

1603rd meeting

Monday, 19 November 1973, at 10.55 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. C. S. M. MSELLE (United Republic of Tanzania).

A/C.5/SR.1603

ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMITTEE'S WORK

1. The CHAIRMAN informed the members of the Committee that Mr. Pérez-Guerrero, Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, was leaving New York the following day and had asked to be allowed to address the Committee before he left in connexion with the first reading of section 14 of the proposed programme budget concerning UNCTAD. He took it for granted that the Committee would wish to hear the Secretary-General of UNCTAD and, as the current meeting was to be devoted to consideration of the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force established pursuant to Security Council resolution 340 (1973), he proposed that consideration of that item should be suspended at approximately 12.15 p.m. in order to give the floor to Mr. Pérez-Guerrero. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed with that suggestion.

It was so decided.

2. The CHAIRMAN requested delegations wishing to exercise their right of reply to so inform the Secretary of the Committee so that their remarks could be made at the most appropriate time without interrupting the discussion.

AGENDA ITEM 109

Financing of the United Nations Emergency Force established pursuant to Security Council resolution 340 (1973): report of the Secretary-General (A/9285, A/9314, A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1, A/C.5/1134, A/C.5/1135)

3. The CHAIRMAN announced that Chad, Cyprus, Guinea, Japan, Panama, Peru and Rwanda should be added to the list of sponsors of the draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1) and that the Sudan should be deleted from that list.

4. Mr. RHODES (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) pointed out that the Advisory Committee's report (A/9314) was divided into two main parts, the first dealing with general considerations and the second with cost estimates as such.

5. The most important general consideration which the Advisory Committee had borne in mind was the question whether the expenses of the Force should be provided for within the regular budget of the United Nations or in a special account. The Advisory Committee had taken as its premise the approval given by the Security Council to the Secretary-General's report, which stated¹ that the costs of

the Force should be considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne by the Members in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. The Advisory Committee had then considered whether the wording of that paragraph implied that the expenses of the Force, as "expenses of the Organization" should be charged to the regular budget. It had concluded that they could be provided for either in the regular budget or in a special account, but that a special account presented several distinct advantages, which were enumerated in paragraph 3 of its report. In the second place, the Advisory Committee had suggested that an effort should be made to invite voluntary contributions to help defray the costs of the Force and that such contributions could be in cash or in kind. Thirdly, the Advisory Committee had considered early payment of contributions absolutely essential. Indeed, in his report (A/9285), the Secretary-General had stressed the urgent necessity of providing immediately usable cash resources inasmuch as there were now no cash balances which could be used to meet those new and substantial costs.

6. The question of cost estimates had been dealt with in two separate parts in the Advisory Committee's report. Part I concerned administrative and operational costs of the Force. The Secretary-General's cost estimates under that heading were based, at least partly, on the assumption that certain goods and services would be provided by Governments at no cost to the United Nations. The Advisory Committee considered that the possibility of securing that kind of assistance should be explored further; in particular, it recommended that the Secretary-General should consider the possibility of obtaining free space from scheduled air carriers serving cities in the vicinity of the mission area and was also of the view that Governments in the area could be expected to provide the necessary accommodation for the Force on a rent-free basis.

7. With respect to the costs estimated for civilian personnel, which were discussed in paragraphs 14 to 16 of its report, the Advisory Committee had mentioned the possibility of savings in transportation costs and some economies accruing under the regular budget in respect of staff assigned to UNEF.

8. Part II dealt with reimbursement of extra and extraordinary costs to Governments providing contingents. That was the largest expenditure item since it came to almost \$20 million out of the \$30 million requested by the Secretary-General to meet the costs of the Force for the first six months of its operation. Out of the \$19.7 million requested under part II, \$18.5 million would go to cover pay and allowances for members of the contingents. The Advisory Committee had inquired as to what constituted extra and extraordinary costs to be reimbursed to Governments and had discovered that no uniform definition of

¹ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1973, document S/11052/Rev.1, para. 7.

those costs had ever been laid down. It understood that considerable variations could be expected between the pay and allowances, conditions of service and various requirements of the armed forces of individual Member States. It none the less suggested that Governments providing contingents might voluntarily waive in whole or in part reimbursement of their extraordinary costs. It had suggested further that consideration should be given to the formulation and introduction of standardized cost factors with a view to obviating wide discrepancies between the payments made to different participating Governments. Efforts in that direction should be aimed, of course, at an over-all reduction of those costs.

9. The Advisory Committee's conclusions on the cost estimates were given in paragraphs 24 and 25 of its report. It had concluded that savings could be expected under certain sections, but that under other sections the Secretary-General had made a very conservative estimate of requirements. Naturally, the accuracy of the Secretary-General's cost estimates, which amounted to \$30 million, would depend largely on the rate at which UNEF would be constituted inasmuch as the costs of providing the contingents accounted for the bulk of the required expenditure.

10. In conclusion, the Advisory Committee recommended acceptance of the Secretary-General's estimate in the amount of \$30 million for the costs of the Force during the six-month period from 25 October to 24 April 1974. It also recommended that the General Assembly should authorize the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the Force at a rate not to exceed \$5 million per month after 24 April 1974, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond the initial period of six months.

11. Mr. SILVEIRA DA MOTA (Brazil), introducing draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1 on behalf of all the sponsors, said that the principle on which the draft resolution was based was that of the collective responsibility of Member States in sharing the costs of the United Nations Emergency Force. The sponsors had taken into account the fact that, in deciding to set up the Force, the Security Council had also decided that the costs of the Force should be considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne by the Members in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. The draft resolution complied fully with that decision, since it apportioned the expenses of the Force among all the Members of the United Nations.

12. The draft resolution was further inspired by the criteria explicitly stated in its second, third and fourth preambular paragraphs. In the first place, it was recognized that, in accordance with past decisions of the General Assembly, a peace-keeping operation involving heavy expenditure should be financed through a different procedure from that applied to meet expenditure of the regular budget of the United Nations. The sponsors of the draft resolution had therefore tried to devise a method of financing which would not undermine the principle of collective responsibility. In that regard, they had been guided by the considerations set out in the third and fourth preambular paragraphs, namely the obvious fact that the economically more developed countries were in a position to make relatively larger contributions towards peace-keeping operations of that type, that the economically less

developed countries had a relatively limited capacity to contribute towards such operations, and that the permanent members of the Security Council had a special responsibility in financing them. In every case, those guidelines were embodied in decisions previously taken by the General Assembly itself on the question of the mode of financing peace-keeping operations and, in that sense, did not represent anything new.

13. The operative paragraphs of the draft resolution translated into monetary terms the criteria just mentioned. They also responded to the requests made by the Secretary-General in document A/9285 and to the recommendations thereon made by the Advisory Committee in document A/9314.

14. The amount of \$30 million appropriated under paragraph 1 of the draft resolution for the operations of the Force during a six-month period corresponded to the estimate submitted by the Secretary-General and endorsed by the Advisory Committee. The establishment of a special account was also proposed, in view of the advantages of that procedure, as stressed by the Advisory Committee.

15. Operative paragraph 2 specified the scheme for the apportionment of the expenditure, with the proviso that it was an *ad hoc* arrangement, adopted without prejudice to the positions of principle of Member States on the matter of the financing of peace-keeping operations. In setting up the four categories of countries, in selecting the countries to be placed in each category and in calculating the amounts to be shared by them, the sponsors had borne in mind a combination of factors, such as past decisions of the General Assembly on similar issues, and particularly resolution 2194 (XXI), the criteria invoked in the preamble of the draft resolution and the elements of judgement derived from political and economic considerations.

16. The sponsors had chosen to apply the scale of assessments for 1974-1975 in order to determine the proportions in which contributions would be made to the Force. The rates prescribed in the scale for the next three years were, to a very large extent, lower than those of the present scale, so that a vast majority of Member States would receive a more favourable treatment under the new scale with regard to their share in the financing of the Force.

17. Under operative paragraph 2(a), an amount of \$18,945,000 would be apportioned among the five permanent members of the Security Council, in the proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1974-1976. That meant that the contribution of those States to the financing of the Force would be 15.5 per cent larger than the amount which they would be required to pay if the scale for the regular budget were to be fully applied to the Force. That increase reflected their special financial responsibility with regard to the costs of the operation. Paragraph 2(b) concerned the economically developed Member States. The 23 States in that category would be required to pay for the financing of the Force the same amount as they would have to disburse under the regular scale. In accordance with paragraph 2(c), the contribution of 82 less developed countries would be reduced by 80 per cent in relation to the rates which they

would have paid under the scale for the regular budget. Similarly, the 25 less developed countries mentioned in paragraph 2 (d) were granted the same reduction of 80 per cent, plus an additional reduction of 50 per cent.

18. Operative paragraph 3 simply explained which countries fell into the categories indicated in paragraph 2.

19. Operative paragraph 4 responded to the request of the Secretary-General, who had asked that he should be authorized to enter into commitments for the United Nations Emergency Force at a rate not to exceed \$5 million per month, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond the initial period of six months. That request had been endorsed by the Advisory Committee. The draft resolution provided that the amounts in question should be apportioned among Member States in accordance with the scheme set out in the draft resolution—in other words, in the same proportions.

20. Lastly, operative paragraph 5 invited voluntary contributions to the Force from all sources—that is, from Member and non-member States alike, from individuals and foundations—again along the lines suggested both by the Secretary-General and by the Advisory Committee.

21. The draft resolution before the Committee was the result of long and patient consultations and negotiations. Those representatives who had not directly participated in its preparation had been kept informed of the progress made, and the sponsors of the text had made a determined effort to bring together the largest possible number of delegations in a solution that would reflect, if not the unanimous view, at least the views of a large majority. The proposal had originally been discussed by the Latin American Group. It had then been examined by the Group of 77, after which a series of meetings had been held with representatives of other geographical and political regions. Beyond any doubt, the draft resolution had been openly discussed and drafted in the full view of all Member States, while interested parties had at all times been able to make known their views.

22. The draft resolution did not attempt to settle the global question of peace-keeping or its financing. As stated in paragraph 2, the arrangement was an *ad hoc* one, without prejudice to positions of principle of Member States with regard to the financing of peace-keeping operations.

23. The whole text was the result of a slow work of compromise—a compromise which could not coincide perfectly with the positions and interests of each delegation. Yet it was a compromise which had proved acceptable to a large number of the States Members of the United Nations. Political issues had been deliberately avoided, since it was not the intention of the sponsors to give rise to controversy. Their intention was to provide the General Assembly with a reasonable and speedy solution to the financing of the Force, so as to enable it to perform effectively and thus accomplish its noble mission of peace in the Middle East.

24. When a proposal which reflected the relevant decisions of the Security Council had the formal backing of 35 delegations, covering such a wide area politically and

geographically, it would obviously be very difficult for it to be substantially amended or changed. The sponsors of the draft resolution hoped, indeed, that the text would be adopted by the Committee by consensus. If, however, a consensus proved impossible, the sponsors trusted that the text would command widespread support.

25. Mr. CLELAND (Ghana) recalled that, in pursuance of Security Council resolution 340 (1973), a United Nations Emergency Force had been established in the Middle East following the resumption of hostilities between Israel and a number of Arab States. The financial implications of policing the cease-fire lines had been estimated at some \$30 million for the first six months. The purpose of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1 was to apportion the expenses between the States Members of the United Nations. Those expenses were of an extraordinary nature, different from the regular expenses of the Organization usually met by Member States on the basis of recommendations of the Committee on Contributions.

26. The Security Council had the prime responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Consequently, the permanent members of the Council, regardless of changes in world power relationships, had to bear the brunt of the financial burden for policing the world.

27. Had it not been for the cold war, which had made some permanent members of the Security Council partisans in certain trouble spots in the world, it would have been natural for the troops of such countries to have been utilized in restoring peace in such areas and for the medium-size and smaller Powers to have been spared the effort and cost of such peace-keeping initiatives. However, it was precisely in order to avoid the dire consequences of a possible confrontation between the super-Powers that the medium-size and small countries had been asked to provide contingents for maintaining the peace, as had been the case for the United Nations Operation in the Congo in 1960. That policy of “preventive diplomacy” required not only that the great Powers should accept the services of others, but also that the small and medium-size Powers should assist the major Powers in avoiding a fight to the death by neutralizing areas of conflict in which their respective mutually exclusive interests might propel them into a confrontation.

28. In view of the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council in all matters of international peace and security, his delegation believed that those members should assume a substantial burden of the peace-keeping efforts, the more so since the resolution which had established the present United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East emanated from the Security Council. While the 63.15 per cent of expenditure apportioned among the permanent members of the Security Council under draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1 appeared to be a reasonable compromise, his delegation nevertheless believed that, should the \$30 million estimate prove inadequate for the first six months and should the estimated resources in subsequent months also be insufficient owing to unforeseen circumstances, the permanent members should be magnanimous enough to underwrite such additional expenses.

29. The latest United Nations peace-keeping initiative in the Middle East illustrated the concept of collective responsibility within the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter. In today's world of growing interdependence of nations, the concern of one became the concern of all. The principle of collective responsibility therefore imposed on all Member States, large or small, affluent or deprived, without prejudice to their positions of principle, the obligation of contributing to the over-all effort for containing an explosive situation. It was in that context that his delegation viewed the amount being apportioned among the less developed countries. Those were countries whose capacity to pay had been limited by a host of factors beyond their control and which, in spite of that limitation, had agreed to pay their share within the framework of collectivity. His delegation was gratified that the sponsors of the draft resolution had found it possible, on the basis of equity, to grant special dispensation to the hard-core least developed countries.

30. Ghana continued to believe in the aims and purposes of the Charter and, like other countries, had an interest in the maintenance of world peace, for it was under durable conditions of peace that policies of satisfying the needs of all and raising living standards could best be pursued and ensured. It was with that conviction that Ghana had not hesitated to provide a contingent of about 2,500 men for the peace-keeping operation in the Congo in 1960. In addition to troops, Ghana had also provided logistic and other services amounting to \$1,009,074, a sum which had still not yet been reimbursed by the United Nations.

31. In document A/9285, the Secretary-General submitted, *inter alia*, an estimate of \$19.7 million, of which \$1 million was for reimbursement to Governments for supplies and equipment furnished by them to their contingents and \$18.5 million was for reimbursing Governments for pay and allowances over and above what they would have had to pay their troops if they had been serving on national soil. It appeared that the Secretary-General had not provided for the per diem allowance normally paid to United Nations contingents in the field, as had been the case for UNEF in the Middle East in 1956 and ONUC in 1960. Responding to the Secretary-General's appeal, Ghana was providing 600 men as well as light arms and vehicles as its contribution to the United Nations Emergency Force. An allowance of 86 cents per day had been provided for the operational forces of the 1956 UNEF in the Middle East and for those in ONUC in 1960. As a result of the rise in the cost of living, that allowance had been increased to \$1.30 for the Operation in the Congo, effective 1 October 1960. It appeared that the Secretary-General had made no provision for such an allowance in his estimates. His delegation understood that the practice adopted for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus had served as a precedent, since members of that Force did not receive per diem allowances. It did not accept the Cyprus precedent as a good example. The United Nations troops in Cyprus were all from developed countries which had no problems of currency convertibility and, in any event, the members of that Force were adequately paid by their Governments so that they did not need daily allowances. On the other hand, the developing countries which had undertaken to provide contingents for UNEF were faced with foreign exchange difficulties and could not afford

additional currency exchange sacrifices beyond their commitment of troops and equipment. The omission of estimates for daily allowances was perhaps an oversight due to the urgency of the problems to be solved and his delegation believed that it was not too late to include that type of expenditure in the estimates submitted by the Secretary-General.

32. Accordingly, the delegations from the developing countries, including Ghana, which had committed or intended to commit contingents would submit a proposal aimed at reinstating the payment of a daily allowance and at including the cost in the estimates, unless the Secretary-General was in a position to include that amount in the \$30 million estimate. His delegation would like the representative of the Secretary-General to indicate what could be done in that regard.

33. His delegation found it difficult to accept the suggestions made by the Advisory Committee in paragraph 22 of its report, namely, that Governments providing contingents might voluntarily waive, in whole or in part, reimbursement of their extra and extraordinary expenses. The Member States that had agreed to supply troops together with equipment and vehicles had rendered an invaluable service to the Organization, and the small countries were not rich. Since the current peace-keeping operation was a collective responsibility of all States Members of the Organization, it would be only right and logical that such extra and extraordinary expenses should be apportioned among all Member States and not be an additional burden on those countries which had so promptly and so generously consented to discharge, on behalf of all Member States, an onerous but indispensable peace-keeping duty.

34. With respect to the adoption of standardized cost factors to narrow the wide discrepancies between the payments made to different participating Governments, his delegation believed that an average payment should constitute the basis on which reimbursements should be made to Governments in the future. His delegation was, however, open to all suggestions that would assist the Committee in arriving at a consensus on the matter. It would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1.

35. Mr. MATHESON (Canada) said that his delegation was pleased to be among the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1, which included such a large number of delegations. It was the best compromise that could be achieved given the various political issues involved. While his delegation would have preferred to see the scale of assessments for the regular budget applied fully, it recognized that that had not been possible. His delegation was pleased to have been able to play a part in preparing the draft resolution and in seeking wide support for it, and sincerely hoped that the debate would proceed in a constructive manner. His delegation did not consider that the draft resolution constituted a precedent for future peace-keeping operations and its support and sponsorship were extended without prejudice to the position which it might adopt in the future.

36. Mr. PATRICIO (Portugal) said, with reference to the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force and the equitable apportionment of the expenses among Member

States of the Organization, that Portugal was one of the countries which in the recent past had expressed serious reservations, on grounds of principle, concerning the financing of peace-keeping operations in other regions of the world, because the arrangements made to that end had sought to bypass express provisions of the Charter with respect to actions approved by the Security Council. His delegation maintained those reservations. It would, however, be prepared to join Member States as a whole in devising an *ad hoc* arrangement for the financing of peace-keeping operations in the Middle East, on the understanding that such an arrangement should not serve as a precedent for the future. It congratulated those delegations which had put so much effort into preparing draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1. His delegation would like to be able to support the draft resolution, but there was one detail on which it felt in duty bound to enter very definite reservations. The validity of the premise set out in the third preambular paragraph was unquestionable; it was, therefore, all the more regrettable that the sponsors of the text should have included, in operative paragraph 3, countries with an annual *per capita* income of less than \$1,500 among the 20 or 30 richest and most developed countries of the world. Since Portugal had been included among those countries, his delegation would find it difficult to vote for draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1.

37. The Portuguese Government had duly furnished the Secretary-General with statistics about Portugal's gross national product and *per capita* national income for the years 1969-1970. The Committee on Contributions had, in the light of those statistics and other pertinent factors, fixed Portugal's rate of assessment at 0.15 per cent for the period 1974-1976. That Committee had also agreed that the figure of \$1,500 annual *per capita* income should serve as the dividing line between States having a developed economy and States with an economy still in the process of development. How, then, could one explain the fact that Portugal, with a *per capita* national income far below the figure of \$1,500, had been classified among the 30 most developed countries of the world?

38. It was possible to agree with the argument that members of the Security Council—the organ which, under Article 24 of the Charter, had primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security—should bear a larger share of the financial burden incurred in discharging that responsibility. It was worth emphasizing, however, that the Charter did not distinguish, in that respect, between permanent and non-permanent members of the Council. It would be reasonable to expect that if, because of their special position and influence, the permanent members should pay more, then the non-permanent members should also stand on a different footing from the other Members of the United Nations, since they too enjoyed a specially privileged position, being able to participate actively in the taking of extremely important decisions. It would therefore be reasonable to ask the non-permanent members of the Council to pay a little more too. But all those considerations had been ignored by the sponsors of the draft resolution.

39. That was a lacuna which had not been clarified for the benefit of the less privileged countries. Furthermore, the advantages to be derived from the higher contribution to be

paid by the permanent members of the Security Council would accrue to only one group of States, ostensibly classified as being economically less developed on the basis of criteria that were not applied to other countries, like Portugal, which had been arbitrarily classified among the developed countries. That was obviously discrimination.

40. His delegation wished to point out that the list of economically less developed Member States, from which Portugal had been excluded, included at least a dozen countries with *per capita* national incomes which had led the Committee on Contributions to assess them at between 0.16 and 0.99 per cent for the period 1974-1976. Portugal's assessment, on the other hand, had been fixed at 0.15 per cent by that same Committee.

41. For several years delegations had been stating in the General Assembly, the Security Council and other bodies that Portugal was the poorest and most backward country of Europe. Even at the current session, statements to that effect had been made in the General Assembly and the Main Committees. Yet suddenly, as if by magic, in draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1, Portugal was classified among the 20 or 30 most developed and richest countries of the world. If, as was whispered, the classification of Portugal among such countries was an innuendo implying a sort of culpability and a sort of sanction, his delegation wished to state that it rejected that interpretation and that classification. Furthermore, it would be well to stress that it was not for the General Assembly to approve sanctions against a State Member of the United Nations.

42. That being so, his delegation was constrained to submit an amendment (A/C.5/L.1134), the purpose of which was to delete the word "Portugal" from operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1.

43. Mr. AL-SHARAFI (Yemen) said that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1 had neglected a vital aspect at the heart of the problem of the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force. For the purposes of apportioning the expenses of UNEF, the sponsors had classified Member States into four categories. Each group was to contribute according to its special responsibility or its relative capacity to pay. But the sponsors of the text had forgotten that what was involved was the financing of a force dispatched by the Security Council primarily to help the victims of aggression, expansion and occupation. After the Security Council had appealed for a cease-fire in its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, and after the cease-fire had been accepted by the belligerents, Israel had continued its aggression and expansion. It was because of that situation that the Security Council had deemed it necessary to send an emergency force to put an end to the acts of aggression and occupation perpetrated by Israel after acceptance of the cease-fire.

44. Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic had responded in good faith to the appeal for a cease-fire and had complied with it. The Prime Minister of Israel, on the other hand, had admitted that the Israeli forces had never complied with the cease-fire of 22 October when she had stated that the cease-fire lines of 22 October had never existed.

45. Thus, it was because Israel had not complied with the cease-fire that the Security Council had had to form an

emergency force, the financing of which the Fifth Committee was being requested to approve. It would have been logical to say that the State which had refused to comply with the cease-fire, and whose actions had led to the formation of the Force should finance it. Furthermore, no matter how the expenses of the Force were apportioned, the countries which were allegedly being assisted should not be required to pay for such assistance. It was not customary, when disaster struck, to ask the victims of the disaster to pay for the assistance rendered to them.

46. Some delegations invoked the principle of collective responsibility in the matter of the financing of the Force. A proposal that no further burden should be imposed on the victims would in no way impair that principle. The Arab countries, whose territories were occupied by Israel, were firm believers in that principle. Furthermore, bearing in mind a principle affirmed in resolution 1874 (S-IV) of 27 June 1963, by virtue of which, where circumstances warranted, the General Assembly should give special consideration to the situation of any Member States which were victims of the events or actions leading to a peace-keeping operation, and in order to enable the Fifth Committee and the General Assembly to express an opinion on the reality of the situation, the delegations of Cuba and Yemen had submitted an amendment (A/C.5/L.1135) to draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1. The sponsors of the amendment hoped that the members of the Fifth Committee would support them unreservedly.

47. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Security Council had decided unanimously that the United Nations Emergency Force should be financed in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations, which provided that the expenses of the Organization should be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly; furthermore, Article 24, paragraph 1, and Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter stated clearly that the Security Council acted on behalf of the Members of the Organization, who agreed to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council and to join in carrying out those decisions. At the meeting of the Security Council the representative of Sudan had said that the least developed countries should not be excluded from contributing as far as they were able to the attainment of such a noble goal as the strengthening of peace. It was therefore surprising that the delegations of one or two States, one of whom had undertaken very recently to observe the Charter scrupulously, should say that they were unable to meet their part of the expenses of the Emergency Force. The Charter provided that no Member of the United Nations could evade the obligations arising from resolutions adopted by the Security Council with a view to maintaining peace, for the principle of the collective responsibility of the Members of the United Nations with regard to the implementation of those resolutions was one of the fundamental principles of the Organization.

48. In 1956 a United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East had been set up under a resolution adopted in violation of the Charter and in disregard of the prerogatives of the Security Council. The fact that the resolution constituted an illegal act and therefore could not impose any financial or other obligations on States Members of the United Nations had determined the attitude of the Soviet

Union, whose position of principle had not changed with regard to the Emergency Force which had been set up at that time. In the present case, however, the Emergency Force had been set up by the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter establishing the collective responsibility of all the States Members of the United Nations and therefore imposed financial and other obligations on them.

49. In that spirit, the Soviet delegation took a generally favourable view of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1, since it was based on that very principle of collective responsibility. However, he wished to draw attention to certain provisions which were, in his view, completely unjustified: first, he could not accept that Israel, the aggressor State, should have its contribution to the financing of the Emergency Force reduced; indeed, it was Israel which should bear all the expenses, as had been suggested in the Security Council. Secondly, the method used in the draft resolution for apportioning the expenses among States was unfair to some States. Rich countries such as Canada, Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany, whose *per capita* income was more than \$2,500, would pay the same contribution as States whose national income was three times less—a situation which was contrary to the principle of the capacity to pay. Thirdly, the method used for apportioning the expenses was likely to give rise to disputes: it was difficult to understand, for example, why Poland should pay a proportion of the expenses equivalent to its total assessment under the scale established for the United Nations budget, while countries such as Argentina and Greece, whose *per capita* income was approximately the same, should enjoy reductions of as much as 70 per cent.

50. Consequently, his delegation thought it necessary to introduce an amendment to the draft resolution before the Committee. It proposed that operative paragraphs 2 and 3 should be replaced by a single paragraph, which he read out.² The differences between the proposed amendment and the corresponding text of the draft resolution were as follows: the 6 richest countries—Australia, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, Canada and Sweden—would pay a proportion of the expenses of the Emergency Force 10 per cent higher than their assessments in the scale established for the apportionment of ordinary expenses; Israel would not receive a reduction as compared with its assessment in the scale of assessments for the regular budget; 7 States having a *per capita* income of more than \$1,500 received a reduction of 40 per cent as compared with their contributions according to the scale of assessments for the apportionment of ordinary expenses; 29 developing countries received a reduction of 87 per cent for the financing of the Emergency Force and 72 developing countries received a reduction of 90 per cent. His delegation thought that such a method of apportioning the expenses relating to the financing of the Force was fairer both to the rich countries and to the large group of developing countries and the countries with a medium *per capita* income.

51. As to the financial implications of the Security Council resolution concerning the establishment of the

² Text subsequently circulated as document A/C.5/L.1137.

United Nations Emergency Force, his delegation thought that the amount of \$30 million was extremely hypothetical and very excessive. His delegation fully endorsed the view of the Advisory Committee to the effect that economies should be made in some sections, in particular sections 2, 3, 4 and 6 of part I; it would be wiser to reduce the amounts requested in those sections immediately, without waiting until the end of the six-month period, and it was regrettable that the Advisory Committee had not made specific proposals to that effect. He particularly wished to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to part II (Reimbursement of extra and extraordinary costs to Governments providing contingents), and especially to section 7 thereof, which accounted for almost two thirds of the requested allocation. It could be seen from the report of the Advisory Committee (A/9314, paras. 19 and 20) that there was no uniform criterion for determining what constituted extra and extraordinary costs, and that, consequently, the reimbursements requested by States under that heading might range from \$200 per man per month to nearly four times that amount. The noble cause of maintaining peace should not be transformed into a profitable business. Nor should there be any discrimination between the contingents provided by the different States in respect of allowances, since the conditions of service were the same for all. The Fifth Committee should therefore put an end to that unfair practice and reduce to a minimum the discrepancies between reimbursements to the various Governments participating in the Emergency Force by establishing a ceiling which should not exceed \$250 per man per month.

52. His delegation formally proposed for inclusion in the report of the Fifth Committee a paragraph, which he read out.³

53. Mr. OSMAN (Egypt) said that his delegation had studied carefully the reports of the Secretary-General (A/9285) and of the Advisory Committee (A/9314), which recommended acceptance of the estimates totalling \$30 million submitted by the Secretary-General for the costs of the Emergency Force for a period of six months from 25 October 1973 to 24 April 1974. The issue before the Committee was inextricably linked to the cause of peace. It was not a purely financial question; the criteria to be applied were no different from those laid down in the Charter. The spirit of the Charter should be reflected in all action taken by the United Nations to give effect to Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.

54. It was not possible to establish modalities for financing the Force without making a distinction between the aggressor and his victim. It would be logically and morally incomprehensible to treat both in exactly the same way in respect of the apportionment of the costs of the Force among Member States. The Fifth Committee might not be the proper forum for debating that aspect of the question, but it should not allow itself to be blinded by fictitious distinctions. The cause of peace was an integral whole: there was no such thing as financial, humanitarian or political peace. For Members of the United Nations there was only one Charter which they had undertaken to abide by and whose provisions should prevail in every organ of

the United Nations. It was therefore essential to draw a distinction between Egypt, Syria and Jordan on the one hand, and Israel on the other. Egypt, Syria and Jordan were advocates of peace, and had always respected the sanctity of peace and refrained from violating the territorial integrity of other States. They had adhered scrupulously to the provisions of the Charter, they had never violated its provisions, nor had they flouted United Nations resolutions. Forcing those countries to participate in financing the Force would be tantamount to dealing another blow against their economy, already strained because of the long occupation of their territories and the aggression committed against them. It would also be a disservice to the cause of peace, since it implied that the aggressor could commit aggression with impunity, knowing that the cost of the peace-keeping operation would be shared equally among all. He had therefore been surprised to see that in draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1, Egypt, Syria and Jordan were called upon to share the cost of financing the Force in the proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1974-1976, 0.12, 0.02 and 0.02 per cent respectively; the considerable economic and financial burdens imposed on them as a result of the Israeli aggression and occupation had not been taken into account. It could be argued that those little countries, like the other economically less developed countries referred to in operative paragraph 2(c), were assessed in such a way as to benefit eventually from a reduction of approximately 80 per cent as compared with their assessment in the scale of assessments used for the regular budget. While commending the sponsors of the draft resolution for providing for reduced contributions from developing countries, he stressed the fact that those countries which had had to face considerable economic difficulties because they had to provide for their defence and also reconstruct all that had been destroyed by aggression should be exempted from contributing.

55. He fully recognized the validity of the "collective responsibility" principle, but he felt that exempting Egypt, Syria and Jordan from contributing to the costs of the Force would not contravene that principle. Those States were harnessing all the economic resources at their disposal to reconstruct what the war had destroyed; that was their contribution to the application of the principle of collective responsibility.

56. General Assembly resolution 1874 (S-IV), of 27 June 1963, laid down several principles to serve as guidelines for the equitable sharing, by assessed or voluntary contributions or a combination thereof, of the costs of peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditure that might be initiated in the future. Paragraph 1(e) of that resolution stated that where circumstances warranted, the General Assembly should give special consideration to the situation of any Member States which were victims of, and those which were otherwise involved in, the events or actions leading to a peace-keeping operation. He would have appreciated it if the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1 had applied that principle, which had been accepted in 1963, instead of disregarding and not taking into account the special situation in which Egypt, Syria and Jordan found themselves as a result of Israeli aggression. The amendment contained in document A/C.5/L.1135 remedied that omission, and that was why he urged all

³ Text subsequently circulated as document A/C.5/L.1135.

representatives to agree that it should be incorporated in the draft resolution.

57. Israel had been classified as a developing country in the draft resolution. That was contrary to logic and was not in keeping with the categorization of Israel as a developed market economy country in documents prepared by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. In that connexion reference could also be made to the basic document, which classified countries as developing, developed market economy or planned economy, published at the beginning of 1970 as a United Nations publication, Sales No. E.70 (XVII) 13, and also to all United Nations publications relating to international trade and national accounts statistics. He stressed the fact that Israel not only had a *per capita* gross national product estimated at \$US 2,200 in 1970, which was considerably higher than the *per capita* income in some highly advanced countries, but also its high level of industrialization enabled it to produce sophisticated armaments, including the most modern military aircraft and guided missiles, to support its aggression against neighbouring countries and for export to South Africa.

58. Israel was a real “peace consumer” and should therefore pay peace-keeping costs. The assessment of Israel in the draft resolution before the Committee was well below what it should be if appropriate criteria were applied. That was why he was requesting the sponsors of the draft resolution to amend the text and to include Israel in the category of developed countries which should pay a higher proportion of the costs. Operative paragraph 2 (*d*) provided that special treatment would be accorded to the least developed countries and the sponsors of the draft resolution should be congratulated for their judicious attitude in respect of those countries, but he felt that nevertheless it would be preferable if those countries were exempted from all participation in financing the Force.

59. The CHAIRMAN said that he would give the floor to Mr. Pérez-Guerrero, the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, which he had not been able to do earlier, as several representatives had asked to speak on the question of financing the Emergency Force. The Committee would then hear the representative of Israel speaking in exercise of his right of reply, the representative of Brazil, who wished to clarify certain points, and the representative of Ghana.

60. Mr. CLELAND (Ghana) suggested that after the representative of Brazil had spoken, the representative of the Secretary-General should give the information he had requested on the *per diem* allowance to be paid to members of the contingents provided by the six developing countries.

[Before continuing its consideration of item 109, the Committee heard the Secretary-General of UNCTAD (see paragraphs 76 to 78 below).]

61. Mr. SILVEIRA DA MOTA (Brazil) said that when he had introduced draft resolution A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1 he had stated, with reference to operative paragraph 2 (*a*), that the permanent members of the Security Council would have to pay a percentage of the appropriation requested for the financing of the Emergency Force that would be 15.5 per cent higher than what they would have had to pay in

accordance with the scale of assessments used for contributions to the regular budget. The representative of the Soviet Union had subsequently indicated that that percentage was in fact slightly higher, to be exact, 15.5746 per cent.

62. The CHAIRMAN said that the question before the Fifth Committee was a most difficult matter that involved positions of principle and had political aspects which had been taken up in the Security Council and the General Assembly, and which it would be impossible to leave aside even in the Fifth Committee, although that Committee was concerned essentially with the financial aspects of the problem. He had said at the beginning of the meeting that he had made arrangements to enable representatives to exercise their right of reply without interrupting the course of the debate. He referred in that connexion to annex V of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, which stated, in paragraph 77: “The Special Committee recommends to the General Assembly that delegations should use restraint in the exercise of their right of reply, both in plenary meetings and in the Main Committees, and that their statements in exercise of that right should be as brief as possible”, and went on to state in paragraph 78 that: “statements made in the exercise of the right of reply should be delivered, as a general rule, at the end of meetings”. The Chairman also reminded the Fifth Committee that the General Committee had proposed at the current session that statements made in exercise of the right of reply should be made at the end of the meeting, if there was only one meeting arranged for the day in question, and at the end of the day, if there were two meetings.

63. Mr. HARAN (Israel) said that he would make every effort to conform with the Chairman’s recommendations. As the Chairman had stressed, some aspects of the question went beyond the limits of the financing, in the strict sense, of the Emergency Force and, moreover, several representatives had not confined their observations to purely financial considerations. The representative of the Soviet Union had tried to attach a special financial responsibility to Israel because he claimed that Israel was the aggressor. That was a statement worthy of inclusion in the Soviet Encyclopaedia where history could be rewritten by inserting pages or changing them, but it was certainly out of place in the Fifth Committee. That Committee had to concern itself solely with facts and, fortunately for Israel, those facts showed clearly that the aggression of 6 October had been committed by the Arab States. Proof of that statement was to be found in United Nations documents.

64. Mr. KABARITI (Jordan), speaking on a point of order, said that the Chairman had asked representatives to confine their statements to the item before the Committee. The representative of Israel was speaking of quite another subject.

65. The CHAIRMAN said that when he had made his recommendations on the right of reply, he had said that the question under consideration was a very difficult one, and that although many of its political aspects had been examined in the Security Council and the General Assembly in plenary session, some representatives had raised them again at the present meeting. That was why the representative of Israel had asked to exercise his right of reply. The

Chairman hoped that the representatives who had already spoken, and who had thought fit to speak of the political aspects of the question, would permit the representative of Israel to do the same in his right of reply.

66. Mr. HARAN (Israel) drew the attention of the Fifth Committee to paragraph 3 of document S/7930/Add.2141,⁴ in which the Chief of Staff of UNTSO stated that, on 6 October 1973, Egyptian ground forces had crossed the Suez Canal and that Syrian forces had crossed the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines. Those were facts that had not been denied nor could be denied by any of the belligerents. Moreover, Ihsan Abdel Kudus, an Egyptian journalist and close confidant of President Sadat, in an article published on 27 October 1973 in the weekly magazine *Akhbar El Yom*, had confirmed that it had been Egypt that had begun the war.

67. Following interruptions by a number of representatives, the CHAIRMAN appealed to the representative of Israel to confine himself, if possible, specifically to replying to the statements which had been made by representatives who had spoken before him.

68. Mr. HARAN (Israel) cited President Assad of the Syrian Arab Republic who, on 6 October 1973, had also admitted that it was Syria that had attacked Israel.

69. After further interruptions, the CHAIRMAN recalled that he had asked members of the Committee to help further the Committee's work by confining themselves to replying to statements that had been made during the course of the current meeting. He also reminded members that it would be extremely useful if those representatives to whom the Committee had had the courtesy to listen could extend the same courtesy to other representatives who wished to make their statements.

70. Mr. BOUAYAD-AGHA (Algeria), speaking on a point of order, agreed with the Chairman that the representative of Israel had the right to exercise his right of reply. He should, nevertheless, confine himself to speaking on the item on the agenda, which was the financing of the Emergency Force and the allocation of the expenses imputable to the Emergency Force. If the representative of Israel considered that the statements of certain other representatives were incorrect, he should prove as much. Any other considerations were out of order.

71. Following further interruptions by a number of representatives, the CHAIRMAN appealed to representatives to reply to specific statements made during the meeting. If that was impossible, he would have no alternative but to adjourn the meeting.

72. Mr. HARAN (Israel) said that in exercising his right of reply he was doing so to prove that the allegations by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Yemen and Egypt that Israel was the aggressor were completely unfounded. That was why he had quoted from statements by Arab leaders and journalists.

73. The representative of Yemen had claimed that the United Nations Emergency Force had been established to make the Israeli forces retire to the cease-fire lines of 22 October and had also quoted the Prime Minister of Israel in that connexion, but the representative of Algeria had not, of course, interrupted the speaker at that time. The representative of Yemen had asserted that the Israeli Prime Minister had said that there existed no cease-fire lines of 22 October. That was obvious, since the only cease-fire lines which had been defined were those of 6 October, which had been violated by the Arab States. As to the statement by the representative of Yemen that the United Nations Emergency Force had been established because Israel had not respected the cease-fire, perusal of the Security Council resolution establishing the Force and of the Secretary-General's report to the Council was sufficient refutation.

74. Moreover, in the meantime the situation had evolved appreciably and Israel had reached an agreement with Egypt with a view to beginning negotiations concerning the disengagement and separation of forces. He began to read the terms of paragraph B of the Agreement signed by representatives of Israel and Egypt on 11 November 1973.⁵

75. Following further interruptions by a number of representatives, the CHAIRMAN decided to adjourn the meeting.

[See the note following paragraph 60 above.]

AGENDA ITEM 79

Proposed programme budget for the biennium 1974-1975 and medium-term plan for the period 1974-1977 (continued)* (for the earlier documentation, see 1589th meeting; A/9008/Add.9 and 11, A/C.5/1540, A/C.5/1543, A/C.5/1544, A/C.5/1545, A/C.5/1547)

First reading (continued)*

SECTION 14. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (A/9006, A/9008 AND ADD.6, A/C.5/1520 AND CORR.1 AND 2, A/C.5/L.1111)

76. Mr. PEREZ-GUERRERO (Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) said that UNCTAD, although it was still far from having attained the objectives laid down in the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade in its field of competence, had made progress in some sectors, and needed all the support it could obtain from the Fifth Committee and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to carry out the programme of work involved in the conclusions of its third session. UNCTAD had undertaken important intergovernmental consultations on commodities, in close co-operation with FAO. With respect to the multilateral trade negotiations, he said that the Tokyo Declaration, adopted on 14 September 1973, largely reflected UNCTAD's ideas and approach. There was no doubt

* Resumed from the 1598th meeting.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Supplement for October, November and December 1973, document S/11056/Add.3, annex.

⁴ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1973*.

that UNCTAD would be able to establish useful co-operation with GATT in that field. UNCTAD had also assisted IMF in the important work it was currently undertaking. Furthermore, UNCTAD had convened an important conference in Geneva which was expected to prepare, by the end of 1973, a universally acceptable code of conduct for liner conferences, which, for the first time, would have regard to the interests of all countries. It should also be noted that UNCTAD was participating in the preparation of the charter of economic rights and duties of States; it would have to ask for additional funds for that purpose, and that request would eventually be submitted to the Fifth Committee. UNCTAD was also concerned with the situation of the least developed countries and the landlocked countries, which had to overcome special difficulties and deserved preferential treatment from the international community.

77. UNCTAD fully understood that the financial difficulties of the United Nations made economies necessary, even in priority areas, and it would make every effort to carry out its activities within the limits of the funds available. But it must not be forgotten that its activities were expanding, in accordance with the wishes of the

member States, which had entrusted it with additional tasks. On the manning table there were less than one third of the vacancies there had been in 1972. UNCTAD needed some additional posts. It must have an adequate basis for carrying out its work programme, and needed to have some flexibility. In conclusion he said that he was now actively engaged with the Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management in working out a formula that would enable UNCTAD to achieve its aims.

78. The CHAIRMAN thanked the Secretary-General of UNCTAD for having addressed the Fifth Committee before leaving and expressed his regret that Mr. Pérez-Guerrero would be unable to be present for the discussion of section 14 of the programme budget. It was because of the exceptional circumstances that a departure had been made, with the agreement of the Chairman of the Advisory Committee, from the normal practice, whereby the latter introduced each of the budget sections.

[See the note following paragraph 60 above.]

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.

1604th meeting

Tuesday, 20 November 1973, at 10.50 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. C. S. M. MSELLE (United Republic of Tanzania).

A/C.5/SR.1604

AGENDA ITEM 109

Financing of the United Nations Emergency Force established pursuant to Security Council resolution 340 (1973): report of the Secretary-General (*continued*): (A/9285, A/9314, A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1, A/C.5/L.1134, A/C.5/L.1135, A/C.5/L.1136)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the list of speakers on agenda item 109 would be closed at 1 p.m. that day. As the Committee was running almost 10 days behind the programme of work which it had established, a night meeting had been scheduled.

2. On the preceding day, he had taken the decision to adjourn the meeting because he had considered that that was the best thing to do in the circumstances. As recommended in annex V of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly with regard to the exercise of the right of reply, he intended to invite the representatives of Israel, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Egypt to speak at the end of the night meeting. He hoped that, with the co-operation of all members of the Committee, it would be possible to respect the principles governing the exercise of the right of reply, which he had recalled on the preceding day. Because of the special nature of the question under consideration, he realized that it was sometimes difficult to confine remarks to its financial aspects, but he again urged

representatives exercising their right of reply to limit themselves to replying to the specific points raised in the statements to which they were referring.

3. Mr. ZIEHL (Acting Head, Office of Financial Services) replied in the affirmative to the representative of Ghana, who had asked at the preceding meeting whether a per diem allowance would be paid to members of the Emergency Force, as it had been for members of the first United Nations Emergency Force and during the Congo operation. The allowance had then been fixed at 86 cents per day or the equivalent in local currency, and it had been specified that its purpose had been not to compensate for differences between the pay and allowances given by the different Member States to their armed forces but simply to enable members of the Force to meet their personal and recreational needs, as had been indicated in paragraph 12 of the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions issued in 1956 under the symbol A/3402.¹ As stated by the representative of Ghana, there was no such allowance for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, but it had been considered that in the case of the Emergency Force in the Middle East the conditions of service were different enough to justify payment of the allowance.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Annexes*, agenda item 66.