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Chairman: Mr. Alexis KYROU (Greece).

The Conciliation Commission for Palestine and its work in the light of the resolutions of the United Nations (A/2184, A/2216 and Add.1, A/AC.61/L.23/Rev.3, A/AC.61/L.25) (*continued*)

[Item 67]*

1. Mr. MOSTAFA (Egypt) said that, at the present crucial moment in the Committee's work, he did not intend to reopen the debate, but would merely quote extracts from a number of official United Nations documents on Israel's policy in regard to the United Nations resolutions on the Palestine problem. His only purpose in doing so was to dissipate all doubt and misunderstanding which might have persisted in regard to Israel's real intentions.

2. Various delegations had argued that direct negotiations offered the only course likely to give satisfactory results and had invoked, in support of their opinion, the precedent of the negotiations which had led to the armistice agreements. Those agreements, however, had been concluded not on the initiative of the parties, as the result of free negotiations, but at the invitation of the Security Council and under the Chairmanship of the United Nations Mediator, in implementation of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948.¹

3. Mr. Mostafa further drew the Committee's attention to a statement of principle made, on 9 June 1949, at Lausanne, by the head of the Israel delegation to the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, to the effect that it would be unrealistic to speak of the return of the Arab refugees to their homes and farms since in many cases those farms had been destroyed and the

homes had been occupied by others. The same person had also said that much of the city of Jaffa had been completely destroyed or was uninhabitable and that the remainder of the city was populated by an overwhelming majority of Jews, whereas it had formerly been an almost exclusively Arab area. Academic discussions on the repatriation of Arab refugees were therefore not conducive to progress in the Lausanne negotiations. The Israel spokesman had further added that efforts had been made throughout the world, during the past twenty years, to solve the problem raised by minority groups, which were an important cause of international tension.

4. Referring to the territorial question, the same Israel representative had made it perfectly clear that although Israel had accepted, in May 1949, the Lausanne Protocol as a basis for discussion, it had not thereby undertaken to accept the partition of frontiers indicated therein in accordance with General Assembly resolution 181 (II).

5. Israel had also rejected the plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem and advocated "functional internationalization" or, in other words, access to the Holy Places.

6. Such had been the Israel delegation's attitude to the Palestine problem, an attitude which was a categorical negation of the United Nations resolutions and a defiance of its purposes and principles. That attitude had not changed, as was clear from the Israel representative's significant silence at the previous meeting when asked by the Canadian representative to state his Government's position in regard to the resolutions of the United Nations in general and General Assembly resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (III) in particular.

7. The Israel representative's assertion that the Arab refugee problem was a direct consequence of the intervention of the Arab States in Palestine was a historic untruth and a gratuitous statement which smacked of propaganda. The Security Council's records gave a

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year*, No. 126 (381st meeting).

flat denial to that statement. The exodus of the Arabs from Palestine had started immediately after the adoption of the partition plan, by resolution 181 (II), in November 1947 and had reached a total of between 200,000 and 400,000 before the intervention of the Arab States.

8. Turning to the two draft resolutions before the Committee, Mr. Mostafa said that the four-Power draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.25), which was based on General Assembly resolution 512 (VI), introduced nothing new into the Palestine problem. His delegation was, however, prepared to vote for it since it respected the United Nations resolutions which provided for a solution of the question.

9. The revised eight-Power draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.23/Rev.3), whose authors had made a great and sincere effort to contribute to the solution of the Palestine problem, proposed that the parties concerned should engage in direct negotiations, to which his delegation would have no objection. That method should not be considered as final, however, since it had no proper juridical basis. It was the purpose of the negotiations rather than the method which was important. It would be useless to define the method before defining the purpose. If the parties failed to agree upon the point of departure and the principles, the negotiations might well fail to produce positive results. The Committee would be ill-advised to adopt a draft resolution which deviated from existing resolutions. His delegation would, therefore, vote against the eight-Power draft resolution unless it was amended in such a way as to express respect for the principles contained in the resolutions of the General Assembly.

10. Finally, in correcting the Israel representative's erroneous statement at the 29th meeting that the General Assembly had "refused to become involved" in a boundary adjustment between Egypt and Libya, Mr. Mostafa recalled the Secretary-General's report (A/2141) to the current session of the General Assembly wherein it was stated that, after the matter had been deferred until the General Assembly's sixth session, the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had been notified on 28 January 1952 that the Egyptian representative had signified his Government's intention to enter into negotiations with the Government of Libya with a view to settling the question and that it therefore requested the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee to defer examination of the matter pending a decision. There had, therefore, been no refusal on the part of the General Assembly, as alleged by the Israel representative.

11. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) declared that the representatives of the Arab States, who were the true representatives of the policies and sentiments of their Governments and peoples, had clearly stated that they stood for Arab rights in Palestine, which no Middle Eastern development plan could ever replace.

12. The Arab States could not enter into direct negotiations with Israel unless that country accepted the United Nations resolutions on Palestine. The Canadian representative had twice asked the representative of Israel to define his Government's position in regard to General Assembly resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (III). The Israel representative had evaded the question and had merely hoped that international measures to solve

the refugee problem could soon be worked out within the framework of general international policy.

13. That was a clear departure from the United Nations resolutions on the refugee question, which had recognized their right to repatriation or compensation. Thus the Arab fears and suspicions that their rights in Palestine might be brushed aside were well-founded. Those fears would have to be allayed before any direct negotiations could take place. The Iraqi delegation stood firm on its rejection of any draft resolution which failed to confirm the United Nations resolutions on Palestine and at least guaranteed the Arabs their rights, as embodied in those resolutions.

14. The revised eight-Power draft resolution was totally unacceptable. While appreciating the sincerity of the motives of its sponsors, Mr. Al-Jamali felt that they could hardly realize the tenseness of the situation in the Middle East or the unfortunate effect which their resolution would have throughout the Arab world.

15. The Arab States in 1947 had warned the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Palestinian Question of the danger of adopting the resolution partitioning Palestine; now the eight-Power draft resolution would leave entirely in the air the last remaining rights of the Arabs of Palestine. Whereas General Assembly resolution 512 (VI) referred three times to previous resolutions, the eight-Power draft ignored them. It did not contribute to creating an atmosphere conducive to a practical settlement of the Palestine problem.

16. Besides creating fear and uneasiness in the Middle East, the eight-Power draft resolution was vague and ambiguous. It used phrases such as the "principal objectives of the United Nations on the Palestine question" which were surely already embodied in the resolutions already adopted on the matter and which should therefore be referred to directly in the eight-Power draft. Since that draft did not offer any solution to the Palestine question, the Iraqi delegation would prefer to have no resolution at all and continue to depend on the good offices of the Conciliation Commission.

17. Mr. Al-Jamali therefore appealed to the sponsors of the eight-Power draft to withdraw their resolution. He sincerely believed that in so doing the eight Powers, whose efforts had not been in vain and whose fine spirit of conciliation had already been demonstrated in the Committee, would be serving the cause of peace, for which the Mexican representative had appealed so eloquently (25th meeting).

18. Mr. SHAW (Australia) asked whether the Iraqi representative's appeal to the sponsors of the eight-Power draft to withdraw their resolution should be regarded as a suggestion that the item under discussion should be withdrawn from the Committee's agenda.

19. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) replied that since the eight-Power draft resolution would only serve to worsen the situation, rather than see that resolution adopted, his delegation would prefer the item under discussion to be withdrawn from the Committee's agenda, although he could not speak for the other five sponsors of the item.

20. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the eight-Power draft resolution had in effect been sponsored by fifteen Powers and that the Iraqi representative was in-

directly asking for the withdrawal of the four-Power draft resolution as well.

21. Mr. MOSTAFA (Egypt) said that the Arab States had asked for the inclusion of the item in the agenda of the present session as they had been anxious to give new life to the Conciliation Commission for Palestine and to see the United Nations resolutions implemented by the return of the Arab refugees to Palestine.

22. Since the discussions in the Committee did not give much hope of a settlement, and since his delegation was opposed to the adoption of a draft resolution which would only worsen the situation in Palestine, he would agree to the withdrawal of the item from the agenda of the General Assembly's present session, it being understood that the Arab States would retain the right to ask for its inclusion in the agenda of the next session.

23. Mr. Finn MOE (Norway) thought that the sponsors of the eight-Power draft resolution would have to discuss the Iraqi representative's request that they withdraw their draft. Should they agree to do so, the four-Power draft resolution would have to be withdrawn also.

24. Mr. ARDALAN (Iran) said that if the eight-Power draft resolution was withdrawn he, as one of the sponsors of the four-Power draft resolution, would be prepared to withdraw that draft.

25. Mr. EBAN (Israel), commenting on the procedural questions which had been raised, observed that the item under discussion had been included in the agenda by the unanimous decision of the General Assembly. Consequently, the States which had requested its inclusion had no more control over it than any of the other Member States represented in the Committee.

26. Moreover, it was his understanding that the Committee was continuing its debate on that item in the normal manner. The suggestion that the revised eight-Power draft resolution should either be satisfactory to the Iraqi representative or be withdrawn would, if adopted by the Committee, seriously undermine its prestige. The doctrine that discussion of the item could proceed normally only on condition that those who requested its inclusion in the agenda secured a result favourable to them was one of the most fantastic that had ever been uttered in international life. Debate had resulted in the crystallization of a majority view in a revised text in favour of a mild directive to the parties to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their differences. The Committee was committed to pursuing discussion of the revised draft in view of the large volume of opinion in favour of a settlement through direct negotiation. If it allowed itself to be turned aside from that purpose by pressure, and avowed itself unable to call the parties to peaceful negotiation, its action would be interpreted in the Middle East as a permanent disengagement of the United Nations from an important sphere of international relations.

27. Before explaining Israel's attitude regarding the validity of past General Assembly resolutions, Mr. Eban wished to draw attention to a notable omission from the purportedly exhaustive list of United Nations resolutions on Palestine which had been presented to the Committee by the Syrian representative (35th meeting). Most significantly, the list had omitted the

most recent Security Council decision on the juridical relationships between Israel and the Arab States, a resolution forbidding belligerent rights and acts of hostility, boycott and blockade, adopted by the Council on 1 September 1951 (S/2322) and consistently defied by the Arab States. Yet, there could be no question regarding the binding nature of Security Council decisions taken under Article 25 of the Charter, although it remained a debatable matter whether General Assembly resolutions adopted under Article 11 were in fact mandatory on Member States. In that connexion, the Egyptian representative had expressed the view in 1948 that General Assembly resolutions had only optional effect and States had the right not to comply with them. The issue at that time, moreover, had been whether the right of non-compliance included the right to prevent other governments from implementing General Assembly decisions by the use of armed force.

28. In any event, it was for the Committee to judge whether the fifty-one or fifty-two resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the Palestine question could inflexibly be regarded as the basis for free negotiations between the parties.

29. General Assembly resolution 181 (II), recommending partition of Palestine and a political settlement, had been opposed by the Arab States. Despite their vote against it, it had been adopted, the State of Israel had been established and the mandate terminated. The States which had then opposed the resolution now invoked it and gave retrospective approval to its main provisions. Similarly, General Assembly resolution 194 (III) setting up the Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been opposed by the Arab States. Moreover, it had been amended substantially in order to eliminate all references to resolution 181 (II) and any implication of the validity of that earlier decision. The representative of Pakistan had said in the First Committee (217th meeting) that it would, in fact, replace the latter. Despite the opposition, the General Assembly had adopted the resolution, the Arab States had cooperated with the Conciliation Commission, which they had previously considered invalid, and were now invoking resolution 194 (III) as sacrosanct. Moreover, they had persistently maintained that both resolutions would increase tension in the Middle East.

30. On 16 November 1948, on the motion of Canada and with the support of the Mediator, the Security Council had adopted² a draft resolution calling upon the parties to negotiate directly with a view to concluding armistice agreements. It had done so despite the Arab request that the draft resolution should be withdrawn and that no action be taken. The Egyptian representative would note that the armistice negotiations had been initiated and conducted in response to that Security Council resolution. Instead of waiting until it had the support of both parties, the Council had acted, thus planting the seed for the negotiations which had resulted in the signing of four armistice agreements. Although they were provisional in nature, they had effectively ensured stability in the area and could be counted as a momentous achievement of the United Nations. Had the Security Council, at that time, accepted the thesis that no resolution should be adopted unless all parties supported it, there would never have

² *Ibid.*

been any armistice negotiations or any relative stability in the Middle East. It was significant, moreover, that Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, three of the four States with which agreements had been signed, had vociferously rejected negotiations at the outset only to yield to that procedure for pacific settlement in time. Those facts demonstrated that if it had been feasible to conclude the armistice agreements under United Nations auspices in response to a resolution which had initially been opposed by the Arab States, it was equally feasible to conclude permanent peace treaties with those States in response to the revised eight-Power draft resolution, which was being opposed by them.

31. The Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948 had had compelling moral force; the Mediator had stressed its value in instituting the process of negotiation. Had the Council heeded the opposition to it, there would have been no appeal to which the parties could respond, no clear incentive to free negotiations unfettered by any limiting factor or pre-condition, enabling the parties to discuss a full gamut of alternative solutions. The Council's farsightedness in 1948 had put an end to hostilities and enabled the transition to a situation of relative stability for which the United Nations deserved full credit. Surely the United Nations did not regret the foresight which had brought about that signal achievement in international conciliation. Moreover, in almost every case where the Security Council had appealed for a cease-fire, one of the parties had opposed such action. To make the consent of all parties a pre-condition for endorsement of such appeals would have doomed all efforts to failure. The General Assembly would never have created the Conciliation Commission, it would never have recommended a peace settlement between Israel and the Arab States, or concluded the armistice agreements if it had neglected to adopt proposals initially opposed but later recognized as major achievements of international policy. Israel was confident that the Security Council's resolution of 1 September 1951 calling for an end to the Arab blockade, although still opposed by the Arab States, would ultimately be given full effect.

32. Referring to the Egyptian representative's observations on territorial boundary adjustments between Egypt and Libya, Mr. Eban pointed out that a parallel could legitimately be drawn between the negotiations whereby the two countries had effected certain boundary modifications by mutual consent and the method of territorial adjustment proposed in Israel's peace plan. The grievances regarding the frontiers between Israel and Lebanon, Egypt, Syria and Jordan respectively could similarly be satisfied by direct contact and mutual consent of the parties concerned.

33. The views of the Israel Government as set forth in its peace plan had evoked a gratifying response and had been given wide publicity in leading Arab Press organs, without adverse comment. They supplied the answers to all questions regarding Israel's position on the various aspects of the Palestine question. As had been stated, Israel supported the revised eight-Power draft resolution, in particular paragraph 4 of the operative part, recalling the principal objectives of the United Nations on the Palestine problem. It considered the mention of the religious interests of third parties a valuable addition, and was quite prepared to bear it

in mind. In that connexion, it should be recalled that the President of the Trusteeship Council, on 4 April 1950, in his last report (A/1286, annex III) to the General Assembly on the Jerusalem situation, had recorded his efforts to investigate the possibilities of giving effect to the 1949 Trusteeship Council resolution 232 (VI) adopted despite the opposition of both parties directly concerned. He had been unable to get in touch with the representatives of the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan before the expiration of his own term of office and had therefore continued his consultations with the Israel Government alone. He had reported that Israel had shown a conciliatory spirit and had submitted new proposals which, although they were removed from the Statute for Jerusalem already drafted and from Trusteeship Council resolution 232 (VI), nevertheless represented considerable progress towards a settlement of the problem of Jerusalem and the Holy Places in comparison with previous proposals submitted to the General Assembly. He had felt that the response of the one government with which he had been able to consult might ultimately persuade the other government concerned to take account of United Nations wishes and to co-operate with the Organization in its desire to ensure protection of the Holy Places. Although previous schemes had proved impracticable, Mr. Eban asserted that Israel was still seeking means to carry out the principal objectives of the United Nations. The permanence of those objectives transcended the specific instruments used to implement them at a given moment. When resolutions were not implemented within the time for which they had been intended, their details became incapable of implementation, but their principles remained intact. When the original instruments for implementation no longer served, it was the duty of the parties to seek other machinery for that purpose.

34. Accordingly, Israel was resolved, in accepting the revised eight-Power draft resolution, to bear in mind the principal objectives of the United Nations on Palestine and to seek means of giving them effect even if certain specific proposals had been abandoned, usually as a result of opposition by the Arab Governments. That had been the case for General Assembly resolution 181 (II), for Trusteeship Council resolution 232 (VI), as its President had implied in his report, and for General Assembly resolution 194 (III), as evidenced by the Conciliation Commission's report (A/1985, G) that the Arab States had been unwilling to implement paragraph 5 of that decision. It was important to recall that when the General Assembly adopted resolution 194 (III), including its paragraph 11 on the repatriation of refugees, it had considered it an indispensable condition for the refugees not only to wish to return to their homes, but to be prepared to live at peace with their neighbours. Moreover, they were to be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date. Criteria of peace and practicability were thus the original conditions of the General Assembly. Israel would continue to seek means to assist the international community in its projects of relief and reintegration of the refugees. It had acceded in the past year to all the requests made by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency with regard to the refugees, even beyond the scope of its initial general agreement. Its attitude was identical with that advocated by the Conciliation

Commission on 23 October 1950 in that it agreed that, within the framework of a discussion of all outstanding issues between the parties, preferably by direct negotiations, the refugee question should be given priority.

35. Mr. Eban warned all parties concerned that deferment of negotiations for a peace settlement would mean delay in a complete, humanitarian and lasting solution of the refugee question. So intricate a problem could not be settled in the absence of normal intercourse between the parties or on any basis other than full co-operation between the governments in that area.

36. Israel's position regarding pre-conditions for negotiations had been accurately stated by the Conciliation Commission in 1950. It favoured mixed committees to discuss the individual components of the peace settlement and subsequently to consolidate them in a single settlement. The Arab States had rejected that view and made adherence to General Assembly resolutions a pre-condition. The Commission had found the Arab position inappropriate, especially where the conditions referred to the principles of the resolutions. It had advised against singling out any one principle for special recognition. In practice, the negotiation of a peace settlement would be tantamount to a solution of the refugee problem; it was illogical to reject such negotiation and yet demand such a solution.

37. While Israel's views on the refugee question, territorial adjustments and Jerusalem, as set forth in its peace plan, were admittedly different from the specific terms of General Assembly resolution 181 (II), they conformed with United Nations objectives in adopting that resolution. They respected the Assembly's fundamental purposes even when detailed schemes had to be abandoned. For that reason, the revised eight-Power draft resolution recalling United Nations objectives and urging direct negotiations would be a valuable contribution to international jurisprudence. Israel was prepared to observe the main recommendation of that draft resolution; the moral effects of rejecting its appeal for direct negotiations should not be underestimated. It was important for the United Nations to adopt it.

38. Mr. JOHNSON (Canada) referred to his intervention at the previous meeting and thanked the Israel representative for his full reply to the questions put to him. Mr. Eban had been quite right in taking the view that the Canadian representative had not been interrogating him on certain particular resolutions. He recalled that his question had been whether the Israel representative would care to enlarge upon his original statement with a view to facilitating the initiation of direct negotiations in accordance with paragraph 4 of the operative part of the revised eight-Power draft resolution. Mr. Eban had, that morning, made it clear that, in accordance with that paragraph of the draft resolution, the principal objectives of the United Nations in the Palestine question were to be kept in mind in the proposed negotiations. That reply disposed of the charge that it was the intention of one of the parties to brush aside all United Nations resolutions. Discussions in the Committee had made it clear that one party had narrowed down its attention to two particular General Assembly resolutions, while the other had agreed that the principal objectives of the United Nations were to be borne in mind in the negotiations.

39. Mr. QUINTANILLA (Mexico) said that he had listened with interest to the statement just made by the Israel representative, but was quite unable to agree with him that the suggestion that the proposed draft resolution concerning the Palestine problem should be withdrawn if it was unsatisfactory to the representative of Iraq was one of the most fantastic events in international life. Mexico had always felt a strong sentiment of sympathy with Israel, but in the light of his own personal experience of international negotiation as Chairman of the Inter-American Peace Commission, he submitted that it would be a much more fantastic event if the Committee, which was endeavouring to conciliate the two parties to the Palestine dispute, should assume that it was settling the matter when in fact it was settling nothing. The principal end to be achieved was to reach a solution which would be satisfactory to both parties to the dispute. In the light of that consideration, it would be merely logical and a matter of common sense to consider the appeal made by the representative of Iraq. It would be regrettable if, after the Committee had spent so much time working on the problem and such extensive negotiations had taken place between the parties and the sponsors of the draft resolutions, the resolution finally adopted were unsatisfactory to one of the parties. That would mean that the Committee had in effect done nothing at all. He did not believe, however, that it was necessary to adopt the pessimistic view that the parties could not reach agreement on a text.

40. The representative of Iraq had made a new proposal, but he had been within his rights. In view of that proposal, Mr. Quintanilla would formally move that the debate and vote on the draft resolutions before the Committee should be postponed until the following day. That would allow all Committee members to give full consideration to the implications of the Iraqi delegation's request. He stressed the fact that the intentions and will of the parties to the problem were more important than the words of any formula for its solution. With goodwill, even a bad formula might achieve results, whereas without goodwill, even a very good formula could lead to nothing.

41. On the following day there would be two courses of action open to the Committee. It would either approve a draft resolution which was not acceptable to one of the parties, or it would not approve a draft resolution. It would be a great pity if the Committee, having worked so long and so hard to find a solution acceptable to both parties, were obliged to adopt the latter course, particularly in view of the categorical declaration just made by the Israel representative regarding the validity of the resolutions of the General Assembly on the subject, a validity which he did not impugn. He had realistically pointed out that there were resolutions which might become outdated, resolutions which could be the subject of further consideration. Not even a political constitution was eternal; even the Charter could be modified. But words at the beginning of the debate had led certain Arab States to interpret in a different manner the Israel delegation's views, so important to the Committee's decisions, regarding the validity of the resolutions.

42. The crux of the matter lay in paragraph 4 of the eight-Power draft resolution. That text was unac-

ceptable to the Arab delegations, so Mr. Quintanilla understood, only because it appeared to evade any concrete mention of previous General Assembly resolutions on Palestine. He suggested that their objections might be met by the inclusion, in paragraph 4 of the operative part of the draft resolution, of the words "both the resolutions of the United Nations and" after the words "bearing in mind". He felt that the Israel representative had been quite right in making the point that resolutions, which crystallized an attitude towards a question at a given moment, were quite a different matter from the objectives of the United Nations, which were essentially permanent. He suggested that representatives of the parties concerned should be asked if they were prepared to accept the change which he had just proposed in the draft resolution. If both parties were prepared to accept the amendment, he would withdraw his motion for postponement of the debate; otherwise it would stand.

43. Mr. Quintanilla was convinced that any extra time spent in achieving a solution of the problem would not be time wasted. He assured the parties to the dispute that the only motive for his proposal was a desire for conciliation. He felt that continual failures by the United Nations to achieve peaceful settlement of disputes would eventually lead Member States to doubt the usefulness of the Organization. He hoped that the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee would be able to lead the way by providing a practical solution to the problem under discussion.

44. Mr. Finn MOE (Norway) said that he was speaking only on behalf of his own delegation and not of all the sponsors of the eight-Power draft resolution.

45. The situation had changed since the representative of Israel had made his statement. The Arab delegations had appealed to the sponsors of the draft resolution to withdraw it, while the Israel representative was clearly anxious that it should stand. Whichever course of action was followed by the sponsors, they would be departing from the attitude of neutrality which they had tried to take up. The only way in which the Iraqi representative could achieve the purpose which he had in mind would be to propose formally that the item under discussion should be withdrawn from the Committee's agenda. He requested the Chairman to enquire of that representative whether it was his intention to do so. If withdrawal of the item were proposed, responsibility for a decision on the matter would rest with the whole Committee or with the General Assembly at a plenary meeting. If, on the other hand, the appeal was merely for withdrawal of the revised joint draft resolution, responsibility would rest with fifteen members of the Committee. His delegation was not ready to assume that responsibility.

46. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that a proposal for adjournment of the meeting was before the Committee. Under rule 117 of the rules of procedure, a vote had to be taken at once on such a proposal. He felt, however, that it might be of assistance to members of the Committee if he outlined the situation before proceeding to a vote. Two ideas had been put forward, the first, which was the broader in scope, was that the item should be withdrawn from the General Assembly's

agenda. As the Israel representative had correctly pointed out, items on the agenda of the General Assembly could only be amended or deleted by a majority of the members present and voting. That was clear from rule 22 of the rules of procedure. Deletion must therefore be requested and adopted at a plenary meeting. The request might take the form either of a letter to the President of the General Assembly or a recommendation to that effect in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee to the General Assembly.

47. The second idea was narrower in scope; it was an appeal to the sponsors of the eight-Power draft resolution to withdraw that resolution. As the Norwegian representative implied, the sponsors would be obliged to consult together before they consented to such a withdrawal. One of the sponsors to the four-Power draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.25), namely, the representative of Iran, had expressed readiness to withdraw that draft if the eight-Power draft resolution were also withdrawn. If both draft resolutions were withdrawn, and the item was not deleted from the agenda, another proposal would have to be submitted to the Committee in writing on the following day to the effect that the Committee, after having debated on the item at length, thought it advisable not to submit any draft resolution.

48. Mr. CARPIO (Philippines) said that, in his understanding, no formal proposal had been made to the Committee that the item should be withdrawn from the agenda. In view of the lengthy debate which had already taken place, his delegation would very much regret such a withdrawal. The Mexican representative had made a formal proposal that the discussion in progress should be adjourned until the following day, and that proposal had been subject to an expression by the representatives of the parties to the dispute of their opinion on an oral amendment proposed to paragraph 4 of the operative part of the eight-Power draft resolution. In view of the statements made by the representatives of both the Arab States and Israel, the amendment thus proposed by the Mexican representative seemed to his delegation to offer the best possibilities of reaching a solution. He suggested that the Chairman should ask the representatives of the Arab States and of Israel for their reactions to the proposed amendment and then should put the question of adjournment to the vote. It would be most regrettable if the item were withdrawn on the suggestion of the Chairman and the position as regards the question under discussion remained unchanged.

49. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that he had at no stage in the debate suggested that the item under discussion or the draft resolutions on the subject should be withdrawn, but had confined himself entirely to explaining the procedure which would have to be followed in either of those cases.

50. Mr. RODRIGUEZ FABREGAT (Uruguay) warmly endorsed the Mexican representative's view that time spent on endeavouring to secure agreement between the parties would not be wasted, and supported his proposal that the debate should be adjourned until the following day.

It was so decided.

Change in the order of discussion of agenda items

51. The CHAIRMAN stated that circumstances made it desirable that the Committee should change the order of discussion of the items on its agenda (A/AC.61/2), placing the item on Eritrea, now occupying last place, in penultimate place and relegating the item on the admission of new Members, to last place. If there was no opposition to that proposal, he would consider it as adopted.

52. Mr. MICHALOWSKI (Poland) thought that it would be unwise to postpone consideration of the item on the admission of new Members, which was of con-

siderable importance. He would be opposed to the change in the order of items.

53. The CHAIRMAN thought that all Committee members would agree that the item on the admission of new Members was of great importance, but if the item on Eritrea, which would probably be disposed of after a brief debate, were considered first, the Committee would have ample time for the consideration of the item on the admission of new Members. He called for a vote on the change in the order of the items.

The change in the order of agenda items was adopted by 33 votes to 6, with 13 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.