



CONTENTS

	Page
Economic development of under-developed countries (A/2172, chapter III, A/2192, A/C.2/L.155, A/C.2/L.164, A/C.2/L.165 and Corr.1, and A/C.2/L.166) (<i>continued</i>)	105
(a) Financing of economic development of under-developed countries: report of the Economic and Social Council (A/C.2/L.154 and Corr.1, A/C.2/L.157, A/C.2/L.159, A/C.2/L.161, A/C.2/L.162 and Corr.1 and A/C.2/L.163);	
(b) Methods to increase world productivity: report of the Economic and Social Council;	
(c) Land reform: report of the Secretary-General (A/2194, A/C.2/L.158/Rev.1 and A/C.2/L.160);	
(d) Technical assistance for the economic development of under-developed countries (A/C.2/L.156 and Corr.1 and 2, and A/C.2/L.167)	
Economic development of under-developed countries: (d) Technical assistance for the economic development of under-developed countries (A/C.2/L.156 and Corr.1 and 2, and A/C.2/L.167)	108

Chairman: Mr. Jiří NOSEK (Czechoslovakia).

Economic development of under-developed countries (A/2172, chapter III, A/2192, A/C.2/L.155, A/C.2/L.164, A/C.2/L.165 and Corr.1, and A/C.2/L.166) (*continued*)

- (a) **Financing of economic development of under-developed countries: report of the Economic and Social Council (A/C.2/L.154 and Corr.1, A/C.2/L.157, A/C.2/L.159, A/C.2/L.161, A/C.2/L.162 and Corr.1 and A/C.2/L.163);**
- (b) **Methods to increase world productivity: report of the Economic and Social Council;**
- (c) **Land reform: report of the Secretary-General (A/2194, A/C.2/L.158/Rev.1 and A/C.2/L.160);**
- (d) **Technical assistance for the economic development of under-developed countries (A/C.2/L.156 and Corr.1 and 2, and A/C.2/L.167)**

[Item 25]*

GENERAL DEBATE (*concluded*)

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that some further members would address the Committee availing them-

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

selfes of the right to reply to statements made in the general debate under rule 114 of the rules of procedure.

2. Mr. ARDALAN (Iran) said it had not been his intention in the remarks he had made at the 204th meeting to raise the question of the nationalization of his country's oil industry. No one any longer contested a country's right to nationalize its key industries. Although the question was not within the competence of international bodies, as had been confirmed by the decision of the International Court of Justice, it had been discussed in detail both by the Security Council and by the International Court. It had not been necessary for him, therefore, to expand on that aspect of the problem in his previous statement, and he had not exposed the reasons which had led his people to take the action it had taken; nor had he attempted to demonstrate by means of statistics the illicit profits of the former Company and the insignificant share that Iran had received; and he had not described the wretched conditions of health and housing in which the Company's workers had lived after 50 years' exploitation.

3. His aim had been to submit certain general considerations to the Committee, and show how an under-developed country, after striving for years to recover its legitimate rights and having used for that purpose every possible peaceful and friendly procedure, had

finally decided to nationalize its oil industry. That action was in complete harmony with the spirit of General Assembly resolution 523 (VI). However, since the statement by the United Kingdom representative (207th meeting) in reply to his remarks had contained certain allegations which required clarification, he would answer them briefly.

4. The United Kingdom representative had spoken of the part played by the former Company in the social life of Iran, mentioning the hundreds of millions of pounds which had been invested in capital goods, schools, and hospitals. He (Mr. Ardalan) had to be precise on the subject. In the first instance the 20 million pounds which had been placed in capital equipment had been largely recovered 30 years previously. Since then, the profits realized by the former Company had represented 25 to 30 times the initial capital invested. The former Company had devoted only a minute portion of its vast profits to the consolidation of its position in Iran. It had invested sizeable sums to ensure the welfare of its British employees. But for its Iranian workers it had done little. The International Labour Organisation's report on working conditions in the oil industry,¹ which was in general favourable to the former Company, revealed certain facts. At the end of 1949 nearly 90 per cent of the former Company's salaried employees, almost exclusively British subjects, had been lodged in houses belonging to the former Company, but only 16.6 per cent of the small-wage earners had had the benefit of such housing. Those figures from a competent body, which was very favourable to the British cause, scarcely required comment.

5. The United Kingdom representative had also said that Iran had received large sums in rents and taxes under the imposed concession of 1933. Attention should also be drawn, however, to the sums received by the United Kingdom Government in dividends and taxes. The former Company's profits in 1950 had been 110 million pounds, a sum equal to the total amount of all kinds of payment including royalties and taxes to the Iranian Government during the Company's half century of activity. On the other hand, up to the current year, the former Company had paid the sum of \$1,680 million to the United Kingdom Government in the form of taxes and dividends, including discount to the Admiralty. During its last year of operations the former Company had paid 16 million pounds to the Iranian Government, but during the same year it had paid more than 50 million pounds in taxes to the United Kingdom Government. Those figures were undoubtedly sufficient to justify nationalization and if the Iranian Government had incurred any responsibility, it had been for its delay in fulfilling the legitimate aspirations of its people.

6. The United Kingdom representative had stated that, because the supplementary agreement of 1949 had not been ratified by the Iranian Parliament, the Iranian Government had no legal basis for requesting 49 million pounds from the former Company. The Iranian Government had expressed its willingness, in order to settle the dispute, to deal with the question of compensation on the basis of the nationalization procedure followed in the United Kingdom, or in any other country. To

show its good-will, it had even declared its willingness to submit the problem of compensation to the International Court of Justice. Neither of those proposals had been accepted. Finally, his Government had requested that, before negotiations were begun, 20 million pounds of the 49 million to which it had an undeniable right should be paid to it so that the economic situation of the country might be relieved. That sum of 20 million pounds was less than his Government's share—calculated on the 20 per cent basis and laid down in the imposed concession of 1933—of the former Company's 1951 general reserve of more 110,500 million pounds.

7. The United Kingdom representative had maintained that the Iranian Government had denounced an agreement unilaterally despite definite provisions that the agreement should not be so denounced. In that connexion, he repeated what he had stated to the fourteenth session of the Economic and Social Council to the effect that the concession imposed on Iran in 1933 must be considered as having ceased to exist as a result of the nationalization of the oil industry and consequently the contract entered into with the former Company was no longer valid.² With regard to the United Kingdom representative's assertion that the Iranian Government had undertaken not to modify the terms of the concession illegally obtained in 1933, he pointed out that it was a well-established principle of public law that legislative action taken by an Assembly could not bind the decisions of future assemblies. Any affirmation to the contrary would constitute a negation of parliamentary and national sovereignty.

8. The United Kingdom representative had declined to recognize that his Government had established a kind of economic blockade to prevent the sale of Iranian oil abroad. The fact that it had done so was, however, confirmed by the seizure of a tanker transporting Iranian oil. Moreover, the United Kingdom Government was still exercising pressure on transport companies to prevent them from placing their means of transport at the disposal of the Iranian National Oil Company. The British Prime Minister himself had recognized that other economic restrictions had been imposed on Iran and had said that those restrictions would be relaxed if the Iranian Government accepted the British proposals of 30 August 1952.

9. Legal proceedings might be undertaken by the former Company against any buyer of Iranian oil, but there could be little doubt as to the decisions which would be reached in view of what had happened in a similar situation after Mexico had nationalized its oil industry. All the courts had finally recognized the sovereignty of Mexico and the indisputable right of a country to establish its own laws. It would be infinitely better if the United Kingdom Government were to consider and profit from the lessons of history, and assist instead of attempting to hinder the sale of Iranian oil. Such action, in addition to promoting friendly relations, would be to the economic interest of the United Kingdom.

10. The United Kingdom representative, attempting to minimize the effects of the International Court's decision, had pointed out that the Court had declared itself incompetent solely on technical grounds. He had, how-

¹ *Labour conditions in the oil industry in Iran*, New Series of ILO No. 24.

² See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Fourteenth Session, 594th meeting*.

ever, failed to recognize that the Court had declared itself incompetent because, contrary to what the United Kingdom Government had maintained, the concession of 1933 had been merely a contract under private law and not an international treaty.

11. The United Kingdom representative finally had alluded to his Government's efforts to bring about a settlement of the question. It must be pointed out, however, that all those efforts were aimed merely at the re-establishment of the former Company and at restricting the Iranian Government's freedom of action, as was confirmed by the last note of the British Foreign Secretary.

12. His delegation appreciated the friendly sentiments expressed by the United Kingdom representative, but it would have wished those words to be confirmed by deeds. It regretted the fact that in the oil dispute the United Kingdom Government had completely neglected the principles of friendship and understanding.

13. After the breaking off of diplomatic relations, Dr. Mossadegh had stated that the succession of events had inevitably led Iran to break off diplomatic relations and to postpone the resumption of relations until the British Government revised its attitude, in view of the changes in the world, the national awakening of the Iranian people and the principles of justice and equity. The Iranian Government had explicitly declared that the sincere and friendly relations between the Iranian people and the United Kingdom would continue to stand on their firm foundation. He was sure that if the British people one day saw the books of the former Company and realized the injustices, political manoeuvres, provocations and pillage which had occurred, the patience and endurance of the Iranian people would undoubtedly command its admiration.

14. Mr. ENCINAS (Peru) referring to the Polish representative's statement at the previous meeting that the United States was forcing its technical assistance programmes on the Latin-American countries, wished to inform the Polish representative that neither the United States nor the United Nations nor any other national or international agency had imposed or would in future impose any programme on his government. He invited the Polish representative to prove that that was not the case. He also assured the representative of Poland that no government friendly to his country would dare to attempt any such imposition, but if any government were to do so his Government would reject it. He invited the Polish representative to show that the Polish Government had followed a similar policy.

15. The Polish representative had also compared the wages earned in 1950 by workers in the cotton industry in Peru and in the United States. It was obvious that the figures given were not comparable since they were expressed merely in dollars and not in terms of real wages. Money had a different purchasing power in Peru and in the United States and it was only natural that, expressed in dollar terms, wages should be higher in the United States.

16. In that connexion, he quoted an article by a Soviet student entitled "Workers Income in the Soviet Union" published in the *Monthly Review* of November 1952. That article, which was completely favourable to conditions in the Soviet Union had given an interesting

translation, into dollars, of the prices of consumer goods in the USSR to support the theory that the standard of living was rising more rapidly in the USSR than in other countries. Among other things, it had said that a man's woollen suit in the Soviet Union would cost between \$100 and \$200. A similar suit of national manufacture in Peru would cost between \$20 and \$30. Any comparison between those two figures would be completely arbitrary, and in just the same way it was impossible to compare the figures given by the Polish representative at the previous meeting. He would not, however, accuse the Polish representative of distorting the figures; he preferred to believe that no more exact statistics with regard to wages in Peru had been available to the Polish representative.

17. He did not, on the other hand, wish to create a false impression that wages in Peru, in actual terms, were as high as in the United States. In Peru, as in other under-developed countries, wages were low by comparison with the more advanced countries, where the level of production and of technology was higher. It was in order to raise the real standard of living of the people that Peru was participating in the United Nations programmes of technical assistance.

18. The Second Committee's fundamental task was to attempt to raise living standards, and not to listen to the fruitless accusations and counter-accusations which had been made in its recent debates. He wondered what part would be played by the communist delegations in accomplishing that task. The Polish representative had indeed informed the Committee that his delegation and those of the other People's Democracies did not categorically oppose programmes of technical assistance and financing provided they were carried out under certain conditions. It appeared from the Polish representative's statement that the delegations of the People's Democracies opposed such programmes when they were not organized by a communist government. If that was not so, he hoped the Polish representative would explain under what conditions his delegation would co-operate in the United Nations programmes, since that was a point he did not so far appear to have dealt with.

19. Mr. CECH (Czechoslovakia) said that a number of States had correctly pointed out that failure to promote land reform was one of the main obstacles which had prevented increased agricultural production.

20. In spite of the Turkish representative's attempts to prove the contrary, Turkey was a case in point. The late Minister Karaosmanoglu had said that about 2,500,000 families in the country owned no land at all; about 77 per cent of the arable land was owned by 13 per cent of Turkish land-owners. The Turkish Press revealed many instances of the state of dissatisfaction and unrest. In 1951 one newspaper had reported 718 cases of violations of public order, 400 seizures of cattle and 43 seizures of land; another had described the clashes which had occurred with the police, and a statement by the former Prime Minister had revealed the serious anxiety caused by the situation. The British newspaper, the *Daily Herald*, in December 1950 had described how visitors to Turkey were constantly amazed by the state of the country's economy. In the same year a number of Turkish newspapers had been suppressed and legal action taken against their editors for publishing protests about the prevailing conditions.

The position was aggravated by the fact that the United States policy of integrating Turkey into the United States own military economy had led to the fact that 60 per cent of the budget was allocated to military purposes, with a corresponding decrease in expenditure on agriculture and a resultant perpetuation of the poverty of the rural population.

21. In spite of all attempts to suggest that trade arrangements between the USSR and Czechoslovakia were detrimental to the latter country, it was common knowledge that Czechoslovakia was successfully carrying out a socialist revolution and had already made vast progress in its restoration programme. Its production figures in 1952 had been 18 per cent greater than in 1951; production in the heavy industries had increased by 26 per cent and in foodstuffs by 7.6 per cent. Similar increases had occurred in the coal industry and in electric power production. The productivity of the workers had also greatly increased and there was virtually no unemployment, all the available labour resources being needed to serve the developing socialist economy. In recent years Czechoslovakia had devoted special attention to agricultural production. Although grain production had been somewhat impeded by bad weather conditions, the total area under crops had increased by 2.3 per cent.

22. All those facts served to show the value of the intimate economic co-operation between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, which was assisting Czechoslovakia in developing its heavy industry, and providing raw materials and agricultural machinery. Czechoslovakia had thus been enabled to reduce its agricultural imports. Mining equipment provided by the Soviet Union had similarly enabled Czechoslovakia to increase its coal production, thereby strengthening its economic independence, in contrast to the policy pursued by the capitalist countries, which provided economic assistance solely with a view to extracting profits from the recipient countries.

23. Czechoslovakia was also devoting full attention to increasing its coal production. In the seven years since the end of the Second World War its production had increased by 150 per cent. It was also improving workers' welfare services. Rail and road transport facilities had been doubled in the course of the past year. The increase in exports since 1946 was also a very great achievement. Export trade with the People's Democracies and the Soviet Union was organized on a basis of equality and mutual advantage, in contrast to the policy of domination pursued by the capitalist countries.

24. In conclusion, he quoted figures from the Swiss newspaper *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* of 5 September 1952 illustrating the predatory nature of American investments abroad. In 1951, for example, profits on United States foreign investments had exceeded \$4,000 millions.

25. Mr. LEA PLAZA (Chile) felt bound to refute the allegations made in the general debate by a number of Eastern European delegations which had stated that United States policy had placed Chile in a position of economic and political enslavement and was impeding that country's efforts to raise the standard of living of its people. As the records of the discussion showed, that was an entirely erroneous interpretation of the facts. His country's view was that efforts to assist the economic development of the under-developed countries,

if they were to be effective, must be based on sound international co-operation, with full respect for national sovereignty. It was Chile's traditional policy not to accept dictation from any country or organization.

26. Mr. KRIVEN (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the Turkish representative had been quite unable to refute his delegation's argument that the United States assistance to Turkey was mainly designed to serve United States militaristic plans. The facts were that, although some United States aid to Turkey had been used for agricultural development, it was mainly designed to provide military bases, airports and strategic highways. The working people of Turkey were the first to suffer from the increased military expenditure imposed upon their Government.

27. The Turkish representative had painted a rosy picture of the improvements in Turkey. The true situation, however, could be seen from the report of the mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which made it clear that about two and a half million peasants in Turkey were either landless or owned very little land. Data from the Turkish Press indicated the high rates of interest demanded for loans by the landowners and the state of indebtedness of the peasants. The position of the peasants in the Black Sea area was especially difficult and the Land Commission had long ceased to distribute land. All the facts served to show that the Turkish representative's statements could not disguise the truth, which was that United States assistance was highly detrimental to Turkey's independence and the development of its agricultural economy.

28. Sir Clifford NORTON (United Kingdom) and Mr. VANER (Turkey) reserved their right to reply to statements made in the general debate, but asked for time to prepare their replies.

29. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee should hear the replies at a convenient meeting during the coming week.

It was so decided.

30. Mr. DAWSON (International Labour Organisation), referring to the Iranian representative's allegation of partiality towards the United Kingdom in the ILO report on labour conditions in the oil industry in Iran, pointed out that the ILO was only concerned with working conditions. It was not competent to express any opinion on the dispute between Iran and the United Kingdom and had not done so.

31. Mr. KAZEMI (Iran) assured the Committee that the Iranian delegation had not intended to imply that it questioned the impartiality of the ILO.

32. The CHAIRMAN declared the general debate on item 25 closed.

Economic development of under-developed countries: (d) Technical assistance for the economic development of under-developed countries (A/C.2/L.156 and Corr.1 and 2, and A/C.2/L.167)

[Item 25]*

33. The CHAIRMAN first called upon the Director-General of the Technical Assistance Administration and the Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance

Board to address the Committee on the first sub-item of item 25 to be discussed separately: technical assistance.

34. Mr. KEENLEYSIDE (Director-General of the Technical Assistance Administration) expressed the gratification of all members of the Technical Assistance Administration at the appointment of Mr. Owen as Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance Board. He wished to thank all the delegations which had encouraged and stimulated those who were engaged in carrying out the instructions with regard to technical assistance issued by the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. During the general debate there had, however, been some criticism of TAA.

35. The representative of Sweden had suggested (196th meeting) that there seemed to be some difference between the methods employed in recruiting experts on social welfare and those in recruiting for work in public administration or economic development. That was correct. The difference was principally due to the fact that a specially qualified social affairs officer had been assigned to work for almost a year with the recruitment officials of the United Nations and the officers of the Department of Social Affairs in drawing up a world-wide roster of social welfare experts from lists obtained from professional societies, institutions, individual experts and government departments. That had not yet been done to the same extent in any other field. In general the roster had been used, but direct application had sometimes also been made to governments. The Swedish representative's comments had been brought to the attention of the recruitment unit and her view that application directly to governments should be used more extensively would be borne in mind, with particular reference to the selection of social welfare experts.

36. The Swedish representative had also proposed that young experts should be employed more frequently in meeting the requests from governments for expert advice. On the other hand, the representative of Egypt (197th meeting) and others had strongly urged that only persons with world-wide reputation or equivalent qualifications should be selected. TAA itself was convinced that it was vitally necessary to maintain the highest possible standards in recruiting experts in response to governments' requests. Usually, although not always, that entailed selecting experts of wide and long experience, and hence of a certain age. Certain recipient governments, too, tended to look somewhat askance at an expert if he seemed too young. That suggestion, therefore, could be acted upon only slowly and cautiously.

37. Representatives had also expressed conflicting views on the emphasis to be placed on the desirability of arranging training programmes within the recipient countries, as against stress on the use of fellowships to permit training abroad. There, as in other matters, the wishes of the requesting government had to be respected, although TAA did indicate its own views when suitable occasions occurred. TAA's own views on the relative importance of local training and study abroad depended on the circumstances in each case. In certain countries and certain fields, the establishment and strengthening of local training institutions was obviously more desirable, but there would always be important

instances where technical assistance could be secured effectively only through fellowships tenable in more advanced countries.

38. The representative of Iraq had suggested (205th meeting) that certain experts appointed by TAA, and even members of its staff, had given evidence of nationalistic or racial bias. Although that representative had expressed his preference for discussion of the matter outside the Committee, the inferences to be drawn from his statement were so serious that it would be unfair to the officers of the Department if it were not answered in public.

39. It was very hard to see how any suggestion of nationalistic or racial bias could be true when the nine senior officers of TAA came from nine different countries, represented six different racial groups and belonged to five major religious persuasions; tolerance and understanding would seem almost inevitable. He doubted that any other branch of the Secretariat had a better record in that respect. The chief adviser on social welfare problems was a national of an Arab State and the deputy chief of one of the two major branches of the Department was a citizen of Iran, who spoke Arabic and knew the whole Middle East area intimately. Mistakes might have occurred, but, if so, they had been very few and represented the exact opposite of the general attitude of TAA. He himself knew of only one instance in the past two years; the individual responsible, an expert, had been instantly and publicly reprimanded. No exhibition of racial or religious prejudice would ever be countenanced. He would be glad to receive information from delegations concerned about any specific instance of that kind, and, indeed, to discuss personally any other matters connected with technical assistance.

40. The Iraqi representative had suggested that the United Nations tended to direct its efforts in technical assistance towards countries which had already made considerable progress towards economic development rather than to countries which had only just embarked on it. No official body had ever given a clear definition of the term "under-developed", and TAA had been directed by the General Assembly to give assistance to governments on request, and as nearly as possible in the form in which the requests were made. It had tried conscientiously to comply with those instructions. It had, however, made a special effort to bring the possibilities of technical assistance to the attention of governments which indicated a special need for such assistance. To that end regional representatives had been appointed in most major areas, including the Middle East. In 1951, the Deputy Director-General and a senior officer from the Middle East itself had visited the area and conferred with most of the governments there. Unfortunately, the number of requests received from that region was considerably lower than the number from any comparable area. From Iraq itself only four requests for expert advice had been received in three years. Three had been implemented and the fourth was awaiting clarification by the Government. Of forty nominations for fellowships made by the Iraqi Government in 1952, twenty-seven recommendations for awards had been made, six were pending and only seven had been refused. That was a record very much better than average.

41. He was willing to discuss the other and minor criticisms made by the Iraqi representative and welcomed the proposed expansion of the permanent Iraqi delegation in order to maintain closer co-operation with the United Nations organs engaged in technical assistance work.

42. Technical assistance had greatly expanded during the past year. During the first period of the Expanded Programme, a total of eighteen months, expenditures had totalled approximately \$2,900,000. During 1952, it would amount to almost \$6,500,000. Thus, TAA was now operating on a scale three times greater.

43. Since the start of the technical assistance programme in 1948, the United Nations had appointed 500 experts from forty-five countries, of whom almost 300 had been, or would be, sent out in 1952. By the end of 1952 more than 750 holders of fellowships or scholarships would have been sent to the field, as compared with 451 in 1951. Other similar figures could be supplied more appropriately as delegations asked for them during the course of the discussion.

44. Mr. OWEN (Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance Board) said that he wished to report on the work of the Technical Assistance Board as a whole rather than on the particular aspect reviewed by Mr. Keenleyside.

45. The appointment of an Executive Chairman of TAB had been an organizational advance of the utmost importance. Already a marked increase in integration and organization of the agencies concerned could be noted and the programmes had gained momentum. He himself was currently engaged in reviewing every project in operation or contemplated in order to obtain a view of the programme as a whole. He enjoyed the assistance of four consultants with varied experience and from different regions; their report should be ready for presentation to TAB before the end of November.

46. He was under no illusion that the Expanded Programme, with its restricted funds, could directly affect programmes of economic development; but it could be used to see that everything possible was done conducive to the good operation of such programmes, that good men were employed, that the programmes were well devised and that the Programme as a whole was economically and efficiently managed. The start had been promising.

47. The increase in momentum was clearly shown by the number of experts used. As of 1 October 1952, 1,598 experts had been employed, of whom 956 were in the field. They had been drawn from more than sixty countries; that fact alone refuted the idea that the Programme concerned only a few technically advanced countries. The Programme provided a great cross-fertilization of skills and ideas. Furthermore, the 2,697 fellows, of whom, as of 1 October 1952, 869 were engaged in studies, had been drawn from fifty countries and were developing their experience in more than forty-five countries; there again the fullest use was being made of technical training resources in almost all Member States, not merely in a few highly developed countries. It was truly international co-operation, not charity.

48. Some had perhaps been disappointed in the first financial period, when only \$6,500,000 had been involved. A fairly firm estimate for the current financial year was \$21 million, a threefold increase. The group of consultants was reviewing requests and expected requests which, if implemented, would bring the total for 1953 up to \$38 million. It might be expected, however, that that total would be brought closer into line with expected contributions by giving some projects a lower priority.

49. The estimates supplied to the Economic and Social Council had been of necessity somewhat sketchy, but fresh estimates based upon more material showed that the \$25 million target set by the Council would not, even if the carry-over from the first period was taken into account, be at all sufficient to finance all the projects considered desirable in 1953. He must therefore appeal to all delegations to do their utmost at least to reach the target figure.

50. That consideration raised an issue of overwhelming importance to the good administration of the technical assistance programme. In his opinion, the programme should not expand too rapidly, but should rather aim at steady growth and continuity. It was therefore to be hoped that TAC would devise some means whereby TAB would have stronger assurance that it would be able to work continuously. At the present time he was not yet certain what funds would be available for 1953. Such a situation made it extremely difficult to plan. It should surely be possible to know earlier in the year what funds would be available and also to obtain assurances for a longer term. That would help in effecting economies in the administration of the programme.

51. Governments could greatly assist by doing all in their power to hasten the payment of the contributions they had pledged. Some governments, probably for constitutional reasons, were still in arrears for the first financial period. Requesting governments could also help. The principal difficulty encountered in the earlier period had been the vagueness of the requests. Much time had had to be spent in negotiating in order to discover exactly what assistance was required. There were now seventeen resident representatives with whom governments could consult on the spot while requests were in an embryonic stage. That number would be slightly increased and the representatives would be given more administrative resources. They would thus be better able to negotiate with governments, obtain clearer explanations of the requests and see that the country's own plans or any other international assistance received, such as "Point Four" or the Colombo Plan aid, did not conflict with or overlap that supplied by the United Nations. It would be most helpful if governments would set up within their administrative structure some machinery for contact with the resident representatives.

52. Sixty-five million dollars had been pledged for 1953, an advance of \$10 million; but the funds were preponderantly in non-convertible local currencies. TAB had been able to solve the problem of using them in many ways, but there was still a group of important countries in which the difficulty had not been overcome. In that connexion, he wished particularly to thank the Governments of Australia and New Zealand for their

aid in surmounting the currency difficulty, and the Belgian Government, which had made a special effort in that respect. He had cited those countries from among many only as illustrations of what could be done by a special effort to ensure that the Programme was international not merely in name but in reality, so that all Member States might make effective use of it.

53. The assistance requested in 1953 was well in excess of the target figure. Requests must therefore be strictly scrutinized. Thus, the effectiveness of the contact between the United Nations and the requesting governments would be of increasing importance. The great importance of the Programme was that it was a part of the United Nations activities in which delegations and the Secretariat combined to produce positive and tangible results with very small resources. No effort should therefore be spared to make a good thing better.

54. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the joint draft resolution (A/C.2/L.156 and Corr.1 and 2) and to the Ecuadorean amendments (A/C.2/L.167) thereto which were now before the Committee.

55. Mr. DE SEYNES (France), speaking for his delegation alone, not for his co-sponsors, said that, in the view of his Government, the benefits of the technical assistance programme had become a reality. He would not have felt it necessary to return to the subject had the programme not been attacked once again by the delegations of the USSR and the People's Democracies. Such attacks were disconcerting, as of all United Nations activities technical assistance would seem to be the least controversial. Furthermore, the criticism of the programme was proceeding along more and more involved lines. At first, in 1949, the delegations in question had declared their willingness to cooperate and had lent constructive aid in the preparation of the programme. Later, they had claimed that the programme had been diverted from its purpose and that its basic principles had been violated, naturally without advancing any proof of those assertions. Today they were content with saying that the United Nations programme, like any other programme of assistance, should be viewed in a general historical context which was characterized by the imperialistic ambitions of certain countries. He begged the delegations of the USSR and the People's Democracies to keep in mind, when the vote was taken, that it would not bear on the profits of United States capitals invested abroad, on the policy pursued by the metropolitan Powers in their overseas territories, on "Point Four" or on the Colombo Plan, but on the United Nations Expanded Programme which had a character all its own.

56. Paragraph 1 of the operative part dealt with the reform of TAB along the lines which Mr. Owen had explained and which the French delegation approved. The financial arrangements mentioned in paragraph 2 represented a compromise between two trends of thought in TAC, which might be called respectively

the centralizing and decentralizing trends. The matter had been exhaustively debated, opinions had been almost evenly divided, and it was doubtful whether renewed discussion could result in a more acceptable compromise. Many delegations might find some difficulty in accepting paragraph 3; his own, too, had been hesitant. It must be clearly understood at the outset that adoption of it would not commit any government with regard to its contributions. In the case of a programme financed by voluntary contributions, however, it would seem essential to set a financial goal, so that the organ collecting the contributions should, in so far as possible, endeavour to adjust the resources to the needs.

57. Paragraph 4 was self-explanatory; it was to be hoped that it would be effective.

58. Mr. TOUS (Ecuador), introducing his amendments (A/C.2/L.167), said that it was intended as an addition rather than an amendment, since he fully supported the joint draft resolution. It really represented what had emerged in the general debate, which had taken place since the joint proposal had been submitted. The amendment to the first paragraph of the preamble was based on the conviction that the Programme was no longer experimental, but an accomplished fact. Similarly, the amendment to the second paragraph of the preamble was intended to express the fact that the Programme should be regarded as having achieved a certain permanence and continuity. The proposed third paragraph of the preamble simply expressed what the Committee had reason to know that TAB, TAA and the delegations concerned wished. Most governments planned their budgets well in advance; it should be possible for TAB to do likewise.

59. The two additional paragraphs proposed for the operative part simply put those ideas into effect. The proposed paragraph 5 was designed to give the Negotiating Committee the appropriate instructions so that it could report earlier to the Council. The proposed paragraph 6 was intended to enable TAB to plan ahead. True, some delegations might be unwilling to commit themselves so far in advance, but when a government assumed responsibilities, even voluntarily, it should at least be prepared to fulfil them continuously, even though it could of course not foresee all possible contingencies. Long-term government planning supplied a precedent. The figure of \$40 million had been selected since Mr. Owen had stated that requests amounting to \$38 million would be received. He had originally thought that the year 1953 should be specified rather than 1954, but had concluded that constitutional and budgetary difficulties might prevent some countries from accepting the former year. He felt that there should not be any valid objections to his amendments.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.