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Chairman: Mr. Yordan TCHOBANOV (Bulgaria).

AGENDA ITEM 76

The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of "apartheid" of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/4804 and Add.1-5; A/SPC/L.71 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6, L.72/ Rev.1 and Add.1, L.73, L.74, L.75) (continued)

1. Mr. GARCIA PIÑEIRO (Argentina) said that his delegation had a number of practical and political objections to operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of the joint draft resolution (A/SPC/L.71 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6). The real purpose of operative paragraph 5 was undoubtedly to show that the General Assembly was in favour of the expulsion of the Republic of South Africa from the United Nations for continuing its policies of "apartheid". Argentina shared the view of a number of other delegations that the expulsion of South Africa would merely restrict the opportunities of the United Nations for effective action, and prevent it from exerting its influence over South Africa. The Argentine delegation would therefore be unable to vote in favour of operative paragraph 5. It would also be unable to vote in favour of operative paragraph 6 for it felt that the non-white population of South Africa would be the first to suffer from economic sanctions. Furthermore, if all States broke off their diplomatic relations with the Republic of South Africa, they would be unable to take individual action to persuade that country to change its policies. It felt that if the Assembly were to adopt operative paragraph 6, only negative results would be achieved, for opinion in South Africa would unite against the threat from outside. It recognized, however, that there were serious grounds for the general feeling that the Assembly could not go on indefinitely without taking stronger action. Argentina would therefore abstain from voting on operative paragraph 6 and on the resolution as a whole.

2. It would vote in favour of the eight-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.72/Rev.1 and Add.1). The USSR amendment (A/SPC/L.74) seemed at first sight to be an unnecessary repetition of operative paragraph 4 of the eight-Power draft resolution. On closer analysis, it appeared to be seeking to introduce the idea of an arms embargo which was not applicable in the

case in point. It also referred to the "indigenous population of South Africa" which would be very difficult to define. In short, the amendment offered nothing constructive and the Argentine delegation would vote against it. It had no objection to the first part of the sentence forming the Ethiopian draft amendment (A/SPC/L.73), up to the reference to "Article 11, paragraph 3, of the Charter". Drawing the Security Council's attention to the South African problem was probably the most important step the General Assembly could take and was within its terms of reference. The second part of the amendment did not seem to concord with the first, and the Argentine delegation would therefore ask for a separate vote on the two parts of the Ethiopian amendment. It would vote in favour of the first and against the second.

3. Mr. KIKHIA (Libya) said that all delegations condemned "apartheid" in South Africa, but opinions differed concerning the practical action to be taken. Unanimous support of any measures taken would be the best proof of Members' sincerity. The Libyan delegation had co-sponsored the joint draft resolution as the most logical, reasonable and appropriate course for the General Assembly in order to fulfil its obligation to the peoples of Africa and to the world.

4. The chief objections made to the joint draft resolution were directed against operative paragraphs 5 and 6. Yet, if the question were referred to the Security Council, as operative paragraph 5 provided, the great Powers would be forced to take a definite stand and consider the best means of combating "apartheid". The Charter contained provisions for the expulsion of Members that failed to live up to their obligations, and those provisions undoubtedly applied to South Africa which had disregarded repeated appeals by the General Assembly and had made it clear that it had no intention of respecting its obligations under the Charter. Operative paragraph 6 merely asked States to consider imposing certain sanctions against South Africa and did not call for immediate measures.

5. The eight-Power draft resolution, in contrast, was merely a repetition of General Assembly resolution 1598 (XV) and other previous resolutions on "apartheid" by the General Assembly, all of which had proved ineffective in the face of South Africa's obstinacy. Only operative paragraph 4 of the eight-Power draft contained any practical recommendations, and even that was very vaguely worded and was by no means as forthright as the situation demanded. The Libyan delegation would be unable to vote for the eight-Power draft resolution as it stood. It would, however, vote in favour of the amendments to the eight-Power draft resolution proposed by Ethiopia (A/SPC/L.73) and the USSR (A/SPC/L.74) which would bring the eight-Power draft resolution more into line with the joint draft resolution. The Soviet amendment was particularly important because it would deny to

the South African Government weapons to be used against the non-white population.

6. Mr. HASAN (Pakistan) introduced his delegation's amendment (A/SPC/L.75) to the eight-Power draft resolution, calling upon Member States to refrain from exporting petroleum to South Africa. As it stood, the eight-Power draft resolution followed the pattern of General Assembly resolution 1598 (XV). The situation had deteriorated still further, however, since the adoption of that resolution, which had, moreover, made no impression on South Africa. Some fresh provision must therefore be introduced in order to stiffen it. The Pakistan delegation had referred during the general debate (274th meeting) to the resolution adopted at the Second Conference of Independent African States held at Addis Ababa in 1960, calling for oil sanctions against South Africa. It had also said that whatever sanctions were imposed should be such as to have a swift and decisive effect and not to cause widespread injury to the population at large. The Pakistan amendment had been prompted by those considerations.

7. The Ethiopian amendment (A/SPC/L.73) merely referred the question of action against South Africa to the Security Council and the Pakistan delegation would be able to support it. The USSR amendment (A/SPC/L.74) called for the denial of material support to South Africa which might be used to intensify violence and cause further bloodshed. It was vaguely worded and not likely to have any decisive effect on the South African Government's attitude.

8. Mr. DUNCAN (Panama) said that his delegation had always supported the General Assembly's resolutions condemning South Africa's racial policy as unjustifiable and harmful, although it deeply regretted having to take such an attitude towards one of the founders of the Organization and a country which had fought bravely in the allied cause in two world conflicts. It had listened with attention to the Foreign Minister of the Republic of South Africa and although it was unable to agree with much that he had said, it felt that his right to defend his Government's policy must be recognized. To the Panamanian delegation, that policy seemed to be based not on hatred but on fear. It would therefore be unable to vote in favour of the sanctions proposed in operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the joint draft resolution, and if those paragraphs were adopted, it would vote against the draft resolution as a whole. It would vote in favour of the eight-Power draft resolution but not in favour of the amendments to it. Without them, the eight-Power draft resolution would constitute a new appeal to South Africa to bring its policy into line with the Charter.

9. Mr. COLLET (Guinea) said that at its fifteenth session the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1598 (XV) by a large majority and had eliminated a twenty-six-Power draft resolution calling for sanctions.^{1/} The eight-Power draft resolution was merely a repetition of resolution 1598 (XV). The only new element was the reference to the resolution^{2/} of the Security Council of 1 April 1960 and there were three small changes of wording which slightly heightened its urgency. The final statement of the South

African Foreign Minister at the 284th meeting had made it quite clear that the South African Government had no intention of abandoning its policy of racial discrimination. Therefore, unless the amendments proposing specific sanctions were included in the eight-Power draft resolution, the Guinean delegation would vote against it. If those amendments were accepted and incorporated, it would abstain on the eight-Power draft resolution as a whole.

10. The Special Political Committee must give the problem the most serious consideration, for the patience of the non-whites in South Africa and in the rest of Africa, was exhausted. In view of South Africa's disregard of the Assembly's earlier appeals, definitive action must be taken in order to bring about a change of attitude and the immediate introduction of reforms. He therefore urged all delegations, on behalf of justice and international peace, to give their support to the joint draft resolution.

11. Mr. DOBROWOLSKI (Poland) said that it was quite clear that a change in South Africa's policy could only be brought about by external pressure. The joint draft resolution was the best guarantee of an eventual end to the policy of "apartheid" and the Polish delegation would vote in favour of it. Many speakers in the general debate had called for a unanimous draft resolution condemning the attitude of South Africa, and the Polish delegation would therefore also vote in favour of the eight-Power draft resolution as strengthened by the Soviet amendment (A/SPC/L.74). The minimum sanctions recommended in that amendment should encourage those States which were at present unwilling to take any steps and preferred to confine themselves to declarations of principle. The Republic of South Africa was not threatened from outside and the arms which it was importing were obviously intended for use against its own non-white population. It was to be hoped that the United States would exert sufficient influence on its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, and particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, to end the shipments of arms to South Africa. The Polish delegation would also vote in favour of the Ethiopian and Pakistan amendments (A/SPC/L.73 and A/SPC/L.75).

12. Mr. GONÇALVES PEREIRA (Portugal) said that the Portuguese record in regard to racial discrimination spoke for itself. He rejected any accusation of racial bias on the part of Portugal as groundless and out of order. The fact that Portugal was in favour of racial integration, however, did not mean that it considered the United Nations to be constitutionally competent to deal with instances of racial discrimination occurring inside the territory of Member States. On constitutional grounds, therefore, Portugal would be unable to support either of the draft resolutions. It was particularly opposed to the imposition of sanctions, on general grounds and because they came within the exclusive purview of the Security Council.

13. Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India) said that the aims of the two draft resolutions were basically different. The eight-Power draft resolution covered only one aspect of the case, while the joint draft resolution sought to cover both aspects by mobilizing public opinion against the racial policies of South Africa and also by advocating positive action to coerce, or prevail upon, the Republic of South Africa to change its policies. Operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of the joint draft resolution came under Articles 6 and 41 of the

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 72, document A/4728 and Corr.1, para. 9, draft resolution I.

^{2/} Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1960, document S/4300.

Charter, and therefore were within the purview of the Security Council. He was doubtful whether the powers of the Security Council could, or should, be usurped by the General Assembly. The Indian delegation had every sympathy with the purposes of the joint draft resolution. In view of South Africa's persistent disregard of the General Assembly's opinion, it was understandable that faith in comparatively mild resolutions should be dwindling. India would welcome action by all States to give effect to the recommendations in operative paragraph 6 of the joint draft. It had itself taken similar steps many years before. It had once enjoyed substantial trade relations with South Africa, but it had made the sacrifice of breaking off those relations, and the trade in many of the commodities had now gone to other countries.

14. India did not feel, however, that it was proper for the General Assembly to call upon States to take action which should or could be taken in exercise of their own sovereign rights. The Assembly could only appeal to individual States and urge them to take such action in the exercise of their constitutional rights and in consideration of their treaty and other obligations. In that way full freedom would be left to each sovereign State to decide what action it should take in pursuance of the aims of the Assembly's resolution. The Indian delegation had no objection to the joint draft resolution, and would not be embarrassed by its adoption. It had co-sponsored the eight-Power draft resolution because it felt that there should also be a draft resolution which could be unanimously adopted. It was anxious that there should not be a decrease in the number of affirmative votes, for any such result might be misinterpreted as a softening of the United Nations attitude. The General Assembly was entitled to urge States to consider what action they might take collectively or individually at their discretion, without infringing their sovereign rights. Thus, States could take action under the eight-Power draft resolution of the kind proposed in the joint draft resolution, if they so desired. It had been said that if the General Assembly again adopted a draft resolution of the usual type it would mean that its consideration of the item had become a valueless routine. The weight of world opinion, however, should not be underestimated and the eight-Power draft resolution gave ample opportunity for action by individual States.

15. Despite its difficulty over certain of the operative paragraphs, the Indian delegation would vote in favour of the joint draft resolution as a whole because it agreed with its spirit. The joint draft resolution seemed to cover the substance of the amendments that had been proposed to the eight-Power draft resolution. It would be simpler for delegations to vote in favour of the joint draft resolution and to leave the eight-Power draft resolution unamended. The Indian delegation had no objection to the Ethiopian amendment (A/SPC/L.73), but it considered that the USSR amendment (A/SPC/L.74) and the Pakistan amendment (A/SPC/L.75) raised matters which properly came under the Security Council. Moreover, the proposed boycotts of military materials and petroleum were covered by the more comprehensive joint draft resolution. They were not appropriate in the eight-Power draft resolution which was essentially condemnatory, and merely recommended individual States to consider taking steps which would not require special action by the General Assembly or the Security Council. The two draft resolutions were

complementary. Since some States had difficulties in regard to sanctions, there should be two separate resolutions. Both draft resolutions seemed likely to be adopted, and there would be no point in having two almost identical resolutions, as would be the case if the amendments to the eight-Power draft resolution were adopted.

16. Mr. CHATTI (Tunisia) said that the statements made by the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs provided the most compelling argument to vote in favour of the joint draft resolution, for they proved that in dealing with South Africa appeals to reason and moral pressure were unavailing. The text had not been drawn up in a spirit of hatred or revenge, for Africans were not vindictive as shown by the treatment accorded to white people in the newly independent African States and by the desire expressed by the Algerian and Angolan nationalists to live in harmony with Europeans. The approach taken by the United Nations in the past, far from ameliorating the lot of the non-white inhabitants of South Africa, had only led the Government to intensify its repressive measures against them. It had been said that only internal pressure could persuade the Government to abandon the policy of "apartheid": the measures provided for in the draft resolution would have the effect of strengthening such internal pressure, for it would show the opponents of "apartheid" in South Africa, white and non-white alike, that the world community was determined to give them effective support. The United Nations should speak to the rulers of South Africa in the language they understood, which was obviously not that of humanitarianism and reason.

17. If the three proposed amendments to the eight-Power draft resolution were adopted he would vote in favour of that text as a whole. Otherwise, he would abstain, for the text in its present form appeared to treat the issue of "apartheid" as an academic one.

18. Mr. CROWE (United Kingdom) said that although he had two reservations with regard to the eight-Power draft resolution he would, in order to be able to vote for it, prefer not to see it amended. He agreed with the representative of India that it was important that the draft resolution should receive no less support than the corresponding resolution (1598 (XV)) adopted at the previous session. He had already explained in his speech during the general debate (274th meeting) his Government's views regarding the question of the expulsion of South Africa and the application of sanctions. The second part of the sentence in the Ethiopian amendment went far beyond the provisions of Article 11, paragraph 3, of the Charter; indeed, its use of the words "persistent violations of the Charter" related it to Article 6 and it could thus be seen that it would have the effect of introducing the question of expulsion indirectly into the eight-Power draft resolution. He would therefore vote against the second part of the amendment and would abstain on the first part. The USSR amendment had obviously been introduced with ulterior motives, possibly to prevent a unanimous vote on the eight-Power draft resolution. He would vote against it for the reasons he had already stated. While he recognized that the purpose underlying the Pakistan draft amendment was to bring effective pressure to bear on the Government of South Africa, it called for the imposition of sanctions and he would have to vote against it.

19. Mr. AMONOO (Ghana) said that the time for patience, tolerance and moral platitudes in dealing with "apartheid" was over. Action was required if Africa was to be rid of the scourge of racism in its most virulent form. Africa's real friends would vote with the Africans in favour of the joint resolution, while those whose action in the matter was guided by other interests would vote against it. His delegation would support all three amendments to the eight-Power draft resolution, which was otherwise too weak and did not adequately reflect Ghana's abhorrence of "apartheid".

20. Mr. ABRAHAMSON (Denmark) said that as one of the sponsors of the eight-Power draft resolution he associated himself with the views expressed by the Indian representative and hoped that the text would be unanimously approved as it stood. His opposition to the Ethiopian amendment was based on the same considerations as his opposition to operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the joint draft resolution. It was one thing for the General Assembly to express its concern over the continuation of the policy of "apartheid" and quite another for it to put the matter formally before the Security Council, placing the latter under the obligation to consider what coercive measures should be taken. He did not feel that the matter should be formally placed before the Security Council at the present time, and would therefore vote against the latter part of the Ethiopian amendment.

21. Mr. HOOD (Australia) expressed concern lest the impact which unanimous adoption of the eight-Power draft resolution in its original form might have should be lessened by the reservations that some delegations had with regard to the proposed amendments. All three amendments might, in terms of logic and procedure, have been submitted to the joint draft resolution or as new proposals. He would regard any recommendation for coercive action by the General Assembly as trespassing on the terrain of another organ of the United Nations and would vote accordingly in respect of the second part of the Ethiopian amendment. He would also vote against the Soviet and Pakistan amendments. Those negative votes would not necessarily affect his vote on the eight-Power draft resolution as a whole, which would be determined by the general attitude and convictions of his Government concerning the manner in which the United Nations should take note of what was happening in South Africa.

22. Mr. FEDOSEEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), explained that his delegation had proposed the amendment in document A/SPC/L.74, because everyone knew that South Africa's racist laws were applied by force of arms. The General Assembly had recognized in its resolution 1598 (XV) that the South African Government was aggravating racial issues by more discriminatory laws and measures and their enforcement, accompanied by violence and bloodshed. Both the draft resolutions which the Committee now had before it deplored the fact that the enforcement of those laws led to violence and bloodshed. It was also common knowledge that the South African Government obtained from abroad the weapons with which it enforced those laws. It was perfectly obvious that if it ceased to receive such assistance its capacity to carry out acts of violence against the indigenous population would be considerably lessened. Another important point was that if the South African Government, which had seized South West Africa by force and was sending South African mercenaries

into the territory of the neighbouring African States, notably the Congo, ceased to receive arms from abroad it would constitute less of a threat to the independence of other African States and to international peace and security. If the United Nations wanted to put an end to the violence and bloodshed in South Africa it should take steps to stop the flow of weapons and war material to that country. In submitting an amendment to the eight-Power draft resolution his delegation had taken into consideration the fact that a number of the co-sponsors themselves recognized the need to refuse any kind of help to the colonialists which could be used to maintain their rule over dependent peoples. Four of them had also joined in sponsoring a draft resolution (A/C.4/L.704) in the Fourth Committee which requested Member States to deny to Portugal any support and assistance which might be used by it for the suppression of the peoples of its Non-Self-Governing Territories. His delegation felt that the addition of a similar provision to draft resolution A/SPC/L.72/Rev.1 and Add.1 would greatly strengthen the text.

23. He would vote in favour of the Ethiopian and Pakistan amendments.

24. Mr. PERERA (Ceylon) said that although his delegation had joined in sponsoring the eight-Power draft resolution rather than the text favoured by most of the African delegations, it welcomed as a happy augury for the future the unity that the African States were displaying with regard to the issue of "apartheid" despite the balkanization that might have taken place in some parts of the continent.

25. His delegation would abstain on operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the joint draft resolution because it felt that a reference to the Security Council took away from the General Assembly certain rights it possessed. The Ethiopian amendment, on the other hand, was in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Charter. He would have preferred the amendment to have been drafted in such a way as to indicate the actual purpose of the reference to the Security Council but he would not press that point, for his delegation agreed with Ethiopia (285th meeting) that the situation in South Africa could lead to a threat to international peace and security and should therefore be drawn to the attention of the Security Council under the provisions of Article 11, paragraph 3 of the Charter. As far as the Pakistan amendment was concerned, he failed to see where it could be appropriately introduced into the eight-Power draft resolution. If the matter was to be referred to the Security Council, the General Assembly could not prejudice what steps the Council would take, as it would be doing if it called upon Member States to refrain from exporting petroleum to South Africa. He would therefore abstain on that amendment, even though he appreciated the spirit in which it had been moved. For the same reason he would abstain on the Soviet amendment.

26. Mr. BOHEMAN (Sweden) said that his delegation, which had been second to none in condemning "apartheid" as a policy contrary to fundamental human rights and politically disastrous, would vote in favour of the eight-Power draft resolution. It would vote against paragraphs 5 and 6 of the joint draft resolution because it did not believe that the proposed sanctions had any secure foundations in the Charter. It would have definite objections to the inclusion of the Soviet amendment in the draft resolu-

tion of which it was a sponsor. He could, however, assure the Committee that Sweden, of its own accord and in the exercise of its sovereign rights, had prohibited the export to South Africa of any war material, in the widest sense of the term, as soon as the racial issue there had become acute. It would accept the first part of the Ethiopian amendment but would vote against the second part, as also against the Pakistan amendment, for the reason it had just stated.

27. Mr. ESHEL (Israel) said that the substance of the Pakistan amendment was covered by the wording of operative paragraph 6 of the joint draft resolution, for which his delegation would vote as he had stated (282nd meeting). For the same reason it could not support the draft amendment submitted by the USSR. His delegation wished to repeat the statement it had made in the Fourth Committee (1197th meeting) to the effect that it was the declared policy of the Government of Israel to refrain from selling any arms which might directly or indirectly be used for the purposes of colonial oppression. It would abstain on the Ethiopian amendment, which appeared to raise new and controversial issues going beyond the scope of either draft resolution.

28. Mr. GABRE SELASSIE (Ethiopia) said that although it was true, as the representative of Ceylon had stated, that the Assembly could not prejudge what measures might be considered appropriate by the Security Council, sanctions were provided for in the Charter and his delegation was of the opinion that such sanctions were to be used whenever the two organs concluded that they would be useful in achieving the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations with respect to persistently recalcitrant Members.

29. Mr. MILLET (France) agreed with the representative of India that the three amendments would have the effect of blurring the distinction between the two draft resolutions. The first part of the Ethiopian amendment would introduce into the eight-Power draft resolution the idea of a threat to international peace and security, and the second would introduce the idea of possible sanctions, on both of which matters his delegation had always expressed its views. As for the Soviet amendment, it had obviously been submitted for reasons which had very little to do with "apartheid" and its effect would be to decrease support for the eight-Power draft resolution. The Pakistan amendment was likewise unacceptable to his delegation because it too was concerned with sanctions. He hoped, however, that the way in which the Committee voted on the amendments would not make it impossible for his delegation to carry out its original intention, despite certain reservations, of voting in favour of the eight-Power draft resolution.

30. Mr. HASAN (Pakistan) stated in reply to the representative of India that it was precisely because his own delegation considered the eight-Power draft resolution an extremely weak one, that it had felt the need to submit an amendment. He agreed with the statement made by the representative of Mali at the 285th meeting that in the situation the adoption of the eight-Power draft resolution would be a retrogressive step.

31. With regard to the jurisdictional objection raised by some delegations he found it difficult to see why a specific call for an embargo on deliveries of petroleum or arms to South Africa was unconstitutional,

whereas a call for States to take separate and collective action was considered not to be in conflict with the limit placed upon the competence of the General Assembly.

32. Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India) said that paragraph 4 of the eight-Power draft resolution did not call for action by the General Assembly but rather urged all States to consider what each of them, in the exercise of its sovereign rights, could do.

33. Mrs. LIONAES (Norway) said that as a co-sponsor of the eight-Power draft resolution she would vote against the Soviet amendment because it would introduce into that text the idea of sanctions, which was one of the main provisions of the joint draft resolution. She would vote against the Ethiopian amendment as a whole but would be able to vote in favour of the first part if it was put to a separate vote. She was also opposed to the Pakistan amendment. Even if all the amendments were adopted, however, her delegation would vote in favour of the eight-Power draft resolution as a whole.

34. Mr. SINHA (Nepal) said that, as he had explained during the general debate (280th meeting), his delegation would support the eight-Power draft resolution, but could not support those provisions of the joint draft resolution which sought the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations, and the imposition of sanctions against that country. Expulsion of a State would harm the principle of universality, and would deny that State the right to a hearing in the world Organization. As for the proposal for sanctions, operative paragraph 4 of the eight-Power draft resolution urged States to take such action as was open to them in conformity with the Charter, and that seemed to his delegation to be sufficient. It had also been pointed out that operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 encroached upon the competence of the Security Council. Accordingly, his delegation would abstain on those paragraphs, as well as on the amendments submitted by the Soviet Union and Pakistan to the eight-Power draft resolution. It would support the Ethiopian amendment which was in keeping with the spirit of the draft resolution.

35. Mr. MASSOUD-ANSARI (Iran) said that his delegation could not vote in favour of the Pakistan amendment. Iran would have been able to abstain if the provision had related to exports in general, as was the case with operative paragraph 6 (d) of the joint draft resolution, but the Pakistan amendment would lay an unfair burden on oil-producing countries in particular.

36. Mr. GABRE SELASSIE (Ethiopia) said that it was not clear to him why some delegations had said that they could support the first part of his amendment but not the second part. If delegations considered that the General Assembly was not competent to refer such matters to the Security Council, or that the problem of "apartheid", in particular, did not call for such action, the whole amendment would be unacceptable to them. If, however, they accepted the principle of reference of the matter to the Security Council, he did not see why they should find difficulty with the rest of the amendment. It surely could not be denied that the system of "apartheid" was a violation of the Charter. The amendment did not instruct the Security Council to take certain specific measures. The representative of the United Kingdom had said that the wording of the amendment was such as to reintroduce the notion of expulsion under Article 6,

but the Security Council was in no way bound to decide that Article 6 was applicable.

37. Mr. SULEIMAN (Sudan) said that his delegation felt that the question of "apartheid" had been dealt with somewhat passively by the United Nations in the past; it had therefore co-sponsored the joint draft resolution which would constitute an effective step towards bringing South Africa to reconsider its policies. The eight-Power draft resolution fell short of what was called for at the present session, but it would be improved by the Ethiopian amendment, which would bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council, though without suggesting specific measures. He would therefore vote for that amendment and for the Soviet Union amendment; indeed, a vote against the latter would surely be tantamount to a vote in favour of the maintenance of the "apartheid" system by force of arms. He hoped that Member States would consider the principles of the amendment, irrespective of which State had sponsored it. His delegation would also vote for the Pakistan amendment; the Sudan was already committed by resolutions adopted at the Second Conference of Independent African States held at Addis Ababa to the position that the export of oil to South Africa should be stopped.

38. The CHAIRMAN proposed that the Committee should proceed to vote on the joint draft resolution (A/SPC/L.71 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6).

39. Mr. DA COSTA (Brazil) asked that a separate vote should be taken on each operative paragraph and on the last part of operative paragraph 3, namely the words "and incompatible with membership of the United Nations".

40. Mr. GONÇALVES PEREIRA (Portugal) requested a separate vote on the first part of operative paragraph 2, ending with the word "individuals".

41. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first part of operative paragraph 2 of the joint draft resolution.

At the request of the representative of Portugal, a vote was taken by roll-call.

Thailand, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, France, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria.

Against: South Africa.

Abstaining: None.

The first part of operative paragraph 2 was adopted by 100 votes to 1.

The second part of operative paragraph 3 reading "and incompatible with membership of the United Nations" was adopted by 80 votes to 2, with 16 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 1 was adopted by 99 votes to 1, with 1 abstention.

Operative paragraph 2, as a whole, was adopted by 86 votes to 2, with 11 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 3, as a whole, was adopted by 84 votes to 2, with 15 abstentions.

42. Mr. REYES (Colombia) asked for a separate vote on the first part of operative paragraph 4, ending with the words "international friction".

The first part of operative paragraph 4 was adopted by 99 votes to 2, with no abstentions.

Operative paragraph 4, as a whole, was adopted by 87 votes to 2, with 12 abstentions.

At the request of the representative of South Africa, a vote was taken by roll-call on operative paragraph 5.

Lebanon, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan.

Against: Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan.

Abstaining: Lebanon, Mexico, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Thailand, Togo, Uruguay, Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cyprus, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, India, Iran, Israel, Laos.

Operative paragraph 5 was adopted by 47 votes to 32, with 22 abstentions.

At the request of the representative of South Africa, a vote was taken by roll-call on operative paragraph 6.

Morocco, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemen,

Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia.

Against: Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg.

Abstaining: Nepal, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Togo, Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, China, Cyprus, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, Guatemala, India, Iran, Laos, Lebanon, Mexico.

Operative paragraph 6 was adopted by 48 votes to 30, with 23 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 7 was adopted by 55 votes to 22, with 22 abstentions.

43. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the joint draft resolution as a whole (A/SPC/L.71 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Spain, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia.

Against: Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Portugal, South Africa.

Abstaining: Thailand, Togo, Uruguay, Venezuela, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Iran, Italy, Laos, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines.

The draft resolution, as a whole, was adopted by 55 votes to 26, with 20 abstentions.

44. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Ethiopian amendment (A/SPC/L.73) to the eight-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.72/Rev.1 and Add.1).

At the request of the representative of Argentina, a separate vote was taken on the first part of the amendment, ending with the words "Article 11, paragraph 3, of the Charter".

The first part of the Ethiopian amendment was adopted by 70 votes to 3, with 26 abstentions.

At the request of the South African representative, a vote was taken by roll-call on the second part of the Ethiopian amendment (A/SPC/L.73).

New Zealand, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal.

Against: New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands.

Abstaining: Peru, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Federation of Malaya, Guatemala, Iran, Israel, Laos, Lebanon.

The second part of the Ethiopian amendment was adopted by 54 votes to 33, with 14 abstentions.

The Ethiopian amendment, as a whole, was adopted by 55 votes to 21, with 24 abstentions.

45. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the USSR amendment (A/SPC/L.74) to the eight-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.72/Rev.1 and Add.1).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Ireland, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Ivory Coast, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq.

Against: Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland.

Abstaining: Israel, Italy, Japan, Laos, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Uruguay, Burma, Cey-

lon, Cyprus, Ecuador, Federation of Malaya, Finland, India, Iran.

The USSR amendment was adopted by 50 votes to 29, with 22 abstentions.

46. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Pakistan amendment (A/SPC/L.75) to the eight-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.72/Rev.1 and Add.1).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Austria, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania.

Against: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Australia.

Abstaining: Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chad, China, Cyprus, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, Guatemala, India, Israel, Laos, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mexico, Nepal, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Togo, Uruguay, Argentina.

The Pakistan amendment was adopted by 44 votes to 31, with 26 abstentions.

47. Mr. MILLET (France) requested separate votes on operative paragraphs 4 and 6 of the eight-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.72/Rev.1 and Add.1).

Operative paragraph 4 was adopted by 82 votes to 2, with 13 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 6 was adopted by 84 votes to 2, with 11 abstentions.

48. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the eight-Power draft resolution (A/SPC/L.72/Rev.1 and Add.1) as a whole as amended.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic,

Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia.

Against: Portugal, South Africa.

Abstaining: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Guatemala, Guinea, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Spain, Turkey.

The eight-Power draft resolution, as a whole, as amended, was adopted by 72 votes to 2, with 27 abstentions.

49. Mr. ISSAKA (Togo) explained his vote and noted that all delegations had expressed their Governments' indignation at the policies of "apartheid", and at the South African Government's obstinate refusal to cooperate with the United Nations. His delegation would have liked to have suggested that the Security Council should take steps, under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, to enforce respect for decisions of the United Nations, since the situation in South Africa threatened peace and security. It was clear, however, that any sanctions decided upon by the United Nations would not be applied, particularly by countries which had economic relations with South Africa; and, in any case, the effect of such sanctions might be to increase the oppression of those whom the United Nations wished to defend, since the United Nations had no way of protecting the non-white peoples of South Africa against their oppressors.

50. For that reason his delegation had supported the eight-Power draft resolution, which was practical and realistic. His delegation had been unable to support operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of the joint draft resolution. It had abstained in the vote on the Pakistan amendment, but had supported the Ethiopian amendment, which related to a provision of the Charter. His delegation had also supported the USSR amendment, which it interpreted not as a sanction but as a preventive measure intended to protect the indigenous population of South Africa against violence.

The meeting rose at 7.15 p.m.