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Chairman: Mr. Pierre FORTHOMME
(Belgium).

AGENDA ITEM 52

World Food Programme (A/6003/Add.1, A/6149, A/6150; E/4015, E/4043, E/4060; A/C.2/L.819/Rev.1 and Add.1; A/C.2/L.839, L.840, L.841/Corr.1 and Add.1)

1. Mr. BOERMA (Executive Director of the World Food Programme) described the accomplishments of the World Food Programme over the past three years, the lessons that had been learned and the directions in which it should move in the future. Contributions to the Programme had come to about \$94 million, as against the target figure of \$100 million, but more contributions had been in kind than in cash. It had not therefore been possible to buy certain commodities needed to balance diets, but otherwise the experimental programme had been carried out as originally planned. Among foodstuffs provided by way of contributions, rice and sugar had been in shortest supply. Seventy countries, most of them developing countries, had contributed to the Programme, and there had been fifty-four recipient countries. In all, 101 countries had participated in the Programme as donors or recipients or both. That proved that the idea of a multi-lateral food aid programme was thoroughly workable.

2. The World Food Programme made a distinction between emergency operations and projects for economic and social development. Emergency aid had been provided to twenty-five different countries on twenty-nine occasions, particularly in the case of natural disasters and also to solve refugee problems. A sum of \$17 million had been earmarked for emergency aid but, because of serious droughts in several regions, that sum was barely sufficient to meet present needs.

3. The main emphasis of the Programme was on development. One hundred and sixteen development projects, almost all of which were in actual operation, had been approved. Only five projects had been completed and nine others were nearing completion. Food aid was being used in different ways to promote economic and social progress. Perhaps the most obvious application was in labour-intensive undertakings in which workers received part of their wages in the form of food. That was particularly true in rural areas. Food aid was also used as an incentive in

several community development projects; families of settlers opening up new lands were receiving such aid until they were able to bring in their first harvest. The Programme was also contributing to school meals projects and similar activities.

4. Experience had shown that with a little imagination food aid could be linked with projects in almost every sector of the economy. The Programme relied entirely for expertise on the competent organizations in each sector. Throughout the experimental period, co-operation with the agencies had been close and effective. The organizations were playing an important role in all phases of project preparation, implementation and appraisal, while the Programme, for its part, had the feeling that it was providing them with new possibilities of action in their respective fields of competence. The Programme was also collaborating directly with other aid-financing organizations and programmes, notably the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, UNICEF and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

5. The World Food Programme had always arranged for intermediate and terminal evaluations of its projects by independent consultants or by the United Nations and the specialized agencies. It was at present examining with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research the possibility of that Institute playing a role in those activities; a detailed analysis of selected projects would certainly yield valuable information on the economic and social impact of the Programme's aid in different types of undertakings.

6. One of the basic preoccupations of the Programme was to avoid hindering the efforts of recipient countries to increase their own agricultural output; similarly, food aid should not interfere with international trade by taking the place of supplies which a country would normally purchase abroad. Those were the recognized principles of disposal of agricultural surpluses, which had been laid down by FAO. To ensure that they were observed, the Programme consulted regularly with the FAO Consultative Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal before projects were submitted for approval.

7. As regards the future of the World Food Programme, he recalled that proposals had been submitted to the FAO Conference and to the General Assembly of the United Nations that the Programme should be extended on a continuing basis for as long as multi-lateral food aid was found feasible and desirable, and that the target for voluntary contributions for the next three years should be set at \$275 million, of which not less than one-third should be in cash and services.

The FAO Conference had just formally accepted those recommendations. If the General Assembly did likewise, it would perhaps be possible to link World Food Programme aid with national development plans. The form of the link might vary from case to case; it might consist of a package request for aid to a number of different projects incorporated in the plan, or of the programme approach in which food aid was made available to meet an increase in the over-all effective demands for food arising out of the new employment and income created in the course of the development process. Since, in the latter case, food aid was intended to meet an increase in demand, foodstuffs would be distributed through normal commercial channels. At its session in April 1965, the United Nations/FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Programme had decided not to take a decision for or against the principle of programme approach, but had requested a detailed study of the way in which that approach would work in a specific case. That study was being carried out with the co-operation of the Government of Jamaica and a report would be submitted to the Intergovernmental Committee at its forthcoming session in April 1966.

8. Since that Committee's last session, an increasing number of requests for aid had been received from Governments. Projects formally submitted now represented more than \$80 million; and, if the further requests that were already known to be in the offing were included, that figure would exceed \$200 million. But even the latter figure was small in relation to the total volume of aid which the Programme could handle on a project basis if the necessary resources were available.

9. There were other possibilities which could lead to a radical transformation of the Programme: the Argentine proposal for the conversion of the Programme into a world food fund, and the suggestion that the Programme should be organically linked with international commodity agreements. Those were both important ideas, but they went beyond the terms of reference of the Programme and of its Intergovernmental Committee. They should therefore be considered by the United Nations and FAO.

10. The first practical step in preparing for the Programme's next phase would be the Pledging Conference on 18 January 1966. The recommended target of \$275 million for three years represented a substantial increase in comparison with the current Programme. However, it was equivalent to an annual level of only a little more than \$90 million. He was convinced that the efforts needed to achieve that target were well within the reach of donor countries. The experimental programme was already contributing, however modestly, to the economic and social progress of the developing countries. If the General Assembly was willing, and if Governments provided the necessary resources, the Programme could make a substantial contribution to the efforts of the United Nations family during the second half of the United Nations Development Decade.

11. Mr. WELLS (Deputy Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) recalled that at its thirteenth session, held

on 20 November to 9 December 1965, the FAO Conference unanimously adopted a resolution whose text was transmitted to the Committee by the Secretary-General's note (A/6149, para. 15). The draft resolution submitted for the approval of the Committee by the Economic and Social Council (A/C.2/L.839), like the FAO resolution, recommended that the World Food Programme should be continued as a joint United Nations-FAO project for as long as multilateral food aid was found feasible and desirable.

12. The Food and Agriculture Organization attached particular importance to the Programme and was very glad to see it established on a continuing basis, after an experimental period of three years. The Programme had opened up possibilities for the rational use of food aid as capital in the developing countries and had, for the first time, placed at the disposal of the organizations concerned an effective means of supplying emergency food aid.

13. The Organization was also very concerned with the relation of the Programme to agricultural development, and particularly to increasing agricultural productivity, which accounted for more than one-third of the Programme's activities. With respect to emergency relief, he was very pleased to note that an international agreement now enabled the Director-General of FAO to fulfil his responsibilities and supply emergency food aid. The Food and Agriculture Organization hoped that the resources earmarked for that type of assistance would prove sufficient.

14. Governments of both donor and recipient countries had expressed satisfaction with the objectives of the Programme and the manner in which they had been implemented during the experimental period. The FAO Conference had decided that it was not opportune to propose basic changes; like the Intergovernmental Committee, it had felt that the Programme should continue to be based on the project approach. It had, however, agreed, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of FAO had suggested in their joint report (E/4015), that the Programme might support a series of related projects within an approved national plan for general economic development. The Intergovernmental Committee had also recommended that the Executive Director of the Programme should carry out, with the co-operation of FAO, the United Nations and the other organizations concerned, a detailed study of the so-called "programme approach" in collaboration with a specific country; it had, however, recognized that the approach raised many problems and it had taken no final decision of principle. It was important that food aid should not slow down the efforts made by the recipient countries to increase their agricultural productivity.

15. It became increasingly apparent that there were possibilities of a large-scale breakdown in food supplies in some of the more populated regions and that the continuance of large surplus food-stocks in some of the leading developed countries could no longer be taken for granted. It was true that some of the developing countries were capable of producing food in excess of what they consumed at home or normally exported, but those countries were unable to sell their excess production on the world market at

remunerative prices and could not afford to give it away. That had led a number of countries, among them Argentina, to propose that the World Food Programme should be converted into a world food fund. The idea had merit, provided the necessary resources to make commodity purchases were available. The Intergovernmental Committee had decided that it was not competent to study that question and had referred it to FAO and the United Nations. The FAO Council, to which the Committee on Commodity Problems had referred the matter, had requested the Director-General to examine as soon as possible the best way to undertake a detailed study of the problems which would be raised by such a transformation. The Director-General intended to give high priority to such a study in the coming months.

16. Meanwhile, the draft resolution entitled: "Programme of studies on multilateral food aid" (A/C.2/L.841 and Corr.1 and Add.1) now before the Second Committee requested the Secretary-General to examine the problem in detail in co-operation with the Director-General of FAO and in consultation with the executive heads of other interested organizations and programmes, and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session on the arrangements made for undertaking the study and the timetable anticipated. FAO approved of that approach to the question, which, in its view, was separate from the extension of the World Food Programme, embodying as it did issues of international price and stabilization policies for individual commodities which must necessarily involve commodity agreements negotiated within the framework of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. However, where surpluses accumulated as a result of price stabilization measures, it would seem appropriate for such surpluses to be made available to the World Food Programme.

17. The FAO Conference had also discussed the question of the programme versus the project approach, which was the subject of the amendment (A/C.2/L.819/Rev.1 and Add.1) to the draft resolution of the Economic and Social Council. The Conference had felt that the basic character of the Programme should be maintained and that it was therefore of fundamental importance for its satisfactory conduct that the same decisions should be reached by the United Nations and FAO, making no substantive changes. The Argentine proposal raised new issues which, while admittedly important, went beyond the scope of the World Food Programme and called for a separate study.

18. He hoped that the World Food Programme would be extended and expanded by the unanimous action of FAO and the United Nations. Food aid, properly administered, could help directly to supplement deficient food supplies, raise agricultural productivity, and greatly facilitate a wide range of non-agricultural activities contributing to general economic development.

19. Mr. DE SEYNES (Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs) said that there was broad agreement regarding the administration of the World Food Programme among the Director-General of FAO, the Executive Director of the World Food Programme and

the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In consequence, he would endeavour mainly to set the Programme against the background of all the matters which had concerned the Second Committee at the present session.

20. The World Food Programme loomed large in the assessment of the achievements of the United Nations in the first half of the United Nations Development Decade. Its activities would henceforth permeate all operational programmes, and meant much in terms of the assistance provided in those sectors of economic development which fell within the sphere of the United Nations itself. The Programme was also an example of very close co-operation between two United Nations agencies and drew extra strength from the support provided by those agencies, which had throughout co-operated harmoniously in its administration. At the secretariat level, that identity of purpose had taken practical shape in the joint proposals by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of FAO on the future of the Programme (A/4015). At the government level, the complicated process of preparing the legislation required to carry the Programme forward, initiated by the Intergovernmental Committee, had been methodically and successfully pursued by the governing bodies of FAO and the United Nations. The draft resolution submitted for the approval of the General Assembly by the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 1080 (XXXIX), amended by its resolution 1094 (XXXIX) (A/C.2/L.839), called for the convening of a pledging conference for the Programme in January 1966. It established a target of \$275 million for the three years 1966 to 1968, of which 33 per cent should be provided in cash or services if the Programme was to be able to function. He hoped that at the pledging conference fair words and mechanical gestures would be followed by a clear commitment. The World Food Programme must be carried forward in the name of the Governments and peoples of the world, for, as the Secretary-General had pointed out, what is given in the name of citizenship has the best chance of creating responsible citizens in return.

21. In a period when the network of agencies dedicated to international co-operation was undergoing rapid development, the various programmes must not be thought of in isolation. The total resources available today to the United Nations system and to other institutions with which it might work were substantial enough for it to be worth while considering them as a whole and planning new orientations with a view to achieving maximum efficiency. Each of the programmes had everything to gain by being integrated as closely as possible in the network that had gradually been built up and by its activities being viewed within the over-all process of economic development. In particular, it must be considered whether certain restrictive clauses, introduced into legislation at a relatively recent date, still corresponded to reality. That was true of the World Food Programme which, in many respects, was at the meeting point of various types of activities and which had brought the United Nations considerably nearer to action in the field of investment proper. The Programme had already made a preliminary attempt to

adopt a programme approach to assistance, and the competent organs would not fail to consider how far that formula could be applied.

22. But it was also essential to place the Programme within the framework of a world food policy which strove for at least a modicum of co-ordination. Moreover a shift in attitude appeared to be taking place, and it might perhaps be necessary, as the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal had remarked at the opening of the thirteenth session of the FAO Conference, to lift the lid of production restrictions in countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia and a number of others in order to meet world food requirements in the next fifteen years. Then again, it might be wondered whether food aid programmes had not to some extent discouraged agricultural planners in the under-developed countries or helped to depress agricultural prices and to reduce production incentives.

23. It was certain, however, that the World Food Programme was a meeting point for various schools of thought. For if it was recognized that sizable transfers of foodstuffs would continue to be necessary in the years to come, it was also understood that first priority should be given to the development of agricultural production in the under-developed countries themselves. It had been proved that food surpluses, even if they were the result of an anarchical situation, might help to put an end to that anarchy or at least to introduce a semblance of order. Such an overall view was the underlying meaning of draft resolution A/C.2/L.841. The World Food Programme and the wider problem of a world food policy were very closely linked. If there was every reason to believe that a world food policy meeting foreseeable needs would continue to play an important role in food programmes, it might also be supposed that a greater proportion of that food aid would be undertaken multilaterally and within the United Nations system. Thus the present programme might be considered the embryo of a more widespread activity which would have the desired range and scope.

24. The progressive enlargement of the World Food Programme during the second half of the Decade should be accompanied by an over-all study of a more co-ordinated food policy and the establishment of appropriate machinery. It was a task to which the United Nations system as a whole, particularly in the wake of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, seemed naturally fitted and one which it would be difficult for it to evade.

25. Mr. PARDO (Malta) proposed that the statements of the Executive Director of the World Food Programme, the Deputy Director-General of FAO and the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs should be issued in full as Committee documents.

It was so decided.^{1/}

26. Mr. FIGUEROA ANTEQUEDA (Argentina) said that in considering the uninterrupted continuation of

the World Food Programme with a budgetary target fixed for the next three years, the Second Committee was called on to take a particularly important decision, for the activities planned for the Programme over the next three years were based on the principle set forth in recommendation A.II.6 of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development to the effect that the World Food Programme should benefit all developing countries, whether food-exporting or food-importing;^{2/} it was thus the first time that a recommendation of the Conference would be given practical application within the United Nations system, a step which bode well for the future.

27. It must be hoped that in the three years ahead the World Food Programme would continue to expand on its experiments in regard not only to food aid itself but also to the negotiation of agreements on primary commodities and the study of economic development and liquidity problems facing the developing countries. It was important, in particular, that the Programme should try providing food aid under a national development programme. All economic aid ought to be provided in the framework of well-thought-out programmes, whereas hitherto the Programme's activities had concerned only projects or groups of projects. That was a shortcoming which should be corrected, and Argentina was ready to participate in considering the detailed study by the Executive Director of the Programme on the request for food aid to be submitted by Jamaica under its development programme.

28. At its eighth session, the Intergovernmental Committee had studied the question whether the terms of reference of the Programme would allow it to consider and comply with a request such as that submitted by Jamaica. Unfortunately, failing the agreement of a small number of major contributing countries, the Intergovernmental Committee had been unable to adopt the formula proposed by the United Kingdom representative, the Chairman of the working group on rules of procedure established by the committee at its seventh session, to the effect that the word "projects" in the terms of reference could be interpreted as applying equally to "programmes", at the discretion of the Intergovernmental Committee. If the detailed and objective study to be presented by the Executive Director of the Programme on Jamaica's development programme at the next session of the Intergovernmental Committee showed that the programme was well-conceived and that the World Food Programme was able to give it food aid, it would be deplorable if the Executive Director's efforts and Jamaica's hopes were thwarted because some members of the Intergovernmental Committee felt that meeting that particular request for aid was outside the scope of the World Food Programme. It was to avert such a danger that Argentina and a number of other delegations had submitted an amendment (A/C.2/L.819/Rev.1 and Add.1) to the draft resolution submitted by the Economic and Social Council. The intention was not to alter the Programme's terms of reference in any way but to

^{1/} The full texts of the statements by the Executive Director of the World Food Programme, the Deputy Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs have been issued as documents A/C.2/L.845-847.

^{2/} See Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, volume I: Final Act and Report (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 64.II.B.11).

make it clear that they did not exclude action by programme, as in the case of Jamaica. The amendment would not open the door to a countless number of actions by programme as the Programme's resources would not allow it to undertake more than one such action in the three years to come, and in view of time needed for implementation, the results of the action would probably not be known until the end of that period.

29. The sponsors of the amendment felt that the question of the Programme's competence should be settled at once, for it should not be studied by the Intergovernmental Committee at the same time as the practical provisions for aid to the Jamaican programme. It had been said that it was not desirable to amend the text recommended by the Economic and Social Council and the sponsors of the amendment were ready to examine any wording expressly stating their interpretation of the Programme's terms of reference without altering the operative part of the Council's draft resolution. If such an interpretation had been made at the Intergovernmental Committee's previous session, they would not have had to submit an amendment to a draft which they fully supported and which, moreover, the Economic and Social Council had adopted on the recommendation of Argentina and the United States.

30. The question of food aid was increasingly important and was closely linked to the current negotiations on such products as cereals, cocoa and sugar. As the level of food aid mounted, there arose fresh international liquidity problems, which also had a bearing on the question of international monetary reform. It was for those reasons that the Argentine Government had submitted to the Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Programme a proposal for the creation of a world food fund. Like any other practical proposal, it had met with the customary objections, namely, that its financial implications must be studied first, and that it raised the problem of the competence of other organs. It had also been said that the Intergovernmental Committee was not competent to recommend that the organs concerned should undertake the necessary studies. That was why Argentina and a number of other countries had brought the matter, in draft resolution A/C.2/L.841, before the General Assembly, the supreme co-ordinator of United Nations organs.

31. The decision to undertake a study on multilateral food assistance would in no way commit Governments as regards the various proposals set forth in the draft, but any postponement of the study would retard the negotiation of agreements on primary commodities. The draft resolution stressed the seriousness of the problem of hunger, made a clear distinction between long-term efforts to increase food production and the need for multilateral action to combat hunger effectively, and reproduced some of the conclusions contained in the Intergovernmental Committee's report on its eighth session, conclusions which represented the opinion of authorized experts. It also noted the decisions of the Council of FAO and the programme of work of the Committee on Commodities of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Lastly, the sponsors had drafted operative paragraph 1 with great care, so as not to omit

any of the organizations or programmes concerned and to take their terms of reference into account, as they wished the study recommended to the Secretary-General to be as complete and specific as possible and not to be influenced by any of the political positions now held. The sponsors would welcome any suggestion to remedy a possible omission. They wanted the study to avoid duplication and they had set no time limit for its completion, in order to enable all the organizations and programmes concerned to contribute their technical knowledge and experience to it. Accordingly, operative paragraph 2 merely requested the Secretary-General to inform the General Assembly at its forthcoming session of the arrangements he had made. Some existing studies could be utilized. Others were under way, such as the FAO study on the needs and objectives of agricultural production, while yet other studies would have to be undertaken or brought up to date by the competent organizations. The sponsors of the draft resolution hoped that all the organizations concerned would assign a sufficiently high priority to those studies to enable them to be completed within a reasonable time.

32. The decision to extend the World Food Programme, with almost tripled resources, was commendable and should be approved, but it alone would not solve the problem of hunger. At the same time, the questions of production, marketing, financing, distribution and administration were so closely linked to questions of development and economic aid that no adequate solution could be found without the solid experience to be gained through the World Food Programme and a thorough study such as the sponsors of the draft resolution asked for. The sponsors hoped that while the study was being prepared all countries would consider the political measures required to enable them to take the necessary action before the problem of hunger had irreparable consequences for the peace and security of the international community.

33. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that all developed countries, following the example of those which had co-sponsored the draft resolution, would be able to rise above their differences and heed the humanitarian message of Pope Paul VI to the General Assembly (1347th plenary meeting). He remarked that the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations had expressed the desire to participate briefly in the Committee's debate.

34. Mr. CLARKE (Jamaica) said that the Argentine representative had not only outlined the scope of the amendment in document A/C.2/L.819/Rev.1, but had also sketched in the background of the problem. He himself would merely supplement that very fine statement and clarify some of the ideas behind the programme approach. Jamaica, which received aid under the World Food Programme and was a member of the Intergovernmental Committee, had recently been chosen as the subject for studying the feasibility of the Programme approach. The results of the study would be put before the Intergovernmental Committee in April 1966, and would influence thinking on the practicability of food aid to developing countries, since the study covered the practical and administrative implications of such support.

35. The decision to extend and expand the World Food Programme was largely based on the success of its operations in the three-year experimental period which had just elapsed. It should not, however, be forgotten that the World Food Programme was an entirely new venture. It had dealt with a wide variety of projects, and every stage and aspect of operations had had to be carefully checked, with a view to evolving agreed working rules. It should also be borne in mind that one main objective of the Programme had been the evaluation of techniques for administering food aid. In that context, the programme approach was merely one further step in the evaluation process.

36. The ideas behind the programme approach were the outcome of trying continuously to improve the methods of using food aid as a tool in economic and social development. It therefore had far-reaching implications for all future work of the World Food Programme. The basic premise was that all food aid for development had to be used to support new forms of productive undertakings. Some undertakings could be accomplished by labour which would accept its reward in food alone, but the scope for such undertakings was limited. Most development activities needed other things besides food, such as supplies, equipment, and skilled staff which demanded rewards other than food alone. The cost in terms of food of development undertakings therefore varied greatly, and it was at that point that the decision had to be made as to the choice of the appropriate approach. The project approach, which had hitherto been followed by the World Food Programme, largely applied to those undertakings which could be achieved entirely, or for the most part, with food. If carried further, the offer of food aid might encourage the launching of projects that would attract scarce non-food resources from undertakings of greater developmental significance. Because such competition for scarce resources arose, many worthwhile undertakings must therefore remain outside the ambit of the project approach.

37. Furthermore, while the food cost of such undertakings when considered individually might be small, the aggregate food demand for the sum total of developmental activities would be very substantial. The programme approach would be so designed as to meet the additional food demand of all projects comprised in a comprehensive development programme, after making allowances for normal imports and for the maximum increase of internal agricultural output possible during the programme period.

38. If food aid were to be geared to the objective of maximizing the growth rate of developing countries, the administrative machinery should not be limited to the project approach. That fact had emerged from experience and it had been stressed in the expert studies submitted to the Intergovernmental Committee. The multilateral programme of food aid could not achieve its greatest effectiveness if action by project was not supplemented by action by programme. In practice, the choice of approach would depend on the circumstances.

39. Other considerations reinforce the need for the programme approach. One such consideration was the

size of project. The cost of administering a project did not vary proportionately with its size. A multiplicity of small projects might involve high administrative costs, which could be avoided in the programme approach, because of the scope for integration. Furthermore, if projects were to be administered efficiently, a limit must be set on their minimum size. At the fifth session of the Intergovernmental Committee the Jamaican delegation had drawn attention to the fact that the minimum size criterion could work to the disadvantage of smaller countries because individual projects might not be large enough to be approved. There was no doubt that the programme approach was better suited to that kind of situation and to the needs of small nations. The central objective of the World Food Programme was elimination of the conditions which made food aid necessary. In order to achieve that objective, the World Food Programme must have suitable tools. It was for that reason that his delegation had co-sponsored the amendment in A/C.2/L.819/Rev.1 and draft resolution A/C.2/L.841 and Corr.1.

40. Miss MEAGHER (Canada) said that it had taken many years to secure agreement for the establishment of an international agency which would make food available for economic and social development and which would have food available on call to meet emergencies. The World Food Programme today had over 100 projects which had been approved or were in operation. Although the critical phase was over and although the results of the experimental period fully justified the continuation of the Programme, the fact remained that only preliminary conclusions could be made in an assessment of the projects so far completed.

41. The objectives of the World Food Programme were indeed far-reaching. The Programme was based on a desire to meet the food needs of the world's under-nourished peoples, as well as to provide inter-governmental machinery to promote economic development directed to raising the level of food consumption. Her delegation did not regard the Programme as a surplus disposal agency.

42. Draft resolution A/C.2/L.841 and Corr.1 contained a request to the Secretary-General to undertake a series of studies dealing with the means and policies which would be required for multilateral food aid. Her delegation was in favour of such studies provided they did not duplicate those currently being undertaken by the Committee on Commodity Problems of FAO. It attached particular importance to the financial implications of such action. Her delegation also supported the objectives of draft resolution A/C.2/L.839 and hoped that it would be adopted unanimously.

43. Although her delegation was in favour of the continuation of the World Food Programme and the expansion of its resources, it would none the less like to recall the interpretation it had given at Rome of the resolution adopted at the thirteenth session of the FAO Conference. The considerations it had enumerated on that occasion were: the Programme must continue to have joint sponsorship of FAO and the United Nations; there must continue to be adequate safeguards; the aid must consist solely of food-stuffs; the food-stuffs must normally be distributed

free at project sites; the Programme must not encourage uneconomic agricultural production; it must always be possible to provide emergency food aid; food aid would be on a project basis.

44. If the recommendations of the Intergovernmental Committee, on which the Canadian position was based, were accepted, Canada would be prepared, taking into account the degree of financial support granted by other member countries, to provide up to \$US27.5 million in commodities and cash for the period 1966-1968. That was more than a four-fold increase over the initial contribution of Canada to the World Food Programme.

45. In operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.2/L.841 and Corr.1, her delegation would like the words "through the Economic and Social Council" to be inserted after the words "to report". With regard to amendment A/C.2/L.819/Rev.1, it endorsed the conclusions of the Executive Director of the Programme with regard to the need for maintaining a perfect harmony of views between FAO and the Council. Nevertheless, it would be unable to support that amendment because in it the results of the current studies were to some extent prejudged.

46. Mr. TANIMOUNE (Niger) said that he would like to express his gratitude to the various United Nations bodies, and in particular to FAO, for the remarkable efforts they made in aiding the poorer countries. As a result of their achievements, it had been possible for arrangements to be made, especially during the post-war period, to increase the production of food and to set up food reserves. No country was more appreciative than his own of the positive role which had been played by FAO, especially in view of the advantages which had thus resulted for his country's economic development. The delegation of Niger therefore gave its full support to draft resolution A/C.2/L.839 providing for the continuation of the World Food Programme. Although not directly affected by the problem of hunger, his country was prepared to help the countries that were affected by it. Under the FAO Programme, it had already made a modest contribution to that agency in the form of ten tons of beans, and it was also planning to place its millet surplus at the agency's disposal. Because it had reason to appreciate fully the value of international solidarity, his country appealed to the generosity of the developed countries and urged them to increase their contributions to the World Food Programme.

47. Mr. NYUMBE (Sudan) said he was happy to learn that the World Food Programme proposed to assist projects for increasing food production in the developing countries. The shortage of food in those countries was aggravated by their steadily increasing population. That situation was all the more dangerous in that malnutrition affected the physical and mental health of the future generations. The problem of hunger therefore demanded not only immediate action but also long-term planning designed to achieve a final solution.

48. Malnutrition and hunger did not in any wise prove that the people of the developing countries were shirkers; those scourges were in essence the bitter heritage of colonialism. Some of the devel-

oped countries certainly owed their present level of development to exploitation of the peoples of the former colonies. The problem of hunger was linked to all aspects of development, and particularly to the state of agriculture. As a general rule, a developing country, upon becoming independent, had to cope with serious political and economic problems. With regard to agriculture, those countries had to give priority to export crops in order to maintain a favourable trade balance. Food production was left to the local farmers, who were unable to meet the needs of the population because they had to use primitive implements and very seldom employed fertilizer. Owing to the lack of food reserves, the situation was apt to be further aggravated by natural disasters. It was to remedy that state of affairs that FAO had launched the Freedom from Hunger Campaign in 1960 and that the General Assembly had adopted resolutions 1496 (XV) and 1714 (XVI). In resolution 1/61 which it adopted in its eleventh session, November 1961, the Conference of FAO had called for the establishment of a World Food Programme for the purpose of alleviating the sufferings provoked by hunger and malnutrition in the developing countries.

49. His delegation was gratified at the decision to continue the Programme and hoped that the target of \$275 million set by the Intergovernmental Committee for the years 1966-1968 would be reached.

50. It wished, moreover, to thank the World Food Programme, FAO and the other United Nations bodies which had aided his country in resettling the 50,000 inhabitants of Wadi Halfa who had had to be evacuated because of the construction of the Aswan Dam. At the present time, however, the Programme was functioning on an experimental basis, and its main purpose was to provide help in cases of natural disasters. Hence it could not, as was recognized by its Executive Director, provide a final solution to the problem of hunger; such a solution depended on an increase in the agricultural production of the developing countries. That, in turn, required a veritable technological revolution and, in consequence, considerable financial means.

51. His delegation would support draft resolution A/C.2/L.841 and Corr.1. In operative paragraph 1, however, it would like, after the words "various alternative types of action", to have the following words inserted: "including financing of agricultural projects in the developing countries aimed at increasing the food productivity,".

52. Mr. ROOSEVELT (United States of America) said that the extension of the World Food Programme—coupled with the merger of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund, and the establishment of a United Nations organization for industrial development—would help to make the twentieth session of the General Assembly an historic one. In spite of its small size, the World Food Programme was indeed one of the most constructive undertakings ever launched by the United Nations and its related organizations. During the initial three-year experimental period, it had been proved that it was possible to carry out food assistance programmes on a multi-lateral basis while at the same time stimulating

economic and social development. The United States Secretary of Agriculture had said at the first pledging conference for the Programme: "The World Food Programme would permit a direct attack on hunger, and would also provide some of the time needed to promote the economic growth projects which, in the final analysis, were the only cure for poverty."

53. During the first three years of its existence, the Programme had used the pledges by some seventy countries amounting to about \$100 million, of which \$68.7 million had been in the form of food-stuffs, \$5.4 million for shipping and handling services and \$19.6 million in cash for administrative services. One important feature of the Programme was that it involved such a close degree of co-operation among so many parts of the United Nations family; that feature might well become an example for other activities. The pledges of food, amounting to about 60 per cent and consisting principally of cereals and cereal products, had been used to provide assistance in twenty-nine emergency situations in twenty-two countries. In addition, over 114 projects affecting more than fifty countries had been approved. There was a wide variety of projects in which food was being used for partial wage payments, in land reform, land reclamation and development, afforestation and a variety of public works projects and industrial projects. An important function of the Programme was to supply food to countries that had experienced natural disasters.

54. He congratulated the Executive Director of the Programme and expressed the hope that the continuation of the Programme and the increase in contributions in response to the new target of \$275 million would make it possible to carry out even more varied and more useful activities.

55. Retracing the origins of the Programme, he recalled the main provisions of General Assembly resolution 1496 (XV), the establishment of the Intergovernmental Committee in 1960 and the proposal made by the United States Government when that Committee had met in April 1961. That proposal had called for a three-year experimental programme with a target for voluntary contributions of \$100 million in cash and commodities. He also recalled General Assembly resolution 1714 (XVI), which had been adopted as the result of studies carried out by FAO and the United Nations and of consultations between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of FAO. The crux of that resolution had been the recognition that the ultimate solution to the problem of food deficiency lay in self-sustaining economic growth of the developing countries and that the utilization of surplus food-stuffs therefore represented an important transitional means of helping those countries in their economic development.

56. He was proud of the role that had been played by his country, which, in the past three years, had contributed to the Programme a sum of \$50 million, which represented half of the Programme's resources. That contribution had consisted of \$40 million in food-stuffs and \$10 million in cash and services. He mentioned in that connexion the food assistance provided by the United States on a bilateral basis under the Food for Peace Program, which had been

established under Public Law 480 of 1954 on foreign aid. Total food-for-peace exports over the past ten years had had a value of more than \$12.3 billion, about one-third of which had been a gift either for relief in emergency situations or for use to assist work projects for development. The President of the United States had, furthermore, just authorized the extension of the existing agreement with India, which would cover shipment to that country of an additional 1.5 million tons of grain foods. The United States believed that all nations in a position to do so should join international efforts to help India to meet the serious food crisis it was passing through.

57. With respect to the World Food Programme, the United States was prepared to contribute up to 50 per cent of the required commodities and up to 40 per cent of the needed cash and services. In so far as administrative costs were concerned, the United States was prepared to pledge up to \$6 million for administrative costs for the three-year period 1966-1968, subject to the approval of Congress. The United States would also provide shipping services sufficient to cover ocean freight on commodities supplied by it. The total cash and services would not exceed 40 per cent of the cash and services called for by the Programme. Taking into account the contribution announced by Canada, it would be noted that approximately 60 per cent of the target set had already been met.

58. His Government favoured the undertaking, on an experimental basis, of action by programme if the current studies showed its feasibility and if the necessary resources were available. Since, however, the World Food Programme was a joint programme of the United Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organization, its extension must be approved in the same form by both organizations if it was desired to avoid any doubts as to the legality of that extension. It was for that reason that he urged the withdrawal by its sponsors of the amendment (A/C.2/L.819/Rev.1) to the draft resolution submitted by the Economic and Social Council. The FAO was, after all, unable to approve the proposed interpretative amendment because its governing body, the FAO Conference, had adjourned. In the opinion of his delegation, the adoption of the proposed amendment could only delay the extension of the Programme, to the detriment of the developing countries it was intended to serve.

59. Furthermore, since food aid itself was not the permanent solution, his delegation hoped that the World Food Programme, while continuing its extremely useful work, would make a still greater contribution by encouraging increased agricultural production in the countries affected by hunger. It was for that reason that draft resolution A/C.2/L.839, authorizing the continuation of the Programme, had his delegation's whole-hearted support. His delegation expected much to emerge from the discussion of draft resolution A/C.2/L.841 and Corr.1, which had been so clearly explained by the representative of Argentina when he had introduced it. He thanked that representative for having agreed to examine the amendments proposed by some delegations, including the delegation of the United States.

60. Mr. VAN DEN BOOGAART (Netherlands) said that he wished to praise the Executive Director of the

World Food Programme and his able staff for the way in which they had fulfilled their heavy task. The World Food Programme represented one of the most original and constructive programmes undertaken by the United Nations. It had shown that food aid could make an essential contribution to meeting desperate situations and to dealing with the development problems of the less developed countries.

61. One of the most important aspects of that endeavour lay in the close co-operation which had been established between various members of the United Nations family. From that point of view, the World Food Programme constituted yet another manifestation of the interdependence of development efforts in the United Nations family of organizations and of the unity of purpose which was the primary condition for the success of the development policies of those organizations.

62. His delegation fully supported Economic and Social Council resolution 1080 (XXXIX), which provided for extending the Programme without interruption for as long as multilateral food aid was found feasible and desirable, and for establishing for the three years 1966-1968 a target for voluntary contributions of \$275 million. The developed countries must, indeed, devote their utmost efforts to meeting the considerable needs of the less developed countries. The fact, moreover, that one of the main contributing countries had stated its readiness to contribute up to 50 per cent of the commodities required showed that the target established was a realistic one. The Government of the Netherlands, for its part, had recently proposed to the Parliament a substantial increase in its contribution to the World Food Programme. During the experimental period 1963-1965, the contribution of the Netherlands had totalled 1.7 million guilders a year, supplemented by an extra contribution both in 1964 and in 1965. For the coming three years, the contribution proposed to the Parliament amounted to 6 million guilders, and the anticipated increase clearly demonstrated the importance that the Netherlands Government attached to the Programme.

63. Mr. TERRY (New Zealand) said that his country had participated in the activities of the World Food Programme since its inception and considered that the Programme had played an important part in the battle against hunger. His delegation was in favour of an extension of the Programme on a reasonable basis, but it doubted whether the target of \$275 million established for voluntary contributions was a realistic one. The vote of his delegation in favour of the draft resolution did not, therefore, represent a commitment to increase the amount of its contribution, which would in large measure be determined by those which other countries made. New Zealand did not, in fact, have any food surpluses, and the assistance it was at present making available under the World Food Programme placed a burden on its internal resources.

64. His delegation supported draft resolution A/C.2/L.841 and Corr.1, although it was not convinced that the time for carrying out the proposed concerted study had been particularly well chosen. The Committee on Commodities had rightly drawn the attention of the Intergovernmental Committee to the necessity

of taking into account, when undertaking such a study, the implications of the proposed action on the over-all aid given to the developing countries, the ability of the contributing countries to assist and the effect on world trade in agricultural products and on the prices of non-surplus food-stuffs. He hoped that the sponsors would take those suggestions into account in revising their draft resolution.

65. As for the proposed amendment (A/C.2/L.819/Rev.1) to the Council's draft resolution, his delegation felt that, before embarking on the course recommended, it would be wise to await the results of the experiment being carried out in Jamaica and, at the present stage, merely to mention the proposal in question in the Committee's report.

66. Mr. HOVEYDA (Iran) said that, as the representative of a country which was mobilizing all its resources in the struggle against hunger and ignorance, he could do no less than support the draft resolution (A/C.L.839) submitted by the Economic and Social Council for the approval of the General Assembly. His delegation had taken the same stand at the previous FAO Conference, and the Shah of Iran had said, in the message he had transmitted to FAO on the occasion of its twentieth anniversary, that the fight against disease, the fight against hunger and the fight against ignorance were different aspects of a single struggle.

67. His delegation supported draft resolution A/C.2/L.841 and Corr.1, and endorsed the reservations expressed by the Canadian representative concerning the necessity of avoiding any overlapping between the studies proposed and the studies already in progress. It also agreed with the remark of the United States representative regarding the essentially provisional nature of the World Food Programme. The real aim must be to enable the developing countries to become self-sufficient in that regard. Food aid could not, however, be reduced so long as that aim had not been achieved. His delegation wished to express its gratitude to the countries which had contributed to the success of the World Food Programme. The contribution pledged by the Canadian representative showed that the economically developed countries were prepared to co-operate with the developing countries in order to solve the problem of hunger and thus carry out one of the most important tasks of modern times.

68. Mr. CUHRUK (Turkey) said that, despite the difficulties encountered in determining policy, implementing projects and meeting emergencies, the World Food Programme offered, within the limits of its experimental period, promising potentialities for multilateral action. Having overcome the difficulties inherent in providing aid in the form of food-stuffs, the Programme had successfully promoted economic and social development, while at the same time adhering to the FAO principles concerning the disposal of surpluses.³ It had succeeded in co-ordinating its aid with the development plans of the countries concerned and had shown that food aid could contribute to the financing of economic development.

³ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Commodity Policy Studies*, No. 10, *Functions of a World Food Reserve—Scope and Limitations*, Rome 1956, annex III.

69. Turkey had benefited from twelve World Food Programme projects concerned mainly with reafforestation, soil conservation, agricultural settlement and school feeding, and had received 10 per cent of the aid given in kind. In May, under the auspices of the United Nations and FAO, his country had held a round-table conference in which experts from Africa, the Middle East and Europe, as well as representatives of Governments, had participated and at which useful recommendations had been made regarding the preparation and implementation of projects. Turkey had suggested to the Intergovernmental Committee that similar conferences should be held in other regions.

70. The Turkish delegation considered that the experience of the past three years gave grounds for optimism and that the World Food Programme should

be able to undertake more ambitious programmes in the future. It approved the financial target of \$275 million established by the Economic and Social Council and the Food and Agriculture Organization Council—a target which it felt was reasonable in relation to the capacity of the beneficiary countries to use the available aid. It also approved the supply in cash and services of no less than 33 per cent of that amount and considered that the activities of the Programme should be based on aid to individual projects, although other possibilities might be explored as available resources increased.

71. His delegation would therefore support not only the draft resolution of the Economic and Social Council (A/C.2/L.839) but also the draft resolution on multilateral food aid (A/C.2/L.841 and Corr.1).

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.