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Chairman: Mr. Alexis KYROU (Greece).

The Conciliation Commission for Palestine and its work in the light of the resolutions of the United Nations (A/2184, A/2216 and Add.1, A/AC.61/L.23/Rev.4, A/AC.61/L.25, A/AC.61/L.33) *(concluded)*

[Item 67]*

1. Mr. DUNCAN (Panama) referred briefly to the statement made by the Iraqi representative at the previous meeting. He expressed his conviction that the comments made in that statement on the eight-Power draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.23/Rev.4) had not been in any way intended as a reflection on the sponsors. He thought that the statement had been of value in that it had revealed the impressions of the Iraqi representative concerning the nature of the problem. Even if some of those impressions were erroneous, the Committee was now at least fully informed of them.

2. In conclusion, Mr. Duncan expressed regret that the Arab States had not offered their co-operation in producing a concrete proposal for an amendment to the draft resolution which would render it more acceptable to them.

3. Mr. SHUKAIRI (Syria) suggested that the phrase "in conformity with the resolutions of the General Assembly on Palestine", which was thrice used in last year's resolution 512 (VI), should be incorporated in paragraph 4 of the operative part of the eight-Power draft resolution so that it would read "the establishment of such a settlement in conformity with

the resolutions of the General Assembly on Palestine . . .".

4. Count D'ASPREMONT LYNDEN (Belgium) said that he would vote against the four-Power draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.25) because it omitted the essential requirement of embodying an invitation to the parties to enter into direct negotiations. Experience had revealed that only direct negotiations could achieve the peace which was unanimously desired. It was the very essence of diplomacy and the usual method of settling disputes between States. It was in line with the policy of the United Nations, which had continually affirmed that it was the primary duty of parties to a dispute to seek settlement of that dispute. A peace imposed by third parties could not be a true peace. Instruments of conciliation and good offices could only be a means of assistance. It appeared to him that the four-Power draft resolution, in evading direct reference to a need for direct negotiations by the device of recalling a previous resolution, in which the words "direct negotiations" did not appear, led only to a deadlock and by-passed the road to peace.

5. The eight-Power draft resolution, which called upon the parties to enter into direct negotiations, had in its original form revealed many deficiencies. It had not attributed sufficient importance to previous United Nations resolutions; it had given the Conciliation Commission for Palestine too small a part to play; it had made no mention of the problem of the Holy Places which was a matter of concern to the whole world and not only to the parties to the dispute. In its final form, however, thanks to the efforts made by a number of men of goodwill, most of the deficiencies had

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

been remedied, and the Belgian representative had hoped that the final text would be acceptable to all who truly desired peace.

6. Unfortunately, he noted that one of the parties to the dispute refused to accept the draft resolution. As the representative of Mexico had pointed out (37th meeting), the best formula for conciliation would be ineffective if it was rejected outright by one of the parties concerned. Since the Arabs, for reasons which he found difficult to understand, but of which they alone were the judges, refused to accept the eight-Power draft resolution, particularly the outstandingly important paragraph 4 of the operative part, the draft resolution, despite its undeniable good qualities, was bound to fail to achieve the end which the Committee was seeking to attain, namely, the restoration of peace in Palestine.

7. The Belgian representative said that he would therefore be obliged to abstain from voting on paragraph 4 of the operative part and, consequently, on the eight-Power draft resolution as a whole. He much regretted that the lengthy debate on the item had produced no progress towards a final peaceful settlement and deplored the fact more particularly on account of the refugees whose sufferings, which he had witnessed for four years, would inevitably be prolonged thereby.

8. Mr. ARDALAN (Iran) said that part of the Netherlands representative's statement at the previous meeting required elucidation by the Iranian delegation. He was convinced that, in his reference to the settlement of difficulties and differences in the Middle East by means of the intervention of other States, that representative had been thinking of the area of Palestine.

9. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) assured the sponsors of the eight-Power draft resolution that his comments at the previous meeting should not be taken as casting a personal reflection on any member of the Committee. Despite his respect for his fellow representatives, however, he did not feel that the policies which they advocated were always just or impartial. The Palestine problem had been created in 1947 by the mistaken attitude taken up by persons whose integrity was beyond question.

10. In reply to comments from the representatives of the Netherlands and Ecuador at the previous meeting, Mr. Al-Jamali insisted that the eight-Power draft resolution was not neutral. It represented the interests of Israel, and had been drafted and modified with the consent of that country. It was anti-Arab, and could not be considered as a friendly draft resolution. It would neither contribute to peace nor bring about conciliation.

11. The draft resolution was ambiguous in language and was clearly designed to invalidate previous United Nations resolutions in conformity with the wishes of Israel. Paragraph 4 of the operative part would weaken the force of past resolutions, undermine the prestige of the United Nations and the interests of peace in the Middle East. As far as the Arab States were concerned, it was not a step forward, as the Netherlands representative had suggested, but a step backward. It was only a step forward for Israel. The real meaning of paragraph 4 of the draft resolution was

not in the written words, but it could be read between the lines. The idea of the draft resolution was simply to release Israel from its obligations under United Nations resolutions. He could understand a desire that direct negotiations should take place, but could not understand the apparent change in the United Nations attitude towards the rights of the Arabs, as stated in General Assembly resolution 512 (VI). He could not see how the Arab world could be expected to retain its confidence in the United Nations in face of such progressive reduction of its rights. He hoped that his views were clear. They dealt with rights, with peoples, with peace and the interests of the United Nations and were not concerned with the personalities of those responsible for drafting the eight-Power draft resolution.

12. Mr. RIAD (Egypt) said that his delegation would be obliged to vote against the eight-Power draft resolution unless it could be amended to express respect for the principles contained in the resolutions of the General Assembly. The resolution in its final form remained unsatisfactory. He wished to make it clear that Egypt would never accept direct negotiations unless Israel declared its readiness to respect United Nations resolutions on Palestine.

13. Blatta OGBAZGY DAWIT (Ethiopia) said that his Government sincerely appreciated any effort made to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem, since it affected an area so close to Ethiopia. He had no doubt that the six-point plan put forward by Israel (29th meeting) might be of great benefit to the whole Middle Eastern area, but those points must be subject to a successful outcome of negotiations between Israel and the Arab States. There could be no justification for ignoring the resolutions already adopted by the General Assembly on the Palestine problem and his delegation could not support any resolution which failed to take them into account. He did not feel that the eight-Power draft resolution, even as amended, could provide a basis for direct negotiations between the parties to the dispute, since it did not clarify the subject matter of those negotiations.

14. The four-Power draft resolution, on the other hand, sought a solution to the dispute within the framework of General Assembly resolutions. The Ethiopian delegation would support it in the hope that its adoption would lead to the elimination of the unfortunate conditions prevailing in the Middle East.

15. U KA SI (Burma) said that his delegation desired a peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem and would support any measure tending to promote friendly relations between the parties. After careful consideration, however, his delegation had reached the conclusion that neither of the two draft resolutions before the Committee was likely to lead to a peaceful settlement of the question. While in favour of direct negotiations, he noted that the most important operative paragraph of the eight-Power draft resolution was defective and that the draft seemed to ignore the existing United Nations resolutions. The text had originally been too vague to provide a basis for the desired negotiations. As finally amended, however, the eight-Power draft resolution did provide such a

basis, and the Burmese delegation would accordingly support it.

16. The four-Power draft resolution appeared to be merely a repetition of previous resolutions which had so far failed to produce satisfactory results. His delegation would accordingly abstain from voting on it, and also on the Syrian draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.33).

17. Mr. RAJAN (India) said that the only basis for direct negotiations between parties to the Palestine dispute must be the previous resolutions of the General Assembly on Palestine. His delegation felt that the eight-Power draft resolution, even in its amended form, was inadequate. The principal objectives of the United Nations in Palestine and the resolutions in which those objectives had been embodied should be the basis of the negotiations and not be simply borne in mind. He preferred the language of General Assembly resolution 512 (VI) which urged the parties to settle their differences in conformity with the resolutions of the General Assembly on Palestine. That resolution had been adopted by a large majority.

18. The Indian delegation could not see how constructive negotiations could take place without prejudice to all claims which might be advanced by either party. Given the language of paragraph 4 of the operative part of the draft resolution, Mr. Rajan thought that it might not be without significance that the preamble merely recalled and did not reaffirm the previous resolutions of the United Nations on Palestine. For those reasons, and from the tone of the Committee's debate, it seemed unlikely that the proposals contained in the eight-Power draft resolution could lead to a settlement. In view of the hostility which they had aroused, they might even delay such a settlement. Any solution to the problem would have to be agreed upon rather than imposed.

19. The eight-Power draft resolution made no provision for certain changes, which the Indian delegation would consider desirable, namely, the expansion of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine from three to five members and the transfer of its headquarters to Jerusalem. He believed that those changes would enable the Commission to function more realistically and effectively.

20. The four-Power draft resolution, on the other hand, could be regarded as reaffirming and continuing the policy of the United Nations on the Palestine problem. It provided for the changes in the number of members of the Conciliation Commission and in its working procedure which Mr. Rajan had already advocated as desirable. Although the Commission had little to show for its labours, he did not believe that United Nations policy, which had been evolved in an attempt to reconcile the differences between the parties, was useless or that negotiations based upon it would be barren of result. Until the parties could mutually agree on some other policy, it remained the best available foundation for a settlement. Mr. Rajan would like to see the four-Power draft resolution adopted but he hoped that any draft resolution which the Committee might finally adopt would lead to a restoration of security and stability in an area vital to world peace. The United Nations had a direct and special responsibility for developments in Palestine, and it must be the primary concern of all

Member States to create conditions for the most effective discharge of that responsibility.

21. Mr. SARASIN (Thailand) expressed his appreciation of the efforts made by the sponsors of the eight-Power draft resolution to find a solution to the problem before the Committee. The proposal made by the Mexican representative (37th meeting) had seemed likely to go a long way towards making the draft resolution acceptable to both parties. Unfortunately, however, the Arab States had made it clear that it was not acceptable to them. It might well be, therefore, that the draft resolution would aggravate the problem rather than solve it. In a question where such strong feelings were involved, it was most important that any approach to a solution should be acceptable to both sides. His delegation would therefore be unable to support the eight-Power draft resolution, and would be guided by the same principle in respect to the other draft resolutions before the Committee.

22. Mr. CASTILLO ARRIOLA (Guatemala) said that his delegation had refrained from participating in the general debate because it had felt that it was for the Arab States, on the one hand, and Israel, on the other, to put their differences of opinion before the Committee and initiate direct negotiations with a view to securing a peaceful settlement of the problem. Such a procedure would appear to be the one best calculated to restore peace to that area of the world.

23. The Guatemalan delegation had taken an entirely impartial position in the dispute, and had supported the just claims of both the Arab States and Israel. It had hoped that the proposal for direct negotiations would lead to a possibility of establishing lasting peace in Palestine, and the hope had been strengthened by the announcement of Israel's intention to release the blocked accounts belonging to Arab refugees. It appeared from the debates in the Committee, however, that there was a major obstacle still remaining to peaceful settlement. Direct negotiations presupposed a readiness on both sides to make concessions, and no such concessions had been forthcoming. All efforts had been vain, and the attempt to promote direct negotiations had failed. It must be recognized, however, that the efforts had been made and made in good faith, particularly by the sponsors of the eight-Power draft resolution. The Guatemalan delegation would vote for that draft resolution, in the hope that, if the parties to the dispute later felt able to change their attitude, it would provide a foundation for negotiations.

24. Mr. YIN Pao-Yu (China) had hoped that the Committee might have evolved a compromise text embodying the main ideas of the eight-Power and four-Power draft resolutions and acceptable to both parties. The eight-Power draft resolution, in its final form, was not very different from General Assembly resolution 512 (VI) adopted in January 1952. The main difference between the two texts lay in paragraph 4 of the operative part of the eight-Power draft. It might have been better merely to reaffirm the provisions of the resolution so recently adopted by the General Assembly.

25. Since there appeared to be no objection on the part of either Israel or the Arab States to direct negotiations, Mr. Yin Pao-Yu could not wholly agree with the Netherlands representative's statement at the previous

meeting. Both parties had signified their acceptance of the idea of direct negotiations; the point at issue was on what basis such negotiations should take place. As he saw it, the Arab delegations' main objection to the the revised eight-Power draft resolution was the use of the words "bearing in mind". If that phrase could be changed to read "in conformity with" that draft resolution might prove acceptable to both parties. It would be difficult for his delegation not to give full recognition to previous General Assembly resolutions on the Palestine question, and particularly to resolution 512 (VI).

26. Since one of the parties to the dispute found the eight-Power draft resolution unacceptable, its adoption would serve no useful purpose. The Chinese representative would therefore be unable to support that draft and would vote for the four-Power draft resolution which was merely a reaffirmation of General Assembly resolution 512 (VI).

27. Mr. Juan B. DE LAVALLE (Peru) said that his delegation would abstain from voting on the eight-Power draft resolution as it found unacceptable the words "bearing in mind", contained in paragraph 4 of the operative part.

28. Mr. QUINTANILLA (Mexico) wished, first of all, to make it clear that although his delegation had participated in the efforts of conciliation, it had not submitted any amendments to the eight-Power draft resolution. It had, however, suggested that the draft resolution should be so phrased as to "take into account" previous General Assembly resolutions on Palestine.

29. A solution could be imposed only in the case of armed conflict. Since the purpose of the eight-Power draft resolution was presumably to bring the parties together, the only possible solution was one which would be acceptable to both the Arab States and Israel.

30. It was regrettable that it had not proved possible to find a draft acceptable to both parties, as Mr. Quintanilla did not believe that it was the intention of Israel to disregard previous General Assembly resolutions on Palestine. He could see very little hope of direct negotiations taking place on the basis of a resolution which had been so vehemently rejected by one of the parties.

31. While hoping that if adopted the eight-Power draft resolution would succeed in bringing about a *rapprochement* between the Arab States and Israel, the Mexican delegation would nevertheless be obliged to abstain from voting on it.

32. The CHAIRMAN announced that under rule 130 of the rules of procedure he would put to the vote the three draft resolutions before the Committee in the order in which they had been submitted.

33. Mr. SHUKAIRI (Syria), speaking on a point of order, said that his delegation's draft resolution was of a procedural nature, involving no decision on the substance of the question. Rule 130, which the Chairman had quoted, did not therefore apply to the Syrian draft resolution which did not "relate to the same question". Whereas the other draft resolutions before the Committee contained recommendations, recalled previous resolutions and so forth, his draft resolution merely requested the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on certain legal points. Furthermore, should

the Syrian draft resolution be adopted, no action would be possible on the other draft resolutions until the requested advisory opinion had been received. It was therefore only logical to put his draft resolution to the vote first. Mr. Shukairi was sure that neither the Committee nor the sponsors of the the other draft resolutions would close their minds to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. He therefore requested the Chairman to put his delegation's draft resolution to the vote first.

34. The CHAIRMAN asked the Committee to decide whether the Syrian draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.33) should be voted on first.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Yemen, Afghanistan.

Against: Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Iceland, Israel, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Sweden, Union of South Africa, Uruguay, Belgium.

Abstaining: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Thailand, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Burma.

The proposal to vote first on the Syrian draft resolution was rejected by 21 votes to 13, with 24 abstentions.

35. The CHAIRMAN then called for a vote on the eight-Power draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.23/Rev.4) and said that, at the request of the representative of CHINA, a separate roll-call vote would be taken on paragraph 4 of the operative part.

The first part of the draft resolution, up to and including paragraph 3 of the operative part, was adopted by 34 votes to 11, with 9 abstentions.

36. The CHAIRMAN asked for a separate vote on paragraph 4 of the operative part.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

France, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Israel, Liberia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Sweden, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Australia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador.

Against: India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Yemen, Afghanistan, China, Egypt, Ethiopia.

Abstaining: Greece, Luxembourg, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Argentina, Bel-

gium, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador.

Paragraph 4 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution was adopted by 31 votes to 14, with 13 abstentions.

Paragraph 5, 6 and 7 of the operative part were adopted by 35 votes to 16, with 3 abstentions.

37. The CHAIRMAN called for a vote on the eight-Power draft resolution as a whole.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Israel, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Sweden, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Australia, Brazil, Burma.

Against: Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Yemen, Afghanistan.

Abstaining: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Greece, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Argentina, Belgium.

The draft resolution as a whole (A/AC.61/L.23/Rev.4) was adopted by 32 votes to 13, with 13 abstentions.

38. The CHAIRMAN next asked for a vote on the four-Power draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.25).

The draft resolution was rejected by 27 votes to 14, with 13 abstentions.

39. Mr. ORDONNEAU (France), commenting on the Syrian draft resolution, recalled that his delegation had consistently taken the position that the International Court of Justice had not been created as a United Nations tribunal and had no competence to interpret the Charter or render advisory opinions to the General Assembly, as would be seen from a study of Chapter II of its Statute. Practice had been different, but his Government's position had been in some measure vindicated by the fate of the advisory opinions so rendered. The practice was to be deplored because it compromised the authority of the International Court in purely political questions. Thus, the French delegation was against the Syrian draft resolution on principle.

40. It further objected to the Syrian draft in the interest of the Arab refugees themselves. The special circumstances of the Palestine question had rendered the General Assembly competent to deal with it. If, as the Syrian representative argued, the Assembly was not competent to recommend negotiations between the parties, its competence to settle the refugee question could also be called in question. Carried to its logical conclusion, the argument adduced by the Syrian representative would in fact deprive the refugees of the international protection afforded by a General Assembly resolution and leave them no other recourse than the courts

of Israel. In their interest, therefore, the French delegation would vote against the Syrian draft resolution.

41. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq), recalled that in 1947, the delegations of Iraq, Syria and Cuba were among those which had advocated that the Palestine question should be referred to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. The vote had been close, but the draft resolution had been rejected¹ mainly on the grounds that the issue was political. The position of the movers had been judged correct from the legal point of view by Mr. Hans Kelsen in his book *The Law of the United Nations*. The United Nations had not been competent to adopt General Assembly resolution 181 (II). The force of the law had been opposed to that political action. Politics could not be permitted to supersede legal rights. Arab legal rights were continued to be disregarded by the United Nations. The Arab States could renounce those rights on behalf of the refugees. From the human as well as the political point of view, it would be wise to consult the International Court in order to achieve a peaceful settlement based on justice. He appealed to all Member States to unite in seeking such a just peace.

42. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that his delegation would take no part in the manoeuvres and lobbying whereby the United States had been attempting to consolidate a Middle East bloc to be used as a base for aggressive action by the North Atlantic Treaty nations. Such manoeuvres had nothing in common with the interests of the peoples of the area and could hardly be expected to promote the peace which the Soviet Union wished to see restored in that part of the world.

43. The rights of the Arab refugees had been recognized by General Assembly decisions which could not be revised or annulled. There was therefore no need for an opinion from the International Court of Justice. Moreover, it would be incorrect to refer such a political matter to the Court. The USSR delegation would accordingly vote against the Syrian draft resolution.

44. The CHAIRMAN put the Syrian draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.33) to the vote.

The draft resolution was rejected by 23 votes to 13, with 19 abstentions.

45. Mr. SIRI (El Salvador) said that his Government continued to recognize as valid and effective all General Assembly resolutions in force on the Palestine question. It reaffirmed its belief in the right of the refugees to repatriation and compensation under the terms of those resolutions. It particularly supported the validity of the General Assembly proposal to place Jerusalem under a permanent international régime with adequate guarantees for the protection of the Holy Places within and outside of the city in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 181 (II), 194 (III) and 303 (IV).

46. Mr. NINCIC (Yugoslavia) expressed keen disappointment because the Committee had been unable to reach a formula for a peaceful settlement acceptable to all the parties concerned. Nevertheless, he had voted in favour of the eight-Power draft resolution because it indicated the course most likely to conduce to an agreed

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, 32nd meeting.*

settlement without prejudice to the rights and claims of the parties or impairing the validity of existing General Assembly resolutions. The four-Power draft resolution was unacceptable to the Yugoslavian delegation because it advocated a course which had thus far proved fruitless. The Syrian draft resolution was also unacceptable because it would seek a legal opinion in connexion with a problem which was essentially political.

47. Mr. EBAN (Israel) had voted for the eight-Power draft resolution because it recommended a normal method of pacific settlement of differences between sovereign States and placed no unnecessary compulsion on the proposed negotiations. Like other representatives, he would have preferred a more satisfactory wording of certain passages, but as a whole, the draft resolution merited support because it expressed the basic desire of the United Nations for a free and directly negotiated settlement. Israel deeply appreciated the efforts of the eight sponsoring Powers to find a formula compatible with the Charter, harmonizing the various views expressed in the Committee.

48. The draft resolution might bring about significant progress towards peace and stability in the Middle East, an objective for which Israel would continue to strive. Negotiations would bring the parties together to resolve their differences in an atmosphere of goodwill and to find the means of working in association with their neighbours. The draft resolution imposed nothing in favour or against the Governments concerned. The issues outstanding between them remained unsolved. The proposal represented the beginning of a struggle for peace rather than the end of that process. It conferred no privileges; on the contrary, it was a source of heavy obligations for all concerned.

49. Apart from paragraph 4 of the operative part which constituted the core of the draft resolution, Israel attached great importance to paragraph 2 of the operative part calling upon the parties to refrain from acts of hostility. That injunction was of overriding importance before, during and after negotiations.

50. The Government of Israel pledged itself to make every effort to find a procedure which would activate negotiations. Their success would strengthen peace throughout the Middle East.

51. Mr. SHUKAIRI (Syria) had voted against the eight-Power draft resolution because, while it proposed a method of pacific settlement, it destroyed the indispensable basis for any just solution. The Syrian Government would refuse to enter into the proposed negotiations in the absence of a precise injunction to the parties that past General Assembly resolutions should form the substantive basis for them. The subject matter for negotiation included the rights of the refugees which could not be circumscribed or denied by any State. They were not the rights of the United Nations, but of individuals, and they had been recognized by the international community. Similarly, the Syrian Government would refuse to negotiate with Israel the establishment of economic relations between the two countries, as was its right under the Charter.

52. The eight-Power draft resolution would not serve the cause of peace in the Middle East, which had been disrupted by the changes brought about in Palestine by United Nations decisions. That opinion had been echoed in a recent Press interview by the head of the Egyptian Government, General Naguib. He had criticized the Western Powers for supporting Israel and for creating a nation of one million persons which had spoiled relationships among 50 million Arabs. He had expressed distrust of Israel's intentions in view of its repeated violations of United Nations decisions and its refusal to repatriate the Arab refugees. Israel must accept repatriation before it could be considered trustworthy. Egypt had also vigorously opposed the recent agreement between Israel and West Germany because it was designed to strengthen Israel militarily and could have been prevented by the United States if the latter had so desired.

53. Until Israel assumed full responsibility for the implementation of United Nations resolutions, there could be no negotiations.

54. Mr. JONES (Liberia) emphasized that the primary objective of the Committee in relation to the item before it should have been to seek ways and means of implementing past General Assembly resolutions which had outlined the course for a peaceful settlement and instructed the Conciliation Commission for Palestine to bring it about. Where General Assembly directives had not been carried out it should have found out why. The debate had shown that both parties bore responsibility for the unsatisfactory outcome of the Committee's deliberations. Nevertheless, Liberia had voted for the eight-Power draft resolution because in its final form, it actually represented the majority view in the Committee and of the three draft resolutions submitted it offered the best course. Mr. Jones was convinced that if the parties approached negotiations in the proper conciliatory spirit, they could reach a permanent settlement of their differences and bring peace to the Middle East.

Complaint of violation by Arab States of their obligations under the Charter, United Nations resolutions and specific provisions of the general armistice agreements concluded with Israel, requiring them to desist from policies and practices of hostility and to seek agreement by negotiation for the establishment of peaceful relations with Israel (A/2185 and Add.1)

[Item 68]*

55. Mr. EBAN (Israel) suggested that as the item was specifically related to the discussion which had just been completed, he would seek instructions from his Government regarding the necessity of maintaining it in the light of the action taken by the Committee on the previous item. Pending receipt of those instructions, the Committee might proceed to consider the next item on its agenda.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.