UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY



Distr. GENERAL

A/4503 23 September 1960 ENGLISH ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

Fifteenth session

DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SCCIALIST REPUBLICS ON DISARMAMENT

Submitted for the consideration of the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has submitted for consideration by the United Nations General Assembly the question of disarmament and the situation with regard to the implementation of the General Assembly resolution of the previous session on this question.

The disarmament problem is the central problem of today, the problem on whose solution the preservation of peace greatly, if not fundamentally, depends. This is now recognized by all States. At the same time, the Soviet Government is deeply concerned over the failure thus far to make any headway in the settlement of this problem.

States have by now stockpiled, and they continue stockpiling, huge quantities of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery to targets in any part of the world. This in itself creates a grave danger to peace, since among the countries possessing nuclear weapons there are those which declare "brinkmanship" and gross violations of the sovereignty of other States as their State policy and which do not stop short of such methods as are usually only employed in wartime.

In the circumstances where States possess enormous stockpiles of nuclear weapons, each step forward on the path of the armaments race also increases the danger of the so-called accidental outbreak of war. Inaccuracies in the

work of a radar system can lead to misinterpretation of the radar signals, and this may result in the commencement of military operations and, consequently, in an unprecedented disaster. A misunderstanding of orders by pilots who, according to the United States Government, make routine bomber flights carrying atomic weapons, may mean that these bombs will be dropped on the territory of another State, with all the ensuing consequences. A malfunctioning of the electronic devices in a military nuclear rocket system may also set off the chain reaction of military conflict.

If the nuclear arms race continues, it will be more and more difficult to prevent such "accidents".

The arms race is one of the major factors heightening distrust and suspicion in the relations between States and poisoning the world atmosphere. The "cold war" which is so hated by the peoples is a product of the arms race; it hampers its elimination and makes the arms race more and more dangerous for States and peoples.

The ending of the arms race is a way towards the strengthening of peace. The solution of the disarmament problem would also have an enormous economic effect. Disarmament would release huge material and financial resources which could be used for the good of mankind.

Over \$100,000 million have again been consumed in the huge furnace of war preparations in the one year that has elapsed since the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly which unanimously approved the idea of general and complete disarmament. Simple calculations show that these resources would suffice to finance a complete technical and economic reconstruction of the entire African continent. This money could be used to feed hundreds of millions of starving people for a year. Just one per cent of the total amount of military outlays of States would be enough to build more than 100 fully equipped universities in countries which are greatly in need of highly qualified specialists. The money spent

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on building a single United States nuclear-powered submarine would suffice to build at least fifty houses with 100 flats each or 10,000 cottages. This is what the arms race steals from mankind.

Considering that for many years the negotiations on isolated disarmament measures were invariably deadlocked by the Western Powers, a year ago, at the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet Union proposed an entirely new approach to the solution of this problem and put forward the idea of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The posing of the question of general and complete disarmament was prompted by life itself, for in the age of nuclear weapons and powerful rockets partial or half-way disarmament measures cannot completely eliminate the danger of war.

Only general and complete disarmament can ensure the solution of this great problem. Only general and complete disarmament can ensure lasting peace and tranquility for mankind.

In raising the question of general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union, which is today generally recognized to be one of the mightiest military powers in the world, proposed on its own initiative to forgo this military might for ever, to destroy it completely, if the other great Powers would do the same. If the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the other Mestern Powers are ready to do this, it remains only to agree on the best way of translating this into reality. But if they are not ready, it means that their statements about wanting peace and about needing armaments only for defence against possible aggression are not to be believed.

That was the core of the Soviet Union's proposal on general and complete disarmament.

The new approach to the solution of the disarmament problem stems from the very nature of our country's socialist system. Vladimir Lenin, the

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founder of the Soviet State, said that disarmament is an ideal of socialism. Indeed, the socialist States do not need armaments for any purpose but to defend themselves against possible attack from without and to ensure the preservation of peace throughout the world. The Soviet armed forces do not have and cannot have any other objectives, for the foreign policy of socialism is a peaceful and humane policy. And if the Western Powers agreed to give up armed forces and armaments, to eliminate the means of waging war, the socialist States would have no need whatsoever for armed forces and armaments and there would be no reasons for maintaining rocket troops, an army, navy, air force or anti-aircraft defence. None of these is needed for the successful building of communism in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Our lands are rich in natural resources, our people like to work, and science and technology render good service to our cause.

War is not needed for the triumph of communism, since the struggle for communist ideas is waged not between States but between the classes inside each State. It is a slander on socialist countries to accuse them of wanting to impose their ideas on other peoples and other States by means of war.

At the fourteenth session the Soviet Government did not confine itself to raising the question of general and complete disarmament; it also placed before the United Nations a concrete programme for such disarmament. In an attempt to facilitate in every possible way, the settlement of the disarmament problem, and to create an atmosphere conducive to negotiations on this problem, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a decision to reduce the armed forces of the Soviet Union by 1.2 million men, i.e. by one third. This decision is being scrupulously carried out.

Now that a year has passed since the Soviet Union raised the question of general and complete disarmament, it can be said with all certitude that

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the idea of general and complete disarmament has received the support of all peoples, who want this idea to be realized as quickly as possible. And this is quite understandable, for the peoples of all countries - not only the socialist, but the capitalist countries as well - want peace, want a world without armaments and without wars between States. No one needs war, not the Soviet people, not the American, British, French or Chinese people, not the peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America or Australia.

The desire of the peoples for peace found expression in the resolution of the last session of the General Assembly on general and complete disarmament, a resolution which, as everyone remembers was adopted unanimously. Not a single State opposed the resolution - all of them supported it. Even those States which have accelerated the armaments race and continue to do so now, and which, as experience has shown, had no intention of giving up their brink-of-war policy, did not dare at the time to come out openly against general and complete disarmament.

The General Assembly declared in its resolution that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important question facing the world today, called upon the Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem and expressed the hope that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control would be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time. This established the general line for disarmament negotiations. It was decided that the negotiations should be conducted within the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee.

The peoples of the world placed their highest hopes on these negotiations. They wanted to believe that now all States, and particularly the great Fowers which possessed the most powerful weapons, would find a new approach to the disarmament problem and reach agreement at last on its practical settlement.

A year has passed since that time. Unfortunately, it must be stated that this year was wasted as far as disarmament was concerned. This is an alarming fact which cannot and must not be disregarded.

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What happened? Why did it prove impossible to advance a single step towards the implementation of the aforesaid resolution during the year following its adoption by the General Assembly? Why did the negotiations in the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee fail to produce any positive results?

To answer these questions one must turn to the facts. The facts show that once again, as in the past, two opposing lines, two positions, clearly and definitely emerged in the course of the negotiations in the Ten-Nation Committee.

One of them was in keeping with the demands of the peoples for a speedy settlement of the disarmament problem. The other was in direct contradiction with those demands and was a poorly camouflaged attempt to prevent disarmament.

The line of fighting for general and complete disarmament was pursued in the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee by the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria, i.e. the socialist States. The line of opposing the solution of the disarmament problem was followed by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Canada, i.e. the Western Powers, members of the North Atlantic military bloc.

Our position during the negotiations was crystal clear: the socialist States proposed to get down to business as quickly as possible, to start work on a practical solution of the problem, to discuss in a business-like way a programme of general and complete disarmament and to work out an appropriate agreement.

The position taken by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was flexible throughout the negotiations. The delegations of these countries in the Committee expressed their readiness to hear with due attention and respect all the remarks, proposals and observations of the Western Powers regarding the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament which were aimed at a speedy settlement of this vital question. The Soviet Government proved its readiness by its deeds. It was prepared to consider any other realistic programme for disarmament.

When we learned from conversations with the President of France, General de Gaulle, that the French Government thought it advisable to start disarmament with the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons to the target, the Soviet Government treated the idea in all seriousness and, after

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giving it careful thought, made an important amendment to the programme for general and complete disarmament. The amended programme provided for the elimination, in the very first stage of general and complete disarmament, of all means of delivering nuclear weapons to the target. The Soviet Government agreed to this in the desire to expedite agreement, although it is generally acknowledged that the Soviet Union has superiority in the most modern and effective means of delivering nuclear weapons, namely, inter-continental ballistic missiles.

The Soviet Government met the Western Powers half-way on a number of other matters as well.

The United States and other Western States sought from the Soviet Union a more specific and detailed description of the control system in our programme for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government took this into account as well. The amended Soviet proposals set forth in a comprehensive and highly detailed manner a plan for the establishment of a control system and the implementation of strict international control over all disarmament measures. Now no one can assert, unless he wants to contradict the facts, that the Soviet Union is evading the establishment of strict international control over measures for general and complete disarmament. Needless to say, however, the Soviet Government is in favour of control over disarmament while vigorously objecting to all attempts to impose control over armaments, i.e. control without disarmament, which, as everycre will understand, would be merely a system of legalized international espionage.

After all, the establishment of control over armaments, if armaments were retained, would mean, in effect, that each side would know the quantity, quality and deployment of the armaments possessed by the opposing side. Consequently, an aggressor could increase his armaments to a superior level in order to choose the opportune moment and launch an attack. We will never agree to control over armaments without disarmament, because this would mean conniving at aggression. Our goal is to secure a stable peace, which can be achieved only through the elimination of armaments and armed forces under strict international control.

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For example, if agreement is reached on the destruction, in the first stage, of all means of delivering nuclear weapons to the target and on the dismantling of foreign military bases on the territories of other countries and the withdrawal of foreign troops from those territories, then appropriate measures of control over the implementation of these arrangements must also be worked out.

The same applies to the subsequent stages of disarmament.

Such is the Soviet Union's stand on the problems of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which the Soviet Government adopted during the negotiations of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee and to which it still adheres. No one can deny that this is a constructive stand which is prompted by the desire to reach agreement more rapidly on general and complete disarmament.

Yet, all the efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist States to have the Ten-Nation Committee act in conformity with the General Assembly resolution and set about reaching a practical solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament ran up, as it were, against a stone wall, against the negative stand of the United States and other Western Powers. Cur partners in the negotiations stubbornly refused to start working out a treaty on general and complete disarmament and in every way avoided discussion of the substance of the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament. For the benefit of the outside world they say "yes" on disarmament questions, but when it comes to specific consideration of the disarmament question, they make every effort to prevent agreement on disarmament.

The United States, for its part, made proposals which provided for neither general nor complete disarmament, nor any disarmament at all, but only for measures of control over armaments, which, however, means control without disarmament. This fully applies as well to the so-called "Western plan" of 16 March 1960 and the so-called "new" proposals put forward by the United States after the Ten-Nation Committee had already suspended its work.

What did the Western Powers actually propose? They proposed the establishment of control over rockets, control over satellites, control over atomic industry, control over the deployment of armed forces, financial control, ground control, control by means of aerial photography - and all this with States retaining all their armed forces and armaments, including nuclear weapons and all means of delivering them to the target. The question, when presented in this way, may be of interest to those who, while preparing for military adventures, are concerned with collecting secret information on the armed forces and armaments of other States, but it has nothing to do with disarmament. One cannot but see that the establishment of control without disarmament not only would not contribute to the consolidation of peace but, on the contrary, would make it easier for a | potential aggressor to realize his plans which pose a threat to the peoples.

But the Western Powers in the Ten-Nation Committee did not wish to discuss anything except control without disarmament. As the only specific measure for the first stage, beyond control, they proposed that the strength of the armed forces of the United States and the USSR should be limited to 2.5 million men, even though it is known that this is precisely the present strength of the United States armed forces whereas the Soviet armed forces will number 2,423,000 men on completion of a unilateral reduction of one-third, i.e. even less than proposed by the Western Powers. Why, then, was the proposal to set the level at 2.5 million men made at all?

It is difficult to evaluate this attitude otherwise than as indicating ' the unwillingness of the Western Powers to agree to disarmament.

Not only did the Western Powers refuse to discuss the Soviet programme for general and complete disarmament in a business-like manner in the Ten-Nation Committee, not only did they put forward no proposals of their own which would meet the requirements of the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament, but they even went back on their own proposals as soon as they were accepted by the Soviet Union.

It should be noted, for example, that, although France advanced a proposal to begin disarmament with the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons to the target, its representative in the Ten-Nation Committee in effect abandoned this proposal as soon as it was accepted by the Soviet Union and began advocating not the elimination of the means of delivery but only control over them. One need not be a specialist to understand the fundamental difference between the elimination, the destruction of rockets, military aircraft, warships and other means of delivering nuclear weapons to the target and the establishment of control over them.

The fact that the French Government abandoned its position as regards giving priority to the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons to the target is all the more incomprehensible since it is well known that in rocketry, i.e. in the most advanced means of delivery, France is far from being the first. She may soon be outstripped even by West Germany, which the Pentagon intends to supply with strategic rockets. Consequently, if agreement were reached on the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons to the target, France, far from standing to lose, would on the contrary gain, inasmuch as she would be on a par with Powers which are ahead of her now as far as the means of delivery are concerned. There arises a legitimate question: are not France's NATO commitments more important to her than solving the disarmement problem?

It is obvious that, with the United States and its allies taking a negative stand as regards general and complete disarmament, the Ten-Nation Committee was unable to do any useful work towards implementation of the General Assembly resolution. Moreover, from a body for negotiation on disarmament it began to turn into the very opposite: an instrument for covering up the continuation of the arms race.

Suffice it to say that, while the Ten-Nation Committee was holding talks on disarmament, military appropriations continued to grow in the United States, the construction of United States nuclear-rocket bases was stepped up in Britain, Italy and a number of other States, a new military treaty with the United States was imposed on Japan against the will of the Japanese people, preparations began for supplying the West German revenge-seekers and militarists with "Polaris" strategic nuclear rockets, and steps were taken to expand the production of chemical and bacteriological weapons of mass destruction. In other Western countries belonging to NATO, the arms race was given ever greater impetus as well.

All this was being done with the Ten-Nation Committee serving as a screen. On the one hand, the arms race was being stepped up and war preparations on an ever-growing scale were going on at a feverish pace, and, on the other hand, unsupported protestations of a desire for disarmament and for continued

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negotiations were being made in the Ten-Nation Committee. It was becoming more and more apparent that the United States and its NATO allies were seeking, as before, to drown the disarmament problem in futile disputes.

Under the circumstances, the Soviet Union and the other socialist States found themselves faced with the problem whether there was any sense at all in continuing the work of the Committee. After considering the situation that had arisen through the fault of the United States and its allies, the Soviet Government could not but draw the conclusion that it was necessary to suspend its participation in the work of the Ten-Nation Committee and to raise the question of the necessity of considering the disarmament problem in the General Assembly. The same conclusion was reached by the other socialist States represented in the Committee.

It was not easy for the Soviet Government to take this decision, for it was precisely the Soviet Government that had put forward a programme for general and complete disarmament, had sought to show the greatest possible flexibility during the negotiations on putting the programme into effect and had fought steadfastly for the negotiations to be effective and make progress. Nevertheless, it had to take this step. To do otherwise would have meant merely helping those who do not want disarmament, who are continuing to push the world towards war.

Now that the United States and its allies have brought the disarmament negotiations in the Ten-Nation Committee to an impasse, the General Assembly should examine most earnestly the situation that has arisen and take the necessary steps to remove the obstacles barring the way to a solution of the disarmament problem. To achieve this, it is necessary to declare bluntly and plainly, on behalf of all the States of the world, to those who prevent the success of disarmament negotiations:

It is time to put an end at last to manoeuvring and delays; a solution of the disarmament problem cannot be postponed any longer; the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament cannot be put off any more!

To expedite solution of the disarmament problem, the Soviet Government is submitting to the General Assembly a proposal entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament", which is appended $\frac{1}{1}$ to this statement.

The Soviet Government believes that this proposal provides a sound basis for drafting and concluding a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In this proposal, the Soviet Government goes even further to meet the position of the Mestern Powers and takes into account their attitude on a number of major points, including their assertions that it would be advisable, beginning with the first stage, to couple measures for nuclear disarmament with measures to reduce armed forces and conventional armaments. To this end, the Soviet Government proposes that a substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments should be provided for in the very first stage.

What is the essence of the Soviet proposal?

The Soviet Government proposes that within four years or some other agreed period all States should carry out in three consecutive stages the complete and final elimination of all their armed forces and armaments. At the same time all measures for disarmament must be strictly controlled so that not a single State can shirk its obligations under the treaty on general and complete disarmament and consequently, so that no State can take advantage of the elimination of the armed forces and armaments of other States for aggressive purposes.

In the first stage, which is to last for about a year or a year and a half, manufacture of the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets must be stopped and the existing stockpiles destroyed. In the first stage, too, all foreign military bases in the territories of other States must be dismantled and all foreign troops withdrawn from such territories. The strength of the armed forces of States must be substantially reduced, with the maximum strength of the armed forces of the USSR and the United States being set at the level of 1,700,000 men. Conventional armaments must be reduced accordingly.

The implementation of all these measures would mean that a year or a year and a half after the disarmament treaty becomes effective not a single State would have at its disposal military rockets or military aircraft capable of carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs, or warships equipped for this purpose, or any other means which could be used for delivering nuclear warheads to the target.

Not a single foreign military base - rocket, air, naval or any other - would remain in the territories of States. All foreign troops would be withdrawn from

the territories of other States whether or not they are occupation troops or are now stationed in foreign territory in accordance with some agreement. The armed forces and conventional armaments of States would be considerably reduced.

It would be no exaggeration to say that if all these disarmament measures were carried out, the world would heave a sigh of relief, since the arms race would be stopped, the danger of a surprise nuclear attack by one State on another would be eliminated and, in general, the threat of a sudden outbreak of war would be considerably reduced. All this would, of course, have a beneficial effect on the international situation as a whole.

However, the implementation of the disarmament measures proposed by the Soviet Government for the first stage would not in itself entirely remove the threat of war. Even then States would still retain nuclear and other weapons of mass extermination. But without the means of delivery, nuclear weapons cannot be used to harm other States. Therefore the means of delivery must be destroyed and control must be established to prevent their manufacture. States would still have large armed forces and conventional armaments. In other words, they would still have the reans of unleashing war.

Therefore, the Soviet Government proposes that, immediately following the completion of the measures of the first stage, which are to be carried out from beginning to end under strict international control, and after the international control organ and the Security Council have satisfied themselves that all the States have fulfilled their obligations for the first stage, States should proceed to the realization of other large-scale disarmament measures comprising the second stage.

In the second stage the Soviet Government proposes, among other measures, the complete prohibition of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass extermination as well as the discontinuance of the manufacture and destruction of the existing stockpiles of such weapons, and further reduction of the armed forces of States, together with a corresponding reduction of armaments and war matériel.

The implementation of these large-scale measures would mean that there would be no more weapons of mass extermination left in the world, while armed

forces and conventional armaments would have been substantially reduced. Obviously, this would reduce to a minimum the possibility of armed conflicts flaring up between States.

Yet, even this is not a complete and final solution of the problem now facing humanity. If States retain armed forces - even though on a reduced scale - the danger of war will not yet have been ruled out. But if so, how can we be sure that the arms race will not start again and the world will not, in the end, return to the present state of affairs?

The Soviet Government believes that <u>in the third stage</u> it will be necessary to go still further and complete the elimination of the armed forces and armaments of all States, stop war production, abolish war ministries, general staffs, and military and para-military institutions and organizations of every kind, and also stop appropriating funds for military purposes.

Upon the completion of the third stage of general and complete disarmament States would have neither soldiers nor weapons any longer, and the danger of war would be consequently eliminated once and for all. Then the age-old dream of humanity - a world without weapons, a world without wars - would have come true.

The internal security of States would be ensured by strictly limited and agreed contingents of police or militia. In case of need, States would place such contingents at the disposal of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international security.

These are the main points of the Soviet proposal, "Basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament".

The Soviet Government expects that the Members of the United Nations will consider the proposal, "Basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament" with all due seriousness and responsibility. The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the discussion of this proposal in the General Assembly will make it possible to proceed without delay to the practical solution of the disarmament problem and will provide specific guidance for the solution of this problem during negotiations in an appropriate working body. As for the composition of such a working body, it would seem necessary that, in addition

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to States belonging to the existing military blocs, wider opportunities in considering the disarmament question should also be given to States adhering to neutral positions. It would also be desirable that the main areas of the world should be represented in such a disarmament body.

The Soviet Government realizes that the working out of a treaty on general and complete disarmament will require patience, mutual regard for the interests of all parties, and flexibility on the part of all the participants in the negotiations. The Soviet Government, as before, is ready for such negotiations. It is aware that the peoples of the world, anxious for a radical solution of the disarmament problem, are eagerly waiting for practical measures for general and complete disarmament to be initiated as soon as possible.

Naturally, an important step ensuring the success of the negotiations on disarmament would be the re-establishment of the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. Thereby great China would become a party to the negotiations on disarmament.

The peoples of the world insistently demand a prompt solution of the disarmament problem. They expect the United Nations General Assembly to speak out with authority on this vital problem.

Good will and determination are required for the solution of the disarmament problem. It is in this spirit that the Soviet Government urges all Members of the United Nations to approach the consideration of the disarmament problem, the most burning and pressing problem of our times.

> N. KHRUSECHEV, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

23 September 1960