

964th meeting

Friday, 24 October 1975, at 10.50 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Roberto MARTINEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras).

A/SPC/SR.964

AGENDA ITEM 53

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa
(continued) (A/10050-S/11638, A/10052-S/11641, A/
10103-S/11708, A/SPC/174, A/SPC/L.326):

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*
(A/10022);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/10281)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic had asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply at the end of the preceding meeting, following a statement by another delegation. As the other delegation had withdrawn its name from the list of speakers, he had not called upon the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic. However, the latter had asked to reply to the representative of the United States of America at the current meeting on behalf of his own and other Arab delegations. Although the right of reply was supposed to be exercised at the end of meetings, in the absence of any objection he would take it that the Committee wished to accede to that request in the case being considered.

It was so decided.

2. Mr. EL SHEIBANI (Libyan Arab Republic), speaking in exercise of the right of reply on behalf of the Arab group of countries, said it appeared that the representative of the United States of America was new to the Committee because he had raised a matter which had been discussed in the Third Committee. His enthusiasm for zionism had no doubt made him forget the rules of the General Assembly. He was apparently joining in the propaganda which was being directed against the United Nations in the United States because of the fact that the Organization did not follow the directives of the United States and its ally, zionism. However, his attempt to defend zionism was doomed to failure. Members of the Committee were well aware how closely the Zionist régime was linked with South African racism. The United States representative seemed unaware not only of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly but also of the nature of zionism. There was a great difference between zionism as a racist theory and Judaism, which was recognized by the Arabs as a divine faith on the same footing as Christianity. The sufferings of Jews had been caused by Western countries and never by Arabs. Moslems, Jews and Christians had coexisted throughout history until zionism had emerged as a fanatical racist movement similar to South African racism. In his enthusiasm to defend the Zionist entity, the United States representative seemed to have overlooked the references in the report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022), particularly in paragraphs 66 and 205, to the

relationship between that entity and the South African racist régime.

3. He would leave it to the members of the Committee to judge the increasingly close relationship between Tel Aviv and the racist régime in Pretoria, which was being strengthened in all fields. The increasing bonds between those two régimes, which ignored United Nations resolutions, showed the morality of zionism.

4. It was not surprising that the United States representative had asked members of the Committee not to draw a comparison between the Zionist régime and that of South Africa. What was surprising was that that appeal should be made on behalf of a country which knew full well what its responsibilities were towards an international organization which had condemned racism, oppression and the debasement of man. If the United Nations condemned countries which collaborated with the South African régime, it must likewise condemn those which collaborated with similar régimes, such as the Zionist one.

5. The co-operation between Arabs and Africans was a historical, cultural and religious bond in their fight against racism. The Arabs supported the liberation movements in South Africa, which were also supported by the United Nations and the international community, in their fight to eliminate racism.

6. His delegation wished to maintain the right of reply to the United States representative until it had read the summary record of the preceding meeting.

7. Mr. KATZEN (United States of America) said that he wished to reserve his right to comment on the Libyan representative's remarks at a subsequent meeting.

8. Mr. MOHAMMED ALI (Oman) said that the *apartheid* policy of the white minority in South Africa was a challenge to the United Nations, whose Charter and resolutions upheld the principles of the independence of peoples. All countries were opposed to the odious policy of discrimination on the basis of race and colour. In the discussion on the item, representatives of most countries in the world had expressed indignation and had called upon the United Nations to see that the international community instituted strict sanctions and other measures to oblige South Africa to renounce that policy.

9. There was a great similarity between the racist régime in South Africa and that in Israel, which was committing the most barbarous crimes against the Arab people of Palestine, depriving them of their fundamental rights just as the white minority was depriving the black majority of theirs in South Africa. Israel was defying the United Nations resolutions condemning the policy of oppression and racial

discrimination which it pursued against the Arab citizens of Palestine. The close co-operation between the two régimes was clear proof of the similarity between them.

10. He supported the appeals by previous speakers calling upon all countries to halt military and economic aid to the Government of South Africa, since such aid enabled it to pursue its discriminatory policies.

11. In Oman there was no discrimination whatsoever. All people had the same rights and duties. The same should be true of all peoples in southern Africa, who should live together in peace and harmony in order to build a society where all had equal rights.

12. His country had always supported the United Nations resolutions condemning the South African régime. It had no political or economic relations with that régime and would not allow its citizens any commercial or social contacts with it.

13. Mr. BANGO BANGO (Zaire) said that, despite repeated appeals by the United Nations for unconditional amnesty for all persons imprisoned or subject to restrictive measures for their opposition to *apartheid*, the Vorster clique was consolidating its cynical régime, which debased the black man in the land of his ancestors. The recommendations made by the Special Committee against *Apartheid* in Chapter II of its report, concerning that régime's policy of so-called *détente*, the need to step up international action, the special responsibility of the United Nations to the people of South Africa, the recognition of the right of self-determination, condemnation of the "bantustans", the need for sanctions against South Africa, and assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements were fully supported by his delegation. The World Peace Council's award of the Frédéric Joliot-Curie Gold Peace Medal to the Special Committee showed its appreciation of that Committee's work to maintain international peace and security.

14. The attainment of independence by the four new States Members of the United Nations was cause for satisfaction to the whole of Africa and a just recompense for their heroic fight against colonialism.

15. Thirty years after the establishment of the United Nations, the white minority régime of South Africa, which took its inspiration from the racist ideas of nazism, still ignored the recommendations and decisions of the United Nations, strong in the support of many Western countries, including the great Powers belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which, as permanent members of the Security Council, were responsible under the Charter for maintaining international peace and security. The contributions made by the science and technology of those Western countries enabled South Africa to assert itself as a military and even an atomic Power. The Committee should continue to denounce the dangers inherent in the supply of arms to South Africa. The embargo on trade with that country and, above all, on arms deliveries, should be total, because *apartheid* was not only a denial of the intrinsic value of man but also a crime against humanity. The United Nations should also call upon Governments to point out to Western firms the danger to

international peace and security constituted by their continued trade relations with South Africa.

16. The South African Prime Minister's campaign of charm showed that he realized that the days of the *apartheid* régime were numbered. Zaire respected the positions of other sovereign African States with regard to that campaign, but, for its part, it considered that any dialogue with Zaire should start with a dialogue between the blacks and whites in South Africa itself.

17. The Vorster clique's pledge to announce the independence of the Transkei "bantustan" in 1976 deceived no one. The establishment of "bantustans" merely continued the *apartheid* policy by dividing Azania into small States which were not viable and would always be at the mercy of the white minority régime. His delegation therefore felt that the Committee, in another resolution, should again urge those specialized agencies and governmental and non-governmental organizations which had contact with the blacks in South Africa to develop among them a spirit of brotherhood in order to awaken them to national consciousness, which alone could prevent the Balkanization of their country. The indigenous inhabitants of Azania must realize that they belonged to a single nation. Zaire's own experience showed that the lack of a sense of nationhood was the source of many of the internal upheavals from which various third-world countries suffered.

18. Zaire's position with regard to the unhappy lot of its Azanian brothers had been clearly expressed by its President when he had said at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly (2140th plenary meeting) that his country could not be happy so long as its South African brothers were suffering under the yoke of the South African racists. Zaire also unconditionally supported the Azanian liberation movements in their fight to regain their freedom. In the light of the failure by the white minority and its friends to recognize the fundamental human rights of all of the country's inhabitants, the independent African States and their friends had no choice but to help the people of Azania in their armed struggle for freedom, even though they had constantly told white South Africans that they had nothing against the coexistence of whites and blacks in Azania. Zaire remembered with gratitude the financing by the United States of the United Nations operation in 1960, which had prevented the secession of the copper zone. It was therefore disappointed that that friend of its early days appeared to have no African policy apart from the maintenance of the *status quo*. That freedom-loving country, which had fought for its own independence, had done nothing to help Africa to free itself from colonialism and *apartheid*. It was the Africans themselves who, in a bitter struggle, had overcome the anachronistic Fascist power of Portugal and won the liberation of all that country's African possessions. In some cases, the United States had even worked against the interests of Africa. Zaire for its part, however, would continue to shoulder its responsibilities to its brothers who were victims of *apartheid*.

19. Mr. RASOLONDRRAIBE (Madagascar) said that the discussions on the agenda item under consideration showed that, despite its obstinacy, the racist régime could not hope to win by exhausting its opponents. All the speakers had

shown their determination to support the legitimate cause of the non-white inhabitants of Azania. His delegation strongly supported those statements and wished to reaffirm its active solidarity with those people and the liberation movements, whose representatives it was pleased to see taking part in the debates.

20. For the States members of OAU, political independence would not acquire its full meaning until the continent had been freed from all forms of racist, colonial and foreign domination. It was frustrating that the independent African countries were obliged to devote time to such political problems when they would have preferred to concentrate their efforts on their own development. They were also sorry to see their relations with countries on other continents poisoned by those problems.

21. It had often been said that Africa was a young continent which could make a valuable contribution to building a better world, but it would be unable to fulfil that vocation so long as racism, *apartheid* and colonialism existed on its soil. On the other hand, its victory over those forces of evil might constitute its most important contribution to the work of the United Nations. The fight against *apartheid* should be a joint effort of the whole international community from which no country in any part of the world should hold back. It was because that principle was not yet fully understood that the action of the international community, and especially that of the United Nations, had so far been disappointing. Not only had the Organization constantly disagreed on what should be done, but it had also permitted a small group of countries to prevent the establishment of a true collective will to rid the world of a racist, anachronistic, illegal régime. The first and greatest mistake was to have permitted the South African racist régime to become a founder Member of the United Nations. It was difficult to understand how a nation could take part in formulating the lofty principles of the Charter and sign and ratify that document while hoping to profit indefinitely from the misery of its black population. Admittedly, other delegations, too, had endorsed the principle of the right to self-determination while their Governments remained determined to repress anti-colonial movements. Those countries' recourse to the provisions concerning "domestic jurisdiction" had later shown that they shared South Africa's restrictive manner of interpreting the Charter of the United Nations.

22. Another failure lay in the inability to make all United Nations organs admit the illegal nature of South African domination. The votes at preceding sessions of the General Assembly showed the existence of an overwhelming majority determined to proceed beyond the simple condemnation of *apartheid* to practical measures under Chapter VII and Article 6 of the Charter, but three permanent members of the Security Council had succeeded in thwarting the will of the majority. Those countries should be reminded that it was essentially from them that a number of Member States had learnt the ideas of legality, democracy and universal suffrage which they were calling for in Azania. They should also be reminded that the Vorster régime, owing to the way in which it had been elected, its social and economic domination and the practices and policies which it pursued, could not claim to represent the people of South Africa and

therefore had no legality. By maintaining their political, diplomatic, military, technical and economic relations with the Vorster régime, those countries were helping to strengthen it and to increase *apartheid's* chance of survival. The most obvious illustration of that fact had been given at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, when the three Western permanent members of the Security Council, through their vetoes and in the name of the principle of universality, had succeeded in keeping in the United Nations 4 million whites and leaving 20 million non-whites outside. Now that South Africa had itself chosen no longer to participate in the work of the Assembly, those delegations might more easily agree to vote for the draft resolution submitted to the Security Council in 1974, thus ending 30 years of political and juridical stalemate during which there had been endless discussions on whether South Africa would be more susceptible to diplomatic pressure within or outside the Organization. In fact, the South African racist régime was in no way prepared to give up power either voluntarily or under the pressure of its friends.

23. It had been repeatedly stated in the Committee's discussions that all were agreed in condemning *apartheid* and on the need for change and only differed on the method to be followed to obtain that result. However, the choice of methods seemed very limited. His delegation was not willing to yield to the attempt to blackmail the African countries and destroy their unity by telling them that if they did not adopt a certain strategy they would lose the support of other countries or groups of countries. Agreement must be reached on the illegality of the existing régime in South Africa and on the changes which should be made in that country. The principal question to be resolved immediately in South Africa was one of power and democracy. His delegation endorsed all the recommendations made by the Special Committee against *Apartheid* particularly those concerning a mandatory arms embargo and condemnation of the "bantustans", the aim of which was to perpetuate white supremacy by dividing the blacks.

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued)* (A/SPC/L.326)

24. Mr. HAYNES (Guyana), speaking on behalf of the sponsors, proposed that a vote should be taken on draft resolution A/SPC/L.326.

25. The CHAIRMAN said that the delegations of Afghanistan, the Congo, Czechoslovakia, Kuwait, Mali, Morocco and Romania had become sponsors of the draft resolution.

26. Mr. AL-HADDAWI (Iraq) said that his delegation would also like to join the sponsors.

27. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.326.

At the request of the representative of Jordan, the vote was taken by roll-call.

* Resumed from the 960th meeting.

The Congo, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chad, Chile, China.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The draft resolution was adopted by 90 votes to none, with 9 abstentions.

28. Mr. VONUTHMANN (Federal Republic of Germany) said that it was with regret that his delegation had had to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution. The United Nations had dealt with South Africa and the problem of *apartheid* since 1946 because it was one of its foremost tasks to eliminate all forms of discrimination on grounds of race, religion or political convictions anywhere in the world. It was somewhat surprising, therefore, that after 29 years of heated debate a "special responsibility" was being established for the United Nations with regard to South Africa. His delegation had tried to ascertain what that "special responsibility" could imply. There were two possibilities: it either confirmed a situation which had been known to all for many years, in which case a draft resolution was unnecessary, or it was intended to create something new, and in that event one might wonder about the nature of that new element.

29. The wording of the draft resolution reminded his delegation of the terminology used to describe the relationship between the United Nations and Namibia. As all were aware, the United Nations had assumed direct responsibility for Namibia under General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967. Did the draft resolution on which the Committee had just voted seek to establish a similar relationship between South Africa and the United Nations? Some of the terms used in its preamble seemed to suggest that, especially the references to the "liberation movements" and the right to "self-determination". Such terms were normally used in connexion with dependent Territories.

30. His Government did not view South Africa and the problem of *apartheid* in that context. South Africa was a

sovereign State and a Member of the United Nations. The formal assumption of a special responsibility by the United Nations for parts of the population of a Member State was not envisaged in the Charter and would exceed the Organization's authority.

31. Accordingly, the Federal Republic of Germany, which, like other States, categorically rejected the policy of *apartheid* of South Africa, had been unable to lend the draft resolution its support.

32. Mr. SERUP (Denmark) said that the affirmative vote cast by his delegation on the draft resolution should be viewed against the background of Denmark's firm and consistent opposition to the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. On the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations, his delegation wished to join in the international community's demand that the Government of South Africa should end its policy of *apartheid*. His Government looked upon the proclamation as a reaffirmation of a moral responsibility which the United Nations and the international community must feel towards the people of South Africa as a whole.

33. Mr. VROON (Netherlands) said that his Government had consistently expressed its repudiation of the system of *apartheid*, which it considered to be a violation of basic human rights. The statement made by the representative of his country in the Committee (955th meeting) and his delegation's vote in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/L.325 on solidarity with the South African political prisoners could leave no room for doubt with regard to his Government's position. However, at the Committee's 960th meeting his delegation had made it clear that his Government did not consider the situation in South Africa to be a colonial one. Consequently, it had serious doubts about some of the expressions used in the draft resolution that had just been adopted; they seemed to indicate that the situation in South Africa was comparable to a colonial situation.

34. Moreover, his Government doubted the appropriateness of proclaiming a special responsibility towards the people and organizations mentioned in paragraph 1. On the one hand, the United Nations had the responsibility of upholding human rights whenever and wherever they were being violated, and *apartheid* had been a major concern of the United Nations for many years. On the other hand, if the purport of the draft resolution was to equate the situation in South Africa with the situation in Namibia, it should be borne in mind that the special responsibility of the United Nations for Namibia was unique in character in view of the particular international status of that Territory.

35. For those reasons, his delegation had been unable to support the draft resolution.

36. Mr. CRAIG (Ireland) said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution in order to acknowledge, on the thirtieth anniversary of the United Nations, the special moral responsibility of the United Nations and the international community for all the people of South Africa. In practical terms, the United Nations had recognized that responsibility by creating the United

Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa.

37. His delegation would have preferred to see the draft resolution make a clear distinction between the special situation in South Africa and a classic colonial situation, and acknowledge the role to be played by many different kinds of organizations in the task of ending *apartheid*—a task which, in the view of his delegation, could be undertaken only in accordance with the principles laid down in the Charter.

38. Mr. SCARANTINO (Italy) said that his country was fully and firmly committed to the struggle against *apartheid* and shared the views of all countries that were concerned with ensuring respect for fundamental human rights. It was therefore with deep regret that his delegation had been obliged to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution. To begin with, it considered that the language used in the draft resolution was inappropriate in the context of the Committee's work. The draft resolution embodied some elements that would be more pertinent in the framework of decolonization. The reference to the "leadership" of the liberation movements in the third preambular paragraph and to "self-determination" in the fourth preambular paragraph were out of place in a discussion of *apartheid* which was in no way connected with the problems dealt with in the Fourth Committee.

39. Yet, his delegation would have been glad to support the draft resolution if its difficulties had been limited to its wording. Unfortunately, its very concept was unacceptable, because there could not be such a thing as a "special" responsibility of the United Nations towards anyone in the field of human rights. By its very nature, the United Nations was committed and responsible whenever and wherever fundamental human rights were threatened. Any other attitude would be discriminatory. The idea of a "special" responsibility introduced a very dangerous and misleading element because it called to mind different problems, like Namibia, and might imply a sort of "ordinary" and therefore diminished responsibility by the United Nations elsewhere and towards others.

40. Mr. DUCLOS (Canada) said that although his delegation had supported the draft resolution, it felt that the language of operative paragraph 1 was somewhat vague. The debates conducted in the United Nations over a period of 30 years and the establishment of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa had surely indicated that the Organization had a special interest in and responsibility for efforts to put an end to *apartheid*. Similarly, the language of paragraph 2 might have been clarified to ensure that terminology relating to decolonization was kept distinct from that relating to *apartheid*.

41. Mr. OHTAKA (Japan) said that his Government's consistent opposition to *apartheid* and racial discrimination in South Africa remained unchanged. His delegation had, however, abstained in the vote on the draft resolution because some of its wording was inappropriate and contained far-reaching implications which his delegation could not support.

42. Mr. PETHERBRIDGE (Australia) said that, although his delegation had voted for the draft resolution, it felt that some of its language, especially in paragraph 2, was much too broad.

43. Mr. BRIGHTY (United Kingdom) said that, like others, his delegation would have liked to join in a resolution condemning *apartheid* but had abstained on the draft resolution in question because it had had difficulty in accepting a number of points in the text. The United Kingdom did not endorse the principle of armed struggle and therefore could have voted for the draft resolution only if the references to "the courageous struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa" in the third preambular paragraph and to "their legitimate struggle for self-determination" in the fourth preambular paragraph had been interpreted to mean peaceful struggle by non-violent means. Nor could it accept any implication of support for armed struggle in operative paragraph 2. As far as the reference to self-determination was concerned, while his delegation fully endorsed the aspiration of the whole population of South Africa to take part in the political process, the United Kingdom recognized the Government of South Africa and its sovereign status. Finally, with regard to paragraph 1, his delegation did not understand the concept of special responsibility in what was a non-colonial situation, nor did it believe that the Charter of the United Nations conferred any special responsibility on the United Nations in respect of South Africa. The objective of the United Nations should be to promote and encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms wherever the need arose, anywhere in the world.

44. Mr. QUENTIN (France) said that although his delegation supported some of the objectives of the draft resolution and was sympathetic to the humanitarian concerns which the latter expressed, it had been obliged to abstain in the vote because of its very serious reservations about the text. It felt that the concept of a special responsibility of the United Nations towards the liberation movements of South Africa had no basis in the Charter and that the draft resolution was likely to commit the Organization to actions not in keeping with the purposes for which it had been established. France condemned the policy of *apartheid* and was sympathetic to the efforts of the South African people to end it, but it could not give its endorsement to methods which might not be peaceful. Moreover, it did not seem altogether justified to envisage a solution to the problem of *apartheid* on the basis of criteria which were better suited to decolonization. His delegation therefore regretted that, on the thirtieth anniversary of the United Nations, it had been unable to support the initiative taken by the sponsors of the draft resolution.

45. Miss JAUREGUIBERRY (Argentina) and Mr. PINTO-BAZURCO (Peru) said that they would have voted in favour of the draft resolution had they been present and would support it in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly.

46. The CHAIRMAN said he understood that Cyprus, Nepal and Qatar would also have voted for the draft resolution had they been present.

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

47. Mr. DORON (Israel) noted that his country had been accused by Arab delegations and certain others of having a special relationship with South Africa. He repeated his delegation's categorical rejection of such allegations. The stories of arms deals and military co-operation between South Africa and Israel were pure fiction.
48. The report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (A/10022) had itself provided figures showing that South Africa's volume of trade with Israel represented a minute fraction of its trade with other countries, and yet it was Israel which had been singled out for special treatment in the report of the Special Committee. The purpose, of course, was to divert attention from the trade being conducted with South Africa by the Arab countries themselves. For example, on 27 June 1974 the *Nairobi Daily Nation*, had quoted President Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania as saying that the oil-producing Arab States were spending millions of dollars buying gold from South Africa instead of using that money to develop their own countries or helping African liberation movements. He then quoted an article entitled "Arabs expand trade with South Africa" which appeared on 18 March 1975 in *The Observer* of London; it stated that, despite the decision taken by the League of Arab States in 1973 to impose an oil embargo on South Africa, there was evidence of growing trade relations between the Arab States and South Africa. The article went on to say that Saudi Arabia was negotiating gold purchases in South Africa and had recently sent a trade mission there to discuss the importation of food and prefabricated building materials. The same article spoke of forthcoming South African business ventures in Egypt and Jordan, and noted that a number of Persian Gulf States were trading openly with South Africa. It was clear, then, that the Arab States were primarily motivated by the shrewd promotion of their own business interests.
49. Furthermore, whatever perverse and ridiculous resolutions might be adopted in the United Nations, the whole world knew perfectly well that the Jewish people had for centuries been the victims rather than the perpetrators of racial persecution and discrimination. Racial discrimination in any form was abhorrent to Israel and contrary to its fundamental beliefs and policies despite all hypocritical Arab assertions to the contrary.
50. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania to address the Committee.
51. Mr. SIBEKO (Observer, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania) said that those countries which had abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/SPC/L.326 were still longing for the days before decolonization. They claimed that the oppressed millions of South Africa were not colonial subjects because the United Kingdom had given independence to the régime in South Africa. However, the latter was a minority régime and granting it independence had been an arbitrary act. The real issue was not terminology or semantics, but rather the fact that some Governments did not want the people of South Africa to enjoy the same international support that had been given to Namibia. The term "decolonization" was not irrelevant, because transfer from British colonialism to South African colonialism was not liberation.
52. It was particularly ironic that Italy, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany were prominent among the abstaining Powers. The Federal Republic of Germany, in particular, in view of its own history, ought to have done everything in its power to combat the régime of Hitler's ex-underling, Mr. Vorster. France should also be reminded that its own Maquis had been in effect a national liberation movement.
53. Mr. RUPIA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that the Israeli representative's quotation from President Nyerere was irrelevant and was designed to sow discord between the Arab and African States. It would have been better if the Israeli representative had been able to deny the existence of relations between his country and South Africa instead of offering quotations out of context. The support of the United Republic of Tanzania for the Arab countries in their just struggle against Israel was unequivocal.
54. Mr. HENDAWY (Egypt) said that, in voting for the draft resolution, 90 members of the Committee had recognized the special responsibility of the United Nations with regard to *apartheid*. Yet Israel, which had not even been present during the vote, had returned to the conference room armed with press clippings designed to show among other things, that Egypt was playing host to South African businessmen. The source of those allegations might perhaps have been his own imagination. There was no split between the African and Arab States despite Israeli efforts to sow discord. The Israeli representative had also mentioned the policies of the oil-producing States; but in fact their attitude had been praised in the Committee. The fact was that Israel had not broken off relations with South Africa or closed its consulates there. His delegation stood by the documents of the Special Political Committee.
55. Mr. HOUNGAVU (Dahomey) said that, speaking on behalf of the African Group, he wished to denounce Israel for trying to sow confusion in its ranks. The solidarity between the Arab and African States remained firm. He categorically rejected the allegations made by the Israeli representative; the African States knew how to defend themselves and their principles without any instructions from imperialist States like Israel. With regard to the specific issue under discussion, a colonial Power had given the South African minority régime its independence and a colonial situation was therefore involved. If that situation did not change, an armed struggle would be necessary.
56. Mr. JAMAL (Qatar) said that the Israeli representative only wanted to justify his country's racist attitude and its continued relations with South Africa. The attitude of the Arab countries was clear-cut despite Israeli efforts to distort it. Israel's efforts to divide the Arab and African countries would fail.
57. Mr. DORON (Israel), referring to the Egyptian statement that he had possibly invented the articles he had quoted, observed that he had indicated where and on what dates they had been published. Anyone could find them and see that nothing had been quoted out of context.