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Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Government of the Republic of China (A/2375, A/C.1/L.42)

[Item 77]*

1. U MYINT THEIN (Burma) recalled that the matter under discussion had arisen from the cablegram dated 25 March 1953 (A/2375) from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Burma to the Secretary-General concerning the "Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Kuomintang Government of Formosa". At its 86th meeting, the General Committee, in recommending the inclusion of that item on the agenda of the seventh session, had for technical reasons changed the heading of the item to "Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Government of the Republic of China". In that connexion, the Burmese representative wished to make it clear that his Government recognized the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China as the only legal government of China, and that it had withdrawn its recognition of the then Government of the Republic of China. Thus, the use of the phrase "Government of the Republic of China" in the official documents of the General Assembly did not make any difference as far as the Burmese Government was concerned. The repudiation by Burma of the government headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek remained unaltered and the complaint was directed against the set of people who today occupied Formosa and exercised jurisdiction over the island. Moreover, the Burmese representative used the word "Kuomintang" for the sake of clarity; he did not use it in any derogatory sense, but only because the government led by Chiang Kai-shek was best known by that term and because Burma could not associate the Generalissimo with the government of the Chinese mainland.

2. U Myint Thein proposed to go briefly into the whole history of the Kuomintang intrusion into Burma, beginning from early 1950 up to the present day, notwithstanding the fact that during the sixth session,

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

at the Committee's 504th meeting, on 28 January 1952, he had apprised the Committee briefly of what had been happening in Burma.

3. In 1949, when the Kuomintang *débâcle* had taken place, some Kuomintang troops had fled towards the south-west and some thousands had crossed the border into Indochina, where they had been disarmed and interned. Early in 1950, however, some 1,700 had crossed the border into the Keng Tung State of Burma, where they had preyed upon the countryside and had caused great hardship to the inhabitants of the locality by their demands for food, transport and services. Units of the Burmese Army had contacted those troops and required that they should either leave Burmese territory forthwith, or submit to disarmament and internment in accordance with international law. Quite apart from the infringement of Burma's territorial integrity, which no self-respecting nation could tolerate, there had been the obvious danger that the presence in Burma of the Kuomintang intruders might lead to grave international complications. Instead of complying with that reasonable and lawful demand, the Kuomintang forces, having entrenched themselves in the triangle bounded by the Mekong River on the east, by the Keng Tung-Tachilek Road on the west and the Thai-Burma border on the south, had taken up a truculent attitude. Meanwhile, the armed forces of the Union of Burma had captured over 200 Kuomintang troops who had infiltrated into the town of Keng Tung in the guise of civilians. Shortly after that occurrence, a letter had been received by the Commander of the Burmese Army in Keng Tung from Major General Lee of the Eighth Army requesting the release of the interned soldiers and a stay of offensive action against Chinese troops.

4. In June 1950 the Burmese Army had launched operations against the Kuomintang concentrations in the Tachilek sector, and on 21 July 1950 all the Kuomintang nests around the Keng Tung-Tachilek Road had been cleared, and Tachilek itself reoccupied. From the documents captured in the course of that operation, it had become clear that the Kuomintang troops in that sector had consisted of units of the Eighth Army, of the Twenty-Sixth Army and of the 93rd Division. When

the operations had begun, one general of the Twenty-Sixth Army who said that he had commanded the operations against the Burmese forces, General Lai Iang Saae Tia, had given a Press interview in Bangkok, which had been reported in the Thai paper, *Lak Muang*, of 22 June 1950. The general had declared that one reason why the Kuomintang troops had clashed with the Burmese forces was that the Burmese soldiers had resorted to intimidation in order to disarm the Chinese units. Moreover, in reply to a reporter's query whether the Twenty-Sixth Army intended to continue fighting, the general had replied that a three-point demand had been made, namely, that all Chinese merchants arrested by Burmese soldiers and numbering many thousands should be liberated; that a guarantee should be given by the Burmese authorities that they would definitely terminate fighting with the Chinese Army; and that the Burmese soldiers should be withdrawn from the vicinity of the area where the Kuomintang troops had established themselves. The general had also explained that the purpose of his trip to Bangkok had been to visit the Chinese military attaché, an old friend of his, and to obtain instructions from the Chinese Government in Taiwan (Formosa) as to further actions to be taken by his army. U Myint Thein wished to deny the arrest of thousands of Chinese. It was true that 1,500 had been detained, but 1,300 of them had been released after screening.

5. After the retreat from Tachilek, it was discovered that the Kuomintang troops, numbering approximately 1,500, had reassembled at Mong Hsat, sixty miles west of Tachilek. Since most of the units of the Burmese Army had, unfortunately, to be withdrawn for more urgent duties elsewhere, the Kuomintang forces had been given the opportunity to dig in and reorganize at Mong Hsat, which had become and remained their main base for future operations. In the meantime, General Li Mi had, during the latter part of 1950 and early 1951, dispatched agents to the north-western border region of Burma to contact and recruit Kuomintang elements who had taken refuge there. Those recruits had then been surreptitiously dispatched to Mong Hsat where they were trained and equipped with new weapons which could only have come from sources outside Burma. The Kuomintang troops had swollen to 4,000 by April 1951. As additional recruits were received, more training centres had been established at Mong Yawng and Mong Nyen, which were east and north-west of Keng Tung, respectively.

6. The Burmese representative then gave a geographic description of the general area around Mong Hsat, explaining that the open spaces in the immediate vicinity of Mong Hsat provided excellent air-drop zones and training grounds. The Kuomintang forces had set about improving and enlarging the airstrip which had been built by the allied forces during the war as an emergency landing strip at Mong Hsat. U Myint Thein referred to exhibit documents 15 and 16, contained in a folder which his delegation distributed to the members of the Committee,¹ showing photographs taken of the airfield at Mong Hsat, together with photographs of Kuomintang troops undergoing training at the Mong Nyen training camp.

¹ These documents were not distributed as United Nations documents.

7. Having established themselves firmly at Mong Hsat and branched out to Mong Yawng and Mong Nyen, approximately 3,000 Kuomintang troops under the direct command of General Li Mi had advanced northwards, during the latter part of April 1951, and had established their headquarters at Mong Mao, in the northern Wa States on the Burma-Yunnan border. That force had been further strengthened by fresh recruitments made in that border region. Subsequently, it had been discovered that General Li Mi had made an attempt to penetrate into Yunnan Province with a view to contacting guerrilla forces operating there and recruiting additional troops to augment their forces within the Union of Burma. On their return to Burma, General Li Mi and his troops had proceeded to build up strongholds along the Burma-Yunnan frontier; they had by then added another 2,000 recruits to their forces, thereby necessitating the launching of another major operation by the Burmese Army to drive them from those positions. As a result, those troops, numbering approximately 6,000, had withdrawn southward towards Mong Hsat, leaving behind them scattered groups in the area adjoining the Burma-Yunnan frontier. Thus, at the end of 1951 the Kuomintang forces in the Keng Tung State had been greatly increased, thereby substantially widening the area of operations of those forces in eastern Burma.

8. After the withdrawal of his forces to Mong Hsat towards the end of 1951, General Li Mi and a considerable number of officers and men of his forces had returned to Formosa, presumably for training. It was known from newspaper dispatches that General Li Mi had been in Formosa in early 1952, while confirmation of the return to Formosa of subordinate officers and men had been obtained from a document seized in 1952 from a Kuomintang courier on the Taunggyi-Keng Tung road. Another document found on the corpse of a Kuomintang officer killed on 8 February 1953 at the Loi-Kaw battle also revealed the dispatch of trainees to Formosa. The Burmese representative then read the text of those two documents (exhibits 11 and 13 of the folder distributed by his delegation).

9. On the return of General Li Mi to Formosa, General Liu Kuo Chwan had been placed in command of all the Kuomintang troops in Burma, and he had proceeded to concentrate on the further reorganization, recruitment and training of all the forces under his command. He had also constructed additional air-drop zones inside the Keng Tung State and had further improved the Mong Hsat airfield, making it possible for the regular landing of aircraft of the type of C-46 and C-47.

10. The rapid expansion of the Kuomintang forces in eastern Burma at the beginning of 1952 provided evidence of further expansionist tendencies on the part of those troops within the Union of Burma. As early as January 1952, contact had been established between those troops and the Karen insurgents in the Mawchi area, as a result of which Kuomintang troops had been dispatched early in 1952 to join with the insurgents in their fight against the forces of the Union of Burma. By the middle of 1952, about 1,000 Kuomintang troops had been fighting side by side with the insurgents in the areas in which the Karen rebellion had been still active. A look at the map supplied by his delegation would

show that those areas were west of the Salween River, whereas the previous activities of the Kuomintang troops in Burma had been restricted to areas east of that river. Moreover, the Burmese Government had conclusive evidence to the effect that the linking of the Kuomintang troops with the Karen insurgents had been no mere accident; it was part of a deliberate policy of the Kuomintang High Command to undermine by subversion the authority of the Government of the Union of Burma, and to aim at its eventual downfall.

11. The Burmese representative then referred to exhibits 3 and 5. Exhibit 3 contained, *inter alia*, a certificate issued to four members of the First Army who had been sent out on duty on the Burma Road, as well as the text of the "Summary decision of the discussion of the Sub-Committee of the 4904 Battalion", outlining the steps to be taken prior to the attack of the Burmese Army. Among the fundamental principles set forth therein, it was stated that the Burmese Government was controlled by corrupt Burmese who oppressed other nationalities. It was also stated that at the end of the war a campaign should be launched to the effect that it was the Burmese Army which had attacked first and that the Kuomintang troops were in no way responsible for the fight; that the Burmese Army had in fact committed rape and robbery; and that the tribes in the north of Burma should be encouraged and supported in their struggle for independence. Exhibit 5 contained instructions to the effect that the Kuomintang troops should support all political parties, especially the rebel Kaw-thu-lay Government and Karens and Mons, and to assist them in their aim.

12. Towards the middle of 1952, small groups of Kuomintang troops had made their way westward and northward across the Salween River and, by December 1952, the Kuomintang concentrations in the Mong Hsu and Mong Pan areas had become so great that they had been able to take forcible possession of those states in the following months. The significant fact about all those activities was that they had occurred in widely separated parts of the Union of Burma at approximately the same time. That fact indicated the existence of a concerted attempt on the part of the Kuomintang High Command to gain control of areas within the Union of Burma, extending from the extreme northern limits of the Shan State right down to the seacoast at Moulmein and as far westward as Loi-Kaw, in the Kayah State. Luckily, the occupation of those places by the Kuomintang troops had been of very short duration.

13. The Kuomintang forces had not limited themselves to military activities but had interfered in the internal affairs of Burma and had engaged in subversive propaganda against the Government. For example, when they had occupied the Mong Hsu area, they had deposed the ruling chief and replaced him with one of their own choosing, to whom they had given a Chinese bride. They had also issued reaflets in Burmese and Shan inciting the citizens of the Union of Burma to rebel. Their objective was, obviously, to set up the minority groups inhabiting the eastern portions of the Union of Burma against the lawfully established government. The Burmese representative then read the text of documents contained in exhibits 4 and 4A. It was obvious, therefore, that those self-styled anti-communist crusaders were not fighting the troops of the People's Re-

public of China but were undermining the authority of the Government of the Union of Burma in the hope that they would eventually succeed in replacing it with a government more amenable to their desire and wishes. Not only had those troops entered and remained illegally on Burmese territory, refused to disarm and to be interned as required by international law, engaged in hostilities against Burmese armed forces, but also they had interfered in the internal political affairs of Burma and were aiming at the downfall of the lawfully established government of Burma by all means at their disposal. Indeed, there could be no clearer case of aggression than that. However, the Kuomintang aggressors had been heavily punished for their crimes; their forces were being driven back across the Salween River.

14. The Kuomintang troops in Burma called themselves the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army. General Li Mi was its over-all commander, while General Liu Kuo Chwan appeared to be the actual commandant. The area in which they operated was divided into three zones: zone No. 1 was the area east of the Salween River, containing some 4,000 men; zone No. 2, in the north-eastern sector, contained about 3,000 men; zone No. 3 comprised the Mong Hsat-Mong Pan area, with some 4000 men. Other minor areas were controlled by Karen rebels.

15. U Myint Thein then referred to some of the depredations carried out by the Kuomintang troops against the civilian population of the localities in which they had operated. The commonest form of crime had been forcible demands for supplies and services. After the fashion of the Chinese Nationalist forces, the Kuomintang troops had lived off the countryside. Since the eastern portion of the Shan State was comparatively poor, it could be imagined what three years of continuing demands without payment had meant to the population. Whole villages had been abandoned, owing to inability to meet the demands. In other instances, they had been ransacked or burnt down owing to failure to meet the demands. The Kuomintang troops, in addition to food, had demanded building material and labour. The Mong Hsat airfield had been enlarged and improved by forced labour. The local population had also been subject to taxation and tolls of various kinds. There had been instances where villagers had been seized and held for ransom. Some had been killed even though the ransom had been paid. In other cases, villagers had been seized and put to death on suspicion of being spies of the Government or otherwise unfriendly to the Kuomintang troops. Civilian officials of the Government had been killed as part of a deliberate policy of disrupting the administration. Women had not been spared. Furthermore, the Kuomintang troops had engaged in large-scale smuggling of opium and in organized gambling. Observing that the Chinese Nationalist Army had never been well known for its discipline, U Myint Thein said that the effects of releasing troops composed partly of the depleted Nationalist Army and partly of riff-raff recruited from the border area on a peaceful civilian population could be imagined.

16. As for the reasons why his Government held that the activities of the Kuomintang troops in Burma were directed and supported by the Taipei Government, in the first place, regardless of his designation, General Li Mi was the recognized leader of those forces. The contention of the Taipei Government that they did not

exercise control over General Li Mi and that they had merely some influence over him which varied from time to time was hardly in accordance with the facts that were known. U Myint Thein quoted a statement by a Formosa newspaper in July 1951 and a dispatch from Formosa in August 1951, both of which used the term "Nationalist forces". It was known that General Li Mi had visited Taipei in December 1951. The news of the visit had first been reported by the Associated Press on 27 December 1951. A fuller account had been published on 29 December 1951 by a Chinese magazine in Hong Kong, which had quoted General Li Mi as having stated at the Hong Kong airport that the main purpose of his return to Taipei was to report to the President and to call on a few high officials. Another Hong Kong paper had reported on 14 January 1952 that General Li Mi had returned to confer with the chiefs of staff on guerrilla warfare. According to that account, the most important request made by General Li Mi had been for more financial aid and for skilled personnel. It had been learned, according to the news statement, that the political bureau was to send a group of about fifty men to assist General Li Mi in Yunnan. U Myint Thein also drew attention to a picture of the general talking with General Sun Lip Yin in Taiwan, apparently at a parade or manoeuvres. A United Press report from Taipei of 3 February 1952 had stated that Li Mi was returning to Yunnan after conferring with authorities in Formosa.

17. Those Press reports, when taken collectively, established beyond all doubt that General Li Mi had visited Taipei in December 1951 to confer with the highest military and political authorities there. Yet Mr. Tsiang had contended that General Li Mi had been sent to Yunnan three years previously, had assumed the character of a Garibaldi and had become independent of his Government. That contention had been made at the First Committee's 505th meeting, on 29 January 1952, at a time when General Li Mi had been in Formosa.

18. There was reason to believe that General Li Mi had been back and forth between Formosa and Mong Hsat since then. The last visit to Formosa had been early in March 1953. It was known from a document taken off the body of one of the three Occidentals killed in a battle between Burma Army forces and Kuomintang troops that General Li Mi had been in Burma in February 1953. That document, included in the file of documents furnished to the Committee, was a letter from a prominent Karen insurgent leader indicating the close liaison established between the insurgents and the Kuomintang as well as General Li Mi's presence in Burma early in 1953 at the time of the concerted and centrally controlled attempt by the Kuomintang forces to extend their operation across the Salween River at widely distributed points.

19. On 2 March 1953, the Prime Minister of Burma had given notice that the question was being taken to the United Nations. Within a week, the United Press had reported from Taipei that General Li Mi was there to make a personal report on the mainland situation as he knew it. The United Press had learned that the purpose of the visit had been to brief the Government on the exact position of his men with relation to Burma, to prepare to answer Burma's threat to bring the issue before the United Nations. The significant fact

of the timing of General Li Mi's visit to Formosa, the circumstances attending that visit and the previous visit in December 1951 all combined to prove that his relationship with Taipei was that of a commander in the field and his government.

20. There was further evidence from the international Press to support the view that the Kuomintang troops in Burma were part of the Kuomintang army. U Myint Thein cited Reuter's report from Taipei of 23 January 1953, according to which a Chinese Nationalist spokesman had denied that Kuomintang troops had joined Karen rebels against attacking Burmese troops, stating that the Kuomintang troops fought only Chinese Communists. A yet more forthright admission was contained in a statement attributed by the *Times* of London to Mr. Patrick Soong, *chargé d'affaires* of the Kuomintang Embassy at Bangkok, to the effect that the Kuomintang troops, which numbered 12,500, were under the direct command of the military headquarters in Formosa; that, so far as his Government was concerned, they were deployed in undermarked territory, where the authority of the Burmese Government was at least questionable; and that the operations were really an extension of the struggle against communism in Korea, Indochina and Malaya. U Myint Thein observed that it was thus admitted that the Kuomintang troops in Burma were under the direct command of the military headquarters in Taipei. The number of troops given by Mr. Soong coincided almost exactly with his own Government's estimate of 12,000. U Myint Thein said he would deal with the reference to "undemarcated territory" later on.

21. His Government also had a number of documents taken in the course of military operations which lent strong support to the charge that General Li Mi and his troops were under the direction of the Taipei Government. Those documents were included in the file of documents circulated to the Committee. Reading the first of those documents, which was a pamphlet issued over the signature of Chiang Chung-ching, another name for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, U Myint Thein said that it would be noted that it was addressed to "Director Li", and through him to the rank and file of the National Army stationed in Yunnan and to the armed forces of the local anti-communists. That was an implicit admission that General Li Mi had under his control units of the National Army. U Myint Thein also drew attention to the admission in that message that some supplies had been furnished, with an apology that more had not been sent, and to the promise that the irregulars in General Li Mi's forces would be given the same treatment as the regulars.

22. Another of the documents was a reproduction of an identity certificate issued to cadets, which was such as would be issued to regular officers of the regular Kuomintang army and carried the picture of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalist emblem. Some twenty of those certificates had been recovered from the bodies of Kuomintang troops. U Myint Thein also read a message to General Li Mi from the son of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who was apparently director of the political department of the Ministry of Defense at Taipei, which stated that, under the guidance of the President, General Li Mi had already accomplished a great deal. Another of the

documents circulated to the members of the Committee contained detailed instructions issued over the signature and seal of the Chief of the Formosa General Staff and proved that the Kuomintang forces in Burma had been receiving directives and orders from the Taipei Government. He then read another of the documents, a letter from the Divisional Commander of the First Division of the Peace Corps to the Commander of the Government forces at Mong Ping dated 26 August 1951, in which it was stated very clearly that the Kuomintang forces in Burma were directly under the command of President Chiang and Chairman Li.

23. Moreover, it was known from the statements of captured senior officers of the Kuomintang forces that the latter were directed and controlled from Taipei and that the supplies received had come from Formosa.

24. U Myint Thein pointed out that in evaluating that evidence, it must be borne in mind that the operation was a clandestine one, and that it was always difficult in such cases to get the kind of proof that a court of law would require. He submitted, however, that the clear admission of Mr. Soong did constitute absolute proof. Mr. Tsiang might deny that the Government he represented had had any hand in the matter; but Mr. Soong was in charge of the Kuomintang Embassy nearest to the scene of operations, was probably transmitting directives and was obviously in a much better position to know what was going on.

25. Additional and substantial evidence of Formosa's complicity was provided by the phenomenal improvement in the armaments carried by the Kuomintang forces in Burma. Contrasting the equipment of the troops which had first entered Burma in 1950 with that of the Kuomintang troops there at present, U Myint Thein said that they were armed almost exclusively with infantry and heavier weapons of United States manufacture. Burma Air Force planes, in recent sorties, had encountered light anti-aircraft fire, as a result of which one transport aircraft had been lost. Obviously the growth of the force from 1,500 comparatively lightly armed men to 12,000 well-armed men in less than three years could not happen in the hinterland of Burma unless some outside Power were furnishing the inspiration, leadership, direction and equipment. Even without other evidence, the process of elimination would have led to the conclusion that that Power was Formosa. Since the material was already in Burma, his Government did not wish to delve too deeply into the question of how it had been transported there. All of it could not have been brought in by aircraft although planes had been used for some time.

26. Dealing with Mr. Soong's statement regarding the "undemarcated" border, U Myint Thein recalled that as far back as 1893 there had been agreement on the frontier from latitude 25 degrees 35 minutes north and longitude 98 degrees 14 minutes east southwards to the Indo-Chinese and Thai borders. The frontier had been demarcated with boundary pillars, except for a strip of 200 miles through the Wa States. Even along that strip the line had been agreed upon and defined in an exchange of notes in 1941, where the line was described minutely and in detail. The Kuomintang forces, he emphasized, were nowhere near the northern section of Burma, where the frontier line remained undemarcated.

27. Turning to the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.42) submitted by his delegation, U Myint Thein said that some had expressed privately the view that the wording was too strong. But foreign troops had forced their way into his country, embarrassing the Government and harming its citizens. They had forced their presence upon Burma, and were resorting to tactics which might give rise to international complications. From whatever point of view the matter was taken, their presence must amount to aggression. His Government's contention was that those troops were part of the Kuomintang army and were maintained by Formosa. If that was so, the action of the Kuomintang Government certainly called for condemnation and for immediate action. The proclaimed aim of the United Nations was the preservation of peace, but the attempt to preserve the peace of the world would come to naught if a blind eye was turned toward the Kuomintang aggressor in Burma. He noted that his Government did not demand any particular form of action but asked only that the Security Council should be requested to take appropriate action. The condemnation requested in the draft resolution was necessary in order to stop the activities of the Kuomintang Government in regard to reinforcements and further supplies, and it would also deter adventurers, individuals and organizations from participating in that mad adventure which could never be a menace to the People's Republic of China. Such a condemnation would also, it was hoped, force neighbouring countries to keep a more watchful eye on the border traffic.

28. His Government had given careful consideration to the implications of the draft resolution just as it had given its careful consideration to the step of bringing the matter to the notice of the United Nations. Burma had only recently emerged as an independent nation, and had been beset with internal difficulties which, fortunately, it was surmounting despite the wishful thinking contained in a recent outburst of the Foreign Minister of Formosa. Now that the internal situation had eased, it appeared as if the Kuomintang Government would like to create further difficulties and problems which would make Burma's international relations intolerable.

29. His Government had tried hard to settle the question outside the United Nations. As soon as the Kuomintang forces had entered Burma, there had been an unfruitful attempt to settle the matter at the military level, followed by military operations. His Government had then been informed through the United States Embassy, which was friendly both with Formosa and Burma, that orders had been issued by Formosa for the forces to withdraw, but the forces had merely moved to the Mong Hsat area where they had proceeded to entrench themselves. Efforts at settlement had continued through the United States Embassy, but, despite the encouragement and hope given to his Government, the forces, instead of withdrawing, had grown in size and equipment. There had been feverish activity on the diplomatic level in 1952, after his intervention in the debate in the United Nations. Signs had once again been hopeful, but his Government had been disillusioned and had come to the end of its endurance and to the view that it had no alternative but to lay the full facts before the United Nations in order that suitable action might be taken to ensure that the Kuomintang forces

should submit to disarming and internment or leave the country. His Government thanked the United States Embassy and the Prime Minister of India for their efforts. That those efforts had not resulted in relief was sad, but it was understandable in view of the fact that they were dealing with people who believed that their only salvation lay in the coming of a third world war.

30. Recalling that, during the sixth session of the Assembly, at the Committee's 504th meeting, when the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France had declared that their countries would not tolerate communist aggression in Southeast Asia, he had inquired whether that declaration applied only to communist aggression and had hoped that it would cover any kind of aggression, U Myint Thein thought it unnecessary to say that his country was vitally interested in the reply. Aggression was aggression, irrespective of the identity of the aggressor.

31. Mr. TSIANG (China) reserved his right to reply if necessary to certain points made by the representative of Burma after he had had the opportunity of studying that representative's statement.

32. The representative of Burma had made a great deal of a Press report regarding certain statements supposedly made by the *chargé d'affaires* of China at Bangkok. In that connexion, Mr. Tsiang informed the Committee that Mr. Soong had sent him a cable stating that his remarks had been grossly misquoted by the *Times* and that he had asked the *Times* to publish a correction. As for the documents presented by the Burmese representative, it would be noticed that the messages all directed action against the puppet régime in China and that there was no evidence that his Government had urged any action against the Burmese Government. On the contrary, Mr. Tsiang stated, his Government had done its best to prevent such action.

33. Burma and China were close neighbours, but only once during the long history of their relationship had there been a period during which China could be said to have committed any aggression against Burma. It was significant that that one instance had occurred when China itself had not been independent but had formed part of a world empire under Mongol rule. If the long history of relations between the two countries taught anything, it was that Burma had nothing to fear from China as long as that country was independent and was ruled by a government that was Chinese in composition and in purpose. China had followed a policy of isolation from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries. It had been forced out of that policy in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when it had endeavoured, to the best of its ability at that time, to assist its neighbours against Western aggression. After the Second World War, China had found itself for the first time surrounded by independent neighbours. Mr. Tsiang said that it had often been said that close neighbours must be either strong friends or bitter enemies. The pattern of relations between China and its neighbours was something which they could create from the very beginning, because it was the first time that they could meet each other as independent nations. The thought of his Government had been that they should make sure that that pattern should be one of strong friendship, and that China should take the initiative because it was larger in size. In that connexion,

Mr. Tsiang recalled that, in the middle of the Second World War, his Government had resolved that there must be strong friendship between China and Japan, which had invaded China and had been the aggressor. In the winter of 1942-1943, on the instructions of his Government, he had stressed that policy in a statement made at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York. Clearly, if his Government had wanted to pursue such a policy regarding the aggressor against China, it must want to follow a similar policy with regard to all its other neighbours.

34. Mr. Tsiang recalled that, during the Second World War, his Government had sent its forces into Burma to help liberate it from Japanese aggression. While he might be mistaken, he believed that more Chinese than Burmese blood had been shed in the liberation of Burma. In 1948, Burma had become independent. At the ceremonies celebrating that independence, China had been represented by its present Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yeh, to whom the Burmese Government had presented the first flag of independent Burma, a gift which was treasured by his Government. Expressing his faith that in the long run Burma and China would be and must be friends, Mr. Tsiang recalled that his delegation had sponsored the resolution in the Security Council recommending the admission of Burma to the United Nations (S/717).

35. Declaring that the charge of aggression made by the Government of Burma was a serious one, Mr. Tsiang said that the idea of aggression against Burma had never entered the minds of the Chinese Government. The charge related to an army, called the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army, which was led and commanded by General Li Mi, who had been born in a village on the border between Burma and China. The men under his command had banded together to fight communism and for the liberation of their country, and because their homes and families had been ruined by the communist régime. Those men were regarded as heroes by all free Chinese all over the world, from whom they received financial aid. They stood in Chinese eyes in the same position as Garibaldi had stood to the Italian people.

36. What did the Burmese people think of that army? The Committee had heard the representative of the Burmese Government. However, Mr. Tsiang had some other information which, although he did not claim represented the views of all, must express the feelings of some Burmese. He read a newspaper dispatch published in an English-language newspaper in Hong Kong, bearing the date-line Singapore, 27 March 1953, to the effect that two Burmese army officers, observing the fight against communist guerrillas in Malaya, had said, before their departure for Rangoon, that the Burmese and the Chinese Nationalist forces were friends and that they would rather fight the communists than the nationalists.

37. Mr. Tsiang explained that he was not speaking as an apologist for the Yunnan Anti-Communist National Salvation Army. That force had started with a core of the Chinese Army, but had developed and grown into an army which was not part of the regular army of the Republic of China. He noted that, according to the representative of Burma and the Burmese memorandum (A/2375), those forces, which had originally

numbered about 1,700 men, now numbered 12,000 as a result of recruiting on the spot. The Burmese Government apparently claimed that the increase was due to forces sent by the Chinese Government. Mr. Tsiang emphasized that the Government of China had not sent a single soldier to reinforce that army.

38. At the beginning of 1950, about 200 men of the Chinese Army had accepted internment in Burma. Mr. Tsiang had received letters from some of those men stating that the Government of Burma had at the time promised them the opportunity to go to Formosa. The men had originally been interned at Meiktila and had later been transferred to Mandalay. The treatment they had been given had been the subject of much complaint particularly as regards food and accommodation, and the conditions were said to have been worse after the transfer. In 1951, a representative of those men had addressed an appeal to the Prime Minister of Burma for better treatment, which had remained unanswered. Mr. Tsiang was referring to the matter not because he wished to pass judgment on the Government of Burma but to point out that if the treatment of that early batch of prisoners of the Chinese Army had been better, the problem might not at present have been so difficult or so large.

39. In 1950, as the Burmese representative had stated, Burma had sent forces against the Nationalist forces. There must have been casualties and the original core of Chinese armed forces must have been reduced to less than 10 per cent of the present force. That force had grown and had changed in nature. It was not part of the Chinese Army and it must be obvious that it was not under the physical control of his Government. While it was true that his Government had some influence over General Li Mi and some of the officers, that influence varied from time to time, as did General Li Mi's influence over his scattered forces. In so far as the Government of China had influence over General Li Mi, it had used it to further the wishes of the Government of Burma. At the beginning, his Government had warned General Li not to enter Burma. Knowing that the boundary was long and complicated, and that even in the demarcated section it was difficult to tell where one country started and the other ended, while it was still more difficult in the undemarcated area, his Government had repeatedly endeavoured to persuade General Li not to enter Burma. Mr. Tsiang observed that if paper transactions were of any interest, it would not be hard for his Government to issue an order to those forces, but that would not be a practical or sensible way to end the matter. It might be expected that his Government should pronounce a moral condemnation so as to prevent the collection of funds by the representatives of those forces among the free Chinese, but it was psychologically impossible for his Government to do so.

40. The representative of Burma had referred to the efforts of the United States Embassy at Rangoon. The efforts of the United States Embassy at Taipei had been equally strong and had been aimed at one objective, to get the Government of China to exercise its influence over the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army. In response to the appeals of the United States Ambassador, his Government had given assurances, which he hoped had been transmitted to the Government of Burma, that despite the difficulties involved, it would

try to stop the collection of funds by the agents of that army. That was a big effort on his Government's part to meet the wishes of the Government of Burma. His Government had also given assurances, which he likewise hoped had been transmitted to the Government of Burma, that it would not give clearance to any aircraft taking off from any airfield on Taiwan flying to that border region. The members of the Committee must appreciate that, in view of the state of mind of his people, that was not an easy step to take. It indicated the extent to which his Government wished to co-operate with and assist the Government of Burma.

41. The attitude of the Burmese Government had not been very helpful. It had done things which made it difficult for the Government of China to exercise its moral influence over General Li Mi. On the one hand, Burma had brought the question and the monstrous charge of aggression before the United Nations. On the other hand, the Government of Burma, in dealing with the question by force, had chosen to use some Burmese communist units against the Anti-Communist Nationalist Salvation Army, an action which made the problem much more difficult. Mr. Tsiang explained that he was not protesting or complaining about what the Government of Burma had a right to do within Burmese territory. The actions of that Government, however, and particularly the participation of communist units, made his Government's task of exercising its moral influence far more difficult.

42. His Government continued to stand ready to use the offer of good offices made by the United States Embassy at Taipei. It did not wish to resort to paper promises or official documents which might not solve the problem. For example, if his Government promised to withdraw the army, they might lay themselves open to the charge of bad faith because of the physical and psychological difficulties standing in the way of having such a withdrawal carried out. The problem required careful study, and his Government could not commit itself to something which it could not carry out within the appointed time.

43. In conclusion, Mr. Tsiang reiterated that if the Government of Burma wished to use force, that was the business of the Government of Burma. But if that Government wanted the Government of China to use its moral influence in the matter, he must ask the Burmese Government not to put further difficulties in the way of a solution. The Burmese draft resolution was neither helpful nor just, and was not acceptable.

44. Mr. MENON (India) said that his delegation wished to express its deep concern in the matter, because it felt that any violation of the honour of Burma or any wrong done to that country was as significant to it as a wrong done to India.

45. The statement of the representative of Burma was a masterpiece of cogent argument, of economy and of understatement. His Government and Burma were concerned with the fact of aggression upon the territory of Burma. His delegation supported the position taken by Burma and hoped that a solution of the difficulties would soon be found by the removal of the foreign troops from Burmese territory. He reserved his right to intervene in the debate at a later stage.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

