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MEETING**

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Chairman: Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON (Thailand).

AGENDA ITEM 21

Admission of new Members to the United Nations: reports of the Security Council and of the Committee of Good Offices (A/2973, A/AC.80/L.3/Rev.1) (*continued*)

1. Mr. LYNKOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that adoption of the draft resolution (A/AC.80/L.3/Rev.1) would assist eighteen countries to achieve their legitimate desire to become Members of the United Nations. Some of the applicants had been waiting for nine years and the sooner a way was found out of the impasse which had prevented their admission, the better it would be for the United Nations, which could then assume the role envisaged by its founders of a truly international organization bringing together States of different political and social systems. In the atmosphere of relaxed tension which marked the tenth session of the General Assembly it should be possible, if policies of discrimination and favouritism were abandoned, to secure the admission of all applicant States fulfilling the definition in the draft resolution.

2. Some representatives had referred in the debate to the use of the veto to block applications for membership in the past, forgetting that the principle of unanimity in the Security Council was a guarantee of the equal treatment of all applications for membership in the United Nations, including those of States at which certain Members of the Organization might look askance. He was gratified that so many speakers had expressed their readiness to agree to the admission of all eighteen applicants without question, but regretted that others had seen fit, while announcing their support of the draft resolution in principle, to cavil at some of the applicants. Experience showed that abstention in voting, although a legitimate right of any Member, tended, if carried out on any large scale, to defeat attempts to break the membership dead-lock, since a "chain reaction" of abstentions had the effect of a veto. It was therefore incumbent on Members to be cautious in expressing their reservations as to individual applicants for admission. His own delegation had certain doubts, but was prepared in the interests of solving the problem to agree to the admission of all eighteen.

3. He noted encouraging signs of a general desire to settle the admission problem. The draft resolution had been co-sponsored by no fewer than twenty-eight States and had been revised to remove any doubt that all the

eighteen candidates for membership about which no problem of unification arose were in fact to be admitted. The sentiment of the Bandung Conference had been in favour of wider United Nations membership and at the Geneva Conference of the Foreign Ministers of four States Mr. Molotov had appealed to the United States and United Kingdom Governments to support the Canadian proposal. During the General Assembly debate on the subject the Indian representative had made a similar plea (533rd plenary meeting) saying that the United Nations had never been intended to become a league of select people. Such statements were straws in the wind, showing the large volume of sentiment in favour of a wider United Nations.

4. With regard to individual applications for membership, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria fulfilled the requirements of Article 4 of the Charter. They were able and willing to carry out the obligations of membership and were in fact, with Albania, already co-operating actively with specialized agencies of the United Nations. They had given tangible proof of their desire to co-operate in the maintenance of peace and security, the relaxation of international tension and the reduction of armaments, and to settle their disputes by peaceful means.

5. He associated his delegation with an appeal to the permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council to accept all eighteen applicants unanimously and he called on the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee to be similarly unanimous in supporting the draft resolution, for which his own delegation would certainly vote.

6. Mr. LUNDE (Norway) associated his delegation fully with the appeal made by the Chairman of the Committee of Good Offices and by the representative of Canada to break the membership dead-lock. It was to further that objective that Norway had co-sponsored the joint draft resolution, which expressed the clear desire of the overwhelming majority of States that the eighteen applicant States about which no problem of unification arose should be admitted to the United Nations. The widest possible membership was imperative if the Organization was to continue to be the great forum of all political opinions and trends and Norway had consistently supported that ideal.

7. Article 4 of the Charter should be interpreted as it had been interpreted in the past, that is, in the liberal spirit which had motivated the Security Council and the General Assembly when the first new Members had been admitted. The problem of the admission of new Members had been the product of tension between the great Powers; it was basically a political problem and should now be resolved by a political compromise. The general sentiment in favour of such a solution reflected world public opinion, and should not be disregarded. Continuation of the membership dead-lock would be detrimental to the efficiency and authority of the Organization.

8. The draft resolution (A/AC.80/L.3/Rev.1) introduced by Canada deserved the Committee's full support. Its paragraph 2 was a clear and adequate statement of its purpose; it required no amendment. There was no valid reason based on Article 4, interpreted liberally as it had been in the past, to justify exclusion of the eighteen applicant States. It was therefore incorrect to describe the proposal as a "package deal", thus implying that it set aside the Charter. Both the USSR and the Cuban amendments were unnecessary. That of the USSR (A/AC.80/L.5) might give rise to procedural difficulties and might result in unequal votes for each country, thus weakening the effect of the resolution as a concerned expression of the general desire for a solution. He appealed to the USSR representative not to insist on putting it to the vote. The Cuban amendments (A/AC.80/L.7 and Corr.1) appeared to indicate to the Security Council what procedure it should follow in formulating its recommendation. There was no need for such indications. There was no suggestion in the draft resolution as it stood that the applicant States should not be examined in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter and with the rules and practice of the Security Council. To infer such a suggestion was to misinterpret the intent of the sponsors. Finally, with regard to the Cuban amendment (A/AC.80/L.8) to the USSR amendment, while Norway sympathized with the desire of certain States to admit applicants where there was still a unification problem, it would be premature to extend the list of eighteen at that stage.

9. The Norwegian delegation hoped that the general sentiment in favour of admission of the eighteen States would be reflected in the Security Council when the Council reconsidered the applications. If they should receive favourable recommendations, Norway would vote for all eighteen in the General Assembly. It would particularly welcome Finland, with which it had close ties of friendship. Admission of all eighteen would be a gratifying achievement and a promising augury for the next decade of the United Nations. It would strengthen the Organization and co-operation among all nations, great and small.

10. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) pointed out that in the first five years of the existence of the United Nations it had proved possible partially to overcome the difficulties entailed by the admission of new Members and to increase the membership by nine States. Since 1950, however, the membership question had been deadlocked, despite the generally recognized desirability of a rapid solution.

11. Attempts to solve the problem on a legal basis had proved fruitless precisely because it had become essentially a political problem. Thus, suggested solutions had been based on interpretation of Article 4 of the Charter; on the 1948 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice¹; on interpretation of Article 27, which embodied the rule of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council; and on the statement of 7 June 1945² issued by the four sponsoring Powers of the San Francisco Conference. They had failed to break the dead-lock. Similarly, the Interim Committee in 1948 and the Special Committee on Admission of New Members in 1953 had not succeeded in working out a solution. It was in October 1953 that the General Assembly,

in pursuit of its unrelenting efforts to go forward towards the ideal of universality, had adopted resolution 718 (VIII) establishing the Committee of Good Offices and instructing it to consult with the members of the Security Council with a view to exploring the possibilities of reaching an understanding which would facilitate a solution. The Assembly was largely indebted to that Committee for the general sentiment now prevailing in favour of a solution. The Salvadorian delegation wished to join in the tribute paid to the Chairman and members of the Committee, and to point out that many delegations, among them its own, had co-operated in the difficult task of solving the problem.

12. El Salvador, in company with Costa Rica, Honduras and Nicaragua, had consistently maintained that the responsibility for the final decision on the admission of new Members lay with the General Assembly and not with the Security Council, a position that was borne out by an analysis of the relevant provisions of the Charter and the background documentation, including the statement on the voting procedure in the Security Council issued at San Francisco in 1945 by the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR and China and endorsed by France.

13. As the primary responsibility for the admission of new Members lay with the General Assembly, it would be in keeping with the principles of international law and with the spirit of the juridical system on which the United Nations was based for the General Assembly, whose decisions were taken by democratic procedures because the veto was unknown, to settle the problem forthwith. Unfortunately, that interpretation of the powers of the Assembly, as well as other possible juridical solutions, had failed to win the necessary support. Hence, if the problem was to be solved, a political rather than a juridical approach would have to be found.

14. There was now some prospect that the problem might be solved at the present session through the adoption of the twenty-eight Power draft resolution (A/AC.80/L.3/Rev.1) which, although in many ways similar to previous resolutions on the subject, had eliminated many unnecessary and controversial details and was therefore likely to obtain wide support. His delegation would vote for the joint draft resolution.

15. Although the principle of universality had not prevailed at San Francisco, when the United Nations had been founded, political developments since then, the advent of the atomic age, and a decade of international tension had demonstrated the necessity of widening United Nations membership. In that connexion Article 4 of the Charter should not be too rigidly interpreted. It had been drafted at the conclusion of the Second World War to prevent the admission of enemy States, a term defined in Article 53, paragraph 2. Ten years had elapsed since then and, in view of the changes in the international situation, Article 4 should be applied liberally.

16. The United Nations had been designed as a world forum, a repository of international thought. It could not talk in terms of victors and the vanquished, but in terms of nations and people devoted to the task of saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war, and of promoting justice, freedom and the well-being of all peoples. Accordingly, the question of the admission of new Members could not be decided on the basis of personal preferences. Since its inception the United Nations had comprised States representing many different

¹ *Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4) Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1948, p. 57.*

² *United Nations Conference on International Organization, III/1/37 (1).*

traditions and if it was to survive, it must reflect the world as it was.

17. The joint draft resolution called for the admission of all States about which no problem of unification arose. It should be clearly understood that that phrase referred to unification for purposes of membership in the United Nations only and was not intended to exclude from membership applicants concerning which the problem arose in other contexts.

18. His delegation had some reservations about the qualifications of some of the applicants, but it would support the joint draft resolution in a spirit of compromise.

19. As the ultimate success of the draft resolution was contingent not only upon the General Assembly's action, but also the action of the Security Council, his delegation was somewhat perturbed by the attitude of one permanent member of the Security Council, for, if the application of any State for membership was vetoed or otherwise failed to receive the necessary number of votes, all the strenuous efforts made to solve the problem at the present session would have been in vain.

20. Certain misgivings had been expressed about the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic, which, some representatives had felt, was not a sovereign State. Yet, the Taipei Government and the Peking Government had both recognized that State and in 1946 China had voted in the Security Council (57th meeting) for its admission to the United Nations, as well as for the admission of Romania in 1947 (206th meeting). Moreover, it might be useful to recall that international law had established certain precepts concerning the recognition of new States. According to the Inter-American Convention on the Rights and Duties of States signed

at Montevideo in 1933 and the Charter of the Organization of American States signed at Bogotá in 1948, the political existence of a State was independent of its recognition by other States, while recognition was deemed to be unconditional and irrevocable and implied that the State granting recognition accepted the existence of the new State and attributed to the new entity all the rights and duties attaching to statehood under international law.

21. The admission of new Members would raise a problem of membership of the councils of the United Nations and of the International Court of Justice. During the discussion at the present session of the General Assembly of the question of convening a conference for the review of the Charter, his delegation had pointed out (543rd plenary meeting) that some amendments were so urgently needed that they could not await the convening of a general conference for the review of the Charter. He had referred to necessary reforms in the membership of the Councils and of the International Court of Justice. If eighteen new Members were admitted, thus increasing the membership of the Organization by approximately 30 per cent, there would have to be a proportionate increase in the number of members of the Councils and judges of the Court.

22. If the joint draft resolution was finally adopted, his delegation would assume that the great Powers would co-operate effectively in the review of the Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in accordance with the procedure laid down by Article 108 of the Charter, to ensure that the present distribution of posts in those bodies would not be substantially affected by the admission of new Members.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.