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CONTENTS

	Page
Palestine: question of an international régime for the Jerusalem area and protection of the Holy Places; special report of the Trusteeship Council (A/1286, A/1367, A/1367/Corr.1, A/1367/Add.1, A/AC.38/L.63, A/AC.38/L.69, A/AC.38/L.71) (continued)	495
Report of the Security Council (A/1361)	499

Chairman: Mr. Víctor A. BELAÚNDE (Peru).

Palestine: question of an international régime for the Jerusalem area and protection of the Holy Places; special report of the Trusteeship Council (A/1286, A/1367, A/1367/Corr.1, A/1367/Add.1, A.AC.38/L.63, A/AC.38/L.69, A/AC.38/L.71) (continued)

[Item 20 (a)]*

1. Mr. ROSS (United States of America) complimented the Swedish delegation on its efforts to solve the problem of Jerusalem. He wished to make it clear that the United States Government had consistently supported the United Nations in its handling of the Jerusalem question and continued to uphold the principle of an international régime for the Jerusalem area.

2. That support had extended to the provisions of resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 until it had become apparent that force would be needed for their implementation. The United States had also supported the adoption of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, establishing the Conciliation Commission, and as a member of the Commission, had participated in drafting the detailed proposals for a permanent international régime for the Jerusalem area as required by the resolution.¹ At the fourth session of the General Assembly his delegation had favoured those proposals as representing a reasonable compromise between the interests of the world community and those of the inhabitants of Jerusalem. It had been a matter of regret to it that the Assembly had not actively considered the proposals of the Commission and that Israel and Jordan had not supported them.

3. In 1949 the Assembly had adopted resolution 303 (IV) under which Jerusalem was to be established

as a *corpus separatum*, the Trusteeship Council being instructed to complete the draft statute for Jerusalem and to proceed to its implementation. The United States had at the time opposed that resolution as being impracticable, and events had proved it right.

4. The Trusteeship Council had carried out its mandate as regards the revision and completion of the Jerusalem statute and the United States had participated in the work. But the President of the Council had been unable to obtain the co-operation of the Governments of Israel and Jordan in putting the statute into effect, and the Council had finally resolved to refer the question back to the General Assembly (A/1286, para. 14).

5. The United States Government continued to be fully aware of the importance of Jerusalem to the family of nations. It was desirable to make immediate arrangements to allow the world community its legitimate rights in the Holy City. Although the Governments of Israel and Jordan should not be allowed what amounted to a power of veto over United Nations decisions in respect of Jerusalem, it was clear that there was no practicable way to implement a statute which was opposed by them and by the people of Jerusalem. The United Nations should therefore refrain from taking decisions to which those governments would naturally be opposed, and should not involve the international community in responsibilities not corresponding to its interests in Jerusalem. His delegation thought that the General Assembly should continue its efforts to establish an international régime in Jerusalem, while giving full consideration to the changes in conditions which had taken place in the three years since the approval of the 1947 resolution. The solution must be acceptable to the two States concerned, and the United Nations should not create a new entity against the wishes of the people in the area. The rightful authority of the United Nations should

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex*, vol. I, documents A/973, A/973/Add.1, A/1113.

be represented in the Jerusalem area, but the Organization should not lightly undertake the huge financial and administrative burden of a separate city State.

6. He thought that it was important to settle the controversy, with as little further debate as possible, at the current session of the Assembly. Further delay in settlement would have a bad effect on future efforts to establish an international régime in Jerusalem. His government was prepared once again to offer its fullest co-operation in any effort to reconcile conflicting points of view on the issue, and to find a solution which would contribute to peace and stability in the Jerusalem area while taking into account the interests of the principal communities there and the views of Israel and Jordan.

7. His delegation had studied the draft resolution submitted by the Swedish delegation (A/AC.38/L.63). He considered it a valuable contribution to the solution of the problem. Israel had already indicated its general acceptance of the proposal, and it was disappointing that Jordan was not able to do so. His delegation did not see how the terms of the draft resolution could appreciably derogate from Jordanian sovereignty in Jerusalem, but in any event the representative of Jordan had indicated that his government was prepared to give to the United Nations the pledges outlined in the Swedish proposal. It was also prepared to co-operate with a United Nations representative if such a representative were sent to Jerusalem to represent international interests. Presumably the Government of Israel would also agree to those conditions. It might be possible to modify the Swedish proposal so as to maintain the greater part of the preamble and part A, containing the pledges to be given to the United Nations by the governments in the Holy Land. Part B might be replaced by a provision to the effect that, pending further decisions by the United Nations on the status of Jerusalem, a representative, with staff, should be sent to the city. Such a representative, who would have the benefit of experience on the spot and full and constant consultations with the parties, would be able to make recommendations which might serve as a basis for further decisions. Such a suggestion, while admittedly not entirely satisfactory, would be supported by his delegation if it were acceptable to Jordan and Israel, and might constitute a step in the direction of a final settlement.

8. With regard to the draft resolution proposed by the Belgian representative (A/AC.38/L.71) for the establishment of a committee for further negotiations on Jerusalem, his delegation thought that the negotiations which had already taken place were quite exhaustive. His government, as a member of the Conciliation Commission, was fully aware of the careful examination given by the Commission to every aspect of the question. He could not therefore support the Belgian proposal, as his delegation believed that the Assembly should take a step in the direction of a final settlement at its current session.

9. TUQAN Bey (Representative of the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan) said that he found it necessary to intervene at that stage in the debate in order to answer certain comments made by representatives. The Australian representative had said (76th meeting) that the President of the Trusteeship Council had received no answer from the Jordan Government to

its invitation to discuss measures for the internationalization of Jerusalem. As his government had previously declared itself against the principle of internationalization, it had not seen fit to take part in any discussions on implementation.

10. It was not true that the Holy Places were neglected, and any reports to that effect must be tendentious. If the Australian representative was referring to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, he wished to point out that that had been damaged in the earthquake of 1927, and during the period of the United Kingdom Mandate no agreement had been reached for its repair.

11. With regard to freedom of access to the Holy Places, it must be pointed out that such access in many cases involved passing from one country to another. Pilgrims were not subjected to any more inconvenience than was usually involved in customs examination at a frontier, and it was hoped that when the Armistice Agreement, which was not a definitive measure, was superseded by a final peace, some better arrangements could be made. Meanwhile everything possible was being done to facilitate the visits of pilgrims to the Holy Places.

12. The Australian representative had expressed concern respecting the security of what he had called the oldest religious community in the world. That community was perfectly secure. Relations between Moslems and Christians in Jerusalem were based on the principle of equal rights for all. The Christian citizens of Jerusalem would be as vehemently opposed to internationalization as the Moslems of Jerusalem.

13. His delegation could not accept internationalization because it was based on a principle which impaired the sovereignty of the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan, since the Swedish draft resolution would make the commissioner's authority supersede that of the Jordan Government.

14. The good points in the draft resolution were already being implemented by the Jordan Government. His delegation did not wish to indulge in immoderate language, but as he had explained on the previous day (77th meeting), it did wish to express its strong opposition to the Swedish draft resolution.

15. On that occasion he had refrained from referring to the situation existing between Jordan and Israel, because he had not desired to create any confusion in the minds of the members of the Committee. He felt that the time had come to make some reference to that situation. The Armistice Agreement signed at Rhodes² provided, in article VIII, for the establishment of a special committee to deal with the claims of both parties. The Jews desired access to the Wailing Wall and other Holy Places, to resume the functioning of the Hadassah Hospital and the Hebrew University on Mt. Scopus, and also to use the cemetery on the Mount of Olives. But the Arab claims, including free access to the Arab College and Arab Orphanage, the cemetery of Mamillah, to Nabi Daud, and the Christian cemetery on Mt. Zion, together with the return of Arab quarters now in Jewish hands, must also be taken into consideration. These claims and counter-claims were now being discussed by the Special Committee.

² See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 1, p. 5*

It was natural that each side should attribute importance to its claims. If, for instance, the Arab quarters were returned to their owners, it would be of help to thousands of refugees. A fair settlement could not leave the claims of citizens unsatisfied.

16. The Swedish draft resolution would mean the satisfaction of most of the Jewish claims, but would give nothing to the Arabs. The Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan was naturally unable to accept such a one-sided settlement.

17. He had adduced those considerations in addition to others which he had already set forth in his previous statement, in order to make clear why his delegation opposed the Swedish draft resolution.

18. With regard to the Belgian draft resolution, he could not see that any good purpose would be served by resuming discussions on the basis of the internationalization of the Jerusalem area. His government would continue unalterably to oppose internationalization. His delegation could not accept any measures likely to impair the sovereignty of Jordan. Subject to those objections, however, he felt and hoped that a workable and agreed solution might eventually be reached through negotiations. His government was prepared to co-operate with the United Nations within the limits which he had described.

19. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that the change which had taken place in the attitude of many of his colleagues since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 181 (II) had had disastrous effects for Palestine and had seriously undermined the prestige of the United Nations.

20. Iraq had then been and still was in favour of an Arab Palestine and an Arab Jerusalem; its attitude towards the problem differed little from that of the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan. Jerusalem had been inhabited by Arabs for centuries and its connexions with Islam were strong and beyond dispute. Those facts had however been disregarded by the General Assembly resolution of 1947. That resolution, which the Iraq delegation had opposed and still opposed as contrary to the Charter, proposed the partition of Palestine into three parts, a Jewish State, an Arab State and a special international régime for Jerusalem; Jerusalem was to be an international zone free of political conflicts or nationalistic feuds, an island of peace in a world of turmoil.

21. The fundamental principles on which that resolution had been based had not changed in the three years which had elapsed since its adoption, since spiritual values did not change from year to year. In the intervening period, however, the Jewish State had come into existence and had taken possession of a large part of Arab territory and a large part of Jerusalem itself. In the face of the influence exerted by the Jews, the course of expediency and compromise had been adopted.

22. It was significant that both in 1947 and in 1948 the Jews had expressed their willingness to accept the complete internationalization of Jerusalem. They had given no indication of their opposition to the proposal until after the admission of Israel to the United Nations. Many Member States had certainly voted for its admission in the belief that it would abide by United

Nations decisions. It was evident, however, from the statement made at the 77th meeting by the representative of Israel that it had no intention of returning the Arab territory it had occupied.

23. Following the discussion of the Jerusalem question at the fourth session of the General Assembly, the problem had been referred to the Trusteeship Council. As a result of the influence exerted by certain elements in the Council, which were opposed to the implementation of the General Assembly resolution 303 (IV), the Council had approached its task in a half-hearted and defeatist spirit. It did not attempt to enlist the support of the great Powers in implementing the General Assembly resolution but contented itself with addressing communications to the two States occupying Jerusalem, well aware that their response would be in the negative. In the same defeatist spirit, the question had been referred back to the General Assembly, which was now called upon to decide whether its own views on Jewish interests and ambitions were to prevail.

24. Iraq was in sympathy with the attitude of Jordan. In its opinion, that country should make no concessions until respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter had been guaranteed in Jerusalem and a firm stand taken towards the claims of Israel.

25. Iraq could not accept the Swedish draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.63). In the first place the proposal disregarded the fact that it was not merely the buildings and shrines of Jerusalem which were the concern of the international community, but the land as well, in fact all of the Holy Land.

26. Secondly, the proposal transferred international rights in Jerusalem to the occupying authorities. In the opinion of Iraq, if those rights were to be transferred at all, they should be transferred to the Arabs. The late Count Bernadotte had himself taken the view that, under any system of partition, Jerusalem should be an Arab city.

27. Thirdly, a settlement for Jerusalem was inseparably connected with the settlement of other problems affecting Palestine. Free and safe access to Jerusalem could not be guaranteed until an equitable solution of the Palestine problem as a whole had been achieved. Such access was not guaranteed by the Swedish proposal.

28. Fourthly, the Swedish plan for the supervision of the Holy Places should not apply to Jerusalem alone but to the whole of Palestine. The United Nations had never renounced its right to safeguard the Holy Places throughout Palestine.

29. Fifthly, the Swedish plan was an implied criticism of Arab history and Islamic tradition. The Holy Places had been under the care of the Arabs for centuries and they had always treated pilgrims with toleration and hospitality.

30. Sixthly, the adoption of the Swedish proposal would have the effect of undermining the authority of the United Nations, since it would mark a concession to expediency. Decisions of the United Nations should be based on a solid foundation and on the assumption that they were intended to be permanent. To yield to expediency in the present instance would

merely lead to continued trouble in Palestine and to the destruction of the Holy Places, which the Swedish proposal was interested to protect.

31. Finally, the Swedish proposal, which was based on the idea of the acceptance of the parties, had lost its *raison d'être* by reason of its rejection by the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan. In the circumstances, therefore, he hoped that the Swedish delegation would see its way to withdrawing its draft resolution.

32. With regard to the attitude of the great Powers towards the Jerusalem question, if they had in fact wished to implement the General Assembly decision, they could have done so. But so long as they responded to pressure and made no serious attempt to implement the provisions of the Charter, no final settlement or peace was possible.

33. The United Kingdom representative had expressed the view (75th meeting) that the wishes of the population of Jerusalem should be taken into account. It was unfortunate that his delegation had not adopted that attitude in 1947, when it had taken the view that Jerusalem did not belong to either the Jews or the Arabs but to the international community. About 80,000 of the former inhabitants of Jerusalem had been driven from their homes since that date. It was the height of inconsistency to deny the applicability of the principle of self-determination in 1947 and to use it in 1950 as an argument against internationalization.

34. The representative of New Zealand (76th meeting) had completely misunderstood the attitude of the Arabs in imputing warlike intentions to them. The Arabs had admittedly regarded resolution 181 (II) as illegal; they had regarded and continued to regard the establishment of a Jewish State as contrary to the principles of democracy and self-determination proclaimed in the Charter. They had been and still were being treated inequitably, and until the United Nations took steps to meet their claims, either in full or in part, there could be no peace in the Middle East. The Arabs would not, however, have gone to war, if their brothers in Palestine had not been in danger; the Committee had already been informed of several instances of the mass destruction of innocent Arabs. The Arab States had gone to war in defence of the Arabs in Palestine. Moreover, the Arabs had not been defeated; their hands had been tied by the great Powers while the Jews had been supplied with money and arms.

35. To sum up, the Iraq delegation agreed with the late Count Bernadotte that, under any system of partition, Jerusalem should be an Arab city within an Arab State. Failing that, it could accept no proposal short of complete internationalization.

36. Mr. ORDONNEAU (France) reaffirmed the fundamental interest of his government in the problem of Jerusalem and the protection of the Holy Places. France had participated actively in the work of United Nations organs on the question and had contributed to what it considered to be an equitable solution: the establishment of an international régime for the Jerusalem area. That principle had been reaffirmed by the General Assembly; the fact that it had not been put into effect would not induce the French delegation to retreat from it or to reverse it.

37. France could not support any alternative solution unless it offered adequate guarantees, which could be applied effectively, for the protection of and access to the Holy Places. The guarantee contained in the Swedish draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.63) were not adequate and could not be effectively applied in the absence of acceptance by both parties directly concerned. The representative of Sweden had emphasized the decidedly limited scope of his proposal: it merely represented interim measures to be taken pending the adoption of final steps to institute an international régime and establish an international legal jurisdiction over the Holy Places. The French delegation was gratified that the Swedish proposal in no way altered or weakened General Assembly resolution 303 (IV) and that the measures proposed were strictly temporary. On the other hand, as the Belgian representative had pointed out, temporary measures, to be effective, must be capable of immediate application without difficulties. The co-operation of both Israel and Jordan was indispensable. While Israel had accepted the Swedish plan in principle, Jordan had categorically rejected it. That fact was even more significant when it was recalled that most of the Holy Places, and particularly, the most important Jewish Holy Places, were situated in the territory under the control of Jordan. In the circumstances, the Swedish proposal did not have much chance of being successfully applied and France could not support it.

38. The French delegation was inclined to support a constructive proposal similar to that put forward by Belgium. The Committee would be better advised to defer a decision now in the hope that the Assembly's previous decisions could be better applied in the future.

39. Lord MACDONALD (United Kingdom) noted with satisfaction the genuine concern of all delegations regarding the fate of Jerusalem and the high regard for the Holy Places expressed by Israel and the Arab States. He did not accept the possibility that the views of the Jews and Arabs were forever irreconcilable.

40. The unique attraction of Jerusalem could not be denied. It was therefore difficult to abandon the ideal principle which the Assembly had endorsed on three different occasions beginning in 1947. Nevertheless, it was clear that all hope of internationalization must be abandoned for the time being and for some time to come. In the circumstances, the Swedish proposal was the only practical and sensible suggestion whereby some, though not all, of the goals toward which the Committee was working could be attained.

41. Opinion in the Committee appeared to be divided between those who, like the United Kingdom representative, felt that it was better to achieve what was possible for the time being, those who adhered strictly to full internationalization although they knew it was unattainable, and the majority, who realized that internationalization was hopeless for the present but were reluctant to abandon their high ideals. The United Kingdom delegation respected the sincerity of and sympathized with the scruples of the majority. In its view, however, internationalization was not a practical proposal. In supporting a workable plan when the ideal could not be realized, it was not betraying any principle to expediency, as the representative of Iraq had sug-

gested. If its position did constitute a betrayal of principle, surely that of Belgium was not less a betrayal of principle. The Committee should not be beguiled by the Belgian proposal. It had all the seductive appeal of escapism and a "do-nothing" policy. A vote for the Belgian draft resolution was a vote in favour of nothing.

42. The Belgian proposal actually called for a new committee to do what had already been done by the Mediator, the Conciliation Commission and the Trusteeship Council: to investigate the situation on the spot in consultation with all the parties concerned. There was no reason to believe that the new investigating group would succeed where others had failed. The effect of the proposal was to relieve the General Assembly of its responsibility to face the hard facts and make a difficult choice. It maintained the pretence that internationalization was feasible and once again deferred a decision. In short, it evaded the issue. The representative of the United Kingdom acknowledged that there were pressure groups at work, but emphasized that there was a variety of such groups and they were not all exerting pressure on the same side.

43. The representative of Lebanon, in discussing the crucial question of implementation (77th meeting), had revealed himself as more of a philosopher than a practical statesman. He had singled out the United Kingdom, the United States and France and imputed to them a special responsibility to ensure compliance by Israel and Jordan with the General Assembly's resolution 303 (IV) regarding Jerusalem. He had been guilty of another kind of escapism; its purpose was identical with that of Belgium, but its form was different. The United Kingdom representative would welcome a reply from him explaining what he expected the other fifty-six Member States to do to implement internationalization. Would Lebanon and the other Arab States persuade the Jordan Government to abandon its zone in Jerusalem, which had been hallowed by centuries of Arab nationalism? Surely the Arab States did not expect the Arabs of Jerusalem to accept alien rule, which might possibly result from internationalization. Similarly, the United Kingdom representative would like the representative of Belgium to explain exactly what the proposed four-member committee was to do before the sixth session of the General Assembly. Obviously, it could do no more than work hard along the lines of the Swedish proposal.

44. The United Kingdom delegation had been disappointed to hear that the Jordan Government could not accept the limited measures set forth in the Swedish draft resolution. It still hoped that if the General Assembly adopted it, Jordan would see its way clear to co-operating in its implementation. In principle, Jordan had appeared to accept a large part of the Swedish proposal, including the appointment of a United Nations representative.

45. The position of the United Kingdom Government had been consistent, and he wished to reaffirm it in order that no misunderstanding should arise: his government did not feel able to assist in the implementation of any recommendation which was not acceptable to both of the parties directly concerned.

46. Mr. DE SHRYVER (Belgium) observed that the Swedish proposal had not obtained the wide acceptance

which had been anticipated principally because the representative of Jordan had now clearly explained why his government rejected it. In the knowledge that the Jordan Government would not accept it, the Belgian representative had explained at the 77th meeting that the Swedish draft resolution was in fact not practicable. The Belgian proposal, on the other hand, had been framed in the broadest possible terms so that it would be generally acceptable. It was, however, subject to amendment. While his draft resolution noted the failure to carry out the internationalization of Jerusalem, it took into account the fact that the majority of Member States had nevertheless not abandoned the principle laid down by the General Assembly. Accordingly, it instructed the Trusteeship Council, which was specially competent in the matter, to appoint four persons to study, in consultation with all groups and governments concerned, the conditions of a settlement which could ensure the effective protection, under United Nations auspices, of the Holy Places and of spiritual and religious interests in the Holy Land.

47. In reply to the question put by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. de Shryver could not, in the light of previous United Nations experience, be certain that the proposed four-member committee would succeed. Nor was he certain that it would not succeed. Obviously, its task would be made more difficult if the positions of Israel and Jordan remained absolutely unaltered. It was to be hoped, however, that they might come to a better appreciation of the situation and a re-evaluation and modification of their positions. The four-member group might be able to accomplish much useful work and to prepare the ground for the final solution desired by all. It was significant that no voice had been raised against United Nations protection of the Holy Places and religious interests in the Holy Land, and there was no indication that an appreciable majority of Member States were abandoning the principle repeatedly affirmed by the General Assembly.

48. Belgium had consistently endeavoured to obtain respect for Assembly decisions. The United Kingdom had voted in favour of internationalization for Jerusalem. France was determined not to renounce its support of territorial internationalization. Until the final form of an international régime had been settled, there was no reason to abandon the principle. On the contrary, there were many reasons, not only of a religious nature but of a general moral character, for which every constructive effort should continue to be made to implement that principle. Belgium had not introduced its draft resolution as a result of pressure from any source. The only pressure to which Belgium had yielded had been the pressure of the higher principle.

Report of the Security Council (A/1361)

49. Mr. HAY (Australia) proposed that the Committee should follow the procedure adopted in the past two years in regard to the Security Council's report and should adopt a resolution to the following effect: "The General Assembly takes note of the report of the Security Council covering the period from 16 July 1949 to 15 July 1950".

50. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the report of the Security Council

before the Committee (A/1361) included a number of illegal decisions which had been taken when the composition of the Council was illegal because of the absence of the representatives of the USSR and China. Moreover, those decisions had been taken with the illegal participation of the representative of the Kuomintang group, which the Government of the People's Republic of China had deprived of any right or authority to represent China in the United Nations.

51. Illegal decisions on the Korean question had been taken on 26 and 27 June and on 7 July^a under pressure from the United States, which was attempting to camouflage its armed intervention in Korea under Security Council decisions.

52. Article 27 of the Charter laid down that all decisions by the Security Council must be taken by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. The resolution of 27 June had, however, been adopted by six votes only, the "vote" of the representative of the Kuomintang group, which illegally occupied China's seat in the Security Council, having been counted as the seventh vote. That resolution had also been adopted in the absence of two permanent members of the Council, the USSR and China. For both those reasons the resolution had no legal validity.

53. By the resolution on Korea the Security Council had also violated the most important provision of the Charter, which specifically prohibited intervention by the United Nations in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, since the dispute in Korea was an internal conflict between two groups of the same State and people. The resolution of 7 July, under which the necessary armed forces and other facilities were placed at the disposal of the so-called Unified Command, under the guidance of the United States, was also a flagrant violation of the Charter.

54. All the resolutions adopted by the Security Council on the Korean question flagrantly violated Article 32 of the Charter, which laid down that any State which was not a Member of the United Nations, if it was a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, should be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. Only the representative of the Syngman Rhee clique had, however, been invited to attend the relevant meetings of the

Security Council, a proposal to invite a representative of the People's Republic of Korea having been rejected. The Council's resolutions had therefore been adopted on the basis of one-sided information submitted by the United States delegation and the representative of the Syngman Rhee clique.

55. Those illegal resolutions had been passed by the Security Council under pressure from the United States. In so doing, it had not fulfilled its function as the organ chiefly responsible for the maintenance of peace and security but had served as an instrument of the United States ruling circles, which had unleashed the war.

56. When the draft report had been under consideration in the Security Council, the USSR delegation had pressed for the deletion of those decisions which had been taken by the Security Council at a time when its composition was illegal. It had therefore been unable to vote for the draft report in its existing form and had abstained from voting. It considered that the General Assembly could not properly take note of the report adopted by the Security Council when it was illegally composed until those decisions had been deleted.

57. Mr. ORDONNEAU (France) said that the views of his delegation had been fully set forth in the records of the Security Council. He would therefore merely confine himself to saying that its views were diametrically opposed to those of the USSR.

58. Mr. ROSS (United States of America) said that, while he did not question the USSR representative's right to criticize the report, he emphatically disagreed with his views.

59. Mr. WIANG (China) protested against the charges which the USSR representative had brought against his government. The statement made by the USSR representative was not only an insult to his government, which was the only legal government of China, but also to the other members of the Security Council, which had endorsed the report. His delegation, representing a member of the Council, would certainly not brook any such insult.

60. The CHAIRMAN put the Australian proposal to the vote.

The proposal was adopted by 42 votes to none, with 8 absentions.

^a *Ibid.*, Fifth Year, 473rd, 474th, 476th meetings.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.