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Chairman: Mr. Yordan TCHOBANOV (Bulgaria).

AGENDA ITEM 23

Question of Oman (A/4521; A/SPC/62; A/SPC/L.78
and Add.1) (concluded)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that he intended to put the draft resolution (A/SPC/L.78 and Add.1) to the vote, and that at the request of the representative of the Ivory Coast a separate vote would be taken on the third paragraph of the preamble and on operative paragraphs 1 and 2. Before calling upon the Committee to vote, he gave the floor to representatives who wished to explain their vote.

2. Mrs. QUAN (Guatemala) said that the authors of the draft resolution A/SPC/L.78 and Add.1 had unfortunately not revised their text in the light of the observations made by many delegations during the discussion on the question of Oman. She wished, therefore, to explain why her delegation would have to abstain from voting. Her delegation, of course, supported the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on which the draft resolution was based, and in particular the right of peoples to self-determination and independence and the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and its abstention did not imply any change in its position with respect to the need for the elimination of colonial systems in all their forms. That position, however, did not prevent it from considering the draft resolution objectively. It felt that while the draft clearly reflected the objectives pursued by the Special Political Committee with regard to the question of Oman, it did not state the premises on which those objectives were founded. An uninformed reader would wonder what was the situation underlying the draft resolution, who was oppressing the people of Oman, what foreign forces were operating in its territory and who were the parties concerned whom the General Assembly was inviting to settle their differences peacefully. There was no precedent and no previous resolution to answer those various questions. None of the resolutions adopted by the Committee at the present session was so vague as the draft resolution now before it; but the resolutions of the General Assembly constituted important precedents, and if the United

Nations wished to preserve its moral and legal authority, it must adopt resolutions that were as precise, as well-balanced and as objective as possible.

3. Mr. TREMBLAY (Canada) said that the question of Oman was the result of a dispute between the independent State of Muscat and Oman and certain dissident elements in the latter territory; it was not in any way of a colonial nature. It was clearly apparent from the statements made by the delegations of the Arab countries that the issue was the right of a dissident group to secede. His delegation thought that it encouraged that tendency the United Nations would be setting a dangerous precedent; it would therefore vote against the draft resolution.

4. Mr. GALLEGOS (Ecuador) said that since his delegation had not made a statement during the general debate on the question of Oman, he would like to explain its point of view concerning the draft resolution before the Committee. Devoted as it was to the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination and independence, it would vote for the third paragraph of the preamble; but it would abstain in the vote on operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 because it had not been able on the basis of arguments advanced during the discussion to form a very clear idea of the problem. Some representatives had said that the Treaty of Sib of 1920 had been imposed by force. If that was the case, it should be considered void; Ecuador, in accordance with the principles of the inter-American juridical system and the Charter of the United Nations, condemned wars of conquest and did not recognize victory as a source of law. On the other hand, the argument—which incidentally had not been proved—that Oman, an integral part of the Sultanate of Muscat, desired to set itself up as a separate unit and become independent, was inadmissible, since a minority could not be conceded the right to self-determination.

5. With respect to operative paragraph 2, his delegation wished to state that although it condemned any military infiltration which threatened the sovereignty of a State, it noted that although the presence of foreign forces in the territory of Oman was asserted by some, it was denied by others. In the absence of any clear information, therefore, his delegation would have to abstain, since it did not want to take sides in that controversy.

6. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the third paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution (A/SPC/L.78 and Add.1).

The third paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 37 votes to 14, with 26 abstentions.

A vote was taken by roll-call on operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution.

Libya, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon.

Against: Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy.

Abstaining: Mexico, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, India, Iran, Ivory Coast, Japan, Liberia.

Operative paragraph 1 was adopted by 29 votes to 20, with 32 abstentions.

A vote was taken by roll-call on operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.

Peru, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal.

Against: South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama.

Abstaining: Peru, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Spain, Thailand, Venezuela, Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Dahomey, Ecuador, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Israel, Ivory Coast, Japan, Liberia, Mauritania, Mexico, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay.

Operative paragraph 2 was adopted by 36 votes to 20, with 31 abstentions.

A vote was taken by roll-call on the draft resolution as a whole.

Congo (Leopoldville), having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Ceylon, Chad.

Against: Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxem-

bourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada.

Abstaining: Dahomey, Ecuador, Federation of Malaya, Greece, Guatemala, Ivory Coast, Japan, Liberia, Mexico, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia.

The draft resolution (A/SPC/L.78 and Add.1) as a whole was adopted by 38 votes to 21, with 29 abstentions.

7. Mr. MASSOUD-ANSARI (Iran) said that his delegation had voted for operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution for reasons which he had already explained in his previous statement (300th meeting). It had abstained in the vote on operative paragraph 1 because it was not clear as to the juridical and political bonds between Muscat and Oman, or the extent of the latter's territory, and because it wished to avoid raising difficulties later. It had voted for the draft resolution as a whole because it shared the aspirations of the people of Oman.

8. Mr. ALVARADO (Venezuela) said that his delegation, like many others, did not have sufficient information to be able to form a judgement on the situation in Oman; its doubts mainly concerned the third preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 1. In order to decide its position, however, his delegation had carefully considered the two theses which had been put forward.

9. If the United Kingdom's argument that Oman was an integral part of an independent and sovereign State, the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, was accepted, the third preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 1 would be inapplicable, since it was not the business of the United Nations to dismember a sovereign State or to interfere in questions falling within its domestic jurisdiction. If the thesis of the Arab States that Oman had been an independent and sovereign State for 1,200 years was accepted, the reference to resolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples was out of place and the question arose why the United Nations should recognize the right to self-determination and independence of a State which had allegedly already existed as such for many centuries. Those were the reasons why his delegation had abstained.

10. Mr. MAURTUA (Peru) said that while his delegation supported the principle of self-determination as a rule of international law, it could not possibly pass judgement on each of the ideas contained in the draft resolution, since some of them had not been debated and others lacked precision. In view of the complexity of the text and in the light of the opinions expressed during the debate by the representative of Mexico (305th meeting)—opinions which his delegation fully shared—Peru had had to abstain on the draft resolution as a whole.

AGENDA ITEM 25

Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/4861; A/SPC/58 and Add.1)

At the Chairman's invitation, Mr. John H. Davis, Director of the United Nations Relief and Works

Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, took a place at the Committee table.

11. Mr. DAVIS (Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) introduced the Agency's report for the period 1 July 1960 to 30 June 1961 (A/4861). As the report had been distributed several weeks earlier he would not comment on it in detail, but would interpret the work of UNRWA in the light of certain significant facts and describe the needs of the Agency up to 30 June 1963.

12. The two most important facts about the Palestine refugee problem were, first, that so little progress had been made towards a solution in the thirteen years which had elapsed since the problem had arisen and, second, that throughout that period 300,000 young refugees—150,000 boys and 150,000 girls—had been allowed to grow to maturity without an opportunity to develop their aptitudes. So far as concerned the first point, the responsibility for seeking a solution rested with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine rather than with UNRWA. He would therefore not comment further on that point, the more so because the Conciliation Commission had approved, and intended soon to make public, a report prepared under the direction of Mr. Joseph E. Johnson. As to the second point, he said that during the past year UNRWA's operations had proceeded without interruption or serious difficulty. The relationship between the Agency and the host Governments had been good; internally, the Agency had improved its administration by strengthening its field offices, to which it had delegated certain responsibilities from Headquarters, and by assigning strong men to key field posts. The relief activities—food distribution, health and shelter services—had been maintained at the established level, and education had been improved and expanded. In judging the work of the Agency for the past year it must be borne in mind that the average expenditure for all relief services, not including education, was about \$28 per person for the year, or 8 cents a day. Education was the one item in the Agency's programme for which per caput expenditure had significantly increased: it had more than doubled in four years and for the current year would average about \$10 per caput, including the investment in new schools. Basically, the situation of the refugees had remained unchanged; 4,500 more refugees had been added to UNRWA's ration rolls, and some 30,000 more to its basic register. In brief, the lot of most refugees continued to be hard and they were insistently demanding the implementation of operative paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III).

13. He recalled that in the report^{1/} which he had submitted at the previous session, he had expatiated on the tragic plight awaiting young refugees when they reached maturity; the great majority of them had been denied the opportunity of learning the skills of their fathers—mostly farming—by working beside them, and relatively few—less than 2 per cent—had been able to acquire skills through specialized training. As a result, many refugees were today unemployed and unemployable, but that did not mean that it was impossible for exceptionally gifted young people to overcome that handicap through ingenuity, initiative and perseverance. Last year he had set

forth a five-point programme^{2/} designed to combat the deadening effect exercised by refugee life on youth, a programme which it was proposed that the Agency should carry out during its three-year mandate period, in other words, between 1 July 1960 and 30 June 1963. The main objectives of that programme were to maintain the relief services and certain aspects of basic education at the per caput level of 1960, to expand vocational training facilities so as to increase the number of graduates, to double the annual number of university scholarships, to improve the preparatory education programme and extend it by a year, and lastly to continue a modest loan or grant programme for helping qualified refugees to put their acquired skills to productive use in enterprises of their own choosing. As he had also pointed out, those recommendations were in conformity with the directives given by the General Assembly in its earlier resolutions, in particular in paragraph 6 of resolution 1456 (XIV).

14. As was clear from the report before the Committee (A/4861), the three-year programme was proceeding on schedule. In fact, the vocational training portion of the programme was somewhat ahead of schedule because the second phase of construction (the doubling of the size of the training centres) had been integrated with the first phase (construction of new buildings) for reasons of economy. He would summarize, country by country, the progress made towards implementing the Agency's programme. In Jordan, the Kalandia Vocational Training Centre had been doubled in size, so that it now accommodated 392 trainees. A new centre had been opened at Wadi Seir and was at present providing training for 404 students. A teacher-training centre for men, which was training 200 teachers during the current year, would be able to accommodate 400 students by September 1962. A combination teacher-training centre and vocational training centre for young women was now being erected at Ramallah and would be opened in September 1962; a year later, it would attain a capacity enrolment of 633. In Syria, the Agency had just completed the construction of a new vocational training centre for men, near Damascus. Plans had been made for the construction of a similar institution at Homs, which the Agency expected would be completed by the autumn of 1962. In Lebanon, a new centre for 400 men was nearing completion at Sibleine, south of Beirut; classes for instructors who would teach in the new centres now being built would begin in January 1962, and classes for students would start in the autumn of 1962. In Gaza Town, the vocational training centre which the Agency had been operating for several years was being expanded. In the Gaza Strip, the Agency was reassuming operating responsibility for the agricultural training centre at Beit Hanoun; that centre would accommodate about eighty trainees who, contrary to the practice of other centres, would not live in dormitories.

15. The Agency was proud of the quality of the vocational training which it was able to offer to the refugees. The courses were being developed by experts, twenty-one of whom had currently been made available by UNESCO; that number was expected to increase to at least thirty, as new centres were opened. The basic function of the experts was to help get the

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 14.

^{2/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session (Part I), Special Political Committee, 199th meeting, para. 13.

new centres started and to train carefully selected refugees as future instructors. Among the other phases of the three-year programme, one of the most vital was the improvement and expansion of basic education. The Agency tried to maintain the general educational level prevailing in the host countries, where enrolments were rapidly increasing and where additional years of schooling were being provided. In view of the many handicaps which inevitably confronted young refugees, care should be taken to avoid placing additional difficulties in their path by giving them a basic education inferior to that offered to non-refugees in the host country.

16. From the practical point of view, there were no insurmountable obstacles to the implementation of the Agency's programme. The most critical problem now facing the Agency was that of financing the programme for the future and in particular for the balance of the period of its current mandate, namely, up to 30 June 1963. In his previous annual report, he had set forth a projected three-year budget which would cover the entire extended period of the mandate, using as a base the total expenditure of the Agency for the fiscal year 1960. The cumulative expenditure for those three years, over and above the base expenditure for 1960, would amount to \$16.2 million. The Agency, in view of the increasing costs which it had to meet would probably find it very difficult to remain within that figure set for additional funds, but it was determined to do so. Half of the \$16.2 million was required to meet relief costs, and the inevitable increases in the cost of basic educational services; the other half was being used for the programme of assistance to young refugees. He had stated, the previous year, that he would attempt to raise at least \$4 million from extra-budgetary sources. Thanks to the generosity which countries had shown during the World Refugee Year, \$4.5 million had already been raised in that manner. Of that total, almost \$4 million was being used to finance the expansion of vocational training facilities, about \$400,000 was for the making of grants and loans, and the remainder would make possible the granting of additional university scholarships. Without those extra-budgetary funds, the Agency could not have launched its programme of assistance to young refugees, because contributions from Governments had, with a few exceptions, been the same in 1961 as in 1960.

17. Recapitulating the financial needs of the Agency, he said that regular contributions from Governments for 1960 (i.e., contributions other than those specifically intended for the three-year programme for refugee youth) had reached approximately the same total as the 1960 expenditure level, which had been of the order of \$34.5 million. On that basis, it had been calculated that the aggregate additional financial needs of the Agency for the three-year period of its mandate would be \$16.2 million. Judging by the contributions pledged, the Agency would receive \$34.2 million from Governments for 1961, whereas expenditure, including investments for vocational training and teacher-training facilities, were estimated at \$39.5 million. The Agency's funds for the current year would therefore be considerably below its needs; in order to meet that shortfall, the Agency had had to draw upon the \$4.5 million of extra-budgetary funds available to it and to reduce its working capital fund to a minimum. In doing so, it had necessarily taken a risk, but a risk which it believed was justified in view of the great needs that it had to meet.

18. If the \$4.5 million raised from extra-budgetary sources were subtracted from the \$16.2 million total, there remained an amount of \$11.7 million which he had intended to request from Governments. However, after careful review of the parliamentary problems which confronted Member Governments in connexion with any increase of their contributions to the Agency in the short run, he had decided, in order not to jeopardize the three-year programme, to seek as much additional support as possible from extra-budgetary sources, and to make an effort to obtain scholarships up to 30 June 1963 for young refugees in the vocational training centres which the Agency would operate. If he managed to acquire those funds—which was by no means certain—there would still remain a shortfall of about \$9.7 million, which would have to come from Governments if the total programme of the Agency was to be implemented.

19. While, from a humanitarian standpoint, the programme of assisting young refugees was perhaps the most vital, in that it helped to raise the hope and spirits of the refugee youth, if total funds were short it would be still more essential to provide for the refugees' physical needs in terms of food, shelter, health services and basic education. That was why, when considering the Agency's financial needs, it was essential to look at the programme as a whole. For his part, he did not see how the programme for assisting young refugees could be continued if the total budget was not provided; and curtailing or stopping the vocational training programme would be a tragic and retrograde step in regard to the young refugees.

20. The Agency would, moreover, be seriously handicapped if Governments in general were to follow a practice of earmarking additional funds for use in a specific aspect of the three-year programme, particularly since the \$2 million to be raised from extra-budgetary sources would in fact be earmarked for vocational training scholarships.

21. In conclusion, he wished to re-emphasize the fact that the Agency's three-year programme was not intended to be a solution for the Palestine refugee problem. Rather was it based on the humanitarian principle that young refugees should be given an opportunity to put their talents to useful purposes. To deny them that opportunity would handicap them for the whole of their adult lives; to give it to them, on the other hand, in no way prejudiced the ultimate solution to the refugee problem, for the young people would need specialized skills wherever they might ultimately live. Moreover, if they were not trained at the proper age, they would probably miss the opportunity permanently, since training facilities were likely to remain very limited in the area for a considerable time.

22. He was deeply convinced of the need to carry the Agency's three-year programme to completion in all its aspects. If that was to be done, the total budget must be met. He therefore urged the General Assembly to consider the entire three-year expanded programme as an integral "package", taking duly into account the fact that vocational training centres and the loan or grant programme would be in a very vulnerable position if the budget were not met in full. He appealed to Governments to increase their contributions.

23. With respect to the need for the Agency's services beyond 30 June 1963, he foresaw little likelihood of a rapid and total solution to the Palestine

refugee problem; it therefore appeared to him that the Agency's services would have to be continued, probably for a considerable time after that date. Furthermore, even if the problem were solved, many refugees would still need assistance in overcoming the corroding effects of having lived as refugees for so long, and particularly educational and financial assistance designed to help them adapt themselves to their new life. It was his considered judgement that a continuation, through some United Nations medium, of the services currently provided by the Agency was essential to the preservation of stability and peace in the Middle East and in the world, pending a full and satisfactory solution of the Palestine refugee problem. It was in that context that the problem of whether and for how long the Agency's mandate should be extended beyond 30 June 1965 should be approached.

24. The CHAIRMAN, before starting the general debate, drew the Committee's attention to documents A/SPC/58 and A/SPC/58/Add.1, which he read out.

25. He suggested that it might expedite consideration of the substance of the question if the Committee took a decision, at that stage, on the request submitted by the Arab delegations. He recalled that, in the course of several previous sessions, Mr. Izzat Tannous, a member of the group mentioned in document A/SPC/58, had been heard as a spokesman for the Arab refugees of Palestine, in his capacity as Director of the Palestine Arab Refugee Office in Beirut and in New York. During the previous year the Committee had also heard another spokesman, Mr. Emile Ghory, in compliance with a request similar to that now before it.

26. In the circumstances, unless any objections were raised by the Committee's members, he proposed at the appropriate stage, in accordance with past practice, to invite the spokesman appointed by the group in question to take a place at the Committee

table, in order to be heard on the question of the Arab refugees.

It was so decided.

27. Mr. COMAY (Israel) wished to make a reservation concerning the decision just taken. It was true, as the Chairman had said, that refugee spokesmen had previously been heard by the Committee, and the Israel delegation had then raised no objection. Nor was it raising any objection in the present case. However, experience had shown that in each case the spokesman concerned had not directed his comments to the Agency's report but had exploited the privilege of a hearing in order to make a political propaganda speech. His delegation hoped that the spokesman who was about to be heard would limit himself to the item on the agenda.

28. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia) said that the question under discussion was so vast that no restrictions should be imposed beforehand. The problem in fact concerned 1,200,000 refugees who had been living in exile for thirteen years. It would be inhuman to limit the freedom of expression of the spokesman for those refugees, on so tragic a subject.

29. Furthermore, the Director of the Agency himself had, in his report (A/4861), linked the question of the refugees with the question of Palestine as a whole. In that report, and in the statement he had just made, the Director had referred to the wishes of the refugees who insisted on their right to repatriation in accordance with operative paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III). Thus the whole case of the refugees was before the Committee.

30. For his part, he believed that the matter of the statements by representatives of the refugees should be left to the Chairman, who would no doubt be liberal in the interpretation of his powers.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.