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Chairman: Mr. Leo MATES (Yugoslavia).

Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance for the economic development of under-developed countries: report of the Economic and Social Council (A/2430¹, A/2447 and Corr.1)

[Item 27]*

Technical assistance in public administration (A/2430¹, A/2447 and Corr.1)

[Item 61]*

1. Mr. OWEN (Executive Chairman, Technical Assistance Board) regretted that the tremendous momentum gained by the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance in the four previous years had not been maintained in 1953. Financial limitations and uncertainties had made it necessary to abandon plans for expansion; many requests had been refused and the hopes of many governments had been disappointed. In sharp contrast to the earlier years, 1953 had been marked by consolidation, disengagement and retrenchment. Programmes had been pruned of less useful projects; early mistake had been rectified; and administrative arrangements had been greatly improved. But it was no longer possible to respond to more than a fraction of the requests for technical assistance.

2. Although very modest by modern budgetary standards, the programme had certain features which made it unique. It drew its financial support from an increasingly wide range of countries. Many of the contributions were small and paid in non-convertible currencies, but they all played a part in giving the programme its distinctive international character. One of the most encouraging features of the work had been the extent to which many countries, such as India, Egypt, Chile and Brazil, themselves needing some form of technical aid, had been able to provide assistance to others less developed in some respects than themselves. The richness and variety which the active participation of so many nationalities gave to the programme and the importance for the programme

of being able to draw upon so wide a range of skills and experience could not be exaggerated, but it must ultimately be judged by the quality of its results rather than by the variety of its resources.

3. Some of the most important contributions of international technical assistance were complementary to the provision of capital for investment. Capital was such a scarce factor in under-developed countries that existing resources should be used as efficiently as possible. Methods should be evolved, to make greater use of the resources which were abundant such as unskilled labour. Everything should be done to render any new capital more effective.

4. To illustrate the better use of existing resources, he outlined certain projects initiated in Liberia, Israel, and in the Trust Territory of Somaliland. Capital had been economized by the use of a much higher proportion of such local resources as were relatively abundant, for example, in Israel, Afghanistan and Yugoslavia.

5. Examples of how the programme could help countries to make the best use of capital obtained from abroad were to be found in India and Pakistan, which had purchased agricultural machinery with loans from the International Bank. Paraguay, Ethiopia and Indonesia had secured similar loans for projects which they were undertaking in collaboration with United Nations experts.

6. In selecting a number of projects which were of the type and in the stage of maturity to illustrate the work of the programme, he drew attention to the thirty or more projects for surveying the resources of various countries to ascertain more definitely the possibilities for development and to lay the basis for long-range plans. Many educational, vocational training and health projects were related to others more directly concerned with material results. One of the most important successes of the programme was that it had encouraged governments to develop administrative machinery to plan the broad outlines of their economic development and to relate requests for technical assistance to those plans.

7. One of the most satisfactory features of the programme was that it had stimulated so much constructive effort on the part of the less developed countries themselves. For every dollar's worth of international help, several dollars' worth of local effort had been made. Local staff had been associated with the international staff; clinics, training centres and demonstrations centres had been built; and many other local expenses had been incurred.

8. The benefits of some aspects of the programme might transcend any advantages gained by a single country. The possible savings to vast regions resulting from the effective control of locusts in a few countries could not be assessed. Again, the apparently modest activities of two FAO veterinary experts in Burma might lead to the revolutionary alleviation of a dev-

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 3.*

estating cattle disease afflicting wide areas. Results already achieved suggested that a major discovery might be made which would benefit not only Asia and the Middle East but also North America, where the disease caused considerable destruction every year.

9. Doubts had been expressed as to whether the supply of competent and suitable technicians could meet the needs of an expanding international programme and as to the number of places in technical institutions which might be available for technical assistance fellowship-holders. Fortunately all the recruits and all the training facilities needed for the programme were available in some country or other. Nevertheless, in order to improve recruitment, the programme would still require the full assistance and co-operation of governments. In that connexion he welcomed the initiative of certain European governments as a result of which an extremely useful consultative meeting of European national committees on technical assistance had recently been held in Paris to discuss ways in which the European donor countries could assist the programme more effectively.

10. The most important development in programme planning and administration was the Technical Assistance Board's decision to change the emphasis in programme planning from headquarters to the field. That policy placed heavier demands on the resident representatives. It was therefore unfortunate that, owing to financial limitations, the number of those representatives might have to be reduced in 1954 and that the responsibilities of some of them might have to be spread over rather wide areas. The resident representatives and their staffs were an indispensable element in the efficient administration of the complex programme and their services were esteemed by the governments which had requested their appointment.

11. The crucial question was whether the programme would be provided with the financial resources to proceed, to expand gradually and to fulfil its promise. Although the rate of cash payments had been rather better in 1953 than in 1952, considerable doubt had arisen concerning the probable payment of some contributions. TAB had therefore decided to reduce the programme planned for 1953 by the equivalent of \$1,800,000, to stop the hiring of experts, the placing of fellowship holders and the purchase of equipment involving payments in convertible currencies until the end of the year, to restrict the amount of cash to be disbursed and the obligations to be undertaken during the first six months of 1954 and to ask the participating agencies to make what further savings were possible and, in particular, to reduce their headquarters costs for 1954 by as much as 20 per cent as compared with 1953. It was hoped that the forthcoming pledging conference would remedy the situation but, as no significant carry-over of funds from 1953 to 1954 could be expected, governments would have to pledge a total of not less than 20 per cent in excess of the previous pledged total if the programme was to be implemented in 1954 on the scale originally planned for 1953.

12. Some governments had indicated to him privately that their pledged contributions would be increased by proportions ranging from 20 to 100 per cent. From the financial point of view, however, disproportionate importance was attached to the pledges of the principal contributing countries, and their announcements at the pledging conference would be awaited with eagerness. Governments which had not

yet paid their pledged contributions either in whole or in part would be doing the programme a great service at a time of difficulty by fulfilling their pledges forthwith. He urged all governments which believed in the programme to pledge the highest possible contribution for 1954, to pay their contributions as early in the year as their constitutional arrangements permitted and to help TAB administer the programme flexibly by lifting, or at least relaxing, any restrictions on the use of specific goods or services.

13. At Geneva during the sixteenth session of the Economic and Social Council he had drawn the attention of the Technical Assistance Committee to some of the difficulties arising from the uncertainty about the long-term financial support of the programme. By its very nature the programme required continuity over a period of years; nothing could be more wasteful of public money than to operate the programme spasmodically. While it was impossible for some governments to make pledges for more than one budgetary year at a time, it might be possible to devise forms of assurance, subject to annual confirmation, affording a more certain basis for planning several years ahead.

14. The programme had already proved that useful practical results could be achieved by international organizations at no great cost, but what had been achieved fell pitifully short of the needs of the less-developed countries. It was for governments to decide whether the work, so full of promise, was to be carried forward on a scale which matched its challenge.

15. Mr. KEENLEYSIDE (Director-General, Technical Assistance Administration) stressed that the constantly changing estimates of the funds which would be available for programme purposes in 1953 had made rational and effective planning almost impossible. The serious doubts that had arisen concerning the payment of funds pledged at the February conference had seriously disrupted the Administration's work and had led to regrettably high administrative costs and to disappointment in the countries requiring assistance. For the past six months TAA had been discouraging, postponing or refusing many requests.

16. United Nations technical assistance in public administration had originally been proposed in a draft resolution submitted, on 14 January 1948, by the Brazilian representative at the sixth session of the Economic and Social Council² and in a report by Mr. Camu of the Belgian delegation transmitted to the Fifth Committee at the third session of the General Assembly. The result had been General Assembly resolution 246 (III) providing for the establishment of an international centre for training in public administration under the direction of the United Nations. In 1949 a minimum programme of public administration had been outlined in the Secretary-General's report to the ninth session of the Council (E/1336)³. The programme did not provide for the establishment of the international centre, but proposed seminars on administrative problems for senior civil servants; fellowships and scholarships in public administration; assistance to governments, on request, by the provision of experts in the development of public administration training facilities; advice and assistance to governments of Member States in arranging the bilateral exchange of civil servants; and

² See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Sixth Session, Annex, agenda item 40.*

³ *Ibid., Ninth Session, Annex, agenda item 4.*

encouragement and financial assistance to the International Institute of Administrative Sciences for the exchange of information on public administration subjects.

17. As the original idea of an international training centre had been abandoned, the emphasis was transferred to regional and national training centres. The changes had been made with the knowledge and approval of the Council and the General Assembly. At the eleventh session of the Council the term "programme" had been substituted for the words "international centre". As the need for improved public administration for the successful execution of economic and social welfare measures had become more apparent, the relationship of the programme to technical assistance, as defined in General Assembly resolution 200 (III) and Council resolution 222 A (IX), had developed from co-ordination with other activities under the regular and expanded programmes (Council resolutions 253 (IX) and 292 (XI)) to recognition of the fact that the improvement of public administration was one of the basic and continuing objectives of technical assistance. At its Sixth Session, the General Assembly, in resolution 518 (VI), had formally accepted public administration as one of the basic principles of the United Nations programme of technical assistance. By the second half of 1951 the Public Administration Division had become a recognized component of TAA.

18. Mr. Keenleyside then outlined the specific duties of the Public Administration Division which were undertaken in constant co-operation with the other divisions of TAA and with the Fiscal Division of the Department of Economic Affairs. Constant attention was given to the assistance which the programme in public administration could afford to, and derive from, other technical assistance projects of the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

19. The rate of expansion of the public administration programme was best indicated by the number of expert-months served on the public administration projects which had increased from 65 in 1951 to 180 in 1952 and which would reach about 475 in 1953. Projects were being undertaken in twenty-two different countries.

20. The importance of carrying on, within the Secretariat, certain activities indispensable to the programme—but not performed elsewhere—was widely recognized. Such activities included the collection of certain general official and public information about the public services of various countries, the comparison and study, in constant consultation with experts in the field, of methods of rendering technical assistance in public administration, and the continuous analysis and evaluation of the results of such technical assistance with a view to improving techniques.

21. As a result of those developments the Council had unanimously approved the draft resolution contained in its resolution 492 B (XVI). The draft resolution was intended to codify the practices which had developed, with the approval of the General Assembly and of the Council, over the previous five years. Its adoption by the General Assembly would provide a proper legislative basis for the continuation of those activities but would not authorize the initiation of any new activities or involve the expenditure of any additional funds. It would merely authorize the

Secretary-General to continue to include in the budgetary estimates the funds necessary to carry out an effective programme. The relevant estimate for 1954 was exactly the same as in 1953.

22. Mr. DJERDJA (Yugoslavia) said the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance was of vital importance because it furthered the implementation of the fundamental principles of the Charter and was a concrete action contributing to the attainment of lasting peace. Certain recent developments in the international situation could be construed to mean that the immediate danger of war had receded and that the world could look forward to an era of peaceful progress. The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance by helping to remove grounds of friction between nations could contribute to the realization of that aim.

23. The Yugoslav delegation considered the expanded programme as part of the much broader aims of the United Nations. The need for technical assistance for the purpose of assisting the general economic development of under-developed countries was so great that it could hardly be ignored. The successes already attained by the programme in furthering the economic aims of the United Nations showed that its activities should be pursued with greater vigour. The very fact that, at the present moment, the number of well-founded programmes for the granting of technical assistance was almost twice as great as the available funds proved the usefulness and necessity of the programme. The implementation of the expanded programme was closely connected with the necessity of granting financial aid. Although opposition to its basic principles still existed, the success of the programme had defeated scepticism and overcome all kinds of reservations. The number of contributing countries had increased from fifty-five in the first year to almost seventy in the third year. The adherence of new contributors was proof of the programme's growing success. It had been broadened primarily with regard to the number of countries receiving aid which had increased by twenty-six in the third year of the programme to reach the present total of ninety-seven. Experts of sixty-four nationalities had been sent to the various countries in the course of the past year. It was expected that during the current year 2,500 experts would have been sent to various parts of the world while the number of fellowship holders would be almost 2,000.

24. Yugoslavia had been one of the chief beneficiaries under the programme during the last three years. The Yugoslav Government supported it because there were no political "strings" attached to it and because it furthered the basic principles of the Charter in which Yugoslavia firmly believed. A few concrete data would suffice to illustrate the usefulness of the programme in Yugoslavia. Until 31 August 1953, Yugoslavia had received 126 experts from fourteen different countries. The fact that a considerable number of experts had often come from smaller countries was particularly noteworthy.

25. He gave examples of the excellent work being done in Yugoslavia under the programme and stressed, in particular, the progress that had recently been achieved by the strengthening of the institution of resident representatives. The greatest benefit was that it enabled greater flexibility in the planning and implementation of programmes. Decentralized planning could only increase the efficiency of programmes even

if it did involve further expenditures. Resident representatives should not only be skilled administrators, they should also be economic experts since, in that capacity, they could be of considerable assistance to the governments to which they were accredited.

26. Mr. Owen had rightly expressed his concern about the immediate future of the programme. Needs and requests were increasing every year but unexpected problems had arisen with regard to the collection of contributions.

27. By resolution 492 C.II.A (XVI), the Council had set as its target the previous year's operative sum of \$25 million, and to that end all governments would have to increase their contributions by 25 per cent; but even if that target were reached the growing financial needs of the programme would still be far from satisfied. For that reason his delegation believed that strict measures of economy should be undertaken in all spheres of the programme's activities so that every dollar was properly spent. At its last session, the Council had rightly advocated a revision of the system of assessing the financial implications of certain projects. The working group which was soon to meet to study that question should pay particular attention to the problem of economy in the administration of technical assistance. The Executive Chairman of TAB had stressed that the delay of governments in fixing their contributions constituted a great obstacle to efficient planning. He hoped that shortcoming would be eliminated during the current year.

28. In 1952, the General Assembly had decided to institute a system of long-term planning. Such planning was impossible if increased financial support was not forthcoming. His delegation considered that at the present session a definite step should be taken towards the gradual increase of contributions in proportion to the increased needs of the programme.

29. The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance was essentially a long-term one. Action taken at the present time might have to be continued for several years before fruit became apparent. The decrease in financial resources would have very harmful consequences and would result in the abandonment of a number of projects. It would be difficult to find plausible arguments in favour of reducing contributions at the present moment. Expenditure for defence purposes no doubt restricted considerably the possibility of increasing contributions but not to such an extent as to render their gradual and steady expansion impossible.

30. The Committee should also study the problem of achieving greater participation by governments themselves. It was true that under Council resolution 222 (IX), assistance was granted to a government only at its own request. However, in view of a certain rigidity in the automatic granting of basic resources, governments could apply for help only within certain limits. Such rigidity had been necessary in the earlier period of the programme but greater flexibility was now possible. Council resolution 492 B (XVI) also showed that the problem deserved more attention than it had received hitherto.

31. In the light of its experience, Yugoslavia considered that the national committees for technical assistance should be more active, both in the beneficiary and the donor countries; in the developed countries they might assist in the recruitment of ex-

perts; in the under-developed countries they could see that assistance by those countries was put to the most efficient use. Yugoslavia also considered that there was too much red tape in the process of implementation of the programmes. The volume of correspondence, in particular, could be considerably reduced.

32. Strict time-limits should be adhered to by both sides with regard to the submission of annual programmes. Experience had shown that considerable economic damage and delays might be caused if the requested form of technical assistance with regard to a project under construction was not forthcoming at the right moment. Programmes should be worked out at least six months in advance and should subsequently be circulated to all countries receiving and granting technical assistance, so that TAA or the specialized agencies might choose the best alternatives from the offers of technical assistance they received.

33. If parts of the programme were not to be carried out, the following principle should apply: credits granted to a country should lapse only if the receiving country was responsible for the non-fulfilment of the programme but not if it was TAA which was responsible for it. New ways of granting assistance and of improving existing methods should be sought. The questions of the organization of the work and the administration of enterprises with a view to making them profit-yielding could also be the object of technical assistance. For example, special courses for executives of enterprises in the under-developed countries should be held and they should be provided not only with administrative and organizational training but also with training of a technical character.

34. In the future special attention should be paid to the question of consulting scientific institutions and experts on technical problems facing the under-developed countries as also to the desirability of promoting closer contacts and exchanges between scientific institutes in various countries.

35. Financial expenditure for certain experts was sometimes too high. It might be possible to acquaint the governments receiving aid with the financial implications of specific projects. TAA could usefully prepare reports summarizing the experiences of experts who had visited various countries, drawing attention to identical or similar instructive developments in the economic sphere.

36. He was only too conscious of the great difficulties which had beset Mr. Owen and Mr. Keenleyside in the pursuance of their duties. The Yugoslav delegation appreciated the efforts they had made and hoped that Mr. Owen had been able, during his visit to Yugoslavia the previous summer, to convince himself not only of the useful results of technical assistance but also of the value attached to the programme.

37. Finally the expanded programme represented a constructive contribution to the development of friendship and co-operation among nations. Yugoslavia attached considerable importance to it and was far from under-estimating the role it played in the efforts of under-developed countries to overcome poverty, backwardness and want.

38. Sir Clifford NORTON (United Kingdom) said that it was of very good augury for the Committee's work that it was beginning its deliberations with a debate on the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. The United Kingdom Government had al-

ready expressed detailed views on it at the recent session of the Economic and Social Council in Geneva.⁴

39. It was sometimes said that the programme was in a state of crisis. The implication was that if something drastic was not done it would soon collapse. He wondered whether that was not the wrong way to look at it. It was certainly true that the programme had reached an important stage in its development. It had three years of history behind it. They had not been easy years but in a new field of international co-operation, it could hardly have been otherwise. Both the participating governments and the hard-working members of the United Nations Secretariat and the specialized agencies concerned could be congratulated on the fact that the problems had in the main been overcome. The general picture was reasonably satisfactory.

40. The participating countries, after an initial period of hesitation and even suspicion, now had confidence in the programme and saw that it could produce valuable results. That was why requests for assistance had begun to outstrip available funds. In fact, where previously there had been a buyer's market for assistance there was now a seller's market. Although the limitation of funds had caused difficulties it would generally be agreed that such a situation was healthier than one in which surplus funds would be in search of projects. Projects must now be really worthwhile to qualify for funds.

41. He did not mean to suggest that the programme necessarily disposed of sufficient funds and indeed the possibility must be considered that more funds would produce greater results. But funds were not always available and there were already too many calls upon what governments could provide. In that connexion, he stated that the United Kingdom Government could not yet commit itself on the level of its contribution in 1954.

42. The present situation should be regarded not as one of crisis but as a threefold challenge—a challenge to contributing governments to maintain the programme; to the administrators of the programme, to see that maximum efficiency and economy was made of existing resources; and to recipient governments to ensure that their requests for assistance were part of genuinely co-ordinated policies with every attention given to priorities.

43. The measures approved by the Council at its sixteenth session for the reorganization of the programme were timely. The work done at Geneva constituted a valuable effort to profit by the experience of a proving period and to place the programme on a sounder basis. Attention was rightly paid to the problem of stabilizing the financing of the programme. He was glad that a working party of TAC was to conduct a review of present financial procedures and to consider the system of allocation for funds to be applied as from 1955. He also commended the suggestion that the General Assembly might wish to request the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to review the administrative procedures and expenditure of TAE and those of the participating organizations, in so far as they were financed from the Special Account.

44. He hoped that the Executive Chairman of TAB would be able to produce constructive and acceptable

recommendations on the future of any carry-over from operations in 1954.

45. He agreed that more attention should be given to programme evaluation and the appraisal of results—a question which would require further consideration before definite proposals could be accepted.

46. The proposals for developing technical assistance planning at the country level should prove a valuable step in enabling recipient governments to co-ordinate their requests. It should yield results more in accord with an important principle of the programme, namely, that assistance should only be rendered in agreement with the governments concerned and that governments desiring assistance should perform in advance as much of the work as possible so as to define the nature and scope of the problem involved.

47. The administration of the programme should be flexible and should always be kept under review. In that sense TAC would continue to have a special responsibility.

48. The future could be faced with confidence. It was most encouraging that such an imaginative scheme of international co-operation should have had such success. In particular the invidious distinction between “developed” and “under-developed” countries was beginning to be less clearly drawn. Another hopeful factor was the receipt of substantial offers of contributions from countries which had not previously participated.

49. In sum, the United Kingdom delegation considered that the work of the Council on the subject was generally satisfactory and reaffirmed that the expanded programme would receive all possible support from the United Kingdom in the coming year.

50. Mr. DE SEYNES (France) was glad that the Committee was beginning its work with the discussion of the expanded programme since no subject was more likely to produce unity at a session which would probably deal with many controversial issues. The expanded programme had won approval throughout the world and his delegation was particularly pleased that at the last session of the Economic and Social Council the Soviet Union and the Polish delegations had announced their intention of making substantial contributions to the programme.

51. The programme was now meeting with some difficulties, particularly of a financial nature. Such a situation was in many ways encouraging because it was the result of the remarkable expansion of projects which created as many needs as they fulfilled. There were therefore undoubtedly serious problems to be faced but in attempting to solve them delegations should not forget the basic reasons for confidence in the programme.

52. First, it was a self-sufficient programme, in the sense that it could bear fruit independent of any more ambitious programmes. Secondly, it was a programme whose benefits were consolidated and accumulated in such a way as to bring additional permanent advantages to the recipient countries. Thirdly, the programme had been organized within the framework of existing and experienced institutions. Finally, it was administered by a keen and competent team which had given abundant proof of devotion and efficiency.

53. The French Government had always sought to approach the day-to-day problems involved in the execution of the programme in the light of those ad-

⁴ See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Sixteen Session, 747th meeting.*

vantages. In seeking to find ways and means of improving methods and increasing the efficiency of the programme, the French Government envisaged no revolutionary action. However its past experience led it to question certain of the methods and administrative systems employed.

54. The French Government had noted with satisfaction the decision taken by the Economic and Social Council to re-examine certain of the financial procedures which seemed partly responsible for present difficulties. The policy of short-term financing applied to projects whose execution required more than a year seemed highly unsatisfactory. Whatever confidence could be placed in the continuity of the programme, any speculation on the funds available in the future was hazardous. Even if the programme had to be provisionally curtailed, it should be protected against the inevitable risks involved in voluntary and annual contributions. Otherwise programmes already undertaken might have to be interrupted or postponed.

55. His delegation was also pleased that TAC had decided to re-examine the question of automatic allocations. His Government had reluctantly accepted the decision taken on that matter for 1954, which seemed to mark a step backwards in the efforts so far undertaken to achieve a more realistic system. Everyone would agree that the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance at the national level was a desirable goal and alone could produce maximum efficiency.

56. Some delegations considered that the automatic allocation of a large proportion of the available funds to participating agencies would run counter to efforts made in that connexion. However, within the present administrative structure the solution adopted might possibly be the best available. It was precisely the administrative structure which should be re-examined.

57. In general, Council resolution 222 (IX), which had been endorsed by the General Assembly at its fourth session, had proved itself to be a remarkably useful instrument for the implementation of the programme. However, all its provisions should not be regarded as sacrosanct. In particular, governments should be more closely associated in the management of a programme which, in fact, had been created for and was maintained by governments. Only closer association of governments could solve some of the difficulties that had been experienced from the outset.

58. The structure of TAB might lead to a certain paralysis which more direct and sustained action by governments should make it possible to avoid. Thus, in the problem of allocations, there was some danger that a system decided on somewhat arbitrarily in 1949 would tend to become crystallized in spite of the shortcomings revealed by experience. In the same way, the unification of certain procedures or methods which might differ from one agency to another might be frustrated if governments did not have the opportunity of intervening directly in decisions on such methods and procedures.

59. TAC, set up to facilitate such governmental participation, had not hitherto been able to play its part effectively. As Chairman of TAC since 1952, he had been able to appreciate the remarkable results it had achieved. Few United Nations bodies had shown such vitality or worked in such a practical and fruitful way. Nevertheless, whether through shortcomings in its terms of reference or through a tradition which had been gradually built up from the outset, TAC

had not played the direct and sustained role in the execution of the programme which some delegations had hoped at the time resolution 222 (IX) had been adopted. That fact was particularly significant as regards the preliminary approval of programmes. TAC had exhaustively examined a number of very delicate problems concerned with methods, procedures, and even principles of action but had never undertaken a critical study of programmes before they were initiated.

60. That situation was unusual and did not arise in any of the other extra-budgetary programmes in which the United Nations participated such as UNICEF, Palestine and Korea. Those programmes were organized in a way that permitted governmental departments to examine and approve programmes before funds were expended. The French Government felt that a similar method should be adopted in the case of the expanded programme.

61. In referring to the association of governments, he had in mind a selective system which would ensure the association of all governments contributing to and benefiting from the programme. In that connexion he pointed out that TAC did not include governments which were not Members of the United Nations, although such governments seemed to be participating in the programme on an increasing scale.

62. For those reasons, the system established by resolution 222 (IX) should be very seriously reconsidered. It could not be reviewed in detail in the Second Committee but should be studied first by TAC itself and then by the Council so that a detailed plan could be submitted to the General Assembly. His delegation did not wish to open a debate on the question but rather to draw the attention of governments to the problem.

63. The French Government had not yet decided on the exact way in which governments could be associated more directly in the execution of the programme. There were several possible solutions and his Government would be grateful for any suggestion which other governments might make.

64. For those reasons and with due regard to the provisional nature of some of the financial provisions for 1954, the French delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution before the Committee. The French Government had carefully examined the paragraph of the resolution inviting governments to give the programme financial support for a period longer than a year. French preliminary practice made it impossible to undertake a definite financial commitment for more than one year. Nevertheless, the French Government wished to assure the Committee of its continued support for a programme which it had considered from the outset to be one of the most fundamental and urgent components of the work of the United Nations.

65. Mr. McKEEN (Canada) wished to reaffirm his country's belief in and continued support for the technical assistance programmes, which were based on mutual aid and enlightened self-help, and contributed to the achievement of the objectives of Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter.

66. The United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance had made a slow start because demand had exceeded supply, and the precise scope had not been determined. At present the only limitations were financial, as was shown by examples of

technical assistance in such matters as physical rehabilitation, building, commerce, telecommunications, mining and statistics.

67. TAA was faced with the problem of using its resources to the best advantage by establishing priorities and cutting down overhead costs. If wisely administered and, above all, widely and generally supported, the programme could do much to develop the human and natural resources of the world and to enrich the lives of all men everywhere.

68. Mr. HALIQ (Saudi Arabia) said that considerable attention had been given to the question of technical assistance by the Council at its sixteenth session. It had called for continued support of the expanded programme and had urged the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds and the Technical Assistance Conference to meet soon and secure funds. It had furthermore stressed the need for economy. Moreover, TAA feared that the shortage of funds might check the growth of the programme as had been made clear in its fifth report (E/2433).⁵

69. Many of the early difficulties had been overcome and sound administrative machinery was being established. Countries' willingness to co-operate with TAA diplomatically was not so evident in so far as cash was concerned and the result was that projects had to be curtailed or discontinued altogether. It should be strongly emphasized that the programme was not just largesse distributed by the industrially advanced countries: that should become the basic belief of the participating countries, for the failure or success of that enterprise would determine the role the United Nations would play in maintaining peace and stability.

70. The donor countries must be persuaded that the enterprise was a good investment; and, at the same time, reasonable economies would have to be made. In an international programme of technical assistance, there was a natural tendency for the programme to be self-generating as countries came to realize its benefits and as its bureaucratic structure became well established. Recently emphasis had been placed on methods for promoting integrated programmes of human and material resources development and community organization for economic development, whereas at the beginning the emphasis had been on mission surveys and recommendations. But sufficient funds were not, and were not likely to be, forthcoming and some of the more detailed surveys and programmes of development had been shelved by governments unable to put them into execution. That was exceedingly frustrating for all concerned. International technical aid should always aim at practical achievement: TAA was, in practice, faced with the choice between courageous objective advice and an unintended form of deception.

71. The overriding consideration in all the advice and operations should be economic rather than "humanitarian". It followed that the objectives of TAA and of the specialized agencies should perhaps be reviewed. While the recipient countries recognized the value of reports and recommendations, they would prefer new methods of production, new factories, and new enterprises. If the means to bring those things about were not available, reports and plans would seem to be wasted effort. To most people in recipient

countries, the major aim of technical assistance was industrialization but, except for FAO, most of the specialized agencies seemed to lay the main emphasis on matters of a humanitarian nature.

72. It was, perhaps, significant that there was not a single agency participating in the programme whose sole concern was purely economic. A special kind of industrialization was called for, but ordinarily the interest of international technical assistance had been focussed on changes in techniques of production rather than on the extension of those already in general use. He referred to the report of the Director-General of ILO to the Asian Regional Conference, which stated that (a) the problem was to develop a new type of industry which for the same amount of capital investment could at the same time produce more than cottage and handicraft industries and provide more employment than large-scale factory industries, and that (b) the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance might play a most significant and useful role in that connexion by assisting the less-developed countries to elaborate methods of raising productivity which required little or no capital investment.

73. Except in broadest generalizations none of the United Nations specialized agencies except FAO was actually concerned with any of those aspects. The Bank and the Fund might play a more important part in that connexion. It would be more advisable and practical for both the programme and the recipient countries to concentrate their efforts on such basic objectives as domestic capital formation, under-utilized resources and operations liable to produce results; the criteria of choice should be more economic, and less bureaucratic and propagandistic. In its extensive oil operation Saudi Arabia had gone ahead successfully without being gravely handicapped by health conditions, labour problems or social maladjustment.

74. Perhaps a modified pattern of priorities could be worked out in functional terms and not merely in terms of immediate absorptive capacity and multiple needs. From the social and economic standpoint, increase of productivity in marketable and under-utilized resources meant well-being and ultimate political and economic liberty. He quoted the example of Japan, where bigger risks had been taken and more drastic alterations made than a modern United Nations technical mission would have advised. United Nations experts called in to advise governments perhaps tended to become obsessed by the social and cultural background of economic activity, thus tending to overlook the more pressing economic needs; they might have to decide whether means to attain economic objectives in a retarded economy should dominate their recommendations.

75. He did not wish to criticize the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, but hoped to assist it in defining its function in a more practical frame of reference. The aim was to contribute towards sustaining the programme and strengthening it as a novel instrument in practical international co-operation.

76. The objectives of international technical assistance implied continuity, but the future operations of the programme might unfortunately have to be reduced. Both recipient and donor countries would be the losers if the programme were curtailed. One suggestion he would advance was that annual quota subscriptions should be made to the programme in the same way as to the annual United Nations budget, an arrangement which

⁵ See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Supplement No. 10.*

would be preferable to the present voluntary system. Excessive administrative costs might also be reduced. A uniform scale of basic pay, comparable to that in effect for regular governmental and private agencies engaged in similar work, might be adhered to. Various privileges given to United Nations experts, such as leave, subsistence allowance, travel costs for dependents, transportation of personal effects, clothing allowance, and the pension system might be reconsidered. The practice of the United Nations agencies might be compared with the practice of governmental agencies, non-profit private agencies and religious and business organizations working in the same regions. In Saudi Arabia, the administrative cost to the Government was much lower when dealing with such organizations than with United Nations missions. He also suggested that the principle of sub-contracting should be most carefully considered.

77. The question of the convertibility of currencies contributed by Member States was another difficulty confronting TAB. It was a chronic problem in the economic development of the under-developed countries, and he could think of no fully satisfactory solution. A good deal of saving on convertible currencies might, however, be effected if the remuneration of staff and experts, both locally and externally recruited, were reviewed. There were few directly applicable precedents for organization and procedure in international technical assistance but it was possible to identify some administrative difficulties and offer tentative suggestions as to ways and means of solving them. His delegation attached great importance to the programme, which deserved to be sustained and encouraged in every possible way.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.