

exhaustion of countries' resources, and monetary instability, recalled the collapse of the 1930s in Europe and could not but give rise to a feeling of helplessness.

29. His delegation had repeated over and over again that a political solution must be found to the problem of the Palestine refugees in the Middle East. The situation there was the result of the partition of Palestine and the setting-up of a foreign State in that territory. The causes rather than the effects must therefore be attacked, and the great Powers which bore direct responsibility, namely the United States of America and the United Kingdom, must make a joint effort to find a final solution. Those Powers, particularly the United States, must also stop providing Israel and other States in the area with military assistance which only added to the existing instability.

30. So long as that type of military aid continued, a real solution to the Palestine problem would not be found by regularly increasing the contributions to UNRWA. The United States did not accomplish much when with one hand it made a huge contribution to the Agency and with the other it helped to maintain the chaos prevailing in the Middle East. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had a budget of some \$16 billion, whereas \$2 billion would be enough in any other country to maintain very comprehensive intelligence services. Moreover, part of that budget was known to be used for the purpose of engineering coups d'état or stirring up abnormal situations, although it could be used for aid to the Palestine refugees.

31. The United Kingdom also had a certain moral responsibility towards Palestine. However, it was currently facing very grave economic problems and was probably doing the best it could.

32. Like the United States, the USSR spent huge sums on its intelligence service, the KGB. It, too, could use part of that money for assistance to the Palestine refugees. The Scandinavian countries, for their part, were doing their best, but they should urge the United States to change its attitude.

33. It had been said that the Palestinians were Arabs and that it was the Arab countries which should come to their

aid. Although in no sense responsible for the situation existing in Palestine, Saudi Arabia had, for its part, made major contributions to the Agency.

34. The Zionists, like the others who were responsible for the present situation, seemed unwilling to acknowledge that the Palestine problem could have only a political solution. They refused to comply with the numerous resolutions in which the United Nations had called for the refugees to be permitted to return to their homes. While it would not in itself represent an immediate solution to the Palestine problem, the implementation of those resolutions would at least be a first step. Tracing the history of the various waves of conquest in the Middle East, he observed that the Zionists, too, were invaders and that it was only because of their doctrinaire fanaticism that they believed that right was on their side. There would be no peace in the area until the Palestine refugees could return to their homes. All countries recognized that fact—even a country as far away as Japan.

35. Détente would accomplish nothing unless it was based on a completely new attitude, and unless the Powers concerned drastically changed their view of international affairs and abandoned the old concept of a balance of power and spheres of influence, which had caused so many wars.

Mr. Tellmann (Norway), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

Organization of the Committee's work

36. The CHAIRMAN asked those members of the Committee who wished to do so to put their names on the list of speakers for the general debate on the item under consideration and to give the officers of the Committee as soon as possible any draft resolutions they wished to submit to the Committee. He recalled that the Committee was already somewhat behind in its work and also, in accordance with the General Assembly's request, contained in a letter dated 11 November 1975 from the President of the Assembly (A/SPC/178), had to hear the representatives of the two communities in Cyprus at its next two meetings.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

975th meeting

Wednesday, 12 November 1975, at 10.55 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/PV.975*

AGENDA ITEM 125

Question of Cyprus (A/10242, A/10256-S/11825, A/10276-S/11840, A/10282-S/11844, A/10283-S/11845, A/10292-S/11847, A/10305-S/11854, A/10310-S/11859, A/10322-S/11860, A/10323, A/10343-S/11875, A/10351, A/L.769, A/L.773, A/SPC/175, A/SPC/178)

1. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): This meeting has been called pursuant to two decisions adopted by the General Assembly on agenda item 125, entitled "Question of Cyprus". The first, which was adopted at the 2367th plenary meeting, held on 30 September 1975, was

* Verbatim record (see para. 1 below).

mentioned in the letter addressed by the President of the General Assembly to me [A/SPC/175]. The second decision of the Assembly was adopted at the 2041st plenary meeting yesterday. In connexion with that decision the President of the General Assembly addressed a letter to me [A/SPC/178] in which he states the following:

"As you know, the General Assembly, at its 2355th plenary meeting, held on 22 September 1975, decided that item 125, entitled 'Question of Cyprus', would be considered directly in plenary meetings. At its 2367th plenary meeting, held on 30 September 1975, the General Assembly also decided that when considering the item it would invite the Special Political Committee to meet for the purpose of affording representatives of the Cypriot communities an opportunity to take the floor in the Committee in order to express their views, and that it would then resume its consideration of the item taking into account the report of the Special Political Committee.

"At its 2401st plenary meeting, held today, the General Assembly decided to invite the Special Political Committee to meet on Wednesday, 12 November, for the purpose of hearing the views of the representatives of the Cypriot communities, on the understanding that verbatim records would be kept of those meetings of the Committee. The General Assembly also decided to resume consideration of this agenda item in plenary meeting on Thursday, 13 November, in the morning."

2. In response to that letter from the President of the General Assembly, I announce to the Committee that verbatim records will be kept of the proceedings of today's meetings and will be annexed to the report that the Committee will transmit to the General Assembly.

3. The first speaker on my list is Mr. Celik, representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, on whom I call.

4. Mr. CELIK (Turkish Cypriot community): At the unilateral request of the Greek Cypriot side we are once again before this Committee. We believe that it would have been more useful for all of us had we continued intercommunal negotiations as prescribed by the resolution adopted last year [General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX)]. Nevertheless, we are glad that we have been given a chance to hear the Greek Cypriot view and to answer it, so that the realities of Cyprus cease to be distorted.

5. I was very disappointed yesterday when I listened to Mr. Christophides' address before the General Assembly [2401st plenary meeting]. Indeed I was more than disappointed, together with others who had expected the Greek side to come to the United Nations with more realism and with some regard to truth. Instead we heard Mr. Christophides' appeal on behalf of Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike for remedies which, if granted, would help the Greek Cypriot leaders to bring to a successful conclusion their 12-year-old attempt to catch the Turkish Cypriot partners unprepared and unprotected and to give to them the final blow in the name of union with "mother Greece".

6. As we listened to Mr. Christophides and heard him expound his views on Cyprus—in complete disregard of the

Turkish Cypriot view and of the suffering of the Turks during the last 12 years—our hopes for a speedy solution waned.

7. His statement that Turkey's duty was to restore the 12-year-old unconstitutional rule of Archbishop Makarios does not infuse us with any confidence in the Greek Cypriot administrators. Naturally they are sorry that they were prevented from continuing to run the country on their own—as they did for 12 years—having destroyed 103 Turkish villages, having rendered one fourth of the Turkish community homeless and workless, and having excluded all Turks from the benefits of the budget of Cyprus for 12 years.

8. I do not intend to reopen these pages again here. It is sufficient for me to see that the Greek Cypriot leaders have not repented an inch for what they have done to us for the last 12 years.

9. It is a great eye-opener for us to see that what the Greek Cypriot leadership is seeking to get is the chance to destroy us completely in Cyprus. To us Mr. Christophides' statement to the General Assembly yesterday and the draft resolution [A/L.769] which he has submitted mean nothing else.

10. I shall not go into a detailed reply at this stage because the debate will be in the General Assembly, and Mr. Denктаş, the leader of the Turkish community and the negotiator at the intercommunal talks, is here to take part in that debate.

11. I feel sure that, especially after hearing Mr. Christophides' accusations levelled against the Turkish leadership, Mr. Denктаş will be given a chance to reply. Indeed we feel that this is a necessity of natural justice if justice is to be done. We also feel that the natural result of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) necessitates the hearing of the two sides. Otherwise, how can you expect Mr. Denктаş to take part in intercommunal negotiations, on the basis of equality, when he has not been heard here?

12. The Greek Cypriot negotiator has the right to speak at the plenary meeting. His non-appearance at this time is no ground for refusing a hearing to Mr. Denктаş. We claim that we are given the right to give our side of the story. Otherwise we believe justice cannot be done.

13. This 12-year-old pretence that the Greek Cypriot side represents Cyprus must cease. We expected Mr. Christophides himself to own that there was a Turkish side to the problem of Cyprus, but he chose to speak for the Turks of Cyprus also—those Turks whom he did not see for 12 years, and who chose once and for all to move to the north in order to escape the life which had been tailored for them for 12 years by the Greek Cypriot administrators.

14. This is making fun of the 12-year-old tragedy of the Turkish community. It is adding insult to injury. We cannot accept this ridiculous position of being represented here by a Greek Cypriot whose whole policy had been to destroy our independence and to destroy us, as a political entity, with it.

15. We have appeared before this Committee, despite these reservations, not because we believe in the usefulness of heated acrimonious discussions, but because we believe that it will be a disservice to the principles of justice and to our community if we allow the Greek Cypriot side to be seen as the sole arbiters of the problem which they themselves created back in 1963. We are convinced, however, that far from facilitating an early settlement of the problem, polemics on the issue will only aggravate the situation and render a solution all the more difficult.

16. The current debate will produce yet another resolution but not a solution. We shall still have to go back to the negotiating table and try with goodwill, sincerity and patience to find a just and durable solution to a problem which has been outstanding unnecessarily for 12 years.

17. So why are we here? What is the position of the two sides? Why are we not engaged in serious negotiations trying to find a just and durable solution to our problems? Why have the intercommunal talks, which were conducted under the auspices of the Secretary-General, been interrupted? In short, why has the Cyprus problem not been resolved so far? And how can this Committee and the General Assembly contribute to the speeding-up of a peaceful solution?

18. The two communities have very widely diverging views on the Cyprus question.

19. For the Greek side, the Cyprus problem started in 1974 with the Turkish intervention. In all public statements by the Greek Cypriot leadership an effort is made to present the Cyprus problem, not as an intercommunal problem which started back in 1954 over *enosis*, but as an international issue between Turkey and the Greek Cypriots.

20. The Greek Cypriot side is trying to present the problem as a Turkish aggression, as a Turkish occupation of Greek Cypriot land, as a simple land dispute or a simple refugee problem which, when solved, would solve the problem of Cyprus and turn the island into a paradise. But the truth must not be concealed or ignored.

21. For the Turks, the Cyprus problem did not start in 1974. It started in 1954. The problem cannot be solved by putting the clock back to the pre-intervention days of 1974, thus leaving the Greek Cypriot leadership free to complete its programme against the Turks. And, to judge from his address yesterday to the General Assembly, that is exactly what Mr. Christophides wants. The problem is an important political problem resting on the question of what to do with an independence, brought about under agreed terms by two national communities, which the Greek side attempted to destroy.

22. Fundamentally, the Cyprus problem is that of ensuring the continuation of the bicomunal, biregional independence of the island. It is the problem of guaranteeing the status and security of the life and property of the Turkish Cypriot community, which has suffered innumerable hardships and misery trying to preserve the independence of the island.

23. As so often stated, the Turkish side stands for the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus. No one can

question this in the light of our resistance to Greek Cypriot attempts to unite the island with Greece over the last 12 years.

24. We stand for territorial integrity—in the sense that the island shall not be united, in whole or in part, with any other country—as provided by our Constitution of 1960; and we stand for non-alignment, which we regard as a sincere aim and not a means of uniting the island with Greece. Within that framework we ask for biregional federation, and hence political equality, which is embedded in all federal arrangements, so that the past cannot be repeated at our expense.

25. Our proposals at the intercommunal talks have been motivated and dictated by past experience. Our main objective is to create a new structure which would prevent a recurrence of the unfortunate past. We want a set-up which will encourage respect and co-operation between equals. Cyprus is unique in many respects and unless the problem is diagnosed very carefully and correctly the solution, if achieved, will not be effective or lasting.

26. The Turkish Cypriot community still considers the intercommunal talks to be the best, in fact the only, method for solving the Cyprus problem. But the talks must be taken seriously and political propaganda must cease. There can be no meaningful negotiations, and certainly not on terms of equality, if the Greek Cypriot leaders consider themselves completely free to usurp all procedural rules in order to achieve, in international forums, one-sided resolutions which run completely contrary to and contradict everything said and done at the intercommunal talks.

27. Again, there can be no meaningful negotiations while the Greek Cypriot side's sole aim continues to be to treat the Turkish community as non-existent in the island and while the problem of Cyprus is looked upon not as a problem which has arisen from the policy of *enosis* followed by the Church in Athens but as a problem which will be solved the moment Turkey abandons all Turkish Cypriots to the mercy of the *enosis*-bound Greek Cypriot community and its murderous underground organizations.

28. The Greek Cypriot leaders, who for 12 years did nothing to solve the problem but, on the contrary, did everything possible to aggravate the situation in order to erode the rights and status of the Turkish Cypriot community with a view to removing all impediments to union with Greece—and, for this purpose, led the island from crisis to crisis—those who closed their eyes to the destruction of 103 Turkish villages and the existence of 24,000 Turkish refugees for 12 years, and all those who are solely responsible for the present unfortunate state of affairs in Cyprus cannot now demand a solution in a few months.

29. Greek Cypriot leaders must see the realities of Cyprus. My distinguished Greek Cypriot counterpart, Mr. Christophides, was not on the moon when the notorious Akritas Plan was prepared, when secret Greek armies were formed and when Turkish Cypriots were attacked in 1963. Mr. Christophides is an intelligent and literate friend. He cannot pretend ignorance of repeated *enosis* statements made by his leader, Archbishop Makarios. He cannot ignore repeated *enosis* statements made by his Greek colleagues.

He cannot plead ignorance of the fact that as late as May 1975 his leader publicly reaffirmed that he had not deviated at all from his oath of 1950 that he would work for *enosis*.

30. That truism, that self-criticism on the part of the Greek Cypriot leaders, is a must if we are going to talk peace.

31. We also need time, patience and statesmanship. We need goodwill, sincerity and good faith to reorganize the bicomunal state, so that what has happened to us and what has befallen our State in the name of *enosis* cannot be repeated in the future when the Greek Cypriot leaders decide—as they did in December 1963—that international agreements which had solved the problem should no longer be honoured by them, just because they had never looked upon the bicomunal, binational independence as a desired end in itself but merely as a means to an end, namely, union of Cyprus with Greece.

32. If the problem of Cyprus had not been resolved it is not because the differences between the two sides are irreconcilable but because one side, namely, the Greek Cypriot side, is not in favour of an agreement.

33. During the period from 1968 to 1974 there was no solution to the Cyprus problem because Makarios refused to sign an agreement which would close the door to *enosis*. In a statement made public by Archbishop Makarios himself, through his Public Information Office, in May 1975, he said:

“If the talks continue . . . the mistaken impression will be formed that the Cyprus problem is merely a dispute between the two communities and the problem will shift from its present international basis, shrinking to the dimensions of an internal problem of the island.”

34. Archbishop Makarios is also on record as having said that he did not reach an agreement with the Turks in order to prolong his political life. He made that statement to Lawrence Stern of *The Washington Post*, and it was published in the summer 1975 issue of *Foreign Policy*.

35. It is significant to note here that during the last 12 years Archbishop Makarios, as the so-called President of Cyprus, refused to recognize, to meet and/or consult with his Turkish Vice-President; that the Turkish Cypriot community as a whole received no dues, no money, no direct or indirect benefits from the Cyprus budget during that period; and that the Turkish community has had to maintain 26,000 refugees while 103 Turkish villages were in ruins and Turkish-Cypriot-owned land and properties were illegally utilized and exploited by the Greek Cypriots. All foreign aid received by Cyprus was usurped by the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community was not allowed to benefit. That is why Makarios has refused to settle the Cyprus problem for 12 years. He had everything to gain by prolonging the issue.

36. The objective of the Greek Cypriot side in resorting to this discriminatory treatment and to delaying tactics was to achieve the internal collapse of the Turkish Cypriot community, which was deprived of all its legitimate and

constitutional rights and was left without any administrative or economic base. Time, for the Greek Cypriot side, was a new weapon to be used against the Turkish Cypriots. While time ran against us, the Greek Cypriots put in an appearance at every international forum as “the Government of Cyprus”—we saw a repetition of this play-acting yesterday. Our protestations that they represented no one except themselves were effectively nullified by their well-known propaganda tactics. Negotiations continued but with no result, because we were told that in order to get our financial dues from the budget of Cyprus, in order to enable our refugees to return to their homes in 103 destroyed villages, and in order to be able to live in Cyprus in comparative peace, we should first accept the Greek Cypriot concept of a settlement.

37. That Greek concept was that we should forgo our co-founder partnership status in the independence of Cyprus. We heard Mr. Christophides yesterday. He continues to believe that Makarios is Cyprus. If Makarios occupies the presidential seat, no matter how, all is well for Cyprus; even the past 12 years' misrule seems to have been quite in order. The Greek Cypriots wanted us to agree to a form of independence which, according to Makarios, would be “the feasible solution, a presently attainable solution for the Greek Cypriots”. This “attainable” or “feasible” solution was defined for the Greek Cypriot community as “a solution aimed at attaining better conditions for the full realization of the national aspirations of the Greeks of Cyprus without excluding union with Greece”.

38. That was the main reason why no solution was found to the Cyprus problem during the period from 1963 to 1974. We, as the Turkish Cypriots of Cyprus, were in a very bad position, but we knew that if we bowed to the policy of the “feasible solution” which Archbishop Makarios was trying to force upon us, we would lose our freedom, and our inalienable rights in the independence of Cyprus would be destroyed for ever.

39. We chose to resist, at great cost and sacrifice, this attempt to destroy our independence. The Greek Cypriot leaders went around the world pretending that all was well with Cyprus except that there was some trouble with the extremist Turkish Cypriot elements—that is how Mr. Christophides tried to present the case yesterday. To their own people each week they preached that the present state of affairs—namely, a Greek Cypriot administration getting away with the deception that it represented the whole of Cyprus—was the nearest thing to *enosis* and that the “feasible solution”, when achieved, would not in any way bar *enosis*. Yesterday we heard nothing from Mr. Christophides about *enosis*. He spoke a great deal about his country and independence but said not a single word about an independence closed to *enosis*.

40. Archbishop Makarios, however, was able to state publicly that he would never sign a new agreement which barred *enosis*. But in the meantime the world was told that the Turkish Cypriots were intransigent and were resorting to delaying tactics. The same accusation was levelled against us yesterday by Mr. Christophides.

41. The negotiator of the Turkish Cypriot community, the person directly concerned with the whole problem, is here.

If he is not allowed to address the plenary meeting of the Assembly, how will you decide on these issues? Mr. Denktaş is here in New York waiting for a chance to put before you all the facts, the true facts about Cyprus. If Mr. Christophides is not afraid of the truth, why is he shielding himself behind rules and regulations in trying to stop the Turkish voice from being heard?

42. Everything that was said and proposed in the three rounds of talks in Vienna, and in the fourth round of talks in New York—which, incidentally, was sabotaged by the Greek side for ulterior political motives—is on record with the Secretary-General. In any case, some of it has already been made public.

43. In Vienna, contrary to wilful Greek propaganda, progress had been achieved, and had the Greek side continued negotiations, more progress would have been made. We might in fact have been very close to a final settlement today. Why have the intercommunal talks been interrupted? Mr. Denktaş is here to give you all the facts. Will you not hear him? If you do not hear him, how will you ask him to continue the negotiations in the future “under conditions of equality”?

44. The reason behind the sabotaging of the talks is really very simple. So long as Makarios is the one that runs the show and so long as he remains faithful to his 1950 oath to realize *enosis* during his lifetime—and he says he has never deviated from that oath—he will not come to any agreement with us on a biregional federation, a federal State which is closed to *enosis*. That would be too much of a compromise in view of his holy oath. Even as late as 1974 Makarios declared: “. . . To me independence is a compromise. In other words, if I had a free choice between *enosis* and independence, I would support *enosis*.” How does one arrive at a fair settlement with a leader so apathetic about realities as that?

45. If the Cyprus problem is still outstanding, if the talks have been interrupted, the Greeks have only themselves to blame, and no one else. It is the Greek side which took the talks lightly and preferred international propaganda to serious negotiations. It is the Greek side which kept running from one international forum to the other, trying to deceive the world about the true nature of the Cyprus problem. It is the Greek side which has always insisted and still insists on ignoring present realities and demands a solution which disregards the past.

46. It is easy for the Greeks to utilize their effective propaganda machinery and make use of the well-known Greek lobby to influence various Governments and world public opinion; but that sort of approach cannot and will not solve our problem. If we want a political settlement, we have to be realistic. It is no use trying to ignore the Turkish Cypriot community. It is no use trying to deny the present realities.

47. And what are these realities? Is the Akritas Plan for the destruction of our independence not a reality? Is the December attack on the Turkish community with intent to abrogate the 1960 Agreements not the main reality? Is the resistance to all this by the Turkish Cypriot community not a reality? And are we to forget the thousands of Turks who

have been killed or maimed and the thousands of homes that have been destroyed, all in the name of *enosis*?

48. Yesterday, Mr. Christophides talked of destruction, of war, of homes destroyed and of refugees. Are we to forget that he is now shedding crocodile tears about those and forgetting that for 12 years Turks stood on the receiving side? How can he disregard the fact that what happened in July 1974 was the direct result of a 12-year-old attempt to destroy the Turkish community, remove the impediments to *enosis* and unite the island with Greece? How can we shut our eyes to the fact that but for our resistance and for Turkey, Greece would have colonized the island several times in the past?

49. Mr. Christophides may feel sorry that Turkey, acting within its rights, cut short—after a 12-year wait—this *enosis* movement. Makarios may be very upset that the Turkish Cypriot community, which he always depicted as “a national and religious enemy”, has been saved and strengthened. But all these are our reasons for joy and for thanksgiving. And in that you can see the paradox of Cyprus.

50. Mr. Christophides cannot make even a child believe that once Turkey pulls out of Cyprus all will be well. If Turkey's withdrawal is untimely and takes place before a satisfactory settlement, we know what will befall us. Mr. Christophides must know that my community has been waging a struggle for survival against Archbishop Makarios since 1950—when he declared that he would achieve *enosis* during his lifetime—and since 1955 members of our community have actually been dying in order to arrest this *enosis* policy. How can he ask us now to believe him or his leader? How can he pretend that the two communities can live in peace and harmony by putting the clock back to the pre-coup days of 1974?

51. These are the present realities which must be taken into account if we are to have a settlement at all, and if we are to maintain the independence of the island.

52. What is Makarios doing to bring about a political settlement? What is he doing to prevent further separation from becoming deeper and more permanent? Has he considered the Turkish community's proposals for a transitional joint federal Government [A/10256-S/11825, annex, appendix I]? Has he accepted the Turkish community's proposals for normalization of everyday life in as many fields as possible by running some services jointly, with a view to easing tension and paving the way for a political settlement? Has he responded to our sincere call for a political truce, to put an end to heated acrimonious discussions in international forums, which only help to make positions more rigid and inflexible?

53. On the contrary, he is doing just the opposite. He is doing all he can to bring about further separation and mistrust between the two communities. He is doing everything to push the Turkish Cypriot community into further and deeper separation. Makarios has repeatedly and publicly declared that he will not sign an agreement within the framework of the present realities—an agreement which will legalize the present *de facto* situation on the island.

54. The following are only a few examples of Greek Cypriot policy and determined action to isolate the Turkish Cypriot community, cut it off from the outside world and ultimately render it stateless.

55. Within the framework of the transitional joint federal Government, we officially asked Mr. Clerides, at the third round of talks in Vienna and the fourth round of talks in New York, to give us a few thousand Republican passports for use by the Turkish Cypriot community, and agreed to submit regular returns showing to whom the passports have been issued and when. The Greek Cypriot representatives refused. But when we issued our own travel documents to enable members of our community to travel abroad, they wrote to all foreign Governments asking them not to recognize those travel documents, and thus denied freedom of movement abroad to the Turkish Cypriots.

56. Likewise, they have officially approached all foreign Governments and made attempts to block all exports originating in North Cyprus from entering the world market, by putting out false propaganda and trying to create the wrong impression that all agricultural produce exported by North Cyprus is or was Greek-owned. This they did forgetting that almost half of the grapes—the biggest single agricultural product in South Cyprus—grown in the South are from Turkish-Cypriot-owned vineyards, and have for the last two years been harvested and marketed by the Greeks or utilized in Greek-Cypriot-owned wine production.

57. They have declared all ports and airports in North Cyprus “illegal” and threatened to take legal action against all vessels and aircraft using them, thus trying to cut us off from the outside world.

58. For the past 12 years they have refused postal services to all Turkish towns and villages, but when as an act of necessity we issued our own stamps and established our own postal services, they blamed us for wanting separation.

59. The Greek Cypriot administration still continues to pocket all foreign aid received by Cyprus from outside, and North Cyprus is not allowed to benefit from it.

60. Makarios went as far as to threaten to freeze all deposits of the Turkish banks with the Central Bank of Cyprus. If he does that and in consequence we are forced to issue our own currency, who will be working for more separation?

61. If this state of affairs is allowed to continue and we are forced to take appropriate measures to rectify this anomalous situation, can this possibly be considered as a unilateral move by the Turkish Cypriot community towards further separate or full independence?

62. Forgetting all the inhuman treatment which they have inflicted on the Turks for the last 12 years, the Greek Cypriots are trying to present the Cyprus problem as having started in 1974, and to use the legitimate and justified Turkish intervention as a pretext for rendering us “stateless”, as an excuse for continuing their policy of discrimination and for continuing to ignore the very existence of the Turkish Cypriot community.

63. We are constantly being pressed to make a choice between withdrawal of Turkish troops, and suffering the continuation of Makarios’ above-cited policy and actions, in other words, “Greek aggression”. Well, the Turkish Cypriot community has made its choice. The Turkish Cypriot community has the right and the status to determine its own future—the right of self-determination. The Turkish Cypriot community will never agree to a state of statelessness. We shall never abandon or concede our right of equality as a co-founder partner of the Republic of Cyprus.

64. In our view, therefore, this recourse to the United Nations was not necessitated by facts or developments. It was made as a result of a political decision by the Greek Cypriot leadership.

65. The question is, therefore, whether the United Nations will encourage Archbishop Makarios to continue with the process of internationalizing the Cyprus problem at the risk of destroying all chances of meaningful negotiations or whether the international community will support the intercommunal negotiations so that the two communities share the responsibility of rearranging their home on the basis of equality and mutual respect. Equality and respect cannot be established while one side, taking full advantage of procedural rules, is allowed to carry on its campaign of maligning the other partner.

66. We have come to New York with an open mind, hoping that a constructive debate would be conducted and some positive elements would emerge in the course of the debate which would facilitate the resumption of the intercommunal talks and contribute towards an early settlement.

67. To our great surprise, however, the Greek Cypriot delegation has submitted a draft resolution [A/L.769] which completely ignores present realities on the island and directly contradicts what has been negotiated and agreed upon in principle during the intercommunal talks in Vienna. This shows that the Greek Cypriot leadership is still determined to follow its policy of the last 12 years which was to disregard the Turkish Cypriot community, render it stateless and try, in time, to suppress or eliminate it by all means possible.

68. This draft resolution shows that the attitude of the Greeks to the Cyprus problem has not changed. The aim continues to be international propaganda. A sincere desire to find a solution to the problem does not exist. If this draft resolution is adopted by the General Assembly, if this approach of the Greek Cypriot side to the problem is endorsed by the world body, especially before the Turkish Cypriot side, an equal co-founder partner of the Cyprus Republic, is even heard at all levels, I regret to say that it will kill negotiations and render a final peaceful political settlement very difficult, if not impossible.

69. I do not intend to elaborate on the draft resolution, or touch on any fundamental issues in my statement today because the draft resolution and the substance of the Cyprus problem will be debated at the plenary meetings in the next few days and Mr. Denktaş, leader of the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkish Cypriot negotiator in the intercommunal talks, is here in New York and has asked to

be allowed to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on Cyprus, to present the Turkish Cypriot view on the Cyprus problem at the highest level and in the most authoritative manner.

70. I do hope that in the name of natural justice, he will be afforded equal treatment with the Greek Cypriot side and be given the opportunity to address the plenary meeting and answer any questions raised during the debate so that the final draft resolution will be adopted after both parties to the problem have been heard.

71. Resolution 3212 (XXIX) of the General Assembly calls upon the two communities to continue negotiations, with a view to finding a final settlement, “on an equal footing”. This just and reasonable request will no doubt be repeated this year. But how can the two communities negotiate on terms of equality when one of them can continue to pretend that it represents Cyprus as a whole at all international forums? How can that degree of goodwill so necessary for the continuation of the talks be generated when one of the parties under an assumed authority can tell the world that the Turkish community is politically non-existent on the island?

72. The status of equality of the Turkish Cypriot community must be reaffirmed and proved by the General Assembly in word as well as in deed, by allowing that community to participate in the deliberations of the Assembly on Cyprus; otherwise, the Greek Cypriot leadership will grow more intransigent and continue to seek new excuses for abandoning the intercommunal talks and running to the United Nations.

73. If Cyprus is to have peace and tranquillity again, if the island is to continue as an independent island, the equal status of the two national communities must be reconfirmed and Makarios should be given to understand that he is not, and cannot be, the sole representative of Cyprus. He forfeited this right when he armed the Greek Cypriots to

the teeth and attacked the Turkish Cypriot community, a part of his people, with the sole aim of forcing us into submission and achieving *enosis* in 1963.

74. Disregarding the past, while resolving on the present, can only compromise the final settlement and the independence of the island. Had we, for example, received in 1963, and thereafter, the interest and understanding of the United Nations which we partially receive today, the history of Cyprus would most probably have followed a different course from its present one.

75. The Greek Cypriot leadership, seeing that the problem was being tackled in its present perspective, would not have been as intransigent as it has been; the Turkish Cypriot community would not have suffered as much as it has done; Turkish rights on the island would not have been as harshly violated; the Greek appetite for annexing Cyprus would not have grown out of all proportion and the unfortunate coup of July 1974—in which Greeks killed more than 2,000 Greek Cypriots—would not have taken place. Most probably there would be a happy, prospering island today and the General Assembly would not have been burdened with a thorny problem, artificially created with a view to destroying an independence by misapplying all United Nations principles.

76. We hope that the General Assembly, through its present deliberations and the draft resolution it adopts at the end of the current discussions, will prepare the necessary ground and atmosphere for the resumption of the intercommunal talks, and pave the way for an early peaceful settlement.

77. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker on my list has a statement of approximately one and a half hours' duration; we shall therefore adjourn now and hear him this afternoon.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.

976th meeting

Wednesday, 12 November 1975, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/PV.976*

AGENDA ITEM 125

Question of Cyprus (*concluded*) (A/10242, A/10256-S/11825, A/10276-S/11840, A/10282-S/11844, A/10283-S/11845, A/10292-S/11847, A/10305-S/11854, A/10310-S/11859, A/10322-S/11860, A/10323, A/10343-S/11875, A/10351, A/L.769, A/L.773, A/SPC/175, A/SPC/178)

1. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): Pursuant to the decisions adopted by the General Assembly [2367th and 2401st plenary meetings] on agenda item 125

entitled “Question of Cyprus”, the Committee heard, at this morning's meeting [975th meeting] the views of the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community. I now invite the representative of the Greek Cypriot community, Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, to make his statement.

2. Mr. PAPAPOPOULOS (Greek Cypriot community): I am very grateful for having this opportunity to address the Special Political Committee on the true facts about Cyprus and for having been allowed to attempt to clear up and to

* Verbatim record (see 975th meeting, para. 1).