

that UNCTAD would be able to establish useful co-operation with GATT in that field. UNCTAD had also assisted IMF in the important work it was currently undertaking. Furthermore, UNCTAD had convened an important conference in Geneva which was expected to prepare, by the end of 1973, a universally acceptable code of conduct for liner conferences, which, for the first time, would have regard to the interests of all countries. It should also be noted that UNCTAD was participating in the preparation of the charter of economic rights and duties of States; it would have to ask for additional funds for that purpose, and that request would eventually be submitted to the Fifth Committee. UNCTAD was also concerned with the situation of the least developed countries and the landlocked countries, which had to overcome special difficulties and deserved preferential treatment from the international community.

77. UNCTAD fully understood that the financial difficulties of the United Nations made economies necessary, even in priority areas, and it would make every effort to carry out its activities within the limits of the funds available. But it must not be forgotten that its activities were expanding, in accordance with the wishes of the

member States, which had entrusted it with additional tasks. On the manning table there were less than one third of the vacancies there had been in 1972. UNCTAD needed some additional posts. It must have an adequate basis for carrying out its work programme, and needed to have some flexibility. In conclusion he said that he was now actively engaged with the Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management in working out a formula that would enable UNCTAD to achieve its aims.

78. The CHAIRMAN thanked the Secretary-General of UNCTAD for having addressed the Fifth Committee before leaving and expressed his regret that Mr. Pérez-Guerrero would be unable to be present for the discussion of section 14 of the programme budget. It was because of the exceptional circumstances that a departure had been made, with the agreement of the Chairman of the Advisory Committee, from the normal practice, whereby the latter introduced each of the budget sections.

[See the note following paragraph 60 above.]

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.

1604th meeting

Tuesday, 20 November 1973, at 10.50 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. C. S. M. MSELLE (United Republic of Tanzania).

A/C.5/SR.1604

AGENDA ITEM 109

Financing of the United Nations Emergency Force established pursuant to Security Council resolution 340 (1973): report of the Secretary-General (*continued*): (A/9285, A/9314, A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1, A/C.5/L.1134, A/C.5/L.1135, A/C.5/L.1136)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the list of speakers on agenda item 109 would be closed at 1 p.m. that day. As the Committee was running almost 10 days behind the programme of work which it had established, a night meeting had been scheduled.

2. On the preceding day, he had taken the decision to adjourn the meeting because he had considered that that was the best thing to do in the circumstances. As recommended in annex V of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly with regard to the exercise of the right of reply, he intended to invite the representatives of Israel, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Egypt to speak at the end of the night meeting. He hoped that, with the co-operation of all members of the Committee, it would be possible to respect the principles governing the exercise of the right of reply, which he had recalled on the preceding day. Because of the special nature of the question under consideration, he realized that it was sometimes difficult to confine remarks to its financial aspects, but he again urged

representatives exercising their right of reply to limit themselves to replying to the specific points raised in the statements to which they were referring.

3. Mr. ZIEHL (Acting Head, Office of Financial Services) replied in the affirmative to the representative of Ghana, who had asked at the preceding meeting whether a per diem allowance would be paid to members of the Emergency Force, as it had been for members of the first United Nations Emergency Force and during the Congo operation. The allowance had then been fixed at 86 cents per day or the equivalent in local currency, and it had been specified that its purpose had been not to compensate for differences between the pay and allowances given by the different Member States to their armed forces but simply to enable members of the Force to meet their personal and recreational needs, as had been indicated in paragraph 12 of the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions issued in 1956 under the symbol A/3402.¹ As stated by the representative of Ghana, there was no such allowance for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, but it had been considered that in the case of the Emergency Force in the Middle East the conditions of service were different enough to justify payment of the allowance.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Annexes*, agenda item 66.

4. When the Secretary-General had submitted an estimate of \$30 million for the expenses of the Force, he had had very little time to prepare his calculations and had based them essentially on the comparable expenses incurred for the Cyprus operation. Since at the outset the Emergency Force had consisted of contingents transferred from Cyprus, the question of the per diem allowance had not arisen immediately. It had subsequently been calculated that an allowance of 1 dollar per day per man would require an amount of \$1 million for the first six months. The Secretary-General would not take a final decision on the amount, however, until he had received all the figures which he needed to make an accurate estimate. The amount of \$30 million was a first estimate, and the Secretary-General would very likely have to submit a revised estimate which could incorporate the amount corresponding to the payment to members of the Emergency Force of the per diem allowance which was decided upon.

5. Mr. CLELAND (Ghana) requested that the Fifth Committee's report should duly record the fact that the representative of the Secretary-General had indicated that the United Nations would assume responsibility for the payment of the per diem allowance.

6. In addition, he formally proposed that, in order to accelerate the work of the Committee, representatives should exercise their right of reply not at the end of the night meeting but at the end of the consideration of agenda item 109.

7. The CHAIRMAN recalled that he had indicated at the beginning of the meeting how he had intended to organize the work and that there had been no objection to his proposals. The Ghanaian representative's proposal could be discussed at the following meeting, when a list had been made of the delegations wishing to exercise their right of reply.

8. Mr. CLELAND (Ghana) said that he had not been present at the beginning of the meeting. He accepted the Chairman's suggestion.

9. Mr. MARTIN (Spain) said that Security Council resolution 340 (1973), which established the Emergency Force, raised two important issues: the amount of appropriations necessary and the proportion in which each Member State should contribute to the financing of the Force.

10. His delegation had studied the reports of the Secretary-General (A/9285) and of the Advisory Committee (A/9314), which had recommended acceptance of the Secretary-General's estimate in the amount of \$30 million for the cost of the Force during the six-month period from 25 October 1973 to 24 April 1974. The Advisory Committee had also recommended that the Secretary-General should be authorized to enter into commitments at a rate not exceeding \$5 million per month during the period 25 April to 31 October 1974 inclusive, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond the initial period of six months. His delegation would support those recommendations.

11. With regard to the share of the costs to be paid by each Member State, his delegation had studied very

carefully draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1, which had been introduced by the representative of Brazil and was sponsored by a number of delegations. The Spanish delegation paid a tribute to the sponsors of the text, who had succeeded in striking a delicate balance by endeavouring to apply the principles set out in resolution 1874 (S-IV) of 27 June 1963, with the exception of one principle, to which he would refer. It was also glad that the principle of the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council was being put into practice for the first time. Spain had always maintained that, since Articles 23 and 27 of the Charter conferred rights and special functions on certain countries, those countries should also contribute in a special manner to the financing of peace-keeping operations. At the eleventh session, the Spanish delegation had stated at the 545th meeting of the Fifth Committee on 6 December 1956, that there were two considerations governing the apportionment of the expenses of the Force: namely, that the maintenance of peace concerned all members of the international community; and that certain Powers, by virtue of Article 23 of the Charter, played a preponderant part in the maintenance of international peace and security. The draft resolution under consideration respected those two principles and, in view of the delicate balance achieved in the text, his delegation would support it.

12. Nevertheless, it saw no valid reason to ignore the fifth of the principles recognized by General Assembly resolution 1874 (S-IV), which stated:

“Where circumstances warrant, the General Assembly should give special consideration to the situation of any Member States which are victims of, and those which are otherwise involved in, the events or actions leading to a peace-keeping operation.”

It would therefore vote for the amendment submitted by Cuba and Yemen (A/C.5/L.1135).

13. Mr. McCARTHY (Australia) said that his delegation had co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1 in the belief that it represented a basis for the financing of the Force which was practical, viable and acceptable to the great majority of States Members. Australia hoped that the question would be solved quickly and as satisfactorily as possible. He announced that the Australian Government would make an advance cash contribution to the costs of the Force.

14. It was the Security Council which had decided to establish the Emergency Force, whose composition—or at least the composition of its nucleus—had already been determined, as had its objective, which was to preserve the cease-fire and to keep the peace. The Fifth Committee simply had to decide how the cost of the Force was to be apportioned between Member States as equitably as possible. When the Security Council had adopted its resolutions 338 (1973), 339 (1973), 340 (1973) and 341 (1973), it had not sought to ascribe blame for the initiation of fighting on 6 October. That was particularly true of resolutions 340 (1973) and 341 (1973), in which the Council had decided to establish the Emergency Force and had defined its mandate. It was in that spirit that the Fifth Committee should try to apportion the costs on a basis

which took account of the capacity to pay of Member States and which rejected all extraneous considerations. His delegation accordingly appealed to all members to help the Committee to ensure that agreement on the financing of the Force was reached quickly and with a minimum of dispute. Like Security Council resolutions 340 (1973) and 341 (1973), the draft resolution before the Committee was the culmination of a process of lengthy and often difficult consultations, during which all parties had had the opportunity of expressing their views, which had always been taken into account. The text had been drafted only after the sponsors had satisfied themselves that it was as close as possible to a consensus.

15. The Australian delegation, for its part, had hoped that the costs of the Force could be apportioned according to the scale of assessments used for the regular expenses of the United Nations. It would also have preferred a more specific reference to the concept of collective responsibility. But, like its co-sponsors, it had made concessions so that agreement could be reached on a text which would enable the great majority of Members to agree to pay the costs of the Force, without regard to the political issues which had bedevilled the cause of peace in the Middle East for so long. His delegation believed that the draft resolution took into account, in as complete a manner as possible, all the political and economic considerations which had been raised. It avoided ascription of blame. It was designed to solve a problem and not to give rise to further problems. The Australian delegation therefore urged the members of the Committee not to incorporate in the text amendments which, like those proposed, would if adopted prejudice the offer from the Australian Government that he had mentioned at the beginning of his statement.

16. Mr. AL-KHAYAT (Iraq) said that his country had always called upon the Security Council to take effective measures to ensure a just and permanent settlement in the Middle East. Iraq had always advocated a policy of strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations and to provisions of the Charter, including the principle of non-acquisition of territories by force and the principle of self-determination of peoples. Those principles were respected by the vast majority of the Member States. The continued occupation of the Arab territories by Israel was a violation of those principles and yet those who believed in them were being asked to overlook them in the present situation, in the hope that with the passage of time Israel's aggressions and colonial expansionism might be forgotten and tacitly condoned. The Organization and its very foundations were thus threatened by the intransigence and defiance of a racist expansionist régime, aided and abetted in its imperialist policies by one of the permanent members of the Security Council. Instead of complying with the provisions of numerous United Nations resolutions and fulfilling the conditions which were the basis of its admission to the Organization, Israel had grown increasingly contemptuous of the United Nations and all it stood for.

17. The task of the Emergency Force should be to counter aggression rather than simply to observe cease-fire lines, if it was to maintain the sanctity of the principles of the Charter. Were it to counter aggression and help to maintain the territorial integrity of States threatened by an aggressor,

were it to restore the usurped rights of a people living in exile or under foreign occupation, Iraq might have contributed generously towards meeting its expenses. Moreover, in view of the present assigned tasks of the Force, his delegation believed that Israel and its mentor, the United States of America, should bear those expenses. As the task of the Force was to observe cease-fire lines inside sovereign Arab States, his delegation would abstain from participating in the voting on draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1.

18. Mr. AL-HUSSAMY (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the report of the Secretary-General made reference to General Assembly resolution 1874 (S-IV) of 27 June 1963, which set forth principles to serve as guidelines for the sharing of the costs of future peace-keeping operations. Paragraph 1 (e) of the resolution stated that: where circumstances warranted, the General Assembly should give special consideration to the situation of any Member States which were victims of, and those which were otherwise involved in, the events or actions leading to a peace-keeping operation. In accordance with that principle, his delegation believed that the victim Member States should be exempted from any financial responsibility arising from expenditure relating to such peace-keeping operations, in order not to treat victims and aggressors on an equal basis.

19. Because of the Israeli aggression, the Syrian Arab Republic had suffered heavy losses as a result of the raids launched on the ports of Latakia and Tartus, the refinery at Homs, electricity stations in Damascus and Homs, the sugar factory at Homs, the plywood factory near Latakia and many civilian areas in Damascus. Furthermore, the Syrian Arab Republic had had to ensure the needs of daily life for thousands of Syrians driven out from their villages by the aggressor. Only recently, and after the cease-fire, Israeli soldiers had plundered the crops, stores and houses in newly occupied Syrian villages, loading their loot on to military trucks in sight of the United Nations observers. All those losses had come on top of the losses suffered by the Syrian Arab Republic because of the Israeli aggression of 1967, six years of occupation of one of the richest parts of its territory, and the expulsion of more than 120,000 inhabitants out of their homes, making of them a new category of displaced persons, whose right to return had been fully recognized by United Nations resolutions but never permitted to operate by the Israeli authorities. Those circumstances warranted the giving of special consideration to a victim Member State and that special consideration justified total exemption when the victim was one of the economically less developed countries.

20. His delegation had hoped that draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1 would take into consideration all the principles mentioned in resolution 1874 (S-IV) and would not single out the principle mentioned in paragraph 1 (e), which was no less important than the others and was an integral part of the resolution. It was unfortunate to note that the international community was once again to bear a heavy burden in order to restore peace and security in the Middle East. That was the responsibility of the aggressor and justice would be done only when the aggressor paid the price for its flagrant defiance of international law and justice. The Syrian Arab Republic had paid not only in hard currency for the construction of the ports and industrial installations destroyed by Israel but also in blood for the

defense of its territorial integrity, its sovereignty and independence, and that was why it expected support and sympathy from the international community. After all, it was the very Charter that Syria was defending.

21. Mr. ÇOMO (Albania) recalled that when the General Assembly at its 2161st plenary meeting on 31 October decided, on the recommendation of the General Committee, to include the question of the financing of the Emergency Force in the agenda of the session, the Albanian delegation had clearly expressed its position on the matter. It wished to point out that the question of the creation of a United Nations Emergency Force, and its financing, had been discussed long ago in the General Assembly, and contradictions had been expressed. At previous sessions of the General Assembly, and in particular during the nineteenth session, the Albanian delegation had expressed its point of view on the subject. The People's Republic of Albania had objected in the past and was objecting now to the creation of an emergency force. In the existing political circumstances, when it was well known that the imperialist Powers had attempted to use the United Nations Force in the interest of their policies, it was understandable that that Force had not served the purposes of the Charter but, in violation of the principles of the Charter, had brutally interfered in the internal affairs of the countries to which it had been sent, thus violating their sovereignty, and in the final analysis had served to implement the policy dictated by the imperialist Powers, in particular by the United States of America. For those reasons, the People's Republic of Albania had never contributed to the financing of that Force.

22. The matter now before the Fifth Committee, namely, the recommendation, contained in document A/9285, that the expenses of maintaining the Emergency Force should be borne by all Member States, was not purely a financial one but was a political question.

23. It was well known that on 6 October Israel, with the support of the United States, had launched another attack against Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic. The two super-Powers, under the pretext of establishing a cease-fire and of securing peace in the Middle East, had, contrary to the most elementary practice and in gross violation of the Charter and the rules of procedure of the Organization, behind the backs of other members of the Security Council and in accordance with their hegemonistic policies, decided everything between themselves, including the question of sending a United Nations Emergency Force to the Middle East, and had forced their will upon the Security Council, without the States members of the Council or any others ever being consulted.

24. The Albanian delegation denounced the political bargaining between the United States and the Soviet Union, which was directed against the interests of the Arab peoples and which violated the principle of the sovereign equality of States. Now, after having covered their deeds under the cloak of the Security Council, the two super-Powers had presented the Member States with a fait accompli and put them in a situation where they were asked to approve expenses required for the financing of the Force. The Albanian delegation resolutely rejected such a practice and

considered illegal any action taken by the two super-Powers in connexion with the Force.

25. The financing of the Emergency Force by all Member States was unjust and the People's Republic of Albania would not contribute to it in any way. It was unacceptable that the burden of the expenses arising as a result of military aggression against two States Members of the Organization—Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic—should be imposed on States which had always resolutely opposed that aggression and had strongly condemned the Zionist Israeli aggressors and their defenders.

26. The Albanian delegation fully understood the concern felt by peace-loving Member States about the situation in the Middle East and would like to assure them that Albania would always stand together with them in supporting the just cause of the brotherly Arab peoples against imperialist Israeli aggression.

27. Mr. NAUDY (France) said that his delegation wished first of all to stress the new context in which the Committee would be adopting recommendations to give effect to Security Council resolution 340 (1973) and to the report of the Secretary-General (S/11052/Rev.1)² on the implementation of that resolution. On the present occasion, the establishment, the composition, the organization and the financing of the Emergency Force were in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and his delegation welcomed that fact.

28. The diligence with which the Secretary-General was implementing the Security Council's resolution, the interest aroused in the international community by the operation now in progress, and the number of States sponsoring draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1, would at least testify that everything possible had been done to face up to the difficulties of the situation.

29. The budget estimates established by the Secretary-General must be read in the light of the report of the Advisory Committee which provided useful explanations on the figures submitted by the Secretary-General. His delegation admitted that, in the circumstances, those fairly approximate estimates had been established on the basis of certain hypotheses and that there were still many unknown factors. That was why it endorsed the Advisory Committee's conclusion that the Secretary-General's cost estimates should be accepted without reductions, since they were very conservative.

30. His delegation was interested in certain other observations in the report of the Advisory Committee. First, there was the question of providing for the expenses of the Force in a special account. It appeared that, although those expenses could be considered as expenses of the Organization under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter, for purely technical reasons it would be better to establish a special account. Secondly, there was an urgent need to provide the Secretary-General with immediate cash resources to meet cash requirements. His Government in-

² *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1973.*

tended to comply with the Secretary-General's appeal. Lastly, there was the question of what constituted the reimbursable "extra and extraordinary costs". That was a delicate problem in view of its political implications and had already been the subject of lengthy studies. However, it deserved closer consideration, as the Advisory Committee had proposed, so that the formulation and introduction of standardized cost factors could be reviewed, with a view to obviating wide discrepancies between the payments made to different participating Governments.

31. His delegation paid tribute to the efforts of all the delegations which had worked on draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1 to reach a compromise that was acceptable to all. Such a spirit of collaboration appeared to be commensurate with the importance of the undertaking and reflected the principle of collective responsibility which must be taken into account when financing peace-keeping operations. However, the compromise text was made up of mutual concessions and could therefore at least give rise to certain reservations if not criticism. His delegation would have been happier if the scale of contributions had been closer to the scale of assessments normally applied, with a special exception made for the least developed countries. Furthermore, although his delegation did not object to the reference, in the preambular part of the draft resolution, to the "special responsibilities of the States permanent members of the Security Council in the financing of such operations", it wished to point out that the permanent members should be able to exercise those responsibilities at all other levels without discrimination. Finally, in his Government's view, the financial arrangements incorporated in the draft resolution should in no way constitute a precedent.

32. Taking those points into account, his delegation could vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1. It hoped that the adoption of the text would contribute to the success of the action decided upon by the Security Council to ensure an effective guarantee of the cease-fire with a view to maintaining lasting peace in the Middle East. His delegation reserved the right to speak again on any amendments to the draft resolution under consideration.

33. Mr. TARDOS (Hungary) said that the renewed fighting in the Middle East, following Israel's stubborn refusal to implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the prolonged occupation of Arab territories invaded by Israel forces in 1967, had prompted the Security Council to decide, in resolution 340 (1973), to constitute a new United Nations Emergency Force. The Fifth Committee must consider the financial implications of that decision, but it was to a certain degree inevitable that it would also deal with the political aspects of the Security Council resolution.

34. His Government considered that the establishment of the new Emergency Force was in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and it was ready to participate in its financing, according to the special scale to be decided by the General Assembly. His Government trusted that the use of the Force would be in line with the letter and spirit of the Charter, and that it would not have to reconsider its decision to support the constitution of the Force. In that respect, it hoped that the new international

relations between the big Powers would prevent abuse of the Force, such as had occurred in the Congo. His Government's readiness to participate in the financing of the new UNEF did not in any way mean that its views on the former UNEF and ONUC had altered.

35. His Government felt that the new arrangement should not be used to perpetuate the current situation, namely Israeli occupation of Arab territories. UNEF should be instrumental in establishing the conditions required for successful negotiations aimed at establishing peace in the region.

36. In his report, the Secretary-General estimated that the operational costs of UNEF for a period of six months would amount to \$30 million and the Advisory Committee recommended acceptance of that estimate. The Advisory Committee, however, pointed out that savings could be made in some sections, while in others the Secretary-General had perhaps underestimated requirements. The heading under which the largest savings could be made was that concerning the reimbursement of extra and extraordinary costs to Governments providing contingents. The Advisory Committee pointed out, in paragraph 19 of its report, that preliminary information suggested that the amounts to be reimbursed would be within a range of between \$200 per man per month and nearly four times that amount. It was also clearly stated, in paragraph 20, that no uniform definition of those costs had ever been laid down. It therefore seemed very reasonable to suggest that the question should be reviewed, the scope of the reimbursement should be defined, cost factors should be standardized as far as possible and the total amount of reimbursement per man per month should be determined. His delegation supported the draft paragraph proposed by the Soviet delegation (A/C.5/L.1136) designed to limit reimbursement to Governments to \$250 per man per month.

37. By its resolution 1001 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956, the General Assembly had approved the guiding principles proposed by the Secretary-General, namely that the cost of equipment and pay and allowances for members of the contingents would be borne by the Governments providing them. One month later, the Secretary-General had had difficulties in recruiting the national contingents and, not wishing to accept the offers of certain Eastern European countries, had recommended changes in the formula. The General Assembly had approved that recommendation in resolution 1089 (XI) of 21 December 1956, thereby making it possible to interpret the decision to mean that even the pay of very highly paid specially recruited soldiers could be reimbursed to Governments. It would be very reasonable to return to the first reimbursement formula, as a sign that the situation had returned to normal after the cold war. While preferring the methods of reimbursement approved by the General Assembly in resolution 1001 (ES-I), his delegation found the maximum amount of reimbursement proposed by the Soviet delegation reasonable. That proposal would bring about a considerable reduction in the costs of the Force.

38. His delegation supported draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1 as a whole. However, it felt that the text did not take full account of the capacity to pay of different countries. Furthermore, the criteria used to determine the

stage of economic development they had reached appeared to be geographical rather than economic. Wishing to improve the text, his delegation had become a sponsor of the draft amendment submitted orally at the previous meeting by the representative of the Soviet Union. That amendment made a clearer distinction between the various groups of countries on the basis of *per capita* national income. His delegation hoped that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1 would be able to accept that amendment. It was ready to support the amendment submitted by the delegations of Cuba and Yemen (A/C.5/L.1135).

39. In connexion with the remarks made on the previous day by the representative of Israel, his delegation wished to recall that the occupation of foreign territories in itself constituted an act of aggression, that no one could be an aggressor in his own country and that a truce line had certainly existed on 5 June 1967.

40. Mr. JALIL (Ecuador) said that, in his delegation's view, draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1, which it had sponsored, provided the most equitable and realistic method of financing the costs of the Force. The draft resolution, like all texts submitted to the Fifth Committee for consideration, was of an exclusively financial nature. The United Nations must assume the responsibility entrusted to it under the Charter and the draft resolution before the Committee met that demand in the most equitable manner possible. His delegation hoped that the text, in its current form, would receive wide support in the Fifth Committee.

41. Mr. JASABE (Sierra Leone) said that his Government believed in the principle of collective responsibility and was therefore prepared to contribute whatever was required of it in the shortest possible time. However, it was concerned that the action of the super-Powers which were Members of the Organization was creating an atmosphere of insecurity on the international scene.

42. His delegation was grateful to the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1 for their well-balanced text. It was aware of the considerable preparatory work undertaken to ensure the success of the draft resolution, which it would have no difficulty in supporting in its current form.

43. He welcomed the fact that the Force had been established on the basis of a wider geographical representation than had previously been the case. Furthermore, the agreement between the parties was encouraging, and, as the Secretary-General had said, it constituted an important step towards peace in the Middle East. His delegation also welcomed the decision taken by nine member countries of the European Economic Community to circulate a general policy statement on the Middle East as a United Nations document.³ In that statement, the signatories advocated an immediate return to the cease-fire lines of 22 October and the continuation of negotiations with a view of establishing a lasting peace on the basis of the Security Council decision of November 1967.

³ *Ibid.*, Supplement for October, November and December 1973, document S/11081. The text was also circulated as document A/9288.

44. The concept of neutrality today was different from that of the 1930s. It was now in the interests of every nation, whether large or small, developed or developing, to ensure that there was peace in the world.

45. His delegation hoped that, since the United States and the Soviet Union had finally reached a compromise on the problem of observers, a limited attempt would be made to control every aspect of the operation of the Force. As past experience had shown, now that the Secretary-General had been given a clearly defined mandate, his prime objective should be to ensure that the cease-fire was respected. That was essential if the Organization wished to avoid a recurrence of the situation which had occurred during the United Nations Operation in the Congo and the crisis which had arisen over Article 19 of the Charter.

46. His delegation felt that the funds required for the Emergency Force should be provided through *ad hoc* contributions. It hoped that it was the last time that Member States would be called upon to make contributions to finance peace-keeping operations in the Middle East.

47. Mr. SANISLAV (Romania) said that his country's support for a political settlement of the Middle East conflict and the establishment of a just and enduring peace in that region was well known. During the six years which had passed since the adoption, on 22 November 1967, of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), his Government had constantly spoken and acted in favour of an urgent settlement of the problems in the Middle East, in accordance with the provisions of that resolution which offered a rational and equitable basis for a lasting solution in the region. The last conflict had shown that that resolution should be implemented in a continuous manner, with a view to achieving the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories, the acknowledgement and safeguarding of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States in the region, and the settlement of the problem of the Palestinian people, in accordance with their legitimate aspirations.

48. On 24 October, in a statement distributed as an official document of the Security Council⁴ and of the General Assembly as document A/9255, his Government had spoken, *inter alia*, in favour of the implementation of Security Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), the immediate establishment of an area separating the armies in the conflict and the sending of United Nations observers or peace-keeping forces, formed of contingents supplied by Member States. The fact that the United Nations Emergency Force was present in the region should ensure the creation of a favourable atmosphere for the continuation of specific efforts to reach a political solution to the problems of the Middle East, on the basis of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), in accordance with the legitimate interests of the cause of peace and security in the world.

49. His delegation took a positive attitude to the financing of the Emergency Force. It supported some of the major provisions in draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1, but it endorsed the amendment submitted by the delegations of

⁴ *Ibid.*, document S/11045.

Cuba and Yemen (A/C.5/L.1135), and would also support the amendment submitted orally on the previous day by the Soviet delegation, since it improved draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1.

50. The organization, operation and financing of the Emergency Force should correspond to the objectives of the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in application of strict respect for the right of all Member States to participate, on an equal footing, in the adoption and implementation of resulting decisions and measures. In his delegation's view, every possible effort should be made to settle the situation in the Middle East immediately by political means. At the present time, conditions favoured a final settlement of the conflict. In the future, Romania would also make its contribution to the consolidation of the cease-fire and the cessation of military activities, in order to create the desired conditions for the peace conference which should be held under the aegis of the United Nations. The peace conference could then begin its work with a view to reaching a political settlement of the complex problems of the region and bringing about an end to the conflict once and for all.

51. The current Emergency Force had been set up under the special conditions required by the complex situation in the Middle East. The arrangements agreed upon regarding that specific situation, including the methods for financing the Force, should not be applied to other situations which already existed or could arise in the future. His delegation's affirmative vote in the present case in no way altered Romania's position regarding the financing of the United Nations Operation in the Congo and other United Nations expenditure which Romania did not recognize.

52. Mr. KARHILO (Finland) recalled that it was not the first time that the Fifth Committee had examined the question of financing peace-keeping operations. In that connexion, annex II of the report of the Secretary-General (A/9285) contained a very useful review of the financing of previous peace-keeping operations.

53. The position of his Government in respect to peace-keeping operations and their financing had not changed since the inception of the first Emergency Force in 1956. Finland considered the establishment and operation of United Nations forces to be a joint undertaking for the maintenance of peace and security. Since that was the principal task of the Organization, Finland regarded its share of the resulting expenses as part of the responsibilities it had assumed when accepting the Charter of the United Nations. On the other hand, it stressed the principle of collective responsibility of all Member States for all operations jointly undertaken. That principle should be reflected in a significant participation of the entire membership in the financing of such operations.

54. The present United Nations Emergency Force had been established by Security Council resolution 340 (1973). The Secretary-General had submitted preliminary estimates for UNEF amounting to \$30 million for a period of six months. Furthermore, the Secretary-General had proposed that the costs of the Force should be considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne by

the Members in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. The Security Council had approved the Secretary-General's report and had decided that the Force should be established in accordance with that report. That meant that the Council had also approved the proposals concerning the financing of the Force and, in particular, the provision that the expenses of the Force should be considered as expenses of the Organization in the sense of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. Pursuant to that decision, the Secretary-General had submitted detailed budgetary estimates which were now before the Committee. It was the right and the duty of both the Advisory Committee and the Fifth Committee to express an opinion on the estimates submitted by the Secretary-General, but he considered that the Fifth Committee should not depart from the decision taken by the Security Council.

55. The reasons given by the Advisory Committee for instituting a special account for peace-keeping operations were convincing. That technical arrangement must not, however, in any way run counter to the central principle of collective responsibility. His delegation also supported the Advisory Committee's recommendation that voluntary contributions could be in cash as well as in kind, on condition that those in kind corresponded to the actual requirements of the Force.

56. On the other hand, it would be unreasonable to ask countries contributing contingents to waive, in whole or in part, any reimbursement of extra and extraordinary expenses that the General Assembly might allow. It would be difficult to ask a small country supplying a contingent at great expense to take on an additional financial burden representing, in some cases, much more than its total contribution to the Organization's regular budget.

57. The Government of Finland had consistently taken an interest in peace-keeping operations and had participated in them all, either through voluntary contributions or by placing military personnel at the disposal of the United Nations. In addition, the Finnish Government had decided in 1968, in close co-operation with the Governments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, to establish a stand-by contingent in order to be able to respond promptly and effectively to any request from the United Nations. It was because of those arrangements that the Finnish Government had been ready to respond immediately to the appeal launched by the Secretary-General on 25 October 1973.

58. According to the Finnish Constitution, the armed forces of the country could not be used for any other purpose than the defence of Finnish territory. Thus, the Finnish unit in the Force was composed entirely of volunteers. It was, therefore, natural and right that the expenses of the contingent should be regarded as Finland's extraordinary and reimbursable expenses.

59. While emphasizing the principle of collective responsibility, his delegation was prepared to take account of the fact that the economically less developed countries could not contribute as much as others to peace-keeping operations. It was therefore prepared to approve the ideas put forward in draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1.

60. Mr. WANG Wei-tsai (China) said that when the General Committee of the General Assembly had adopted

the recommendation that an item on the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force should be included in the agenda of the current session, his delegation had stated that it would elaborate on the Chinese Government's position of principle when the substantive question came up for discussion.

61. The Chinese Government had always held that the essence of the Middle East question lay in the aggression committed by the Israeli Zionists, with the support of the super-Powers, against the Arab and Palestinian peoples. Thus, with all other justice-loving Governments, the Chinese Government firmly supported the Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian peoples in their just war against Israeli aggression. The United States and the Soviet Union were in fierce contention in the Middle East. With their recent counter-attack against Israeli aggression, the Arab countries and peoples had emerged from the "no war, no peace" impasse to which they had been brought by the two super-Powers and that naturally ran counter to the wishes and tacit understanding of those Powers. That was why, when the situation had been most favourable to the Arab peoples and when the Israeli Zionists had been isolated for the first time, the Soviet Union and the United States had lost no time in imposing a "cease-fire in place" on the Security Council so as to put an end to the Arab people's just war against Israeli aggression. The draft resolution imposed by the United States and the Soviet Union did not in any way condemn the Israeli aggressors or provide clearly for the unconditional and total withdrawal of Israel from occupied Arab territories. Nor did it mention restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people. The so-called "cease fire in place" was in fact an attempt to reimpose a situation of "no war, no peace" on the Arab countries and thus enable the two super-Powers to dominate the Middle East and dictate the fate of the Arab peoples.

62. Subsequently, after secret deals between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Security Council had adopted another resolution providing for the dispatch of a United Nations Emergency Force to the Middle East. The baleful consequences of that action were obvious: it would transform sovereign Arab States into an area under international control and pave the way for control of the Middle East by the super-Powers. His delegation had therefore solemnly declared that it was opposed to those resolutions and it was only in consideration of the wish expressed by the victims that it had not participated in the vote.

63. On 27 October, when the Security Council had discussed the question of the financing of UNEF, his delegation had stated that since it was not in favour of the dispatch of UNEF to the Middle East it could not, of course, participate in the costs of the Force. Several representatives had expressed dissatisfaction at the costs of the Force and some considered that such costs should be borne by the super-Powers. That was entirely justified. To regard the costs of the Force as expenses of the Organization and to request all Member States to participate in the financing of UNEF was tantamount to requesting all Member States to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the two super-Powers.

64. The United Nations had already been given serious lessons on the question of the apportionment of military

expenses for so-called peace-keeping operations. Some countries had rightly refused to participate in the financing of such operations. As a result of that situation, the Organization was grappling with a serious financial crisis which had had a harmful influence on the normal activities of the Organization. Unless the United Nations learned its lesson, the financial crisis would worsen and his delegation could not but express its anxiety about that prospect.

65. Although, economically, China was still a developing country with a relatively low national income, it had done its best to participate in the regular expenses of the Organization. It supported all justified expenses that were in accord with the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Conversely, it was opposed to all unjustified expenses that ran counter to those objectives and principles, and refused to participate in financing them.

66. The position of principle adopted by his delegation on the Middle East question had won it the sympathy and support of many countries. Some, however, had invoked the Charter of the United Nations in affirming that anyone who refused to participate in the financing of UNEF would violate the Charter. That was a distortion of the purposes and principles of the Charter. Article 1 of the Charter explicitly provided that one of the purposes of the United Nations was to suppress acts of aggression. Failure to condemn and put a stop to Israeli Zionist aggression was, therefore, a violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter. Basing its position on the aforementioned points, his delegation would not participate in the vote on draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1; it reiterated that the Chinese Government could not participate in the financing of UNEF.

67. Mr. BISHARA (Kuwait) observed that it seemed to be becoming the rule to apportion expenses for various aspects of United Nations activities according to the scale of assessments used for the regular budget. He regretted that development, because the scale of assessments was based mainly on national *per capita* income. In the present case Kuwait had been, unwillingly, included among those countries whose national *per capita* income was \$1,500. That was because of erroneous calculations. Kuwait was in fact a developing country with no industry, agriculture or infrastructure, and no mineral resources except for oil. That mineral resource was depletable and non-renewable. For those reasons he was apprehensive about such a frequent use of the scale of assessments; moreover, it had just been revised, with the result that Kuwait's contribution had been increased from 0.08 to 0.09 per cent.

68. He was prepared to accept the provisions of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1. He also supported the amendment by Cuba and Yemen (A/C.5/L.1135).

69. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) asked the representative of the Secretary-General to indicate how much each Member State would have to pay towards the costs of the Emergency Force in the Middle East, under draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1, and how much each Member State would have to pay for the costs of the Emergency Force under that draft resolution as amended by the representative of the Soviet Union at the previous meeting. He would like that information expressed

as percentages, in the form of a scale of assessments, and also in absolute figures.

70. He said that he would like to exercise his right of reply at the end of the next meeting.

71. Mr. CLELAND (Ghana), referring to the draft paragraph (A/C.5/L.1136) proposed by the Soviet Union for inclusion in the report of the Fifth Committee, said he would like to know what grounds he had for proposing a maximum reimbursement of \$250 monthly *per capita* to Governments for extra and extraordinary costs. He also asked what had been the average amount reimbursed to Governments, per man per month, for the United Nations Operation in the Congo. That information would greatly facilitate consideration of the matter.

72. The CHAIRMAN said he felt that the Secretariat would need time to provide the information requested.

73. Mr. ZIEHL (Acting Head, Office of Financial Services) said that he could not provide the information requested immediately. Referring more specifically to the question asked by the representative of Ghana, he said he felt it would be lacking in tact to indicate the amount reimbursed to the various countries involved by naming them directly. In any case he would have to consult the Secretary-General on that matter, but he thought he would be able to provide the figures without naming the countries.

74. Mr. CLELAND (Ghana) thanked the Acting Head of the Office of Financial Services for the information he had provided, but he did not see why the countries concerned should prefer not to be named.

75. Mr. SILVEIRA DA MOTA (Brazil), referring to the request of the representative of the Soviet Union, said it would also be useful if, for the purposes of comparison, the Secretary-General indicated how much each State would pay towards the costs of the Force on the basis of the scale of assessments for 1974-1976.

ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMITTEE'S WORK

76. Mr. STOBY (Guyana), raising a question relating to procedure, said that the question of co-ordinating the meetings of the Advisory Committee and the Fifth Committee arose every year. The Advisory Committee usually met in the afternoon, with the result that the Fifth Committee's second meeting often had to be held in the evening. He wondered if, not only from a practical point of view but also from an economical point of view, the Advisory Committee could not meet in the evening. He asked what savings could be made if that arrangement was introduced.

77. Mr. BOUAYAD-AGHA (Algeria) said that the point made by the representative of Guyana was very pertinent.

78. Mr. ZIEHL (Acting Head, Office of Financial Services) said that a night meeting of the Fifth Committee involved additional expenditure of \$184.50 per hour, while a night meeting of the Advisory Committee involved additional expenditure of only \$27 per hour. The additional cost was due mainly to the cost of the overtime worked by security staff, members of the Department of Conference Services and sound technicians.

79. Mr. RHODES (Chairman of the Advisory Committee for Administrative and Budgetary Questions) said that it was not the first time that the question of the time-table of meetings of the Advisory Committee and the Fifth Committee had been raised. Economy measures were useful only if they had positive results. He had established that night meetings of the Advisory Committee were seldom useful. He reserved the right to convene meetings of the Advisory Committee whenever he felt it necessary.

80. The CHAIRMAN said that it would indeed hardly be appropriate for the Fifth Committee to decide on the time-table of meetings of the Advisory Committee. Another reason that the Committee could seldom meet in the afternoon was that there was no meeting room available at that time.

81. Mr. STOBY (Guyana) thanked the Acting Head of the Office of Financial Services and the Chairman of the Advisory Committee for the information they had provided. He was, however, not fully convinced by the arguments advanced by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee. With regard to the question of meeting rooms, the difficulties probably arose from the fact that it was known in advance that the Fifth Committee usually did not meet in the afternoon and the rooms were therefore allocated to other committees and organs. He reserved the right to submit, in collaboration with other delegations, a formal proposal for the solution of the problem.

82. Mr. TARDOS (Hungary) said that, as a member of the Advisory Committee, he himself felt that it would be preferable if a small group of people, rather than a large group, met in the evening. The Advisory Committee, however, because of the nature of its work, had to keep constantly in touch with Secretariat officials, which was fairly difficult to do in the evening. Another reason for the fact that the cost of a night meeting of the Advisory Committee was lower than that for a night meeting of the Fifth Committee was that the Advisory Committee required fewer interpreters than the Fifth Committee.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.