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Chairman: Mr. Thor THORS (Iceland).

AGENDA ITEM 70

Complaint of acts of aggression against the People's Republic of China and responsibility of the United States Navy for those acts (A/2756, A/AC.76/L.23) (*continued*)

1. Mr. TSIANG (China) said that according to the explanatory memorandum submitted by the USSR (A/2756) in support of its request for inclusion of the item on the agenda, and to the statement made at the 48th meeting by the USSR representative, the United States had allegedly committed four specific acts of aggression against China: the occupation of the Island of Taiwan (Formosa) by force; the conclusion of a mutual defence treaty with the Republic of China; hostilities along the coast of China; and finally the stopping of merchant vessels in the China Sea. He intended to examine those four charges one by one.

2. The first was a figment of the imagination. The 1,200 Americans stationed on Formosa had no more occupied that island by force than the 35,000 Chinese in New York had occupied that city against the will of the American people. The common feature of both the American colony in Formosa and the Chinese colony in New York was that both communities were unarmed. There were no combat units of the United States on Taiwan any more than there were combat units of the Chinese armed forces in New York. Another respect in which the two communities were identical was that both were on foreign territory at the invitation or with the permission of the Government of that territory. Not a single port, airfield or railway on the island of Taiwan had been seized by the Americans, and the Government of the Republic of China was in full control of and exercised sovereignty over all parts of that territory.

3. The mutual defence treaty concluded between the United States and the Republic of China on 2 December 1954 was like many treaties which countries in Europe, America, and Asia had been obliged to conclude to ensure their defence against the Communist threat. Those treaties were not aggressive in character. The signatories to those treaties had in fact conformed to their obligations under the United Nations Charter, particularly the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force, either against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other way incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations.

4. It was true that there had been hostilities along the coasts of the provinces of Fukien and Chekiang and around the coastal islands in that area. It was the universal desire of the Chinese people to get rid of the Communist regime. The world should know that the Government of the Republic of China had not given up hope of restoring the freedom of the Chinese people, and the independence of China. The hostilities along the coast of China had been started on 3 September 1954 by the Chinese Communists, who had bombarded the island of Quemoy. The Republic of China had retaliated against the aggressors—it could hardly have acted otherwise when confronted by such a situation. The Government of the Republic of China had needed no encouragement to act as it had done. To say that those hostilities were an act of aggression by the United States was to stretch language too far.

5. He then dealt with the question of the stopping of merchant vessels in the China Sea. Under Chinese domestic law, the Chinese Communists were insurgents. The Government of the Republic of China believed itself to be within its rights in seizing all vessels belonging to Communist China, and considered such action to be entirely within its domestic jurisdiction. It had always been very careful with foreign vessels. Its objective and its right were to prevent strategic materials from reaching the insurgents. In the exercise of that right, it was inevitable that the Government of the Republic of China should at times cause inconvenience to neutral shipping, but it had always been prepared to listen to any complaints on that subject. In almost all cases, such complaints had been settled to the satisfaction of the complainant. Even in the case of Soviet Union vessels, or those flying the flag of other Communist countries, and therefore not to be considered as neutral shipping, the Government of the Republic of China had always acted in conformity with international law. It was prepared to negotiate and, if necessary, to abide by a decision of the International Court of Justice.

6. In the case of the USSR vessel *Tuapse*, the Government of the Republic of China had readily accepted the good offices of the French Government for the amicable settlement of that incident. While negotiations had been in progress, the USSR delegation had insisted that the incident should be brought before the United Nations and had requested (A/2741) that the question should be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly. The Government of the Republic of China thought that when a question was the subject of direct or indirect negotiation it should not be debated before the General Assembly. That was why it had objected to the inclusion of the question in the Assembly's agenda. When the Assembly had nevertheless decided to accede to the USSR delegation's request, the Government of the Republic of China had asked the French Government to suspend the negotiations in progress.

7. The four accusations of acts of aggression brought by the Soviet Union against the United States were therefore totally groundless. It was obvious that in requesting the inclusion of the item on the agenda, the USSR wished to use the debates for its own propaganda purposes.

8. The Republic of China was proud of the friendly relations which had subsisted for many years between it and the United States. He recalled that in 1937 the United States had provided the most generous and disinterested assistance to China, which had at that time just been invaded by Japan and was struggling for survival. Although circumstances would have enabled it to derive certain economic and political advantages from its assistance, the United States had once and for all renounced all the privileges which it had previously acquired in China. During the Second World War, the nations of the British Commonwealth had also become the allies of China and had made great contributions to the defeat of Japan. Following the example of the United States, those countries had not only refrained from demanding political and economic advantages from China in return for their assistance, they had also renounced their privileges in China, and the United Kingdom had restored the international settlement to Chinese sovereignty.

9. When the war was over, and the Chinese people was suffering great hardship, particularly from lack of food and medical supplies, the Government of the Republic of China had applied to United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) for assistance. The funds available to that organization for post-war relief work had been contributed by the countries of the Commonwealth, Latin America, the Middle East and above all the United States of America. The Republic of China had received from UNRRA supplies and services to the amount of \$670 million. With that help the Chinese people had been able to survive during the difficult post-war years. No hate propaganda against the United States would make the Chinese people forget what it owed to that great country.

10. Being unable to persuade the Chinese people that the United States had exploited China, Communist propaganda was insinuating that the United States, being a capitalist country, was also inevitably imperialist, as it could not be the one without the other. That theory was unfortunately very widespread in certain countries of Asia. It was, however, quite obvious that in the modern world the capitalist countries realized that they could make no profit out of the poverty of the countries of Asia and that, on the contrary, it was in their interest to ensure a rise in living standards in those countries. The economy of the United States, unlike that of certain other countries was not essentially dependent on foreign sources of raw materials and foreign capital. The United States was accordingly not driven to pursue a policy of economic expansion, and China for its part had never seen any sign of such expansion. Accordingly, despite the fact that the United States was an eminently capitalist country, relations between China and the United States had always been most cordial and constituted a model of international relations. The accusations made against the United States by the Soviet Union were not plausible and merely sprang from the needs of Communist propaganda.

11. It was, to say the least, curious that such charges should be brought by a country which was itself far

from being above reproach. The USSR was hardly qualified to lead a campaign against imperialism and against policies of aggression, as, if there was any country in the world which practised aggression and imperialism it was the Soviet Union. He had on a previous occasion spoken of the relations between China and both the old Russia and the Soviet Union. He would not return to that question, but he wished to describe the relations between China and the Soviet Union since the end of the Second World War.

12. When a new regime, claiming to be firmly anti-imperialist, had been introduced in Russia after the revolution, the Chinese Government had been prepared to welcome it, hoping that the anti-imperialist attitude was sincere. Those hopes had soon been dashed. Although the USSR had renounced the privileges which it had enjoyed in China in common with other countries, it had failed to make any concession with regard to the privileges which were peculiar to the Soviet Union, such as, for instance, its right in the Manchurian railway. Instead of ceasing, the imperialistic activities practised by the former Russian Government, such as intrigues in Outer Mongolia and infiltration and aggression in Chinese Turkestan, had indeed been developed on the foundations built by Czarist Russia. Later, the Soviet Union alone of all the Allied States that had taken part in the common struggle against Japan had demanded compensation for its contribution. It had claimed special privileges in Port Arthur and Dairen and a 50 per cent share in the Manchurian railway. The Chinese Government had made those concessions and had signed a treaty to that effect, whereupon the USSR had taken advantage of those privileges to assist the Chinese Communists, by transferring to them enormous stores of Japanese arms and material seized in Manchuria and by hindering, through its occupation of the port of Dairen, the Chinese Government's efforts to suppress the Communist insurrection in China. It was sufficient to compare the United States conduct towards China with that of the Soviet Union to realize who was the undoubted author of aggression against China.

13. He wished to discuss another matter. Some Asian countries had only experienced the imperialism of maritime Powers and had concluded that only those Powers could harbour imperialistic designs. It was consequently difficult for them to see the problem in its proper perspective. Countries such as Turkey, Iran, China and Korea which had experienced imperialism from both maritime Powers and a continental country were the only ones which understood the true picture. Because of its double experience, the Chinese Government was in a position to say that the period of maritime imperialism was over. Those Powers had reached a point where they could be prosperous without that kind of expansion. The one country which had not reached that stage was the Soviet Union. For that reason, the Chinese delegation hoped that the Asian countries would carefully watch the Soviet Union's southward expansion. That was the real danger. In order to meet it, the Asian countries could greatly profit by the friendly help which the maritime Powers, together with other democratic countries, placed at their disposal. The future of Asia depended on co-operation in a determined resistance against Soviet imperialism.

14. Mr. VAVRICKA (Czechoslovakia) said that the easing of tension brought about by the cessation of

hostilities in Korea and the restoration of peace in Indo-China had created a climate conducive to the settlement of the international problems still outstanding. Its effect had been especially welcome in the Far East. Unfortunately, that area continued to be the stage for events which constituted a threat to world peace, such as the acts of aggression systematically directed over several years against the People's Republic of China. The nerve centre was the island of Taiwan seized in 1949 by Chiang Kai-shek and subsequently occupied by the United States for conversion into a base from which to launch an attack against the People's Republic of China and where Chiang Kai-shek's troops could be trained for that purpose. In vain did the United States representative contend that the United States military personnel stationed on Taiwan only consisted of a few hundred instructors. It was common knowledge that the occupying force was in fact the United States Seventh Fleet, which had entered Taiwan waters in 1950 and enjoyed the direct or indirect support of all United States naval and air forces in the Far East. In occupying Taiwan, the United States had shown what were its real objectives in the Far East. By stating, in his message of 2 February 1953, that he had instructed the Seventh Fleet no longer to oppose any attack against the mainland of China, the President of the United States had tendered an implied invitation to Chiang Kai-shek's supporters to intensify their acts of provocation and aggression. Their answer to that invitation had been the attack launched in July 1953 against the island of Tungsan. Even though they had been trained and armed by the United States, the Kuomintang troops had, however, been repelled with heavy losses.

15. He pointed out that by the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 the United States had pledged itself to restore to China all the Chinese islands that had been seized by Japan, including the island of Taiwan. In his statement of 5 January 1950, the President of the United States had reiterated that pledge and had also declared that his country desired to remain aloof from the conflict, that it had no expansionist designs on Taiwan or on any other part of Chinese territory, and that it did not intend to establish military bases on that island. The United States Government had on several occasions solemnly proclaimed that Taiwan was an inalienable part of Chinese territory and that United States forces would not intervene there. Hence, the acts of aggression committed by the United States Navy and Air Force were flagrant violations of that country's commitments under international treaties and its solemn declarations. He noted that when the United States representative had reviewed the various treaties concluded by the United States in the Pacific area, he had omitted any mention of the obligations that his Government had assumed in respect of Taiwan by virtue of the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Agreement.

16. The United States representative had asserted that the purpose of his country's policy and of the occupation of Taiwan was to prevent aggression and to ensure greater stability in the area. But it could hardly be called aggression if a legitimate Government took measures, in its own territory, against a group of rebels who had illegally usurped the function of government in disregard of the will of the overwhelming majority of the people. The Government of the People's Republic of China, the only legitimate Government of China, had the right to exert its sovereignty over all Chinese

territory, including Taiwan. As Mr. Chou En-lai, Minister of Foreign Affairs of that Government, had declared on 11 August 1954, it was the duty of the Chinese people to liberate that island from the domination of a group of traitors led by Chiang Kai-shek. To prevent the Government of the People's Republic of China from exercising its sovereign rights was tantamount to interference in its domestic affairs and a violation of China's territorial integrity. The measures that had been taken on the pretext of ensuring stability in the Far East were designed to pave the way for further interference in the domestic affairs of the People's Republic of China; they were an infringement of the rights of the peoples of Asia and a threat to peace in the Far East.

17. The policy of provocation and aggression directed against the People's Republic of China disturbed all peace-loving peoples and was condemned by eminent statesmen even in countries which co-operated closely with the United States. On 14 July 1954, Mr. Attlee, the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, had said in the House of Commons that to consider waging war against Communist China in order to restore Chiang Kai-shek to power would be to ignore political realities and to commit a military absurdity. Mr. Attlee had also indirectly condemned United States interference in the domestic affairs of China.

18. The United States Government had sent a group of military experts into Taiwan to reorganize and train the Chiang Kai-shek forces; it supplied those forces with all the arms and equipment they required, including aircraft and vessels, on which it had spent \$1,400 million between July 1950 and July 1954. It was clear from newspaper reports that the preparations for attack against continental China were well advanced.

19. For some time the acts of piracy and aggression committed by the Kuomintang forces under the protection of the United States had been increasing. Between June 1950 and February 1954 the airspace of the People's Republic of China had been violated more than 7,600 times. Coastal towns had been bombed and civilians killed. The United States Navy and Air Force were helping Chiang Kai-shek's navy to blockade the People's Republic of China and to commit acts of piracy against foreign merchant ships plying the China Sea. Moreover, the Kuomintang was sending saboteurs and spies to the Chinese mainland with the co-operation of the United States services. The United States Air Force was engaged in active intervention: it was carrying out strategic reconnaissance flights and delivering spies and saboteurs by parachute and, in July 1954, had even shot down two Chinese aircraft over the island of Hainan.

20. All those events were evidence of the design of the United States to extend the aggression against China. The mutual defence treaty concluded between the United States and Chiang Kai-shek was further evidence. Under that treaty, the United States undertook to defend, by its armed forces, the territory at present held by Chiang Kai-shek. The latter, by stating that the treaty had reinforced his supporters' determination to restore freedom on the Chinese mainland, had disclosed the true purport of the treaty which the United States delegation had tried to represent as a contribution to the cause of peace. Furthermore, the treaty contained a provision to the effect that it could be extended to other areas. That provision proved that the signatories intended to prepare new acts of aggres-

sion not only against the mainland of China but also against other regions of the Far East. The treaty was a flagrant violation of the undertakings entered into by the United States by virtue of the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Agreement. The treaty, which flouted the interest of the Chinese people, concluded between the United States and the Chiang Kai-shek group which represented no one save itself, was intended to legalize the arbitrary occupation of the island of Taiwan and the interference of the United States in the domestic affairs of the People's Republic of China. That country's Minister of Foreign Affairs had been fully justified in terming it an aggressive pact.

21. The United States Government refused to follow the course of a peaceful settlement in Asia and, as the United States representative's statement indicated, persistently followed a policy of slander and aggression against the People's Republic of China. The Chinese people had shaken off the yoke of imperialism and won its independence. It was now devoting itself to the peaceful development of the country and had already accomplished a great deal. It was known how greatly it prized international peace. The important role it had played at the Geneva Conference was evidence of its attitude; so was the declaration of peaceful coexistence issued by China jointly with Burma in June 1954 and with India in April 1954. The principles of the declaration had been reaffirmed in the joint declaration of the People's Republic of China and the USSR of October 1954, the terms of which he mentioned.

22. The aggressive acts committed by the United States against the People's Republic of China and the military and financial assistance supplied by it to the Chiang Kai-shek group were bound to endanger peace in the Far East and to increase international tension. For that reason his delegation unreservedly supported the USSR draft resolution (A/AC.76/L.23), the adoption of which would unquestionably strengthen the cause of peace.

23. Mr. DERINSU (Turkey) said that to ask the Assembly to consider the item before it was a mockery of the intelligence of mentally and morally sound people. Very recently, the Committee had discussed an item which a country owing obedience to the Soviet Union had submitted for the ostensible purpose of decreasing international tension, whereas its real purpose had been to increase that tension.

24. A proposal similar to that before the Committee had been submitted to the Security Council (S/1757) and the General Assembly in 1950 (A/C.1/660). The Security Council had rejected it (530th meeting). The General Assembly had not even voted on it, for in November 1950 it had had to turn its attention to the very serious matter of the Chinese Communist military intervention in Korea, which had occurred shortly after the item had been placed on the Assembly's agenda. Communist China had been condemned for its act of aggression, and that condemnation still stood. He could not help wondering why the question had been once again submitted to the General Assembly.

25. To speak of a lessening of international tension while increasing it by roundabout methods, to ignore the propaganda campaign started by the Chinese Communists soon after the Geneva Conference and the statements made by leaders of Communist countries about the liberation of Formosa, while at the same time asking for the inclusion in the agenda of an item like that before the Committee, exemplified a familiar Com-

munist technique. Everyone knew that the people of free China did not want that form of liberation, which in fact was slavery. All the free peoples were aware of the fate of countries "liberated" by the Communists during the Second World War, and that was why they were vigilant.

26. Throughout the current session, the Assembly had heard much about the need to reduce international tension. The weight to be attached to that phrase when used by representatives of countries in the Soviet bloc could be judged from the fact that, one week after the opening of the session, Mr. N. S. Khrushchev had stated, in an address delivered in Peking, that the Soviet people would support the Chinese people in their determination to liberate the Chinese oppressed by Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan.

27. The United States had helped to maintain stability in the Taiwan area, a stability which would be further strengthened by the mutual defence treaty it had recently concluded with the Republic of China. It was entirely in keeping with the tactics of Communist propaganda that those countries should for that reason be accused of committing acts of aggression. The Turkish delegation regarded such an accusation as pure propaganda. But such propaganda would not achieve its purpose of creating confusion and sowing the seeds of discord among the free nations.

28. Mr. NISOT (Belgium) said that the United Nations was barely emerging from a long struggle against serious aggression. Its success in arresting that aggression had been largely due to the efforts made by the United States and to the sacrifices made by its people.

29. The Soviet Union delegation was proposing that the General Assembly should denounce the United States as an aggressor and that it should make a series of affirmations which not only were devoid of any foundation but were belied by that Member State's entire past conduct and by the intensive activities it was constantly carrying out throughout the world in the cause of peace.

30. Whatever might be the inclination in certain quarters to underestimate the intelligence of the General Assembly and to misjudge the credulity of the masses, there were limits which could not be exceeded. The Belgian delegation would vote against the USSR draft resolution.

31. Mr. LUCET (France) having referred to the first paragraph of the Soviet Union's explanatory memorandum (A/2756), said he had difficulty in understanding why the Soviet Government wished to reopen a debate which had been suspended for five years and accused the United States of being, if not the author, at least chief accomplice in acts of aggression, which it was by no means certain had actually taken place.

32. In the statement he had made at the 48th meeting, the USSR representative had contended that States which had answered the appeal of the United Nations in 1950 had committed an act of aggression in Korea; since that time, he maintained, the situation had steadily deteriorated and the United States was now encouraging and supporting overt acts of aggression.

33. The United States representative had made the very pertinent reply that the United Nations had already rejected, by overwhelming majorities, the charge on which that reasoning was based. One had only to read President Eisenhower's recent declarations to be

convinced that the United States was, on the contrary, pursuing in the area in question a policy of patience, caution and deliberate opposition to adventures.

34. Since 1950, however, the leaders of Communist China had been advocating direct action to "liberate" Taiwan. Mr. Chou En-lai had reaffirmed that object only the day before and had said that other Powers should hold aloof from a matter which lay exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of his own régime. Obviously, something more than a purely legal issue was involved. An offensive undertaken by Peking to occupy Taiwan by force of arms would lead to a conflict for which the Chinese Communist Government would bear the full responsibility.

35. It was true that in that area warlike acts were occurring daily, which might endanger peace. There were, however, absolutely no grounds for the claim that the United States Government was to be blamed for that state of affairs. Taiwan had not been annexed by the United States. The French delegation was not prepared to "note", as it was being invited to do by the USSR draft resolution, that acts of aggression, provocative acts and piratical attacks were being committed by armed forces under the control of the United States. It was deplorable that a State should make such serious accusations, unsupported by evidence, for the sole purpose of perpetuating the tension of the cold war, which was beginning to ease.

36. His delegation had confidence in the wisdom of the United States Government and would have no hesitation in voting against the Soviet proposal which was unjust, slanderous and without foundation.

37. Mr. SLIPCHENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that all who wished for a lasting peace should be grateful to the Soviet Union for drawing the attention of the United Nations to the acts of aggression of which the People's Republic of China had been the victim.

38. Since the Geneva Conference the situation in the Taiwan area had gone from bad to worse. The series of events described by the USSR and Czechoslovak representatives showed that the United States was no longer confining itself to supporting the Chiang Kai-shek forces, but was taking an active and direct part in those acts of aggression and provocation.

39. It had occupied the island of Taiwan, despite the fact that the restoration of that island to China had been guaranteed under the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Agreement. Through its refusal to respect those instruments, the United States Government had violated China's territorial integrity. In violation of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter, the United States had transformed the island of Taiwan into a military base that threatened the Chinese mainland. United States air and naval forces were blockading China, violating its airspace and territorial waters and threatening to use force against the country's lawful Government, and were thus interfering in the domestic affairs of a sovereign State. The activity of the United States Seventh Fleet in the China Sea and the support which the United States Government was giving to the Kuomintang likewise unquestionably constituted acts of aggression.

40. The incidents during which Chiang Kai-shek aircraft had bombed and machine-gunned the civilian population on the Chinese mainland, causing casualties and material damage, and the operations of Chiang Kai-shek's navy in the China Sea could not have oc-

curred but for the assistance given to the Kuomintang by the United States. That assistance was in fact used to finance the reorganization, equipment and training of Chiang Kai-shek's troops and to meet the cost of military operations directed against the People's Republic of China.

41. Although the island of Taiwan was an integral part of the territory of the People's Republic of China, American statesmen were openly declaring that the United States would oppose by armed force any attempt by the Government of the People's Republic to seize that island. He quoted passages from an interview with Admiral Felix B. Stump, Commander of the United States land, sea and air forces in the Pacific, published in *United States News & World Report* of 27 August 1954. Major General William C. Chase, Commander of the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group in Taiwan, had told the editor of *Newsweek* that all the money which the United States had spent in Formosa had served United States interests. He had confirmed that United States armed forces effectively controlled the Island and Strait of Formosa.

42. The mutual defence treaty recently signed in Washington by the United States Government and the Taiwan authorities was intended to enable the island of Taiwan to be occupied indefinitely by the United States. Under article VII of the Treaty the United States of America would be empowered to maintain land, sea and air forces in Taiwan and in the Pescadores Islands. It was obvious that the conclusion of that treaty constituted a breach of international law. The Chinese people could not tolerate such acts of aggression.

43. The United States representative's statement that the treaty was purely defensive in character was mere propaganda. In point of fact, that treaty encouraged Chiang Kai-shek's supporters to attack the Chinese mainland, for under article VI the provisions of the Treaty could be extended to other territories. It was clear that the United States intended to link the treaty to the pact concluded at Manila and to the North-East Asia defensive alliance which it contemplated. Through those pacts it hoped to be able to draw its allies into a war against China and Asia.

44. The Chinese people sincerely desired peace but from past events had learnt that the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country could only be safeguarded by determined resistance to all aggression.

45. The United States refused to recognize the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China over the island of Taiwan because recognition would mean a breach with Chiang Kai-shek's supporters. The United States reactionary forces, however, were anxious to use Chiang Kai-shek to maintain the tension in the Far East.

46. History, the facts and the treaties the United States had concluded with the Kuomintang group clearly established the identity of the aggressor. Responsibility for the hostilities and for the grave situation which had arisen in the area of Taiwan lay with the United States.

47. The occupation of Taiwan by the United States of America and the acts of aggression committed against the people of China constituted a serious threat to peace in Asia. In the hope of an early settlement of the situation which had developed in the area of Taiwan

and the China Sea, the Ukrainian delegation supported the draft resolution of the USSR.

48. Mr. PASTRANA (Colombia) said that the draft resolution of the USSR was unacceptable, as it merely represented a further propaganda manoeuvre apparently designed to justify the policy of continuous aggression pursued in the Far East by the Peking Government.

49. The draft resolution accused the Government of the United States and that of Taiwan of committing acts of aggression, whereas those two countries were in reality the victims of Communist aggression. It was significant that the draft had been proposed to the General Assembly precisely at a time when Communist China was engaging, entirely without provocation, in acts likely to undermine the Geneva agreements and to aggravate the situation in the Far East.

50. It was evident from such acts and from the statements made by the Communist leaders that the Chinese Communist Government felt no remorse at having violated the principles of the United Nations Charter. The sole purpose of the slogan of coexistence was to complicate the situation in Europe and in the West as a whole; in Asia the Communists had apparently discarded that slogan and regarded any free and democratic nation as an obstacle to their policy of expansion.

51. The USSR draft resolution denied the sovereignty of a Government which was recognized by the majority of States Members of the United Nations and which had on many occasions demonstrated its desire for peace and its respect for the rights of other nations.

52. For all those reasons, the Colombian delegation would vote against the USSR draft resolution.

53. Mr. WEAVER (Canada) said that the first paragraph of the explanatory memorandum submitted by the Soviet Union contained the statement that the cessation of hostilities in Korea and the restoration of peace in Indo-China had created favourable conditions for the settlement of other international problems. The same view had been expressed in the Czechoslovak

draft resolution concerning the prohibition of war propaganda (A/AC.76/L.16).

54. The inclusion of such items in the General Assembly's agenda did not in any way indicate a sincere desire to take advantage of those favourable conditions for the purpose of improving the international situation. The USSR had requested the inclusion of the item in the agenda in the early days of the current session, at a time when there was some prospect of international agreement on the urgent issue of disarmament. If the Soviet authorities wished their avowed desire for peace to be taken seriously, they should abstain from engaging in such cold-war manoeuvres.

55. Any possible doubts as to the identity of the aggressor in the Far East had been dispelled by Mr. Sobolev himself, who had spoken at length on the territorial demands of Communist China and had implied that the Chinese Communists were determined to gain those demands, if necessary by force. The United States representative had shown that the Soviet Union's support of its Communist allies might well create in the Far East the dangerous situation fraught with serious consequences for the cause of international peace and security referred to in the Soviet Union's explanatory memorandum.

56. The time was scarcely propitious for a defence in the United Nations of the policies of Communist China. The discussion was beginning just at the moment when the Communist Chinese had shown their contempt for humanitarian principles and international obligations by sentencing a group of United Nations airmen after a mockery of a trial. Whatever might be the real intentions of the Soviet authorities and the Communist Chinese Government, their action in advancing such charges could only have the effect of increasing the distrust and suspicion which were at the roots of international tension. It was therefore a matter of regret to the Canadian delegation that the Soviet delegation should have imposed such a sterile and mischievous discussion upon the United Nations.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.