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Headquarters, New York

CONTENTS

Chairman: Mr. Alexis KYROU (Greece).

Admission of new Members: (*a*) Status of applications still pending: report of the Security Council (A/2208, A/AC.61/L.30, A/AC.61/L.31, A/AC.61/L.32, A/AC.61/L.35/Rev.1 and Corr.1, A/AC.61/L.36, A/AC.61/L.37, A/AC.61/L.38, A/AC.61/L.39, A/AC.61/L.40) (*continued*)

[Item 19]*

1. The CHAIRMAN said that several documents had just been distributed to the members of the Committee, namely, a United States draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.37), three draft resolutions submitted by France (A/AC.61/L.38, A/AC.61/L.39 and A/AC.61/L.40) and a revised text of the Polish draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.35/Rev.1 and Corr.1) which read as follows:

"*The General Assembly*

"*Requests* the Security Council to reconsider the applications of Albania, the Mongolian People's Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Austria, Ceylon, Nepal and Libya, in order to submit a recommendation on the simultaneous admission of all these States as Members of the United Nations."

2. Mr. FERRER VIEYRA (Argentine) said that his country's position as regards the admission of new Members to the United Nations had always been in keeping with the strictest principles of law, and had been to champion the sovereign powers of the General Assembly, the universality of the Organization, and the legal equality of States. His delegation had noted with satisfaction that an increasingly large number of countries was supporting the idea that the Charter conferred sovereign powers on the General Assembly. The draft resolutions submitted by Peru (A/AC.61/L.30) and by the Central American States (A/AC.61/L.31 and A/AC.61/L.32) gave grounds for hope that the General Assembly itself, after a further study of its prerogatives and powers, might be able to extricate the United Nations from the dead-lock which had been reached. It was impossible for the Organization to represent the community of nations when there were many States which were not members. World public opinion, whose support was so necessary for the success of the United Nations, was already aroused because of the need of universality and the anachronistic nature of the privilege of the veto. The situation was causing the Organization to lose prestige.

3. The procedure for the admission of new Members to the United Nations was laid down in Article 4 of the Charter, and the destiny of the United Nations would be deeply influenced by the interpretation given to that Article and to Article 27, establishing, by the unanimity rule, the privilege of the veto for the five permanent members of the Security Council. He wished to lay particular stress on the phrase "in the judgment of the Organization", occurring in Article 4. That phrase did not mean "in the judgment of the General Assembly" but neither did it mean "in the judgment of the Security Council". The General Assembly had never claimed the faculty of being able of itself to admit a State to membership—that should be a corporate act, requiring the opinion of two United Nations organs: the General Assembly and the Security Council. The competence of each of those organs in formulating the "judgment of the Organization" was dependent upon the powers and functions attributed to each one under the Charter. The Security Council, however, had hitherto erroneously maintained that it was the organ responsible for pronouncing judgment. There was no basis in the Charter for the theory that a favourable recommendation of the Secu-

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

rity Council was an absolute prerequisite for admission or for the theory that the Security Council must take the initiative in the matter. Such contentions were based on purely political considerations. The first formal requirement laid down in the Charter was "the judgment of the Organization"; that was a matter for the Organization itself. The second requirement was the responsibility of the applicant State, which had to fulfil certain conditions laid down in Article 4, paragraph 1. Any State was entitled to submit proof that it had fulfilled those conditions, but the principle of objectivity, which should govern such cases, would be difficult to apply as certain subjective elements would inevitably be introduced into the consideration of such proof.

4. A decision of the General Assembly to admit a State to membership in the United Nations implied the exercise by that organ of its powers of sovereignty, and each Member State retained its full right to vote for or against an application, because the individual sovereignty of each Member State was also involved. That did not mean defending discretionary powers but emphasizing the full right of each State to vote solely on the basis of its own judgment on the matter of whether or not an applicant State should be admitted to membership in the United Nations. If by discretionary powers was meant the right claimed by the Security Council to decide by itself whether or not a State should be admitted to the United Nations, the Argentine delegation would be opposed to such powers as being contrary to the Charter.

5. The principal difficulty in interpreting Article 4 lay in paragraph 2. It was necessary to consider the meaning which the Charter had intended should be attributed to the words "decision" and "recommendation". As it was clear from paragraph 1 that the "judgment of the Organization" was required for the admission of new Members, Mr. Ferrer Vieyra would interpret that as meaning that both the Security Council and the General Assembly should participate in formulating that judgment. Paragraph 2 clearly indicated that the Security Council's task was solely to make a recommendation to the General Assembly and the onus of the Assembly to decide whether or not the application was accepted. No question had been raised as to whether or not the General Assembly was competent to accept or reject a favourable recommendation from the Security Council in connexion with the admission of a State. But when it was suggested that, by the same power of decision, the Assembly could accept or reject a negative recommendation from the Security Council, it was being argued that the Security Council could not make a recommendation on the non-admission of a State, but only on its admission. Such a contention was equivalent to denying the authenticity of the working documents used at the San Francisco Conference and the official records of that Conference.

6. The matter had been especially considered by the Advisory Committee of Jurists and then in Committee II and finally at the plenary meetings of the Conference. The Advisory Committee of Jurists had unanimously been of the opinion that the text of Article 4, paragraph 2, clearly established the power of the General Assembly first to accept or reject the recommendation for the admission of a new Member and, secondly, to accept or reject a recommendation that a State should not be admitted to the United Nations. That point of view was also clearly stated in the report of Committee II.[1] Mr. Ferrer Vieyra added that no representatives had impugned the authenticity of the documents to which he was referring. But certain representatives had stated and continued to state that there could be no negative recommendations as regards the admission of new Members.

7. Referring briefly to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 3 March 1950,[2] the Argentine representative pointed out that an advisory opinion was not binding either on the Security Council or the General Assembly or even on the Court itself. The two judges who had voted against the opinion had stated their views in documents of lasting value, and it should not be forgotten that it might be possible for the Court to change its opinion and move towards an interpretation more closely in keeping with the records of the San Francisco Conference.

8. Mr. Ferrer Vieyra wondered whether any conclusion by the Security Council transmitted to the General Assembly and referring to the admission or non-admission of new Members, might not be taken as constituting a recommendation. Once the Security Council had had the opportunity to consider an application for membership, it might be held that it had participated to the extent required by the Charter in formulating the judgment of the Organization. In any case, its opinion, whether favourable or unfavourable, had to be transmitted to the General Assembly, which was responsible for making a decision. If a case arose in which the Security Council refrained from giving any opinion, even if that were contrary to the Charter, the General Assembly might accept on its own initiative the application for admission from the State concerned, because the "judgment of the Organization" might be reached by a favourable recommendation from the Council, by an unfavourable recommendation or even if the Council abstained from making either recommendation. Mr. Ferrer Vieyra wondered what would happen if all five permanent members of the Security Council voted for the admission of a State, but that application still failed to obtain the seven votes required for a favourable recommendation on account of the negative votes of the non permanent members. The problem before the Committee was in essence to determine what constituted a favourable recommendation. It had already been accepted that if seven favourable votes were obtained, including the votes of the five permanent members, the recommendation was favourable and the same applied to a majority of seven votes with one permanent member abstaining. The difficulty arose when one permanent member voted against the admission of a State to the United Nations. Would that mean that the permanent member had vetoed the recommendation in accordance with the privilege conferred upon it by Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter?

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[1] See *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization*, II/1/39.

[2] See *Competence of the General Assembly for the admission of a State to the United Nations. Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1950*, p. 4.

9. It was a well known fact that Argentina had always considered the inclusion of the right of veto in the Charter as a step backward in international law. Once the veto had been incorporated in the Charter, its application should have been strictly limited. In that connexion, the Argentine delegation fully supported the statements already made by the representative of El Salvador (42nd and 43rd meetings). The veto could not be used to violate the Charter itself. It was not applicable in the case of decisions relating to the admission of new Members where the General Assembly and the Security Council had concurrent powers but where the General Assembly was responsible for making the final decision while the Council's sole duty was to make recommendations. To admit the use of the veto in such cases would be to recognize that the power of decision which was concentrated in the General Assembly was also vested in the Security Council. That procedure had been followed hitherto on the basis of an erroneous interpretation by the Security Council and by the General Assembly which the Organization was not obliged under the Charter to continue to follow. Furthermore, Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter referred to a procedural matter and the veto was consequently not applicable. That question was both substantive and procedural: its substantive character was covered by Article 4, paragraph 1, which enumerated certain conditions which must be fulfilled in order to obtain membership in the United Nations and which required the "judgment of the Organization" in that connexion.

10. One of the questions which should be considered by the special committee envisaged in the draft resolution of the five Central American States was whether the recommendation of the Security Council on the admission of new Members was a procedural matter in view of the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter. His delegation would vote for that draft resolution.

11. In conclusion, the Argentine representative reiterated his Government's opinion that the United Nations should endeavour to become more universal in character.

12. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) referring to certain comments which had been made in the Committee, said that the opinions expressed by delegations classified them in two groups: a positive and a negative group. Under the first group he would classify all delegations which were genuinely concerned to find a solution to the serious problem of the admission of new Members and were accordingly prepared to discuss the various points of view held and to see the question submitted to careful consideration. In the second group he would place those delegations which adhered firmly to a purely political interpretation directed towards excluding a large number of States from membership in the United Nations. The question should therefore be discussed but the General Assembly was not the appropriate place. It was preferable to set up a special committee which would have more time to consider the different aspects of the question.

13. Mr. Urquía felt that the representative of Poland (43rd meeting) had carefully avoided discussing the substance of a theory which had been held by well known legal experts and which was familiar to the United Nations. He had quoted and commented upon the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 3 March 1950, and in doing so had, in the speaker's opinion, distorted the underlying conceptions of that opinion. He had rightly held that the Court had stated that a Security Council recommendation was necessary for the admission of a new Member to the United Nations, but his mistake lay in going on to affirm that the Court had stated that the rule of unanimity was applicable to the admission of new Members. Mr. Urquía quoted the text of the Court's advisory opinion as a proof that the Polish representative was mistaken. The terms of the original request for an advisory opinion would imply that in the event of an unfavourable vote by one of the permanent members of the Security Council, there would be no recommendation. The Court had therefore merely been asked to determine whether the General Assembly could decide to admit a State when the Security Council had not submitted a recommendation. Mr. Urquía thought that the Court's opinion was clear on that point.

14. Commenting on the draft resolution of the five Central-American States submitted at the General Assembly's sixth session (A/C.1/708), the USSR representative had maintained (44th meeting) that the International Court of Justice should not be asked for an opinion because the question was of a political nature. It would appear that the delegations of the USSR and Poland held divergent views on the subject, as the Polish representative had sought to base his arguments on the Court's advisory opinion which, in the view of the USSR delegation, did not seem to be valid in connexion with the question under discussion. The USSR representative had also suggested, in commenting on the statement of the United States representative, that the United States considered the United Nations Charter as a scrap of paper. He felt that such an attitude might rather be attributed to the USSR which had made a very cursory reference to the statement made at the San Francisco Conference on 7 June 1945[3] which was the fundamental basis of the draft resolution submitted by the four Central American States. The USSR representative had referred very briefly to that draft resolution and had alleged repeatedly that it was based on an absurdity. He had, however, refrained from demonstrating what that absurdity was. Mr. Urquía hoped that any other speakers who shared the view of the USSR would be prepared to deal with the substance of the draft resolutions before the Committee and would not confine themselves to bare statements which could only prove that they had no arguments with which to oppose those on which the draft resolutions were based.

15. The USSR representative had said that it was agreed at the San Francisco Conference that no particular United Nations body should be given any special authority to interpret the Charter; that was true, but it must be understood and explained in order that its consequences might not be distorted. No particular body of the United Nations was empowered to inter-

[3] See *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization*, III/1/37 (1).

pret the Charter in such a way that its interpretation was binding on the United Nations as a whole, but it must be clear that each organ of the United Nations was, within its competence, naturally empowered to interpret the Charter in so far as the discharge of its own functions were concerned. There had been no intention in the draft resolution of the four Central American States to allow the General Assembly to make its interpretation of Articles 4 and 27 of the Charter binding on any other organ. It was merely suggested—and Mr. Urquía did not think it could be denied—that the General Assembly, acting within its competence in regard to the admission of new Members, was empowered to apply and interpret the Charter under its own responsibility.

16. The USSR representative had concluded his statement by accusing the representatives of Peru and El Salvador of doing propaganda. Mr. Urquía felt that such charges should be made rather against States which used the United Nations for purposes of propaganda rather than against countries which were trying to deal seriously with problems and which, in any event, had no desire to impose their theories on other peoples.

17. Turning to the constructive proposals for solving the question of the admission of new Members, he recalled the United States representative's statement (43rd meeting) that the great Powers had solemnly undertaken in San Francisco to use the veto only in really exceptional cases. Four of those Powers had honoured their solemn undertaking, while the fifth, the USSR had made the exception the rule. The pledge had been embodied in the statement of 7 June 1945, one of the fundamental documents of the United Nations in the opinion of the late Judge Azevedo, a member of the International Court of Justice who had issued a dissenting opinion when the Court issued its advisory opinion of 3 March 1950 on the question of the admission of new Members. The statement of 7 June 1945 had considerable weight, especially in the light of Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Charter whereby Member States pledged themselves to fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them under the Charter.

18. It had been stated that the USSR had abused its veto privilege. That statement was true because even if it were argued that there existed an unrestricted right of veto, the Soviet Union had, in connexion with the admission of new Members, voted against the unanimous opinion of all the members of the Council. Moreover, El Salvador and certain other countries did not consider the veto applicable to the question of membership. That was why they felt that the USSR had in fact abused its privilege. The United Kingdom representative would note that as, in the view of the delegation of El Salvador, no permanent member was constitutionally entitled to use the veto in the question of the admission of new Members, the exercise of the right of veto in such cases would always be considered abusive.

19. The position of the United States was constructive in that it supported the draft resolution of the five Central-American States (A/AC.61/L.32) calling for inter-sessional study of the membership problem and a report on the results of that study to be submitted to the General Assembly's eighth session.

20. In order to dispel what appeared to be a slight misunderstanding of the Salvadorean position on the part of the United Kingdom representative (44th meeting), Mr. Urquía emphasized that his delegation did not wish to abolish the veto; it wished, on the contrary, to maintain it, provided its applicability was limited as pledged by the great Powers in San Francisco. Moreover, the sponsors of the draft resolution of the four Central-American States would be prepared to revise their position if the United Kingdom representative demonstrated to them that the statement of 7 June 1945 actually afforded no basis for the belief that the veto was not applicable to the admission of new Members. He had not so far done so. A review of the first two paragraphs of the statement of 7 June 1945 showed that the questions on which the Security Council was to vote had been grouped in two categories. The first category included questions requiring the adoption of measures for the settlement of disputes or situations likely to give rise to disputes, measures regarding threats to the peace or breaches of the peace. Decisions on all those questions were to be subject to the veto and required the affirmative vote of seven members of the Security Council including the five permanent members. The second category included matters which did not require the adoption of such measures and decisions on them could be taken by the affirmative vote of any seven members. The admission of new Members could certainly not be characterized as a matter falling in the first category. And it was to that category only that the veto was applicable. The first paragraph of the statement of 7 June 1945 clearly stated that in all questions other than those included in the first category a "procedural vote" was applicable. While the enumeration of questions in the first category had been exhaustive, the matters listed in the second category had merely been given as examples of the type of question to which the "procedural vote" rather than the veto should apply. There was no reason why the admission of new Members should not be added to that second group as it was related to the Security Council's procedure and could certainly not qualify for inclusion in the first category, which dealt exclusively with questions related to the maintenance of peace and security.

21. That interpretation of the Charter provisions on the admission of new Members formed the basis of the draft resolution of the four Central American States. It was not an original interpretation; it merely reproduced the terms in which the great Powers, by their statement of 7 June 1945, had understood the voting procedure in the Security Council. They had made that statement in order to reassure the small States and win acceptance of the veto privilege by the majority of the delegations at the San Francisco Conference. The soundness of the Salvadorean contention was further borne out by various statements by representatives of the great Powers in Committee III at San Francisco. They had emphasized the importance of the agreement embodied in the statement of 7 June 1945; they had stated that it was the result of a compromise and had urged other nations to place

their confidence in them. The representative of Greece,[4] reflecting the general view of the small States, had stressed that without the unanimity of the great Powers, the Organization would not survive; for that reason, and in the conviction that the great Powers were well-intentioned and would exercise their right of veto as rarely as possible, the Greek Government had accepted the voting procedure which had been proposed. Thus the smaller States, confident that the veto would only be used to the mutual advantage of all Members of the United Nations, had signed the San Francisco Charter.

22. It was clear from the statements of their representatives that Cuba, Egypt (44th meeting) and Argentina also favoured constructive action on the membership problem designed to increase the universality of the United Nations. El Salvador was gratified by their support of the draft resolution of the Central American States and by the knowledge that they shared the desire of those countries to open the door of the United Nations to many deserving States whose entrance was being barred by the will of a single State.

23. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) felt that the problem regarding the admission of new Members had originated in the tension which characterized the relations among the great Powers and was not likely to be resolved effectively until that tension had been eased. It must also be recognized that so long as the veto privilege existed and any one of the permanent members of the Security Council wished to exercise it, the United Nations was legally powerless to prevent its use in cases of application for membership. The South African delegation could not accept any proposal which was not wholly compatible with the Charter or which sought to modify the Charter by interpretation. For all those reasons, and in the light of past experience in the Main Committees of the General Assembly and in the Interim Committee, his delegation approached the dilemma on the admission of new Members with a sense of frustration. It would vote without enthusiasm in favour of the draft resolution of the five Central American States establishing a special committee to study the question in the hope that such a study might be useful.

24. Mr. Jordaan agreed that the USSR had been abusing its veto privilege in cases of applications for membership. It had admitted that certain States fulfilled the criteria laid down in Article 4 regarding membership eligibility, but had made their admission conditional on the admission of other States which had not been deemed eligible by the majority either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly. Thus it had favoured the admission of Italy and Finland as part of a "package" admission, but had rejected their applications when they were considered separately. Such contradictory actions gave cause to doubt the good faith of the USSR. It was the view of the South African delegation that each applicant for membership had the right to have the merits of its case decided separately. Accordingly, he would vote against the Polish draft resolution on those grounds, and also because it included States whose peace-loving intentions were open to doubt. On the other hand, he would vote in favour of the United States draft resolution regarding the admission of Japan.

25. Mr. LORIDAN (Belgium) said that his delegation approved the suggestion contained in the draft resolution of the five Central American States to establish a special committee to consider the question of the admission of new Members, as also of its proposed terms of reference.

26. Belgium was gratified to be one of the countries chosen to serve on the proposed committee, and would gladly do so.

27. The Belgian delegation would vote against the Polish draft resolution as it treated with levity the provisions of the Charter dealing with the admission of new Members.

28. Mr. RODRIGUEZ FABREGAT (Uruguay) remarked that of all the proposals which had been submitted on the question of the admission of new Members, he would be inclined to support the draft resolution of the five Central-American States which proposed that the problem should be referred to a special committee.

29. The Uruguayan delegation's position on that and related problems was unchanged, although it had abstained from voting on the various proposals on the matter at the General Assembly's sixth session, as it had felt that none of those proposals provided a proper solution. Indeed, his delegation had pointed out at the time that the principle of universality, which his country had championed ever since the San Francisco Conference, could be applied only if a better understanding could be reached among the Members of the United Nations.

30. Referring to the United States representative's recent statement (43rd meeting), Mr. Rodriguez Fabregat observed that that representative approached the question of universality with realism when he stated that the United Nations needed the energy, enthusiasm and collective strength and wisdom which the new Members would bring to the Organization, while they, in turn, needed to become Members of the United Nations so that they could contribute to the work of promoting world peace. Between their desire to enter the United Nations and their actual admission, however, stood the veto. It was, therefore, all the more necessary to deal with the problem as it involved the voting procedure in the Security Council.

31. A variety of views had been expressed in the Committee regarding the right of veto. The United States representative, for example, had maintained that the veto was meant to be used only in very exceptional cases and not, as had been done by the USSR, in regard to the admission of new Members. The United Kingdom representative had gone even further and had submitted that the abolition of the veto instead of promoting the principle of universality might even militate against it. The USSR delegation, on the other hand, was not only firmly opposed to the abolition of the right of veto but indeed made frequent use of it in the Security Council.

32. Thus the problem before the Committee was extremely complex and the suggestion of the sponsors

[4] *Ibid.*, III/1/47.

of the draft resolution of the five Central American States was both wise and timely. That there was need of such a discussion was also shown when the Interim Committee dealt with the matter. It would be a mistake, for the moment, to discuss the substance of the problem or its various aspects, since it would be a departure from the Committee's past approach to the matter. Furthermore, such a procedure would involve a detailed analysis of all the legal aspects of the question and would necessitate a study of the meetings at the San Francisco Conference which, though not without their errors, had given birth to the United Nations Charter which was now a part of the law on which the Organization was based. Another reason for referring the problem, which warranted further study, to a special committee, was the time factor.

33. Mr. Rodriguez Fabregat wished however to submit several suggestions to the sponsors of the five-Power draft resolution. First, there was no absolute need to list in the draft resolution itself the countries which would make up the proposed committee; secondly, it might be desirable to enlarge the proposed committee's composition; and thirdly, it would be preferable for the members of the special committee to be elected in plenary session or appointed by the President of the General Assembly.

34. The special committee, if established, would consider in addition to the draft resolutions under discussion the historical and legal background material. It would also deal with any comments from Member States and would consider both past and present suggestions, bearing in mind the Organization's development and work. It would consider the draft resolution of the four Central American States and the substance of the Peruvian draft with which his delegation was, generally speaking, in agreement. The special committee should further be guided by the views advanced in the general debate and should bear in mind all the changes which had taken place since the San Francisco Conference as well as the fact that so many peace-loving nations were awaiting the opportunity to co-operate with the United Nations in promoting world progress.

35. Mr. Chieh LIU (China) thought it regrettable that the United Nations had had to seek a solution year after year for the important and urgent question of the admission of new Members. The blame for that lay with the Soviet Union which had used the veto no less than twenty-eight times as an instrument to thwart the purpose and function of the United Nations.

36. The Chinese delegation's position on that matter was clear. Far from using the veto, it had supported the applications of all the States whose admission it had believed would strengthen the solidarity of the free peoples of the world. In the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee (17th meeting) at the General Assembly's third session, it had also supported the Interim Committee's recommendation that the permanent members of the Security Council should agree among themselves not to use the veto in regard to the admission of new Members.

37. Referring to the draft resolutions before the Committee, Mr. Chieh Liu said that the Polish draft resolution was nothing short of political horse-trading. Some representatives, however, had been inclined to accept some form of "package" deal in the interests of universality.

38. While agreeing that universality, which was the Organization's ultimate goal, was desirable, it could not and should not be achieved at the expense of solidarity. Since the United Nations primary purpose was the preservation of peace and security, the primary responsibility for many decisions had been placed on the Security Council. That was why the Charter contained certain provisions permitting the suspension and expulsion of Members who had persistently violated the Charter.

39. It was hardly likely that the admission of States which had, through their actions and policies, demonstrated their unwillingness to fulfil the objectives of the Charter would contribute towards the Organization's effectiveness. As the Chinese representative had said on a previous occasion (396th plenary meeting), his delegation did not subscribe to the theory that any State applying for membership should be admitted forthwith. On the contrary, some States were definitely precluded from membership because they were either puppets of another Power, and could not therefore be properly called independent, or because the nature and policy of their government was such that they could not be described as peace-loving. That was why his Government was strongly opposed to the Polish draft resolution or any other so-called "package" deal.

40. The Peruvian representative's contention (42nd meeting) that by proposing the so-called "package" deal the Soviet Union had in fact given its affirmative recommendation to certain non-Communist States, and that the General Assembly could, therefore, proceed to a vote on the individual applications on the basis of that interpretation, had a great deal to be said for. But the matter was even simpler. The point at issue was not the right to or the use of the veto by the permanent members of the Security Council, but rather its illegal use. The USSR had vetoed the recommendations on the admission of new Members not on the basis of Article 4 of the Charter but on the grounds that the satellite Powers which it had sponsored had not been included in those recommendations. Such a veto was illegal and could therefore be considered invalid. That argument and the arguments in support of the Peruvian draft resolution and the draft resolution of the four Central-American States revolved around the interpretation of the effect of the use of the veto in the Security Council. As those juridical interpretations needed careful consideration, the draft resolution of the five Central-American States, for which he would vote, offered the best solution, namely, the establishment of a special committee to study the question.

41. The Chinese delegation had already intimated its intention in the Security Council (603rd meeting) to support the application of Vietnam, proposed by France. Vietnam was now among the nations valiantly resisting aggression. Like Korea, it symbolized the United Nations determination to resist aggression and lawlessness.

42. Although China had been at war with Japan for many years, it had come to realize that after a period of Allied occupation, Japan had qualified to join the other peace-loving nations in helping to bring stability to the Far East. Moreover, it had concluded peace treaties with practically all the Allies, including China. It had further proved its willingness and ability to meet the obligations of the Charter in its dealings with the United Nations specialized agencies. The Chinese delegation would therefore support the United States draft resolution on the admission of Japan to the United Nations.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.

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