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Chairman: Mr. Víctor A. BELAÚNDE (Peru).

Palestine: question of an international régime for the Jerusalem area and protection of the Holy Places; special report of the Trusteeship Council (A/1286, A/1367, A/1367/Corr.1, A/1367/Add.1, A/AC.38/L.63, A/AC.38/L.69) (continued)

[Item 20 (a)]*

1. Sir Carl BERENDSEN (New Zealand) pointed out the great difficulty, in view of the background of the problem and the situation existing in Jerusalem, of determining with any certainty the correct course for the General Assembly to adopt. When the question had first come before the United Nations in 1947 the New Zealand delegation had seen clearly that no solution could be perfect and that any decision must inevitably cause suffering to many innocent people. After careful and earnest consideration New Zealand had joined in the two-thirds majority vote in favour of a solution which it had considered to be the least objectionable, considering the situation: partition of Palestine, economic union, and an international régime for the Jerusalem area. In similar circumstances it would again reach the same conclusion as had led it to vote for the General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947. The circumstances, however, had changed in at least one fundamental respect: it had proved impossible to carry out the terms of that resolution.

2. Although many provisions of the resolution had been unpalatable to the Jewish authorities, they had accepted the 1947 resolution for the sake of its substantial advantages. The Arab States, on the other hand, had rejected the Assembly's decision and resisted its execution by force of arms. They had opposed internationalization of Jerusalem as a *corpus separatum* under United Nations authority. They had failed to comply with the Assembly's decision; rather than accept it they had chosen to go to war, and they had been

defeated. As a direct result of their action, Israel and Jordan had been placed in a stronger position than either had held before the war. Nevertheless, the two States which had established control over Jerusalem should not on those grounds be given the right to remain where their victorious arms had carried them. The New Zealand delegation was not justifying their position, and differed in important respects from their views on the future of Jerusalem. It was understandable, however, that they should refuse to abandon the territory which their peoples had defended against invasion and where they had sacrificed many lives.

3. The Arab States which had used force to prevent the internationalization of Jerusalem in defiance of the Assembly's 1947 resolution were at present urging adherence to it. In the light of the record their actions could not be described as consistent, and in some aspects were absurd. They might be asked whether they were suggesting that the Assembly should use force to eject Israel and Jordan from the territory won in a trial of arms which they themselves had provoked.

4. The solution of the problems of Palestine and of Jerusalem must be sought on broader grounds than the claims of any single State. The historic importance of Jerusalem and its veneration by the followers of three great world religions must be borne in mind, as well as the strong public opinion which insisted that the Holy Places and the City should become an international responsibility. Israel and Jordan, however, although they had been adversaries in the war, were united in their resistance to that plan. The explicit pledges they had given to ensure protection of and free access to the Holy Places in their respective zones were doubtless made in good faith and would be observed, but did not constitute an adequate solution. Consequently the Assembly was once again confronted with the problem of carrying out whatever decision it might adopt.

5. The New Zealand delegation had consistently held that adequate provision must be made for carrying

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

out Assembly decisions. Put to the test, the 1947 resolution on Palestine had proved nugatory and the result had been war between the parties directly concerned. Having made the decision, the Assembly had proceeded to ignore its execution. It must not repeat that mistake. Before adopting any resolution it must determine concretely the means by which to enforce its decision.

6. The New Zealand delegation had again been shocked by the Assembly's irresponsibility in 1949. In adopting resolution 303 (IV) the Assembly had reaffirmed its decision to establish an international régime in Jerusalem, had instructed the Trusteeship Council to draft a statute, and had then divested itself of any further responsibility. The Council had been expressly warned that no action of the governments concerned should divert it from adopting and giving effect to the statute of Jerusalem, but it was not clear, in the face of determined opposition by Israel and Jordan, how the Council was expected to impose that statute. Obviously the Council could not have imposed it by force, and so had remained helpless to carry out the Assembly's expressed will and had been compelled to place the problem once again before the Assembly. At best the Assembly's 1949 decision could only have been motivated by wishful thinking associated with a reckless evasion of the problem of execution. Such a decision could only have been reached for reasons other than those which would have led to a responsible effort to cope with the problem. If the final vote had been secret, the results might have been different. New Zealand had supported internationalization, and believed that a case could be made against the opposition of Israel and Jordan. That did not relieve the Assembly of its responsibility. It should have faced the problem squarely and taken a definite decision in the sure knowledge that its decision could be carried out. In the absence of any concrete proposal to implement the internationalization of Jerusalem, a more practical solution had to be sought.

7. New Zealand rejected any proposal to defer a decision. It also now opposed the establishment of a *corpus separatum* for the entire Jerusalem area. It could, however, accept a plan similar to that put forward by the Conciliation Commission whereby the international régime would be limited generally to the case of the Holy Places and all other matters left to the authorities in control.¹ That plan might have gained wide acceptance had it not been rejected at the time by Israel and Jordan. Israel was apparently prepared to accept it at present, as restated in the Swedish draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.63). New Zealand would support the Swedish proposal as the best solution that could be achieved in the circumstances and hoped that Jordan could also be persuaded to accept it. It was the best practicable guarantee for the preservation of peace and happiness in Jerusalem, in Palestine and in the Middle East generally.

8. MOSTAFA Bey (Egypt) protested against the allegation made by the New Zealand representative that the Arab States had been aggressors. They had only taken action to fill the vacuum created by the failure

of the United Nations to implement the partition plan and by the withdrawal of the United Kingdom authorities on the termination of the Mandate in Palestine. He resented the suggestion that the Arab States were being absurd in supporting internationalization of Jerusalem.

9. After a full discussion of the internationalization of Jerusalem, the United Nations General Assembly had adopted a resolution containing certain measures to that end, based on the assumption that its earlier decisions on the subject had been just and equitable. He quoted the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolution 303 (IV) of 9 December 1949, and of the partition plan adopted in resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 providing for the constitution of the Jerusalem area as a *corpus separatum*, and pointed out that the Trusteeship Council had been entrusted by the United Nations with the administration of the area and instructed to prepare and approve a statute for the city. The Council had prepared a statute in April 1948 but had not adopted it.

10. The provisions of the resolution made quite clear what the Assembly had meant by the words *corpus separatum*. The basic idea of the international régime for the area was that the City of Jerusalem, a holy city for the three great monotheistic religions, was unique and should be safeguarded by humanity as a whole as represented by the United Nations. The advocates of partition had claimed that Jerusalem was the spiritual capital of humanity. Religious peace and peace in general could best be ensured by United Nations authority over the city.

11. Jerusalem had always been international in its very structure. In the course of its history it had been possessed by many different peoples. It contained many communities of nationality other than Arab or Jewish, and could not properly be regarded merely as an Arab-Jewish city. Many minority groups and religious communities had given the city an inter-denominational as well as an international character. As a symbol of religious inspiration throughout the world, it should become a centre where the cultural traditions of Christianity, Islam and Judaism could flourish in peace under the international authority of the United Nations. Only such an administration could protect the interests of all the communities in the city. Domination by either or both of the political entities now constituting Palestine would impair the international character of Jerusalem and might interfere with the freedom which should belong to it as a holy city.

12. The protection of the buildings in the holy city offered by Jordan and Israel was not enough. Spiritual freedom for religious bodies must also be maintained, and pilgrims must be allowed liberty of movement. Administrative unity in the city was indispensable to peace, security and the fulfilment of its religious function. Since most of the sacred buildings and religious institutions were in the old part of the city, while other religious institutions and the more modern parts were in the new quarter, unity was necessary to allow free access for all to all parts of the city; otherwise its life might be paralysed. Partitioning the city would be a disadvantage to all and would invalidate any agreement between Israel and Jordan regarding freedom of access

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex, Vol. I, documents A/973, A/973/Add.1, A/1113.*

to the Holy Places. Moreover, far greater efforts would be required to render the two parts of a divided city viable than to restore the unity of the whole.

13. That was why the General Assembly had voted in 1947 for the internationalization of Jerusalem. Since the plan for partitioning Palestine had not been carried out, an international régime could not be established for Jerusalem. It was true that the late Count Bernadotte had in June 1948 revealed his faith in the power of the Arab Government of Palestine to safeguard religious freedom by suggesting that the entire Jerusalem zone should be included in the Arab State of Palestine.² In September 1948, however, he had proposed that the city should be placed under the exclusive authority of the United Nations.³

14. In 1948, the General Assembly, in resolution 194 (III), had reasserted its intention of placing Jerusalem under United Nations control and had instructed the Conciliation Commission for Palestine to submit detailed proposals regarding a permanent international régime for the Jerusalem area. At the request of the Commission, the Arab States had submitted their views to it. Those views were in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions of 1947 and 1948. The representative of the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan had been among the authors of the proposals submitted. The plan eventually produced by the Conciliation Commission, however, had not been in accordance with the General Assembly resolution and had destroyed the very idea of internationalization. On the pretext of taking the existing situation into account, the Commission had produced a plan tending to the partition of Jerusalem and providing for the protection of the Holy Places.

15. When the question had been considered by the General Assembly in 1949, representatives of Jordan and Israel had spoken against internationalization and demanded the continuation of the situation as it was. The Assembly had nevertheless decided to continue to support the idea of the international régime. Resolution 303 (IV) of 9 December 1949 had confirmed the provision of resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 that Jerusalem was to be established as a *corpus separatum* under an international régime to be administered by the United Nations with the Trusteeship Council as Administering Authority. The City of Jerusalem was to include the municipality of Jerusalem together with the surrounding towns and villages. The Trusteeship Council was to complete the preparation of the statute of Jerusalem.

16. In pursuit of its task the Council had adopted two resolutions in December 1949 (A/1286, para. 2), one requesting the President to prepare a working paper on the Statute of Jerusalem, and the other requesting him to invite the Israel Government to take certain action to prevent anything occurring to hinder the execution of the General Assembly resolution. The working paper prepared by the President (A/1286, annex I) had departed from the Assembly's resolution and tended to partition the city into three sections. The

Council had not endorsed the President's proposals, but proceeded to elaborate a statute, which it had adopted on 4 April 1950 (A/1286, annex II), thus discharging part of the mission entrusted to it by the Assembly. The Council had not, however, fulfilled the most important task assigned to it, since it had failed to adopt measures for the implementation of the statute. It had postponed taking any action, until the Egyptian delegation had been led, at the 283rd meeting of the Trusteeship Council, to submit proposals for consultation with a view to the preparation of a list of candidates for the post of Governor of Jerusalem, together with the instructions to be given to him, and for the appointment of a United Nations representative to collaborate with the occupation authorities in the administration of the city. Such an appointment was provided for under paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III). The President was, further, to take measures to ensure the speedy demilitarization of Jerusalem. The Council had found itself unable to endorse the Egyptian proposals designed to prepare for the implementation of the statute.

17. At its session in June 1950 the Council had taken no measures to implement the statute, on the ground of the failure of the occupying authorities to collaborate with it. It decided instead to refer the matter to the General Assembly. The non-collaboration of the parties, however, had not been new. The General Assembly had not allowed the attitude of the occupation authorities to deter it from trying to proceed with its work for the protection of the Holy Places. Both Jordan and Israel had earlier undertaken to respect the principle of internationalization. Both governments had signed the Lausanne Protocol in May 1949 (A/1367, chapter I, para. 12) but had not observed it. The draft proposal for the internationalization of Jerusalem produced at the request of the Conciliation Commission by the Arab delegations had met with the approval of the representative of Jordan. The Egyptian representative did not understand how the representative of Jordan could now object to the internationalization of Jerusalem or break the international agreement signed by his country.

18. Mostafa Bey thought that the Committee should adhere to the principles of General Assembly resolution 303 (IV) of 9 December 1949, and invite the Trusteeship Council to proceed with the implementation of the Statute. If difficulties arose, the Council could appeal to the competent organs of the United Nations. It was not true to say that the United Nations was without means to implement its decisions. The United States delegation had circulated a document at the second special session of the General Assembly,⁴ beginning on 16 April 1948, suggesting that Palestine be placed under United Nations trusteeship and stating that the United States Government was prepared to provide forces for the implementation of that step. Another example of the means to implement decisions was the resolution introduced in the Security Council on 28 October 1948 by China and the United Kingdom⁵ envisaging sanctions against any parties defying the orders of the United Nations. An international statute

² See *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for July 1948*, document S/863, part III, para. 3.

³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Supplement No. 11*.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Second Special Session, Annex to Vols. I and II*, document A/C.1/285.

⁵ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year*, 374th meeting.

as laid down in the resolutions of the General Assembly was the only solution to the problem of Jerusalem which could ensure peace and safeguard the prestige of the United Nations in the Middle East.

19. Mr. DE SCHRYVER (Belgium) wished to indicate the position of Belgium on the important question of Jerusalem, and reserved the right of his delegation to intervene at a later stage in the debate.

20. Analysing previous relevant decisions of the General Assembly, he noted unanimous agreement among delegations regarding the unique character of Jerusalem and the Holy Places, and definite and almost unanimous support for the United Nations decision to assume international responsibility for Jerusalem and the Holy Places. After carefully considering various proposals for an international régime, the General Assembly had accepted the principle of a *corpus separatum*. In view of the inability of the Trusteeship Council to implement the decision of the General Assembly, two possible alternatives were open to the Assembly in reconsidering the question. It could accept the solution suggested by the Swedish delegation (A/AC.38/L.63), or seek a solution on the basis which had already been adopted.

21. Although the Swedish draft resolution represented a sincere attempt to arrive at a satisfactory solution, it could not be regarded as a statute for the Holy Places, since the opening paragraphs showed it clearly to be a mere series of provisional measures for functional internationalization. The Belgian delegation was not in favour of the Swedish draft resolution, because the fundamental element of acceptance by the States of Israel and Jordan was lacking and would prevent attainment of the objects.

22. A further difficulty was that the Swedish proposal represented a functional solution which depended very largely on the good will of the States occupying Jerusalem and gave very limited powers to the United Nations commissioner, who could exercise his functions only if peace prevailed in the area. In the absence of the territorial status found in other proposals and of the atmosphere of peace and understanding, it would be difficult for an official who had only moral authority and very limited resources to function efficiently in the City of Jerusalem or in the Holy Places. A functional solution even more than a territorial one required a legal state of peace rather than a precarious and uncertain armistice.

23. The Swedish proposal was weak in providing for a temporary solution which could be acceptable only if there were general guarantees that a limited objective could be attained. While definitive solutions might, in the initial stages, achieve only limited results, with the passage of time they became broader and more final. On the other hand, a functional provisional agreement without provision for demilitarization or neutralization could hardly provide a satisfactory basis for the protection and guarantees so urgently needed. He therefore could not agree with the representative of the United Kingdom and others who had criticized other proposals as unrealistic or impracticable, since in the opinion of the Belgian delegation the Swedish proposal itself was not realistic and was impossible to fulfil.

24. A different solution should therefore be sought. The Trusteeship Council had failed, but the failure did

not apply to the principle involved but rather to the method employed. In that connexion the statement of the representative of Iraq (75th meeting), that the Trusteeship Council's work had been fruitless because the efforts necessary for implementation had not been made, was extremely significant. Therefore the Belgian delegation considered that the principle of a *corpus separatum* should not be altered but that a new approach should be used. The main difficulty was probably that the General Assembly had given the Trusteeship Council such precise terms of reference that negotiations had been impossible and no tangible results had been achieved. Care should be taken in the future to allow for a compromise and to avoid giving the Trusteeship Council or any commission terms of reference so strict and limited that they tied the hands of negotiators.

25. The Belgian delegation had been pleased to note the respect shown by the representative of Israel and the representative of the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan for all religious places in the area now occupied by their troops, and their willingness to make every effort to protect those buildings and Holy Places until the question had been settled. While the prevailing precarious situation was admittedly regrettable, conditions would not be improved by the adoption of a theoretical solution which lacked any solid or lasting basis.

26. Obviously international status for Jerusalem could not be achieved by negotiation and persuasion alone. The co-operation of the States concerned, their neighbours and the inhabitants of the area was essential. Co-operation in the unique case of Jerusalem would afford the neighbouring countries a measure of prestige which had never been achieved by force of arms, and would gain support for them from the international community in the solution of their own problems.

27. Referring to the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom (75th meeting) regarding concern for the rights and freedoms of the inhabitants of Jerusalem, he pointed out that that problem had been anticipated at the time of the decision in favour of internationalization, and that the distinction in international public law between domicile and residence could be invoked in the case in question. Moreover, the international character of the population was an important consideration.

28. The inhabitants of the capital city of one of the great democracies of the world did not enjoy the right to vote. Yet no one argued that important principles had been violated thereby. The basic point at issue was whether in adopting the Swedish proposal the General Assembly would abandon the principle of the *corpus separatum* and delude itself into thinking that the new proposal, in the prevailing circumstances, with no provision for demilitarization or legal peace settlement, represented a final solution.

29. The Belgian delegation agreed with the representative of New Zealand that decisions which could not be implemented should not be taken. It considered that the Swedish proposal was unsatisfactory but would consider favourably a proposal which, in accordance with earlier decisions of principle, would designate a negotiating committee which would not be given too limited terms of reference and would have the power to study, discuss and prepare various formulas for

final settlement by means of negotiations with the occupying States, the neighbouring States, the great Powers who wielded so much influence in the Near East, and the populations concerned.

30. If such a committee could not be agreed upon, then probably no resolution would receive the required two-thirds majority and the question would be postponed to the sixth session of the General Assembly. It would be preferable to avoid a further unfortunate delay and to enable progress to be made toward understanding and a final solution of the problem.

31. Mr. SIMIC (Yugoslavia) said that his delegation had never supported the proposal for the territorial internationalization of the Jerusalem area; and the phrase "*corpus separatum*", used by the Yugoslav representative in the minority report of the Special Committee on Palestine^a in which Yugoslavia had been represented, had never been interpreted to mean the separation from Palestine of a part of its territory. On the contrary, Yugoslavia had proposed the establishment of a United Nations agency entrusted with the care and protection of the Holy Places which would communicate proposals, complaints or petitions to the national authorities of the independent States of Palestine. If a dispute arose, the matter would be referred to the International Court of Justice.

32. Since the adoption of the General Assembly resolution 181 (II) the situation with respect to Jerusalem had become more complex, tension between the States concerned had greatly increased, and the possibility of carrying out the original provisions for internationalization did not exist. Yugoslavia had consistently voted against the proposals for the internationalization of Jerusalem. It did not believe that the decision for internationalization could ever be implemented so long as means of enforcement were not available. Consequently, when the representative of Lebanon had argued (75th meeting) that the United States and the United Kingdom had not been sufficiently energetic in implementing the Assembly's resolution, he had not made clear what means they might have employed to do so. The Yugoslav delegation had wondered whether the high principles to which the representative of Lebanon had referred were to supersede the right of peoples to self-determination and the sovereign rights of two independent States. Yugoslavia recognized the right of the international community to ensure the protection of and free access to the Holy Places. It could not believe, however, that the authorities in control of Jerusalem would deliberately interfere with freedom of religious expression and worship. It hoped that the representative of the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan would follow the example of the representative of Israel and accept the Swedish draft resolution. Yugoslavia would support it.

33. Mr. HAY (Australia) reviewed the action of the United Nations on the important question of Jerusalem and noted the decision to establish a *corpus separatum* under a permanent international régime to ensure demilitarization and neutralization of the zone as well as free access to the Holy Places, freedom of movement throughout the territory, and preservation of the Holy

Places and all religious buildings and sites. That decision had been justified by the unique character of the Holy City and by the importance of religious peace in Jerusalem for the maintenance of general peace in the area.

34. Unfortunately the General Assembly's resolve to preserve the unique and sacred character of the Holy City had twice been obstructed by the course of events. Resolution 181 (II) had not been carried into effect because of the fighting which had broken out in May of that year. Despite the efforts of the Trusteeship Council resolution 303 (IV) had not been implemented because of the attitude of the two governments directly concerned. The special report of the Trusteeship Council (A/1286) had indicated the difficult circumstances in which that body had worked, and had stated that the representative of the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan had informed the Council that his government would not discuss any plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem, while the representative of Israel had declared that Israel also opposed internationalization of the Jerusalem area as a whole, although it was willing to accept the principle of direct United Nations responsibility for the Holy Places alone. After completion of the Council's work on the statute, some members had favoured an immediate admission of failure while a majority, including Australia, had decided to transmit the text of the statute to the governments occupying the Jerusalem area and to request their full co-operation in accordance with the terms of resolution 303 (IV) of the General Assembly. Subsequently the Jordan Government had given no answer to the invitation to discuss ways and means of implementing the statute, while the Israel Government had communicated its own new proposals which did not meet the conditions for internationalization set by the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council.

35. The Australian Government had taken the position that it was the duty of the Trusteeship Council to try to fulfil the instructions of the General Assembly: to complete the statute and request the co-operation of the parties. The Australian delegation had never held the view that proposals of the General Assembly should be enforced by arms, and had at no time taken the position that, if the General Assembly were not prepared to support its decision with armed force, the decision should not be taken. Despite the attitude of the delegations of Israel and Jordan at the fourth session, the Assembly had had no right to assume that they would not co-operate with a clear majority decision. Not until the middle of 1950, when those governments had indicated their refusal to co-operate, had the time for reconsideration been reached.

36. Clearly for the present the objective of preserving the unique character of Jerusalem could not be secured. An equally important objective, the preservation of the Holy Places and of freedom of access to them, was being endangered, since hostilities might be renewed and bring the inevitable consequence of damage or destruction to the Holy Places, which had already suffered from neglect and lack of supervision. Moreover, the danger of deterioration of the surroundings of certain Holy Places must also be foreseen.

37. The Australian delegation could not share the confident belief of the Jordan representative that access

^a See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Supplement No. 11, Vol. II, appendix V, section E.*

to the Holy Places was now completely free. His statement (74th meeting) that so far as his country was concerned there were no limitations on movement undoubtedly referred only to movement between the Holy Places in territory under Jordan control. The Australian delegation understood freedom of access to mean not only freedom to enter Holy Places under the control of any one country, but freedom to pass from one to another no matter which country controlled the territory in which they happened to be. Freedom of access in that sense did not now exist.

38. The Australian Government felt that a practical approach to the problem was indicated and that it was pointless to adhere to a solution which had produced no results in the past and seemed unlikely to produce any in the future. While some form of internationalization was clearly the only effective means of maintaining the international character of Jerusalem, it was not necessarily the only effective means of preserving the Holy Places or of ensuring free access to them. If it were agreed that the second and more limited objective was desirable, and that failure to act promptly would only decrease the chances of securing that objective in the future, an alternative and more practical means of approach must be sought.

39. That position did not mean that the Australian Government accepted a situation in which the City of Jerusalem was divided between two States which had shown all too little regard for the clear wishes of the General Assembly. It continued to believe that the city was unique in character, must be of international concern, and should not be subjected to the sovereignty of any single nation or divided between two nations. In addition the security and freedom of the Christian community of Jerusalem was of considerable concern. The Australian Government had therefore regretfully concluded that the objective of internationalization must for the moment remain in abeyance. The practical approach toward the second objective of preservation of the Holy Places by no means diminished its belief in the principle of an international city.

40. The attitude of the Australian delegation to any proposals put forward would be determined by its esti-

mate of their possible contribution to the preservation of the Holy Places and the guarantee of free access to them. From that point of view the Swedish draft resolution appeared to have much to commend it. Its implementation in good faith would do much to satisfy the requirements for a temporary solution. Its main value, however, depended almost entirely on the response of the Governments of Israel and Jordan. Despite the fact that the attitude of those two governments in the past gave no cause for optimism and that the cautious and general statements which they had made so far gave no satisfactory indication of their views on the very important detailed provisions of the Swedish draft resolution, the Australian delegation hoped that the representatives of those governments would give the most categorical assurances that they would accept and honour the pledge contained in the operative part of that resolution and co-operate fully with the United Nations commissioner. It was comparatively easy for the representative of Israel to give the required undertakings, since the responsibilities placed on his government by the resolution were relatively small. Although he had said (75th meeting) that that proposal represented a fair and practical basis for solution, it would have been more helpful if he had given a direct assurance of support or at least a detailed analysis of his views. While the Government of Jordan was in a more difficult position, since it controlled the territory where the majority of the Holy Places were situated, the Committee must know whether that government conceded the very limited measure of international supervision required by the draft resolution and whether it would undertake to allow full freedom of access as defined in the preamble to that draft.

41. If categorical assurances from the representatives of Israel and Jordan were forthcoming, the Australian Government would be pleased to accept them and on that basis to support the Swedish draft resolution either in its present form or with such amendments as the majority of the Committee deemed fit.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.