



**General Assembly**

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/46/452  
24 September 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Forty-sixth session  
Agenda item 84 (b)

**SPECIAL ECONOMIC AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE:  
SPECIAL PROGRAMMES OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE**

**Emergency assistance to the Sudan and Operation  
Lifeline Sudan**

**Report of the Secretary-General**

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. In its resolution 45/226 of 21 December 1990, entitled "Operation Lifeline Sudan", the General Assembly called upon Member States to continue to contribute generously to the relief and rehabilitation requirements of displaced persons and to respond generously to the appeals for immediate food and non-food emergency relief and rehabilitation support made by the Government of the Sudan, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP).

2. The General Assembly further requested the Secretary-General to monitor and assess the evolution of the emergency situation, and to report to the forty-sixth session of the Assembly on all matters connected with the implementation of emergency and relief operations in the Sudan. The present report has been prepared in response to that request.

## II. CURRENT SITUATION IN THE SUDAN

3. Since the last report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly (A/45/547), the Sudan has gone through a dramatic year. In addition to the continuing civil war, it has been afflicted by a drought even more serious than that of the period 1984-1986. Almost 8 million people have been at risk. To meet that situation, a large-scale relief operation was mounted. The relief operation is still in progress. However, unacceptably high levels of malnutrition still prevail in various parts of the country, and every effort is being made to reach those areas with deliveries of relief supplies by air, river and over land. Unlike 1990, rains have been good. Rainfall amounts have been above average in all major crop-producing areas. In Kordofan and Darfur, rainfall was also better than average in terms of frequency and distribution. The good rains augur well for improved crop production. However, these very same rains make relief transport for the present operation extremely difficult.

4. Limited quantities of seeds and tools have reached traditional farmers in the drought-affected areas. However, whatever the size of the harvest, a substantial segment of the population will continue to lack the purchasing power to have access to adequate supplies of food. Millions of displaced persons will continue to lack employment or agricultural opportunities. Thus, while the outlook for 1992 is brighter than 1991, the situation will remain fragile, and continued international assistance will be required.

5. At least 3.5 million conflict-displaced people and millions of others left impoverished due to successive years of drought have no assurances that essential food and non-food needs can be met from their own resources. Continuing conflict in the south of the country has disrupted planting and driven millions into camps for displaced persons, urban areas or the households of relatives where basic means of survival will be extremely limited. The impact of changes in neighbouring countries, principally in

Ethiopia, resulted in approximately 200,000 Sudanese refugees returning from Ethiopia towards the end of May in search of security and assistance. This movement has and will continue to add further strains on food and non-food requirements. Under these circumstances, there is a need for the extension of Operation Lifeline Sudan for at least one more year.

6. With the exception of the period 1988-1989, farmers and herders have since 1984-1985 faced a series of droughts that has left millions economically marginalized. Despite the substantial food and non-food aid provided by the international community, survival for many in Darfur, Kordofan and the central and eastern regions has depended upon what remains of their traditional coping mechanisms. Hence, to cover pockets of need unmet during the 1991 relief operations and to ensure that millions of increasingly impoverished peoples will have food, the international food pipeline into the Sudan will have to be maintained over the coming year.

### III. SUDAN EMERGENCY OPERATION

7. Towards the middle of August 1990, the intensity of the drought and its effect on Government efforts for agricultural self-sufficiency were apparent. The Government relied on the results of the November crop assessment mission of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to determine the course of action it would take.

8. The results of the Government/United Nations/non-governmental organization situation survey of 17-27 November 1990 indicated that the impact of food shortages had already taken its toll in many areas of the country by early November. By early December, the FAO crop assessment mission confirmed that the overall food production shortfall for the entire Sudan would be 1.5 million tons; and by 19 December, the WFP assessment mission concluded that 7.7 million people would not have access to food and would therefore require a total of 1.145 million tons to see them through the following year.

9. The Government had intended to announce its emergency relief policy in mid-January 1991, but due to the introduction of the Federal constitution and the conflict in the Gulf, it was not announced until 12 February 1991.

10. The plans had five principal components: (a) the Government of the Sudan agreed to provide the most favourable exchange rate (i.e., 12.3 Sudanese pounds for \$US 1) for all relief goods and activities; (b) all imported relief items were to be exempted from customs duties; (c) in order to facilitate the import of spare parts for primary transportation of relief food, the Government permitted hard currency payments to be made to transporters; (d) as a consequence of the 1 January 1991 implementation of the Federal constitution, state relief committees were to assume responsibility for secondary transport and distribution up to village council levels; (e) WFP was requested to assume responsibility for the coordination of relief food and port operations and for the delivery of relief food to five primary hubs.

11. Immediately following the WFP December assessment mission report, its Executive Director appealed to the international donor community to respond to the assessed food needs and to ship food aid to the Sudan urgently. One month later, UNICEF issued its own appeal for \$30 million, followed up in July by a supplemental appeal for \$9 million. On 14 March 1991, the Secretary-General launched a consolidated appeal for \$716,583,400. As of mid-August, 57 per cent of the assessed need of 1.145 million tons of food aid had already been pledged, of which 323,676 tons arrived at Port Sudan and a further 26,660 tons were delivered through Kenya and Uganda. For the non-food sector, \$20,542,697 had been provided by mid-August for operations being conducted from Khartoum and a further \$7,199,717 for non-food assistance being implemented from Nairobi.

12. Though the international community responded both with concern and speed to the threat facing the Sudan, transport of vitally needed assistance remained a major problem. The nation's weak road and rail infrastructure, combined with the sheer enormity of the country and the vast distances between population centres, made relief deliveries from primary hubs to secondary destinations very difficult.

13. By mid-August 1991, WFP had been able to move over 260,000 tons from Port Sudan to primary hubs, from where non-governmental organizations, working under the authority of state relief committees, had been able to move more than 160,000 tons to secondary destinations.

14. The July and August rains in some of the most severely needy areas, such as Darfur and Kordofan, made roads impassable. Furthermore, insecurity resulting from tribal conflicts made passage, particularly in southwestern Darfur, hazardous; and the sheer number of village councils throughout Darfur province complicated the process of determining priority distributions.

15. Despite initial fears, the rates of mortality in Darfur and elsewhere have not reached the proportions anticipated. In part, this was the result of the enterprise and efforts of both the state and central Government and of the non-governmental and bilateral donor communities and the United Nations system. However, many vulnerable groups throughout the country have been obliged to sustain themselves through the last vestiges of traditional coping mechanisms.

16. While relief assistance has been provided to most areas of the country, some areas remain uncovered by relief operations. The Government of the Sudan and the United Nations have urged the donor and non-governmental organization communities to pay priority attention to uncovered areas of need.

17. With the onset of the rains, and given the vast distances and poor roads, airlift and airdrop operations were activated in order to reach many of the pockets of needs otherwise inaccessible. Funding from the Netherlands, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland enabled WFP to begin airlift operations in July.

Summary of donor food pledges as at 26 August 1991

Donor	Quantity (metric tons)	Value (United States dollars)
Austria	2 000	886 000
Canada	44 233	20 570 219
European Economic Community	218 737	103 284 531
France	1 000	443 000
Germany	20 000	8 860 000
Canadian Food Grains Bank	7 479	3 427 597
Help the Aged	1 200	531 60^
Ireland	1 400	620 200
Italy	2 000	886 000
Japan	17 000	7 531 000
Netherlands	25 400	11 250 200
Pakistan	5 000	2 215 000
United States of America	207 035	105 120 545
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	68 273	30 244 939
World Food Programme	25 000	11 075 000

Note: The United States dollar value of food aid is calculated using the following assumption:

	<u>Cereals</u>	<u>Others</u>
Cost	\$130/ton	\$650/ton
Ocean freight	\$ 63/ton	\$ 63/ton
Internal transportation	\$250/ton	\$250/ton

18. Notwithstanding the fact that the large-scale relief operation mounted in the Sudan has been extremely helpful, the difficulties encountered over the past six months point to six important steps that must underpin relief efforts in the coming year. First, even greater concentration will have to be placed upon developing effective secondary transport capacity. Secondly, as part of subsequent relief efforts, greater emphasis will have to be placed upon a more balanced food basket. Thirdly, the provision of seeds and tools to affected communities must be seen as an important component of emergency relief and rehabilitation. Fourthly, the impoverishing impact of the 1990-1991 drought will mean that a vast community of urban and rural poor will not have access to food, whatever the foreseeable results of the harvest, and therefore the food pipeline will have to continue to flow over the forthcoming year. Fifthly, greater flexibility is required in the targeting of donor contributions to ensure that vitally needed food can be used where it is most needed rather than restricted to a predetermined destination. Finally, greater attention will have to be given to preparedness measures, including reserve food stocks and analysis of traditional coping mechanisms, than has been received to date.

#### IV. OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN

19. Operation Lifeline Sudan set an historical precedent in 1989 when the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) agreed that the delivery of humanitarian assistance to war-affected civilians, wherever they might be, should transcend both military and political considerations. Through agreed "corridors of tranquility", relief goods were to be permitted to move freely in conflict zones under the United Nations flag, and access for relief flights to a large number of rural centres was also approved.

20. Operation Lifeline Sudan expected some shortfalls between planned and actual deliveries of emergency assistance supplies. Although the discrepancies between targeted and actual assistance were not large, the reasons that gave rise to them revealed two fundamental problems that had to be addressed. The first was that initial targets were based upon surveys undertaken during late 1989. Those target figures were regarded as final, despite the fact that populations in the conflict zones shifted and control over specific areas, such as Kajo Kaji, had changed hands.

21. Secondly, substantial quantities of food assistance were initially intended to have been transported by United Nations train and barge convoys through conflict areas; but despite protracted negotiations, neither train nor barge ever left during the course of 1990. Similarly, no road corridor through conflict zones had ever been open during the year; hence, certain areas designated for relief food were never reached.

22. The consequences of rigidly apportioned relief allocations and of persistent failures to open corridors of tranquility in the conflict zones had by the beginning of 1991 cast some doubt over the viability of Operation Lifeline Sudan. From the Government's perspective, OLS Phase II had ended,

and a further phase was not to resume until what were described as "technical discussions" reviewed the operational modalities of Operation Lifeline Sudan.

23. At a meeting held between the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions, Regional Cooperation, Decolonization and Trusteeship and the Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council on 18 February 1991, the United Nations and the Government of the Sudan renewed their commitment to the principles of Operation Lifeline Sudan and agreed that certain of its principles would be applicable, where appropriate, to the larger programme of emergency assistance required to alleviate the effects of drought that has hit the whole country. United Nations Operation Lifeline Sudan air operations to SPLM-held areas were suspended for almost 10 weeks, between mid-February and the end of April, pending the finalization of technical discussions.

24. Agreement on an Operation Lifeline Sudan "interim arrangement" to resume airflights and food deliveries to the south was accepted during the period just prior to the presentation by the United Nations on 12 April of a preliminary working paper on Operation Lifeline Sudan technical discussions. United Nations Operation Lifeline Sudan relief aircraft began flying regularly from Kenya by the beginning of May, and food deliveries, when not hampered by flooded roads, have since gone regularly into the southern sector from Kenya and Uganda. Up to the last week in August, over 18,000 tons had been delivered to SPLM-held areas.

25. The Operation Lifeline Sudan technical discussions themselves began in May and focused upon three broad issues: (a) needs assessments; (b) monitoring and management; and (c) corridors of tranquility.

26. Based on discussions both in Khartoum and Nairobi with all parties to the Operation Lifeline Sudan arrangement, the Government, the United Nations and SPLM recognized the impracticalities of basing delivery targets, particularly in times of complex emergencies, upon information completed months beforehand. Therefore, the principle was accepted that needs assessments would not be limited to the outcome of a single annual assessment, but would be supplemented by rapid response assessments when so requested by any Operation Lifeline Sudan party. The United Nations would be responsible for undertaking both types of assessments, which, as agreed, would be regarded as authoritative and definitive.

27. All parties accepted the principle that, when so requested by the United Nations, they were obliged to ensure access routes for the safe passage of relief supplies. Only when that fundamental condition was met could the United Nations ensure that relief supplies would be delivered.

28. The discussions furthermore reaffirmed the lead monitoring and management role of the United Nations under Operation Lifeline Sudan.

29. Discussions on the consolidation of arrangements for the continuation of Operation Lifeline Sudan are still in progress. These focus on the opening of all previously agreed corridors of tranquillity. Throughout 1991, the delivery of relief supplies to the "conflict zone" has been on the basis of ad hoc arrangements orchestrated by the United Nations system. Under separate arrangements, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) resumed airlifts and relief operations in both Government-held town and SPLM-held areas by May 1991.

30. Airlift operations by WFP and the Lutheran World Federation to Juba delivered relief food and non-food aid from UNICEF and non-governmental organizations over the past year. The pipeline remains fragile but has been able at least to maintain an estimated 200,000 displaced persons at an adequate though minimal nutritional level. WFP and ICRC airlifts to Wau to assist a minimum of 100,000 displaced persons in that town began in July and continued to provide emergency relief and rehabilitation materials up to the beginning of September. Over the past year, the town of Malakal had received limited amounts of non-food assistance, but WFP barge convoys from Kosti provided much-needed assistance during the months of July and August.

#### V. SPECIAL EMERGENCY PROGRAMMES

31. In the midst of the drought relief operation and Operation Lifeline Sudan, events in Ethiopia towards the end of May resulted in hundreds of thousands of Ethiopian and returning Sudanese refugees fleeing to the Sudan. Historically, the Sudan has always extended hospitality to those seeking refuge from outside its borders. Once again the Government, in collaboration with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations has provided assistance to an estimated 50,000 Ethiopians, mainly former military personnel, who had fled to the Kassala area. Two months later, the Government of the Sudan, UNHCR and the Provisional Government of Ethiopia had arrived at a tripartite arrangement to enable those refugees to return voluntarily to their country of origin.

32. In the southern Sudan, along the Sobat River, large numbers of Sudanese refugees had begun to congregate at the beginning of June around the town of Nasir after fleeing refugee camps along the border of western Ethiopia. In the light of these events and others in countries of the Horn of Africa following the change of government in Ethiopia, the Secretary-General sent a high-level United Nations inter-agency mission in mid-June to establish ways to provide assistance to the affected populations. Led by the Executive Director of WFP, the mission agreed with the Government on means to implement procedures for immediate assistance to the returning Sudanese refugees. These included an immediate airdrop of food at Nasir followed by the delivery of food by barge along the Nile and Sobat rivers for as long as emergency assistance was required.



33. The special relief programmes for returning Sudanese refugees were to be under the overall supervision of the United Nations, which would take general responsibility for determining numbers of beneficiaries and the distribution and monitoring of relief. Based upon this agreement, 500 tons of food were airdropped by WFP at Nasir up to the end of July, and WFP barge convoys delivered 300 tons of food aid to both Nasir and Malakal.

34. This agreement served as the basis for subsequent WFP airdrop, airlift and barge deliveries. ICRC established its own arrangements for assisting an estimated 75,000 returning Sudanese refugees at Pochalla.

#### VI. PROGRAMMES FOR THE DISPLACED

35. The problems of displaced persons are part and parcel of most aspects of emergency and relief operations under way in the Sudan. The number of people who have had to move from their homes in search of food, employment and security is considerable and, at any one time over the past three years, totalled approximately 20 per cent of the population. In seeking to deal with a problem that strains urban and rural resources and infrastructures, the Government developed extensive relocation and resettlement schemes. The fact that a very high proportion of those displaced have few if any resources, as evidenced by displacement camps in Khartoum itself, makes relief assistance essential for their survival. With Government assurances that its relocation and resettlement schemes were based upon the principle of voluntarism, the international community had over the past year become increasingly willing to consider assistance for basic services for relocated and resettled displaced persons.

#### VII. RELIEF FOOD ASSISTANCE

36. As indicated in the table, as of mid-August, donor response had resulted in pledges of over 630,000 tons, 57 per cent of the 1.145 million tons of assessed needs. However, it became evident during July that an additional 100,000 tons of food assistance over and above the 653,000 tons pledged would be required for delivery and distribution prior to the end of 1991. This requirement has been included in the Secretary-General's consolidated interim appeal for emergency operations in the Horn of Africa area of September 1991.

37. Donor support for the transport of relief food and logistics management has been substantial. This has enabled WFP to play a major role in relief operations.

38. While virtually all food aid under the Sudan Emergency Operation and Operation Lifeline Sudan is for free distribution, WFP has tried, where feasible, to place emphasis upon food-for-work programmes in order to prevent a growing dependence upon free food aid. Towards that end, WFP collaborated with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in a joint work programme to provide food for work for those who lacked alternative employment in

specific UNDP and WFP project areas. These work programmes include roads, wells, environmental health improvements, sanitation services and the building of schools and health-care centres.

#### VIII. NON-FOOD ASSISTANCE

39. UNICEF continued its wide range of non-food activities throughout accessible areas in the Sudan. Despite frequent suspensions of relief airlifts, principally in the south from Lokichokio, relief operations had reached a significant percentage of vulnerable groups. Relief assistance included health services, with special attention to immunization, control of diarrhoeal diseases, provision of essential drugs; nutrition, including supplementary feeding and household food security; and water supply, sanitation, basic education and relief and shelter.

40. Overall immunization coverage in the northern regions had reached 71 per cent in 1990, and by August 1991 had reached 81 per cent in SPLM-held areas. Since the beginning of Operation Lifeline Sudan, 150,000 children had been vaccinated against measles, with coverage rates ranging between 5 per cent in Akon, Akobo, Ayod and Waat and 70 per cent in Bor, Kapoeta and Torit. Rates for Polio 3/DPT 3 do not exceed 30 per cent to date. In the Government-held towns, efforts to increase coverage has continued with good results. At mid-year in Juba, the largest of the Government-held towns, coverage for children under one year of age had reached 42 per cent.

41. Delivery of life-saving drugs has continued. At least 146.6 tons of essential drugs and one million sachets of oral rehydration salts have been despatched to all regions of northern Sudan and the three southern states of Bahr-el-Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria. These supplies have been delivered by road, air and barge. For areas isolated during the rains, supplies were delivered by the UNICEF light aircraft. In areas held by SPLM, essential drugs were targeted to 200 primary health-care units and health centres, although delays in delivery have been due to transport and security constraints. In cooperation with non-governmental organizations, intensive and refresher training courses were carried out for community health workers, medical assistants and birth attendants.

42. In the nutritional sector, the production of concentrated protein nutritional supplements for children (UNIMIX) commenced in mid-February 1991, and by the beginning of September 1,647.5 tons had been produced; 1,640 tons have been delivered to the Red Sea Hills, northern Kordofan, Darfur, Khartoum and Juba in western Equatoria, Upper Nile, Bahr-el-Ghazal, southern Kordofan and the Central region. Two hundred twenty feeding centres have been established in these areas, catering to approximately 54,000 malnourished children. UNICEF has also been supporting training programmes in Port Sudan, southern Kordofan and Khartoum for 236 health workers on the management of feeding centres. Most of these trainees are from the Ministry of Health and non-governmental organizations involved in the running of the 220 centres. Nutrition surveys have been undertaken by the Ministry of Health with full

UNICEF technical and financial support in Darfur, Kordofan and Equatoria. In those areas where increases in malnutrition are evident, UNIMIX has been targeted.

43. In southern Sudan, over 300 tons of locally grown seeds have been provided in the Upper Nile region by bartering relief food and salt. UNICEF has also distributed 100,000 agricultural tools to farming families in the southern sector. In El Obeid, the existing small nursery programmes have been expanded to include displaced members of the community. A similar initiative is planned for Wau. Discussions have been held with the Ministry of Agriculture, and a baseline survey has been carried out.

44. A strategy to improve household security has been adopted by UNICEF. In Khartoum, among the displaced communities, seeds have been distributed to women heads of households in parallel with the installation of hand-pumps.

45. Basic educational supplies have been distributed to primary age schoolchildren in all regions of the Sudan. A total of 131,000 children received sufficient supplies for six months.

46. FAO actively participated in all inter-agency discussions on the Sudan Emergency Operation.

47. As part of its regular programme activities the FAO Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) continuously monitors the food supply situation in the Sudan. The assessments of the System are disseminated through regular reports sent to Governments and international aid agencies.

48. In addition, as a follow-up to a full-scale FAO/GIEWS crop assessment mission which, in November 1990, assessed the shortfall of the main cereal crops in the country, an assessment mission was fielded in April 1991 specifically to evaluate the wheat harvest then under way. The result of the mission has confirmed Sudan's poor aggregate cereal harvest for the second consecutive year and the urgent need to expedite the distribution of food relief before the start of the rains, which had already begun prematurely in some areas. A summary of the findings of the mission was transmitted to the food aid donors on 18 April 1991.

49. Seven provinces have been identified as most needy in terms of agricultural materials. FAO has surveyed the requirements and continuously updates its assessments, which currently are as follows: seeds, \$US 6,370,000; hand-tools, equipment and spares, \$US 1,808,000; and related expenses, \$US 3,252,000. The value of the needs in the agricultural sector, not including the requirements for animal vaccines, drugs and related material, is estimated at \$US 11,430,000.

50. Fully recognizing the gravity of the situation in the Sudan, the United Nations Development Programme had earmarked \$US 15 million for a programme to be implemented throughout 1991 with the cooperation of UNICEF, WFP, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Department of Technical

Cooperation for Development of the United Nations Secretariat and a number of international and local non-governmental organizations. The programme addresses issues relevant to the alleviation of the acute needs for food and drinking water for the Sudanese population. It aims at strengthening the capacity of the Government in monitoring and planning for these kinds of emergencies, and providing food for work in water-related projects.

51. The UNDP Emergency Unit, under the direction of the Special Coordinator of the United Nations Secretary-General for Emergency and Operations in the Sudan, continued to provide substantive and logistical support services to the combined relief efforts of the Government, bilateral donors, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations.

52. The World Bank has recently approved a loan of \$US 25 million for a project that includes water supply, essential drugs and drought recovery measures.

## IX. REPLIES FROM MEMBER STATES

### A. Commission of the European Communities

53. The Commission has already taken substantial action to meet the priority needs of the Sudanese population affected by famine and conflict. Since early December 1990, the Commission has decided on food aid actions totalling 111.635 tons of food products, which when combined with some 32.216 tons of food aid pledged prior to December and now being delivered, brings the total amount of European Economic Community food aid for the victims of the present famine in the Sudan to 143,851 tons (over 50 million ECU or \$US 67 million in value). In addition, the Commission has recently decided upon a new package of emergency aid actions, primarily for non-food items, for a total of 5.64 million ECU. These emergency and food aid actions are essentially being implemented by non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies.

54. The Commission is concerned about the continued difficulties being faced by relief organizations in the implementation of operations in the Sudan and the lack of any real coordinated relief plan for the south, similar to the previous Operation Lifeline Sudan programmes. The Commission would ask the United Nations to increase pressure on the relevant parties to facilitate relief operations throughout all of the Sudan and to seek to have the positive elements in the recent statement issued by the Government of the Sudan and the United Nations, and referred to in the United Nations appeal, given greater practical effect on the ground.

55. The Commission will continue to monitor closely the situation in the Sudan and is prepared to consider further humanitarian assistance in the light of developments.

**B. Greece**

56. The Government of Greece has decided to contribute to the programme of humanitarian relief assistance for the Sudan in the amount of 4,000 metric tons of wheat.

**C. Japan**

57. Emergency relief assistance from the Government of Japan for the Sudan has been as follows:

- (a) Fiscal year 1988 (1 April 1988-31 March 1989): 175 million yen;
- (b) Fiscal year 1989 (1 April 1989-31 March 1990): 400 million yen.

**D. Nigeria**

58. Nigeria has made donations of relief materials worth 2 million naira to assist the flood victims of the Sudan.

**E. Norway**

59. Norwegian emergency assistance to the Sudan has so far in 1991 amounted to NKr 31 million, of which NKr 7 million have been channelled through UNHCR and UNICEF and NKr 24 million through Norwegian non-governmental organizations. In addition to food aid, the contributions have also been used to finance blankets, medicines and tents.

**F. Pakistan**

60. In response to the appeal for urgent humanitarian relief assistance for the Sudan, the Government of Pakistan has decided to make a contribution of 5,000 tons of rice to the people of the Sudan affected by the present drought situation. WFP has been requested to make the necessary arrangements for the delivery of this consignment.

**G. Spain**

61. The Government of Spain has decided to extend humanitarian relief assistance to the Sudan in the form of 3,000 metric tons of sorghum through WFP.

4. Turkey

62. On the emergency appeal of the Minister of Finance of the Sudan, who attended the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (COMCEC) meeting in Istanbul regarding the heavy flood in the Sudan in 1987, relief supplies consisting of 300 tents, 5,000 blankets, and 5 boxes of medicine were sent on 11 September 1987.

63. Because of the heavy flood in the Sudan in 1987, the Turkish Red Crescent sent 28 tons of food aid on 11 August 1990, which included macaroni, flour, red lentils, peas and sugar.

64. With regard to the earthquake that hit the Sudan on 10 July 1990, a check for 5,000 Swiss francs, made out by the Turkish Red Crescent, was sent to the Sudan.

65. Funds allocated to the Sudan under the scope of the African Sahel Technical Assistance Programme have been found suitable for establishing a health-care centre to provide basic health services and mother and child care. Sudanese officials have been provided with three alternative projects for the health centres to be established in Khartoum. With regard to the Sudanese officials' request concerning the project to establish a health centre with a 50-bed capacity, it had been decided that Turkey would contribute \$US 1,415,000. Meanwhile, Turkey and the Sudan have committed to spend \$US 400,000 and \$US 600,000 respectively for the operational expenses for two years. The project has not been implemented yet. Two Sudanese experts have participated in the water and soil development programme, two in the food processing and dairy technology programme and one in the project planning and management programme, which were organized in the fall of 1990 within the framework of the Turkish Foreign Technical Assistance Programme activities.

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