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CONTENTS

	Page
Repatriation of Greek children: reports of the Secretary-General and of the international Red Cross organizations (A/2236 and Add.1, A/2241 and Corr.1, A/AC.61/L.18, A/AC.61/L.20, A/AC.61/L.21) (concluded)	139

Chairman: Mr. Alexis KYROU (Greece).

During the discussion of agenda item 23, the Chairman was replaced by the Vice-Chairman, Mr. Clarence L. Simpson.

Repatriation of Greek children: reports of the Secretary-General and of the international Red Cross organizations (A/2236 and Add.1, A/2241 and Corr.1, A/AC.61/L.18, A/AC.61/L.20, A/AC.61/L.21) (concluded)

[Item 23]*

1. Mr. VAVRICKA (Czechoslovakia) said that once again certain delegations were using the question of the repatriation of Greek children to attack the countries which had offered those children asylum.

2. As his delegation had had occasion at previous sessions to comment on the slanderous assertions which had been directed against the peoples' democracies, it did not propose to take up the matter in any detail for the two following reasons: first, because it considered that the use of the item before the Committee for propaganda purposes could in no way contribute to a fruitful or speedy solution of the problem; and secondly, because it was convinced that some of the delegations, which had adopted an unfair and mistaken attitude towards the problem, had done so merely because they lacked proper information on all the facts of the matter. His delegation would therefore give the Committee an objective outline of the situation.

3. The Czechoslovak Government had, from the very outset, favoured the idea of repatriation. That was clear not only from the fact that it had supported part C of General Assembly resolution 193 (III), but also from the fact that it had immediately undertaken, in co-operation with the Czechoslovak Red Cross, to give practical effect to that resolution. The Czechoslovak Red Cross had, accordingly, communicated with the International Red Cross from whom it had received in August 1949

the first list of requests from parents containing 5,060 names. On 12 September 1949, the Czechoslovak Red Cross had sent to Geneva a list of 138 names of Greek children identified as being in Czechoslovakia. Between March 1949 and April 1950, three meetings had been held in Prague between representatives of the International Red Cross and the Czechoslovak Red Cross. Meanwhile every effort had been made to make the Greek children happy; they had been well housed, fed, and generally cared for and had been brought up by Greek teachers to love their country and its glorious traditions.

4. Various obstacles to the repatriation of the Greek children, however, had arisen and continued to arise. It was impossible to believe that the Greek Government would keep its promise that there would be no discrimination whatever against the Greek children or their parents.

5. The Czechoslovak delegation was in possession of very serious evidence, provided not by a Czechoslovak citizen or a Greek fighter in the cause of freedom but by Mrs. Ruth Gage-Colby, an American citizen and observer of an organization accredited to the United Nations. During a mission in Greece, Mrs. Gage-Colby had observed that there were children who had been placed in institutions where the food, medical and health services and general conditions were very much below the minimum requirements. She had stated that she herself had seen numbers of small children dying of hunger in their beds in those institutions. The nurses had shown her examples of gross negligence on the part of the directors and cases of incredible discrimination towards some of the babies for political reasons. Queen Frederica of Greece had actually let it be known that she would prefer that the Greek children who were at present living in the peoples' democracies should not return to Greece but should be sent to a neutral country.

6. The value of the Greek Government's promises was again shown in the execution of a Greek national hero,

* Indicates the item on the agenda of the General Assembly.

who had been put to death in spite of the assurances given by that Government in a letter to the head of the Greek delegation to the General Assembly's sixth session.

7. A letter from the International Committee of the Red Cross, dated 11 January 1952, had confirmed the fact that in Greece there were children detained in re-educational camps, so-called agricultural colonies, or prisons. Their number was not far short of 1,600, consisting of about 1,150 young boys and 450 young girls. They were not juvenile delinquents who had been duly sentenced, but children and adolescents, the children of Greek fighters for freedom, and they were not only victims of discrimination but were persecuted and detained because of their political convictions and those of their parents.

8. Yet another obstacle in the way of returning the children to their homes was the grave difficulty of accurate identification. The International Red Cross itself had admitted that many of the children had been too young to know their own or their parents' names; even where the names were known, phonetic transliteration of Greek names was liable to give rise to further confusion. Thus the lists prepared by the International Red Cross had been more than inaccurate. Besides, the International Red Cross had confined itself to the mechanical transmission of lists of requests sent by the Greek Red Cross without verifying them or establishing the fundamental conditions that the requests had been voluntarily made. During the talks which had taken place between the International Red Cross and the Czechoslovak Red Cross in Prague in April 1952, representatives of the Czechoslovak Red Cross had requested that the lists should be corrected. They had also asked why the International Red Cross had automatically transmitted inaccurate and false lists without verification or control. It had received no reply to that question, except the stereotyped excuse that the International Red Cross was merely an intermediary. Such an excuse could not be described other than as an evasion, since it was clear from the very report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on its activities in 1950 that its work was to verify and classify the original requests forwarded by the Greek Red Cross. Up to the present time the International Committee of the Red Cross had not carried out that task.

9. As regards the 138 Greek children identified in Czechoslovakia, it would appear that practically none of the requests for repatriation had been written by the applicants themselves and that in many cases they had been signed by a third party. Many of the so-called requests for repatriation had been brought for signature to persons in prisons or concentration camps.

10. It had been agreed, on the suggestion of the Czechoslovak Red Cross, that the authenticity of all requests were to be verified by the International Red Cross Mission to Greece. Each request for repatriation would be signed by two members of the mission.

11. Out of the 138 cases, however, only 78 had been signed as agreed, 22 had been signed by one member only, while 30 had not been signed at all. That was typical of the documents received by the Czechoslovak Red Cross in connexion with the 138 Greek children in that country. Consequently, it could not be argued that the conditions set out in the various General Assem-

bly resolutions on the question had been fulfilled and voluntary requests for repatriation been presented.

12. Finally, Mr. Vavricka could not pass over in silence the slanderous and hypocritical attack of the United States representative. The humanitarian sentiments she had expressed, with which his delegation was in full sympathy, were in complete contradiction with her Government's action in Germany. When, after the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Red Army, the Czechoslovak Government had started investigations to discover the children of Lidice and other Czech and Slovak children, the American occupation authorities, instead of making the fascist kidnappers bear the responsibility for the deportation and germanization of the children, had helped them to legalize the nazi crimes by issuing an order under which a deported child living with its fascist foster-parents could not be repatriated without the consent of its foster-parents. The American courts in West Germany had given judgments that constituted serious violations of international law, as for example in the case of Hana Pospisilova, a Czech girl 13 years of age whose repatriation had been refused, the case of Bruno Klos, age 15 years, and others. In the case of the Yugoslav boy Ivan Pircnik, an American court had decided that the child was to remain with his foster-parents and that his mother must sacrifice her natural feelings to that decision, since Yugoslavia could not come up to West German standards, which had a system of "free enterprise". It had been only later that the court had recognized Yugoslavia as a country equal to West Germany, where the child could receive just as good an education as that of his foster-father, a former SS trooper. It was clear that for the American courts of West Germany the system of "free enterprise" was a prerequisite for repatriation and a past in the SS was a satisfactory qualification for the good education of a child.

13. In conclusion, the Czechoslovak representative said that he hoped his statement would elucidate certain aspects of the problem and thus perhaps contribute to its solution.

14. Mrs. KHOKHOL (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that her delegation considered the problem of the repatriation of the Greek children as a purely humanitarian one, and it was unfortunate that certain other delegations, particularly the Greek delegation, while paying lip-service to the humanitarian aspects of the question, were in fact using it as a pretext for slandering the peoples' democracies which had been harbouring the Greek children. There was no truth in the allegation that the children were being forced to forget their language and their fatherland. It was clear from letters written by the children themselves that in the countries of the peoples' democracies they were surrounded with care and love, were learning their native language and the history of Greece, and were receiving good food and general education and training.

15. The Ukrainian representative felt that any consideration of the question of repatriated Greek children should include examination of the treatment which the children would be likely to receive in Greece itself. The situation there had deteriorated, and Greek citizens adhering to democratic convictions had been subjected to coercion, while the parents of some of the children whose repatriation was under consideration had themselves been subjected to persecution. It was clear that

the Greek Government's intention in seeking repatriation of the children was to obtain custody of their persons in order to re-educate them in the prisons and concentration camps which were hypocritically referred to as "re-education centres". In at least one of those children's homes the mortality rate was 90 per cent, and that was a sample of the fate awaiting repatriated children in Greece.

16. The fourth general report of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies (A/2236 and Add.1) shed little light on the problem. As the representative of Czechoslovakia had pointed out, there had been many cases in which the International Red Cross had sent to the harbouring countries such inaccurate lists as to make it impossible to repatriate Greek children at all.

17. Mrs. Khokhol regretted the slanderous nature of the Cuban representative's speech (23rd meeting) about Spanish children alleged to be in the USSR, but refrained from further reference to it on account of its irrelevance to the subject under discussion.

18. The United States representative (23rd meeting) had made great play with the humanitarian aspects of the problem and had hurled many charges against the peoples' democracies. In reply to questions about Soviet Union children not yet repatriated to their country from the American Zone of West Germany, the United States representative had merely answered that an investigation was being made, passing over in silence the fact that the investigation had been in progress since 1949 and had not yet produced any findings with regard to several hundred children. It seemed strange that the United States representative should speak on behalf of Greek children when children of the Soviet Union, and particularly of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, had not yet been repatriated from the American Zone of West Germany.

19. Some representatives, particularly those of Poland (23rd meeting) and Czechoslovakia, had effectively refuted the allegations that the peoples' democracies were unwilling to abide by the resolutions of the General Assembly. The hesitation of the peoples' democracies to repatriate Greek children was prompted entirely by their doubts as to whether repatriation would be in the best interests of the children themselves. The Ukrainian delegation has always taken, and continued to take, the humanitarian view that all children should be unconditionally repatriated.

20. Mrs. Khokhol said that her delegation would be unable to accept the joint draft resolution before the Committee (A/AC.61/L.18) unless paragraphs 3 and 4 of the operative part, which expressed regret with regard to the attitude of certain countries, were deleted, in which case the Ukrainian delegation would have no objection to the remainder of the draft resolution.

21. Mr. ORDONNEAU (France) expressed disappointment at the obvious deterioration in the situation of the question of the repatriation of the Greek children. At the previous session of the General Assembly,¹ it had appeared that the stand taken by the Czechoslovak delegation might augur well for future negotiations. But such hopes had been dashed, and it was particularly bitter to have to note that an implacable political system

was continuing to seek its victims even among children. With deep regret, the French delegation would vote for the joint draft resolution.

22. Mr. KINDYNIS (Greece), replying to the allegations of some delegations, said that he would briefly review their main arguments, which had varied little during the past four years.

23. He saw no reason to enlarge upon the Polish and Czechoslovak representatives' statements that refusal to repatriate the Greek children detained in their countries was dictated by concern for the safety of the children themselves. Both the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies, in their *note verbale* of 18 April 1952 (A/2236, annex 2), had stated that they had received renewed assurances from the Greek Government that children repatriated to Greece would immediately be returned to their parents and that no legal proceedings or measures of political discrimination would be taken either against the parents or the children. A further assurance had been offered by the supplementary report of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies (A/2236/Add.1) in connexion with the last group of sixty-nine children repatriated from Yugoslavia. That report contained a reference to the efficiency of the Greek Red Cross and to the care provided for the children.

24. With regard to the allegation of forgeries, Mr. Kindynis quoted the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies again as having pointed out that it was the failure of the harbouring countries to co-operate which had made it impossible to verify requests for repatriation. Those countries had been asked, as long ago as 1949, for lists of the Greek children living in their territory, and no practical action had as yet been taken, although the Greek Red Cross had reiterated its readiness to reconsider difficulties with an open mind. The permanent representative of Greece, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General and dated 10 March 1952, had reported that fact and suggested that the national Red Cross Societies of the harbouring countries should make specific reference to any doubtful cases. The letter had been a reply to statements made by the USSR representative² about allegedly falsified lists submitted by the Greek Red Cross and the Greek Government.

25. With regard to the Czechoslovak representative's statement that there were no Greek children in the Soviet Union, Mr. Kindynis pointed out that the USSR delegation had not hitherto denied the statement made by the Greek³ and other delegations before the First Committee in 1950 that there were Greek children in the Soviet Union and in East Germany. From reports reaching the Greek Government, it would appear that the children detained in East Germany had been transferred to industrial centres in the Urals. Reports referring to the presence of the children had even appeared in the Press in the Soviet Union. Further evidence was contained in a report (A/AC.16/1289) of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans dated 7 November 1951. According to that report, Greek children were being systematically transferred to East Germany, where they were detained in a camp and subjected to political indoctrination. The problem was

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 34th meeting.*

² *Ibid.*, 57th meeting.

³ *Ibid.*, Fifth Session, First Committee, 397th meeting.

being used for propaganda purposes, by the very delegations which had originated that accusation, and which represented as Greek democratic heroes persons who had been legally proved to be communist spies. It was malicious propaganda to accuse the members of the Red Cross organizations of basing their actions on political considerations and no such allegations should be allowed to divert the attention of the United Nations from the real facts. Many thousands of Greek children had been abducted from their homes, detained for five years by the Cominform countries, denied repatriation despite repeated efforts by the United Nations and the most respected international humanitarian organizations, and, with the exception of those repatriated from Yugoslavia, not a single Greek child had been sent back to Greece by the harbouring countries. The Cominform countries were still refusing to act like respectable members of the world community. No further endeavours would therefore serve any useful purpose, and it was with great regret that the Greek delegation would be obliged to vote for the discontinuation of the Standing Committee on the Repatriation of Greek Children and the suspension of the work of the Red Cross organizations, as proposed in the joint draft resolution. That was the only realistic decision the General Assembly could take under the circumstances.

26. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) said that, if the draft resolution of which his delegation was one of the sponsors appeared to be negative, it was because it dealt with a negative and unhappy situation. He did not agree with the Uruguayan representative's suggestion (22nd meeting) that the draft resolution would have the effect of closing the door to further negotiation. The draft resolution did indeed recommend that the Standing Committee on the Repatriation of Greek Children should be discontinued and that the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies should be suspended, but that was merely a recognition of the fact that those bodies could no longer do any useful work. The draft did not completely close the door because it specifically stated that the suspension of the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies was to continue only until such time as conditions making practical action by the Red Cross possible and useful were established. In that connexion, Mr. Munro drew attention to a passage from the letter of transmittal accompanying the fourth general report of the Red Cross organizations concerned. He did not think that the draft resolution could be said to prevent any of the harbouring countries from returning children to their parents, should they wish to do so.

27. Mr. NINCIC (Yugoslavia), referring to the statement made by the Czechoslovak representative, reminded that representative that the decision of a United States court, refusing to repatriate a Yugoslav boy taken to Germany during the war, had subsequently been quashed by a higher United States court and the boy had been returned to his parents in Yugoslavia. There were, however, sixty-three other Yugoslav boys who had been sent to the USSR for education at the close of the war and had not been returned to Yugoslavia. It had been impossible for the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow to ascertain their whereabouts.

28. Mr. ASTAPENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the attitude of the peoples'

democracies was fully in accordance with the letter and spirit of resolution 193 C (III) adopted at the third session of the General Assembly and confirmed at the fourth session by resolution 288 B (IV). They had never refused their co-operation in the repatriation of children whose parents had expressed a desire to that effect.

29. It was well known that the Greek children had originally been sent to the peoples' democracies at the request of their parents, who had been anxious to save their lives. Many of the children had been fleeing from persecution in Greece, and some of those who remained had been persecuted, imprisoned and confined in concentration camps. In such appalling circumstances, it had naturally been difficult for the Greek authorities to find parents who were prepared to request the repatriation of their children, and they had accordingly been obliged to resort to falsification of lists. It must be quite clear to any unbiased person that the charges preferred against the peoples' democracies were merely evidence that the ruling circles of certain countries were using the question of the repatriation of the Greek children as propaganda. The United Nations should not lend itself to such purposes.

30. In view of the fact that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the joint draft resolution before the Committee contained unfounded and slanderous reflections on the countries which had sheltered the children of Greek patriots, the Byelorussian delegation was submitting the following amendment (A/AC.61/L.20): "Delete paragraphs 3 and 4 of the operative part of the draft resolution".

31. Mr. RODRIGUEZ FABREGAT (Uruguay) felt that no question involving children should be made contingent upon the solution of a political problem. According to one of its sponsors, the representative of New Zealand, the joint draft resolution before the Committee did not close the door to further negotiations on the problem. He could not himself feel that that was so, nor did he think it proper to cancel a resolution of the General Assembly just because some Members refused to accept it. It was true that paragraph 7 of the draft resolution requested the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies to continue their work, but that work was to be confined to Yugoslavia. The problem should not be left at that.

32. Without wishing to propose amendments or new draft resolutions, the Uruguayan representative asked the sponsors of the joint draft resolution if they would consider transferring the reference to Yugoslavia to some other paragraph and redrafting paragraph 7 in such a form as to request the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies to continue their work. In that way, the two neutral organizations would have an opportunity to continue to deal with the problem, on however small a scale. If such an amendment were not acceptable to the sponsors of the joint draft resolution, he intended to ask that the vote on paragraph 7 be taken in two parts, the first part ending at the phrase, "continue their work", and the second part comprising the remainder of the sentence.

33. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) supported by Mr. BERNARDES (Brazil) expressed respect for the humanitarian ideals which had inspired the representative of Uruguay. Since, however, the joint draft resolution

was a recognition of the facts of the situation, and the continuation of committees which could do nothing effective and which were merely being flouted was harmful to the reputation of the United Nations, it would not be desirable to amend the text. The situation was to be deplored, but since the work of the Standing Committee would merely be suspended, it could easily be revived if the situation changed. Most probably the consensus of opinion in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee would be that the draft resolution in its present form was the proper way of dealing with an admittedly tragic situation.

34. Mr. TRUJILLO (Ecuador) wished to make a brief statement in view of the comments of the Uruguayan representative, with whom he agreed as to the desirability of not abandoning the possibility of repatriating any of the Greek children.

35. In view of certain passages in the Czechoslovak representative's statement he felt that there was some hope, which should not be under-estimated, of possible future negotiations. He accordingly proposed an amendment to the joint draft resolution, as follows (A/AC.61/L.21):

"1. Delete paragraph 5 of the operative part.

"2. In paragraph 7 of the operative part, delete the words 'in Yugoslavia'."

Thus, one last effort would be made by the United Nations by keeping the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies at work on the problem, and an opportunity would be provided to ascertain whether practical results could be obtained from the offer which the Czechoslovak representative had made in the last part of his statement.

36. Mr. RODRIGUEZ FABREGAT (Uruguay) said that he would vote in favour of the Ecuadorean amendment.

37. Mr. THORSING (Sweden) said that his delegation had reluctantly arrived at the conclusion that the work of repatriation, except for Yugoslavia, had come to a dead end. He would therefore vote for the joint draft resolution. He associated himself whole-heartedly with the expression of appreciation of the work carried out by the Red Cross organizations and by the Standing Committee and would convey that appreciation to Mr. Grafstrom, the Chairman of the latter body.

38. Mr. NUÑEZ PORTUONDO (Cuba) asked that the joint draft resolution should be voted on paragraph by paragraph. He would vote against paragraph 5 of the operative part because it was a confession of the failure of the United Nations in a great humanitarian task and could result only in undermining the prestige of the Organization. He would vote for the Ecuadorean amendment in the conviction that the least that could be done was to urge existing humanitarian organizations to continue their efforts towards ultimate repatriation of the Greek children.

39. Mr. DAWIT (Ethiopia) also paid a tribute to the efforts of the Red Cross organizations and of the Standing Committee and applauded Yugoslavia's co-operation. As there did not seem to be any alternative, however, he would support the joint draft resolution.

40. Mr. SHAW (Australia) said that his Government was particularly concerned that a solution to the problem should be found not only out of respect for humani-

tarian principles and out of friendship for Greece, but because the parents of a number of the children involved had migrated to Australia where they lived in the hope that their families would ultimately be reunited. While he sympathized with the views of the Uruguayan and Ecuadorean representatives, he could not foresee any change in the obstinate attitude adopted by certain States harbouring Greek children which would warrant renewed hope of a solution. So far as the Red Cross organizations were concerned, their considered conclusions could not be ignored. In the circumstances they could not be asked to continue efforts which they believed to be hopeless. Accordingly, while the Australian Government remained ready to support any further practical measures, it would vote for the joint draft resolution in recognition of the harsh realities.

41. Mr. TOV (Israel) expressed profound sorrow regarding the plight of the Greek children who had become the innocent victims of the political upheaval in their country. The organizations which had endeavoured to restore them to their families deserved the highest praise. They should be urged to continue their efforts in all the harbouring States. The Israel delegation believed that those States would ultimately react favourably to the humanitarian aims of the United Nations. It would therefore abstain in the vote on paragraph 4 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution. Supporting the Ecuadorean amendment with regard to paragraph 5, it would regretfully vote in favour of the joint draft resolution as a whole.

42. Mr. WECKMAN (Mexico) would also vote in favour of the joint draft resolution as a whole and abstain on the Ecuadorean amendment. He would vote against paragraph 4 of the operative part of the joint draft, however, because such an energetic condemnation should be reserved for extreme cases, such as aggression.

43. Mr. AMMOUN (Lebanon) would abstain on paragraph 4 of the operative part, but support the joint draft resolution as a whole. He would further vote for the Ecuadorean amendment in the belief that the co-operation of all parties concerned was necessary in the interests of the Greek children.

44. Mr. KINDYNIS (Greece) would vote against all amendments to the joint draft resolution because they did not afford the slightest hope of altering the totally negative situation with which the United Nations was confronted.

45. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) would vote against the Byelorussian amendment because the two paragraphs it would delete actually expressed the feeling of the majority of Member States that the unco-operative attitude of certain States harbouring Greek children should be condemned. Moreover, it was clear from the remarks of the Byelorussian representative that even if the two paragraphs were retained, the joint draft resolution would not lead to the return by those States of the Greek children living within their borders.

46. Mr. Chieh LIU (China) regretted that the joint draft resolution crushed all hope for the repatriation of the Greek children from the countries still harbouring them. In particular, suspension of the activities of the Red Cross organizations would make it impossible to ascertain whether and at what moment conditions were established which would make practical action by them

possible and useful. As the recent conference of the International Red Cross in Toronto had shown, that body remained in constant touch with similar organizations in the countries behind the "iron curtain". The United Nations had nothing to gain by suspension of those activities. On the other hand, it was justified in discontinuing the Standing Committee because it could no longer operate effectively. For those reasons, he suggested that the Ecuadorean amendment should be changed so that, instead of deleting all of paragraph 5, the first clause of that paragraph providing for the discontinuance of the Standing Committee would be retained, and everything after the word "work" in paragraph 7 would be deleted.

47. The Byelorussian amendment was unacceptable because it would delete the most important point in the joint draft resolution, namely, its condemnation of what was tantamount to an act of international gangsterism.

48. Mr. TRUJILLO (Ecuador) accepted the modifications proposed by the Chinese representative to his amendment to paragraph 5 of the operative part of the draft resolution.

49. Mr. LOPEZ (Philippines), in a further attempt to leave the way open so that the Red Cross organizations might resume their efforts whenever conditions permitted, suggested an alternative wording for the second part of paragraph 5 and would change the first word of paragraph 4 from "Condemns" to "Deplores".

50. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) appreciated the motives of those who had suggested amendments to the joint draft resolution, but again drew attention to the statement by the Presidents of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies which was to be found in the letter of transmittal of their report to the Secretary-General. They had clearly asserted that they remained ready to resume their efforts if conditions could be established at the governmental level which would make such action practical or useful and that they continued to be at the disposal of the Governments concerned for further assistance in the repatriation of the Greek children. Surely Greece was the best judge of the proper moment to reapply for Red Cross assistance and the Greek delegation fully supported the joint draft resolution.

51. Mr. DURON (Honduras) deplored the obstinacy of the countries still harbouring Greek children, but found himself compelled to support the joint draft resolution in the absence of a more adequate solution. He would also vote for the Ecuadorean amendments as modified by the Chinese representative.

52. Mr. ISKANDAR (Indonesia) deeply regretted that the humanitarian problem of the Greek children had been submerged in political controversy. Paragraph 4 of the joint draft resolution was likely to create increased political tension instead of contributing to a solution of the problem. He could not support it and would therefore abstain in the vote on the joint draft resolution.

53. Mr. SIRI (El Salvador) felt that despite failure to resolve the problem under discussion, the United Nations could not, on grounds of principle, abandon its efforts. Accordingly, he would vote against the Byelorussian amendment and for the Ecuadorean amendment, as modified by China. If the latter were rejected, he

would abstain on paragraph 5 of the operative part and on the relevant section of paragraph 7. Otherwise, he would support the joint draft resolution as a whole.

54. Mr. CASTILLO ARRIOLA (Guatemala) would support the joint draft resolution in so far as it dealt with the humanitarian, rather than with the political aspects of the problem. Accordingly, he would abstain on paragraph 4 of the operative part and vote for the modified Ecuadorean amendment.

55. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) could not support the joint draft resolution because it was primarily political in nature and did not offer practical measures to overcome the difficulties encountered by harbouring States in the repatriation of the Greek children.

56. The remarks of the New Zealand representative emphasizing the importance of paragraphs 3 and 4 bore out the contention that the authors did not desire so much to resolve the humanitarian problem, as to condemn those countries whose political structure displeased them. The USSR supported the Byelorussian amendment to delete those paragraphs. It would abstain on all other amendments.

57. While the remaining paragraphs of the joint draft resolution were not objectionable *per se*, with the sole exception of paragraph 5 of the operative part, they contributed nothing to a solution of the problem and the USSR would abstain in the vote on them. It would vote for paragraph 5 because it suggested a practical approach to the problem and would discontinue the Standing Committee which had been set up without justification and had proved to be an obstacle to the repatriation of the Greek children.

58. Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland) also favoured the Byelorussian amendment to delete paragraphs 3 and 4. Their effect was to slander the harbouring States and convert the humanitarian question of the repatriation of the Greek children into a spring-board for political propaganda. The facts demonstrating that those States were doing their utmost to care for the children and remove obstacles to ultimate repatriation had not been refuted.

59. The CHAIRMAN called for a decision on whether the Committee should proceed to a vote on the joint draft resolution.

The Committee decided to proceed to a vote by 28 votes to 14, with 8 abstentions.

60. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the joint draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.18) and the Byelorussian (A/AC.61/L.20) and Ecuadorean (A/AC.61/L.21) amendments thereto.

The preamble of the joint draft resolution was adopted by 50 votes to none, with 7 abstentions.

Paragraph 1 of the operative part was adopted by 51 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

Paragraph 2 was adopted by 50 votes to none, with 7 abstentions.

The Byelorussian amendment calling for deletion of paragraph 3 was rejected by 41 votes to 5, with 11 abstentions.

Paragraph 3 was adopted by 43 votes to 5, with 8 abstentions.

The Byelorussian amendment calling for deletion of paragraph 4 was rejected by 36 votes to 5, with 16 abstentions.

Paragraph 4 was adopted by 36 votes to 5, with 17 abstentions.

The Ecuadorean amendment to paragraph 5, as further amended by China, was adopted by 21 votes to 20, with 17 abstentions.

Paragraph 6 was adopted by 54 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

The Ecuadorean amendment to paragraph 7 was adopted by 23 votes to 11, with 20 abstentions.

The joint draft resolution, as a whole, as amended, was adopted by 46 votes to 5, with 7 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.