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Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Government of the Republic of China (A/2375, A/C.1/L.42, A/C.1/L.43, A/C.1/L.44/Rev.1) (continued)

[Item 77]*

1. Mr. LAWRENCE (Liberia) observed that the Committee was confronted with a problem as old as history—the problem of the strong man taking advantage of the weak.

2. At the 605th meeting, the representative of Burma had clearly and convincingly presented his Government's complaint against the Government of the Republic of China in Formosa. He had charged that that Government had committed acts of aggression against and violated the territorial integrity of Burma by the establishment and maintenance of armed forces within the country, and that those forces had the avowed intention of attacking a neighbouring country with which Burma was in friendly relations.

3. It would seem that a small remnant of the Chinese Nationalist Army had fled across the border from China, and that those troops had refused to submit themselves to Burmese authority, to be duly disarmed and interned, in accordance with international law. On the contrary, they had offered resistance to the Burmese armed forces. As a consequence, the Burmese forces had been obliged to engage the Chinese Nationalist forces in defence of Burma's independence. The representative of Burma had asserted that the Burmese forces would have easily expelled the Chinese Nationalist invaders were it not that the invaders received outside aid in the form of arms and other material from the Government in Formosa. The representative of Burma had further asserted that the invading forces had been exacting tribute from local inhabitants and using them in the construction of airfields, roads and other military establishments. The original band of 1,700 men had increased to 12,000 well equipped men. During the three years of fighting, the Burmese believed that the increased equipment had been supplied by the

Government in Formosa, a conclusion which appeared inescapable.

4. In his statement at the 605th meeting on 17 April, the representative of China had admitted that the original force which had entered Burmese territory had been composed of units of the Nationalist Army of China, but that General Li Mi, who was an officer of the Nationalist Army in Formosa, and his forces were not completely subject to the orders of the Government of the Republic of China.

5. The Liberian delegation urged that the Government in Formosa should exercise all possible influence over those troops, in the most unequivocal manner. Moreover, every directive and every possible coercive measure should be used to cause those forces in Burma to surrender and submit to internment or withdrawal. That would constitute evidence of the goodwill and desire of the Formosa Government to have General Li Mi and his forces leave Burmese territory.

6. The representative of China had stated, on 17 April that about 200 men of the Chinese Nationalist Army had accepted internment in Burma at the beginning of 1950. Those men had complained of maltreatment and poor food and housing. The Chinese representative had concluded that the current problem would not be so great or so difficult had the treatment accorded by the Burmese Government been better. Mr. Lawrence felt that that was a novel argument for the refusal to disarm and to be interned in accordance with international law. That argument appeared to him to strengthen rather than to refute the charges made by the Government of Burma.

7. The evidence submitted by the Burmese delegation was most cogent, adequate and forceful. Mr. Lawrence hoped that the great majority of the delegations had been convinced by that proof and that they would acknowledge the fact that hostile foreign armed forces were present on Burmese soil, and that the territorial integrity of Burma had been violated, with a resultant threat to its independence and to world peace. The Liberian delegation was convinced that aggression had been carried out against Burma and considered that the United Nations should unhesitatingly condemn

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

that aggression in unequivocal terms. Aggression had now taken place in Burma, yet tomorrow it might take place anywhere else.

8. In conclusion, Mr. Lawrence hoped that the United Nations would now, as in the past, continue to uphold the principles of the Charter, which called for the respect of the political independence and territorial integrity of all Member States. He would support any draft resolution which would bring to Burma the relief to which it was entitled.

9. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that the representative of Burma had given ample evidence in support of his Government's complaint concerning aggressive action by the Kuomintang group in Formosa. The presence of foreign troops in Burma had been discussed in the international Press during the last three years, and world public opinion had been concerned that a new centre for military operations was being established in Burma for purposes of political blackmail and pressure against the Far East in general and the People's Republic of China in particular. From the statement made by the representative of Burma and various Press reports, it was possible to arrive at a good picture of the situation in that part of the world.

10. The remnants of the Kuomintang armed forces which had been defeated in 1950 and which had constituted the nucleus of the Kuomintang group in Burma, had grown in size and now had even airfields at their disposal. It was General Li Mi, a Kuomintang general, who conducted the over-all operations. The marauding forces in Burma acted as though they were in conquered territory. They terrorized the population, plundered, looted, stole and even killed members of the Burmese Government and local authorities. They forced the local population to build roads, runways and other military installations for them.

11. The Government of Burma had called on the commander of those forces to surrender and leave Burma immediately. When General Li Mi had refused to comply, and instead had engaged in military operations against the Burmese armed forces, the latter had attempted, without success, to force the bandits to comply with the legitimate claims of the Burmese Government. Military operations were still continuing, and the efforts to achieve a solution by diplomatic means had not succeeded. There was no doubt, in the light of evidence, that the Kuomintang armed forces in Burma were directed by the Chiang Kai-shek group in Taiwan (Formosa). General Li Mi was undoubtedly a subordinate of Chiang Kai-shek. General Li Mi appeared to be the official commander of these armed forces and maintained a constant liaison with the authorities in Taiwan about his military operations in Burma. Moreover, the representative of Burma had cited many facts showing that General Li Mi acted under the direct instructions of the Chiang Kai-shek group, thus proving that the entire responsibility for the aggression against Burma must be borne by the authorities in Taiwan and their supporters.

12. The fact that the Taiwan authorities supplied the armed forces in Burma with military equipment was admitted by Chiang Kai-shek himself. Furthermore, the various exhibits submitted by the Burmese representative had proved conclusively that the armed forces in

Burma were subject to the authorities in Formosa, and that those forces were equipped with the latest weapons, provided by air from Formosa. It was quite clear that technical equipment could only be supplied from Formosa, a fact which was also confirmed by the American Press. It was clear, however, that there must be some way other than the air-lift to transport the tremendous amount of arms, and there was no doubt that Thailand was this transportation link. Press reports stated that such substantial arms and ammunition could only be sent with the approval and assistance of the Government of Thailand, and that the territory of Thailand was used by the aggressors in Burma as a route for the transportation of their military supplies.

13. Some representatives had sought to gloss over such facts, and to cite others, without disproving those which had been adduced, confining their statements to generalities. Yet the aforementioned facts disproved the contentions of the Kuomintang representative that the Kuomintang group in Taiwan did not bear responsibility for the aggression committed against the Union of Burma.

14. Moreover, the aggressive activities of the Kuomintang-directed bands in Burma were also aimed against the People's Republic of China. It would be recalled that those forces had invaded the Chinese province of Yunnan, but had been crushed and forced back into Burma. That invasion had been designed to undermine the peaceful and constructive work of the liberated people of China. It was obvious that the tremendous task of rehabilitation and reconstruction which was being successfully carried out in China had aroused hatred and rage among General Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang group, who had been expelled from China by the Chinese people. That group's attempts to return to China in order once again to oppress the Chinese people were undoubtedly doomed to failure.

15. In conclusion, Mr. Kiselyov urged the Committee to condemn those acts of aggression and to take all the necessary steps to put an end to them. Such a decision would be welcomed by world public opinion. His delegation fully supported the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.42) submitted by the Burmese delegation.

16. Mr. BAKR (Iraq) expressed his gratification at the way the debate had developed in the First Committee, without heat or rancour. The discussion, as a result, had elicited the facts of the situation and had allowed the delegations to look clearly into the present complaint. He hoped that the happy atmosphere which had followed the unanimous vote in the General Assembly on Korea (427th plenary meeting) would continue to the benefit of the United Nations.

17. The complaint of the Government of Burma was precisely the type of problem which the Organization was equipped to study, with a view to finding a solution. It was a case which provided an opportunity for applying the precepts of the Charter. It would be most unfortunate if the United Nations failed to find a solution, and the Committee should therefore make a special effort in that regard.

18. The principle involved was of the greatest importance. A marauding army had violated Burmese territory, waged war and engaged in lawlessness. The Government of Burma had been fully justified in com-

plaining of the violation. No State could tolerate a position where a foreign army, having violated its frontiers, continued to wage war with the help of foreign governments or groups. Such a situation was fraught with ugly possibilities. It would make it possible for another government to smuggle large numbers of its troops under some disguise and use them as a hostile element to carry out acts of aggression or subversion. Most dangerous of all would be the fact that such a force was armed and supplied by a foreign government. No matter what justification there might be for such a situation, the fact remained that it was extremely dangerous, particularly since it might lead to circumstances which would invite the intervention of foreign Powers.

19. The facts of the case proved indisputably that the Chinese Nationalist Army in Burma had committed an act of aggression and that that army had been supplied with arms and equipment by some foreign source. An army could not fight for four years without receiving continuous supplies of arms and ammunition from an outside source. The Iraqi delegation considered that the argument concerning the degree of control exercised over that army by the Government of the Republic of China was somewhat open to question. The representative of China had denied that his Government had control over the army, but had admitted that it had some influence over its commander. If it had some influence with General Li Mi, the commander, that meant at least some control over his army. Hence it should not be difficult to get General Li Mi to refrain from his activities, if the Government of the Republic of China so desired.

20. The conclusion as to what should be done appeared inescapable: the United Nations should require that the Chinese troops in Burma submit to the requirements of international law. They should either be disarmed and interned or leave the country. Moreover, the United Nations should call upon all Members concerned to co-operate along those lines. In the circumstances, that relatively small army could not be expected to invade any territory around it. The Members of the United Nations could surely not allow a foreign military base to be established illegally on the soil of a sovereign and independent country. The United Nations could surely not remain idle while a dangerous and explosive situation was developing which might turn into an insoluble world problem. Nor was it possible to condone the principle that some Powers supplied arms to a foreign army in a foreign country, whose frontiers and sovereignty had been violated.

21. In conclusion, Mr. Bakr asserted that his Government was friendly both to the Government of the Republic of China and the Union of Burma. His delegation, however, had viewed the facts of the situation in the light of the Charter and international law and hoped that the United Nations would not shirk its duty.

22. Mr. JOHNSON (Canada) wished to join in the tribute already paid to the representative of Burma, who had presented his Government's case with restraint and eloquence. His statement had actually consisted of two parts. In the first part, he had submitted evidence to establish that about 12,000 Chinese troops were on Burmese territory, that they were living off the country and that they refused to withdraw or to be

disarmed and interned. In the second part of his statement, he had endeavoured to demonstrate that the Chinese troops were under the direct control of the Government of the Republic of China.

23. The representative of China had denied that his Government had effective control over General Li Mi's troops, but he had made no real effort to challenge the main allegations contained in the first part of the statement of the representative of Burma. Hence there appeared to be little doubt that General Li Mi's forces had, contrary to international law, maintained themselves in Burma for the past few years and had refused to withdraw or to be disarmed and interned. Indeed, the Burmese Government was in an intolerable situation, and the restraint it had shown in bringing the case to the United Nations only after years of negotiations had produced no solution was all the more commendable.

24. It was another matter, however, for the Assembly to declare that the Government of the Republic of China was wholly responsible for the activities of General Li Mi's forces. There now seemed to be a good chance of reaching agreement with the Government of the Republic of China to use its influence to secure the withdrawal of Chinese troops in Burma, and the Canadian delegation therefore hoped that the Burmese Government would not press for a formal condemnation of the Government of the Republic of China as an aggressor.

25. A more appropriate draft resolution would be one which, while recognizing the established facts of the case and the principles of international law, would place the main emphasis upon the paramount hope of reaching a practical solution by negotiation between the parties directly concerned, with such assistance as could be rendered by third parties. Such a draft resolution was more likely to provide a solution to the current difficulty than an outright condemnation of the Government of the Republic of China, whose direct control over General Li Mi's forces was doubted by several representatives. The Canadian delegation would, however, vote for a draft resolution deploring the activities of General Li Mi's forces on Burmese soil.

26. Mr. Johnson hoped, therefore, that the Burmese representative would respond to his appeal to accept some modification of his draft resolution; by so doing, he would be contributing to the speedy and peaceful withdrawal of Chinese forces from Burma. The Canadian delegation would examine all draft resolutions in the light of those considerations.

27. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) considered it his duty to state clearly that the presence of foreign troops on Burmese territory should in no way be condoned, but on the contrary should be forthrightly condemned, and that effective measures should be taken which might lead to the surrender or eventual evacuation of those troops.

28. If the United Nations did not denounce and condemn the presence of such alien forces on Burmese soil, nothing would prevent the occurrence of similar adventures in other parts of the world. The adoption of an appropriate resolution by the United Nations would undoubtedly greatly facilitate the task of Member States which maintained friendly relations with the Government of the Republic of China in Formosa in

prevailing on it to take all the steps which would lead to a satisfactory solution for Burma. He would consider an appropriate resolution to be one containing positive elements, such as were embodied in the draft resolution submitted by Mexico (A/C.1/L.44/Rev.1). Any draft resolution couched in weaker terms might encourage those who had so far abetted the Chinese forces to relax their efforts to bring about a solution.

29. As an Asian country, Saudi Arabia was highly concerned about the Burmese question, particularly since, if such incidents were to be allowed to occur, they might lead to a series of conflicts or possibly civil wars, to the detriment of the economic, social, and cultural development of Asia.

30. It was fortunate for the United Nations that it was two small Member States that were involved in the present conflict. Otherwise, the Organization might have become involved in a situation far more grave. However, aggression was aggression regardless of whether it had been launched by a big or a small nation, and it could plunge the world into a global conflict. The Saudi Arabian delegation would therefore give its support to Burma, which was a victim of aggression.

31. Mr. LUDIN (Afghanistan) declared that the representative of Burma had clearly and convincingly established the fact of the presence in Burma of 12,000 Chinese troops, professing allegiance to the Chinese Nationalist cause and receiving moral encouragement as well as material aid from the Government of the Republic of China in Taiwan. Those troops had been engaged for the past three years in continuous conflict with the Burmese armed forces and had inflicted suffering and deprivation on the peace-loving people of Burma. They had levied taxes and exacted forced labour and had exercised the functions of a foreign occupation army. Instead of abiding by international law and submitting to disarmament and internment, they had engaged in subversive activities against the Burmese Government, with a view to overthrowing it.

32. All those acts constituted a clear-cut case of aggression which was thoroughly unjustifiable. Even to the most ardent believer in the cause of Nationalist China, which those forces professed to promote, it must have become obvious that these bands preferred the sanctuary of the Burmese soil to the obvious trials and tribulations which might await them on the soil of China. On the other hand, even from the strictly Nationalist Chinese point of view, the irregular armed forces operating on the soil of Burma did not offer any justification for their continued existence.

33. The Chinese representative, in his statement on 17 April, had paid a touching tribute to the armed forces under the command of General Li Mi, stating that those forces were regarded as heroes by all free Chinese everywhere. Mr. Tsiang presumably viewed with disfavour the activities of those irresponsible armed forces on the soil of Burma and disclaimed any visible relations existing between his Government and those armed forces, yet at the same time, he had ventured to praise them as heroes and patriots. In fact, General Li Mi had even been designated as the Gari-baldi of China.

34. Furthermore, Mr. Tsiang had stated that his Government had some degree of influence over those armed forces and that that influence varied from time

to time. The Afghan delegation hoped that the degree of that influence was commensurate with the amount of moral and material assistance rendered by the Government of the Republic of China to those forces. The ties between the Nationalist Chinese elements in Burma and the parent organization on Formosa were real and demonstrable. Formosa could undoubtedly exercise a considerable measure of influence over those forces.

35. The picture which had emerged from the statements of the Burmese and the Chinese representatives was a sinister and ugly one, involving international dangers and complications, and hence deserved the most serious and urgent attention of the General Assembly. The real problem was the disarming and internment of the Chinese forces in Burma. That could be brought about by bringing to bear on those forces all moral influences which could be rallied for a peaceful settlement of the problem.

36. The Afghan delegation hoped that every kind of moral censure and disapprobation would be used to discourage the aggressors and to compel them to desist from their wrongdoing and to persuade them to submit to the due process of international law. The Government of the Republic of China and the neighbours of Burma might be called upon to render every assistance to realize the United Nations objective.

37. The delegation of Afghanistan was prepared to give whole-hearted support to the Burmese draft resolution, while it would carefully study the other draft resolutions submitted on the item.

38. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the complaint of Burma of aggression against it by the Kuomintang group in Formosa deserved the most serious attention of the United Nations.

39. The remnants of the Kuomintang bands led by Chiang Kai-shek, which had been routed by the armies of the People's Republic of China, had fled into Burma and, instead of surrendering their weapons in accordance with international law, had opposed the Burmese armed forces. Those bands would clearly have been easily liquidated by the armed forces of Burma but for the assistance and direct support given to them and their aggressive activities by the Chiang Kai-shek group in Taiwan. Judging by the official documents submitted by the Government of Burma, that group, notwithstanding the contentions of its representative in the Committee, led and directed the operations of the marauding bands against the Union of Burma, for which aggressive acts the Taiwan authorities bore full responsibility. The Kuomintang group, through General Li Mi, controlled the operations, and the general maintained liaison between the two areas by moving back and forth between them. For two years, the Kuomintang bands had received equipment and supplies from Taiwan, which had enabled them to build up their strength and widen their constant criminal operations against the population of Burma.

40. It had been contended that the Kuomintang bands which had invaded Burma were not under the control and direction of the Chiang Kai-shek group in Taiwan. In that connexion, the United Kingdom representative had referred (608th meeting) to the distances involved, apparently to prove that the Taiwan group could not physically exert a sufficient amount of influ-

ence over the predatory forces in Burma. But there was a wealth of evidence which left no room whatever for doubt as to the control and direction exercised by the Kuomintang group in Taiwan. Despite the attempts to portray the matter otherwise, the facts proved that the Kuomintang units in Burma had been grouped in regular army units under the sole command of General Li Mi, who had been appointed by the Chiang Kai-shek group in Taiwan. The documents submitted by the Government of Burma showed that the Kuomintang units in Burma were disposed in military districts, just like regular army. Those units were none the less bandits, as the Government of Burma contended, since no other name could be given to regular army units which engaged in crimes such as they had committed in Burma.

41. It was clear that the Chiang Kai-shek group in Taiwan controlled the operations of the bandits in Burma. Even were there no other evidence to that effect—such as, for instance, exhibit 10 of the file of documents submitted by Burma¹ which quoted the commander of one of the Kuomintang divisions in Burma as saying that those forces constituted the army of the National Republic of China, under the direct command of Chiang Kai-shek, or such as the letter from Chiang Kai-shek's son, which the Kuomintang representative had misinterpreted—the appeal made by Chiang Kai-shek to the forces in Burma sufficed to reveal the true relationship between the Kuomintang authorities in Taiwan and the Kuomintang bandits in Burma.

42. Mr. Baranovsky was surprised that some delegations refused to open their eyes to the obvious aggression which the Kuomintang group was guilty of committing against the Union of Burma. His delegation, on the basis of the convincing documents made available by the representative of Burma, as well as the additional facts adduced in that representative's statement, considered as fully proven the charge of aggression committed by the Chiang Kai-shek group in Taiwan against Burma. It was also established beyond any doubt that that group was guilty of gross interference in the domestic affairs of Burma, and that the Kuomintang bands were guilty of crimes against the Burmese people.

43. The Union of Burma had every reason to consider the situation as one which gave rise to a threat to international peace and security. The General Assembly could not ignore the dangerous situation which had developed in Burma and must take all the necessary steps, in accordance with the Charter, to end the Kuomintang aggression against Burma.

44. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR unconditionally supported the complaint of the Union of Burma and endorsed the draft resolution submitted by that country.

45. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia) considered that the picture as it had emerged from the debate was quite clear, and that there was a definite trend in the views of the majority on the matter.

46. Before discussing that, he wished to refer to Mr. Tsiang's assertion on 17 April, in connexion with certain statements reported in *The Times* of London as having been made by Mr. Soong in Bangkok, that Mr. Soong had requested that the account of those

remarks should be corrected. In the short period of time available, the Indonesian delegation had searched through all the recent copies of *The Times* of London, but regretted that it had been unable to find either a correction or a letter requesting a correction. He emphasized that his interest in the matter stemmed from the importance and the nature of the statements made by Mr. Soong.

47. There were certain basic facts which Mr. Palar thought the Committee was generally agreed upon: in the first place, all had been impressed by the facts adduced by the representative of Burma, as well as by the manner in which that representative had presented his case; secondly, there had been an invasion of Burmese territory by alien forces; thirdly, those forces should either be removed or interned; and, fourthly, the presence and actions of those forces should not be condoned, but should be condemned.

48. There remained the question of whether the forces on Burmese soil were linked with the Formosa Government. It was the considered opinion of the Indonesian delegation that the representative of Burma had proved the existence of such a link and that the aggression in Burma must therefore be considered as aggression carried out by the Taipei Government. The delegation of Indonesia therefore supported the Burmese draft resolution.

49. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon) observed that the dispute regarding the presence of foreign armed troops in Burma was not one of those to which the world had become accustomed, and which separated the world into two groups, one communist and the other non-communist. On the contrary, the dispute appeared to be one between two countries which were regarded as belonging to the free world. The fact that the discussion was taking place immediately after the achievement of unanimity among the two world groups on the Korean issue gave a foretaste of what the United Nations could accomplish in solving specific problems once the cold war was concluded.

50. A further point to be noted was that the dispute was not between an under-developed country and a developed one, between an Asian or African country, for instance, and a European country, or one of the Western Powers to which imperialism was imputed. Nor was the dispute one between two countries with a history of antagonism; it was one between two Asian countries which had suffered together and which had participated together in the same struggle. The words of the representative of China concerning the friendly feelings which his country had for Burma had been most reassuring in that connexion. While it was true that there were no diplomatic relations between the two countries, there was no question of expansion or imperialism involved.

51. The question did not seem to be a difficult one to settle, since Burma wanted the troops to be either interned or evacuated, and the representative of China had not sought to justify the presence of the troops on Burmese soil, but, on the contrary, had stated that his Government had tried and would continue to try to get the troops to withdraw from Burma. All agreed on the need for a solution. The discussion had been one of the most fruitful and sober in the Organization, and its tone had been due especially to the moderation and

¹Not issued as United Nations documents.

wisdom shown by the representative of Burma. There were two difficulties. The first related to the practical means for ending the situation. The large numbers involved might perhaps make disarming and internment difficult. In the second place, there was the problem of how to reach and persuade the forces to retire or to submit to internment.

52. In a sense, the Lebanese delegation would have liked to identify the government responsible for the troops as that of the Republic of China, because in such an event evacuation would have been made so much easier. The Lebanese delegation understood the Burmese desire that the Government of the Republic of China should be branded an aggressor. But the evidence was too varied in nature and the question of responsibility would require a much more profound inquiry for such a verdict.

53. An important aspect of the situation was that the fact of the presence and increase in number of the troops was a consequence of the armed struggle between communist and anti-communist forces in the world in general and, in the instance under discussion, in China. The entry of the Chinese Nationalist forces into Burma had been due to their retreat in that struggle. Their subsistence and expansion in Burma had likewise been due to that conflict. In any case, it was clear that the troops were regarded by many people as the champions of anti-communism in that part of the world.

54. Mr. Azkoul could only deplore, however, the theory that the struggle against communism justified the violation of international law and of the independence and territorial integrity of other countries. That frame of mind had undoubtedly encouraged the forces to push on into Burmese territory. In that connexion, Mr. Azkoul cited the letter which the Burmese representative had quoted as having been addressed by General Li Mi to the Commander of the Burmese Army, to the effect that, in view of the fact that the Southeast Asian countries constituted an anti-communist group and that the men of the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army were anti-communist, there must be no fighting. Implicit in that letter was the obvious assumption that the presence of those forces on Burmese soil was considered justified because they were anti-communist. It was that frame of mind which constituted the danger. Mr. Azkoul was happy to note that none of the representatives who had spoken, not even the representative of China, had manifested any support for that way of thinking.

55. That frame of mind was not confined to the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army, but was to be found also in other and much more important countries. A characteristic manifestation was that the occupation and use of a given country was considered justified if regarded as necessary in the cold war. It was the duty of the General Assembly to issue a clear condemnation of such ideas in order to help weaken and eliminate them.

56. Mr. TSIANG (China) reserved his right to reply, if necessary, to points that might be raised by the two representatives who were to follow him on the list of speakers.

57. With the exception of a few delegations, the majority of the members of the Committee had approached the problem in a constructive manner. Mr. Tsiang

wished to do likewise. He had noted one central misunderstanding in the course of the debate, due perhaps to his not having made quite clear in what capacity he was speaking in the Committee. He emphasized that he was speaking as the representative of his Government, and not as the representative of the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army. The representative of Pakistan, perhaps because of that misunderstanding, had tried to construe the fact of Mr. Tsiang's not having commented on certain parts of the statement of the Burmese representative as constituting agreement with those parts. That was not the case. His silence had been due to the fact that he was not in a position either to affirm or deny what the representative of Burma had said about that army. He suggested that the Committee might withhold its verdict in that respect, since only one side had presented its case.

58. It was true that Mr. Tsiang had compared General Li Mi to Garibaldi, but that was not because there appeared to him to be a resemblance on all counts. He had studied history sufficiently to know the pitfalls of historical judgments on contemporaries. But he had foreseen that one of the difficulties that would face the Committee was the psychological factors underlying the problem; he had meant to show that General Li Mi and his followers were popular in China and among Chinese everywhere in the same way as Garibaldi and his followers had been considered heroes by the Indian people. The government of Victor Emmanuel and Cavour had experienced considerable difficulty in handling Garibaldi, and the same type of difficulty was faced by the Government of the Republic of China in the case under discussion. The important thing was a correct appreciation of the psychological situation.

59. The representative of Burma had furnished the Committee with a number of documents which showed quite clearly the nature of the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army. For example, the reference in one of the documents to discussions and decisions taken in a battalion "sub-committee" indicated unmistakably that the army was not centrally controlled or supplied. While Mr. Tsiang was not a military man, he could not imagine any regular army going about things in such a manner. The Burmese representative's evidence concerning appeals for supplies and money was also hardly characteristic of a regular army. Again, the document in which a unit had demanded the release of Chinese merchants also illustrated his point; the protection of citizens abroad was one of the functions of a diplomatic service, and it was inconceivable that such a step should be carried out in that manner by a force under the control of a regular government. The reference in that document to the friendly diplomatic relations between the two countries lent further support to his argument: his Government had no diplomatic relations with the Government of Burma, and therefore would not have referred to them. In fact, all the documents contained unmistakable evidence as to the nature of the movement.

60. Mr. Tsiang considered it significant that only one representative had referred again to the message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to General Li Mi. As he had pointed out, that message had been addressed only to forces in Yunnan province and therefore was not related in any manner to any aggression against Burma.

61. The situation was that the Government of Burma faced difficulties. A number of draft resolutions had been submitted, and he had already indicated that the one submitted by Burma (A/C.1/L.42) was not just, helpful or acceptable to his Government. With regard to the draft resolutions submitted by Argentina (A/C.1/L.43) and Mexico (A/C.1/L.44/Rev.1), Mr. Tsiang said that he appreciated the constructive intentions of those proposals, whose sole aim was to find a settlement in accordance with the principles of the Charter. He was not prepared to deal with the provisions of those draft resolutions at that stage, but wished to repeat what he had said in the General Committee (86th meeting), namely, that in so far as his Government had any influence over the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army, it would exercise that influence so as to further the wishes of the Government of Burma. His Government had already

notified the United States Embassy in Taipei that it would try to prevent any supplies from being sent from Taipei to that army; further, his Government had tried to stop collections on that army's behalf. His Government had never sent any supplies and had never allowed any of its aircraft to be used to take supplies to that army. Any supplies that had been flown over had been taken in chartered and private aircraft, to which his Government would now refuse clearance for such purposes.

62. In conclusion, Mr. Tsiang referred to the deep interest which the Committee had shown in getting the troops in question out of Burma. He was authorized to say that his Government would give the United Nations the utmost co-operation to achieve that objective.

The meeting rose at 5.5 p.m.

