

be allowed to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on Cyprus, to present the Turkish Cypriot view on the Cyprus problem at the highest level and in the most authoritative manner.

70. I do hope that in the name of natural justice, he will be afforded equal treatment with the Greek Cypriot side and be given the opportunity to address the plenary meeting and answer any questions raised during the debate so that the final draft resolution will be adopted after both parties to the problem have been heard.

71. Resolution 3212 (XXIX) of the General Assembly calls upon the two communities to continue negotiations, with a view to finding a final settlement, “on an equal footing”. This just and reasonable request will no doubt be repeated this year. But how can the two communities negotiate on terms of equality when one of them can continue to pretend that it represents Cyprus as a whole at all international forums? How can that degree of goodwill so necessary for the continuation of the talks be generated when one of the parties under an assumed authority can tell the world that the Turkish community is politically non-existent on the island?

72. The status of equality of the Turkish Cypriot community must be reaffirmed and proved by the General Assembly in word as well as in deed, by allowing that community to participate in the deliberations of the Assembly on Cyprus; otherwise, the Greek Cypriot leadership will grow more intransigent and continue to seek new excuses for abandoning the intercommunal talks and running to the United Nations.

73. If Cyprus is to have peace and tranquillity again, if the island is to continue as an independent island, the equal status of the two national communities must be reconfirmed and Makarios should be given to understand that he is not, and cannot be, the sole representative of Cyprus. He forfeited this right when he armed the Greek Cypriots to

the teeth and attacked the Turkish Cypriot community, a part of his people, with the sole aim of forcing us into submission and achieving *enosis* in 1963.

74. Disregarding the past, while resolving on the present, can only compromise the final settlement and the independence of the island. Had we, for example, received in 1963, and thereafter, the interest and understanding of the United Nations which we partially receive today, the history of Cyprus would most probably have followed a different course from its present one.

75. The Greek Cypriot leadership, seeing that the problem was being tackled in its present perspective, would not have been as intransigent as it has been; the Turkish Cypriot community would not have suffered as much as it has done; Turkish rights on the island would not have been as harshly violated; the Greek appetite for annexing Cyprus would not have grown out of all proportion and the unfortunate coup of July 1974—in which Greeks killed more than 2,000 Greek Cypriots—would not have taken place. Most probably there would be a happy, prospering island today and the General Assembly would not have been burdened with a thorny problem, artificially created with a view to destroying an independence by misapplying all United Nations principles.

76. We hope that the General Assembly, through its present deliberations and the draft resolution it adopts at the end of the current discussions, will prepare the necessary ground and atmosphere for the resumption of the intercommunal talks, and pave the way for an early peaceful settlement.

77. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker on my list has a statement of approximately one and a half hours' duration; we shall therefore adjourn now and hear him this afternoon.

*The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.*

## 976th meeting

Wednesday, 12 November 1975, at 3.30 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/PV.976\*

### AGENDA ITEM 125

**Question of Cyprus (*concluded*)** (A/10242, A/10256-S/11825, A/10276-S/11840, A/10282-S/11844, A/10283-S/11845, A/10292-S/11847, A/10305-S/11854, A/10310-S/11859, A/10322-S/11860, A/10323, A/10343-S/11875, A/10351, A/L.769, A/L.773, A/SPC/175, A/SPC/178)

1. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): Pursuant to the decisions adopted by the General Assembly [2367th and 2401st plenary meetings] on agenda item 125

entitled “Question of Cyprus”, the Committee heard, at this morning's meeting [975th meeting] the views of the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community. I now invite the representative of the Greek Cypriot community, Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, to make his statement.

2. Mr. PAPAPOULOS (Greek Cypriot community): I am very grateful for having this opportunity to address the Special Political Committee on the true facts about Cyprus and for having been allowed to attempt to clear up and to

\* Verbatim record (see 975th meeting, para. 1).

dispel several of the myths and distortions of the truth that have been attempted here and elsewhere.

3. The General Assembly, in its wisdom and after long and protracted consultations between all parties, has already decided [2367th plenary meeting]—and it was announced by its President as a decision of that body—that the full views of the two main communities of Cyprus should be heard by the Special Political Committee, which was convened for that purpose. That is in fact why the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community and myself are both here today and this is the opportunity that we have to give a full account of our views and to state our respective positions.

4. It is difficult therefore, to reconcile this view with the claim, made so persistently and at length, for Mr. Denktaş to appear and address the General Assembly. If he wanted his views to be heard, why is he not here? Is Mr. Çelik not expressing the Turkish Cypriot views? If not, whose views is he expressing before this august body? Is it really by chance that Mr. Denktaş is asking to air the views of the Turkish Cypriot community, that he is asking so persistently to be allowed to address the General Assembly, or is it something else?

5. We have heard a rather incomprehensible view, or should I say a muted threat, that if Mr. Denktaş is not permitted to address the General Assembly, he will be led to further separatist and partitionist attitudes, and therefore, in order to preserve the unity of Cyprus, Mr. Denktaş, we were told, must appear and speak in the General Assembly. But is not his very presence there, in the capacity in which he has asked to be present, a living symbol of the very partition that theoretically he is trying to avoid by seeking the right to address the General Assembly? Is he not asking to be in the Assembly in order not to air the views of the Turkish Cypriot community—since they have indeed very eloquently been expressed here this morning—but in order just to stress the fact that there exist now in Cyprus two separate States, and therefore his presence there will be the very living symbol of that view?

6. The very choice of the title that he is using for exercising that right is also very revealing. Apparently he is signing the request, to be so permitted to address the General Assembly, as Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus. Yet, there are scores of letters and documents—and I am sure I need not remind the representatives here of that—which have been circulated on his behalf, and these documents of the United Nations are signed by him as the President of the Turkish Federated State. The agility in choosing titles as they fit circumstances or aims should not be lost upon the representatives here.

7. It is this selective choice of roles, this selective choice from the Constitution of Cyprus, this selective choice of parts of resolution 3212 (XXIX) which is glossing over the real issues behind the Cyprus question. That is what is tending to confuse the issue and make an otherwise clear issue appear as a rather complicated problem. This is so because the underlying issues are purposely confused in order to gloss over the starkly clear issue before the Assembly. This issue is singularly clear, and I am asking the representatives, in their deliberations, to bear in mind what

the real issue, the real question of Cyprus, is. It is a question of aggression by a powerful and expansionist country, Turkey, against a defenceless, small and non-aligned country, Cyprus. There exists in Cyprus today, and continues to exist in Cyprus as we are talking here, a military aggression which threatens the very existence of Cyprus as an independent State and as a non-aligned country. If the occupation of Cyprus by a powerful and important NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] ally, Turkey, is allowed to continue, then the survival of Cyprus as an independent State must be considered as untenable.

8. Nobody must have any illusion that the Greek Cypriot population can for long hope to preserve Cyprus as an independent State against the pressure of Turkish military might, which is in occupation of 40 per cent of the most productive and best developed area of Cyprus. Sooner or later, Cyprus will be subjugated and subjected to unbearable pressure, and Cyprus will face new attempts to absorb it by one or another of the groups seeking support for its independence and the safeguarding of its non-alignment.

9. Just over a year ago, the General Assembly of the United Nations, at its 2275th plenary meeting on 1 November 1974,<sup>1</sup> considered the Cyprus question as item 110 on its agenda and unanimously adopted resolution 3212 (XXIX).

10. It should be stressed that in that unanimous vote, the vote of Turkey was also included, because Turkey, together with all other nations, solemnly, and I assume after due consideration, gave its affirmative vote to that resolution. Turkey, like every other Member State of the United Nations, by virtue of being a Member, is bound by the Charter of the United Nations to respect and implement United Nations resolutions and, more particularly so, resolutions which are adopted unanimously and for which it votes.

11. Members will recall that that resolution was the outcome of a very laborious effort by the Contact Group of Five of the non-aligned group of countries, and after consultation with all interested parties, it was made possible, through the untiring efforts of that Group—to whom our thanks must go—to reach a consensus of opinion. We accepted that resolution, though it fell short of pointing out the stark truth, that of the Turkish aggression, because we were taught, and we accepted it, that it was more important at the time to find a consensus of opinion, a resolution for which Turkey also would have voted, so that Turkey would have also been bound by it. In the operative part of the resolution, it must be recalled, the General Assembly, among many other things, calls upon all States “to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against it”. It also urges “the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs”. It also considers “that all the refugees”—and I stress “all the refugees”—“should return to

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 2275th meeting.*

their homes in safety and calls upon the parties concerned to undertake urgent measures to that end”.

12. The problem of Cyprus was also considered at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries,<sup>2</sup> and its Declaration,<sup>3</sup> in similar but stricter terms, asked for the immediate withdrawal from Cyprus of all military forces and for the urgent and unconditional return of all the refugees to their homes.

13. Over 12 months have elapsed since the unanimous adoption of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), and several months since the Lima Declaration, and naturally and legitimately we are here again before this august body, as the people directly concerned with resolution 3212 (XXIX), to pose some questions to all those who voted for it, and that means, all the Member States: What happened to that resolution? Has the determination expressed through the unanimous adoption of that resolution been heeded? And, if not, what do they intend to do about it? Are they to be indifferent, or perhaps sympathetic observers, watching such an expression of their considered opinion and intention being so arrogantly and provocatively trampled upon and ignored? Are they going to disregard such effrontery and contempt for their decisions?

14. That is why we are here today, and this is my answer to the question “What are we doing here instead of being at the negotiating table of the intercommunal talks?”

15. These are the questions Cyprus now poses to the world Assembly. These are the questions which Cyprus poses to the non-aligned group, to all those who believe that the solution of international disputes must be sought and pursued through meaningful negotiations, through peaceful means and not through the threat and exercise of armed force.

16. Much was said and heard this morning in this debate; but when all the statements are stripped of their political nomenclature and of double-talk and diplomatic niceties, the basic issue and the stark reality of the problem is revealed, and all it boils down to is this: Has Turkey complied with that resolution? Has Turkey complied with the resolution it voted for, which was unanimously approved on 1 November 1974, or not? What has Turkey's attitude been towards that resolution and all the resolutions of the Security Council? Unfortunately, sadly, the only answer that can truthfully be given is that Turkey's attitude has been one of contemptuous disregard for and non-compliance with any of the provisions of resolution 3212 (XXIX) and of all the subsequent resolutions of the Security Council. There has been no withdrawal of any Turkish troops from the island, speedy or otherwise. No measures have been taken to return the refugees to their homes, urgent or otherwise. In fact, not a single one of the approximately 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees has been allowed to return to his home and property. There has been no cessation of Turkish military interference in Cyprus, and no respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus.

That phrase has become a cliché. For Turkey, it has become a meaningless cliché that for us amounts almost to sarcasm; for how can a country, especially Turkey, speak of respect for the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus when Turkey's military forces exercise full and absolute control over 40 per cent of the territory of Cyprus and over the Turkish Cypriot population residing there? How can a country, especially Turkey, speak of respect for the sovereignty of Cyprus and in the same breath advocate solutions contrary to that sovereignty, and actually impose such solutions on Cyprus by the force of its arms? How can one speak of respect for such sovereignty, when Turkish military forces prohibit entry into 40 per cent of the area of the Republic not only to officials and officers of the Republic of Cyprus for the purpose of carrying out the attributes of sovereignty, but even to the indigenous inhabitants of such areas, the legal and lawful owners of the houses and properties in the occupied 40 per cent of the area who have been driven away from their homes by force of arms?

17. Here in this assembly we have heard the Turkish Cypriot representative welcome, not condemn, the occupation of Cypriot land by Turkish troops. He almost expressed satisfaction and was gloating over the fact that the military intervention is continuing and is likely to continue until such time as Turkey, not the Turkish Cypriots, is satisfied that a satisfactory solution to the Cyprus problem may be found.

18. But this selective choice of words from resolutions and decisions has also been exhibited in many other ways. We have heard about negotiation. We were asked whether it would not be more useful to have been at the negotiating table for the talks, rather than being here. We have been told we should view these negotiations with an open mind, and yet in the same breath, almost in the same phrase, we were told that if a resolution is adopted, then that would be the sure death of those negotiations.

19. Why this fear of publicly airing views? Why this reluctance to have international bodies consider the true facts about Cyprus? Because some people prefer behind-the-scenes negotiating, where it is not truth and principles which decide the outcome but might and military force.

20. It has also been said that if we continue to “internationalize”, as it was called, the Cyprus issue, then the Turkish Cypriot community will feel free to proceed to a unilateral declaration of independence. Well, it is strange that, of all the five main items that were included in General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), only the part which deals with the intercommunal talks was selected for reference here, and, not even on that part—either now or earlier—has any firm proposal been made as to how the talks should proceed, or as to how they were expected to reach a fruitful solution.

21. How can one refer to the talks out of context, as if the other part of the resolution did not exist? How can one expect that a free and substantive resolution aiming at reaching a solution freely accepted by the parties, which will take note of the legitimate and fundamental rights of both communities, can be implemented when one of the sides is threatening at any unfortunate turn of the talks, at

<sup>2</sup> Held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975.

<sup>3</sup> See document A/10217.

any hint of an impasse, the use of military might in order to assure the choice of a solution that has been predetermined? Indeed, in operative paragraph 4, resolution 3212 (XXIX) calls for continuation of the negotiations, but the words “with a view to reaching freely a mutually, acceptable political settlement, based on their”—that is, the communities—fundamental and legitimate rights” must not be forgotten.

22. Under a later resolution of the Security Council, resolution 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975, such talks were placed “under his [*the Secretary-General's*] personal auspices and with his direction”.

23. In pursuance of these resolutions there have indeed been negotiations between representatives of the two communities in Cyprus, or should I perhaps say that those negotiations were turned by the Turkish side into a mockery. The Turkish side has turned the negotiating procedure into a travesty, and it was given to procrastination rather than to negotiation. There have been three rounds, three attempts at such talks in Vienna, or perhaps four, if one is to include the abortive round in New York in September 1975. At the New York round, the negotiators simply met only once face to face, and that was just in order simply to agree that they had disagreed, or, perhaps more accurately, in order to be informed of the text of the Secretary-General's statement—not even an agreed communiqué—which said, “. . . A formal meeting was held on 10 September. In the absence of concrete proposals, the talks were adjourned. The Secretary-General will remain in contact with the two parties as regards further action.”<sup>4</sup> This statement to the press on the so-called negotiations accurately sums up the result of these efforts and is in every respect very illuminating. After one whole year and after four rounds of talks, there are not even concrete proposals and not even a basis was found on which to commence serious and meaningful negotiations.

24. The Greek Cypriot side did submit its proposals on all aspects of the Cyprus problem on 10 February 1975 and, at later rounds of talks, the Greek Cypriot side submitted detailed documents, outlining its views further on certain points of the said proposals. Those proposals are languishing in files and have never been the subject of any meaningful negotiating. So when there are no “concrete proposals” on the negotiating table, the blame cannot be laid on the Greek Cypriot side.

25. At three of these four meetings, the Turkish Cypriot side was asked to submit its proposals on all aspects of the problem, and on each and every occasion a clear and unequivocal promise, a commitment, was given that such proposals would be forthcoming. On each and every occasion the Turkish Cypriot side, although firmly committed to placing its proposals on the negotiating table, always failed to do so, and instead of putting forward proposals it put forward pretexts and excuses as to why it had failed to do so or why it was impossible to do so. On one occasion it was the continuation of the arms embargo, since lifted, which the United States Congress had imposed

on military aid to Turkey, on another it was the indecision of the military leaders in Turkey; on yet another it was the then forthcoming elections in Turkey, since carried out and concluded. Be that as it may, until this day, no Turkish Cypriot proposals on all aspects of the problem—and I stress the words, “all aspects of the problem”—have been submitted. It is very significant that the excuses given for such a failure were never related to the Turkish Cypriot community as such, or to any of its problems or to its own circumstances, but were always related to the internal and external political situation of an outsider, that is, Turkey.

26. The views expressed at the meetings by the Turkish Cypriot side, even in response to the suggestions of the Secretary-General and his gestures of goodwill towards implementation of that part of resolution 3212 (XXIX) which related to the desire “that all the refugees should return to their homes in safety”—implementation of which is, of course, not negotiable but mandatory, since resolution 3212 (XXIX) was endorsed by the Security Council [*resolution 365 (1974)*—were not decided upon by the Turkish Cypriot leadership but by the Turkish Government in Ankara.

27. So much for the much-heralded and oft-declared respect of Ankara and Turkey for the sovereignty and independence of Cyprus demanded by General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and Security Council resolution 367 (1975).

28. At the third round of talks in Vienna the Turkish Cypriot representative firmly committed himself to submitting full and complete proposals prior to the holding of the fourth round in New York and, in answer to direct questions by the Secretary-General, a firm commitment was given that there would be no further delays and that proposals would definitely be submitted prior to the meeting so that serious and meaningful negotiations would be possible in New York. We all know what happened in New York in September, and the aforementioned press statement is quite revealing. No proposals were submitted and no negotiations were carried out, and yet we heard here this morning that there had been progress in Vienna. Again, an opportune choice of words. Progress achieved in Vienna did not relate to the eventual solution of the Cyprus problem but to side issues, or should I say it was progress towards the implementation of the designs of Turkey for the total separation of the population and the total partition of the island. Yet if it is stated here that there had been progress, then I find it hard to understand how the Secretary-General, under whose personal guidance and auspices these talks are being carried out, could publicly state that he is not prepared to participate any longer in such negotiations unless a concrete basis for them is found.

29. So much for the negotiations which, as I have pointed out, are the only point of resolution 3212 (XXIX) that the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community chose to refer to.

30. It is very relevant and very important, however, to try to identify the true reasons why the type of negotiations called for in the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions are and will remain impossible. Those reasons must be identified. They must, if possible, be eliminated so

<sup>4</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirtieth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1975, document S/11789/Add.1.*

that meaningful and constructive negotiations may become possible. We hope that they will be so identified, and a great contribution towards their elimination will be made if, by another resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, they are identified clearly as the continuation of the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey, the continued presence in Cyprus of Turkish invading troops and their use in carrying out the type of faits accomplis which we have been witnessing in the last 12 months—the true reasons why the negotiations cannot possibly culminate in “reaching freely a mutually acceptable political settlement”.

31. As long as Turkey seems interested in carrying out talks for the sole purpose, as it seems to be doing, of legitimizing through our signature its military invasion and occupation of 40 per cent of Cyprus, as long as Turkey is using the Turkish troops on the island to make us “accept the new realities”—obviously realities imposed by armed force—and as long as it is using its forces on the island fully to control and even oppress the Turkish Cypriot community and as a permanent threat of further military action against the Greek Cypriots, the negotiations are not and cannot be constructively and freely carried out “with a view to reaching freely a mutually acceptable political settlement, based on their fundamental and legitimate rights”, that is, of both communities.

32. It was said this morning, and we were told in no uncertain terms, that the current debate will produce yet another resolution, but not a solution. That is indicative of the importance that the Turkish Cypriot side—and of course Turkey—attributes to the debate in the United Nations. They are questioning the very existence of the United Nations and the usefulness of any debate being carried out in this august body under any circumstances. This attitude of mind and the reasons on which this frame of mind is based are the true reasons why the negotiations have not until now truly started and cannot do so in the future, let alone progress.

33. These reasons must be correctly identified and appreciated in all their ramifications and categorically rejected in the General Assembly resolution.

34. For intercommunal talks to progress and, hopefully, reach a mutually acceptable political settlement based on the fundamental and legitimate rights of both communities on the island, there must be the withdrawal of all foreign troops, as resolution 3212 (XXIX) has urged—and we have yet to hear an unconditional commitment that there will be compliance with that part of the resolution; and all refugees must return to their homes and urgent measures to that end must be taken by all the parties concerned, as resolution 3212 (XXIX) has called upon the parties to do. The policy and tactics of trying to consolidate the occupation of 40 per cent of Cyprus through faits accomplis effected and supported and made possible only by the presence of Turkish troops on Cyprus must be rejected as a method of reaching a negotiated settlement. The two communities in Cyprus must be left alone, without any outside interference, to conduct meaningful negotiations. This is the substance of the draft resolution submitted by Cyprus [A/L.769] which is now pending before the General Assembly.

35. Why is it so offensive? Why should it be “the grave of any further negotiations”, when that resolution asks, in effect, for nothing more than a reaffirmation of the unanimous view taken by this Assembly last year, and only adds that faits accomplis—and the now attempted colonization of Cyprus is one such fait accompli—cannot be accepted as a method or as an avenue for reaching a freely and mutually acceptable political settlement? I could understand it if the resolution was offensive and unacceptable to Turkey, because it is Turkey’s aggression that the resolution identifies as the real reason why progress cannot be made. But why should it be objectionable to the Turkish Cypriots?

36. Turkey has not complied with any of these principles. Furthermore, never once has it expressed itself as being firmly committed to complying with those principles which have been incorporated, by the unanimous decision of the General Assembly, in its resolution 3212 (XXIX), and in Security Council resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975) which, since they are Security Council resolutions, are mandatory. They have not been complied with because there was never any intention of complying with such principles, because Turkey has other designs and other aims in mind concerning Cyprus.

37. The Cyprus question is not one of a constitutional dispute between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. It is not over what happened 20 or 10 years ago. It is what happened last year and what is happening now that are the crux of the matter. Certainly the Cyprus question did not start last year, but the campaign for the abolition of the Cyprus State commenced last year.

38. Furthermore, the very nature and conduct of the Turkish military operation in Cyprus were and are contrary to the declared purposes of the Treaty of Guarantee,<sup>5</sup> which was used by Turkey as a pretext for invading the island, because they are directed at destroying, instead of protecting, the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus; they are aimed at abolishing the constitutional order and the *status quo* established by the Constitution and which, under the Treaty of Establishment<sup>6</sup> and the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey had undertaken to uphold and support. Even if Turkey’s initial pretensions did confuse some people, its continued occupation of Cyprus and the policies it has been following since then must be held to reveal to all that the invasion had nothing to do with the re-establishment of constitutional order or the protection of Turkish Cypriots. More and more Turkey’s true nature and intentions are becoming clear to all.

39. Now, almost 18 months later, not only has the constitutional order—which Turkey had guaranteed and which, allegedly, it aimed through its invasion to re-establish—not been accepted by Turkey, but Turkey is openly and publicly advocating other constitutional orders; it is openly declaring the total abolition of that constitutional order and promoting its replacement by a new constitutional order which, whether it is disguised as bizonal federation or, whether it is more truly the pursuit of a

<sup>5</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5475, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5476, p. 8).

confederation, or whether it is referred to under any other name, amounts only to partition, which partition, by the said Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey is bound to prevent.

40. The solution advocated by Turkey is nothing else but partition of the island into two separate and distinct zones which are, however, not pre-existing zones, but zones that can only be brought about by the forcible and heartless uprooting of about 300,000 Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, that is, just over half of the total population of Cyprus. And once this heartless and forcible uprooting has taken place and the separate zones are thus technically created, we are told, we shall attempt to reconnect the zones under some sort of agreement, the transparent aim of which is to disguise the actual partition which is already in process of being implemented.

41. But it has also been said that another aim of the invasion was to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community. It has already been pointed out that under the Treaty of Guarantee Turkey had simply guaranteed the *status quo*, the constitutional order of Cyprus. Under that guarantee, Turkey is not the protector of any one individual or of any one community on the island, but it is the guarantor of the constitutional order for the whole population of the island, because none of the three guarantors is the guarantor of any one of the communities on the island: Greece is not the guarantor of the Greek Cypriot community, neither is Britain the guarantor of the British nationals residing on the island. The guarantee has nothing to do with the rights of the individuals; it has to do only with the preservation of the *status quo*. The extent or nature of that guarantee, or how the powers under that guarantee may be exercised is a different matter, and I shall not labour the point any further.

42. However, anybody—and there are very few—who may be allowed to enter the occupied areas of Cyprus will testify that the first to suffer occupation and oppression by the Turkish invading forces are the members of the Turkish Cypriot community. The Opposition Turkish Cypriot newspapers are replete with complaints and reports of that tragic situation under the conditions of occupation. These people are uprooted from their homes, they have been forcibly installed in the looted houses which the Greek Cypriots were forced, also by the use of arms, to abandon—without any consideration of their social and economic needs, their preferences, their skills or their training. Their movements are restricted as much as anybody else's; unemployment is rampant; and their safety, security and property are at the whims of the military Turkish leadership.

43. We have heard before, and we heard again this morning, the repetitions of wholly unsubstantiated allegations against us—these clichés—that in the 12 years since December 1963 the Turkish Cypriots have been the victims of suppression, the victims of discrimination by the Government, and that they were compelled to be segregated in enclaves, deprived of their freedom of movement and of opportunities of economic advancement. All those are false charges, made with the obvious political propaganda purpose in mind of presenting the Turkish Cypriots as suffering at the hands of the Greek Cypriots and thus requiring the military intervention of Turkey to restore their rights.

44. Those false accusations have been persistently made in the past, and if the motive and reason for making such statements seemed to be incomprehensible at the time they were made, since the Turkish invasion it has become obvious: the reason was to lay the foundation and, by pre-emptive justifications, to demonstrate the necessity for the morally, politically and legally unacceptable Turkish invasion.

45. The same false accusations are still being made because now there is an even greater need to justify the same invasion and its continuation, which is in such dire disregard of international world opinion; the latter demands the immediate cessation of the invasion that has continued in utter disregard for and flagrant violation of resolution 3212 (XXIX).

46. In the first place, I should like to mention that the falsity of these charges has been incontrovertibly disclosed and exposed in the past, and I do not think I need elaborate unduly on what should be obvious and manifest to all members of the Assembly. I wish only to refer to some extracts from reports that must be held by all to be incontrovertible and undeniable since they emanate from no less high and independent an authority than the Secretary-General of the United Nations himself.

47. The first quotation is the following:

“... the lack of movement of Turkish Cypriots outside of their areas is also believed to be dictated by a political purpose, namely, to reinforce the claim that the two main communities of Cyprus cannot live peacefully together in the island without some sort of geographical separation.”<sup>7</sup>

48. I now quote from another report by the Secretary-General:

“The Turkish Cypriot leaders have adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve having members of the two communities live and work together, or which might place Turkish Cypriots in situations where they would have to acknowledge the authority of Government agents.”<sup>8</sup>

That report goes on to say:

“Indeed, since the Turkish Cypriot leadership is committed to physical and geographical separation of the communities as a political goal, it is not likely to encourage activities by Turkish Cypriots which may be interpreted as demonstrating the merits of an alternative policy.”<sup>8</sup>

And the report continues:

“The result has been a seemingly deliberate policy of self-segregation by the Turkish Cypriots. ... the hard-

<sup>7</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1964*, document S/5764, para. 113.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twentieth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1965*, document S/6426, para. 106.

ships suffered by the Turkish Cypriot population are the direct result of the leadership's self-isolation policy, imposed by force on the rank and file."<sup>8</sup>

49. So much for the often-repeated allegation that the seclusion of some of the Turkish Cypriots—because there were never more than 40 per cent of the Turkish Cypriot population so secluded—into enclaves was imposed on them by the Greek Cypriots or that it was made necessary by the attitude of the Government of Cyprus.

50. It should be obvious from what I have said that it was the Turkish leadership that had always pursued and imposed a policy of apartness and segregation, because only through such a policy could the foundations of the partition of the island be laid and the policy made plausible. The acts and policy of Turkey since the invasion and the tactics of creating new realities, as they have been called, through *faits accomplis* are a continuation of that same policy, consistently followed throughout, pursued in disguise through the so-called federal system—which in fact is a confederal system. That appears undeniable. That is exactly what Turkey is pursuing through its policy—a confederation, not a federation. First, they are uprooting people by force from their homes and property, and once two separate zones are thus created, they loosely join them under the guise of a confederate system. Again we encounter the same selective choice of words. That is why we constantly hear so much of the propaganda slogan of “partnership in equality”. Here again is a very deliberate choice of words with a double meaning.

51. We are all for equality. We, the Greek Cypriot side, now demand equality, full and absolute equality of the people, of the individuals. When one has a minority of 18 per cent seeking to separate the land in equal shares, with the vast majority of 80 per cent of the population being restricted to 60 per cent of the land—which is mostly uncultivable and undeveloped—one has inequity and inequality among the people. That is the kind of “partnership in equality” that is well known, I think, to many Member States here, and particularly to the African States. It is this “partnership in equality” which the minority régime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia is preaching and trying to implement by the use of force. Smith also asks the vast majority of the population to join him in a form of “partnership in equality”, to run the affairs of the country “normally”, as he calls it. For the majority to have equal rights, to have also a determining voice in the affairs and the fate of the country, to have also the right to enjoy their property and their houses is not running the affairs of the country normally.

52. We observe this same strange frame of mind regarding the use of the term “fundamental and legitimate rights”—not “equal rights”—for the Greek Cypriots. It seems that the Turkish Cypriot leadership wishes to present the picture as though it were only the Turkish community in Cyprus that has rights which have to be safeguarded. We heard that very phrase this morning. We heard that it is not possible to reach a solution in the negotiations “until the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community are safeguarded”. What about the rights of the Greek Cypriot majority?

53. The idea is sometimes put forward that the Turkish community in Cyprus, which amounts to only 18 per cent

of the total population, a community which owns only 12.6 per cent of the privately owned land—according to records prepared by the British Administration—is fully within its fundamental and legitimate rights in usurping and taking by force 40 per cent of the most fertile, the best, the developed part of the island, while the majority of the population, the 82 per cent of the population, the Greek Cypriot community, the lawful and legal owners of most of the usurped land, have no similar fundamental and legitimate rights.

54. When the Turkish Cypriots are freely given the land usurped, they are exercising their “legitimate” rights. When the Greek Cypriots who own this land, who developed this land with their own money and labour, refuse to accept such *faits accomplis*, when they refuse to accept the usurpation of their lands and properties and of the investments they have made on such lands, where they have lived and prospered for centuries, they are called “intransigent”, they are called slow to accept the new realities of Cyprus.

55. It is perfectly “legitimate”, it is the exercise of the fundamental rights of any Turkish Cypriot, no matter in which part of the island he previously resided, to be allowed, as it has been claimed and granted, freely to move into the occupied area. It is also asked that they should be freely allowed to reside in houses which do not belong to them but which belong to their Greek Cypriot compatriots.

56. The usurpation and exploitation of lands and properties which belong to Greek Cypriot compatriots is being accepted as the exercise of the fundamental and “legitimate” rights of Turkish Cypriots. But for 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to want and to demand nothing more and nothing else than to be allowed freely to return to their homes and properties, which belong to them, in conditions of safety, as resolution 3212 (XXIX) requested, is considered by Turkey to be unacceptable, to be a denial of the present realities of Cyprus.

57. It is the exercise of the legitimate and fundamental right of the 18-per-cent Turkish-Cypriot minority to ask for a 50-per-cent participation—as it is euphemistically termed, “partnership in equality”; but for the Greek majority of 82 per cent, to ask for their fundamental and legitimate rights, including the right to have a say in the fate of their country, is a denial of the realities created by the invasion. I find this a peculiar frame of mind, a peculiar use of words, with different meanings according to whether they refer to Greek Cypriots or to Turkish Cypriots; it seems that there are legitimate rights, there are fundamental rights, but they belong exclusively to the Turkish Cypriots; the same rights cannot be asked for and cannot be granted to the Greek Cypriots.

58. It is in that sense that we also view the much-heralded proposal for a so-called transitional Government [*A/10256-S/11825, annex, appendix I*]. The Special Political Committee may have noticed that the proposal was not for the establishment of “a transitional Government” to govern the island, to exercise its legitimate and sovereign powers over the whole area of Cyprus; it was to be a legitimate Government, a transitional Government which, however, would have a very limited objective: to run certain common

services—nothing more. This is not a proposal for setting up a Government; it is not a first step towards a Government; it is a first step towards undermining the very existence of the Cyprus State.

59. In that respect I should like to quote the statement made by the Greek Cypriot negotiator, Mr. Clerides, in reply to that proposal, when it was made:

“The Turkish Cypriot proposals for the creation of a transitional joint federal Government, which were sent to me at 5 p.m. this afternoon, and almost immediately released to the public, are totally unacceptable and cannot even form the basis for negotiations. They are aiming at the abolition of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, which has international recognition, and a continuation of the occupation by the Turkish forces of 40 per cent of the territory of the Republic. No transitional federal Government is possible whilst the Turkish military continue to occupy territories of the Republic.

“Furthermore, the Turkish proposals are so designed as to prejudice the solution of the Cyprus problem by compelling the Greek Cypriot side to accept not only the principle of a biregional Federal State but also the equal representation of the two communities in the central Government, ignoring the fact that the Greek community constitutes 82 per cent of the total population of Cyprus, whilst the Turkish community constitutes only 18 per cent.”

60. Very briefly, I refer to two points raised this morning about the alleged refusal to issue passports to Turkish Cypriot citizens. There is no such refusal. I categorically state that they can obtain passports at any moment that they want by simply applying to any of the appropriate Government authorities. What is objectionable is that the wholesale issue of thousands of passports should be given to the Turkish Cypriot administration for issue at will—and for very good reason, which I hope to explain later in my statement.

61. As for the banks and the alleged threat to freeze the deposits of Turkish depositors with the Central Bank, suffice it to say that no less than three banks are freely operating within the occupied areas, without any restriction whatsoever.

62. Turkey did not invade Cyprus, as Turkey initially alleged and wanted the world to believe, in order to re-establish the constitutional order that Turkey had guaranteed. Nor did Turkey invade in order to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriots. The senseless coup of the defunct Greek military junta was used as a pretext to set in motion an old plan—the old plan of partition of the island of Cyprus into a Greek and into a Turkish zone as a first step, and when the opportunity arose in the future, to annex the whole island. That this was an old plan which Turkey had been following with unique consistency is very obvious from the statements made as far back as 20 years ago by Turkish politicians, by Turkish ministers, and even by one Turkish Prime Minister, and by the statement of the Turkish position on the solution of the Cyprus problem given to the United Nations Mediator, Mr. Galo Plaza, and

included in his report to the Secretary-General.<sup>9</sup> Reference has often been made to these statements and so I shall not unduly tax the patience and time of the Committee by referring to many of them; I shall confine myself to three of them—the most revealing.

63. As early as 1955 the then Foreign Minister of Turkey, the late Mr. Zorlu made no secret at the official forum of the Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus held in London in August-September 1955 that Turkey had claims on Cyprus. Mr. Kemal Satir, former Prime Minister of Turkey, in a public statement in 1964 said: “Cyprus will be divided into two sections, one of which will join Turkey”. In June 1964 Mr. Erkin, then Foreign Minister of Turkey, clearly spelled out the real intentions of Turkey when he said in a newspaper interview: “The radical solution would be to cede one part of Cyprus to Greece and the other, closest to the Turkish Adriatic coast, to Turkey”.

64. Hardly three months later, on 8 September 1964, the former Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Ismet Inonu, addressing the Turkish National Assembly with reference to the Geneva talks of that year, said: “We officially promoted the federation concept rather than the partition thesis so as to remain within the provisions of the treaties”—meaning the treaties by which the Republic of Cyprus was established.

65. So for each reference that may be made here as to statements made by the Greek Cypriots about *enosis*, I could counter with an equal number of statements made by the Turkish Cypriot leadership and by Turkey about partition. The only difference is that while the Greek Cypriots were simply talking about it, Turkey has acted on its pronouncements. It is not the brave talk of the Greek Cypriots about *enosis* which brought the Turkish army to Cyprus. And let us clear up this question of *enosis* once and for all. It is no secret and it is not unknown to this body that the fight was waged against the British colonial administration of the island for the right of self-determination, which was aiming at *enosis*. At least five times recourse was had to the Assembly to achieve it. But precisely because we were realists, precisely because we realized that self-determination was unattainable, we accepted independence.

66. Archbishop Makarios, who is presented here as the great protagonist of *enosis*, indeed led the struggle for the self-determination of our country. There is nothing to be ashamed of and it is nothing that we believe gives any right now for the invasion of the island, because it was that same man, Archbishop Makarios, who fought and won three elections since 1960 against opponents who had as their platform *enosis*, while he was against it. His last opponent in an election, a man who was advocating *enosis*, is here with us in the Cyprus delegation. He managed to get 3 per cent of the popular vote.

67. An attempt at a coup was made against Archbishop Makarios and he nearly lost his life, because he was accused of not pursuing *enosis*. Even the leaders of that coup, stupid and senseless though it was, after they came to

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for January, February and March 1965, document S/6253.



power never proclaimed that they were fighting for *enosis*, but that their aim was for continuation of the talks for reaching a mutually acceptable solution.

68. Last year in the Assembly the Cyprus delegation submitted a draft resolution, dated 26 October 1974.<sup>10</sup> The seventh preambular paragraph read as follows:

“Noting the position of the Government of Cyprus that it is opposed to the annexation of the Republic of Cyprus or any part of it by any other State, or to the merger of the Republic of Cyprus or any part of it with any other State, or to its partition or division in any form”.

The draft resolution, which was submitted by the Cyprus delegation, was not accepted by the Turkish delegation. It was therefore the old established plan of partitioning the island that brought the Turkish army into the island. It is the implementation of that plan that we now see unfolding in Cyprus. It is that plan which the Turkish invading forces had executed, following to within a few miles in accuracy the plan proposed by them to Mr. Galo Plaza.<sup>11</sup> It is the legitimization of that plan which Turkey wants to obtain through the intercommunal talks, and for Turkey there will never be progress in the negotiations unless it is progress towards the legalization of that plan, and this is exactly what the Greek Cypriot side will never accept. We cannot—and nobody is entitled to ask us to—agree to become parties to an agreement which will simply legalize the Turkish invasion and its horrible aftermath, thus laying the foundation for the third round, the final partition of our country through the forceful eradication of the indigenous population and through a change of the demographic structure of Cyprus.

69. It is this reality which must be identified through the discussions in the Assembly and it is this reality which must be clearly rejected by this international community as a feasible alternative and as being morally, legally and politically contrary to the fundamental and legitimate rights of both communities on the island. Only then, when the ultimate imperialistic plans of Turkey become known and exposed may we hope that the negotiations will be placed on a different and constructive footing, only when it becomes obvious that the world will not accept the theory that might creates right, only when the cessation of the invasion becomes a reality and the return of all the refugees to their homes is implemented, as demanded by resolution 3212 (XXIX), may we hope for the carrying out of the meaningful negotiations envisaged in that resolution with a view to reaching freely a mutually acceptable political settlement based on the fundamental and legitimate rights of both communities.

70. Turkey is using the military might of its invading army in Cyprus to shield its continuing *faits accomplis*, and to put us before the following bleak and tragic dilemma: “Either the Greek Cypriot community agrees to concede by its signature the permanent occupation of 40 per cent of its

land, or the Turkish invading army will continue the military occupation of that same area, which in addition it will turn, through colonization and other measures, into a province of Turkey.” That is the dilemma before which the Greek Cypriot side is now placed. That is for Turkey the only acceptable outcome of the intercommunal talks. That is the outcome which they ask us to accept *a priori*, before we even begin the talks and before they put their proposals on the negotiating table. They want us publicly to accept the underlying principles of this dilemma. That is why the negotiations have become a travesty and that is why no complete proposals have thus far been submitted by the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot side, because they themselves know that their real aims and intentions about Cyprus, which are reflected in those proposals, will be revealed through them and will meet with a world-wide outcry as being totally unacceptable.

71. We definitely and utterly reject the dilemma posed before us as illegal and immoral. We shall never accept the theory that might creates right, that war and military invasion can ever create legitimate rights. War and the use of arms as a means of solving international disputes are internationally, and also by the Charter of the United Nations definitely and categorically rejected. Turkey is promoting the idea that the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, is the obstacle to any such agreement being reached. They could not be more wrong. There is no Greek Cypriot leader, indeed there is no Greek Cypriot, who will accept this dilemma or be prepared to add his signature to such a shameful capitulation.

72. We may have been militarily defeated by Turkish military might, but we are not vanquished. As a State we may have lost everything through a hopeless war, but we still have our dignity as human beings, and our dignity is not to be bartered and we shall not sign our unconditional surrender as is being demanded of us. We place our hopes in the United Nations, even if some people think that it is useless to debate any international problems before the United Nations, even if it is claimed that this debate “will produce yet another resolution but not a solution”. The support that we get from world opinion may not be much, but it is our only hope. We still believe—I hope I am not wrong—that no country, not even Turkey, is big or strong enough to ignore so contemptuously the expressed determination of this world assembly that the solution of the Cyprus question must be found through negotiations and not through the use of military might or the threat of its use.

73. No country, not even Turkey, is big or strong enough to ignore the principles laid down in unanimous United Nations resolutions or to pursue unilaterally policies that totally ignore the fundamental and legitimate rights of all the people of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots as well as Turkish Cypriots.

74. The fact that Turkey has managed to convince a number of States and well-meaning people all over the world that the dispute over Cyprus is a constitutional dispute between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots is already a major political victory for Turkey. Turkey does not want to upset this image by actually proceeding now, without any provocation, to a military occupation of the

<sup>10</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes, agenda item 110, document A/L.738.

<sup>11</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1965, document S/6253, para. 109.

rest of the island. But it aims at achieving its same territorial expansion policy through colonization of the island of Cyprus. And colonization is really what Turkey is now steadily implementing.

75. This is the newest and most ominous development with regard to Cyprus. This one development, if it succeeds, will be presented later to the world as being incontrovertible, as being an irreversible new reality that we shall again be asked to accept. There is already undeniable evidence that Turks from the mainland of Turkey are being transported from Turkey into Cyprus and are already settled in several of the villages, in the occupied areas, in houses and properties of the forcibly evicted Greek Cypriots.

76. Members of UNFICYP, members of foreign diplomatic delegations, have already submitted reports of their having witnessed this wholesale settlement and colonization of Cyprus by Turks from the mainland of Turkey. Foreign correspondents have seen these people and reported on the latest developments. Suffice it to mention a few quotations from reputable international sources.

77. On 27 October 1975, Mr. Caglayangil, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a report made to the Ankara Radio, Domestic Service, was quoted thus:

"Answering a question, Mr. Caglayangil said that those who, allegedly, have been sent from Turkey to settle in the Federated Turkish State of Cyprus, are actually workers who have gone to Cyprus to meet the labour needs of the Turkish sector."

Mr. Caglayangil also said that "thousands of Turkish Cypriots who were forced to leave the island because of the pressure applied on the Turkish Cypriots earlier wanted to return to where they were born".

78. On 15 October 1975 a statement by Mr. Orek, another Turkish Cypriot leader, was published in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers *Zaman* and *Halkin Sesi*: "... A limited number of workers is coming to Cyprus from Turkey in order to meet the demands of seasonal employment...".

79. Those were the statements made by a Turkish official and a Turkish Cypriot official when the colonization became apparent and could no longer be denied. As to the explanations given, I shall have some more words to say in a minute. But in the meantime, an investigation conducted on the spot by the respected newspaper *The Guardian* was published on 18 October 1975:

"Migration of Turks to the northern Turkish occupied part of Cyprus is taking place on a scale that will soon radically alter the racial balance of the island and could seriously affect the chances of a political settlement.

"... The recent removal of several hundred Greek Cypriots from the north of the island was ordered specifically to create space for immigrants.

"... The immigration is taking place in considerable secrecy. There has been no mention of it in the Turkish Cypriot press and only rare, oblique references in Turkish mainland papers.

"... Investigation has disclosed that most of these immigrants (from 10,000 to 15,000 persons, according to Turkish Cypriot sources), are Lazes from the northern Black Sea coast of Turkey. The Laze immigration seems to have begun in March or April.

"... According to figures given by Turkish Cypriot sources, the rate of migration appears to be between 1,500 and 2,500 persons a month. With an estimated force of 40,000 Turkish soldiers in the north, it would take one year (at the higher figures) and just over two years (at the lower figures) for mainlanders to outnumber Turkish Cypriots."

80. The following is an extract from the reply of the Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists, dated 14 July 1975, to a communication of the so-called "Bar Association of the Turkish Federated State":

"... the actions of the Turkish authorities are going far to create a situation of faits accomplis by setting Turkish immigrants (in violation of paragraph 6 of article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949) in the homes from which Greek Cypriots were driven or fled at the time of the invasion by the Turkish armed forces."

81. According to the London *Financial Times* of 15 October 1975, immigration from Turkey to Cyprus is intended to reach the figure of 80,000. I mention that because in this very room there are two representatives who have been told in the last two days by Turkish Cypriot representatives that it is not true that the wholesale colonization of Cyprus is in the offing. "Only 84,000 Turks from the mainland of Turkey will be added to the 120,000 indigenous Turkish population of Cyprus," they said.

82. But let us consider the explanations given for the migration of "workers" as they are euphemistically called.

83. I hope it is appreciated that, since no Greek Cypriot is allowed into the occupied area of Cyprus and since even the freedom of movement of UNFICYP is strictly and drastically restricted, it is not possible for us to collect just yet, and lay before the Committee, concrete evidence of this horrible, inhuman and illegal plan.

84. It is, however, well known, and it is openly reported in the Turkish Cypriot press, as well as in the Turkish press, that within the occupied territory of Cyprus there is currently unemployment at an unprecedented level, reaching the rate of 25 per cent of the economically active Turkish population. It is also well known that the Turkish labour force was previously mainly engaged in agriculture and in services—that is, in hotel, catering and other tourist activities. It would indeed be a very peculiar and entirely novel method of solving one's unemployment problem—which, in the case of the Turkish Cypriots, is so acute that 25 per cent of the economically active population are unemployed—to have about 30,000 Turkish Cypriots, mainly agricultural workers, unemployed, and yet to import from abroad an equal number of agricultural, semi-skilled or unskilled workers to "meet the demands of seasonal employment".

85. But it has also been said that the settlers are in fact Cypriot subjects returning from abroad, and this also must

be taken up. I have with me, at the disposal of any interested person, the population and vital statistics for Cyprus from the year 1881, based on the registration and census of population—not concocted by any Greek Cypriot but carried out until 1960 by the British, who, with their well-known passion for statistics and accurate accounting, might be expected to have kept good accounts.

86. Throughout those years, the population percentages for Cyprus and figures for immigration and emigration have remained constant, with very slight fluctuations. Furthermore, the total number of Turkish Cypriots who emigrated from 1955 to 1963 to various countries—mainly to Britain, Australia and Germany, and some to Turkey—was only 10,625, and for the period from 1963 to 1974 only 6,539. It is significant that during that same period the number of Greek emigrants from the island was 50,956—that is, a higher rate than that corresponding to the population distribution. If, therefore, the total number of Turks who have emigrated from Cyprus is only 6,539, and if none of them has died, and if all of them were well within the child-bearing age group and very active and fertile in that field, and if all of their children are alive and well, it still remains for me an insoluble biological problem how they have managed to multiply to 80,000 strong and able-bodied seasonally employed workers within the brief spell of 10 years, or to have descendents and descendents' descendents who, as we are sometimes told, now amount to 300,000 persons of Turkish Cypriot origin who are likely to come to Cyprus "to assist with the seasonal employment needs". I confess I cannot give an explanation for this biological miracle. Had the statement not been made seriously, I might have been tempted to doubt its veracity.

87. Of all such unilateral actions, of all such faits accomplis, none is more ominous, none is more clearly contrary to international law and to the spirit and letter of United Nations resolutions than the colonization of Cyprus.

88. Colonialism has almost been eradicated, and the world has sacrificed many lives and undergone much suffering in setting in motion the process of the final eradication of colonialism from the face of the earth. We hope the world cannot and will not remain indifferent to the only instance in the twentieth century world in which colonialism is being revived. Therefore our recourse to the United Nations, which Turkey so much disdains, the point of which is being questioned, aims at nothing more than asking the General Assembly to reaffirm its resolution 3212 (XXIX) and to make it clear to all that resolutions—whether unanimous or otherwise, whether endorsed by the Security Council or otherwise—are adopted with the intention of their being implemented, and that Member States have an overriding duty to implement such resolutions. Furthermore, we ask that the process and tactic of the fait accompli be rejected as a method of reaching a solution in Cyprus. A solution cannot be freely reached as long as the invading forces are on the island. Furthermore, this new and hideous development, neo-colonialism, cannot leave this house unmoved.

89. Before I end my address I am obliged to raise one more tragic aspect of the tragic problem of Cyprus. It is the question of the missing persons; it is the question of the undeclared Greek Cypriot prisoners of war and missing

persons from both communities, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. These are subjects that we definitely—I stress that, "definitely", and want it to be clearly placed on record—want separated from the political issues of the Cyprus question. It is a humanitarian problem the solution of which should be actively and incessantly pursued by enemies and friends alike, by Governments, organizations, institutions, and generally by human beings of goodwill all over the world.

90. Seventeen months after the complete cessation of hostilities and warlike activities in Cyprus, the fate of 2,107 persons, mostly Greek Cypriots, and a number of Turkish Cypriots, remains totally unknown. Some of these people were soldiers, but many are civilians of various ages, including women and children. During the past year tireless efforts have been made to trace and obtain the release of undeclared prisoners and missing persons, but without success. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representatives participated in the work of joint committees and sub-committees, together with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross and of the United Nations, to consider the problem in order to collect and verify information and to study ways and means of tracing and obtaining the release of those who are alive or establishing the fate of those whose death is feared. All these efforts have failed to yield any result, mainly because the Turkish military authorities in Cyprus are refusing freedom of movement and search either by joint committees or even separately and singly by representatives of the United Nations and of the International Red Cross.

91. The agonizing problem thus remaining is reflected in the anguished voice of parents asking to know, as they are entitled to under any legal and moral law and under any local or international law, about the fate of their loved ones. I need not elaborate, and indeed words fail me in describing the tragedy of a parent condemned to live the rest of his life in doubt as to whether his child is dead or alive.

92. This agony of not knowing for sure gives perhaps greater pain and suffering than even the sure knowledge of the death of relatives and loved ones. Once more we appeal to the humanitarian feelings of the Turkish Government and of the Turkish military authorities in Cyprus to heed the voice of the anguished, the imploring of the parents of the missing persons, and to assist, to facilitate or at least not to obstruct the efforts to trace such people. For our part, on the Greek Cypriot side, we are prepared to give every facility and to reach any agreement for the tracing of such people. We furthermore state categorically that no effort will ever be made to gain political advantage or make political capital out of such a humanitarian issue, even if it were to be admitted that all or any of such people were killed in cold blood after the hostilities ended.

93. There was a bloody and ruthless military attack on Cyprus and thousands of defenceless and unarmed civilians were caught in the storm of the invasion. It is understood that in such circumstances it is mainly the innocent, mainly the powerless, who suffer. In the hours of armed combat soldiers of all nations tend to shoot first and ask questions later. Many of those missing and unaccounted for may have perished in those few hours of actual fighting or even in the

aftermath of the advance of the Turkish forces. But there are hundreds of these people who are now missing and unaccounted for who for many hours, even days, even weeks, after the last shot was fired were seen or known to be alive and in the hands of the Turkish authorities. The joint committees previously referred to have worked for many days, weeks and months, and compiled detailed dossiers of not less than 70 cases of such persons who were undeniably alive and in the hands of the Turkish forces or authorities long after the hostilities ended. Those dossiers have been submitted, but no reply has yet been forthcoming as to the outcome of the investigations promised. When I say that such persons were known to be alive and in the hands of the Turkish authorities, I am referring to clear and uncontradicted objective evidence of the fact. For the purposes of this debate I shall mention but a few examples.

94. There are 15 persons who spoke over the Turkish radio station in Cyprus, "Bayrak", as late as the end of August 1974, that is, 40 days after the invasion and 15 days after the last shot was fired. They identified themselves, giving their rank and number. They stated that they were well treated, and there are tape recordings of their voices. There are persons who were in prison or in prisoner-of-war camps, and who were visited by representatives of the Red Crescent who distributed food and other necessities of life to them. Pictures of these people being visited by such officials, together with captions giving their names, were published in official Turkish bulletins and magazines. The publications indicate that such visits took place as late as 4 September 1974, so they were then still amongst the living. As late as 19 September 1974 the Turkish magazine *Hayyat* published photographs of lines of Greek Cypriot prisoners being sent for transportation to Turkey; several of them who were clearly identified are still missing. There are several other photographs of people; several hundred other people who have been seen in prisons and have been spoken to by relatives and friends who knew them, and a few people who were named in the lists of those to be released on 6, 7 and 8 November 1974, that is, four months after the invasion, are still missing. They have never been released.

95. We want to know the fate of those people. It is not for us to recriminate or to ask for punishment of those people responsible for the loss of many such persons. We only want to know. We have a right to know. The Turkish authorities are obliged by man-made and divine law, by all rules of war and of peace, on clearly humanitarian grounds, to account for such people. We repeat once more that it is not our intention to make political capital out of such an issue, and none will be made. We are prepared to set up a commission, a joint commission, under the chairmanship of the International Red Cross or of United Nations officials, to carry out investigations in both regions for Greek Cypriots and for Turkish Cypriots, from the last known point of detention or arrest of missing persons, to take statements from those who were last known to be in charge of such persons, and to trace the whereabouts or the fate of the missing people.

96. Those who may be traced alive should be forthwith released. For those who have met with their death, no matter under what circumstances, we want to establish finally the fact that they are dead. We do not even want the

names of those who killed them. We do not want to know even if they were killed in cold blood. We do not want to know the names of those who killed them or to hear of them. Let their own consciences be their most effective tormentors and punishers, because it is not for us to mete out retribution. We are even prepared to accept that efforts of this nature should be undertaken exclusively by Red Cross or by United Nations officials, without the participation of anyone from the Greek Cypriot side, and we shall accept their findings without question.

97. The tragedy of uncertainty must be ended. The families of the missing persons can no longer bear this crushing uncertainty as to the fate of their children. This aspect is not an aspect of the Cyprus problem only; it is a problem for the world community, for the conscience of all civilized persons and for all countries.

98. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): I should like to make some brief comments in connexion with the statements of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot representatives. I shall not take up the points raised by the representative of the Greek Cypriot community. The other representative of the same community who spoke in the General Assembly yesterday [240<sup>st</sup> plenary meeting] made, of course, the same points. I shall therefore give an answer to both of them in a plenary meeting. With the proliferation of Greek delegations, each wearing a different hat, this will help to shorten the debate.

99. I notice, however, that the Greek Cypriot representative—the one who spoke here today—objected to the proposal requesting that Mr. Rauf Denктаş should be given the right to make a statement at a plenary meeting of the Assembly. If I understood him correctly, he expressed some doubts about the title of Mr. Denктаş as Vice-President of Cyprus. He should know that over the ruins of the Constitution destroyed by the leaders of his community 12 years ago, Mr. Denктаş is as much Vice-President of Cyprus as Archbishop Makarios is President.

100. The Greek Cypriot representative made some comments regarding the internal structure of the Turkish community. I would think it is none of his business. The Turkish community is and will remain as free as the Greek community to regulate its domestic affairs.

101. I also noticed that the Greek Cypriot representative, not satisfied with encroachments upon the internal affairs of the Turkish community, presumed to pass judgement on Turkish internal affairs. He spoke of "military rulers in Turkey". He must be confusing Turkey with another country whose military rulers directly caused the recent tragedy of Cyprus which he lamented so bitterly.

102. The Greek Cypriot representative also seemed very surprised that the Turkish community preferred what he called "the Turkish aggression" to the Greek embrace. But it is not for me to give an answer to that; the Turkish community will, I am sure, take care of that point.

103. The Turkish Cypriot representative, Mr. Çelik, has once again presented the true nature of the problem we are called to discuss in this debate. The problem is basically a conflict between the two communities which encompasses not only constitutional matters but also the very future of Cyprus.

104. The source of the sufferings of Cypriots since 1963 is nothing else but a double attempt by the Greek Cypriot community to destroy the Constitution and to relegate the Turkish community to the status of a defenceless and powerless minority and for Greece to annex the island in connivance with the Greek Cypriot leadership.

105. The Greek Cypriot leadership has successfully carried out its attempt to crush the state structure and the fundamental rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Greece almost succeeded in its attempt to take hold of the island, preferring a protracted veiled *enosis*, through creating a second Greek State over the shambles of the bicomunal State of Cyprus. Until *enosis* could be safely proclaimed, it was convenient for Greece to allow for the continuation of a dual Greek political existence. The fiction of an independent Cyprus was therefore maintained, the more so since the Turks had been totally eliminated from the Government and administration of Cyprus and were no longer in a position to influence the policies of the so-called independent Republic of Cyprus.

106. Within that game, there was also a contest for power, a dark and sinister struggle, a network of intrigues and conspiracies among Greeks, so complex and complicated that only those who are versed in the subtleties of Byzantine reasoning can understand all its ramifications. Basically, this intra-Greek struggle evolved around the ambitions of Archbishop Makarios to extend his power beyond reach and to manipulate the *enosis* aim accordingly; but it involved also the intricacies of the domestic politics of Greece. That was not a struggle about *enosis*; the participants in that game were all agreed about it. It was a struggle about how and when *enosis* would be achieved, to the benefit of whose passion it would be carried out.

107. That was the situation until the military junta came to power in Greece. The junta, representing the more reactionary and chauvinistic elements among Greeks, immediately embarked upon a policy of instant *enosis*.

108. When Turkey rebuffed the Greek Government and refused to negotiate on any other basis than the independence of the island, the Greek Government attempted to intimidate Turkey and the Turkish community by having its armed forces occupying Cyprus launch direct military attacks upon Turkish Cypriot settlements all over the island. This recourse to the use of force in 1967 provoked a crisis which eventually compelled the Greek Government to accept, for the first time, direct negotiations between the two communities of Cyprus.

109. Turkey then hoped that this willingness on the part of Greece to transpose the problem into the intercommunal framework signified that Greece had at last renounced the aim of *enosis* and accepted the upholding of the independence and sovereignty of the island. The Turkish community for its part vainly nurtured the hope that Archbishop Makarios would seriously negotiate a state structure which would safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of both communities.

110. The intercommunal negotiations lasted for six years, in vain. During all that time it never occurred to the Greek Cypriot community, negotiating from a position of

strength, that time was passing. It is because it faces a relatively equal negotiating party today—the Turkish community—that it shouts “time is the essence”. During all these years, the Greek Government under the guise of supporting the intercommunal talks continued to strengthen consistently its military colonization of Cyprus, culminating in the well-known coup of July 1974.

111. I have made this brief historical outline with a view to showing how consistent the policy of *enosis* has been throughout the years and how justified are the misgivings of Turkey and the Turkish community in this respect. We cannot close our eyes to the bitter lessons of the past. We know only too well that the passion of *enosis* is bound to be resurrected whenever the chances are perceived to be real.

112. It was therefore with a feeling of incredulity that we heard no mention of this fundamental issue by Mr. Christophides in his statement yesterday [*ibid.*]. Today Mr. Papadopolous mentioned this fundamental issue by saying that all the pronouncements about *enosis* were just talk. He said that it was, of course, innocent talk; but whenever Turkey spoke of partition that represented a militant policy.

113. In support of their allegations, the Greek Cypriot representatives yesterday and today cited certain statements of politicians and governmental figures in Turkey. In all those statements to which they referred, the idea of partition is taken up as a defensive argument. Partition has never been a political objective of Turkey vis-à-vis the Republic of Cyprus. It has always been used to counter the idea of *enosis*. The best proof of this is that, despite the situation created last year, despite all its consequences and despite the *de facto* situation in the island today, Turkey has never considered implementing a policy of partition.

114. We are dedicated to the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus because we believe that destruction of the independence of any country in the world would create a most serious precedent which would only be detrimental to peace and security throughout the world. We are dedicated to the ideal of independence because it represents an important factor for the stability and tranquillity of the eastern Mediterranean. We stand for an independent Cyprus where there would be no strategic weapons and no forces capable of carrying out strategic operations. We stand for a real non-alignment of Cyprus, not a parody of it as has always been the case.

115. Those are the reasons why, despite the discouragement and the pessimism that the Turkish community has accumulated over the years in its unyielding attempts to live side by side as equal citizens with the Greek community, we have urged and still urge it to negotiate a peaceful settlement on the basis of the independence, sovereignty and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus.

116. My intention is not to make a long statement at this stage. I just wanted to elucidate who has stood and still stands for the independence of Cyprus and who has consistently been against it. We want the members of this Committee who unanimously support the independence of Cyprus not to be misled on this crucial point.

117. The Turkish delegation will reply in due time in a plenary meeting of the Assembly to the slanders uttered yesterday to the extent that they call for a reply from Turkey. As for the other allegations of Mr. Christophides and Mr. Papadopoulos, Mr. Çelik is taking care of them.

118. What is discouraging is not that these slanderous accusations are levelled against Turkey—for we were expecting exactly that, since we have long come to the conclusion that aggressive and abusive rhetoric is second nature to Greek Cypriot representatives. But we had expected, as I am sure all the members here did, to read between the lines a readiness to work for a peaceful settlement and a willingness to respond to the Turkish community's desire for continued negotiations. Now it is not clear to us what the Greek objectives are. I can only hope that this Greek tragedy has not gone so far as to prevent them from conceiving their own best interests.

119. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on Mr. Çelik, the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community.

120. Mr. ÇELİK (Turkish Cypriot community): Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling on me a second time so that I may elaborate on a couple of issues raised by the Greek Cypriot representative this afternoon.

121. Mr. Papadopoulos has argued that Mr. Denктаş, the Turkish Cypriot leader and the negotiator in the talks, should address the Special Political Committee and not a plenary meeting of the Assembly. He asked me what views I represented here. Well, I do not think he should have any doubt about whose views I represent. I clearly represent the views of the Turkish Cypriot community.

122. But I am not surprised to see the Greek Cypriot representative unhesitatingly continuing to attempt to prevent us from being heard and to present us as second-class citizens. To the Greeks it is justified that they should speak in the General Assembly, that they should speak here, that they should speak anywhere, in any international forum that they can possibly have access to. But when it comes to us, we should be barred from speaking; we should be prevented from speaking. Why are they so afraid of the world hearing the Turkish views? I think the answer is obvious to everyone in this room.

123. I do not want to go into details on this subject. I stated my views on it this morning. But we feel that in the name of justice we should be given an equal say. There are serious, legitimate, justified reasons for Mr. Denктаş to be heard in the Assembly. The draft resolution submitted by the Greek side will be debated there. The substance of the matter will be debated there. Therefore, we feel it appropriate, indeed essential, that both sides should be heard before a draft resolution is adopted which, it is expected, will be binding on both sides and which will be designed to bring us together around the negotiating table. I think that the very opposition sounded here furnishes yet another moral reason for Member States to support our application for a hearing in the General Assembly.

124. Once again we have witnessed an attempt here by the Greek side to present the legitimate and justified Turkish

intervention in Cyprus as aggression. There was no aggression, there could be no aggression on the part of Turkey. This intervention—a justified intervention—was not aggression but an attempt to prevent the consolidation of aggression that had been set in motion back in 1963 by joint Greek mainland and Greek Cypriot forces in order to destroy the independence of Cyprus. What the Turkish invasion was designed to prevent was the attempt which had culminated in July 1974 in the well-known coup that caused so much bloodshed to both Greeks and Turks alike. That cannot be presented here as aggression; the world body cannot be asked to issue a condemnation of it.

125. We are asking the world totally to reject the contention that there is a Turkish occupation of Cyprus. But for the presence of Turkish soldiers in Cyprus I would not be here to defend my community's rights. Total massacre was programmed for us. Even Archbishop Makarios had to testify to the existence of such plans when he spoke in the Security Council on 19 July last year.<sup>12</sup>

126. The very men who planned all this, who caused the death of 2,000 Greek Cypriots and forced Turkey to land in Cyprus are all free in Cyprus, quite free, fully armed, roaming about with their gunmen and publishing papers advocating union with Greece.

127. This allegation of unjustified occupation has come from an EOKA leader, a pro-*enosis* Greek Cypriot leader: my colleague here. That very circumstance shows how flagrantly the facts can be distorted and misrepresented. No mention is made here of secret Greek armies in Cyprus—Sampson's army, Lyssarides's army. Lyssarides is another Greek Cypriot leader, and he is probably in this very room today. And there are other secret armies; I do not know how many—but they know.

128. Mr. Papadopoulos has tried to claim that the process of the abolition of the Cyprus State started last year. By doing that, is he trying to reassert the legitimacy of the *enosis* movement, from which Greeks have suffered as much as Turks? Mr. Papadopoulos has not stated here whether he is still faithful to his *enosis* oath. His leader, Archbishop Makarios, says that he himself still is. We do not know whether the other Greek leaders are still faithful to the oath or not. We never hear anything about it.

129. Incidentally, we have not asked the Greek Cypriots for their unconditional surrender. We have asked only for the establishment of equality in Cyprus.

130. Another matter which is constantly and harshly exploited is the question of refugees in Cyprus. The question of refugees is not new—and it is not new especially to us. We have suffered from a refugee problem for the past two decades. We have had to maintain 26,000 refugees for the past 12 years, in very difficult conditions, including very extreme measures taken by the Greek side, to the point of asking that import duties be paid on subsidies, on food aid coming to us from Turkey. When we applied to international bodies for help in rehabilitating our refugees, in rehousing them, we were rejected because, it was claimed at the time, refugees could not exist in Cyprus, since persons could not be refugees in their own country.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-ninth Year*, 1780th meeting.

131. In saying that, I do not intend at all to underestimate the question of refugees. There is a question of refugees, and I think we have to examine it here.

132. In 1963, 26,000 Turkish Cypriots were uprooted—some of them for the second time, because they had been uprooted back in 1957. In 1974, more than one half of the Turkish Cypriot community, 60,000 persons, were uprooted from the south and had to flee to the north for safety. About an equal number of Greeks, afraid of the Turkish military intervention, chose to go to the south—some 80,000 to 90,000 persons. The number given for Greek Cypriot refugees has been constantly increasing. To start with, it was 60,000. It became 80,000. Then it became 100,000, and then 160,000. Very recently we have heard a figure as high as 220,000.

133. But it is not difficult to ascertain the number of these persons. We know the villages that they evacuated. There is an official Greek census which gives the figure for these refugees. By even the most exaggerated estimate, the number of these persons cannot possibly exceed 100,000. Why put forward these figures here when we have Greek authorities themselves to cite? I have with me an extract from “The Legal Aspects of the Problem of Refugees in Cyprus”, prepared by the Greek Cypriot Attorney-General himself, Mr. Criton Tormaritis. He claims that there cannot possibly be more than 120,000 Greek refugees in Cyprus. And that is the figure given by a Greek who was trying to present his case. His claim is included in an official record.

134. The refugee problem is naturally a very important problem, a very human problem, a problem which must be resolved. How is this problem going to be resolved? We have had 84,000 refugees, some of them have already been accepted, some of them are in the process of being rehabilitated. An equal number of Greek Cypriots have been resettled in Turkish houses and on Turkish properties in the south. There are still 5,000 to 8,000 Greek refugees who are being kept in tents as a showpiece for propaganda purposes. They are being kept there for political exploitation. Even the Greek papers are constantly criticizing the Greek Cypriot administration for not rehabilitating these people, since they have the opportunity to do so and the means to do so. They have kept these refugees in order to ask for foreign aid; incidentally, they have gone on record again, they are writing in their own press, that there is today a two-year stock of food received as foreign aid for these so-called refugees which is being sold on the open market at half price in Nicosia. This is another proof that the number of refugees, as presented by the Greek side, is grossly exaggerated.

135. The allegations here that the Turkish side did not come forward with any constructive proposals during the intercommunal talks is untrue; it is unfounded; it is political propaganda. During the talks we suggested a joint federal central Government to the other side. We have also put forward concrete proposals for the structure of the central Government and for the powers and functions of the central federal Government which we hoped would be set up. These proposals are contained in a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council, issued on 19 September 1975 [A/10256-S/11825].

136. It is claimed here—as it has always been claimed by the Greek side—that the reason the negotiations were interrupted was that we did not come forward with concrete proposals on the question of territory. This again is untrue.

137. At the third round of the talks in Vienna, Mr. Clerides had agreed in principle to abide by a federation, a loose central Government, and participation of the two communities in the central Government on the basis of equality. In return, reciprocal marks on geographical boundaries would be compared from 1 to 6 September and attempts would be made to bridge the gap of the differences between the two sides and then the two negotiators would come to New York with the maps ready for both sides.

138. But as soon as he returned to Cyprus, Mr. Clerides was attacked so much that he had to default. He made public statements saying that he would not prepare his map. As a result of that, Mr. Denktas also had difficulties in preparing his own map. Nevertheless, Mr. Denktas came to New York and brought with him an agenda—known to the Secretary-General—of 8 to 9 items, including concessions on calculations of approximately 240 square miles of land, readjustment of roads so that freedom of movement could be afforded to thousands of Cypriots, and other relevant matters. But Mr. Clerides would not negotiate on this, claiming that his directives from Cyprus were such that he could not negotiate unless Mr. Denktas submitted concrete proposals.

139. Mr. Denktas' plea to Mr. Clerides that he could not know whether Mr. Denktas had brought any concrete proposals with him until they started talking, was of no avail; he had his instructions. Not even for the sake of preserving the atmosphere of optimism which prevailed among the two communities, would he sit down and negotiate. I do not think I need elaborate on this any further.

140. As regards the allegation that the Turkish side is for partition, this, again, is wrong. Partition, or double *enosis*, as it is called, has always been the antidote to *enosis*. We have always spoken of partition when the Greeks pressed and fought not only us but also each other for *enosis*. We said that if *enosis* comes, it must be on the basis of self-determination, applied to both communities equally, and if both communities opt for double *enosis*, then double *enosis* we shall have. We have never come forward with a partition policy in the past except when the Greeks have pressed for *enosis* themselves.

141. We are quoted as having asked Mr. Galo Plaza for partition. I believe that our feeling of insecurity, our worries about our lives and property in Cyprus, have been fully justified by recent events in Cyprus. If we had wanted partition, we could have proclaimed it last year. If we wanted partition, we could proclaim it today. We do not, because we do not want it. If we wanted partition, we would agree with Makarios and negotiate on territory, and nothing else. But because we do not want partition, we do not give priority to negotiation on the territorial aspect of Cyprus. We insist on, and we want to settle, the constitutional problem, the federal set-up, the structure, the

participation of the communities, and then, naturally, the aspect of territory will also be taken up, and naturally it will be the subject of negotiation. If we wanted partition, we would not have proposed to the Greek side a joint central federal Government which would unite, not divide, the island.

142. I want to put on record once again that we are against partition, we are against double partition, we are against *enosis*, and the Turkish Cypriot community will try, with all its means, to prevent any unilateral annexation of any part of the island.

143. I meant no disrespect to the United Nations when I said this morning that the present discussions, the present debate on Cyprus, would produce yet another resolution, but not a solution. What does resolution 3212 (XXIX) say? It says in the clearest of terms that the constitutional problem of Cyprus is primarily the concern of the two national communities on the island. And it calls upon the two sides to come together at the negotiating table and negotiate a peaceful settlement on an equal footing. I cannot understand, therefore, why the Greek-Cypriot representative here was so angry with me when I said that after this resolution he would still have to go back to the negotiating table and try to negotiate a settlement—a peaceful solution.

144. The allegation that Cyprus is being colonized by Turkey is again most unjust, most unfair and most unfounded. Turkish mainland labour, skilled or unskilled, and for that matter Greek mainland labour, skilled or unskilled, is exported—we know it—to Belgium, to France, to Germany and to many other European countries, and no one raises a voice about it. It is quite normal. South Cyprus, the Greek part of Cyprus, is exporting labour to other countries today. That is no problem. But when a few hundred skilled or unskilled labourers come from Turkey, then suddenly the political mechanism starts working, the Greek lobby starts working and this is presented as if Turkey were colonizing Cyprus.

145. I assure all the members of this august body that there is no colonization of Cyprus. My official letter to the Secretary-General, dated 24 October 1975, which has been circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council [A/10310-S/11859] contains our official reply to these unfounded allegations.

146. With reference to the statistics which we have heard from the Greek Cypriot representative here, all I can say is that they are Greek statistics and they are Greek to us.

147. Even at this late hour we see an unceasing attempt on the part of the Greek Cypriot leadership to present the Cyprus problem here in this august body as a question of minorities and majorities. As we have stated clearly on many occasions before in the United Nations, the question of Cyprus is not a question of minorities and majorities. Minorities can only exist within a nation, and since there is no Cypriot nation—and the Greeks themselves, their very leaders, accept that—there can exist no minority community in Cyprus. There are two national communities, two equal co-founder partners of the Republic of Cyprus. And that equality we mean to maintain and we shall insist on our equal rights.

148. We have been most unduly and most unjustifiably branded both here this afternoon and in the plenary meeting yesterday [2401st plenary meeting] as being the instruments of Turkey. Why? Because being fewer in number and having suffered so much at the hands of the Greeks, we always rely on our motherland—Turkey—for financial support, moral support and military support.

149. Is that being an instrument? How much we need that support is evident from the very events of the last years. We cannot understand all this effort to try to draw parallels between the Greek Cypriot relationship with motherland Greece and the relations of the Turkish Cypriot community with motherland Turkey. I should like to quote from the Greek *Cyprus Bulletin* concerning what Archbishop Makarios said when he was asked to comment on a recent statement made by the Greek Premier that Greece should have a role as leader and not as follower in Cyprus. The date of this is 7 November 1973. Makarios replied that the Greek Government had always had an important say in the handling of the Cyprus problem, taking all general national interests into consideration, and in no case had its position been limited to the role of mere follower.

150. Again asked about a meeting that he had with the Greek Ambassador in Nicosia, Makarios said that during the meeting they had reviewed developments in the Cyprus problem and added that he regarded the Greek Ambassador to Cyprus as an adviser of his and that he exchanged views with him on many matters. "Naturally," he said, "we discussed the internal situation". Ambassadors may be advisers on foreign relations, but not on internal matters. From this I think it is obvious which side is an instrument and which side is not.

151. The Greek Cypriot representative, Mr. Papadopoulos, has very generously offered to issue us, the members of the Turkish Cypriot community, with passports if only, he said, we would bother to cross the line and apply to the Greek Cypriot Government for such passports. I believe that Mr. Papadopoulos came to New York from Cyprus and that he knows what the actual situation there is. He was not on the moon. He knows that politically that is not possible—but that is not important. He knows that physically that is not possible either. We know how the 60,000 Turks lost their lives—they were beaten, they were harassed, they were deprived and robbed of their money and so forth while trying to save their skins by going to the north. I wonder whether Mr. Papadopoulos can assure me or any other Turkish Cypriot that I can return safely to the north if I ever dared to cross the Green Line into the Greek-controlled area of Nicosia. I do not think that needs any further clarification.

152. One final matter which I should like to touch upon is the question of missing persons. This is a humanitarian problem which should be treated in a most humane way. The Greek side, however, is constantly exploiting this very humanitarian issue for strictly political purposes. In Nicosia, Mr. Denktas had informed Mr. Clerides that there were no Greek Cypriots or mainland Greek detainees in the hands of the Turkish side. We do not have them. They do not exist. Mr. Clerides was asked to make declarations to that effect, but he said that to do so would harm him politically and he did not come up with any declaration concerning the reply that he received from us.



153. The same matter was discussed in Vienna. The Greek side was told that no detainees were held by the Turkish side. And yet, as if nothing had happened, the question of political detainees always comes up, to the great suffering of those who have lost their beloved ones one way or another. We have made official statements to this effect also in the deliberations of the Security Council here in New York.

154. The Greek side claims to have 2,000 missing persons—in other words, there are 2,000 dead for whom it cannot account. We know that in last year's bloody coup the whole world international press estimated the number of Greeks that were killed by Greeks to be approximately 2,000 men. That statement was confirmed by Archbishop Makarios himself when he went to the Security Council on 19 July 1974 and addressed the Council.<sup>13</sup> He said that the military régime, through its coup in Nicosia, had caused much bloodshed and taken a great toll of human lives.

155. I should also like to quote yet another religious leader in Cyprus, Papatsesto, a priest, speaking to Makarios after his return to Nicosia after his exile:

“During the coup we buried several people who were still alive.

“There were five big graves, 7 by 20, at the Nicosia new cemetery. Beside lay 22 bodies. An EOKA man came along and ordered the digging of another bigger grave. It was completed within 3 hours. Bodies of 54 National Guards, police officers and others were buried. There then came in truckloads of other bodies: 75 people later, including a baby, a young girl, soldiers and policemen. They were all buried.

“At Lakatamia 17 more bodies were buried in a similar grave. They were brought in nylon sacks in a truck.”

This is an account Papatsesto gave to Archbishop Makarios when he visited the Nicosia Greek cemetery, and this was published in the Greek Cypriot press itself on 18 December 1974. This very quotation comes from *Ta Nea*, a Greek Cypriot newspaper.

156. I have no other comments to make.

157. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I am quite conscious of the late hour. I am not going to take any time because, really, not much time is needed to show the absurdity that is presented by the very distinguished representative of Turkey, who comes here to speak again about *enosis* or other tittle-tattle, Byzantinism, and other things, and does not say a word of what his position is regarding the implementation of resolution 3212 (XXIX), unanimously adopted last year, with the vote of Turkey, calling for the evacuation of Turkish forces from Cyprus, for the cessation of the intervention and for the return of the refugees to their homes. This was intended for Turkey to comply with, and Turkey voted for it; it is now showing such disregard and disrespect for its own vote and continuing the occupation, although the element of urgency was mentioned in the resolution, both for the withdrawal of the

forces and the return of the refugees. And nothing was done.

158. What was the explanation given? None. The Security Council endorsed that resolution, made it mandatory under resolution 365 (1974) and called upon the parties concerned, and therefore upon Turkey, to implement the [General Assembly] resolution. It entrusted the Secretary-General with the duty of following up that implementation and reporting to the Security Council.

159. The Secretary-General, acting in accordance with his duties, sent a note verbale [dated 24 January 1975] to Turkey asking what it had done and what it intended to do for the implementation, in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council. Turkey postponed and evaded replying and, finally, made no response. But instead of that, it declared a separate State, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

160. This was stated yesterday [2401st plenary meeting] by my Foreign Minister. And the first occasion that the representative of Turkey has had to speak about it was here, the first time he has taken the floor, and he said nothing about it. He tried to give a little petty talk about one little thing or another.

161. Now, both he and the so-called representative of the Turkish community, Mr. Çelik, spoke about *enosis*, as if there was any danger of *enosis*. There is not a single member of the international community, or of the United Nations or anyone in this chamber or outside it, who thinks even for a moment that *enosis* is at all a live problem today, was one or yesterday. It has not been a problem for many years, but particularly now there is no problem. And they pretend that there is a problem of *enosis*. But this pretence is so ridiculous that it only emphasizes their inability to reply, to deal with the issue.

162. The issue is one which concerns the whole international community: of aggression, invasion of the worst kind, conforming with every word of the definition of aggression that was adopted last year [General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), annex], and adopted with the participation of Turkey in the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression. Yet, three months after the adoption of the definition, Turkey made an attack upon Cyprus, which fitted in with every word of the definition of aggression. And the two speakers who preceded me disregard that. They do not have to answer.

163. Our concern is for Cyprus, of course, fundamentally, primarily. That is also our concern as members of the international community and of the United Nations, which will crumble if there can be no international security at all, if any bigger Power can attack a smaller country and destroy it and then come and say that it was not really aggression; no, it was merely a right of intervention. A napalm bombing of Cyprus—napalm, a prohibited weapon—destroying citizens, hospitals and everything else, and an invasion of the country, are not aggression. What are they? And not only did Turkey invade, but showed its purpose. What was the purpose? To partition Cyprus by changing by force its demographic character and evicting its population from the invaded territory by the hundreds of

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

thousands. Now Mr. Çelik says: "No, no, the figure is not 200,000; it is 125,000". What difference does it make? The population has been violently and unlawfully uprooted from its homes, from its lands, from its property. And those who have done it get so used to this crime that they say: "We have brought in labourers to cultivate the usurped lands". It is really a deprivation which is unparalleled in history, and particularly in the era of the United Nations.

164. It seems abominable that such arguments are brought in here to justify what cannot be justified. And not a word is said about finding some excuse or making some promise that these troops will be taken away, that the invasion will stop.

165. That is what I wanted to say, and I wanted also to add this. There is all this talk about Archbishop Makarios, about his desire for *enosis*, about his being the obstacle to all the solutions because of his *enosis* proclivities. Well, the junta coup was said to be a coup for *enosis*, yet its only target at the time was to destroy Archbishop Makarios as the man who did not stand for *enosis* but for independence—because when he was elected his platform was an independence platform, and the platform for *enosis* was defeated, as Mr. Papadopoulos has said.

166. So what reasoning is there in saying that Archbishop Makarios was the man of *enosis*, when he was resented, was attacked, was to be killed, by those who sought to attain *enosis*? But at the same time that coup did not declare *enosis*, did not molest a single Turk. It was a coup against the so-called non-*enosis* in Cyprus, but not intended to molest the Turks at all. All that we heard about deaths and killings was about Greeks, not about Turks.

167. But Turkey took advantage of this outside interference in Cyprus which had brought about by means of the coup. It was engineered from outside, quite engineered from outside, and was used really to promote the objectives of Turkey. And now the representatives of Turkey come and speak about it as the reason for their invasion and attack on Cyprus, which is ridiculous. But even if it were so—and it is ridiculous to say such a thing—why did they continue the invasion after the Government in Greece was changed, and why did they start upon a new invasion on 15 August?

168. This is quite enough to show the unsubstantial position of Turkey in opposition to our claim concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX).

169. Mr. PAPOULIAS (Greece): I wish to say a few words in reply to what has been said by the representative of Turkey regarding my country, since on the point under discussion, the representative of the Greek Cypriot community, Mr. Papadopoulos, and the representative of Cyprus, Mr. Rossides, have adequately dealt with the substance.

170. I categorically reject the idea that Greece has ever attempted to annex Cyprus. Had that been the case, Greece would not have come to the United Nations as early as 1954 in order to present the case of Cyprus in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Charter, a procedure to which Turkey bitterly objected at the time.

171. It is well known that Turkey has long been threatening military intervention in Cyprus, and I need not remind representatives how a Turkish landing in Cyprus did not materialize in 1964, although the plan was kept in being so that it could be carried out on the first possible pretext—namely, in July 1974, despite the fact that the pretext Turkey used for the invasion in Cyprus ceased to exist within a few days.

172. As regards the esoteric observations of the representative of Turkey regarding my country's complications, I shall merely say that it would be more advisable for him to look into the internal affairs of his own country. After all, it is the Turkish side that is claiming, all over the world, that its own internal political complications and difficulties prevent substantial negotiations in Cyprus and, consequently, implementation of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions to which Turkey fully subscribed.

173. Mr. PAPAPOULOS (Greek Cypriot community): The representative of Turkey need not complain about the so-called proliferation of Greek Cypriot delegations here, since apparently he chose to leave the task of explaining away the aggression of Turkey to his other representative; for that purpose, the Turkish Cypriot representative spoke.

174. I note with some regret that he has said nothing in this Committee about the implementation of resolution 3212 (XXIX) by his country or about the aggression. We were not told what he now terms it. In the past we have been told that it was a peace-keeping operation. This morning it was described as an intervention. Again we have this, to my mind, peculiar and selective choice of words. This selection of words is not limited to the question of aggression. I am very saddened to see that the same selective choice of words to suit the arguments put forward is being exhibited by the Turkish Cypriot representative. Thus, when we speak about the question of the missing persons, that is exploitation. When he speaks about the alleged sufferings of the Turks, that is stating the facts.

175. But we have heard more of that. In the Vienna communiqué about the missing persons, the actual phrasing was, "No detainees are officially held by the Turkish side". There is a distinct difference between "officially held" and "unofficially held". Had he been more patient with my statement on the missing persons, he would have noticed the very distinct difference that I have stressed. I said that for those who have lost their dear ones the suffering of uncertainty is perhaps greater than knowing for certain that they have lost their lives. If the Turkish side is not holding them, at least let us find out where they are buried. Let us learn their fate. I am very distressed at his flippant effort to write off 2,107 missing persons as having been killed in the coup and buried. All those killed and buried are accounted for, listed and named. How can one claim that people who were killed in the coup of 14 July were healthy, alive and grateful six weeks later, speaking from the "Bayrak" station, or were alive and about to receive medicaments and the necessities of life from the Turkish Crescent about two months later? How could they be alive and listed among those to be released four months later, on 6 November? Again, this is another biological problem.

176. We were also told—and it is an improvement on the selective choice of words—we now have a distortion of words to describe situations to suit our purposes. It was said that the Greek Cypriot population of the North, being “afraid of the Turkish military intervention”—not “the peace-keeping operation” this time—chose to go to the South. It was a really broad choice they were given: to be slaughtered or to flee. And if they then chose to go to the South, now that they choose to go to the North, are they permitted to do so? Why this great disdain on the part of my friend the Turkish Cypriot representative as to whether there are 125,000 or 100,000? Does the number 100,000 make the moral issues involved less urgent? Does it render less mandatory the Turkish obligation to comply with the relevant section of resolution 3212 (XXIX)? Why? Whatever the number may be, let them go to the North. Is the Turkish side prepared to allow them to go to the North, no matter how many they are?

177. We have been told there are only 8,000. Well, as anybody who may have visited Famagusta may know, the town had a population of 50,000. How that number was reduced to 8,000 I do not know. It is a mathematical problem I cannot understand. But even if the number is 8,000, is the Turkish side prepared to let them go back to their homes? Is it now willing to accept that whatever the number may be—and it is one of the most easily established of statistics—they should return to their homes and villages? The less there are the better I suppose it would be for the Turkish aims in Cyprus. And why should there be such a great dispute as to the actual number of refugees? Are you disputing the UNRWA figures? Are you disputing the United Nations figures? Are you disputing the Red Cross figures?

178. All right. Let us have a committee. Is the Turkish side prepared to allow a fact-finding committee to visit the island and establish the facts? We are ready for it any time, with any composition and with any terms of reference. But the point remains, whether there are 8,000 or 100,000 or 125,000 or 200,000, the refugees have an inalienable right to return to their homes and we hope that those rights will be recognized, rather than having debates as to how to resettle them.

179. What is this new theory we hear, of equating the importation into Cyprus of Turkish seasonal workers with the exportation from Cyprus of workers who have become unemployed and are without the chance of earning their living so that they have to emigrate and work outside Cyprus? Are we now equating importation with exportation? This surpasses even the tactical choice of words. This is using a different word to describe completely the contrary situation and equating the two. Indeed, I believe that it is unfair to this Committee to have to listen to such allegations as that when a Turkish labour force goes to Germany there is no problem but that when it goes to Cyprus there is a problem. When Turkish workers go to Germany—and I do not know whether it is to the east or west,—I am sure the Germans would not allow them forcibly to uproot the Germans from their homes and settle there, and I am sure that the German authorities—of whichever State—would not permit them permanently to settle there, eradicating the indigenous population.

180. It is, however, heartening to some extent to hear the assurance that Cyprus is not being colonized. I hope that is true. I honestly hope that it is true, otherwise, as has been stated earlier, the finding of an acceptable solution to the Cyprus question will become an impossible task. But if it is so, I hope, in fact, I am sure, that there will be no difficulty in agreeing on the inclusion of that phrase in the draft resolution. If there is no colonization and no intention of colonizing the island, then on that point at least we both agree and I hope that that agreement will be reflected in the draft resolution when it is debated in the General Assembly.

181. Again I notice this great difficulty in accepting the true meaning of words. We were told that there is no question of “a minority and a majority community” in the island; but further on in the statement of the representative of the Turkish Cypriots he admitted that there is “one bigger and one smaller” community. Very well. I accept the terminology. I am prepared from now on to say that the Greek community is four times bigger than the Turkish community which is four times smaller, if that would ease the problem at all.

182. We were also obliquely and tacitly referred to resolution 3212 (XXIX), and some surprise was expressed why I was so concerned that there was no implementation of the resolution, since, we were asked, What does resolution 3212 (XXIX) say? It says that the constitutional system is the concern of the communities in Cyprus. I am afraid that not even the explanation of selective choice of words will fit this instance. Now it is selective memory which is being exhibited. We are forgetting that there are three other vital and important points in that resolution. No mention is made of the aggression, no mention of the cessation of military intervention and no mention of all the refugees being allowed to return to their homes. All we are being told is that the negotiations are the concern of the two communities.

183. Well, I have given my views on the progress and outcome of these negotiations and I am surprised that the proposals—which we are told Mr. Denktaş was going to submit but did not submit, which are known to the Secretary-General and yet are not known to us—have not been put on the negotiating table. I do not know whether my information from Mr. Clerides is correct or not, but my information is that the request that the negotiations should be postponed until after the Turkish elections was made by Mr. Denktaş; but since this is the first time we have heard it, at least this debate has done some good. It has at least marked the time when the Turkish Cypriot side agrees partly—to my mind a very small part, but partly—to comply with the commitment which it had so clearly given in all three rounds of talks in Vienna that it would have full proposals, covering absolutely every aspect of the Cyprus question, to put on the negotiating table a week before the negotiations were to take place in New York. At that time it obviously could not know whether Mr. Clerides would sit down to the negotiations or not; why were the proposals not given eight days beforehand, as it had firmly undertaken to do? So firmly, that it said it would submit them one week before, so that clarifications could be asked for from either side, so that when the talks were held in New York substantial and meaningful negotiations could be carried out.

184. We heard about the alleged existence of secret armies among the Greek Cypriots. There are no such armies, but if there were, and if we are trying to effect the withdrawal from Cyprus of all armies, I would say that there is one marked difference: even if such an army existed, it would be a Cypriot army, not a Turkish army. The Turkish Cypriot community may regard the Turkish forces as armies of its own motherland, and that community is free to choose its relations with its motherland as long as it does not do so at the expense of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus, but Turkey is still a foreign country to Cyprus.

185. We heard something else which must be mentioned. If, we were told, Turkey had wanted to advocate a policy of partition, it could have done so, and if the Turkish Cypriot community had wanted partition it would have had it by now. Well, I have my doubts as to whether it will be so easy, whether the legal fiction they have used as a pretext for invading the island in pursuance of the Treaty of Guarantee will stand the test, if partition were the solution that either Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots were to pursue. What is more, I have a feeling that there are several countries which have until now been reluctant to take an active role in Cyprus, but which would not view with the same, let us say, favourable indifference the dismemberment of Cyprus, the complete abolition of the independence of Cyprus and its absorption into the NATO camp by being turned into one part Turkish and the other part Greek. That may—just may—be one of the reasons why, publicly or officially, the policy of partition is not being advocated. But why should it be advocated? The way things are now Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots have the best of both worlds. They have partition in fact, whilst they have their freedom to use the legal pretext that Cyprus is independent, and thereby legalistically to comply with the call for the respect of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. When all is said and done, and when we get away from the political nomenclature, the true facts remain that Cyprus is divided by a military line manned by a foreign army, and there is no interchange of people, there is no freedom of movement, there is no freedom of government in what is an integral part of the Republic of Cyprus. So, as it has been repeatedly stated, both on the map and in reality the partition of Cyprus has been implemented.

186. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): I wonder whether they have finished or whether there is a fourth Greek representative in the room? Mr. Papadopoulos has said that I should not complain about the proliferation of Greeks in the Committee, but I am rather embarrassed because I do not know to which one of them I should give an answer at the moment.

187. I think I should start with Ambassador Rossides, who extolled the virtues of resolution 3212 (XXIX) and accused me of not going into the essence of the problem and not indicating how this resolution was going to be implemented by Turkey. He spoke not only as the representative of the Greek Cypriots but, as usual, he postured as the conscience of the United Nations and presumed to teach me how I should write my speeches and with which subjects I should deal.

188. Turkey has nothing to fear from resolution 3212 (XXIX). The main recommendation in that resolution is that the two communities should discuss the problem between them, that the two communities were the main parties to the conflict; and, indeed, with the active participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the two communities held four rounds of talks. There is no other way to implement resolution 3212 (XXIX) than through intercommunal talks. We all know that, and everybody accepts that. The Security Council has also expressed the same view in its resolutions on the Cyprus problem.

189. The really worrying part of today's speeches is that Mr. Papadopoulos said that the Cyprus conflict is not a conflict between the two communities, that it is not a constitutional conflict between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, that the problem is a different one and that it would fade away immediately the Turkish forces are withdrawn from the island. I wonder what would happen then.

190. He constantly said that the Greek Cypriots represented 82 per cent of the population and that the Turkish Cypriots represented only 18 per cent. But we also know something of the recent history of Cyprus and of the use of force by one community against the other. If the Greek Cypriots say that they do not want any intercommunal talks and that the Turkish forces should withdraw from the island, this means only that they would like to solve the Cyprus problem then, in the absence of the Turkish army, in the way they have done in the past.

191. Mr. Papadopoulos has said that there are no private Greek Cypriot armies on the island and that there never were. I shall now quote from the statement of a Greek representative in the Security Council. Ambassador Panayotakos said the following in the Council, on 19 July 1974, when speaking about Archbishop Makarios:

"In February 1972 he turned a deaf ear to Athens' last advice for the formation of a Government of national unity. In reply, he created and armed his own paramilitary units of Praetorians instead—namely, a bunch of SS zealots. He persecuted his political opponents and torture was used systematically against them as a means of extorting confessions, according to a recent official survey. They were also excluded from political life and all public offices."<sup>14</sup>

That is what Archbishop Makarios has done to Greece. I wonder what he is preparing for Turks when the Turkish army leaves, as requested?

192. The representative of Greece has said—if I correctly understood him, because there was a profusion of speeches—that Greece has never attempted to achieve *enosis*. I think that Archbishop Makarios is not in agreement with him. I shall quote Archbishop Makarios, who, on 19 July 1974, said the following when he addressed the Security Council:

"The military régime of Greece has callously violated the independence of Cyprus. Without a trace of respect

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

for the democratic rights of the Cypriot people, without a trace of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, the Greek junta has extended its dictatorship to Cyprus."<sup>15</sup>

He said also:

"The coup did not come about under such circumstances as to be considered an internal matter of the Greek Cypriots. It is clearly an invasion from outside, in flagrant violation of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus."<sup>16</sup>

I do not have to qualify this action described by Archbishop Makarios. The Greek representative says, apparently, that this is not an attempt at *enosis*.

193. I also wonder why suddenly he decides to take upon himself the defence of what the Greek junta has done? In doing so the Greek representative also referred to some Turkish internal difficulties because I mentioned the intricacies of Greek politics. He said that he was spreading the word around that because of our internal difficulties, because of our elections, we cannot negotiate a settlement of the Cyprus problem. That is not true at all. First of all, it is not Turkey which is negotiating on this issue but the Turkish Cypriot community with the Greek Cypriot community, and Turkey has always said that it would be ready to accept any settlement agreed upon between the two communities. So Turkish political developments, the difficulties we may encounter in Turkey within our democratic framework, have nothing at all to do with the solution of the Cyprus problem.

194. I wish to say something more about the question of partition. Mr. Papadopoulos has referred to this question and said that we were indeed following a policy of partition. I do not know what the Turkish Government has to do to convince them that we are not at all following a policy of partition. We are dedicated to the independence of Cyprus. We solemnly declared, each time we spoke in the United Nations, that we want a solution of the problem based on the independence of Cyprus, on the sovereignty of Cyprus, on the territorial integrity of Cyprus, and also that we wish to see Cyprus follow a policy of non-alignment.

195. So far as the other questions are concerned, we have time and again stressed that once a settlement has been agreed upon between the two communities Turkey will do what is expected of it.

196. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community.

197. Mr. ÇELİK (Turkish Cypriot community): The United Nations and this Committee have been hearing the Greek stories for the last 12 years. Therefore, I do not intend to reply to each and every allegation raised in these chambers this afternoon. I should like to put on record only that we have a joint committee in Cyprus—consisting of Turkish Cypriot representatives, Greek Cypriot representatives, United Nations representatives and Red Cross representatives—which deals with humanitarian problems,

including missing persons. All files which have been referred to us by the Greek side have been answered, and we are always willing and ready to help on this humanitarian issue.

198. I should also like to put on record that we, the Turkish Cypriot side, have more than 800 missing persons, lists of whom have been given to international bodies. They have been given to the Greek side, whom we have asked to come forward with official statements concerning the whereabouts or fate of those persons, but it has not bothered even to reply. And, incidentally, Mr. Papadopoulos is a member of that committee.

199. Mr. Papadopoulos says that there are no secret armies in Cyprus; the Greek Cypriots have never heard of them. But, if there are no secret armies, why are the so-called Greek Cypriot administrators, with their President and all that, afraid to go to Sampson and question him regarding the whereabouts of their 2,000 missing persons?

200. Why are they afraid to go to Sampson and question him about the coup that he carried out last year and that caused so much bloodshed? Why are they so afraid, if there are no secret armies, if there are no terrorist organizations in Cyprus, even to carry out a purge of their very civil servants who actually participated in the coup last year? The question is before their Parliament. It has been debated for the past 12 months. But no one dares to come forward with a resolution—let alone implement a resolution—calling for the purging of these people or taking them to court, or at least for measures to ensure that such a calamity does not befall Cyprus again.

201. Some of the points that have been raised here can be solved only within the framework of the intercommunal negotiations, which we hope will resume. I would not wish, therefore, to go into any details on those points here.

202. But I should like to put it on record once more that as a community that has been deprived of all governmental funds, facilities and services for the past 12 years, we are determined to defend our rights in Cyprus. In an independent and sovereign Cyprus our rights are equal and cannot be apportioned. We sit here as a community which resisted the Greek Cypriot leaders who were struggling for *enosis* and which therefore saved the independence of the country. We shall continue to be an insurmountable obstacle to the *enosis* movement of the Greek Cypriot leadership and the Greek mainland Government.

203. I do not agree with—and I should like to have the record straight on this—the statement made by Ambassador Rossides this afternoon that the *enosis* movement was something that concerned only the junta and that since the junta is no longer in power the Turkish Cypriots need have no worries about *enosis*. Well, it is obvious how untrue that statement is. The *enosis* movement did not start with the junta. It started back in the fifties when Caramanlis's democratic Government was in power in Greece. We thought we had solved the problem with the Zurich and London agreements,<sup>17</sup> with our new Constitution in

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> *Conference on Cyprus: Documents signed and initialled at Lancaster House on February 19, 1959, Cmd. 679 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959).*

1960.<sup>18</sup> But the crisis started again during Papandreou's democratic rule in Greece. So it is no use blaming the junta for something that had been going on for decades before the junta came to power in Greece in 1967. And Makarios is still on record as speaking of the "feasible", the "attainable", which, as I tried to explain this morning, does not exclude *enosis*.

204. Mr. PAPOULIAS (Greece): First I wish to object to the use by the representative of Turkey of the words "Greek delegations in this room". There is only one Greek delegation in this room, and I have the honour to be its representative. There is the delegation of the Greek Cypriot community and there is the delegation of Cyprus, a State Member of the United Nations, recognized as such by everyone—with the exception, perhaps, of the Turkish delegation. I object to the words "Greek delegations in this room". I do not use the words "Turkish delegations". I hope that we are now clear on that point.

205. Secondly, I wish to draw the attention of the Special Political Committee to the fact that the statement that was quoted [*para. 191*] was made by Mr. Panayostakos on 19 July 1974, which makes it part and parcel of the shameful coup d'état perpetrated by the junta against the legitimate President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios. It cannot be taken out of context and presented as a Greek statement. It is not a Greek statement. It is a statement belonging to that shameful coup d'état, which, as I said on 8 October last in replying to the representative of Turkey in the General Assembly, was condemned from the outset by everyone and, above all, by my country.<sup>19</sup>

206. The three days that elapsed between the invasion of the Turkish troops on 20 July 1974 and the collapse of the junta on 23 July 1974 are being used as a pretext, as a justification for that invasion—an invasion which continues to this day—and for the non-implementation of very clear General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. That is a tactic upon which I do not need to dwell.

207. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of the Greek Cypriot community.

208. Mr. PAPADOPOULOS (Greek Cypriot community): I do not expect, of course, that with the withdrawal of the Turkish forces from Cyprus the problem will automatically be solved. What I am saying is that without such a withdrawal we can never hope to have a solution which is freely arrived at by the two communities and which will take account of their fundamental and legitimate rights.

209. With regard to the existence of Greek armies and the statement which was made in the Security Council and which was referred to out of context here, as the representative of Greece has just said, I would point out the following. We did have under contract in Cyprus a number of Greek officers—about 350. They helped carry out the ill-famed coup in Cyprus and it is to them that reference

was made in the statement about an invasion from Greece into Cyprus. It was proved that they did not carry out the duties of loyalty to the Cyprus Government but, rather, that they were serving the interests of persons outside Cyprus. The service in Cyprus of those officers, however, should not be regarded as something sinister that was done by the Government of Cyprus. Let me mention that a far larger number of Turkish officers—2,000, we hear—were at the time serving with the unofficial Turkish Cypriot army. Proof of that is a recent law adopted by the so-called Turkish Federated State granting Cypriot citizenship to those officers who had served in Cyprus since 1959—even before the independence of Cyprus was declared—and to their descendants.

210. I shall be even briefer with regard to the comments made by the Turkish Cypriot representative. Indeed, we do have the joint committee to which he referred. It has not met for the past four months because there is no interest by the Turkish Cypriot side in the matters on that committee's agenda. It is true, too, that on the files compiled by the International Committee of the Red Cross about 12 replies were given, all of them brief and all of them the same, that is, "No further details are available." I do not know whether they can really be regarded as replies.

211. As for Sampson and his clique, I wish only to inform the Turkish Cypriot representative, who seems to be following the deliberations of the Parliament of Cyprus very closely, that two resolutions have already been adopted by the Parliament condemning the coup and those who took part in it and authorizing the purging from the civil service of those who exceeded their duties and took an active part in the coup with guns—not the ordinary civil servants who were merely performing their duties under the person who was apparently in authority at the time. I hope that very soon this aspect also will be settled properly.

212. I think that in the meantime for every Cypriot, whether in the Government or outside it, the paramount duty, the paramount interest, is how to assist Cyprus to survive as an independent State, how to resist the Turkish invasion of the island, which is still continuing—rather than to engage in a witch hunt and to try to determine who was and who was not responsible for that infamous coup.

213. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): The representative of Turkey—I wish to address him in the proper way, I do not want to create confusion by even calling the names of the representatives—solemnly said here that Turkey stands for the independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-alignment of Cyprus. The emptiness and hypocrisy of these words is proved by the actions of Turkey. After having destroyed the independence of Cyprus and continuing to destroy it by military occupation, it pretends that it stands for its independence, while we see such violent occupation and invasion as exceptional in the recent annals of history.

214. And then there is the question of "territorial integrity". But territorial integrity is being destroyed every day by expulsion and colonization. What else is that but destroying territorial integrity by partition?

215. Mr. Denктаş, acting under the directions of Ankara, and with its blessing, comes at every moment with a

<sup>18</sup> *Constitutional and Parliamentary Information*, 3rd Series, No. 44 (October 1960), p. 141 and *ibid.*, No. 45 (January 1961), p. 1 (Geneva, Inter-Parliamentary Union).

<sup>19</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 2380th meeting.

blackmail threat, saying that unless this or that is done he will declare a separate, independent State of Cyprus tomorrow; what is that but partition—the separate, independent Turkish State of Cyprus? And this is done with the blessing of Turkey and of the representative here: unless the Turkish Cypriots speak in the plenary meeting of the Assembly they will declare an independent, separate State; unless talks resume within a very short time, there will be a declaration of an independent, separate State. This means that a policy of partition is there, already prepared, and they are waiting for the moment and the occasion to implement it.

216. Therefore, I should like to ask the General Assembly, which is a representative body, not to heed these soothing words; they are more fitting for children when we see the acts of Turkey, which mean that, for it, Cyprus is destined for partition and eventual annexation.

217. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community.

218. Mr. ÇELİK (Turkish Cypriot community): First of all, I should like to put our views on record, or rather correct the record, in view of the allegations just made by Mr. Rossides.

219. Mr. Denktaş has never said that he was going to declare independence tomorrow. We only complained that we are being rendered stateless by the so-called Greek Cypriot administration. We claimed—and we still claim—that we are being deprived of many essential services in Cyprus, that we are being treated as second-class citizens, that we are being cut off from the outside world, that we are being pushed towards separation—which we do not

want—and if this continues we are afraid that we may have to take measures to rectify this anomalous situation which will be considered, we are afraid, as a move towards separation or full independence. But, as all the representatives here have witnessed, Mr. Denktaş is being constantly criticized, he is being constantly attacked, allegations are being directed against him, and I think it is morally all the more important and essential that he should be allowed to speak, to reply in person, in the plenary meeting tomorrow.

220. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to express our gratitude to the representatives of the Cypriot communities for participating in our work today; the verbatim record will be submitted to the General Assembly and, I am sure, will be very helpful in finding the best means of solving the difficult problem that confronts Cyprus at this moment.

221. As I have no more speakers, it is my intention to adjourn the meeting. But, before doing so, I should like to inform the Committee that, in conformity with the decision adopted by the General Assembly on 30 September [2367th plenary meeting], we have to submit a report to the General Assembly, in time for it to be available to the Assembly when it resumes its consideration of the Cyprus question tomorrow morning. If there are no objections, we shall so decide.

*It was so decided.*

222. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Committee will resume consideration of agenda item 54 on Friday, 14 November 1975.

*The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.*

## 977th meeting

Friday, 14 November 1975, at 3.25 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.977

### AGENDA ITEM 54

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (*continued*)\* (A/10114, A/10115, A/10268):

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General (A/10013 and Corr.1);
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/10334);
- (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/10271);
- (d) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10253)

\* Resumed from the 974th meeting.

### GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)\*

1. Mr. SHARAF (Jordan) said that the item under consideration was an important one, since it related to the humanitarian and technical responsibility of ensuring the livelihood, health and education of the refugee population of Palestine. In his report (A/10013 and Corr.1), the Commissioner-General of UNRWA had appropriately noted that, despite some achievements, notably the preservation of the health of the refugees and the development of an impressive education system, the perpetuation of refugee status could be no occasion for celebration. The Committee was confronted with a further dimension of the Palestinian tragedy, namely, the direct needs of some 1,632,000 registered refugees, and the report before it was an