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Chairman: Mr. Omar LOUTFI (Egypt).

AGENDA ITEM 45

Report of the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds (A/3194, A/C.5/694, A/C.5/L.433/Rev.1, A/C.5/L.439) (*continued*)

1. Mr. DE ALMEIDA (Brazil) introduced the amendments (A/C.5/L.439) submitted by his own delegation and those of France, India and Yugoslavia to the seven-Power revised draft resolution (A/C.5/L.433/Rev.1). The amendments were as follows:

"1. Add the following words at the end of the second paragraph of the preamble:

"... to the effect that the proposed change does not serve the best interests of the programmes under their supervision and that these two bodies favour the retention of their present fund-raising procedure."

"2. Amend the fourth paragraph of the preamble to read as follows:

"Recognizing further the need to change the existing procedure for obtaining financial support for those programmes for which voluntary contributions fall considerably short of the financial targets set for them".

"3. Replace the operative part of the following text:

"1. *Decides*

"(a) In the case of UNICEF, to retain the present year-round-fund-raising procedure;

"(b) In the case of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, to retain the present system of a special pledging conference, to be held at the initiative of the Negotiating Committee;

"(c) To convene, during the twelfth session of the General Assembly, an *ad hoc* committee of the whole Assembly, under the chairmanship of the President of the session, where pledges of contributions for the two refugee programmes for the following financial year would be announced;

"2. *Decides further* that States not Members of the United Nations, but members of one or more of the specialized agencies, shall be invited to attend meetings of the *ad hoc* committee for the purpose of announcing their pledges to these programmes."

2. The sponsors of the amendments considered that there was no need for any change in draft resolution B of the seven-Power proposal.

3. The suggested changes should give reasonable satisfaction to the sponsors of the original draft resolution and to the members of the Negotiating Committee, which had stressed the need for special efforts on behalf of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the United Nations Refugee Fund (UNREF). Some solution must be found for the predicament of the refugees, particularly those who were victims of political oppression. But it was important that the valuable work being done under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and UNICEF's activities on behalf of mothers and children should not be jeopardized by any diversion of their funds to the refugee programmes. In that connexion, the statement by the representative of Iraq at the 570th meeting had been of great significance. UNICEF, in the course of its regular programmes, had already given great assistance to refugees, for example in Palestine, where it had devoted \$7 million to alleviating their sufferings. The amendments should satisfy those who considered that the refugee programmes required a new impetus.

4. There appeared to be a wide feeling in the Committee that the new procedure should be tried on an experimental basis. The Brazilian delegation felt that that was a dangerous approach. The procedure suggested by the United States representative and the co-sponsors of the joint draft resolution might prove to be detrimental to one or other of the programmes, whereas the compromise solution suggested in the four-Power amendments would entail no such risk.

5. If sufficient support were forthcoming, a further paragraph might perhaps be added to the amended resolution to the effect that the Secretary-General, through the Department of Public Information, should give the necessary publicity to the *ad hoc* committee's function of receiving pledges for the refugee programmes.

6. Mr. BRAVO CARO (Mexico) thought that the majority view, in which his delegation concurred, appeared to be that there was no need to change the existing procedure, particularly as UNICEF and the Technical Assistance Committee (TAC) had indicated that they found it satisfactory. There were also practical considerations which would prevent his Government from announcing its pledges to the programmes at a single meeting. He would therefore support the four-Power amendments.

7. Mr. CERULLI IRELLI (Italy) also favoured the four-Power amendments and recalled that the Italian representative in the Executive Board of UNICEF had been among the majority, which had opposed the changes proposed by the Negotiating Committee.

8. If the amendments were adopted, little would be left of the original text and he therefore wondered whether it would not be preferable to treat the four-Power amendments as a draft resolution in its own right.

9. Mr. NAIK (Pakistan) said that, in co-sponsoring the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.5/L.433/Rev.1), the Pakistan delegation had been guided by its consistently-held opinion that the procedure advocated in the report of the Negotiating Committee (A/3194) was sound. The Negotiating Committee had a general responsibility for all the programmes, and it would therefore be invidious to single out any particular programme as conspicuously successful or otherwise. There was, however, the possible effect, mentioned in paragraph 13 of that Committee's report, on the prestige of the United Nations of the recurrent failure to achieve announced targets: the implication was that the present procedure must be changed. The draft resolution, which was an attempt to change it, did not seek to replace the existing fund-raising activities of all programmes by other methods; in the case of UNICEF and TAC, it was designed to strengthen their hands.

10. He did not think that the gloomy prognostications of the Brazilian representative were justified. If the new procedure were adopted on a trial basis, no harm would be done to those programmes whose own fund-raising methods were already standing them in such good stead. It was not suggested that there should be any blood transfusion from the financially healthy to the sickly programmes.

11. One reason why the refugee programmes were not thriving was probably the fact that they were of regional interest and not world-wide in their appeal. That situation could best be remedied by focusing the attention of the United Nations on them at the highest level, namely, the General Assembly.

12. Mr. JONES (United States of America) said that the statements of a number of representatives had caused him some surprise. He readily conceded that there was some justification for the criticism that there was at present no guarantee that a joint pledging conference or series of such conferences would increase contributions to the programmes. Nevertheless, the application of the proposed new procedure as an experiment would certainly do no harm. He did not think there was any serious danger of UNICEF and technical assistance funds being diverted to the refugee programmes. The United States and other Governments which together contributed over 70 per cent of the funds for UNICEF and TAC programmes anticipated no such diversion: even if the Committee did suppose, for the sake of argument, that a small diversion did take place, it would certainly be on a small scale, and he could see no reason why any Government should object to it, if it helped to bring relief to thousands of homeless and hungry refugees. That would surely not run counter to the objectives of the United Nations as a whole.

13. It had also been alleged that, even if no diversion of funds occurred, the holding of a single pledging conference covering all the programmes would cause Governments, and especially the Treasury officials who represented them, to reduce their total pledges. That was a strange charge from a responsible body such as the Fifth Committee, and no real evidence of such a danger had been produced. The proposed new procedure was far from being a bold step and, in view of the great need for increased contributions, he earnestly hoped that it would be given a trial.

14. He suggested that, as the amendments were tantamount to a new proposal, their sponsors might perhaps

agree to let the Committee vote first on the draft resolution (A/C.5/L.433/Rev.1).

15. Mr. CARANICAS (Greece) considered that the fund-raising system hitherto employed had been quite successful, and his delegation would therefore support the amendments, in line with the stand it had taken in the UNICEF Executive Board and the Technical Assistance Committee in rejecting the proposals in the Negotiating Committee's report (A/3194). None of the arguments advanced against the amendments had appeared to him convincing.

16. Mr. CHECHETKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) could not support the draft resolution (A/C.5/L.433/Rev.1), because it did not take account of the decisions taken by TAC and the Executive Board of UNICEF. Furthermore, its adoption would not provide a practical solution of the contributions problem, but would entail the very real danger of making the system too bureaucratic. The United States representative had not refuted the arguments in favour of the amendments, but had merely asked that the procedure should be tried out in practice.

17. The Soviet delegation agreed in principle with the first and second amendments in document A/C.5/L.439; in regard to the third amendment, he wished to ask the sponsors whether paragraph 1 (c) of the operative part should be interpreted to mean that the various programmes were to be considered at separate meetings.

18. Mr. DE PINIES (Spain) proposed that the word "voluntary" should be inserted before the word "contributions" in paragraph 1 (c) of the operative part of the third amendment. Particularly in view of the second amendment, it would be as well to make it clear that the change in procedure advocated for the two refugee programmes did not affect the voluntary nature of the contributions.

19. Mr. CLOUGH (United Kingdom) supported the United States representative's proposal that the draft resolution should be put to the vote first. The proposals in document A/C.5/L.439 were not properly speaking amendments, as they differed in substance from the draft resolution. Furthermore, if those proposals were put to the vote first, the Committee might find itself in the awkward predicament of having rejected the proposals and the draft resolution, whereas some representatives might be willing to support the proposals as an alternative, if the draft resolution was rejected.

20. Mr. EL-MESSIRI (Egypt) said that the third amendment implied that there were different degrees of interest in the various voluntary programmes. No such suggestion should be made in respect of programmes based solely on the idea of international co-operation. That idea should underlie all the voluntary programmes without exception and should govern contributions to extra-budgetary funds.

21. Mr. AHMED (Sudan) congratulated the Negotiating Committee on an excellent report. He was sure that all members of the Fifth Committee would agree that pledges should not fall short of the financial targets set for the programmes. Since the existing fund-raising procedure had not proved successful, the Committee should agree to give the new procedure recommended by the Negotiating Committee a trial; it could subsequently be reviewed, if it did not come up to expectations. He would therefore vote in favour of the draft resolution.

22. He could not support the amendments, as he saw no reason for excluding UNICEF and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance from the new procedure, particularly as the annex to the Negotiating Committee's report showed that at 15 September 1956 payments for both programmes had fallen short of the 1956 financial targets.

23. Mr. DIPP GOMEZ (Dominican Republic) said that he would vote in support of the amendments, since they were in conformity with the position taken by his delegation in the Executive Board of UNICEF and in TAC, and took into account the need to find a solution to the problem of contributions to the two refugee programmes.

24. His Government, which combined a humanitarian policy in international matters with a sense of realism, had helped to alleviate the lot of the refugees both by financial contributions and by providing asylum, homes and work for thousands of displaced persons.

25. Mr. DE ALMEIDA (Brazil) could not agree to the United States representative's suggestion that the draft resolution should be put to the vote first. The four-Power amendments were clearly not a new proposal, as they preserved the main objective of the draft resolution, namely, to find some means of improving the financial position of the two refugee programmes.

26. In reply to the USSR representative's question regarding paragraph 1 (c) of the proposed new operative part, the intention was that separate pledging meetings would be held for the two programmes. Such an arrangement would stress the importance of each programme and would induce a greater sense of responsibility in contributing Governments. He accepted the Spanish representative's amendment to the same paragraph.

27. Mr. KHALAF (Iraq) observed that the joint draft resolution sought to introduce a fund-raising procedure which would be more successful than the one now in force; that was the criterion by which the new procedure should be judged when it was reviewed.

28. He could not understand why some representatives were so reluctant to depart from the positions which their delegations had adopted in the UNICEF Executive Board and TAC. The Fifth Committee, unlike the Executive Board and TAC, consisted of representatives of all Member States and it should take a general view of the needs of all the voluntary programmes.

29. For those reasons and because the Negotiating Committee had made it clear that it would wish to reconsider the situation should it be decided that separate arrangements should continue to be made for any one or more of the voluntary programmes, he would be unable to vote for the amendments. He would vote in favour of the draft resolution and supported the suggestion that it should be put to the vote first.

30. Mr. PEACHEY (Australia) recognized that the procedure suggested in the amendments would be an improvement over the patently unsatisfactory system now in force. Nevertheless, he much preferred the draft resolution as it stood, because it refrained from singling out any one programme. His Government was a substantial contributor to UNICEF and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and it had no desire to reduce their effectiveness. He did not think that the joint draft resolution would have that

effect. He would vote against the four-Power proposals, whether they were put to the vote in the form of amendments or as a separate draft resolution, because they ignored the considered views of the Negotiating Committee, which included representatives of the major contributors whose opinions should be considered. He agreed that the new procedure should be introduced on a trial basis for one year.

31. Mr. DIEGUEZ (Guatemala) proposed certain changes in the four-Power amendments (A/C.5/L.439). The words "of the United Nations financed by voluntary contributions for which those contributions" should be substituted for the words "for which voluntary contributions" in the second amendment. The words "with separate meetings dedicated to each programme" should be inserted in operative paragraph 1 (c) of the third amendment. He presumed that the words "these programmes" in operative paragraph 2 were meant to refer to the two refugee programmes. If so, they should be replaced by the words "the two refugee programmes".

32. He would vote in favour of the four-Power amendments. In so doing, he wished to make it clear that he did not underestimate the need to give the necessary stimulus to the refugee programmes. All United Nations programmes deserved the support of all Member States.

33. Mr. FORTEZA (Uruguay) said that he would vote in favour of the four-Power amendments, as he shared the misgivings expressed by other speakers regarding the possible consequences of the new procedure on UNICEF and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. He suggested, however, that the words "to the effect that the proposed change does not serve the interests of the programmes under their supervision and" should be deleted from the first amendment, as he had doubts about the desirability of including such a statement, true though it was, in a General Assembly resolution. He questioned the need for specifying that the existing fund-raising procedure would be retained in the case of UNICEF and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. The reference to the two refugee programmes in operative paragraph 1 (c) should suffice to make it clear that the change in procedure applied only to them. He would not, however, insist on that point.

34. Mr. RAEYMAECKERS (Belgium) shared the Negotiating Committee's concern at the tendency over the last two years for contributions to the voluntary programmes to fall short of the funds necessary for their maintenance. The problem could no longer be ignored. Neither the draft resolution nor the amendments dealt with the substance of the problem. For the moment it could only be hoped that a simple change of procedure would bring about the desired improvement. As the amendments took account of the objections raised to applying the new procedure to the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and UNICEF, he would vote in favour of them.

35. Mr. DE ALMEIDA (Brazil) accepted the amendments suggested by the Guatemalan representative and the change proposed by the representative of Uruguay.

36. The CHAIRMAN proposed that a revised text of the amendments should be submitted at the following meeting.

It was so agreed.

AGENDA ITEM 51

United Nations salary, allowance and benefits system: report of the Salary Review Committee (A/3209, A/3505 and Corr.1, A/C.5/691 and Add.1 to 3) (continued)

37. Mr. AGHNIDES (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions),¹ introducing the Advisory Committee's report (A/3505 and Corr.1), stressed that in the short time at its disposal the Advisory Committee had been unable to deal as thoroughly as it would have wished with every point of difference between the Secretary-General and the Salary Review Committee.

38. The points on which the Advisory Committee differed with the Salary Review Committee were set out in paragraphs 11 (ii) and (iii), 14 (iii) a, 23 (ii) and 29 of the table annexed to the Advisory Committee's report.

39. The question of base salary scales for Professional and higher categories was fundamental to the whole system proposed by the Salary Review Committee. On balance, the Advisory Committee agreed with the Salary Review Committee on that point for the reasons stated in document A/3505/Corr.1.

40. He drew attention to paragraph 11 (vii) of the table annexed to the Advisory Committee's report, dealing with the classification of the main headquarters offices of the organizations for the purposes of the post adjustment. With regard to the Secretary-General's opinion (A/C.5/691) that in January 1957 New York was closer to class 5 than class 4, it might be argued that if the situation in January 1957 was to be considered at all, it should be considered not only in respect of New York but also of the other locations, including Geneva, where some upward movement in the cost of living might have occurred during 1956. The determination of such movements in the cost of living of international officials was a complex task, especially as a considerable element of judgement was involved where such factors as commutation to work, domestic help and medical expenses were concerned. While it was, therefore, possible that in January 1957 class 4 might be slightly unfavourable to the staff at New York, the Advisory Committee was not entirely convinced that there was sufficient justification at that stage for placing New York in class 5.

41. With regard to salaries in the General Service category in New York, the Advisory Committee agreed with the Salary Review Committee's recommendations and the Secretary-General's specific proposal for an increase of approximately 7 per cent over the level of remuneration in force at the end of 1954, such an increase to apply in addition to the 2.5 per cent cost of living allowance granted with effect from 1 January 1956.

42. Mr. MEINSTORP (Denmark) said that the Salary Review Committee's report (A/3209) dealt with the United Nations salary, allowance and benefits system in great detail. A thorough study of that report, together with the comments of the Secretary-General (A/C.5/691 and Add.2), the Staff Council (A/C.5/691/Add.1 and 3) and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

(A/3505 and Corr.1) would require many months. In his view, it would be advisable for the Fifth Committee to confine itself to the main problems so that a decision could be taken at the present session which would be satisfactory to the staffs of the United Nations and the other organizations. The United Nations was greatly dependent on its staff members, whose work was highly appreciated. It was only right that they should be given working and living conditions such as would enable them to perform their work not only with efficiency but also with pleasure and satisfaction, and he trusted that the problem would be solved with due regard to the interests of all concerned.

43. Mr. EL-MESSIRI (Egypt) said that the question under review was of the highest importance to Member States and to the international organizations, their staff members and their executive heads, who were largely responsible for the smooth running of the organizations and effective co-ordination and co-operation between them. The fulfilment of the aims of the United Nations depended largely on the well-being of the staff, as the instrument for carrying programmes of international action into effect.

44. Unlike members of national civil services, members of international secretariats were drawn from all parts of the world and were usually stationed far from their home countries. Their conditions of service had to be such as to meet the requirements of the various organizations and must be flexible enough to be applicable to a wide variety of staff, assignments and location conditions. The problem was therefore extremely complex and it was difficult to work out a system which would be satisfactory in all respects. The Salary Review Committee's recommendations and the Secretary-General's comments should be approached with those factors in mind.

45. He was happy to note that, despite the complexity of the problem, the points of difference between the Salary Review Committee and the Secretary-General were few, as paragraph 9 of the Secretary-General's report giving his own views and those of the executive heads of the specialized agencies indicated (A/C.5/691).

46. Turning to specific points raised in the Secretary-General's report and in that of the Advisory Committee, he pointed out that the executive heads proposed the application of longevity steps to all levels from P-1 to P-4, whereas the Salary Review Committee, which had discussed that point at length, had recommended that P-1 be regarded as a two-year training grade for career staff and had found that salaries above the P-3 level were sufficiently high and did not justify longevity increments.

47. On pensionable scales, the Secretary-General's report noted that the position was partly due to the fact that pensions were based on net pay under the United Nations system but based on gross pay elsewhere. It would be important, in that connexion, to know whether, at the time the net salary system was in force during the early years of the Organization, salaries had been fixed at a level corresponding to the outside gross or net figure. Another factor to be considered was the principle of equity among staff as regards pension scales: under the present system, with New York as the base, the pensionable pay for professional staff at other duty stations was the New York net base scale without any minus or plus differential.

¹ The complete text of the statement of the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions will be found in document A/C.5/697.

That principle had been strongly defended by representatives of the various organizations as a means of assuring equity in pension entitlements.

48. In regard to the conditions of service of non-career staff, the executive heads had expressed the view that the extent to which the device of fixed-term appointments could be used in each organization must continue to depend on the particular circumstances and on their own judgement. However, the Salary Review Committee's recommendations on that point did not preclude the exercise of judgement by the executive heads. In proposing that the proportion of posts so filled might be brought up to 20 per cent, it had made it clear that the actual percentage would naturally vary with the nature of the organization. The Advisory Committee had also stated that an increase in the present proportion of fixed-term posts was desirable.

49. On the question of maternity leave, the executive heads had found themselves unable to support the Salary Review Committee's recommendation that the second six weeks should be on half pay. The facts were, however, that in a large number of countries maternity leave was counted against sick leave or annual leave. In the United Nations, the total period of absence on full pay permitted in a year was considerable—twelve weeks' maternity leave, plus six weeks' annual leave, or a total of about five months. The recommendation was therefore not unreasonable, nor was it inconsistent with the International Labour Organisation Convention concerning maternity protection (revised 1952) which stipulated that absence during a period of at least six weeks after confinement should be compulsory. Whereas the ILO Convention mentioned only six weeks' leave, and that only after confinement, the Salary Review Committee recommended a total of twelve weeks. The executive heads' recommendation that annual leave should not accrue during paid maternity leave was a further step towards normalizing the unduly generous provisions at present in force.

50. On the question of service or "severance" benefits, the Secretary-General's report took the view that it was illogical to pay it at different rates to expatriate and non-expatriate staff. However, the latter had the advantage of remaining in their own country when their contract came to an end whereas the former would need to return to their own country to renew their contacts. The executive heads made the point, furthermore, that service benefit was granted not only to attract staff to temporary service, but also as a partial substitute for certain social security benefits which long-term staff enjoyed. However, in view of the stated fact (A/C.5/691, para. 62) that 90 per cent or more of staff to whom that benefit would apply would be in expatriate service and that the proposal of a service benefit of 6 per cent for all would represent a considerable economy over the Salary Review Committee's proposal, the idea of a uniform service benefit could be supported if the number of expatriates to whom it would apply would invariably exceed the number of non-expatriates.

51. The Secretary-General's proposal that assignment allowances should be paid at one rate for staff members without primary dependants and at another rate for those with dependants was administratively sound and could also be accepted.

52. On the question of the reconciliation of conditions of service under different programmes, the Advisory Committee had recommended that the matter should be further studied and that the Secretary-General should submit a report to the twelfth session. However, he personally felt that the question was too important to be left unsettled. The Salary Review Committee's scheme had been worked out in consultation with the various agencies and the Secretary-General proposed few variations. There was no reason why the Fifth Committee should not decide on the new proposals subject to a review of how they worked out in practice. There was no risk involved in giving them a trial and letting the Secretary-General report on them if that was thought necessary.

53. On the important question of machinery for dealing with the system of classification, divergencies in conditions of service in organizations following the common system and other related questions, the executive heads had said that they were not yet in a position to submit a final statement for their joint views. The Advisory Committee's recommendation was that the question be further studied and a report submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth session. The Egyptian delegation agreed with the Advisory Committee's recommendation, but thought that some discussion of the question would nevertheless be appropriate at the present stage.

54. As regards salaries of Under-Secretaries and officers of equivalent rank, the Secretary-General proposed that the present scale of remuneration should remain unchanged and that the post adjustment applicable to other staff should not apply at the Under-Secretary level. Under the system proposed by the Salary Review Committee, which took Geneva as the base, equal salaries for Under-Secretaries in Geneva and New York without post adjustments for the latter would mean unjustifiably high salaries in Geneva, since Geneva came in class I and New York in class 4.

55. In conclusion, he hoped that the Salary Review Committee's recommendations would be endorsed. Although the proposed system had given rise to certain observations from the staff, it was clear that it represented a set of benefits, some of which were to be found in national systems and others not. It was in that context, and in the light of the system as a whole, that each of the various recommendations should be viewed.

56. Mr. JONES (United States of America) congratulated the Salary Review Committee on its report (A/3209) and its Rapporteur on his clear and concise explanations at the 570th meeting. His delegation regarded the report as a most valuable contribution toward improving employment conditions in international secretariats. The United States of America had been represented on the Salary Review Committee, and while it had not concurred in every recommendation made, the points of difference had been of minor importance.

57. In his delegation's opinion the chief consideration was to ensure that conditions of employment for international officials were such as to permit the recruitment and retention of a staff which met the high standards prescribed in the Charter. In the early days of the United Nations, the emphasis had naturally been laid on the financial conditions necessary for the recruitment and retention of staff, with the result that salaries had had to be paid which many Governments considered excessive in the light of their own civil service

conditions. To his mind, that fact was largely responsible for the differences of opinion between the Salary Review Committee and the Secretariat as to what the present salary scale should be. The time had now come to emphasize another factor involved in the recruitment and retention of qualified staff—that of non-financial incentives. Much of the apparent dissatisfaction with the present salary scales would disappear if the administrations of the various organizations gave more attention to that aspect of the problem.

58. His delegation was somewhat concerned at the reaction of the Secretary-General and the executive heads to the part of the Salary Review Committee's report dealing with that subject. The Salary Review Committee had suggested that specific assignments might be made in every agency to a small personnel committee of appropriate senior officials to give continuing consideration to the special non-financial problems of the international service. The Secretary-General's report devoted only one short paragraph to that recommendation, in which it was stated that the executive heads would continue to give their personal attention to those problems. The United States delegation considered that something more was necessary and hoped that the Fifth Committee would include in the resolution it approved a recommendation to the executive heads to comply with the specific suggestions made by the Salary Review Committee.

59. The United States delegation also attached considerable importance to the proposal that new machinery should be established to deal with certain pay and personnel problems with a view to ensuring uniformity. The Salary Review Committee obviously regarded the present machinery for that purpose as inadequate. The United States delegation was prepared to support the Salary Review Committee's recommendations, although it felt that even stronger machinery

was necessary. The efforts to establish a uniform system would lose much of their effectiveness if such machinery were not established.

60. His delegation's one qualification concerning the Salary Review Committee's report was on the question of the salary level for Under-Secretaries and officers of equivalent rank. The Secretary-General had urged that consideration of the Salary Review Committee's recommendations on the matter should be postponed until the next session of the General Assembly. His delegation supported that request in view of the nature of the posts concerned and on account of its high regard for the Secretary-General's judgement.

61. In conclusion, he paid a tribute to the effort made by all the organizations to co-operate fully with the Salary Review Committee and adopt a common standpoint—an effort which marked a new level of achievement in the co-ordination of personnel policies and augured well for the future of the uniform system.

62. Mr. CLOUGH (United Kingdom) congratulated the Salary Review Committee and the Advisory Committee on their valuable reports. In view of the number and complexity of the documents to be considered, he thought the best procedure would be to base discussion of the Salary Review Committee's recommendations on the table contained in the Advisory Committee's report (A/3505 and Corr.1). Where the Secretary-General agreed with the recommendations, the latter could be endorsed with a minimum of discussion. On the few points where there was difference of opinion, as indicated in the Advisory Committee's report, a fuller discussion would be necessary. By taking the table as a basis for discussion, therefore, the questions could be resolved more speedily.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.