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*Chairman:* Mr. Jorge Pablo FERNANDINI  
(Peru).

## AGENDA ITEM 46

### *Operational activities for development (continued)* (A/6703 and Corr.1, chap. XIII, sects. I and II):

- (a) *Activities of the United Nations Development Programme: reports of the Governing Council*  
(A/6809, E/4297, E/4398);
- (b) *Activities undertaken by the Secretary-General*  
(A/6841)

1. Mr. HOFFMAN (Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme) said that, with the permission of the Committee, he would describe some general current trends in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) after the Co-Administrator, the Associate Administrator and the Assistant Administrators had each made a statement on the specific matters for which he was responsible.

2. Mr. OWEN (Co-Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme) said that the General Assembly had before it, at its twenty-second session, Economic and Social Council resolution 1250 (XLIII), which recommended that the Assembly should approve far-reaching changes in the programming procedures of the Technical Assistance component of the UNDP. The effect of the proposed changes would be to complete the transition to a system of continuous programming combined with project budgeting. Experience gained since 1950 by Governments, participating agencies and the Governing Council and administration of UNDP had convinced them that continuous programming would satisfy certain fundamental requirements of the Programme better than any other system. Those requirements were that the Programme should fully and directly reflect the needs and priorities of the recipient countries, that its procedures should be designed to facilitate the planning and utilization of technical assistance by Governments and that those procedures should be sufficiently flexible to allow adjustments to be made in the light of altered circumstances. Council resolution 222 (IX) which established the Expanded Pro-

gramme of Technical Assistance as a programme financed from voluntary contributions with central control of the distribution of funds to participating organizations, was the first step. Then, with the introduction of the country programming system in 1954, under Council resolution 542 (XVIII), individual Governments, under a new procedure which was still operative, were provided with an annual target and they then submitted request for funds, within the limits of their target, for approval by the Technical Assistance Committee.

3. The improved system now proposed was geared to development aid needs of recipients, and instead of forcing Governments to tailor their needs to fit an annual or biennial programming system, would enable them to make requests covering the entire duration of a project, up to a maximum of four years. The provision whereby funds available but not used in a given financial year could be added to the target for the following year would remove the need for hasty formulation of project requests. Moreover, the provision under which savings arising from the non-implementation or delayed implementation of a project would revert to the country target would enable recipient Governments to derive maximum benefit from the limited funds available.

4. The new procedure would first involve setting targets for the years 1969 and, provisionally, for the following three years, which after approval by the Governing Council, could be communicated to the Governments concerned. The changes would mean, in practice, that from 1969 onwards, a Government, on being informed of its annual target for the following year, would no longer be obliged to decide in advance on its technical assistance requirements for a programme year or biennium; in fact, if it did not submit requests and have them approved up to the full amount of the target before the end of the programme year, the consequence would simply be that the part, up to a maximum of 50 per cent, of the target remaining unprogrammed at the end of that year would be added to the target for the following year. Moreover, the Government would know that any savings resulting from assistance approved but not delivered in the programme year would be carried over to the following year. Governments would be asked to prepare a separate request for each project, specifying its objective, its relationship to national economic development plans or goals, the manner in which the assistance requested would help to meet the objective, the relationship of the assistance to other forms of aid, the arrangements for Government support for the project through the provision of counterpart staff, candidates for fellowships, buildings and equipment, etc. Once approved, the project

request and accompanying budget would result in a single allocation to the participating and executing agency concerned, covering the duration of the project up to maximum of four years. Continuous programming, involving a more rational and less rigid timetable, would help all concerned to play their proper part in the formulation of sound projects. Implementation would be better prepared and time and the country programme could more easily be adjusted; all those involved in the process could thereby improve the efficiency of the Technical Assistance component of the UNDP. He believed that the approval of the Second Committee and the General Assembly of the revised procedures would be in the best interests of the Programme and of all its participants.

5. The Council, in a decision taken at its 1497th meeting,<sup>1/</sup> had invited the Assembly to extend its authorization for the use of funds of the Technical Assistance component on the UNDP for the provision of operational personnel to cover the programme period beginning on 1 January 1969. Many Governments still had no choice but to fill some executive and administrative positions from outside their own public services, often through international recruitment, and it was thought desirable that their freedom of choice should be maintained. An evaluation of the entire OPEX (Programme for the provision of operational, executive and administrative personnel arrangement was in progress and it was hoped that the results would provide a basis for a definitive recommendation to the session of the Governing Council to be held in January concerning the place which such assistance should be given within the Technical Assistance component.

6. As the Committee was aware, the Fund of the United Nations for the Development of West Irian of \$30 million, though not a part of UNDP proper, was so close to its work that it would have seemed appropriate for the Secretary-General to have entrusted the work to the Administrator. An Executive Secretary of the Fund had been appointed. He had set up an office in Sukarnapura and, with the help of a team of consultants, was preparing a development plan for West Irian. A report providing for the expenditure of a substantial proportion of the Fund's monies was about to be considered by the Indonesian Government and its decision was expected in the near future.

7. Mr. HEURTEMATTE (Associate Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme) said that the purpose for which the Special Fund had been established—to prepare the ground in developing countries for the attraction of capital investment to key development projects—was clearly being achieved. For example, thirty-nine of the natural resources surveys and feasibility studies of the Special Fund component of the UNDP had already resulted in the investment of almost \$2,000 million of development capital. Moreover, of the \$47 million spent on those pre-investment projects, only \$24 million had been provided by UNDP; the remainder had been supplied by the recipient countries, whose domestic savings also accounted for some \$800 million of the \$2,000

million invested in development projects. Pre-investment surveys had, of course, produced a different type of financial benefit in those cases in which they revealed that a project was unlikely to be profitable and thus prevented the loss of scarce investment capital.

8. The other types of UNDP projects—those involving the setting up of training institutions and the establishment of national technical research institutes—were easy to assess in financial terms. The recipient countries had come to realize the importance of those institutions in supporting their national development efforts. In recent years, the Administrator of UNDP had begun to attach special importance to arrangements for the period following the completion of projects. Continuous consultation with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the regional banks had been initiated and had already, in some cases, brought results. Support for regional banks and national financial institutions had also been extended. Finally, co-operation with the capital exporting countries would be developed to help draw the attention to investment possibilities uncovered by UNDP. The Programme's association with IBRD and the Inter-American Development Bank, for instance, enabled UNDP (Special Fund) projects to be designed to take the lending policies of those institutions into account.

9. There were similar arrangements for consultations with the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, and UNDP had appointed advisers on pre-investment surveys to serve the regional development banks. Links had been established with the European Investment Bank and a number of institutions in Middle East. A particularly promising association was that with the multi-national Latin American investment association known as, ADELA, and its technical subsidiary, ADELATEC, which had organized international consortia to secure capital for two UNDP (Special Fund) projects. Two further examples of UNDP's support for national development banks were the Burundi Development Bank, to which it had assigned advisers, and the Caribbean Development Bank, which had been established as a result of the favourable report of a UNDP mission.

10. Despite such measures, there were instances of feasibility studies which had not been followed by investment. The administration of UNDP was actively seeking methods of informing potential investors of such opportunities and expected to be in a position to report to the Second Committee on the results achieved at the forthcoming session.

11. Mr. COHEN (Assistant Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme) said that the Secretary-General had already referred to the central role of UNDP in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization (A/6701/Add.1, para. 64). The Administrators and staff of UNDP thus had the responsibility to give leadership and guidance to the United Nations family of participating agencies in their combined response to the needs of the developing countries. There was a vast untapped potential of re-

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 1, "Other decisions", p. 11.

sources within the United Nations system of organizations and any measures which might strengthen the institutions and infrastructure of the system should be undertaken without hesitation. The Programme was seeking to achieve that end in its relationships with the agencies and through the Inter-Agency Consultative Board. It hoped, moreover, that the introduction of the new programming procedures for the Technical Assistance component of UNDP would lead to greater over-all flexibility and increased effectiveness in the Programme. Maintaining the special characteristics of the two programmes did not mean a rigid separation; on the contrary, a unified and well co-ordinated Programme would increase effectiveness. The phenomenal growth of the Programme, particularly in the previous eight years, the ever-growing scope and variety of projects and the increase in regional projects were surely an indication of wide confidence in its effectiveness.

12. The very success of the Programme had, however, created one of its major problems: its impact on the participating and executing agencies, which were confronted with the need to revise their thinking and undertake structural changes. Other serious problems were the effort required of Governments to mobilize their own human and financial resources and assign development priorities, the shortage of trained experts in some disciplines—with the concomitant need to train the next generation of experts—and the difficult process of translating the needs of the governments of developing countries into practical and realistic projects.

13. In that connexion, it should be remembered that the "pipeline" of requests for assistance reflected all existing requests. But in practice, there was a great need for well-prepared requests, in which sectoral needs were related to countries' general development plans. The administration of UNDP was helping Governments to prepare such requests through field visits by senior headquarters staff, by sending consultants to the countries to help with the formulation of requests, through its permanent system of field offices and Resident Representatives, and through regular meetings with the specialized agencies at which methods of relating sectoral to over-all needs were discussed.

14. Mr. HENRY (Assistant Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme) addressing himself to the growing scope of the Programme, said that the next ten years would be decisive for solving the problems of food supply and employment. The time needed to establish training institutions at all levels had been generally underestimated; at least ten years rather than five were needed. Furthermore, many existing institutions, particularly at the primary level, were not fulfilling their potential. Training efforts would therefore have to be continued at all levels, with particular emphasis on improving the effectiveness of institutions already in being. The problem of providing employment opportunities had been seriously under-estimated. Vocational training could not train all young people who needed that type of training, and there was a problem of ensuring employment after training.

15. Employment was linked to rural development, a field in which UNDP was receiving more and more project requests. Many Governments had found that all their trained personnel could not be absorbed through industrial development alone, and were therefore trying to increase the employment potential of rural areas, in particular by diversifying agricultural production in the rural areas, through agriculture and related activities.

16. In the field of natural resources, it was hoped that the world inventory could be completed within a few years. The world forestry survey, for example, would soon be completed as would, within ten years, the inventory of economically exploitable fisheries resources. Work was proceeding simultaneously on other surveys, and it was hoped that, as a result of the systematic application of rational methods and co-operation with public and private bilateral programmes, a global inventory of natural resources would eventually be produced.

17. The problem of applied research was particularly important, for difficulties often arose in the transfer of technology developed in temperate countries to tropical regions. The Programme was not satisfied with the results so far achieved, and would continue its efforts to carry out the aims of the United Nations Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas which was held at Geneva in 1963.

18. As a result of the establishment of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), UNDP was receiving more and more project requests relating to industrial development. The discussions in the Governing Council on UNDP had shown that the problem of pilot projects was very complex, for it was often difficult to determine where pre-investment ended and investment proper began. The Council had, however, declared that it was ready to examine both industrial and agricultural pilot projects, and two industrial projects would be submitted to it in January 1968.

19. Thus, the future direction of UNDP work would include further assistance to Governments in establishing national networks in such complex fields as meteorology and telecommunications, and would help integrate those networks into world-wide systems. In the next three years, far-reaching structural transformations in most developing countries were unlikely and UNDP would therefore concentrate on helping to increase agricultural and industrial production within the framework of existing conditions. In the case of industry, that would involve aiding small-scale and medium-scale industries.

20. Mr. COOMARASWAMY (Assistant Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme) said that one of the most important new developments in the Bureau of External Relations, Evaluating and Reports in 1967 had been the establishment of a separate Evaluation Division, responsible for devising and applying methods of measuring the Programme's effectiveness. The primary purpose of the Division's work was to improve that effectiveness, and more specifically, to keep the Administrator continuously informed of the Programme's experience at both the

sectoral and country levels, and to identify and analyse its strength and weaknesses so that the lessons learned could be systematically applied to policies and procedures. Evaluation covered substantive matters, such as the forms of assistance and the criteria and guide-lines for project selection and design, and procedural matters, such as the processes by which projects were approved, implemented and followed up.

21. To that end, the Division, which had been accorded a certain degree of independence, had begun a detailed examination of a large number of projects in certain defined sectors of the Programme—to begin with, power and multi-purpose river basin development, and education and training related to industry. It was hoped to derive from that examination findings which would provide useful guidance for the planning and implementation of new projects in the same fields.

22. Parallel with and, where possible, in relation to those sectoral studies, the Evaluation Division would undertake in 1968 the first of a series of country programme studies, which would eventually be extended to other fields, with a view not only to develop and apply methods of evaluating the Programme's effectiveness at the country level, but also to help develop the permanent evaluation functions of the Resident Representatives and, where desired, to assist Governments in evolving their own evaluation procedures. The Division was also responsible for special evaluation studies, for example, the survey of OPEX-type assistance to which the Co-Administrator had referred, and another current evaluation dealing with regional and interregional seminars and study tours.

23. The Reports and Statistics Division remained the main source of data on UNDP field activities. Over the years, systematic reporting arrangements had been set up between UNDP and its field offices and between UNDP and the participating and executing agencies to provide continuous up-to-date information on the Programme's activities and achievements. That Division produced most of the information needed for the operational control of the Programme and for the preparation of documents and special studies, as well as the more general material needed for public information purposes. The reporting arrangements were kept as flexible as possible and were frequently adjusted to extend the scope or improve the accuracy of the information obtained. For example, the reporting arrangements for the Technical Assistance component of the UNDP were being reviewed in order to devise methods which would reflect more accurately the work being done by individual experts in small but vital development operations. Similarly, procedures for reporting on the larger-scale pre-investment projects had been adjusted in order, for example, to support the new Development Finance Service by providing it with early information on investment possibilities which became apparent during project implementation.

24. The Division, in conjunction with the substantive divisions of the Bureau of Operations and Programming, was also responsible for ensuring that final reports on UNDP (Special Fund) projects gave recipient Governments a complete and accurate record of

results and solid objective data on which they could base their development decisions. The Administrator had been concerned at the sometimes lengthy delays that occurred before those reports could be submitted to Governments and was therefore introducing a new procedure under which Governments would be provided with a summary of the major findings and recommendations at a much earlier date.

25. Lastly, the Division for External Relations was responsible for ensuring liaison and co-ordination with other members of the United Nations family and the international community in general, and provided the secretariat for the Governing Council and the Inter-Agency Consultative Board.

26. Mr. KRACZKIEWICZ (Assistant Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme) said that he would confine his remarks to two aspects of the work of the Bureau of Administrative Management and Budget which were of particular importance to the Committee: recruitment of experts and co-ordination in the field.

27. Delays in the recruitment of experts were one of the major stumbling blocks to programme implementation, and the Governing Council had urged the Administrator to devise ways and means of avoiding them. That would not be easy, for UNDP was only indirectly concerned with recruitment, which was primarily the responsibility of the participating and executing agencies. The UNDP secretariat had carried out studies of the problem and had held a series of consultations with executing agencies, which had shown that the recruitment problem was, in fact, two-fold, since it stemmed both from a shortage of candidates and from deficiencies at all stages of the recruitment process. The agencies had compiled a list of fields in which experts were in particularly short supply, and had sent it to Member States, especially those which provided experts. The shortage was not yet acute in all fields, but might well become so as programmes expanded.

28. The problem of deficiencies in the recruitment process was equally, or perhaps even more important, but was relatively easier to tackle. The Programme and the agencies therefore believed that, at the present stage, it would be advisable to concentrate on improving the recruitment process. Recipient Governments could help by formulating project objectives more clearly, so that they could be easily translated into job descriptions. Resident Representatives of UNDP and agency representatives could assist Governments in that respect. Recipient Governments could also contribute by evaluating candidates more realistically, by speeding up the clearance of experts, by improving their living conditions and by ensuring, for instance, that they were treated on a par with bilateral experts. The Governments which provided experts could facilitate the search for candidates by strengthening or establishing national committees dealing with recruitment. They could help to obtain the release of qualified candidates and guarantee them re-employment on return from their assignments. Those Governments bore the main responsibility for training experts to meet future needs. The agencies, for their part, should try to widen the scope of their search for experts, pay

more frequent visits to countries which provided experts and arrange more interviews. They could improve and accelerate the procedures whereby project descriptions were converted into job descriptions and could also consider alternative methods, such as the use of sub-contracting. The Programme believed that, in some fields, sub-contracting constituted a convenient and efficient means of mitigating the shortage of experts and encouraged agencies to use it more often.

29. Lastly, UNDP could assist by identifying difficulties and problems and bringing them to the attention of Governments and agencies. Furthermore, it could devise programme procedures that would facilitate recruitment, for example the new programme procedures mentioned by the Co-Administrator, which would help to prevent the many programme changes which now occurred and which greatly complicated recruitment. Where appropriate, UNDP could also help in finding the financial resources to improve recruitment processes and strengthen the recruitment staff of the agencies. The Administrator of UNDP had prepared a report on recruitment problems for submission to the Governing Council, in which he would propose a series of remedial measures. However, the problem was complex and progress would inevitably be gradual.

30. With regard to co-ordination in the field, it was recognized that, basically, recipient Governments were responsible for co-ordinating assistance programmes at the country level. However, Governments often sought the advice of impartial advisers, such as UNDP Resident Representatives. Furthermore, assistance was now being provided by over thirteen participating and executing agencies, thus creating a need for co-ordination at the international level, which was one of the main tasks of the Resident Representatives. The Economic and Social Council, the Governing Council of UNDP and the Second Committee had repeatedly expressed the wish that the co-ordinating role of the Resident Representatives should be expanded and strengthened, and UNDP was trying to comply with that request in two ways. First, it was seeking to achieve better inter-agency understanding of the Resident Representatives' role. That role had been described in the "ten points" approved by the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) in 1961.<sup>2/</sup> Following the establishment of UNDP, a revised system of policy co-ordination at the country level, drawn up by the agencies on the initiative of UNDP, had been endorsed by ACC in June 1966 and by the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 1262 (XLIII). Secondly, UNDP was endeavouring to conclude bilateral agreements with individual agencies. In 1966, the Administrator had concluded an agreement with the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) regarding the integration of FAO representatives into the offices of UNDP Resident Representatives. By the end of 1967, it was hoped to have some twenty senior agricultural advisers working with Resident Representatives. A similar agreement had recently been concluded with (UNIDO)

and six or seven industrial advisers should be working in the field by the end of 1967 or the beginning of 1968. It was hoped that further agreements would be concluded, and UNDP was already in touch with one other agency in that connexion. The Administrator attached great importance to that form of strengthening co-operation in the field, for, in the long run, it was the most efficient and economical way of dealing with a very complex matter.

31. Mr. HOFFMAN (Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme) said that the "team" presentation by his colleagues had shown the truly international character of UNDP, which was also reflected in the calibre of the Programme's field office staffs around the world.

32. As the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs had pointed out at the 1109th meeting, almost all the low-income countries had greatly increased their capability for development. The role of UNDP was to assist low-income countries in further increasing that capability. That was done by helping those countries to improve their capacity, first, to mobilize considerable amounts to domestic and external capital, and, secondly, to make effective use of such capital as well as of other development resources, both physical and human.

33. Some statistics would serve to demonstrate the progress achieved. Ninety-seven of the 328 pre-investment surveys approved thus far by the Governing Council of UNDP have now been completed. Thirty-nine of those projects—costing recipient Governments and the UNDP some \$47 million—had already stimulated \$1.91 billion in follow-up investment, over one third from domestic sources. That was a return-to-cost ratio of about 40 to 1. As a result of UNDP-supported projects, large economically workable deposits of industrial ores had been discovered and millions of acres of fallow land capable of providing large quantities of food had been located and mapped, together with the water resources needed for irrigation and for electric power. Even more striking progress had been achieved in the development of human resources: more than 300,000 nationals of low-income countries had been equipped in their own countries with the technical knowledge, working skills and professional experience essential for increasing economic output and improving social conditions.

34. Another way in which UNDP was increasing the development capability of developing countries was through strengthening international co-operation among developed and developing countries, to speed the development process in the general interest. In 1966 alone, more than 6,500 experts from more than 100 nations, together with their counterparts from recipient countries, had been employed in the field. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization had become a participating and executing agency, while UNCTAD had become a member of the Programme's Inter-Agency Consultative Board. Although not all Governments had yet announced their pledges for 1968, the resources pledged to UNDP had already reached a record level and it seemed certain that there would also be a record number of voluntary contributors. Moreover, it had once more been shown that poverty in the low-income countries was caused

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid., Thirty-fourth Session, Annexes, agenda item 3, document E/3625, para. 31.

not by a lack of resources, but by their under-utilization. A recent survey by the Society for International Development estimated, in fact, that almost 80 per cent of potential physical resources, and almost 90 per cent of potential human resources, in developing countries were not being utilized.

35. There was clearly an urgent need recognized by donors and recipients to strengthen information activities as a means of securing increased support for development efforts. More extensive and effective information work in donor countries could do much to combat public scepticism, raise the level of resources available to UNDP and facilitate the recruitment of highly qualified experts for work in the field. In developing countries, the creative use of traditional and modern communications methods could help, inter-alia, to achieve greater respect for vocational education and more co-operation from public and private sectors in development planning, to enlist interest in follow-up investment possibilities, to promote an improvement in the status and conditions of service of counterpart personnel, to encourage the introduction of new agricultural techniques, to expand markets, and to prepare the population for the profound changes in their way of life that progress always entailed. In short, the key to development was people, and more attention must be given to their attitudes and knowledge about development.

36. Although both the expenditure and the number of projects undertaken by UNDP and its predecessors had increased more than five times between 1959 and 1966, the growth of the Programme had been inadequate to meet valid Government requests for assistance. Voluntary contributions in the same period had risen only about three and a half times. Future requirements were admittedly difficult to assess, but the Secretary-General in his annual report on the work of the Organization (A/6701 and Corr.1, chap. XII) had estimated that voluntary contributions to UNDP must reach at least \$350 million annually by 1970 if the minimum needs for assistance were to be met. That was not a forced growth, but a natural evolution stemming from an increased understanding of the highly complex process of development and the key role that pre-investment and technical assistance could play in it. Paradoxically, one of the difficulties that UNDP faced in obtaining resources was that the amounts required for pre-investment and technical assistance were small. But pre-investment was an indispensable step towards stimulating the sizable amounts of investment which the low-income countries required.

37. Although almost everything needed to accelerate the development process was potentially available, the time factor was critical, because poverty was a threat to peace. The main threat lay in poverty of opportunity, and the international community should set itself the long-range goal of eliminating that form of poverty. Experience since 1958 had shown that most countries with a per capita income of \$100 or less were liable to violent internal upheavals, while every outbreak of hostilities between nations since the Second World War had originated in the less developed parts of the world. Moreover, there was an enormous discrepancy between the sums spent on armaments

and those devoted to peace-building through development assistance: in 1967, approximately \$175,000 million would have been spent on armaments and less than \$7,500 million on development assistance—much of which was in interest-bearing loans or investments. Those constituted no burden on the taxpayer. However, the richer countries, whose gross national product already amounted to some \$1,500 billion could readily afford to meet both their legitimate defence needs and their obligation to help accelerate world economic progress, since all what was needed was to double the present flow of resources to the developing countries to \$15,000 million within three years.

38. In the struggle against world poverty, scepticism and apathy must be set aside and new ways found to help the developing countries achieve in thirty years what the industrialized nations had taken 300 years to accomplish. One of the most important first steps towards that goal was the initiation of a comprehensive global strategy for development, which would be one of the most urgent priorities in the next three years. The establishment of such a strategy would be an extremely difficult task, and UNDP would need the Second Committee's assistance in defining the Programme's role and in carrying it out effectively.

39. The CHAIRMAN thanked the Administrator of UNDP and his colleagues for their statements. The work being done by UNDP was one of the most vital of all United Nations activities, since the evils facing mankind often sprang from economic injustice, and political differences caused by economic disparities frequently threatened peace. He particularly welcomed the Administrator's statement that the utilization of resources was the key to accelerated development, and special efforts would have to be made to help developing countries in that respect.

40. Mr. CHAMMAS (Lebanon), supported by Mr. VARELA (Panama) and Lord CARADON (United Kingdom), requested that the full text of the statement by the Administrator of UNDP should be circulated as an official Committee document.

41. Mr. BOIKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) supported that request. He considered that the statement made at the previous meeting by the Commissioner for Technical Co-operation should also be circulated as an official document.

42. The CHAIRMAN said that, in the absence of any objection, he assumed that the Committee agreed that the statements made by the Commissioner for Technical Co-operation<sup>3/</sup> and by the Administrator of UNDP<sup>4/</sup> should be circulated as official Committee documents.

*It was so decided.*

43. Mr. WANKHEDE (India) said that another year of successful activity had been completed by UNDP, which continued to play an increasingly significant role in promoting the economic and social development of the developing countries. India particularly wel-

<sup>3/</sup> The complete text of the statement made by the Commissioner for Technical Co-operation was circulated as document A/C.2/L.967.

<sup>4/</sup> The complete text of the statement made by the Administrator of UNDP was circulated as document A/C.2/L.968.



comed the extension of its activities to a number of new fields in response to the growing needs of developing countries, which were facing serious problems caused by rapid population increases and balance-of-payments difficulties. Another example of UNDP's flexibility was the changes which the Governing Council had decided to introduce in the programming procedures of the Technical Assistance component of the UNDP. His delegation wholeheartedly welcomed those changes, which were designed to improve the quality of technical assistance projects while providing increased flexibility of implementation. He particularly welcomed the Council's decision to delegate to the Administrator of UNDP the authority to review and approve projects submitted by recipient Governments within the limits of their country targets. That provision would ensure flexibility and continuous programming, and would enable requests for assistance to be met promptly. India fully supported Economic and Social Council resolution 1250 (XLIII) concerning the new procedures, and endorsed the draft resolution contained in that resolution which was recommended for adoption by the General Assembly.

44. Another important decision taken by the Governing Council of UNDP at its fourth session related to pilot and demonstration plants (see E/4398, para. 129 (a) (ii)), and it was gratifying that general agreement had been reached on approving the increasing number of requests for assistance in the establishment of such plants.

45. The Indian delegation welcomed the addition of UNIDO to the family of participating and executing agencies. It was to be hoped that the organization would soon be able to begin operational activities in the field of industrial development and that the Governing Council of UNDP would be able to approve an increasing number of projects in that field. If UNIDO was to be truly action-oriented, it would have to have field representatives in as many developing countries as possible in order to establish effective contact with Governments and assist them in the formulation of requests for assistance.

46. India was glad to see the importance being attached to UNCTAD's role in providing substantive support for technical assistance activities in the field of export promotion, and welcomed the recent discussions between the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, the Director-General of GATT (General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade) the Executive Secretaries of the regional economic commissions and the representatives of UNIDO, UNDP and FAO, with a view to the co-ordination of efforts in that field. It was to be hoped that those discussions would lead to the harmonious utilization of all existing facilities through the development of appropriate centralized services and regional centres.

47. Although no UNDP projects had so far been held up through lack of resources, such a situation might soon arise unless special efforts were made to find additional resources. India supported the Secretary-General's call for annual contributions of \$350 million by 1970, and hoped that the industrialized countries would respond to that appeal and make appropriate increases in their pledges, so as to enable the Programme to meet the growing needs of developing countries.

48. The regular programme of technical assistance continued to play an important part in providing what had been recently described as "seed-money". It was a matter for concern that the annual appropriation for that programme had remained at the level of \$6.4 million despite the considerable increase in the total United Nations budget and the growth in the needs of developing countries. Requests for assistance under the regular programme already far exceeded the funds available to the programme, the value of which had in any case been reduced by about 20 per cent because of increased costs. Although India had endorsed the Economic and Social Council's decision (resolution 1251 (XLIII)) to recommend an appropriation of \$6.4 million for 1968 because there had been no consensus in favour of an increase, it was to be hoped that the General Assembly could reconsider the matter and that the appropriation could be increased before existing investments were adversely affected.

49. The Indian delegation wished to express its warm appreciation of the high standards of efficiency maintained by the Administrator and Co-Administrator of UNDP and the Commissioner for Technical Co-operation. Under their able leadership, he was sure that the UNDP and the United Nations programme of technical co-operation would continue to make an increasingly important contribution to the economic growth of the developing countries.

*The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.*

