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Chairman: Mrs. Lina P. TSALDARIS (Greece).

AGENDA ITEM 33

**Recommendations concerning international respect
for the right of peoples and nations to self-deter-
mination (A/3829, A/3775, A/C.3/L.702) (continued)**

1. Mrs. DE ARENAS (Guatemala), speaking on a point of order, said that while her delegation felt inclined to vote for draft resolution I submitted by the Commission on Human Rights (Council resolution 586 D (XX), para. 1), it wished to know the financial implications of that draft resolution.
2. The CHAIRMAN said that the required information would be supplied by the Secretariat.^{1/}
3. Mr. YAPOU (Israel) said it had been stated in the report of the Third Committee at its twelfth session (A/3775) that in its discussions there had been general agreement on the importance of self-determination for the maintenance of international peace and friendly relations among nations, but that diverging opinions had been expressed on the legal nature and scope of self-determination. A striking feature of the debate on the subject had been the tendency of some speakers to dismiss the historic trend towards real self-determination as a secondary aspect of the draft resolutions before the Committee. It should be borne in mind, however, that two destructive world wars had been fought in the twentieth century for the principle of self-determination, and that two international organizations had been brought into being with a view to maintaining peace based on the principles of the self-determination, political independence and territorial integrity of all countries. Self-determination through statehood and independence had become an integral part of mankind's effort towards higher goals. That meant that self-determination and independence were no longer to be a by-product of war and violent change, but were to be attained under the supervision of the international community, in accordance with the principles of interdependence, regional co-operation and world peace.
4. It was gratifying to note how many of the States Members of the United Nations had achieved independence through internationally agreed procedures; Israel was a case in point. As early as 1897, the aim of the Zionist movement had been defined as that of

creating for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law. Fifty years later, that aspiration had been realized when the creation of the State of Israel was consecrated in a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

5. The movement for self-determination was now on solid ground. The United Nations Charter proclaimed the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in Articles 1 and 55, and in Article 76 spoke of the progressive development of the inhabitants of the Trust Territories towards self-government or independence. Furthermore, article 1 of the draft international Covenants on Human Rights (A/3077, para. 77) defined that political principle and legal right in its collective and individual aspects. Some representatives had implied that it might again be called into question if further study was undertaken; but it was obviously too late for that: the wheel of history could not be turned back.

6. Israel had consistently supported self-determination, which it had given the widest possible interpretation, to the extent of voting for the admission to membership of the United Nations of some of its neighbours which, in its view, were practising policies of hostility contrary to the Charter. Furthermore, it had gone beyond the concept of collective self-determination, and supported the right of every individual to free choice and free practice of his own ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural affiliations.

7. Turning to the draft resolutions before the Committee (Council resolution 586 D (XX)), he said he felt it might have been more appropriate to base draft resolution 1 of the Commission on General Assembly resolution 626 (VII), which dealt with the right of each State freely to exploit its natural wealth and resources. He cited the operative part of that resolution and suggested that the "full information" requested in draft resolution I could be obtained without adding another commission to the many existing organs concerned with the subject; the General Assembly resolution mentioned the regional economic commissions and the specialized agencies, and the Second Committee also might usefully be consulted before a final decision was reached.

8. With regard to draft resolution II, it should be borne in mind that the phrase "peaceful adjustment of any situation ... likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations" covered a wide variety of situations and problems, many of which were under discussion by other Committees of the General Assembly; thus there might be some risk of duplicating the work of other United Nations bodies or indeed of trespassing on their domain. It was questionable moreover whether a commission whose role would be to offer its good offices to the parties to a dispute would, in the event of failure, be an appropriate body to make recommendations to the General Assembly and

^{1/} A statement of financial implications was subsequently circulated as document A/C.3/L.703.

whether establishing a standing good offices commission was preferable to setting up ad hoc bodies when need arose. Finally, he asked whether the Committee was to ignore completely, in such a resolution, the generally accepted understanding that matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State did not fall within the scope of the United Nations Charter.

9. As to the draft resolution submitted by the Economic and Social Council, he could not agree with the representatives who had suggested that the proposed study would mean calling the concept of self-determination into question once again. The text of the draft resolution itself made it clear that that was not so; and the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.702) further clarified the point. Moreover, it could hardly be maintained that on a subject which demanded such clear thinking there was no room for further study. There were many matters which needed consideration: for example, the relationship between independence and interdependence; the question whether self-determination was a relative right, or an absolute one which overrode all other considerations; and the relationship between individual and collective and internal and external self-determination. Moreover, he asked whether it could be said that while the terms "human rights" and "aggression" needed definition, there was no need to define self-determination.

10. However, although the implementation of the principle and right of self-determination would benefit greatly by study and analysis, the Israel delegation was not sure that the Third Committee was the proper body to undertake such a study. The Economic and Social Council, which had submitted the draft resolution, was hardly authorized to deal with a matter which touched at the very roots of the United Nations. Perhaps UNESCO was the agency best fitted to deal with a matter of such broad implications; on the other hand, self-determination raised the question of the rights and duties of States under international law, a subject which had been studied by the International Law Commission and disposed of by the General Assembly several years ago.

11. As there now existed internationally agreed principles and procedures and an enlightened public opinion which followed events all over the world, the Committee must think carefully before taking a final step on the draft resolutions before it.

12. Mr. ALDUNATE (Chile) said that his country had always supported the fundamental theory of self-determination, and believed that the substantive statement of the right should not be altered in any way. It had always voted in the United Nations for recommendations concerning international respect for the right, and, since 1954, had urged the need for machinery to examine all cases in which recognition of the right to self-determination and to permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources was denied. The matter affected all nations, large and small, and all Member States should lend their whole-hearted support to people striving to assert their right of self-determination by free and democratic means.

13. The Chilean delegation in the Commission on Human Rights had succeeded in securing the insertion of the phrase "permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources" in article 1 of the draft Covenants, and was now anxious that that idea should be made a reality. There could hardly be a valid argu-

ment against the right of every nation to the use of the produce of its own land and coastal waters. If that right was questioned, there seemed to be no point in pressing for purely political self-determination and independence, and certainly very little in discussing the law of outer space.

14. It was true that the under-developed countries needed capital and technical assistance from the economically advanced countries. The Latin American countries, for their part, had always pursued an open-door policy in that regard, and had fully respected the rights of the foreign investors who had helped them to make the most of their economic potential. That policy had enabled Chile to develop its mineral resources and industries to such an extent that it was now able to export finished steel products; and it knew how far that progress had been due to United States and European investment. But the adoption of draft resolution I submitted by the Commission on Human Rights would not change that situation in the least; the draft merely stressed still further the importance of encouraging international co-operation in the economic development of the under-developed countries and sought to bring about some clarification of the manner in which foreign investment should be used to that end.

15. It would indeed be a triumph for mankind if the antagonistic blocs now existing in the world were to be reconciled. However, the bloc system still prevailed; and Chile stood in defence of freedom and democracy.

16. It recognized the freedom of foreign investors, but maintained the rights of the domestic owners of economic resources. There could be no ground for suspicion in such an attitude; it must be accepted in good faith. Moreover, anyone who doubted the right of ownership of natural resources ipso facto cast doubt on the right of self-determination itself; a vote against draft resolution I was tantamount to such an expression of doubt.

17. Chile had co-sponsored the proposal which had served as the basis for the Commission's draft resolution II, and would vote for that draft resolution in the Committee; it was sure that every country which upheld freedom and democracy would do the same. Consequently, it could not vote for the draft resolution transmitted by the Economic and Social Council, which in fact annulled draft resolution II.

18. Mr. WISE (United States of America) observed that the issue of self-determination was one of the few in the United Nations on which there seemed to be fundamental unanimity. His country had never forgotten its colonial origins and its fight for independence; accordingly, it had always rigidly adhered to the basic principle of self-determination, which the American people had been the first in the history of the world to assert. Moreover, its leaders, throughout its history, had always expressed the view that the right on which the United States had been founded should not be denied to any other nation.

19. That basic concept had been widely emphasized during the first half of the twentieth century and, although it had been omitted from the Covenant of the League of Nations, it was enshrined in the United Nations Charter. At the 1954 Manila Conference, also, a joint declaration upholding the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and approving the use of every peaceful means of promoting self-govern-

ment had been made by France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. It was clear that those ideas permeated the activities of all United Nations organs; but it was unfortunately equally clear that despite all professions of devotion to the principle of self-determination there were serious disagreements concerning its application and implementation.

20. According to some delegations, all dependent territories should be given their independence within the shortest possible time, regardless of the chaos that would undoubtedly ensue; others asserted that economic and social development was an essential basis for the evolution of the institutions necessary for independence; others again maintained that all dissident groups had the right to secede from the State—a thesis which the United States with its bitter memories of its Civil War, could not uphold, and the acceptance of which would threaten the very existence of most Member States. Some speakers had asserted that only colonies in the traditional sense had the right to demand self-determination; they felt able to make that assertion although today 800 million people were reduced to slavery and had no opportunity of claiming that right. For example, the right to self-determination had not been granted to the Hungarian people in 1956, despite the censure passed on the USSR in General Assembly resolution 1133 (XI). He had referred to that example merely to show that the peoples of countries other than the traditional colonies were entitled to self-determination. On the other hand, it was gratifying to see how many countries which had been colonies were now States Members of the United Nations. He cited the late President Magsaysay of the Philippines, who had said that the threat of colonialism now came from world communism. The United States, for its part, considered that healthy Asian nationalism was a real expression of self-determination.

21. Since all Member States were agreed on the principle of self-determination, but few could define it as a concept, a clearer understanding of the subject seemed essential. The adoption of draft resolution I submitted by the Commission on Human Rights might be harmful; it was regrettable that there was no time to obtain the views of the Second and Sixth Committees on that text. Draft resolution II was, in his delegation's opinion, unsound; there were no grounds for entrusting the matters in question to a body of ten. Moreover, the proposed commission would merely duplicate the functions of other United Nations organs. On the other hand, the draft resolution submitted by the Economic and Social Council was useful, since it provided for further study in a field that had obviously been insufficiently explored. The purpose of his delegation's amendments (A/C.3/L.702) was to clarify the Council's draft resolution.

22. Miss HAMPTON (New Zealand) said that she wished to make her delegation's attitude to self-determination, both in principle and in practice, entirely clear.

23. The New Zealand delegation held that self-determination was a universal principle, and not one applicable only to Non-Self-Governing Territories. That view, which her delegation had clearly stated in the debate on article 1 of the draft Covenants at the tenth session of the General Assembly, was borne out by the facts. First, the term "self-determination" was men-

tioned not in Chapter XII of the Charter, which dealt with the International Trusteeship System, but in Articles 1 and 55, which were general in application. Secondly, a proposal to draft article 1 of the Covenants in such a way as to provide for only a limited application of the right of self-determination had been rejected by the Committee. Thirdly, if the principle applied only to dependent territories, the agenda item relating to self-determination would have been referred to the Fourth Committee, not to the Third, which was concerned with universal principles.

24. The principle of self-determination was not a purely academic one for her country. In New Zealand, the Maoris, Polynesians by race, though numerically in the minority were completely integrated, both socially and economically, with the European majority. Furthermore, New Zealand, which was the Administering Authority for Western Samoa, had promoted that Territory's advancement towards self-government, which now lay within its grasp. New Zealand was in fact promoting a practical exercise in self-determination in Western Samoa. Similar progress was being made in other parts of the world under the guidance of other countries and the Committee should be careful not to take any decision which might impede that progress.

25. The Committee had before it, in Council resolution 586 D (XX), two proposals for studies of the concept of self-determination and one for the examination of any situation resulting from alleged denial or inadequate realization of the right of self-determination. Self-determination had been before the United Nations since 1950, and it was incongruous that, although the draft Covenants contained an article on the right of self-determination and the Committee was now considering two proposals to promote the implementation of that right, the nature of the right was still obscure. That in itself underlined the need for a clearer understanding of what was meant by self-determination.

26. Two of the three proposals before the Committee were virtually measures of implementation. It was very possible that the procedures proposed in those resolutions would conflict with the measures of implementation ultimately included in the Covenants. Furthermore, misuse of those procedures might well lead many Member States to oppose the inclusion of measures of implementation in the Covenants, and even to reject the Covenants themselves.

27. In submitting its two draft resolutions the Commission on Human Rights had departed somewhat from its task. In draft resolution I it proposed the establishment of a commission to conduct a full survey of the right of peoples to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources. Her delegation seriously doubted whether the commission would be able to do anything worth while under its proposed terms of reference. If the Commission on Human Rights had really believed such a survey could achieve results, it should have defined the proposed commission's terms of reference more clearly. As it was, it was only too clear that the meaning of "self-determination" in the context in question was unknown. In addition, the proposal was badly drafted and employed expressions which had been omitted as unsatisfactory from the revised text of article 1 of the draft Covenants. Moreover, the draft resolution did not specify who was to appoint the members of the proposed com-

mission or what its membership was to be. She trusted that those points would be clarified before the proposal was put to a vote.

28. The drafting defects, however, were less serious than the fundamental misconception underlying the whole draft resolution, which appeared to be the expectation that, by establishing such a commission, the United Nations could promote international respect for self-determination in the field of natural resources. In its discussions, the Third Committee should bear in mind the need to harmonize its activities with those of other Committees of the General Assembly. The New Zealand delegation had been most interested in the proposal concerning the availability of capital for development purposes (A/C.2/L.390 and Add.1-3) introduced in the Second Committee (563rd meeting) by the Malayan delegation. It would be most regrettable if the Third Committee took any action which might detract from the positive effect of that proposal.

29. Draft resolution II of the Commission seemed entirely pointless since the General Assembly already had authority, under the Charter, to carry out the task of the proposed good offices commission. The draft resolution appeared to assume that there was a comprehensible right to self-determination which an appointed group could be authorized to implement; but that was not so. As there was no general agreement on the meaning of self-determination, the terms of reference of the proposed commission inevitably lacked definition, and that being so, there was no limit to what the commission might attempt. Under the guise of promoting self-determination, it could examine not only any situation in the dependent territories, but also any situation concerning any national group, provided that that group found ten Member States to support it. That was placing a premium on dissatisfaction and opening the way for misuse of the commission's good offices. The General Assembly was entitled to request some body to use its good offices in a specific dispute, but it could not authorize such action in advance, in connexion with all complaints concerning self-determination, without abdicating its responsibility, and thereby also prejudicing any authority it already exercised in relation to complaints which came before it in the regular way.

30. The wording of draft resolution II was defective also. The first paragraph of the preamble did not correctly reflect the wording of Article 1 of the Charter, and it was doubtful whether the term "friendly relations" was "defined in the Charter", as was stated in the third paragraph of the preamble. Furthermore, no standards were proposed for assessing the "inadequate realization of the right to self-determination" mentioned in the same paragraph, which apparently meant something different from the denial of that right, referred to in operative paragraph 1 (a). Moreover, if a situation was so serious as to demand immediate action she wondered why it should await the complaint of ten Member States. The proposed commission was to consider, under paragraph 1 (a), any situation falling within the scope of Article 14 of the Charter; but Article 14 dealt with situations which were the responsibility of the General Assembly. If the commission was set up, it could lead to blatant interference in the domestic affairs of Member States and prevent the creation of an atmosphere in which the United Nations could function effectively. For those reasons, she

would be unable to support either of the Commission's draft resolutions.

31. The Council's draft resolution, although far from perfect, was more satisfactory, and might possibly result in some definition of the term "self-determination". The arrangements for the establishment of the proposed ad hoc commission were specific and practicable. The reference in the third paragraph of the preamble to "removing differences" was not in her view helpful. The ad hoc commission should be left free to formulate its views objectively; it should not be encouraged to present a report which might gloss over points of divergence in order to achieve unanimity. Unanimity was not an objective in itself; to be of any value, it must reflect genuine agreement. Her delegation, which attached great importance to self-determination, could not support any proposal which might bring the principle of self-determination into discredit. In its attitude to the proposals before the Committee it would be guided by that consideration.

32. Mr. KARAPANDZA (Yugoslavia) said that the United Nations had already achieved significant results in the field of self-determination, and now had to continue its work by adopting appropriate recommendations regarding international respect for that right. It was clear both from the debates and from article 1 of the draft Covenants (A/3077, para. 77) that the right of self-determination was not only a political principle but a universally applicable rule of international law. His delegation's views on that point had been too often stated to need repetition.

33. Draft resolution I submitted by the Commission proposed further concrete measures for the implementation of the right to self-determination, a right which remained a dead letter where peoples were unable freely to dispose of their natural wealth and resources. His delegation would vote for that draft resolution, which the Committee should be able to adopt at the current session. His delegation also supported in principle the Commission's draft resolution II, concerning the establishment of a good offices commission. However, he suggested that consideration of that matter should be postponed to the next session, since the composition of the commission was of particular significance in view of its proposed functions and there was not time to consider the text thoroughly at the current session.

34. The Council's draft resolution had serious shortcomings. First, it envisaged a study of the principle, not the right, of self-determination. Secondly, its adoption would in fact delay the implementation of that right; and thirdly, the task would be entrusted to an ad hoc commission composed of a mere handful of experts. Finally, the draft resolution had not emanated from or been discussed by the Commission on Human Rights. His delegation was not opposed in principle to a study of the legal aspects of self-determination. On the contrary, a study might serve a very useful purpose, provided that it was the right and not the principle which was studied, in which case the adoption of measures for the implementation of the right would not be delayed. But such a delicate task should not be entrusted to a small group; moreover, the International Law Commission existed for precisely such purposes. His delegation would be unable to vote for that draft resolution or for the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.702), which did not materially change the substance of it.

35. Miss GYULAI (Hungary) said she wished to make two points. First, contrary to what was stated in the third paragraph of the preamble to the Council's draft resolution, there was no wide difference of views regarding the meaning and applicability of the principles of equal rights and of self-determination of peoples. The meaning of Article 1 of the Charter, which referred to self-determination, was perfectly clear to most members of the Committee, and there was no real doubt regarding the areas where it should be applied. It had first to be exercised by the peoples who had never had the opportunity of exercising it in the past, namely, the peoples of the dependent territories. Most speakers had been agreed that they should be allowed to achieve self-government as rapidly and as peacefully as possible.

36. Secondly, it was not enough to say that to strive for self-determination was justified, or that the United Nations should do its best to ensure recognition of the right of self-determination by recalcitrant Powers: the United Nations must also ensure that, wherever the need arose, peoples should in fact be enabled to exercise that right. To go even further, decisions taken by the majority of a country's population concerning its form of government and national policy should also be respected by all other countries. It was inadmissible to attempt to impose particular forms of self-determination on any nation, to influence any nation's decision regarding the way in which it should exercise the right of self-determination, or to question the validity of its decision, provided that it had been approved by a constitutionally elected national parliament.

37. Sovereign States were entitled to maintain close relations with other States, and it was contrary to the Charter for any country to attempt to impair those good relations by hostile propaganda or other means. Unfortunately such attempts had been and still were being made with regard to Hungary. They had proved futile, as had been shown by the results of the recent elections, and were deeply resented by the Hungarian people; but they must be discontinued for they were harmful to the cause of peace and hurtful to national feelings.

38. For one delegation, the agenda item on the right of self-determination was only one of many pretexts for attacking Hungary. The reason for its attitude was that the Hungarian people had exercised their right to self-determination after the 1956 counter-revolution in a way which did not please the rulers of certain Western States. But the Hungarian Parliament had approved all the steps taken to defeat the fascist *coup d'état* and at the recent elections, which had been properly conducted, the overwhelming majority of the electorate had expressed their confidence in the Government. Those who maintained that the Hungarian people had not been able to exercise their right to self-determination should look further afield; there were colonial areas where the right was not exercised and where the voice of the people was being stifled.

39. The Committee should continue its efforts to prevent the right of self-determination from being trampled under foot in the colonial territories, and should concentrate on positive resolutions. As many underdeveloped countries were dominated by foreign monopolies, the survey envisaged in draft resolution I, submitted by the Commission on Human Rights would

serve a very useful purpose. It was important also to encourage international co-operation in the economic development of such countries. Her delegation therefore supported that draft resolution. However, it felt that consideration of draft resolution II submitted by the Commission should be postponed as there was not time to give it proper attention at the current session. Her delegation was opposed to the Council's draft resolution, for the reason stated by other delegations, and to the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.702), which did not change the substance of the original proposal.

40. Mr. BEAUFORT (Netherlands) said that he did not wish to dwell on the difference between the principle and the right of self-determination, because although the Charter mentioned the principle only, his country recognized a right of self-determination in those cases where a nation desired to choose its own form of government. It was also prepared to acknowledge the right of self-determination in the case of nations which wished to decide their own political destinies, provided that the peoples concerned were able to make the relevant political decisions by truly democratic means. There were of course minimum requirements as to stability order and economic viability, but the United Nations was bound by the Charter and by moral principle to help emergent States.

41. His Government did not pay lip-service alone to the right of self-determination, but had acknowledged it and was striving to bring about conditions under which it could be exercised as soon as possible. The Indonesian representative had stated at a previous meeting that that was not the case in West Guinea (Netherlands New Guinea), where, he had affirmed, the territory had exercised its right of self-determination in August 1945. But during the war there had been no contact between West New Guinea and the territory occupied by the enemy; it had been physically impossible for the population of West New Guinea to take any part in the Indonesian independence movement or to support the proclamation of August 1945. Moreover, the primitive population of West New Guinea, roughly half of whom had never had any contact with the outside world, had never expressed any desire to exchange Netherlands rule for Indonesian. On the contrary, the overwhelming majority of those of the inhabitants who were able to form a personal opinion felt that Netherlands rule should continue until the population could make its own choice. In accordance with its obligations under the Charter, the Netherlands was bound to respect the wishes of the population, and it was convinced that, thanks to its efforts in the cultural field, the inhabitants of West New Guinea would soon be able to decide their own future. The Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs had stated on 23 November 1957 that if their choice should be to join Indonesia, the Netherlands would respect their wish.

42. It was remarkable that the ardent champions of self-determination in colonial areas were only lukewarm when internal self-determination was at stake. There were two aspects of internal self-determination: legal and humanitarian. With regard to the legal aspect the first part of the third principle of the Atlantic Charter, the permanent value of which had been acknowledged at the San Francisco Conference, clearly referred to internal self-determination. So far as the humanitarian aspect was concerned he wondered why

attention was drawn only to the sufferings of the inhabitants of the dependent territories, when outside the colonial orbit many other people were suffering in the same way from the deprivation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Wherever a totalitarian system prevailed, the most basic human rights, including the right of self-determination, were denied and trampled underfoot; that had been and always would be the case, because of the very nature of such systems. Nevertheless, the systems must not be confused with their adherents, who might be genuinely convinced that the denial of certain human rights was essential to the future safety and existence of their State or society. However, there was no doubt that totalitarian systems were the main obstacle to the realization of the right of self-determination. If the Third Committee wished to promote self-determination, it must take into account dependent peoples everywhere. He would support any proposals based on that broad interpretation of the right of self-determination.

43. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia), exercising his right of reply, said that it was the custom of the metropolitan Powers to set conditions as a pretext for not recognizing the right of self-determination of the peoples under their control. The condition mentioned by the Netherlands representative—that the peoples concerned must be able to make the relevant political decisions by democratic means—was of that nature. The Indonesian people, however, had not been given the opportunity to use democratic means in exercising their right of self-determination; they had been compelled to assert it by force. Furthermore, the question whether the peoples concerned were able to make political decisions was for those people themselves, rather than for the metropolitan Powers, to decide.

44. He disagreed with the Netherlands representative's assertion that the people of West Irian (Netherlands New Guinea) had not been able to exercise their right of self-determination because they had been physically isolated from Indonesia and had not been aware of the freedom movement. Whenever a dependent people fought for its freedom, its leaders and political organizations acted as its spokesmen; that had been the case in India, the Sudan, Ghana, and a number of other countries. That had also happened in West Irian. Furthermore, there had been a strong freedom movement in West Irian itself; some 4,000 of its members were at present in exile in Indonesia while many others had been imprisoned by the Netherlands authorities.

45. The Netherlands representative had further stated that, when the time came, his Government would allow the people of West Irian to choose their future status for themselves. In the meantime, however, the Netherlands authorities were doing all they could—even replacing the Indonesian language by Dutch, as they had not done before—to indoctrinate and intimidate the people of West Irian and to influence and prejudge their choice. Thus, whatever the Netherlands might claim, it was attempting to deny the right of self-determination to the people of West Irian.

46. Mr. SIMPSON (Liberia) said that in dealing with the important and far-reaching problem before it, the Committee must bear in mind that adopting resolutions was not enough, and that any resolutions it adopted must be translated into positive action. Since the Second World War, more than 700 million people,

mainly in Asia and Africa, had exercised the right of self-determination. The old order was gone forever. Whenever a dependent people felt that it was ready to administer its own territory and its own affairs, it should be allowed to do so, whatever opinion anyone else might hold.

47. He did not agree that the meaning of "self-determination" was complex; it was perfectly clear to the dependent peoples, and it was the duty of the United Nations to set up appropriate machinery at the earliest possible date to give effect to the right of self-determination.

48. The Conference of Independent African States recently held at Accra had adopted a resolution condemning the colonial system still practised in Africa, and calling upon the administering Powers to accelerate the progress of the dependent peoples towards self-determination and independence, to respect their human rights, and to abide by the relevant provisions of the Charter. The views expressed in that resolution were warmly supported by his Government.

49. Turning to the three draft resolutions before the Committee (Council resolution 586 D (XX)), he said that while the two draft resolutions submitted by the Commission on Human Rights did not, perhaps, cover the entire issue, they were most constructive, and he would support them both. As regards the Economic and Social Council's draft resolution, it would indeed be disappointing if the statement in the third paragraph of the preamble was true. Operative paragraph 1 of that draft resolution would endow a small *ad hoc* commission with a responsibility too heavy for it to discharge. To establish such a commission would not be in the interests either of the United Nations or of the vital principles at stake. He was therefore unable to support the draft resolution, or the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.702), which did little to improve it.

50. Miss FAROUK (Tunisia) thought it was too late for speculation whether self-determination was a principle or a right. Europe no longer ruled the world; the day of far-flung empires was over. The problem of colonialism no longer concerned only the countries directly involved; it concerned every country in the world. The great lesson which had emerged from the two world wars was that isolationism was no longer possible and that all countries must unite to defend themselves against possible threats to their freedom. The League of Nations had been the first attempt in that direction; it had failed, and the United Nations had taken its place. Unlike the League, the United Nations had realized the need for recognition of the right of peoples to self-determination, and had understood that any denials or violations of that right presented a threat to the world's peace and security.

51. The United Nations must not be allowed to fail; and it must live up to its obligations. Even now, unequal and bloody struggles were going on because the right of self-determination was being denied. The Third Committee should stop postponing the vital issue before it from session to session, and members of the Committee should openly debate it with a view to finding a solution of the problem on which there was agreement. As the lesson of Algeria showed, the progress of history could not be arrested; once a people became conscious of being an entity it would liberate itself whatever happened. Her own country, having but recently achieved its independence, was conscious of

its duty, as a Member of the United Nations, to help the oppressed peoples to achieve their liberation by peaceful means. It was useless to attempt to stop the natural movement towards self-determination by seeking to define terms whose meaning was clear to all. The right of peoples and nations to self-determination was simply their right to create their own political institutions, to develop their own economies and to direct their cultural and social progress without any foreign interference. The Western Powers which seemed to have such difficulty in understanding the term were quick enough to invoke the principle of self-determination when it was in their interests to do so.

52. She would vote against the Council's draft resolution because its adoption would confuse the issue and would greatly retard the work of the United Nations. However, she would vote for the two draft resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights, and hoped that they would be adopted by a large majority; that would help to create conditions in which the right of self-determination could be exercised by peaceful means, and would not have to be won by violence.

53. Mrs. MURAVYEVA (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), exercising her right of reply, said that the United States representative, instead of replying to criticisms of the Council's draft resolution, had chosen to attack the USSR. The method was familiar, but not effective; its use served only to weaken the position of the United States. Such a statement by the United States representative should be considered as

an attempt to side-track the Committee from a business-like discussion of the question and by devious methods to conceal the fact that the United States delegation was against the adoption of effective measures to further the right of peoples and nations to self-determination.

54. The Hungarian representative had already replied to the attack on her people. The Hungarian people were satisfied with their Government and their way of life, and asked merely that no one should interfere with what was certainly their own business.

55. The United States representative had also resorted to the favourite method of his country's yellow Press—invoking the threat of communism. While she knew that the United States Government regarded communism as a threat, she had discovered that a great many people in the United States did not share that view, but looked forward to friendly relations and scientific and cultural exchanges with the USSR.

56. The Council's draft resolution and the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.702) to it did not reflect the views expressed in the Committee. There was no need to indulge in academic exercises on the meaning of the right of self-determination; the Committee should therefore reject the Council's draft resolution and adopt the draft resolutions submitted by the Commission on Human Rights.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.