



Thursday, 22 November 1951, at 10.30 a.m.

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Chairman : Mr. Selim SARDER (Turkey).

Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece : (a) report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (A/1857, A/AC.53/L.2, A/AC.53/L.3, A/AC.53/L.5, A/AC.53/L.6 A/AC.53/L.7, A/AC.53/L.8) (continued)

[Item 19] *

1. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that the list of speakers wishing to take part in the general debate would be closed at noon.

2. Mr. PROCHAZKA (Czechoslovakia) said that the General Assembly was considering the Greek question for the fifth time on the basis of the report drafted by the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. Once again, the General Assembly was being requested to approve the report, but the retention of the Special Committee was no longer requested. On the contrary, it was suggested that it should be abolished after a tribute had been paid to its members for the way in which they had carried out their duties.

3. The Czechoslovak delegation maintained its position with regard to the Greek question. In its opinion, the establishment of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans and the terms of reference assigned to it were irreconcilable with the Principles of the Charter ; all its activities had therefore been illegal. Furthermore, the Committee, in carrying out its functions, had acted unilaterally and tendentiously. His delegation advocated the abolition of the Special Committee, not for the reason mentioned in the Greek draft resolution, but because the existence of the Committee was incompatible with the principles of peace and the purposes of the United Nations. Its main aim had been to maintain the myth that the political independence and territorial integrity of

Greece had been threatened by neighbouring countries and by Albania and Bulgaria in particular. What was the actual origin of the Greek question ? It had arisen from the setting up of a reactionary government forced upon the Greek people by foreign governments in contempt of its sovereignty. That was an insult to a people who had played such a glorious part in the struggle against fascism. Those whom the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans called "partisans" were Greeks who had fought against the nazis.

4. Moreover, American public opinion had always been aware of the fact that United Kingdom intervention in Greece in 1944 had forced a reactionary government on the Greek people. When the United States, in its turn, had embarked on its imperialist policy, it had tried to cover up the facts by making lying accusations against the people's democracies. But everything proved that the ruling classes in Greece and the Greek Government established by the imperialist Powers were opposed to the aspirations of the Greek people and that that situation was doing the country's economy serious harm.

5. The Special Committee's report supported the imperialist policy. It was therefore useful to consider its activities in connexion with the "threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece", since those threats actually came from the Committee itself.

6. There was reason to wonder why those who had supported the establishment of the Special Committee were at the moment in favour of its abolition. According to them, it was because the Committee had completed its functions. The actual reason was that the imperialist Powers had succeeded in making Greece accede to the North Atlantic Treaty.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

7. The aggressive plans of the imperialist Powers went even further: they aimed at securing new bases and new allies in Greece. The establishment of a new organ was being proposed; it would be a sub-commission of the Peace Observation Commission and would be called the Balkan Sub-Commission. As the Czechoslovak delegation had already emphasized, the system of collective measures imposed upon the United Nations was only an attempt to transform the Organization into an aggressive body; the proposal to establish the sub-commission in question was one aspect of that policy.

8. The peoples of Albania and Bulgaria were peace-loving; they had no aggressive intentions towards their neighbours. If the Balkan situation was a threat to peace, it was due to the presence of the imperialist Powers.

9. The Czechoslovak delegation was therefore opposed to the two draft resolutions submitted by Greece (A/AC.53/L.2), on the one hand, and by France, Greece, Mexico, United Kingdom and United States of America (A/AC.53/L.3), on the other.

10. With regard to the first draft resolution, his delegation could at the most accept paragraph 4 in accordance with which the activities of the Special Committee on the Balkans would be discontinued.

11. His delegation was also opposed to the amendment to the Greek draft resolution submitted by the Chilean delegation (A/AC.53/L.7). At the most it could accept the part of the amendment which requested the renewal of diplomatic and good neighbourly relations.

12. On the other hand, his delegation supported the amendment to the Greek draft resolution submitted by the USSR delegation (A/AC.53/L.5), as it proposed the immediate abolition of the Special Committee.

13. The Czechoslovak delegation was opposed to the joint draft resolution recommending the establishment of a Balkan sub-commission under the Peace Observation Commission. The only possible purpose of that new body would be to take over the Special Committee's functions and to camouflage the aggressive, expansionist plans of the imperialist Powers in the Balkans.

14. Finally, his delegation supported all the proposals contained in the USSR draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.6) which alone could ensure the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece and the completely free development of the Greek people.

15. Mr. MACDONNELL (Canada) remarked that it seemed that irrelevant matters were raised whenever the subject of threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece was discussed by the General Assembly. The position, however, was quite simple. The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had before it a report by the Special Committee on the Balkans and two draft resolutions. Under the terms of the first draft resolution, the General Assembly would abolish the United Nations Special Committee

on the Balkans; under the second it would decide to replace that Committee by a sub-commission of the Peace Observation Commission with the responsibility of observing the situation in the Balkans. The Canadian delegation supported that way of dealing with the problem because that was what Greece, the country primarily concerned, wanted. The Greek Government was undoubtedly better able than any other to decide how the United Nations could best safeguard the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece.

16. The USSR representative had stated the previous day (3rd meeting) that for the United States the Special Committee on the Balkans was nothing more than a tool for spying and agitation, but he had not supported that assertion by the least evidence.

17. Canada was not a member of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, but it had supported its creation and had followed its work with interest. The Special Committee had been an experiment in a new technique of collective security. It had made it possible to draw the attention of the public opinion of the free world to the northern frontier of Greece. To have closed that frontier effectively would have taken the mobilization of the entire Greek army. The only possible way of solving the problem by peaceful means had been to maintain peace on the frontier by sending United Nations observers, who would immediately report any violation of the frontier or any infiltration of subversive elements. But while paying a sincere tribute to the services rendered by the Special Committee, it must be acknowledged that the supervision of Greece's northern frontier would not have been sufficient to maintain the country's political independence and territorial integrity. The valour of the Greek fighting forces had also been required.

18. Greece, however, still remained exposed to certain dangers. The Greek representative, jointly with the French, Mexican, United Kingdom and United States representatives, had therefore submitted a draft resolution to the Committee, in which the use of the services of the Peace Observation Commission was contemplated. That organ, part of the machinery set up by the United Nations to ensure collective security, had not been in existence when the Assembly had taken up the Greek question. The use to be made of the proposed sub-commission would depend mainly on the Balkan countries themselves. Contrary to the insinuations of certain representatives, the United Nations would not force its good offices on anyone but would remain at the disposal of all who appealed to it.

19. Mr. ASTAPENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) reminded the Committee that ever since the subject of threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece had been included in the Assembly's agenda, the Byelorussian SSR delegation had maintained that the question was irrelevant to the purposes of the United Nations as defined by the Charter. By submitting that matter again to

the General Assembly the rulers of certain countries, and particularly of the United States, were seeking to place the responsibility for the present situation in Greece on other countries and to divert the attention of world public opinion from their interference in Greek domestic affairs. That had been their purpose in supporting the establishment of the Special Committee on the Balkans in 1947. Today the same countries were proposing to set up within the Peace Observation Commission a sub-commission to be known as the Sub-Commission on the Balkans, whose terms of reference would be even broader than those of the Special Committee, simply in order to aggravate the present tension in the Balkans.

20. In considering the joint draft resolution, the nefarious activities of the Special Committee on the Balkans, whose report was before the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, should not be forgotten.

21. The Canadian representative's statement that the Special Committee had not been a United States tool was obviously without foundation. Proof was provided by the Special Committee's report, which contained only slanders against the people's democracies, but could not conceal from world public opinion the situation provoked in Greece by the intervention of the United States and the United Kingdom.

22. According to the report, it was the people's democracies which threatened the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece. As that allegation was based upon the evidence of persons at present in Greek prisons, it could hardly be claimed that the conclusions of the Special Committee's report were well founded.

23. In fact, the threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece came from the United States, which was seeking to make Greece a fortress and to use the Greek people as cannon-fodder. The brutal interference of the ruling circles of the United States in the domestic affairs of Greece had inflicted untold suffering on the people of that country, in which there existed a reign of terror. Thus, between 1946 and 1951, 10,000 Greek partisans had been sentenced to death and tens of thousands had been deported to camps resembling new Maidaneks and Auschwitzes. The military courts were in permanent session and were handing down death sentences under the unconstitutional law No. 509. In a message (A/1967) they had recently sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the President of the United States, Generalissimo Stalin, the President of the French Republic and various outstanding persons and organizations throughout the civilized world, the Greek patriots sentenced to death by the Athens special military court described the maltreatment and tortures inflicted on them in the Greek prisons. The Secretary-General should distribute that document to the members of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee when it considered the report of the Special Committee on the Balkans.

24. On humanitarian grounds the Byelorussian SSR delegation was making an urgent appeal to the United

Nations to save the lives of the Greek patriots. The United Nations had a humanitarian duty which it could not evade.

25. By its direct intervention in the domestic affairs of Greece, and profiting from the reign of terror in that country, the United States was seizing land and air bases in Greece and in the neighbouring islands. American squadrons were cruising in Greek waters and carrying out joint manoeuvres with the Greek fleet.

26. The CHAIRMAN called the Byelorussian SSR representatives to order. His statement had no connexion with the question before the Committee, and he asked him to keep to the subject.

27. Mr. ASTAPENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the report of the Special Committee on the Balkans contained slanderous accusations against some people's democracies and in particular against Albania and Bulgaria. It was unthinkable not to answer those accusations and show that the threats to the political independence of Greece came not from the people's democracies but from the Greek leaders. His statement was therefore directly connected with the item under consideration and he intended to continue to express his views.

28. Another proof of the aggressive aims of the Greek authorities was their policy with regard to Epirus, but the report of the Special Committee did not, of course, make the slightest reference to it, nor to the continual violations of the Albanian frontiers by Greek armed forces. Those were not occasional acts, but a deliberate policy of provocation aimed at maintaining tension between Greece, on the one hand, and Bulgaria and Albania on the other; that was an integral part of American policy in the Balkans.

29. Those were the reasons why Greece was currently on the verge of bankruptcy. The prices of consumer goods were continually increasing and the high cost of living made it impossible for the workers, whose wages were infinitesimal, to satisfy their most elementary needs. There were currently more than 350,000 unemployed in Greece. Such facts, obviously, were not quoted in the Special Committee's report.

30. To enable Greece to return to a normal situation, the USSR delegation had proposed that measures should be taken to put an end to the interference by the United States in the affairs of that country. Under that proposal (A/AC.53/L.6), a general amnesty would be declared in Greece, concentration camps would be abolished, the death sentences passed by Greek courts on Greek democrats would be annulled, diplomatic relations would be re-established between Greece and Albania, and between Greece and Bulgaria, and the Special Committee on the Balkans would be immediately dissolved. Only the adoption of such measures could restore the situation in Greece to normal and relieve the current tension in the Balkans.

31. His delegation fully supported that proposal and would vote for the USSR delegation's draft resolution.

32. The CHAIRMAN stated that a large part of the statement by the Byelorussian SSR representative had not dealt with the item under discussion. Since he had, nevertheless, allowed him to continue, he would be compelled to do the same in the case of any delegation, and in particular of the Greek delegation, which wished to reply to the point he had raised.

33. Mr. PRICA (Yugoslavia) said that as the situation in the Balkans was liable to constitute a threat to international peace, it was desirable that the United Nations should continue to deal with it and should request one of its organs to observe developments in that area. It was logical to entrust that duty to a sub-commission of the Peace Observation Commission, which the Assembly had decided to establish at its fifth session and whose terms of reference fully met the needs of the situation. The sub-commission's observers would of course only be sent to countries which made a request to that effect. His delegation would therefore vote for the joint draft resolution providing for the establishment of such a sub-commission.

34. The USSR draft resolution was a typical example of the demagogic and propagandist methods so often resorted to by its authors, who attributed to themselves the role of protectors of human rights and of fighters for the freedom and independence of peoples.

35. The Yugoslav delegation had always had the observance of democratic rights at heart and had always supported requests for the repeal of death sentences imposed on Greek patriots, but it nevertheless considered that it was not for those who had made the Greek democratic movement an instrument of their own policy to claim to be the protectors of democracy in Greece. It was, moreover, somewhat odd to find that the USSR draft resolution only concerned twelve patriots condemned by the military tribunal in Athens and was silent with regard to General Markos, leader and organizer of resistance against the fascist invaders of Greece, of whom there had been no further news since it had been learnt that he was in Hungary. It was equally odd that the USSR should forget the fate of those who had fought for the same cause elsewhere, such as Papka-Konnin, Minister in the Bulgarian Government, and his friends, Ivan Maslarov, a member of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sakelarov, who had been sentenced at a secret trial, of which full details had not yet been revealed. Yet, the USSR was represented in Bulgaria by military and civilian advisers.

36. To illustrate the USSR Government's attitude more fully, Mr. Prica quoted two telegrams sent to the head of the Yugoslav delegation, one by the members of a detachment commanded during the war of liberation of the Bulgarian people by General Milanov and Colonel Znopoljek, the other by Bulgarian *emigrés* who had taken refuge in Yugoslavia after participating actively in the resistance movement during the war. In the first telegram, members of General Milanov's detachment had stated that some soldiers "General Milanov and

General Tinski among them" had been arrested and that their lives were in danger, and it asked the head of the Yugoslav delegation to intervene in order to save them. In the second telegram, the former members of the Bulgarian resistance movement had described the terrible treatment meted out to their comrades in arms, some of whom had been tortured, and it asked the Yugoslav delegation to do its utmost to save the lives of Bulgarian patriots who had won the gratitude of all free peoples for their courageous fight against fascist oppression. It was not known whether those unfortunate people would be tried publicly or secretly, or whether they would disappear and never be heard of again. The USSR authorities had paid no heed to their fate, nor to that of Vice-President Koci Dzubse, of Albania, nor of Trajko Kostov, of Bulgaria, who had been condemned to death and executed.

37. The Yugoslav delegation wished to see the annulment of all the death sentences pronounced on Greek partisans and would vote for the Uruguayan draft resolution (A/AC.53/L.8) which requested the President of the General Assembly to use his good offices to dissuade the Greek Government from executing the sentences pronounced. It could not support the USSR draft resolution, the true aim of which was to make use of the tragic fate of human beings to serve a hegemony contrary to the independence of the Balkan nations.

38. Mr. MARTINEZ-MORENO (Costa Rica) recalled the anxiety and interest with which his delegation had always considered any threat liable to endanger the peace of the world.

39. The Costa Rican delegation would vote for the Greek draft resolution and the joint draft resolution; the latter constituted a useful addition, since it guaranteed more effective practical application.

40. In conclusion, Mr. Martinez-Moreno paid tribute to the courage of Greece and its people in fighting for democracy and for the independence and sovereignty of their country. He also congratulated the Special Committee on the Balkans for its work of observation and conciliation, thanks to which it had been possible to maintain the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece and, although the Balkans still remained a danger zone, at least world peace had been safeguarded.

41. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that the list of speakers was closed.

42. Mr. TANGE (Australia) was glad to note that the Greek Government was now in a position to meet the situation on its frontiers without outside help. He was sure that all countries genuinely concerned for the freedom and welfare of the Greek people would share his feelings.

43. The Greek delegation's recommendation that the Special Committee on the Balkans should be discontinued was in accordance with the conclusions of the Special Committee's report, which were based on the change in the situation in the Balkans. The joint draft

resolution was also consistent with those conclusions, since it would enable the United Nations to continue to exercise the vigilance which the Special Committee had recommended in the light of the existing situation. Events had fully vindicated the Organization's vigilance.

44. Because of non-co-operation from Greece's neighbours, the Special Committee had been unable to carry out the work of conciliation allocated to it but it had, nevertheless, successfully fulfilled its second purpose, which was to ascertain the facts and, by publishing them, prove to the world that the Organization was capable of prompt and firm action and, at the same time, provide Greece with a moral bulwark behind which it could proceed with its work of reconstruction and recovery.

45. The USSR representative had put an entirely different point of view before the Committee. As in the past, he had condemned the Special Committee's report, dismissed the evidence submitted, and cast doubt on the impartiality of the Committee's members. With the aid of quotations from the report, he had attempted to prove that both the governments represented on the Special Committee—and Australia was one of them—and the observers sent by that Committee had resorted to threats and intimidation, and that the information they had collected was biased because it came either from the Greek army or from turn-coat guerrillas. The USSR representative, though accepting that part of the report which cleared certain countries of the charge of large-scale military aid to the guerrillas, had nevertheless condemned the Committee as a whole on the ground that its conclusions were not consistent with its findings.

46. The Australian delegation considered the Special Committee's report (A/1857) to be a singularly consistent and impartial document. As proof of that it was enough to examine the USSR representative's allegations in detail. He had stated that the witness mentioned in paragraph 78 of the report could not be regarded as reliable because, on his own admission, he had been guilty of murder. The Australian delegation did not dispute the guilt of the witness concerned, and the value of his evidence might indeed have been open to doubt had it not been confirmed by other sources, and in particular by guerrillas of the same group who had been captured and interrogated separately. Likewise, the USSR representative had quoted paragraphs 111 and 112 of the report to emphasize that the Greek guerrillas had been disarmed on reaching Bulgaria and that, far from being concentrated in special camps, they had been given permission to live outside those camps, and work. The USSR representative had, however, refrained from quoting the remainder of paragraph 112, which stated that fact would be reassuring if it could be taken as indicating that Greek guerrillas who did not wish to return to Greece were allowed to live peacefully and permanently in Bulgaria. Unfortunately, those men remained under the control of the guerrilla movement, and were liable at any time to be rearmed and given new subversive assignments in Greece.

47. The USSR representative claimed that the Special Committee had not been impartial because its conclusions had been based on evidence taken only from the Greek army or police, or from turn-coat guerrillas. But the information given by the guerrillas in most cases corroborated evidence obtained by the Committee from other witnesses. Furthermore, the Special Committee, on page 6 of its report (footnote No. 30) had not denied its inability to obtain evidence from Albanian or Bulgarian eye-witnesses regarding the incidents in question, by reason of the non-co-operation of the Albanian and Bulgarian Governments.

48. In fact, it was clear even from the statements made by the USSR representative himself, that the Special Committee had been extremely cautious and impartial in drawing its conclusions.

49. The USSR representative had challenged the evidence in paragraphs 86 and 87 concerning the presence of Greek guerrillas in Albania because that evidence rested on indirect testimony. But the Special Committee had itself given the sources of its information, and had in fact added that there was little recent evidence to indicate the presence of large numbers of armed Greek guerrillas in Albania. Similarly, in paragraphs 73, 75 and 76 of its report the Committee had indicated that there had been no guerrilla activities of a military character in the course of the past year, which was what the USSR representative claimed. Nevertheless, the Special Committee, whilst recognizing that change of tactics, had added that the guerrilla bands were now engaged in subversive action against Greece. The Committee had no reason to conceal such facts.

50. Finally, the USSR representative claimed that the Special Committee had tried to justify its own existence by fabricating reports of external aid to the Greek guerrillas. If that had been the case, the Committee would have recommended its own continuation, instead of simply requesting the General Assembly to consider the advisability of maintaining United Nations vigilance over the Balkans.

51. The Special Committee had done useful work. Its members and observers had spared no effort in the fulfilment of their dual functions: first, to promote conciliation between Greece and its northern neighbours and establish diplomatic relations between them; and, secondly, to furnish the United Nations with carefully sifted evidence of the threat to the territorial integrity and political independence of Greece. The evidence furnished by the Committee showed that the situation had changed. In February 1951, the Australian delegation to the Special Committee had suggested that the situation regarding external aid to the Greek guerrilla movement had altered, and the USSR representative had yesterday (3rd meeting) spoken with approval of the working paper by the Australian representative on that subject. Nevertheless, the Australian delegation recognized that a threat to the political independence of Greece would continue to exist so long as the Greek guerrilla movement, with

the support of Albania and Bulgaria, continued to send armed agents into Greece to engage in subversive activities against the Greek Government. On that point, the Australian delegation's view accorded with that of the Greek Government, which had associated itself with others in proposing the establishment of a Balkans sub-commission of the Peace Observation Commission. The Australian delegation would therefore support the draft resolution submitted by those delegations to that effect.

52. The Australian delegation reserved its position for the moment on the various amendments to the joint draft resolution, in particular that of Chile (A/AC.53/L.7), until the question had been discussed more fully.

53. Mr. BOKHARI (Pakistan) stated that all freedom-loving peoples would derive real satisfaction from the results obtained by the Special Committee on the Balkans. It was particularly gratifying that the Greek Government, after having entertained fears for its political independence and territorial integrity, considered the continuation of the Committee no longer necessary. The collaboration of the Greek people, the effective co-operation of members of the Committee and the sacrifices borne by certain of the Committee's observers had all contributed towards the achievement of that result. Any resolution adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee should therefore pay to the Special Committee on the Balkans and its staff the tribute which was due to them.

54. However, the Balkans were still not entirely free from danger, and the time had therefore come for the United Nations to have at its disposal a machinery for remedying any tension as soon as it became apparent and before it could constitute a threat to international peace. That consideration justified the joint draft resolution before the Committee.

55. According to resolution 377 (V), "Uniting for peace", the Peace Observation Commission could, upon the invitation or with the consent of any one Member State, appoint a sub-commission and send observers into any area where there was international tension. It would therefore perhaps be superfluous to define the functions of the sub-commission in detail in the body of the joint draft resolution. Nevertheless, the draft resolution as it stood could be considered to embody useful safeguards. He was prepared to vote for it.

56. Mr. Bokhari was pleased to note that the Chilean delegation's amendment recommended, *inter alia*, the resumption of diplomatic relations between Greece and the other countries. He was also glad that a similar recommendation appeared in the USSR draft resolution. As for the other recommendations in the Chilean amendment, he believed that it might be better not to confine the sub-commission within the narrow limits of specific terms of reference; it would be preferable to leave to the sub-commission and the States concerned the responsibility of taking any measures which might prove necessary.

57. The Pakistan representative hoped that the appointment of the sub-commission, which should serve the interests of all States, whether Members or not, would not give rise to any unjustifiable suspicion and it was in that spirit that he would vote in favour of its establishment.

58. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand) recalled his country's interest in Greece. He associated himself with the tribute paid by the Pakistan representative to the Greek people, whose courage and determination had enabled the Special Committee on the Balkans to carry its work for peace to a successful conclusion. He referred to the material assistance which the United Kingdom and the United States had extended to Greece for its reconstruction. Mr. Corner was gratified that the situation had so much improved that the Greek delegation had submitted a draft resolution for the dissolution of the Special Committee on the Balkans. His delegation would vote for that draft resolution.

59. The Balkan sub-commission, as proposed in the joint draft resolution, would be a sound measure. The present threats to Greece and Yugoslavia from the Cominform fully justified the maintenance of an observer body in that region. Accordingly, the New Zealand delegation would also vote for the joint draft resolution.

60. Mr. SAVUT (Turkey) recalled the close bonds uniting Turkey and Greece and expressed the anxiety which the situation in Greece had caused the Turkish Government for the past five years. He was pleased to note that the situation in Greece had so much improved that the Greek Government itself proposed that the activities of the Special Committee on the Balkans should be discontinued. However, the threats to the territorial integrity and political independence of Greece had not entirely disappeared, although they had changed in character. Normal relations between Greece and some of its neighbours had not yet been re-established. There had been many cases of frontier violations. Tension still existed in the Balkans. Consequently, it was essential to maintain some supervisory body.

61. The Turkish delegation would vote both for the draft resolution submitted by Greece and the joint draft resolution.

62. The CHAIRMAN stated that the list of speakers was closed. He suggested that the Committee should adjourn and resume discussion on Friday, 23 November, at 10.30 a.m.

63. Mr. MACEDO (Uruguay) requested an opportunity to speak in order to submit the joint draft resolution appearing in document A/AC.53/L.8, relating to the commutation of the death sentences recently pronounced by the Greek courts.

64. Mr. POLITIS (Greece) said that he respected the Uruguayan delegation's motives. However, the draft resolution had lost its purpose as the Chairman had,

in the course of the 1st meeting, given a ruling excluding the question of the death sentences from the discussions of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. By virtue of that ruling, the draft resolution was not admissible.

65. The CHAIRMAN stated that that was a previous question on which the Committee would have to take a decision. He did not believe that the draft resolution submitted by Uruguay was admissible, but he would not give a ruling on the subject. He read the provisions of rule 122 of the rules of procedure, which were applicable to the case.

66. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom) requested that the meeting should be adjourned in accordance with rule 117 of the rules of procedure.

67. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) wished to speak on a point of order.

68. The CHAIRMAN stated that the motion for adjournment had priority over the point of order raised by the Polish representative.

The motion for adjournment was adopted by 37 votes to 8, with 9 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.