

crimination in any form. They could not, therefore, remain indifferent to what was happening in South Africa, and they called on all States Members of the United Nations to break off all relations with the Pretoria régime. It was only in that way and through the tireless struggle of the liberation movements that the South African people would emerge from their current situation.

50. Venezuela would fully support the programme of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* and would make a contribution to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, with the aim of achieving the elimination of *apartheid*. Her delegation wished to become a sponsor of the draft resolution concerning the Fund (A/SPC/L.324).

51. Mr. HECKSCHER (Sweden) thanked the Venezuelan delegation for its decision and announced that three other countries, Bangladesh, Italy and Malaysia had become sponsors of the draft resolution.

52. Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria), speaking in support of the draft resolution, said he wished to join the representative of Sweden in appealing to Member States for increased contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa.

53. Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius) announced that his delegation also wished to become a sponsor of the draft resolution.

54. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines), Rapporteur of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, announced that some of the members of the Special Committee had had the opportunity, through the courtesy of the representative of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, to see a film on South Africa, entitled "A Tale of Two Cities". It was a documentary on current living conditions in South Africa. He felt that it would be useful for the members of the Special Political Committee to view the film during the discussion of the item on *apartheid*. He therefore proposed that a showing of the film for the Committee should be arranged as soon as possible.

55. He suggested that, in view of the importance of the statements made by delegations, liberation movements and non-governmental organizations on the occasion of the observance of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners, verbatim records should, if possible, be produced of the three meetings (953rd to 955th) which the Committee had devoted to the Day of Solidarity, to enable the members of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* to give the proceedings appropriate publicity.

56. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the officers of the Special Political Committee should make the necessary arrangements for a showing of the film "A Tale of Two Cities" to members of the Committee.

*It was so decided.*

57. The CHAIRMAN noted that the General Assembly, by a decision taken at its 2353rd plenary meeting, had again approved the recommendation of the General Committee (see A/10250) that the Special Political Committee should be authorized to obtain, on specific request, transcriptions of the debates of some of its meetings, or portions thereof. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee decided to have the transcription requested by the Rapporteur of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* produced in accordance with the special authorization given to the Committee.

*It was so decided.<sup>2</sup>*

58. The CHAIRMAN announced that the list of speakers would be closed on Friday, 17 October.

*It was so decided.*

*The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.*

<sup>2</sup> The full text of the statements was subsequently circulated as documents A/SPC/PV.953-955.

## 957th meeting

Wednesday, 15 October 1975, at 3.10 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.957

### AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.324):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

### GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. HUSSEIN (Somalia) congratulated the representative of Papua New Guinea on his country's admission to

the United Nations. He paid a tribute to the outgoing Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, and congratulated the newly-elected Chairman and Vice-Chairman. The awarding of the Frédéric Joliot-Curie Gold Peace Medal to the Special Committee against *Apartheid* was both an honour and an encouragement to it to persevere in the service of the worthy cause of the oppressed people of South Africa.

2. An international campaign to eradicate *apartheid* was more urgently needed than ever before. The Pretoria régime's policy of so-called *détente* was not motivated by any resolve to bring about change within South Africa, but

by the hope of breaking down the increasing isolation of the régime and extending its influence over free Africa. As a delaying tactic, Vorster had promised that there would be significant constitutional changes in South Africa within six months. That promise had not been kept, and the criminal plunder of the land and national heritage of the African people continued under the name of separate development. The "bantustan" plan reflected the basic injustice, racism and inhumanity of *apartheid*. Far from modifying its policies of *apartheid*, the Government of South Africa was going ahead with its system of "bantustans", and the deliberate exclusion of the non-white population from the mainstream of South African society continued unabated.

3. Opposition to *apartheid* was being suppressed with increasing brutality by police-state laws and methods. The Committee's recent observance of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners was clear evidence of the concern of the world community over the situation. Both inside and outside South Africa, many persons and organizations had insisted that the release of political prisoners would be a significant step towards genuine change. The régime's growing repressiveness, however, made a mockery of its claims to be seeking détente. The repeal of some of the provisions of "petty" *apartheid*, far from altering the basic structure of the system, in some cases actually reinforced it by furthering the "bantustan" policy.

4. In view of the steady worsening of the situation, which posed a continued threat to regional and international peace and security, it was disappointing that some powerful Member States of the United Nations were openly opposing the international campaign against *apartheid*. His delegation greatly regretted the triple veto in the Security Council during the discussion on the General Assembly's call for a review of the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa. It also noted with disappointment the unfavourable reaction in some quarters to the exclusion of the South African delegation from the deliberations of the General Assembly at the twenty-ninth session and the bitter concerted attack on third-world countries for their attempts to ostracize the only Member State which had been pronounced guilty of a crime against humanity. As his country's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had observed at the 2376th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, more indignation was being directed against the campaign to end *apartheid* than against *apartheid* itself.

5. His delegation regretted that the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France had pointedly insisted that they recognized the Pretoria régime as the legitimate representative of South Africa, knowing full well that the racist régime represented only a small segment of the total population. It was surprising that those States, which claimed leadership in the preservation of democratic ideals, should strongly oppose the principle of majority rule in South Africa. If they were truly committed to the principles and ideals of democracy, they would have recognized the national liberation movements as the sole and legitimate representatives of the people of South Africa. Man's legitimate aspirations for justice, freedom and human dignity were an irresistible force which could never be suppressed, as the victories of the people of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola and Indo-China, to name only a few, had shown.

6. His delegation welcomed the participation of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) in the work of the Committee. Support for the liberation movements was one of the most important weapons of the international campaign against *apartheid*. As the history of the liberation movements in the former Portuguese territories had shown, the predominant role in any independence struggle had to be taken by the people themselves, while the international community should support their efforts.

7. The United Nations should intensify the action it was already committed to taking in support of the oppressed peoples of South Africa and Namibia by excluding the racist régime from participation in the United Nations and all of its organs. The fraudulent nature of the "bantustans" should be exposed and the minority régime isolated and deprived of all the benefits of international co-operation. The arms embargo should be made mandatory by the Security Council and extended to oil and other strategic materials.

8. Economic and technical co-operation between a number of Western countries and the racist régime was a major obstacle to the efforts of the United Nations. A case in point was the reported deal between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Pretoria régime for the construction of a nuclear power plant in South Africa. A Frankfurt firm was said to be bidding for the contract, and French and Swiss-American concerns were also said to be involved in the deal. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany had reportedly justified the deal on economic grounds, contending that it concerned only reactors and not the uranium enrichment material that was the key to bombs. That Government was, nevertheless, providing South Africa with technological know-how on uranium enrichment, and there was a wide net of semi-official contacts between scientific and military officials in the Federal Republic of Germany and their South African counterparts. Accordingly, the spectre of nuclear weapons for South Africa could not be ruled out. Any such deal would constitute a flagrant violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and of resolutions 1652 (XVI) and 2033 (XX), which had called upon States to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-free zone. It was a great disappointment that the Federal Republic of Germany, which had good relations with many African countries, should contemplate a transaction which could assist South Africa in suppressing African peoples and threaten the independence and sovereignty of African States. Moreover, it was an irony of history that the Federal Republic of Germany, whose people had suffered under nazism and fascism, should support the white racist régime of South Africa, whose obnoxious *apartheid* policy was akin to nazism. His delegation therefore called on the Government of the Federal Republic and other potential supporters of the Pretoria régime to abandon any plans for such a deal.

9. The ruling minority in South Africa would not be induced to abandon its policies by anything less than the exercise of the coercive powers given to the United Nations by Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. In the meantime, Member States could give fitting expression to their rejection of *apartheid* by signing and ratifying the

International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*. It was disappointing that so far only 11 States, including Somalia, had done so. Another important practical measure which could be taken was to contribute to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa. Although Somalia was classified among the poorest States, it had pledged a contribution of \$500 to the Fund as a symbol of its support for its aims. His delegation hoped that all States in a position to do so would contribute generously to that worthy cause.

10. Mr. RUPIA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022) had exposed the untold sufferings of the majority of South Africa's people and the racist régime's increasing military repression of innocent and defenceless black people and all who opposed the obnoxious system of *apartheid*.

11. His delegation held that South Africa had been considered rather too sympathetically by the United Nations. Even when confronted with uncontested evidence of the systematic killing of black people, the United Nations had merely appealed to South Africa to cease its repressive policies. South Africa had reacted by intensifying its oppression of the black population.

12. In the view of his delegation, the Republic of South Africa was an enemy not only of Africa, but of humanity as a whole. The United Nations had repeatedly called on all States to cease co-operating with that monstrous régime and had requested countries which had relations with South Africa to review them. It had time and again exposed the military arrangements existing between South Africa and some Western countries, and had discouraged trade with South Africa in the hope of isolating the *apartheid* régime and thus bringing pressure on it to abandon the policy of *apartheid*.

13. All appeals to South Africa and the friends of South Africa had gone unheeded. South Africa had acquired sophisticated weapons from Western countries and had been given by the Federal Republic of Germany, in exchange for uranium, sufficient technological expertise to enable it to manufacture atomic bombs. Such knowledge was obviously not intended to be utilized for peaceful purposes. It was extremely unlikely that South Africa, an avowed enemy of Africa and the national liberation movements, would not use its technological knowledge against black people within South Africa and the independent African States.

14. His delegation was serious in its bid to isolate South Africa totally, and it considered that the course on which the international community had already embarked should be pursued more vigorously. Unfortunately, every move in that direction in the past had been frustrated by South Africa's closest allies in the United Nations. When the Security Council had met in October 1974 to consider the relationship between South Africa and the United Nations, all who had spoken had vehemently condemned the *apartheid* régime of South Africa. There had also been unanimous agreement within the Council that South Africa was not fit to be a Member of the United Nations. However, when the draft resolution recommending the

expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations had been put to the vote, it had been vetoed by three Western permanent members of the Security Council. In June 1975 the Security Council's move to impose a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa for its persistent refusal to decolonize Namibia had again been frustrated by the triple veto.

15. The allies of South Africa had at times expressed horror in the strongest language at the inhuman policies pursued by the South African régime. They had expressed solidarity with the oppressed people in South Africa but had done nothing to back up their words. Indeed, it was their support that enabled South Africa to continue its repressive policies in total disregard of the will of the international community: as long as South Africa could count on the backing of its allies, it would never change those policies. That was why it was not only going ahead with its policies of "bantustanization", but was campaigning for the legalization of those policies by the international community. His delegation therefore fully endorsed the recommendation of the Special Committee (A/10022, para. 203) that the General Assembly should denounce the establishment of the Transkei and other "bantustans", and call upon all Governments and organizations not to accord any form of recognition to any institutions or authorities of the "bantustans".

16. His delegation believed that the international community had an obligation to give practical support to the suffering masses in South Africa. Words alone would not bring down the South African régime and, consequently, the Government and the people of the United Republic of Tanzania would continue to support the national liberation movements in their sacred task of liberation. Africa was committed to the liberation of South Africa and would accept nothing short of the restoration of all fundamental human rights. There would be no peace in South Africa until *apartheid* and all it stood for were completely wiped out and black people were in control of the country. The time had come for the United Nations to identify itself with the aspirations of the people of Azania by increasing support to their national liberation movements and according them the recognition they deserved. Both ANC and PNC had vowed to liberate their country by all means at their disposal. His delegation congratulated them on the courage they had shown against the most brutal régime in the world and assured them of its undiminished support.

17. His country would continue to endorse all efforts by the General Assembly to isolate the *apartheid* régime and would consider very sympathetically the call by the Special Committee for a conference in 1976 to review recent developments in South Africa and to analyse the role of transnational corporations and other foreign economic interests in South Africa in buttressing the *apartheid* régime (*ibid.*, para. 223). His delegation highly commended the outstanding work carried out by the Unit on *Apartheid* in publicizing the evils of the *apartheid* régime; the recommendation concerning the future of the Unit (*ibid.*, para. 227) deserved careful consideration in view of its additional responsibilities and assignments.

18. Mr. BHATIA (India) said that the United Nations had been considering the question of *apartheid* in South Africa

in one form or another throughout the 30 years of its existence. India had brought up the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa at the very first session of the General Assembly in 1946. Since that time, more than 150 resolutions had been adopted, condemning the racist régime for its repressive and inhuman policies and calling on States to take specific measures to isolate it from the international community. The South African authorities, however, had treated United Nations decisions with derision and had enforced *apartheid* with intensified brutality. On the eve of the current session of the General Assembly, they had launched a wave of arrests under the hated Terrorism Act.

19. It was understandable in such circumstances that the general public, and particularly the victims of *apartheid*, should increasingly feel that the United Nations was incapable of doing much beyond passing pious resolutions. Although the course of events did justify a measure of frustration and anger, his delegation did not believe that the efforts of the United Nations had been in vain. The United Nations had succeeded in making the world aware of the barbaric crime of *apartheid*. The doctrine of domestic jurisdiction claimed by the South African authorities in respect of *apartheid* had been effectively discredited. Through the initiative of the United Nations, there was an organized programme of assistance to the liberation movements and victims of *apartheid*.

20. In response to the repeated calls of the General Assembly, most—but unfortunately not all—Member States had ceased to have diplomatic, trade or social relations with the Pretoria régime, thereby making it virtually an international outlaw. In 1963 the Security Council, in its resolution 181 (1963), had adopted an arms embargo against South Africa and in 1970, in its resolution 282 (1970), it had condemned all violations of the embargo and called on all States to comply fully and unconditionally with it.

21. India had not waited for the United Nations to adopt such resolutions before taking its own stringent measures against the racist régime. Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the Indian nation, had launched a non-violent civil disobedience movement in South Africa even before he initiated India's own independence struggle. India had recalled its High Commissioner from South Africa in 1946 in protest against the Government's racist policies, and in 1954 had closed its diplomatic mission in that country. All trade with South Africa had been banned in 1946, and in 1963 the use of Indian ports and air space had been denied to South African shipping and aircraft.

22. The forward march of decolonization, which had been greatly expedited by the United Nations, was creating pressures on the minority racist régimes in Azania and Zimbabwe. Support or encouragement given by any Member State to the South African régime could only prolong the burden of suffering of Africans and other non-whites in South Africa. Accordingly, his delegation urged States which were collaborating militarily with South Africa to comply with the trade and arms embargo imposed by the United Nations.

23. As his country's Minister for External Affairs had observed at the 2364th plenary meeting of the General

Assembly, there was no clearer case than *apartheid* for intervention by the United Nations. In resolution 3324 B (XXIX) the General Assembly had requested the Security Council to take mandatory measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations so as to ensure strict compliance by all Member States with the arms embargo against South Africa, and his delegation regretted the failure of the Security Council to act accordingly. His delegation endorsed the recommendation of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* that the embargo should be extended to cover petroleum, petroleum products and other raw materials (*ibid.*, para. 210). The danger of bitter race conflict in South Africa was real. Only effective action under Chapter VII of the Charter could compel the rulers of South Africa to abandon their pernicious and inhuman policy of *apartheid*.

24. Mr. CABRAL DE MELO (Brazil) said that his country's opposition to *apartheid* did not stem solely from universal and humanistic values, but also from its national experience. The President of Brazil, in his message to his people on the occasion of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, had pointed out that Brazil was the product of the most far-reaching experiment in racial integration known in the modern world and that the phenomenon of racial discrimination was utterly alien to it.

25. In the past year Brazil had tried to inject new vigour into the struggle against *apartheid*. In June it had received a delegation of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* for consultations with ministers, senior officials and members of the Brazilian Congress. His Government had pledged a contribution of \$10,000 to the newly established Unit on *Apartheid* Trust Fund; it had contributed \$10,000 to the Trust Fund for Namibia and \$5,000 to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, and was considering annual contributions to those funds. His country's authorities had systematically discouraged the participation of Brazilian nationals in sports competitions held on South African territory or with the participation of South African nationals. His Government had recently refused to authorize a Capetown-Rio de Janeiro sailing race and had prohibited the use of Brazilian ports as terminal points or stop-overs for such a race. It had also forbidden Brazilian nationals and boats to participate in the event.

26. On 21 March 1975 his Government had observed the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The President had issued a message, and a commemorative session had been held at the Foreign Ministry. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in a message to the Minister for External Relations, had emphasized that Brazil had been the first signatory of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and had always played a major role in that vital area of United Nations activities. His delegation assured the Committee and the General Assembly that its support would not fail.

27. Mr. MANALO (Philippines) welcomed the award of the Frédéric Joliot-Curie Gold Peace Medal to the Special Committee against *Apartheid* as a recognition of its work.

28. The Government and people of the Philippines completely opposed the practice of *apartheid*. His country had

been a member of the Special Committee since its inception. In compliance with United Nations resolutions, it had, at considerable sacrifice, cut off all trade and other relations with South Africa. It had recently refused the entry of South African delegates to the Conference of the World Boxing Association because they would not renounce the policy of *apartheid*, and it had made every effort to assist the oppressed people of South Africa through voluntary contributions to various United Nations funds. His delegation was therefore a sponsor of draft resolution A/SPC/L.324.

29. The report of the Special Committee made it clear that the problem of *apartheid* had assumed a new and even more dangerous dimension. The policy of *apartheid* was expressly designed to consolidate the political, economic, social and cultural power of a minority régime over the majority, solely on the basis of race discrimination. In all Africa, only Pretoria was ignoring the new social and economic developments and seeking to restore the old tribal enclaves. In ensuring that no African could rise above a certain social and economic level, *apartheid* effectively prevented the black people of South Africa from contributing to their own national development and, ultimately, in the context of the new international economic order, to world development. In order to maintain that system, the South African Government had spent vast sums to build up military and police forces and other instruments of repression, for the system of *apartheid* was based essentially on fear. His country strongly believed that *apartheid* was a crime against humanity, as declared in article I of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*, that it violated principles of international law and that it constituted a serious threat to international peace and security. Since the establishment of the Special Committee, more than enough evidence had been accumulated to condemn South Africa under article II of that Convention. It was disheartening that nothing that the United Nations had done had had an impact on the régime's determination to implement its policies. The so-called "détente" policy had brought about no change inside the country but rather an intensification of *apartheid*. The South African Prime Minister had, indeed, stated that the public had misunderstood his pledge to the Security Council at the end of 1974 to change the situation within six months; he was in fact engaged in a propaganda exercise aimed at gaining international acceptance of his plan to separate the races and perpetuate oppression by the ruling minority.

30. Since *apartheid* was a pervasive system affecting all aspects of life in South Africa, many United Nations organs had become concerned. In addition to the resolutions adopted by the World Population Conference, held at Bucharest from 19 to 30 August 1974, and the World Conference of the International Women's Year, held at Mexico City from 19 June to 2 July 1975, UNESCO had expressed serious concern about its effect on education, science and culture, and WHO had likewise deplored its effect on health and medical services.

31. It had been said that South Africa was a microcosm of the world and that only by ending *apartheid* could its mixed population live together in harmony and co-operation and the country play its rightful role in Africa and in

the world. In taking action to end *apartheid*, the United Nations was, therefore, striving not only to eliminate the systematic oppression and humiliation of people on grounds of colour and race, but also to enable South African society to realize its full potential for progress.

32. His delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution on the status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *apartheid*, adopted by the Third Committee at its 2122nd meeting on 6 October 1975;<sup>1</sup> his Government had, of course, signed the International Convention on that subject. The Convention could be a powerful instrument to help the international community to press for the eradication of the crime of *apartheid*, and it was to be hoped that all States would sign, ratify and implement it. His delegation supported the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee.

33. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania to address the Committee.

34. Mr. SIBEKO (Observer, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania) drew the Committee's attention to a grave situation that had developed in and around Newcastle, a northern Natal industrial town, in recent days. When the bus company serving African townships around that town had raised its fares at the beginning of October, African workers had decided to boycott the company's buses, even though that meant walking several miles. The police had intervened and, according to a report in *The Times* of London on 4 October 1975, at least one African had been killed, several had been injured and three policemen had been seriously injured when trying to free two whites taken prisoner by the Africans. A Mozambique newspaper was said to have reported that two Africans had been killed during the clash with the police. Even a director of a Newcastle firm had admitted to the *Rand Daily Mail* on 9 October 1975 that the police could overdo it.

35. Clearly, the South African *apartheid* régime remained impervious to world criticism over its handling of the just democratic expression of the African masses and was prepared to re-enact Sharpeville tactics in putting down peaceful demonstrations. The international community should condemn the latest atrocities and support the Azanian national liberation movements' reasonable call for reactionary violence to be put down by revolutionary violence.

36. The South African settler colonial régime was particularly sensitive to bus strikes, which in the past had been the harbinger of successful militant struggles. During the 1950s, bus boycott campaigns near Sharpeville and in Alexandra, Johannesburg, had forced the bus companies to capitulate. In the former instance, thugs hired by the bus company to harass and intimidate the strikers—with the thinly-disguised support of the police—had been soundly thrashed, but the two co-ordinators of the boycott campaign, later to become prominent leaders in PAC, had been charged with murder and incitement to public violence. They had, however, won

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 68, document A/10320, para. 27, draft resolution IV.*

their case in the Supreme Court. The Alexandra boycott had led to a nation-wide boycott of the company concerned which had ended in victory when the Chamber of Commerce had elected to pay a subsidy directly to the bus company.

37. In view of that experience, the South African police had been ordered by the Prime Minister to crush the latest boycott. Many firms had made arrangements for their workers to be transported in company vehicles, but under South African laws—observed only in the case of blacks—it was an offence to carry passengers without the necessary licence. As a result, the police had been ordering vehicles carrying the bus boycotters off the road. However, when a driver had been arrested and fined R 30 even his employer had said that the police had gone too far.

38. South Africa felt secure in the knowledge that the Western Powers would prevent the United Nations from taking the necessary action provided for in the Charter to support the Azanian people's just struggle. The only way in which those countries, particularly those holding a veto in the Security Council, could absolve themselves of responsibility for *apartheid* violence in South Africa was by joining

the overwhelming majority of Member States in genuinely condemning *apartheid* and recognizing PAC and ANC as the true representatives of the people of South Africa.

39. The people of the African townships around Newcastle deserved a clear assurance of support from the international community for standing up for rights and principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other fundamental United Nations documents. They could not afford higher fares because their wages had depreciated by 22 per cent with the two most recent devaluations of the rand. A United States congressional committee had found that Africans were the worst victims of the inflation raging in South Africa because whites could legally bargain for higher salaries. He therefore called upon the United Nations to denounce the repressive measures adopted against the latest boycott.

40. Mr. BERG (Sweden) announced that the delegations of Cyprus and Nepal had become sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/L.324.

*The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.*

## 958th meeting

Thursday, 16 October 1975, at 3.10 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.958

### AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (*continued*) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.324, A/SPC/L.325):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

#### GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. SERUP (Denmark), introducing draft resolution A/SPC/L.325, said that over the years since the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1881 (XVIII) calling on the South African Government to release unconditionally all persons imprisoned, interned or subjected to other restrictions for having opposed the policy of *apartheid*, many Member States, including his own, had been deeply concerned about the lack of response to the numerous appeals made by the United Nations. They had therefore welcomed the Special Committee's initiative in appealing to all States and organizations (A/SPC/174, annex) to join in a concerted international campaign for the release of political prisoners and to celebrate the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners.

2. The report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022) showed that people of all races were still being

detained or persecuted under the Terrorism Act and other repressive legislation and confirmed recent arrests and detentions. His delegation had therefore submitted a draft resolution on solidarity with those prisoners (A/SPC/L.325) which was self-explanatory. He wished to inform the Committee that Botswana and Lesotho had asked to join the long list of sponsors. The sponsors believed that the Committee could best demonstrate its solidarity with the victims of the system of *apartheid* and pledge its support for more vigorous international action by adopting the draft resolution by consensus.

3. The CHAIRMAN announced that Honduras also wished to join the sponsors.

4. Mr. GAMMOH (Jordan) supported all the proposals and recommendations made by the Special Committee in chapter II of its report, which not only described the inhuman crimes committed by the racist South African régime but also showed the forces which had relations with that régime. The African peoples' fight for independence and their legitimate rights should be helped by the international community as a whole. The racist régime—which appeared not to realize the strength of the oppressed people's will to pursue that fight—was bound to disappear through the inevitable course of historical evolution.

5. The United Nations must use all means to put an end to a régime which was intensifying its repressive measures