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**Chairman: Mr. Omar LOUTFI (Egypt).**

**AGENDA ITEM 66<sup>1</sup>**

**Question considered by the first special emergency session of the General Assembly from 1 to 10 November 1956 (A/3383 and Rev.1, A/3402) (*continued*)**

***Administrative and financial arrangements for the United Nations Emergency Force (continued)***

1. The CHAIRMAN asked the Committee to consider the various aspects of the question in the order in which the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions had dealt with them in its report (A/3402).

**ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE EMERGENCY FORCE. (A/3402, PARAS. 5 TO 14)**

2. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's special attention to paragraphs 9, 13 and 14 of the report.

3. Mr. JONES (United States of America) said that two points should be borne in mind in considering the Advisory Committee's report: firstly, the General Assembly had already given the Secretary-General broad authorization to take all the necessary administrative and executive action, and secondly, the United Nations Emergency Force represented an activity of a temporary and emergency nature. In those circumstances, the current debate was not really a budgetary debate. The Committee had only to determine whether the Secretary-General required any further authorization from the General Assembly and to give him guidance on those points which were considered vital for the success of an important undertaking.

<sup>1</sup> Considered by the Fifth Committee in accordance with paragraph 4 of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 596th plenary meeting on 26 November 1956.

4. His delegation agreed that, where Member States encountered difficulties in obtaining currency for the payment of their troops at duty stations, the United Nations might appropriately make the necessary foreign exchange available to the Governments of such States, against reimbursement in their currencies (A/3402, para. 9). In its view, the Secretary-General already had sufficient authorization to take such action.

5. With regard to the proposed daily overseas service allowance (A/3402, paras. 13 and 14), he was prepared to rely on the judgement of the Secretary-General, the Military Advisory Group and the United Nations Commander, that such an allowance was necessary, but he felt that there was some confusion about its purpose. A certain degree of hardship was undoubtedly involved in the existing disparities in pay and allowances. The United Nations could do nothing to remedy the disparities in pay, but it could place all troops on the same footing in regard to the purchase of incidentals by means of the proposed allowance. The rate of allowance should be reasonable: difficulties might arise if it were out of line with the troops' regular pay. Viewed in that light, \$1 a day seemed rather high. It should be made clear to all concerned, including the troops, that the allowance was being instituted on a provisional basis and that it was subject to change. It should be reduced as soon as the Commander found it possible to provide recreational facilities and common services for all the troops.

6. Mr. CALOGEROPOULOS-STRATIS (Greece) reaffirmed his country's unanimous feeling that, despite the painful circumstances in which it had originated, the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force marked a decisive step forward in the evolution of the United Nations. For centuries, the international police force had been a dream; it was now a reality.

7. He supported the Advisory Committee's recommendations on all points. Nevertheless, the proportion of the expenditure to be borne by each country had not yet been calculated, nor had he yet been able to consult his Government. He must therefore reserve his Government's position on its financial participation, although he would recommend it to advance part of its contribution to the 1957 budget, as suggested in paragraph 18 of the report. In that connexion, he drew attention to a mistake in document A/C.5/673 which gave a statement of contributions to the budget for the financial years 1954, 1955 and 1956. Greece had paid its 1956 contribution in full some time previously.

8. Mr. HAMDANI (Pakistan) asked whether the official of the Technical Assistance Board (TAB) mentioned in paragraph 5 of the Advisory Committee's report would be paid from TAB funds or from the Special Account for the United Nations Emergency Force.

9. He expressed his appreciation to those Governments which had provided transport for the Force and agreed with the suggestions in paragraph 9 of the report.

10. Before agreeing in principle to the daily overseas service allowance, the Committee might wish to consider whether such an allowance was really necessary or desirable. The membership of the Military Advisory Group, and hence the number of troops involved, might later be increased, with a corresponding increase in the total expenditure on the daily allowance. Furthermore, each contingent of the Emergency Force had its own regulations which varied from country to country, so that a flat rate of \$1 might not be proper and might even give rise to hardship. He was glad to note from paragraph 14 that the rate would in any case be reviewed before the end of the year.

11. Mr. TURNER (Controller) explained that, given the complexity and size of the operation, the Commander and the Secretary-General felt that it was essential and extremely urgent that a person of experience and high qualifications should be attached to the Commander as his Chief Administrative officer. Such a person was being seconded from TAB. He would be paid from the Special Account of the United Nations Emergency Force.

12. He hoped that the Committee would come to a decision on the overseas service allowance in principle without necessarily deciding on the rate. The Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee had not felt that they were committed at that moment to any special amount. One dollar had been mentioned; it should be considered a maximum amount rather than a final figure. The final decision should be left to the discretion of the Secretary-General and the Commander; it would depend on additional data, which were now being sought, and on the final arrangements made for post exchange and other facilities. The Secretary-General was in full agreement with the Advisory Committee that the matter should be dealt with on a provisional basis and that the allowance might have to be reviewed in the light of changing circumstances.

13. Mr. HAMDANI (Pakistan) wondered whether it would be possible to provide the troops with amenities instead of paying a cash allowance. That would have the advantage of eliminating uniformity of treatment between officers and other ranks, which ran counter to army tradition.

14. Mr. AGHNIDES (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) said that the question of the administrative and financial arrangements for the Emergency Force had been referred to the Advisory Committee in a certain form. The Advisory Committee had had to give its answer in the same form. He pointed out that it was very difficult to set up post exchanges and similar facilities in emergency conditions and explained that, as stated in paragraph 12 of the report, the allowance was not intended to compensate for differences in the rates of pay of the members of the Force. A flat rate therefore seemed appropriate.

15. Mr. CERULLI IRELLI (Italy) said that, in view of the many imponderables in the situation, the Committee should be very cautious in making any commitments. The expenditure involved might be considerable and he could not commit his Government

without consulting it. He had no objections to the suggestion in paragraph 9, but had certain misgivings about the proposed overseas service allowance. For one thing, no one knew for how long a period the Emergency Force would have to remain in Egypt. It might, and it was to be hoped that it would, be only a few weeks or months; on the other hand it might be years, in which case even \$1 a day would impose a heavy burden on the United Nations. It was difficult to see how the allowance would equalize the position among the contingents, as those troops who were receiving a hardship allowance from their Government would still be better off than those who received only the United Nations allowance.

16. Mr. URRUTIA (Colombia) wished to emphasize an important question of principle: the countries which had contributed troops to the United Nations Emergency Force had done so not on their own initiative, but because they had been asked to do so. If the United Nations wanted them to withdraw their troops, they would comply immediately. They had no interest in keeping troops in Egypt. The smaller countries could afford to send troops abroad only if it was clearly understood that they would continue to pay those troops at the normal rates. They could not afford to pay overseas allowances or any of the other extra costs involved in sending troops abroad.

17. It was disconcerting to see the lack of responsibility of certain delegations who were prepared to pay enormous sums for oil but balked at paying \$1 a day to the members of the United Nations Emergency Force. That did not seem to be a high price to pay for averting war. The countries which had contributed troops had already done a great deal. If they were to be confronted with continuous expenditure on that account, the United Nations would find it impossible in future to obtain troops on an international basis. The United Nations Emergency Force was fulfilling an important function and it might well be necessary to recruit more troops. It was therefore essential that the principle of paying an allowance should be established from the outset and the Committee should, without more ado, authorize the Secretary-General to make whatever arrangements he saw fit.

18. Mr. CERULLI IRELLI (Italy) did not think that the members of the Committee had shown any lack of a sense of responsibility. The Committee was concerned only with the budgetary and administrative aspects of the problem and his own comments had been inspired solely by a sense of the Committee's administrative and financial responsibilities.

19. Mr. URRUTIA (Colombia) agreed that the political aspects of the problem must be solved elsewhere, but he appealed to the members of the Committee to have the courage not to raise minor questions which would only complicate the major issue.

20. Mr. HAMDANI (Pakistan) said that he would not like his remarks on the overseas service allowance to be misinterpreted. He fully agreed with the Colombian representative on the point of principle. His country was a small country and it had been one of the first to offer troops. He hoped, moreover, that the United Nations Emergency Force would eventually be established on a permanent basis.

21. Mr. GANEM (France) said that France had always supported the idea of an international army; indeed, it had first raised the idea in 1919. Conse-

quently, his Government fully supported the establishment of an international army along the lines on which the Emergency Force had been set up.

22. In principle, he agreed fully with the recommendations made in the Advisory Committee's report, although he had some reservations about the rate of the overseas service allowance. The Emergency Force was stationed in the Middle East, which was not a dollar area, and he was not sure that, in terms of its value in Middle Eastern currencies, an overseas service allowance of \$1 a day was not rather too high.

23. Mr. POLLOCK (Canada), emphasizing that his Government fully supported the establishment of the Emergency Force, said that the sole aim of the Committee's present discussion was to facilitate the activities of the Force and ensure the best possible working conditions for its personnel. The Force was a United Nations effort directly covered by Article 17 of the Charter and therefore deserved the fullest backing of all delegations.

24. On the specific question of the overseas service allowance, he pointed out that many countries were participating in the provision of troops for the Emergency Force and some arrangements were necessary to make certain that the various national contingents received equal treatment. The Canadian Government, for its part, would do all in its power to ensure that Canadian personnel did not suffer from lack of amenities, but the Secretary-General was quite rightly advising the establishment of a special allowance, on a purely temporary basis, on the understanding that the policy should be reviewed at a later date, when some experience had been gained of the actual working of the Force.

25. His delegation fully supported the views expressed in paragraph 14 of the Advisory Committee's report in the desire to demonstrate that it did not wish financial considerations to interfere with the harmonious working of the Force; on the other hand, it felt that the Governments supplying troops should endeavour to keep the expenses to be borne by the United Nations as low as possible. The Canadian delegation therefore hoped that if, as would no doubt be the case, some Governments needed the assistance in regard to foreign exchange referred to in paragraph 9, they would apply for it sparingly and would avoid creating new problems by burdening the United Nations with large sums in non-convertible currencies. No such problems would, of course, arise out of Canada's own contribution to the Force. While fully realizing that a high degree of accuracy with regard to detailed estimates could not be expected in view of the uncertainties involved, the Canadian delegation would be glad if the Controller could give some indication on the basis of past experience, of the magnitude of the problem that might arise in connexion with non-convertible currencies.

26. Canada hoped that the future operations of the Force would be carried on in the spirit of those Governments which had supplied transport at their own expense, and that moderation would be used in applying for assistance of the kind envisaged.

27. Mr. TURNER (Controller) said that it was difficult to give even a general indication of the scale of the problem which might arise from the acceptance by the United Nations of non-convertible currencies in exchange for local currencies; the length of time

that the Force would remain in the area and the extent to which its individual members might wish to obtain local currencies were not known. Nevertheless, as the Force was a United Nations responsibility, it seemed to the Secretary-General and to the Advisory Committee that the United Nations had an obligation to provide exchange facilities to Governments furnishing troops who were not in a position to make the necessary arrangements for themselves.

28. The United Nations had, however, considerable experience in using non-convertible currencies contributed under voluntary programmes, such as the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), or as part of the contributions of Member States to the United Nations budget. The United Nations, the voluntary programmes and the specialized agencies had developed methods of utilizing such currencies by making purchases in various countries and no great difficulty had so far arisen.

29. It was not anticipated, moreover, that troops would wish to convert their base pay into local currencies on a large scale, particularly if the proposed service allowance were to be paid. It was, of course, possible that some difficulty might arise in respect of a particular currency, but on the whole it did not appear to the Secretary-General and to the Advisory Committee that the arrangement recommended in paragraph 9 entailed any undue risk.

30. Mr. VENKATARAMAN (India) said that the United Nations was making a great experiment in creating the Force, and nothing should be done that might discourage the formation of a similar force if it became necessary in the future. Every assistance should therefore be given to the troops of the Governments co-operating in the Force in overcoming any difficulties and hardships that might arise.

31. It was well known that the troops of which the Force was composed came from armies in which very different rates of pay, varying from \$5 to \$150 per month, prevailed. Nothing could be done to equalize the base pay, but the United Nations should certainly place all the troops on the same footing with regard to the provision of local currency for their personal needs. Since the Advisory Committee felt that \$1 per day was a reasonable sum and the Secretary-General agreed, it was difficult to see why there should be any further argument.

32. The Indian delegation therefore supported paragraph 13 of the Advisory Committee's report in its entirety, both in principle and with regard to the proposed amount of the allowance.

33. Mr. FORTEZA (Uruguay) agreed with much that had been said by the Colombian representative. By deciding to set up the Emergency Force, the General Assembly had obviously made itself at least partly responsible for its maintenance. Much of the expense was being defrayed by those countries which had offered troops, but there were considerable differences in the rates paid to their troops for overseas service. Without prejudice to any decision by the International Court of Justice as to the costs of the operation, the maintenance of the Force was undoubtedly an institutional expenditure to be borne by the Organization and financed under Article 17 of the Charter.

34. The Uruguayan delegation felt that the proposed allowance of up to \$1 per day would reasonably pro-

vide for the personal and recreational needs of the troops and hoped that the Committee would approve an allowance at that rate.

35. Mr. RAJAPATHIRANA (Ceylon) emphasized that the Force was not a permanent United Nations police force, but an Emergency Force organized in special circumstances. Whereas a permanent United Nations Force would no doubt have a uniform scale of pay, the troops composing the Emergency Force came from different countries and were receiving very different rates of pay, which it was not at present possible to equalize. Yet something should be done to alleviate the hardships arising from those considerable divergencies. Ceylon had no difficulty in accepting the recommendation that an allowance of up to \$1 a day should be paid, particularly as it was also recommended that the rate should be reviewed before the end of the year. Ceylon also agreed with the arrangements proposed in paragraph 9 and with most of the other observations in paragraphs 5 to 14 of the Advisory Committee's report.

36. Mr. MARGAIN (Cambodia) agreed in general with the views and apprehensions expressed by the Italian representative with regard to the expenditure which the proposed allowance might involve. The main points to be remembered were that the Fifth Committee was chiefly concerned with the administrative and financial aspects of the problem, and that there was no way of knowing how long the Emergency Force would remain in Egypt. The continuing cost of the operation might well cause small countries some concern.

37. The present line of thought appeared to him to be that, although conflicts between countries might arise at any time, the danger of war must be avoided at all costs and that the cost of providing the necessary police force must be met by the United Nations. If that trend continued, the United Nations might find itself bankrupt in a very short time.

38. Mr. Y. W. LIU (China) said that the representative of a Member State which would be called to bear a very large proportion of the cost had said that the proposed allowance of \$1 per day was rather high. With a view to determining whether \$1 per day was a reasonable allowance, he asked if any information was available on its purchasing power in Egypt.

39. Mr. AGHNIDES (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) replied that the Advisory Committee had no information on that point and had therefore been cautious in drafting its report.

40. It should be remembered that the troops would not all be serving in one place and that prices varied considerably according to the locality. The Advisory Committee had thought it best to wait for the Military Advisory Group to report after a few weeks whether the allowance was satisfactory.

41. Mr. NATANAGARA (Indonesia) said that his delegation welcomed the suggestion by the Advisory Committee and the Secretary-General that the United Nations should make foreign exchange available to the Governments which were supplying troops. It also supported the amount of \$1 for the proposed allowance, if the Secretary-General and the Military Advisory Group so agreed.

42. It was gratifying to note from paragraph 5 of the Advisory Committee's report that no additional staff had been required at Headquarters.

43. Mr. ZARUBIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that the Soviet delegation had stated, at the 596th plenary meeting of the General Assembly and at the 538th meeting of the Fifth Committee, that the cost of the United Nations Emergency Force must not be borne by the United Nations. The references made by several representatives to Article 17 of the Charter were irrelevant to the point at issue. The Soviet delegation still believed that all the material costs of the operation should be borne by those Governments which had precipitated the crisis, and it would not consider itself bound by any resolution which provided that such costs should be defrayed by the United Nations.

44. The Soviet Union delegation had no objection to the Secretary-General's suggestion regarding the daily overseas service allowance, provided that its cost was not borne by the United Nations.

45. The CHAIRMAN proposed that the Committee should approve the proposal in paragraph 9 of the Advisory Committee's report (A/3402).

*It was so decided.*

46. Mr. ZARUBIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) requested that paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Advisory Committee's report should be put to the vote.

47. Mr. DAVIN (New Zealand) said that he was obliged to reserve his position on those paragraphs, as he had not had time to consult his Government.

*Paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Advisory Committee's report (A/3402) were adopted by 48 votes to none, with 17 abstentions.*

48. Mr. DIEGUEZ (Guatemala) explained that he had abstained from voting on the paragraphs, because he had not been able to consult his Government regarding their financial implications.

#### THE PROBLEM OF ASSURING THE NECESSARY CASH REQUIREMENTS (A/3402, PARAS. 15 TO 19)

49. Mr. GREZ (Chile) asked what means were to be adopted to obtain the \$10 million referred to in paragraph 15 of the report.

50. Mr. DE PINIES (Spain), referring to paragraph 18 of the report, said that if funds were used for the Emergency Force, they would not be available for the purpose for which they had been intended. Some arrangement would therefore have to be made to repay all advances.

51. In reply to a question by Mr. RAJAPATHIRANA (Ceylon), Mr. AGHNIDES (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) said that it was certainly not the Advisory Committee's understanding that any programme such as the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance would suffer if funds were borrowed from it in accordance with the recommendation made in paragraph 19 of the Advisory Committee's report. Funds would be made available only if they were not immediately required for normal programmes.

52. Mr. POLLOCK (Canada) reaffirmed his view that the costs of the Emergency Force should be shared under Article 17 of the Charter. With regard to the

temporary arrangements proposed in the recommendations of the Advisory Committee and the Secretary-General, the Canadian delegation understood that the Secretary-General would first draw upon the Working Capital Fund and then on any other available sources of funds, but that he would draw on the Special Accounts of the United Nations only as a last resort.

53. The Canadian delegation hoped that Member States would co-operate in financing the Force without recourse to that last resort, but it was essential to ensure that the full costs of the Force would be provided for. The misgivings of representatives could best be met by noting in the summary record and in the Rapporteur's report that the Special Accounts would be a first charge on contributions received under the financial arrangements finally agreed on and that such accounts would not be prejudiced in any way.

54. Mr. TURNER (Controller) said that the Canadian representative's remarks had to some extent answered earlier questions.

55. When the Fifth Committee had referred specific problems to the Advisory Committee at its 538th meeting, it had been understood that those problems were to be considered without prejudice to any future decision about the apportionment of the expenses of the Special Account. Many delegations naturally found it difficult to divorce the two questions and to take a decision on the matters at present before the Committee without knowing how the Special Account was to be financed. It might therefore be considered advantageous to leave those matters until the larger problem had been dealt with.

56. He pointed out that the Secretary-General had stated in his report (A/3383 and Rev.1) that it was necessary to reimburse advances to the Special Account and that such repayments should constitute a first charge against contributions as they were received. The assurance requested by Canada had therefore appeared in the original draft resolution which formed the annex of document A/3383.

57. The primary concern at present was one of interim financing—that was to say of ensuring that the Organization's cash resources, particularly in the early part of 1957, were sufficient to maintain the operation of the Force pending the receipt of contributions to the Special Account.

58. Mr. GREZ (Chile) said that his delegation was prepared to vote in favour of establishing the Special Account in an initial amount of \$10 million, on the supposition that his Government would subsequently be called upon to contribute a percentage of that sum. It should, however, be clearly understood that its vote would be subject to eventual approval by the Chilean Parliament.

59. Mr. PEACHEY (Australia) pointed out that many delegations, including his own, had had no opportunity of receiving instructions from their Governments, particularly with regard to the principle embodied in paragraph 19. It might perhaps be advisable to defer a vote on paragraphs 18 and 19. If a vote were taken immediately, his delegation would feel obliged to abstain.

60. The CHAIRMAN asked whether the Australian representative wished to make a formal proposal that the vote be deferred.

61. Mr. PEACHEY (Australia) replied in the negative.

62. The CHAIRMAN put paragraphs 18 and 19 of document A/3402 to the vote.

*Paragraph 18 was adopted by 46 votes to 8, with 10 abstentions.*

*Paragraph 19 was adopted by 41 votes to 10, with 14 abstentions.*

THE QUESTION OF ENSURING EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL CONTROL (A/3402, PARAS. 20 TO 22)

63. Mr. DE PINIES (Spain) asked why paragraph 20 spoke of the Secretary-General's intention of following "to a maximum degree" the regular financial rules and regulations of the Organization. Could the rules and regulations not be followed in full?

64. Mr. TURNER (Controller) explained that, as a natural consequence of the type of operation involved, there were certain minor ways in which the regular financial rules were not entirely applicable to the present situation. The Secretary-General's intention was to observe the rules wherever they could be deemed applicable.

65. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee appeared to be in favour of accepting the Advisory Committee's recommendations as they stood and suggested that they should be approved.

*It was so decided.*

POSSIBLE CLAIMS IN RESPECT OF DEATH OR DISABILITY ATTRIBUTABLE TO SERVICE WITH THE EMERGENCY FORCE (A/3402, PARAS. 23 TO 25)

66. Mr. TURNER (Controller) said that the problem referred to the General Assembly by the Secretary-General was whether the temporary commercial insurance coverage for a period of one month should be continued, or whether the United Nations should revert to its usual practice of self-insurance. The Advisory Committee had questioned the need for desirability of continuing the existing costly insurance arrangements, considering that it would be sufficient if commercial coverage were henceforth limited to catastrophe risks arising out of the transport by air of any large groups. There were, however, in the Secretariat's view, certain practical difficulties arising out of that concept. For example, it was not possible to foretell with exactitude the future air movements of troops, and there were also other possible risks arising out of troop movements by land or sea against which some insurance was presumably desirable. Possibly it was the Advisory Committee's intention that there should be some form of insurance coverage against excess costs; in other words, that the United Nations could protect itself by a general insurance similar to that at present in use for its staff, but with provision for no benefit payment except and unless any accident occasioned a loss (on the basis of claims by Member States) exceeding say \$250,000. That would be so-called excess insurance. The Secretary-General had so far assumed that individual members of the national contingents were covered for death or disability by their own national insurance schemes, and that any claims against the United Nations would emanate from Governments and not from individuals. The problem therefore was to decide how far the United Nations

should be covered against the risks arising, either by complete coverage or on an excess insurance basis.

67. Mr. AGHNIDES (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) said that the Advisory Committee had contemplated only transport operations by commercial airlines, its idea being to protect the United Nations against claims lodged by Member States in respect of their own nationals.

68. Mr. POLLOCK (Canada) said that his delegation was closely interested in the insurance question, since Canadian troops were participating in the operation. Canadian members of the Emergency Force were fully covered by national insurance arrangements and therefore no claim against the United Nations could arise. He was not sure how far troops from other countries were similarly covered, but to the extent that they were so covered there was no need for commercial insurance protection whether for transport or for service in the area. Clearly, however, the Secretary-General must make provision for all contingencies, and was looking to the Fifth Committee for guidance. Perhaps further consultation between the Secretary-General and the Governments providing forces would be helpful in determining the extent to which claims might be lodged, and a decision could then be taken whether the United Nations should be self-insured or should enter into commercial arrangements.

69. The Canadian Government considered the self-insurance method to be preferable, especially as it had already been accepted by the United Nations in connexion with other forms of service. For reasons of economy, and in order not to commit the United Nations too far, he therefore suggested that the Secretary-General should proceed on the basis of present arrangements, but he would not press his suggestion if a majority of delegations preferred some other form of insurance.

70. Mr. VENKATARAMAN (India) said that he was disturbed by the Statements made by the Controller and the Chairman of the Advisory Committee. He wondered what the position would be with regard to death or disability arising from service. Normally, the Indian Government would make provision for its own troops serving overseas, but in the present instance it was surely entitled to expect the United Nations to reimburse it for any losses incurred. It was hardly fair that Governments providing troops should bear such risks themselves.

71. Mr. AGHNIDES (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions), explained that the intention behind the Advisory Committee's recommendation was that if a major catastrophe occurred, the national government would at first compensate the victim or his heirs as part of its normal insurance arrangements, and would then present the bill to the United Nations.

72. Mr. JONES (United States of America) thought that the Committee was not at present in a position to debate whether claims against the United Nations would in fact arise. Further consultations between the Secretary-General and delegations were still necessary. He appreciated the reasons why the Secretary-General had made temporary provision for blanket coverage but he agreed with the Advisory Committee in assuming that occasional coverage could be obtained, provided it were not more expensive than the blanket

coverage. He thought the Fifth Committee should take the view that the United Nations would accept its own risk, except where the concentration of risk was high.

73. Mr. CERULLI IRELLI (Italy) agreed with the United States representative that it was not yet appropriate for the Committee to discuss the many complex problems raised by paragraphs 23, 24 and 25 of the Advisory Committee's report. He asked for information on the cost of the insurance policy taken out by the United Nations for one month from 12 November 1956.

74. Mr. TURNER (Controller) replied that the cost would be \$100,000 to \$150,000, depending on the number of troops covered. The underwriters had, however, given notice that they would not renew the policy, and any similar arrangement was thus likely to be considerably more expensive in future.

75. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee did not yet appear to be ready to vote on paragraphs 23 to 25 of the Advisory Committee's report. He suggested that they should be referred back to the Advisory Committee for further discussion and should be reconsidered by the Fifth Committee at a later stage.

*It was so decided.*

76. Mr. PETROS (Ethiopia) said that his delegation had voted in favour of the recommendations made in the Advisory Committee's report, because it considered them a positive contribution to the cause of peace. Nevertheless, it did not consider itself bound to contribute towards the expenditure arising from the operation itself. It was not for the Fifth Committee to decide how that expenditure should be apportioned among the Member States. He reserved the right to state his Government's views at a later stage, remarking for the present that it considered the responsibility should rest with those who had precipitated the crisis in the first place.

77. Mr. DIPP GOMEZ (Dominican Republic) said that, in general, his delegation was in favour of the Advisory Committee's report, because it made it clear that an emergency had to be met from emergency resources. He had, however, abstained from voting on paragraph 19, because monies allocated for the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and UNICEF were intended for noble purposes, and it was a bad precedent to contemplate even the temporary diversion of such funds to other ends.

78. Mr. TURNER (Controller)<sup>2</sup> recalled that in the statement he had made on behalf of the Secretary-General at the 538th meeting he had said that the Secretary-General would be willing to make a proposal regarding the manner in which the method of allocating the costs of the Emergency Force should be considered. After further reflection and having regard to the views expressed informally by a number of delegations, the Secretary-General had, however, come to the conclusion that the only practicable and equitable procedure was that which he had proposed in paragraph 6 of document A/3383 and which provided for such costs to be shared by Member States in accordance with the scale of assessments adopted for the regular United Nations budget for 1957.

<sup>2</sup>The complete text of the Controller's statement will be found in document A/C.5/687.

79. Since the General Assembly had established the Force as a United Nations instrument for the accomplishment of certain stated purposes, the logical consequence appeared to be that the United Nations must itself assume full and final responsibility for its effective functioning, including responsibility for the financial and other obligations involved. Furthermore, under General Assembly resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956, the Force had been set up on the basis of principles reflected in the constitution of the United Nations; its Commander had thus been appointed by the United Nations and was ultimately responsible to the General Assembly. His authority had been so defined as to make him fully independent of the policies of any one nation. While, therefore, from a strictly budgetary and accounting viewpoint, the expenses of the Force might be treated as distinct from the regular annual appropriation for financing United Nations activities, they nevertheless remained United Nations expenditures within the general scope and

intent of Article 17 of the Charter. It accordingly seemed appropriate to the Secretary-General that the arrangement adopted by the Assembly at the current session for apportioning the expenses of the United Nations should also apply to the Emergency Force.

80. The Secretary-General, however, wished to make it clear that the preceding considerations applied to the Emergency Force only and not necessarily to other responsibilities which the United Nations might acquire in the Suez Canal area, for example, in connexion with the clearance of the Canal.

81. The Secretary-General was anxious that decisions should be taken as soon as possible on the administrative and financial arrangements for the Force and trusted that the Committee would find it possible to report back to the General Assembly on the matters referred to it at an early date.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.