum ENDC/28)	19 April 1962	ENDC/32
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Letter dated 19 April 1962 from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the Special Represent- ative of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, transmitting an appeal from the Standing Committee of the Young Workers of Germany, a com- pendium of resolutions passed and information on the activities of Young Workers	24 April 1962	ENDC/33
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Report of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A.A. Gromyko, to the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the negotiations in Geneva, on 24 April 1962	25 April 1962	ENDC/34
United States of America: Statement made by the representative of the United States Delegation at the 28th meeting of the Conference, on 26 April 1962	26 April 1962	ENDC/35
Canada: An Outline Comparison USA and USSR Disarmament Proposals	4 May 1962	ENDC/36
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America: Letter from the Co-Chairmen of the Conference to the Special Representative of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitting a message and an appeal by a delegation of the city of Hiroshima. (Japan)	7 May 1962	ENDC/37

<u>Title of Document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Letter dated 14 May 1962 from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, enclosing a letter from Mr. P. Biquard, Secretary-General of the World Federation of Scientific Workers, and the text of a public statement by Professor C.F. Powell, President of the federation, on the subject of nuclear weapon tests.	14 May 1962	ENDC/38
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Statement by the Soviet delegation in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee on 29 May 1962	29 May 1962	ENDC/39
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America: Working Draft of part I proposed by the USA and USSR	30 May 1962	ENDC/40
<u>ibid</u>	31 May 1962	ENDC/40/Rev.1
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America: Draft Report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission (recommended by the Co-Chairmen)	30 May 1962	ENDC/41

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Part C / ENDC/L- Series/

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
SWEDEN		
Observations on the drafting of the preamble of the treaty	30 Mar. 1962	ENDC/L.1
UNITED KINGDOM		
Amendments of the United Kingdom Delegation to the preamble of the Soviet Draft Treaty	31 Mar. 1962	ENDC/L.2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA		
Outline of provisions of a basic treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world	2 April 1962	ENDC/L.3
CANADA		
Draft preamble to a treaty on general and complete disarmament	2 April 1962	ENDC/L.4
INDIA		
Draft preamble for a treaty on general and complete disarmament	2 April 1962	ENDC/L.5
ITALY		
Memorandum concerning the Preamble to the Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament	2 April 1962	ENDC/L.6
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA		
(Working draft)		
Draft Preamble to (Outline of Provisions of a Basic)((the)) Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament (In a Peaceful World)	6 April 1962	ENDC/L.7



<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
BRAZIL		
Comments by the delegation of Brazil on the "Draft Preamble to the Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament" proposed by the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America	12 April 1962	ENDC/L.8
ITALY		
Memorandum (Draft Amendment to the document ENDC/18)	16 April 1962	ENDC/L.9
UNITED KINGDOM		
Comments of the United Kingdom on Part I of the U.S. and Soviet Proposals for a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament	16 April 1962	ENDC/L.10
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Working draft)		
Draft Preamble of the Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament (In a Peaceful World)	16 April 1962	ENDC/L.11
<u>ibid</u>	17 April 1962	ENDC/L.II/Rev.1
UNITED KINGDOM		
Further Comments on Part I of the U.S. and Soviet Proposals for a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament	27 April 1962	ENDC/L.12
SWEDEN		
Draft Amendments to the USSR Draft Treaty (ENDC/2) (Part I - General)	27 April 1962	ENDC/L.13
Corrigendum to the document ENDC/L.13	30 March 1962	ENDC/L.13 Corr.1
Corrigendum to the document ENDC/L.13	30 March 1962	ENDC/L.13 Corr.2

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
SWEDEN		
Draft Amendment to the Outline of Basic Provisions submitted by the United States (ENDC/30) (Objectives)	27 April 1962	ENDC/L.14
CANADA		
Comments on Part I of the USA and Proposals for a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament	27 April 1962	ENDC/L.15
INDIA		
Observations on Part I of a treaty on General and Complete Disarmament	27 April 1962	ENDC/L.16

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Part D Documents containing information of an administrative nature /ENDC/INF.-Series/

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Basic information for delegations on conference arrangements and documentation	14 March 1962	ENDC/INF.1
List of Members of Delegations to the Conference	19 March 1962	ENDC/INF.2
<u>ibid</u>	24 March 1962	ENDC/INF.2 Rev.1
Telegram addressed on 20 March 1962 to the President of the "Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament" by the Foreign Minister of the Mongolian People's Republic	29 March 1962	ENDC/INF.3
<u>ibid</u>	29 March 1962	ENDC/INF.3 Rev.1
Check-list of documents issued between 14 March 1962 and 31 March 1962	2 April 1962	ENDC/INF.4

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Check-list of Documents issued between 1 April 1962 and 15 April 1962	16 April 1962	ENDC/INF.4/Add.1
Check-list of documents issued between 16 April 1962 and 30 April 1962	1 May 1962	ENDC/INF.4/Add.2
Check-list of documents issued between 1 May 1962 and 15 May 1962	16 May 1962	ENDC/INF.4/Add.3
Public release of final verbatim Records and Documents	24 April 1962	ENDC/INF.5
<u>ibid</u>	7 May 1962	ENDC/INF.5/Add.1
<u>ibid</u>	21 May 1962	ENDC/INF.5/Add.2

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Part E Non Governmental communications /ENDC/IGC./- Series/

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
List of Communications received by the Secretariat of the Conference up to 29 March 1962	29 March 1962	ENDC/IGC./1
List of Communications received by the Secretariat of the Conference during the period of 30 March - 4 May 1962	4 May 1962	ENDC/IGC./2
List of Communications received by the Secretariat of the Conference during the period of 5 May - 28 May 1962	23 May 1962	ENDC/IGC./3

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SECTION II - DOCUMENTS OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Part A Verbatim records of the Committee /ENDC/C.1/PV.- Series/

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
1st meeting to 8th meeting.	28 March 1962	ENDC/C1/PV.1
	to 25 May 1962	to ENDC/C1/PV.8
	* * *	

Part B Documents of the Committee /ENDC/C.1/- Series/

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
People's Republic of Poland: Memorandum submitted by the Polish Delegation, dated 28 March 1962, concerning the establishment of a denuclearized and limited armaments zone in Europe	28 Mar. 1962	ENDC/C.1/1
Agreed recommendations by Co- Chairmen on arrangements for discussion of proposals in the Committee of the Whole	2 April 1962	ENDC/C.1/2
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Declaration on the prohibition of war propaganda (draft)	3 April 1962	ENDC/C.1/3
Italy: Proposal in relation with the item "war propaganda"	9 April 1962	ENDC/C.1/4
United States of America: Draft Statement for inclusion in Report of Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to United Nations Disarmament Commission	12 April 1962	ENDC/C.1/5
United Kingdom: Suggested Amendment on the question of war propaganda	12 April 1962	ENDC/C.1/6

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
People's Republic of Bulgaria: Clauses to be added to the draft declaration on the prohibition of war propaganda submitted by the USSR	12 April 1962	ENDC/C.1/7
Corrigendum to Document ENDC/C.1/7	12 April 1962	ENDC/C.1/7/Corr.1
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic: Amendment of the Czechoslovak Delegation to the Draft Declaration on the Prohibition of War Propaganda, submitted by the delegation of the USSR	12 April 1962	ENDC/C.1/8
Romanian People's Republic: Amendments of the Romanian Delegation to the Draft Declaration on Prohibition of War Propaganda submitted by the USSR	12 April 1962	ENDC/C.1/9
People's Republic of Poland: Proposal by the Delegation of the Polish People's Republic concerning the text of document ENDC/C.1/3	12 April 1962	ENDC/C.1/10
Canada: Proposals for inclusion in a text concerning the item on "war propaganda"	12 April 1962	ENDC/C.1/11
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Recommendation on arrangement for discussion of proposals in the Committee of the Whole	25 April 1962	ENDC/C.1/12
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Proposal of the USSR Delegation dated 14 April 1962: Declaration on the prohibition of war propaganda (Draft)	26 April 1962	ENDC/C.1/13
United States of America: Proposal of the United States Delegation: Recommendation on arrangements for discussion of proposals in the Committee of the Whole	26 April 1962	ENDC/C.1/14

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
United States of America: Draft Statement for Inclusion in Report of Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee to the United Nations Disarmament Commission	27 April 1962	ENDC/C.1/15
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Proposal of the USSR Delegation (2nd version of operative paragraph 4 of the Declaration on the Prohibition of war propaganda)	27 April 1962	ENDC/C.1/16
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America: Agreed recommendations by Co-Chairmen on arrangements for discussion of proposals in the Committee of the Whole	24 May 1962	ENDC/C.1/17
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America: Agreed recommendation by the Co-Chairmen Declaration against War Propaganda	25 May 1962	ENDC/C.1/18
Agreed recommendations by Co-Chairmen on Arrangements for discussion of proposals, adopted by Committee of the Whole, at its Eighth Meeting on 25 May 1962	25 May 1962	ENDC/C.1/19
Declaration against War Propaganda Approved by the Committee of the Whole, at its eighth meeting on 25 May 1962.	25 May 1962	ENDC/C.1/20
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Statement by the Soviet delegation in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee on 29 May 1962	29 May 1962	ENDC/C.1/21

SECTION III - DOCUMENTS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE DISCONTINUANCE OF  
NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

Part A. Verbatim records of the Sub-Committee

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
1st meeting to 18th meeting	21 March 1962	ENDC/SC.1/PV.1
	to 29 May 1962	to ENDC/SC.1/PV.18

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