

**REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON CONTRIBUTIONS**

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

OFFICIAL RECORDS: FORTY-SIXTH SESSION

SUPPLEMENT No. 11 (A/46/11)



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New York, 1991

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

[12 July 1991]

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I. ATTENDANCE

1. The fifty-first session of the Committee on Contributions was held at United Nations Headquarters from 3 to 23 June 1991. The following members were present:

Mr. Kenshiro AKIMOTO

Syed Amjad ALI

Mr. Henrik AMNEUS

Mr. Sergio CHAPARRO Ruiz

Mr. Yuri A. CHULKOV

Mr. Jorge José DUHALT

Mr. John D. FOX

Mr. Ion GORITZA

Mr. Peter GREGG

Mr. Elias M. C. KAZEMBE

Mr. Vanu G. MENON

Mr. Atilio N. MOLTENI

Mr. Mohamed Mahmoud OULD EL GHAOUTH

Mr. Dimitri RALLIS

Mr. Ugo SESSI

Mr. WANG Liansheng

Mr. Assen ZLATANOV

Mr. Bagbeni Adesito Nzengeya was not able to attend.

2. The Committee elected Syed Amjad Ali as Chairman and Mr. Dimitri Rallis as Vice-Chairman.

II. TERMS OF REFERENCE

3. The Committee conducted its work on the basis of General Assembly resolution 45/256 A and C of 21 December 1990, which reads as follows:

"A

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling all its previous resolutions on the scale of assessments, in particular resolutions 43/223 B of 21 December 1988 and 44/197 A of 21 December 1989,

"Having considered the report of the Committee on Contributions, 1/

"Taking note of the views expressed in the Fifth Committee during the forty-fifth session, 2/

"Bearing in mind the difficult economic situation faced by many Member States, in particular the developing countries and among them the least developed countries,

"1. Reaffirms that:

"(a) The capacity of Member States to pay is the fundamental criterion for determining the scale of assessments;

"(b) The scale of assessments should be determined on the basis of reliable, verifiable and comparable data;

"(c) The methodology for determining the scale of assessments should be simplified as far as possible with a view to making it more transparent and stable over time;

"2. Requests the Committee on Contributions to recommend to the General Assembly at its forty-sixth session a scale of assessments whose period of applicability will then be decided by the Assembly and which is prepared on the basis of the recommendations of the Committee contained in its report, 1/ taking into account the following:

"(a) The debt adjustment approach used in the preparation of the scale of assessments for the period 1989-1991;

"(b) A low per capita income allowance formula, taking into account the recommendations of the Committee, adjusted in accordance with the evolution of the average world per capita income until 1989;

"1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 11 (A/45/11).

"2/ Ibid., Forty-fifth Session, Fifth Committee, 3rd to 5th, 7th to 9th, 13th, 15th and 52nd meetings, and corrigendum.

"(c) Individual rates for the least developed countries should not exceed their present level, namely 0.01 per cent;

"3. Also requests the Committee on Contributions to use the criteria specified in paragraph 42 of its report for the ad hoc adjustment of the machine scale and to provide detailed information on the decisions made in this regard; it is recognized that the ad hoc adjustment process depends on the availability of points provided voluntarily by Member States;

"4. Further requests the Committee on Contributions to continue its work on the improvement of the methodology for the preparation of future scales of assessment, in particular with regard to:

"(a) The scheme of limits, with a view to reducing speedily any of its excessive distorting effects;

"(b) The possible modification of the statistical base period;

"(c) The possibility of excluding the allocation of any additional points, as a result of the application of the scheme of limits, to those Member States having a very low per capita income;

"(d) The application of debt-adjusted income as recommended by the Committee in its report and the debt adjustment factor and taking into account the views expressed during the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly;

"(e) The application of price-adjusted rates of exchange;

"(f) Alternative income concepts;

"(g) The possible use of factors that take account of the situation of countries with economic characteristics such as those outlined in paragraph 3 of Assembly resolution 43/223 B;

"(h) The relationship of each of the elements and factors as part of the overall methodology;

"5. Requests the Committee on Contributions to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-sixth session a report on the work undertaken in response to the requests contained in paragraph 4 of the present resolution;

"6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Committee on Contributions with the facilities it requires to carry out its work, including supplementary assistance if necessary."

...

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling rule 160 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly,

"Requests the Committee on Contributions to hold in 1991, on an experimental basis, one or two information meetings, in a manner to be decided by the Committee, prior to executing the ad hoc adjustment of the machine scale, so as to give Member States the opportunity to provide the Committee with additional information as deemed necessary for the purpose of making the ad hoc adjustments."

III. ORGANIZATION OF WORK

4. The Committee on Contributions began its task of preparing the new scale of assessments by reviewing the statistical information provided by Member States as well as non-member States for the years 1980 to 1989.

5. In the process of framing the machine scale, the Committee noted the declared intent of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to seek United Nations membership as indicated in documents S/22642 and S/22455, respectively. In view of the near certainty of the two States becoming members before the end of 1991, the Committee examined machine scales including as well as excluding the two States. However, doubts arose about the appropriateness of including in a scale of assessments to be formally recommended to the General Assembly for adoption States not yet members of the United Nations.

6. The Committee requested the opinion of the Office of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat in this matter. The Office of Legal Affairs recalled that, as set out in rule 160 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, the mandate of the Committee on Contributions is to "advise the General Assembly concerning the apportionment, under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter, of the expenses of the Organization among Members, broadly according to capacity to pay". The inclusion by the Committee in its report to the Assembly of information on how expenses would be apportioned to non-member States would, on its face, fall outside that mandate. The Committee was also cautioned not to appear to be prejudging the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on whether or not to admit the States concerned. However, the legal opinion also noted that if the Committee limited itself to proposing a scale of assessments of Member States as of June 1991, that scale might well be out of date by the time the Fifth Committee considered the matter at the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly. The Office of Legal Affairs also advised that, without recommending any hypothetical scale of assessments in its report, the Committee could nevertheless consider the case of a scale of assessments which included the two States in question, and, should the two States indeed be admitted, authorize its Chairman to bring its views on such a scale of assessments to the attention of the Fifth Committee.

7. In an effort to fulfil its mandate under paragraphs 2 and 3 of General Assembly resolution 45/256 A to pre-empt the need for a resumed session of the Committee and to facilitate the work of the Fifth Committee as much as possible, and, at the same time, not wanting to exceed its mandate or prejudice the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, the Committee, having carefully considered the advice of the Office of Legal Affairs, decided to include in the body of the present report a machine scale excluding the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and without ad hoc adjustments. Annex IA to the present report contains a scale of assessments that includes the two States and reflects ad hoc adjustments that the Committee could execute more readily for this version of the new scale. In the event the two States are admitted to the United Nations, the Chairman will seek immediately by mail the authorization of the Committee members to recommend to the General Assembly for adoption the scale of assessments contained in column 7 of annex IA.

8. The Committee also held an information meeting for Member States (see para. 36) and continued its work on the improvement of the methodology for the preparation of future scales of assessment (see sect. VIII).

IV. CURRENT METHODOLOGY

A. Current scale methodology and its application

9. The capacity to pay is the fundamental criterion for determining the scale of assessments. For ease of reference, the methodology currently used to approximate the capacity to pay and its application are briefly described.

10. The components of the methodology and criteria comprise the following:

(a) National income data provided by all States for the 10-year period 1980-1989;

(b) Debt relief reduces the annual national income of eligible countries with high levels of external debt;

(c) The low per capita income allowance formula reduces the national income already adjusted for debt relief on the basis of its two parameters, namely the upper per capita income limit of \$2,600 and the relief gradient of 85 per cent;

(d) The rates of assessment of Member States may not be lower than 0.01 per cent (floor rate) or exceed 25.00 per cent (ceiling rate);

(e) The assessment rates of least developed countries (LDCs) may not exceed 0.01 per cent;

(f) The scheme of limits avoids excessive variations of individual rates of assessments between successive scales.

11. The national income data in United States dollars are prepared by the United Nations Statistical Office for all Member States. For countries with market economies, the figures are derived as follows:

Gross domestic product

Plus : Net factor income from the rest of the world
Equals : Gross national product
Minus : Consumption of fixed capital
Equals : National income in national currency

Application of exchange rate 1/

Equals : National income in United States dollars

12. For countries with centrally planned economies during the years 1980-1989, the derivation of national income involves these steps:

Net material product

Plus : Wages and salaries paid by units of the non-material sphere (excluding allowances for business trips)
Plus : Contributions to social insurance paid by units of the non-material sphere
Plus : Insurance compensation received by the material sphere
Plus : Profit in the non-material sphere
Minus : Losses in reserves in the material sphere
Minus : Insurance premiums paid from the material sphere
Minus : Expenditures on social and cultural services furnished by enterprises of the material sphere to their employees
Minus : Imputed gross output of financial institutions (banks and insurance companies) destined for enterprises in the material and non-material spheres
Plus : Net factor income received from abroad
Equals : National income at market prices in national currency

Application of exchange rate 1/

Equals : National income in United States dollars

13. The methodology transforms national income in United States dollars into assessable income for the determination of individual assessment rates, which are then adjusted through the application of the various limits. In annex IA to the present report, the step-by-step adjustments to the national income averages for the years 1980-1989 through the application of the current methodology are shown for all Member States for the scale of assessments. Annex IB shows the number of points which are redistributed among Member States by each of the steps. The end result is referred to as a machine scale whose calculation is based upon the following adjustment steps:

(a) The national income of countries identified for debt relief is reduced by an amount based on a theoretical debt-service ratio. On the assumption that total external debt outstanding is repaid on the average in approximately eight years, 12 per cent of this debt is deducted from the national income of eligible countries. By reducing the sum total of national incomes, this adjustment increases not the absolute but the proportionate national income of the Member States that received no debt relief or whose relative debt relief reduction is lower than the amount of total debt relief as a percentage of total national income (see annex IA, columns 1 and 2, for the percentage distribution and annex IB, column 1, for the point differences);

(b) The national income figures resulting from step (a) are further adjusted for low per capita national income. The national income of countries whose per capita national income is below the per capita income limit of \$2,600 is reduced by the percentage resulting from calculating 85 per cent of the percentage difference between the country's per capita income and \$2,600. For example, for a country with an average per capita income of \$1,000, the average total national income, adjusted for debt relief, is reduced by 52.3 per cent ($\$2,600 - \$1,000 = \$1,600$; $\$1,600 = 61.5$ per cent of $\$2,600$; 85 per cent of 61.5 per cent = 52.3 per cent). The total amount of relief granted is added to the national income of the countries not affected by the formula in proportion to their respective share (pro rata) of their collective

national income. The national income figures thus adjusted constitute the assessable income (see annex IA, column 3, and annex IB, column 2);

(c) The ceiling and floor rates are applied and the assessment rates of the least developed countries are reviewed to ensure that they do not increase. The points that make up the difference between the sum of the assessment rates thus adjusted and 100.00 per cent are distributed, on a pro rata basis, among the countries with assessment rates below the ceiling and above the floor that are not least developed countries (see annex IA, columns 4 and 5, and annex IB, columns 3 and 4);

(d) The scheme of limits is applied. It consists of eight rate brackets and two sets of constraints, i.e., percentage and index point limits, which delimit the maximum possible individual rate increases or decreases between two scales. The level of the maximum increase or decrease is defined by the limit with the lesser value. For example, the rate of a Member State that was assessed at 3.21 per cent under the 1989-1991 scale can increase or decrease by a maximum of 0.24 points for the new scale ($3.21 \times 0.075 = 0.24$); similarly, a 1989-1991 rate of 2.31 can increase or decrease by a maximum of 0.20 points ($2.31 \times 0.1 = 0.23$).

If the present official
scale is

The percentage change in the new machine scale
should not be more than the lesser of:

Percentage limits

Index point limits

Above 5.00 per cent	5.0	75 points
2.50 - 4.99 per cent	7.5	30 points
1.00 - 2.49 per cent	10.0	20 points
0.76 - 0.99 per cent	12.5	11 points
0.51 - 0.75 per cent	15.0	10 points
0.25 - 0.50 per cent	17.5	6 points
0.05 - 0.24 per cent	20.0	2 points
0.01 - 0.04 per cent	-	1 point

14. After the application of the scheme of limits, the points that cannot be absorbed by countries whose rates of assessment have reached the level permissible under the scheme of limits are distributed, on a pro rata basis, among those countries whose assessment rate increases or decreases are within the constraints established by the scheme of limits (see annex IA, column 6, and annex IB, column 5).

B. Review of the upper per capita income limit

15. In accordance with the mandate contained in paragraph 2 (b) of General Assembly resolution 45/256 A, the Committee examined anew the appropriate level of the adjustment for the upper per capita income limit of \$2,200 applied for the 1986-1988 and 1989-1991 scales of assessments. It recalled its recent deliberations and recommendation in this regard, 2/ which had

focused on avoiding the past practice of increasing the upper per capita income limit on an ad hoc basis.

16. The Committee noted that the upper per capita income limit had been established at \$1,000 in 1948 and left at that level until 1974; the gradient was initially set at 40 per cent; it increased to 50 per cent in 1953 and did not change again until 1974. Both components of the low per capita income allowance formula have been adjusted since then; the more recent changes are shown below:

Comparison of average world per capita income and per capita income limits for statistical base periods after 1970

Assessment scale period (i)	Statistical base period (ii)	Average world per capita income (iii)	Per capita income limit (iv)	Percentage difference (v)
1980-1982	1971-1977	1 210	1 800	49
1983-1985	1971-1980	1 458	2 100	43
1986-1988	1974-1983	1 845	2 200	19
1989-1991	1977-1986	2 155	2 200	2
1992-1994	1980-1989	2 555	2 600	1

The Committee noted that the average per capita income and the per capita income limit have come closer together over time. The Committee decided to use an upper per capita income level of \$2,600 for the preparation of the new scale of assessments, as it approximated the average world per capita income for the statistical base period 1980-1989.

17. One member of the Committee opposed the decision to use \$2,600 as an upper per capita income limit. He noted that the limit was first established in 1948 at a level of \$1,000, which was well above the average world per capita income at that time, and that historically the limit had been maintained at higher levels than the average world per capita income as shown in paragraph 16. He recalled that the upper per capita income limit has been described as a concept that refers to a minimum level of income required to satisfy the basic needs of the population and, therefore, its amount does not necessarily have to be equivalent to the amount of the average world per capita income, although both of them should evolve accordingly. He noted

that the Statistical Office provided information on the evolution of average world per capita income, showing that it increased by 16.8 per cent between the two statistical base periods 1974-1983 and 1977-1986 and by 18.6 per cent between the two statistical base periods 1977-1986 and 1980-1989. He argued that, according to the information provided by the Statistical Office, the average world per capita income has grown 38.5 per cent since 1985, when the \$2,200 level was first adopted, and, therefore, the upper per capita income limit should be established at \$3,000 so as to reflect this evolution. He also noted that the increase in the upper per capita income limit to \$2,600 represents, in fact, a reduction in real terms of the level established in 1985 and pointed out that the level had to be raised to at least \$2,800 in order to maintain the same real value as in 1985.

18. Some members advocated the use of the estimated average world per capita income as the upper per capita income limit in the low per capita income allowance formula. They argued that this would have the advantage of being automatically adjusted in accordance with the evolution of the world per capita income and at the same time would contribute to the establishment of a system which would be stable over time.

19. Some other members considered the increase to \$2,600 more than adequate in view of the problems of calculating an average inflation rate that reflected differences in purchasing power. They felt that the average world per capita income did not reflect the differences in purchasing powers of States and could not therefore be used to automatically adjust the upper per capita income limit.

20. In response to these observations, the Committee examined the difference in the net impact of the three levels; the results of this comparison are shown in annex II to the present report.

C. Debt adjustment approach

21. As mandated by paragraph 2 (a) of General Assembly resolution 45/256 A, the Committee employed in the preparation of the new scale the debt adjustment approach used for the scale of assessments for the period 1989-1991. For this adjustment, the Statistical Office relies on debt stock information provided by Member States to the World Bank and published in the World Debt Tables. These data are used by the World Bank for its operational purposes and include debt stock information for countries below a certain level of national per capita income, which changes over time, resulting in a changing universe of countries for which debt stock data are available at any given time.

22. The Committee noted that these characteristics of the data used for the debt adjustment approach had resulted in debt relief adjustments for two Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries for the 1986-1988 and the 1989-1991 scale, namely Greece and Portugal. The Statistical Office had again made debt adjustments for these countries in computing the new machine scale for those years of the statistical base period that these countries were part of the World Bank universe.

23. Some members of the Committee expressed reservation about the inclusion of OECD countries in the universe of countries receiving debt relief

adjustments in the scale of assessments. Noting that Greece was no longer part of the World Bank universe in 1989, they argued that the inclusion of the two countries violated the spirit underlying those adjustments, which were intended to benefit developing countries burdened by large amounts of external debt. The Committee noted that concern but could not reach a conclusion on whether or how to substitute its own criteria for those of the World Bank. Issues of both consistency and data availability are involved in the question. If the Committee defined its own universe of countries eligible for debt adjustments, it would risk the unavailability or non-comparability of data for some of them. As previously reported, 3/ debt stock data from other sources, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are not comparable to those of the World Bank. If the Committee continued to make debt adjustments on the basis of the World Bank's changing universe of countries, it would risk a certain incompatibility with the General Assembly's intent for the debt adjustments. In that context, it was noted that OECD as well as non-OECD countries might move in and out of the World Bank universe based on changing national per capita incomes.

24. In view of these circumstances and of the continued ad hoc nature of the debt adjustment approach, the Committee decided, in full awareness of the reservations of some of its members, to make the debt adjustment for the new scale of assessments on the basis of the World Bank criteria and data and to revert to the issue at a later stage.

D. Application of the scheme of limits to the assessment rates of non-member States on first becoming Member States

25. In the context of dealing with the integration into the next scale of assessments of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, the Committee addressed the issue of the application of the scheme of limits to the assessment rates of non-member States on first becoming Member States. In discussing this issue, the Committee recalled that the two States that became members since the introduction of the scheme of limits in the 1986-1988 scale were assessed at the floor rate and thus not affected by the scheme of limits. It also noted that the rights and obligations of Member States were quite different from those of non-member States, that a Member State's rate of assessment should reflect its capacity to pay and that Member States with similar national incomes and populations should be assessed at comparable levels.

26. For all these reasons, the Committee concluded that the change from non-member to Member State represented a fundamental change in status. Consequently, the Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly that the scheme of limits should not be applied to the assessment rate of a non-member State on first becoming a Member State. The scheme of limits would, of course, be applicable to a new Member State in the preparation of subsequent scales of assessments using the original rate of assessment as the base in the same manner as for all other Member States.

27. Some members expressed the view that in the light of the extremely high growth rate of the national income of the Republic of Korea, the effect of which cannot be adequately adjusted by the 10-year statistical base period, as well as the uncertainty concerning the future application of the scheme of limits, the Republic of Korea should benefit from the present scheme.

V. REVIEW OF THE SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS

A. Statistical information

28. The Statistical Office provided to the Committee a comprehensive database for all Member States and non-member States on national income in local currency, population, and exchange rates, and for external debt for countries eligible for debt relief adjustment for the period 1980-1989, which is the basis for the preparation of the next scale of assessments. The information presented also included derived data such as national income in United States dollars and average national and per capita incomes which were compared with the averages for the statistical base period 1977-1986 underlying the present scale of assessments. With the exception of the exchange rates of a few countries, the Committee accepted the data presented without change.

29. All data used by the Committee are provided by Member States as well as non-member States or are estimated on the basis of such data. National income data in local currency are compiled by the Statistical Office through its annual questionnaire on national accounts. Population information is based on official data and estimates published in the United Nations Demographic Yearbook. Average annual market exchange rates were obtained from IMF.

30. In accordance with past practice, the Committee converted the national income figures in local currencies provided by Member States into United States dollars by using the average market rates reported by Member States to IMF for each of the years of the statistical base period 1980-1989. For the rapidly decreasing group of countries that are not members of IMF, United Nations operational rates were used.

31. In this connection, the Committee considered a note by the United Nations Statistical Office which compared IMF exchange rates with price-adjusted rates of exchange (PARE). While PARE still has not been integrated into the scale methodology, these data enabled the Committee to identify countries in which exchange rate movements over time do not reflect changes in domestic prices. For these countries, the use of IMF exchange rates may result in a distorted measure of the capacity to pay. The Committee decided to use PARE for the conversion of national income in local currency to United States dollars for seven countries with extreme levels of distortion. These are: Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Lebanon, Nicaragua, Peru and Uganda.

32. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a representation to the Committee, had provided constructed exchange rates (weighted averages of actual exchange rates), which differed considerably from those published by IMF. The Committee examined these rates at great length but decided against their use owing to the fact that they resulted in what were considered unrealistically low average per capita incomes of well below \$2,000. On the other hand, the official rate results in unrealistically high average per capita incomes of almost \$4,000. In the light of the information available to it, the Committee decided that the application of PARE produced more realistic results (per capita income of \$2,545) for the period 1980-1989.

33. On the basis of all information available to the Committee, including that contained in a representation by Bulgaria, it was decided to apply again

the Committee's former decision to use the rate with premium submitted by the Government of Bulgaria as the conversion factor. 4/

34. On the basis of a representation by Romania to the Committee, it was decided to use the exchange rates provided by the Government of Romania, which were different from the ones so far published by IMF. Identical rates had been submitted to IMF. At the time of writing, IMF had not reached a conclusion on whether to change its published exchange rates for Romania.

B. Representations by Member States

35. The Committee had before it 10 written representations from the Governments of Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania and Saudi Arabia. It examined each of them carefully and took them into consideration in its work.

C. Information meeting for Member States

36. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 45/256 C, the Committee held an information meeting on 14 June 1991 to give Member States the opportunity to provide it with additional information as deemed necessary for the purpose of making the ad hoc adjustments. The meeting had been announced in the Journal of the United Nations in advance. During the meeting, the Committee heard 13 statements by representatives of the Governments of Algeria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Hungary, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Peru, Poland, Romania and Tunisia. The Chairman of the Committee informed the government representatives that the concerns expressed would be taken into consideration during the ad hoc adjustment of the machine scale and that the extent of possible relief would depend on the availability of points provided voluntarily for that purpose.

D. Ad hoc adjustments (mitigation) to the machine scale

37. As indicated in section III of the present report, the scale of assessments presented in section VI below is a machine scale excluding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea. The Committee was unable to secure points for the ad hoc adjustment of a machine scale that, in all likelihood, would be outdated after September 1991. In addition there was some reluctance to participate in two ad hoc adjustment processes. The scale shown in section VI has not, therefore, been subject to mitigation.

38. In making the ad hoc adjustments to the scale shown in annex I, the Committee was guided by paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 45/256 A. The oral and written representations made by Member States were also taken into account. On the basis of a strict interpretation of the criteria for ad hoc adjustments endorsed by the resolution, the Committee compiled a list of eight countries whose machine rates would warrant ad hoc adjustments. Particular attention was given to the effects of exchange rate distortions that could not be reduced by the application of PARE, the economic impact of the crisis brought about by the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, and substantial changes in economic circumstances of countries that have occurred since 1989.

39. The Committee had at its disposal 26 points offered by Japan for the purpose of the traditional ad hoc adjustments (for the other 24 points offered by Japan, see para. 59). It distributed 10 points on the basis of the list of countries referred to above. In the process of distribution, several Committee members felt that the criteria could be applied also to a number of other developing countries and the 16 additional points available were distributed on that basis. The results of the ad hoc adjustment process may be easily discerned from column 6 of annex IB.

40. Some members expressed the view that the number of points offered by Japan for mitigation was excessive and the resulting adjustments could not be fully justified in terms of the criteria established by the General Assembly. They argued that large-scale mitigation seriously undermined the capacity-to-pay principle. Those members also expressed reservations on the criteria used to distribute the additional 16 points.

VI. MACHINE SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS

41. The reasons for the inclusion of a machine scale rather than a final recommended scale in the body of the present report are outlined in section I above. In analysing the figures below, and, for that matter, the figures in annexes IA, IB and III, it may be useful to bear in mind the following:

(a) The machine scale was prepared in strict adherence to the General Assembly mandate contained in paragraph 2 of resolution 45/256 A;

(b) The primary reason for changes in individual rates of assessment is to be found in the absolute and relative changes of average national incomes between the statistical base periods 1977-1986 and 1980-1989. Since the scale of assessments is a zero-sum instrument, the relative changes in national incomes actually have greater impact on individual rates of assessment than patterns of absolute growth. This phenomenon explains in large part the decreases in the rates for some countries with strong economies and the increases for countries with economies which are perceived as rather weaker (annex IV). While both experienced economic growth in the 1980s, the relative rate of growth of the latter group exceeded that of the former during the 1980-1989 statistical base period;

(c) While the Committee made great efforts to alleviate the effects of the most extreme exchange rate distortions it was aware of the impossibility of eliminating them entirely. Even the universal application of PARE could not eliminate all such distortions;

(d) The debt adjustment approach, which is still of an ad hoc nature, provides relief to countries on the basis of their debt stock. Thus, it provides greater relief to countries with large outstanding debt rather than those which have repaid some or all of their external debt (71 points redistributed);

(e) The increase in the upper per capita income level provides additional relief to countries with average per capita incomes of less than \$2,600. In the zero-sum context, the total amount of relief granted is added to the national income of the countries with higher average per capita incomes in proportion to their share of their collective national incomes (827 points redistributed);

(f) The large-scale distortions of the capacity to pay inherent in the application of the floor and ceiling rates are manifest (51 and 551 points redistributed as result of floor and ceiling, respectively);

(g) The scheme of limits is intended to avoid excessive variations of individual rates of assessment between successive scales (382 points redistributed).

It should be noted that, without affecting the end result, the volume of points redistributed through the application of each of the elements of the methodology, as shown in parenthesis at the end of subparagraphs (d) to (g) above, might be different if the elements of the methodology were applied in a different order.

42. The complex interaction of all these factors produced the machine scale below:

<u>Member State</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Afghanistan	0.01
Albania	0.01
Algeria	0.17
Angola	0.01
Antigua and Barbuda	0.01
Argentina	0.57
Australia	1.54
Austria	0.77
Bahamas	0.02
Bahrain	0.03
Bangladesh	0.01
Barbados	0.01
Belgium	1.07
Belize	0.01
Benin	0.01
Bhutan	0.01
Bolivia	0.02
Botswana	0.01
Brazil	1.60
Brunei Darussalam	0.03
Bulgaria	0.13
Burkina Faso	0.01
Burundi	0.01
Cambodia	0.01
Cameroon	0.02
Canada	3.17
Cape Verde	0.01
Central African Republic	0.01
Chad	0.01
Chile	0.08
China	0.79
Colombia	0.13
Comoros	0.01
Congo	0.01
Costa Rica	0.01
Côte d'Ivoire	0.02
Cuba	0.11
Cyprus	0.02
Czechoslovakia	0.57
Denmark	0.66
Djibouti	0.01
Dominica	0.01
Dominican Republic	0.02
Ecuador	0.04
Egypt	0.08
El Salvador	0.02
Equatorial Guinea	0.01
Ethiopia	0.01
Fiji	0.01

<u>Member State</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Finland	0.57
France	6.05
Gabon	0.02
Gambia	0.01
Germany	9.02
Ghana	0.01
Greece	0.36
Grenada	0.01
Guatemala	0.03
Guinea	0.01
Guinea-Bissau	0.01
Guyana	0.01
Haiti	0.01
Honduras	0.01
Hungary	0.19
Iceland	0.03
India	0.38
Indonesia	0.17
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0.79
Iraq	0.14
Ireland	0.18
Israel	0.23
Italy	4.29
Jamaica	0.01
Japan	11.95
Jordan	0.02
Kenya	0.01
Kuwait	0.27
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.01
Lebanon	0.01
Lesotho	0.01
Liberia	0.01
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	0.25
Liechtenstein	0.1
Luxembourg	0.06
Madagascar	0.01
Malawi	0.01
Malaysia	0.13
Maldives	0.01
Mali	0.01
Malta	0.01
Mauritania	0.01
Mauritius	0.01
Mexico	0.90
Mongolia	0.01
Morocco	0.04
Mozambique	0.01
Myanmar	0.01
Namibia	0.01
Nepal	0.01
Netherlands	1.52
New Zealand	2.25

<u>Member State</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Nicaragua	0.01
Niger	0.01
Nigeria	0.21
Norway	0.56
Oman	0.03
Pakistan	0.07
Panama	0.02
Papua New Guinea	0.01
Paraguay	0.02
Peru	0.07
Philippines	0.08
Poland	0.49
Portugal	0.20
Qatar	0.05
Romania	0.17
Rwanda	0.01
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.01
Saint Lucia	0.01
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.01
Samoa	0.01
Sao Tome and Principe	0.01
Saudi Arabia	0.98
Senegal	0.01
Seychelles	0.01
Sierra Leone	0.01
Singapore	0.13
Solomon Islands	0.01
Somalia	0.01
South Africa	0.43
Spain	2.02
Sri Lanka	0.01
Sudan	0.01
Suriname	0.01
Swaziland	0.01
Sweden	1.13
Syrian Arab Republic	0.05
Thailand	0.12
Togo	0.01
Trinidad and Tobago	0.05
Tunisia	0.03
Turkey	0.27
Uganda	0.01
USSR	11.21
United Arab Emirates	0.21
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	5.12
United Republic of Tanzania	0.01
United States of America	25.00
Uruguay	0.05
Vanuatu	0.01
Venezuela	0.49
Viet Nam	0.01
Yamen	0.01

<u>Member State</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Yugoslavia	0.44
Zaire	0.01
Zambia	0.01
Zimbabwe	<u>0.01</u>
Total	<u>100.00</u>

VII. ASSESSMENT OF NON-MEMBER STATES

43. In establishing the rates of assessment that form the basis for the calculation of the flat annual fee of which non-member States should contribute to the expenses of the United Nations under the new scale of assessments, the Committee applied the same methodology as for Member States. The proposed rates are as follows:

<u>Non-member State</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0.05 a/
Holy See	0.01
Monaco	0.01
Nauru	0.01
Republic of Korea	0.24 a/
San Marino	0.01
Switzerland	1.16
Tonga	0.01

a/ Not applicable in case of admission as Member States.

44. In accordance with the procedure established by the General Assembly, the rates of assessment are subject to consultations with the Governments concerned.

45. It is recalled that the General Assembly, in its resolution 44/197 B of 21 December 1989, endorsed revised assessment procedures for non-member States. They provide for assessment of contributions on the basis of a flat annual fee which is calculated for each non-member State on the basis of its past level of participation in United Nations activities. It is then applied to the applicable assessment base which equals the total net assessment for the United Nations regular budget for the year, adjusted for tax refunds. The flat annual fee rates in effect are:

<u>Non-member State</u>	Flat annual fee as proportion of <u>assessment rate</u> %
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	10 a/
Holy See	10
Monaco	5
Nauru	1
Republic of Korea	15 a/
San Marino	5
Switzerland	30
Tonga	5

a/ Not applicable in case of admission as Member States.

VIII. POSSIBLE FUTURE ADJUSTMENTS OF THE CURRENT METHODOLOGY

46. In accordance with the mandate contained in paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 45/256 A, the Committee continued its work on the improvement of the methodology for the preparation of future scales of assessment. In the time remaining after the preparation of the next scale of assessments, the Committee was not able to deal with all eight topics listed in paragraph 4. It decided to concentrate its efforts on the statistical base period, the scheme of limits and PARE.

47. In the course of the discussion on these topics, some members expressed the view that, because of the close interrelationship of each of the elements and factors of the methodology, the room for improvements of the individual elements and factors was very limited so long as a very important criterion (i.e., the ceiling, which is another kind of limit) was left out of the consideration. In that connection, they pointed out that the burden of transfer by the application of the ceiling in the machine scale amounted to 551 points as against 382 for the scheme of limits. Those members noted that recently the scale of assessments had been discussed in the General Assembly in an increasingly difficult climate in which many Member States sought to reduce as much as possible their rates of assessment. They considered that that problem had arisen because the rates of assessment were based exclusively on the principle of capacity to pay. In their opinion it was time to review the methodology in a much wider framework so that Member States would look upon their assessed contributions in a more positive light taking into account the benefits and privileges of membership. For example, they considered that the rates of assessment could be linked partly to the participation or membership of Member States in the main organs of the United Nations such as the Security Council, or the Secretariat. In their view, the total minimum share of the permanent members of the Security Council should also be fixed.

48. Other members shared the views expressed in paragraph 47 above that the negative attitudes about the scale of assessments reflect the fact that rates of assessment are based primarily on the principle of capacity to pay. They agreed that the time has come to reconsider the methodology in an effort to have Member States look upon their assessed contributions in a more positive light as a reflection of the benefits and privileges of membership. They suggested that, in addition to linking rates of assessment partly to factors such as seats held by Member States in the major organs of the United Nations and positions held by nationals of Member States in the Secretariat, rates of assessment might also be linked to factors reflecting the interest of Member States in the United Nations such as the size of their missions to the Organization. In regard to the suggestion that the total share of the regular budget paid by permanent members of the Security Council should be fixed, some other members thought there was no basis for such a concept and noted that the *special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council* already are reflected in their increased rates of assessment for special peace-keeping accounts.

49. In regard to the reference in paragraph 47 above about the redistribution of points required by application of the ceiling rate, some members recalled that the possibility of making changes in the ceiling and floor rates of assessment has long been considered a major policy issue well beyond the mandate of the Committee. Furthermore, they expressed the view that it may be

misleading to indicate that application of the ceiling rate requires the redistribution of 551 points. They observed that, while the purpose of the scheme of limits necessitates it to be the last adjustment applied to national income, it appeared that there is no methodological necessity for applying the ceiling rate next to last. As indicated in paragraph 41 above, they noted that the amount of points to be redistributed for each adjustment would depend upon the order in which the adjustments are made. For example, the ceiling rate would require the redistribution of 259 points in the current scale if it were applied as the first adjustment to national income.

50. In the context of its discussion on the upper per capita income limit (see sect. IV, B), the Committee decided to recommend that future adjustments be based on the change in average world per capita income.

A. Statistical base period

51. The Committee examined a number of statistical tables showing the effects of varying statistical base periods using a database updated to and including the year 1989. Annex V illustrates the effects of using statistical base periods of 12, 7, 5 and 3 years.

52. Analysis of the data did not lead to unanimity of opinion among Committee members. Some Committee members voiced their inclination to consider a statistical base period of less than 10 years. They sympathized with the sentiment repeatedly expressed in Fifth Committee debates that a shorter base period would more realistically reflect capacity to pay at the time of payment. It was felt that that argument was all the more relevant in view of the recent market changes in the economies of the countries in Eastern Europe and in countries affected by the crisis brought about by the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. Those members also felt that considerable continuity had been achieved with the 10-year statistical base period that had been used in the scales of assessment in effect since 1983.

53. Some members reaffirmed the need for the stability and continuity inherent in the 10-year statistical base period and emphasized its ability to capture some indication of national wealth and capital accumulation. They held that, over time, it resulted in more realistic assessment rates for the vast majority of Member States by evening out the impact of abrupt or short-lived economic changes. They also pointed out that that issue had been discussed at great length in the Fifth Committee during the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly, when the majority of Member States had expressed support for a 10-year statistical base period.

54. Other members of the Committee expressed the opinion that any decision on changing the statistical base period should be made taking into account the close relationship between the statistical base period and the scheme of limits. It was noted that long statistical base periods may obviate the need for the scheme of limits as they smooth out economic changes over time. Shorter statistical base periods, while better reflecting capacity to pay at the time of payment, might, however, result in the kind of excessive increase or decrease in individual rates between successive scales which the scheme of limits was designed to temper.

B. Scheme of limits

55. The Committee considered this topic on the basis of a note by the Secretariat and a number of statistical tables. The Committee recalled its extensive discussion at its fiftieth session and re-examined the effects of alternative rate brackets and constraints and the progressive application of the scheme of limits over a three-year scale period using the new machine scale. A summary table of the effects of several options is contained in annex VI.

56. Some members noted the benefit of the scheme of limits in the new machine scales to a large number of developing countries which, in their opinion, outweighed the excessive positive or negative impact its application has on the assessment rates of a few developed countries. They also noted in that context the distorting impact of the ceiling. Some other members noted that the scheme of limits benefited 18 countries and that the principal beneficiaries were developed countries. That circumstance resulted in increased rates of assessment for 26 mainly developed countries, with the single largest impact on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In that context, some members of the Committee advocated the gradual abolition of the scheme of limits.

57. The Committee examined five different modifications of the scheme of limits as shown in annex VI. It noted that four of them produced very modest results and therefore did not warrant further study. However, the Committee noted that the progressive application of the scheme of limits over a three-year scale period would result in the phasing out of the scheme of limits in the course of one or two three-year scale periods provided that the rates of the third year of one scale period were used as the basis for comparison with the machine scale of the next three-year scale period. It was also noted that similar results and consequences could be obtained through the successive use of one-year scale periods. However, those modifications might result in increases in the rates of developing countries and decreases in those of developed ones, at least as indicated by application to the new machine scale.

58. In view of the conflicting results yielded by various modified versions of the scheme of limits, some members felt that there did not appear to be a viable alternative to the present scheme of limits except the voluntary redistribution of points from major beneficiaries of the scheme of limits to those most disadvantaged by it, thus preserving the scheme's benefits for the largest possible number of developing countries while at the same time alleviating its most extreme negative effects.

59. At that stage, the Committee was informed that Japan would offer part of the benefit it would receive from the application of the scheme of limits, namely 24 points, for the purpose of reducing the excessive distorting effects in accordance with the spirit of General Assembly resolution 45/256 A. The Committee was also informed that Japan, in making that offer, hoped that its example would be emulated by other major beneficiaries of the scheme of limits in future scales. Japan also hoped that the General Assembly would adopt the new scale of assessments for a three-year period.

60. The 24 points offered by Japan were earmarked on a pro rata basis as follows: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 20 points, Czechoslovakia 2 points, Hungary 1 point and Poland 1 point.

61. In the course of the discussion, further proposals for alternative rate brackets and constraints were made by Committee members. As some of them involved quite extensive reprogramming of the computer program for the scale of assessments, it was not possible to examine their effects during the current session. In that context, the Committee also recalled the General Assembly mandate to keep the scale methodology as simple and transparent as possible and reiterated the close relationship between the statistical base period and the scheme of limits, already referred to in paragraph 50 above.

62. In view of the above, the Committee decided that it was premature at this stage to make recommendations to the General Assembly regarding the preservation, abolition or modification of the scheme of limits.

C. Price-adjusted rates of exchange (PARE)

63. The Committee had before it a note by the Statistical Office reviewing the work it had done since 1985 on PARE and their possible integration into the scale methodology. The note also provided an overview of PARE conversion rates and PARE-converted national income for all countries for the period 1970-1989.

64. The Committee recalled the initial link between its previous analyses of inflation in United States dollars and PARE. Since national exchange rates frequently did not reflect changes in domestic prices, their use for the conversion of national income in local currency into national income in United States dollars might result in distortions of a country's capacity to pay as measured by national or per capita income in United States dollars, particularly in situations with high rates of inflation. From a base period at which actual exchange rates and PARE were on the average equal, PARE followed domestic inflation. It thus corrected inflation-related distortions in national exchange rates and corresponding national income data in United States dollars, and also permitted more realistic low per capita income adjustments in the context of the scale methodology.

65. As reported on several occasions since 1985, the Committee saw great merit in PARE while at the same time recognizing its conceptual and practical limitations. Conceptually, PARE could only eliminate distortions in national income per capita income data in United States dollars that were caused by inflation.

66. Further attention needed to be given to the use of appropriate exchange rates for the base period in the calculation of PARE. That was particularly relevant for countries with economies in transition whose exchange rates already were distorted during the PARE base period. The other question that needed to be addressed was how to deal with changes in the PARE base period in order to keep it as close as possible to the statistical base period used by the Committee for the scale of assessments.

67. PARE's principal limitation consisted, until recently, of the inability of countries with centrally planned economies to support PARE. While most members of the Committee now supported PARE in principle despite some remaining doubts, its application in countries with centrally planned economies or with economies in transition still faced some practical difficulties.

68. However, incremental progress had been made in the utilization of PARE. In the preparation of the 1989-1991 scale, PARE was utilized to identify countries with significant exchange rate distortions. They received special consideration in the ad hoc adjustment of the machine scale. For the new scale, as described in section V, A above, PARE rates were actually used for the conversion into United States dollars of national income in local currency for seven countries with exchange rate distortions of 40 per cent or more.

69. In view of PARE's ability to correct some distortions in the capacity to pay, the Committee would revert to the matter and report to the General Assembly on its further work as appropriate.

IX. OTHER MATTERS CONSIDERED BY THE COMMITTEE

A. Collection of contributions

70. The Committee took note of the report of the Secretary-General which indicated that, at the conclusion of the current session, the following 12 Member States were in arrears in the payment of their assessed contributions to the expenses of the United Nations under the terms of Article 19 of the Charter: Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guatemala, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone and South Africa. In this regard, the Committee reaffirmed its previous decision to authorize its Chairman to issue an addendum to the present report, if necessary.

B. Payment of contributions in currencies other than United States dollars

71. Under the provisions of paragraph 3 (b) of its resolution 43/223 A, the General Assembly empowered the Secretary-General to accept, at his discretion and after consultation with the Chairman of the Committee on Contributions, a portion of the contributions of Member States for the calendar years 1989, 1990 and 1991 in currencies other than United States dollars.

72. The Committee took note of a report of the Secretary-General which stated that nine Member States availed themselves of the opportunity of paying the equivalent of \$4.3 million in eight non-United States dollar currencies acceptable to the Organization in 1990.

C. Date of next session

73. The Committee decided to hold its fifty-second session in New York from 15 June to 2 July 1992.

Notes

1/ IMF exchange rates are used for all IMF members and the United Nations operational rate is used for the remaining countries.

2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 11 (A/44/11), paras. 25-29; and ibid., Forty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 11 (A/45/11), paras. 7-9.

3/ Ibid., Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 11 (A/44/11), paras. 20 and 21; and ibid., Forty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 11 (A/45/11), para. 31.

4/ Ibid., Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 11 (A/43/11), para. 48.

ANNEX IA

STEP-BY-STEP ADJUSTMENTS TO NATIONAL INCOME ON THE BASIS OF THE METHODOLOGY FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE NEW SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS (INCLUDING THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA) (percentage)

STATISTICAL BASE PERIOD 1980-1989 average									
Member State	National Income	INCOME ADJUSTED FOR:					FLOOR=0.01%; CEILING=25%		
		LOW PER CAPITA INCOME \$2600/85%:					Debt, low per capita income and floor	Debt, low per capita income, floor and ceiling	Debt, low per capita income, ceiling and scheme of limits
		Debt	Debt and low per capita income	Debt, low per capita income	Debt, low per capita income and floor	Debt, low per capita income, floor and ceiling			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)		
AFGHANISTAN	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ALBANIA	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ALGERIA	0.37	0.36	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.30	0.17	0.17	0.16
ANGOLA	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ARGENTINA	0.62	0.57	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.54	0.57	0.57	0.57
AUSTRALIA	1.24	1.25	1.38	1.37	1.37	1.49	1.51	1.51	1.51
AUSTRIA	0.61	0.62	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.74	0.75	0.75	0.75
BAHAMAS	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
BAHRAIN	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
BANGLADESH	0.12	0.12	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
BARBADOS	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BELGIUM	0.78	0.80	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.95	1.06	1.06	1.06
BELIZE	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BENIN	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BHUTAN	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BOLIVIA	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01
BOTSWANA	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BRAZIL	2.22	2.14	1.68	1.67	1.67	1.73	1.60	1.60	1.59
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03

STATISTICAL BASE PERIOD 1980-1989 average								
Member State	National Income	INCOME ADJUSTED FOR:						
		LOW PER CAPITA INCOME \$2600/85%;						
		FLOOR=0.01%; CEILING=25%						
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
			Debt	Debt and low per capita income	Debt, low per capita income and floor	Debt, low per capita income, floor and ceiling	Debt, low per capita income, floor, ceiling and scheme of limits	New Scale (including adjustments (mitigation))
BULGARIA	0.15	0.15		0.12	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.13
BURKINA FASO	0.01	0.01		0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BURUNDI	0.01	0.01		0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CAMBODIA	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CAMEROON	0.07	0.07		0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01
CANADA	2.56	2.58		2.84	2.83	3.08	3.11	3.11
CAPE VERDE	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	0.01	0.01		0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CHAD	0.01	0.01		0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CHILE	0.15	0.13		0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
CHINA	2.85	2.85		0.74	0.73	0.76	0.77	0.77
COLOMBIA	0.27	0.26		0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
COMOROS	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CONGO	0.01	0.01		0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
COSTA RICA	0.03	0.02		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
COTE D'IVOIRE	0.06	0.05		0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
CUBA	0.16	0.16		0.13	0.13	0.14	0.11	0.09
CYPRUS	0.02	0.02		0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	0.31	0.31		0.30	0.30	0.31	0.57	0.55
DENMARK	0.53	0.54		0.60	0.59	0.64	0.65	0.65

STATISTICAL BASE PERIOD 1980-1989 average							
INCOME ADJUSTED FOR:							
LOW PER CAPITA INCOME \$2600/85%:							
FLOOR=0.01%; CEILING=25%							
	National Income	Debt	Debt and low per capita income	Debt, low per capita income and floor	Debt, low per capita income, floor and ceiling	Debt, low per capita income, floor, ceiling and scheme of limits	New Scale (including ad hoc adjustments (mitigation))
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
QJIBOUTI	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
DOMINICA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
ECUADOR	0.08	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.03
EGYPT	0.39	0.36	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.08	0.07
EL SALVADOR	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ETHIOPIA	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
FIJI	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
FINLAND	0.46	0.47	0.52	0.51	0.56	0.57	0.57
FRANCE	4.89	4.92	5.42	5.39	5.87	6.00	6.00
GABON	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
GAMBIA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
GERMANY	6.98	7.05	7.76	7.73	8.41	8.93	8.93
GHANA	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
GREECE	0.31	0.29	0.32	0.32	0.35	0.35	0.35
GRENADA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
GUATEMALA	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02
GUINEA	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
GUINEA-BISSAU	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

STATISTICAL BASE PERIOD 1980-1989 average							
INCOME ADJUSTED FOR:							
Member State	National Income	LOW PER CAPITA INCOME \$2600/85%:					
		Debt	Debt and low per capita income	Debt, low per capita income and floor ceiling	Debt, low per capita income, floor and ceiling	Debt, low per capita income, floor, ceiling and scheme of limits	New Scale (excluding adjustments (mitigation))
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GUYANA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
HAITI	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
HONDURAS	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
HUNGARY	0.17	0.16	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.19	0.18
ICELAND	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
INDIA	1.56	1.54	0.35	0.35	0.37	0.37	0.36
INDONESIA	0.64	0.61	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.17	0.16
IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF)	0.97	0.98	0.96	0.95	0.99	0.79	0.77
IRAQ	0.27	0.27	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.14	0.13
IRELAND	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.18
ISRAEL	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.23	0.25	0.23	0.23
ITALY	3.97	3.99	4.41	4.38	4.76	4.29	4.29
JAMAICA	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
JAPAN	11.96	12.08	13.29	13.23	14.39	11.95	12.45
JORDAN	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01
KENYA	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	0.13	0.13	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF	0.78	0.75	0.67	0.67	0.69	0.69	0.69
KUWAIT	0.21	0.21	0.24	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.25
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

STATISTICAL BASE PERIOD 1980-1989 average									
INCOME ADJUSTED FOR:									
LOW PER CAPITA INCOME \$2600/85%: FLOOR=0.01%; CEILING=25%									
	National Income	Debt	Debt and low per capita income	Debt, low per capita income and floor	Debt, low per capita income, floor and ceiling	Debt, low per capita income, floor, ceiling and scheme of limits	New Scale (excluding adjustments (mitigation))		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)		
LEBANON	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
LESOTHO	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
LIBERIA	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA	0.20	0.20	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24
LIECHTENSTEIN	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
LUXEMBOURG	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
MADAGASCAR	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MALAWI	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MALAYSIA	0.22	0.21	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.12
MALDIVES	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MALI	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MALTA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MAURITANIA	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MAURITIUS	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MEXICO	1.24	1.15	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.87	0.88	0.88	0.88
MONGOLIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MOROCCO	0.13	0.12	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03
MOZAMBIQUE	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MYANMAR	0.06	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NAMIBIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

STATISTICAL BASE PERIOD 1980-1989 average									
INCOME ADJUSTED FOR:									
LOW PER CAPITA INCOME \$2600/85%;									
FLOOR=0.01%; CEILING=25%									
	Debt	Debt and low per capita income	Debt, low per capita income and floor	Debt, low per capita income, floor and ceiling	Debt, low per capita income, floor, ceiling and scheme of limits	New Scale (excluding and floor adjustments (religion))			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)		
NEPAL	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NETHERLANDS	1.23	1.23	1.36	1.35	1.46	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
NEW ZEALAND	0.20	0.20	0.22	0.22	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24
NICARAGUA	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NIGER	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NIGERIA	0.54	0.52	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.20	0.20
NORWAY	0.45	0.46	0.51	0.50	0.54	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55
OMAN	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
PAKISTAN	0.27	0.26	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06
PANAMA	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
PARAGUAY	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
PERU	0.16	0.14	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06
PHILIPPINES	0.26	0.24	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.07
POLAND	0.52	0.50	0.35	0.34	0.36	0.36	0.48	0.47	0.47
PORTUGAL	0.21	0.20	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
QATAR	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
ROMANIA	0.27	0.26	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
RWANDA	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

STATISTICAL BASE PERIOD 1980-1989 average

INCOME ADJUSTED FOR:

LOW PER CAPITA INCOME \$2600/85%:

Member State	National Income	FLOOR-0.01%: CEILING=25%					New Scale (including adjustments (mitigation))
		Debt	Debt and low per capita income	Debt, low per capita income and floor	Debt, low per capita income, floor and ceiling	Debt, low per capita income, floor, ceiling and scheme of mix	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
SAINT LUCIA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SAMOA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SAUDI ARABIA	0.79	0.79	0.88	0.87	0.95	0.96	0.96
SENEGAL	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SEYCHELLES	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SIERRA LEONE	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SINGAPORE	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.16	0.13	0.12
SOLOMON ISLANDS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SOMALIA	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SOUTH AFRICA	0.50	0.50	0.41	0.40	0.41	0.41	0.41
SPAIN	1.63	1.64	1.81	1.80	1.96	1.98	1.98
SRI LANKA	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SUDAN	0.06	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SURINAME	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SWAZILAND	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SWEDEN	0.91	0.92	1.02	1.01	1.10	1.11	1.11
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	0.16	0.15	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.05	0.04
THAILAND	0.33	0.32	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.11

STATISTICAL BASE PERIOD 1980-1989 average									
INCOME ADJUSTED FOR:									
LOW PER CAPITA INCOME \$2600/85%:									
FLOOR=0% 1%, CEILING=25%:									
Member State	National Income	Debt low per capita income	Debt low per capita income and floor	Debt low per capita income, floor and ceiling	Debt low per capita income, floor, ceiling and scheme of limits	New Scale (excluding adjustments (mitigation))			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)		
TOGO	0.01	2.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
TUNISIA	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
TURKEY	0.46	0.44	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.27	0.27	0.27
UGANDA	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	7.34	7.41	8.16	8.12	8.84	11.10	10.90	10.90	10.90
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	0.19	0.19	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND	4.13	4.17	4.60	4.57	4.96	5.02	5.02	5.02	5.02
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	27.59	27.83	30.65	30.51	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00
URUGUAY	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04
VANUATU	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
VENEZUELA	0.43	0.40	0.44	0.44	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49
VIET NAM	0.06	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
YEMEN	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
YUGOSLAVIA	0.46	0.45	0.41	0.41	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42
ZAIRE	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ZAMBIA	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ZIMBABWE	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

ANNEX IB

POINT DIFFERENCES RESULTING FROM THE STEP-BY-STEP ADJUSTMENTS TO NATIONAL INCOME ON THE BASIS OF THE METHODOLOGY FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE NEW SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS (INCLUDING THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA)

Member State	Date	Low per capita income	Floor	Ceiling	Scheme of limits	Ad hoc adjustments (mitigation)
	col.(2)-col.(1) of annex IA	col.(3)-col.(2) of annex IA	col.(4)-col.(3) of annex IA	col.(5)-col.(4) of annex IA	col.(6)-col.(5) of annex IA	col.(7)-col.(6) of annex IA
	(2) (-)	(3) (-)	(4) (-)	(5) (-)	(6) (-)	(7) (-)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
AFGHANISTAN		-0.02	0.01			
ALBANIA		-0.01				
ALGERIA	-0.01	-0.07		0.01	-0.13	-0.01
ANGOLA		-0.03				
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA			0.01			
ARGENTINA		-0.05				
AUSTRALIA	0.01	0.13	-0.01		0.03	
AUSTRIA	0.01	0.06		0.12	0.02	
BAHAMAS		0.01		0.06	0.01	
BAHRAIN				0.01		
BANGLADESH		-0.10			-0.01	
BARBADOS						
BELGIUM	0.02	0.08	0.01	0.07	0.11	
BELIZE		-0.01	0.01			
BENIN			0.01			
BIHUTAN		-0.02				-0.01
BOLIVIA		-0.01	0.01			
BOTSWANA		-0.46		-0.01	-0.13	-0.01
BRAZIL	-0.08			0.06		
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM		0.01				

Member State	Debt col (2)-col (1) of annex 1A (+) (-) (3)	Low per capita income col (3)-col (2) of annex 1A (+) (-) (2)	Floor col (4)-col (3) of annex 1A (+) (-) (3)	Ceiling col (5)-col (4) of annex 1A (+) (-) (4)	Scheme of limits col (6)-col (5) of annex 1A (+) (-) (5)	Ad hoc adjustments (midpoint) col (7)-col (6) of annex 1A (+) (-) (6)
BULGARIA		-0.03			0.01	
BURKINA FASO		-0.01	0.01			
BURUNDI		-0.01	0.01			
CAMBODIA		-0.04	0.01		-0.01	-0.01
CAMEROON						
CANADA	0.02	0.26	-0.01	0.25	0.03	
CAPE VERDE			0.01			
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC		-0.01	0.01			
CHAD		-0.01	0.01			
CHILE	-0.02	-0.05				
CHINA		-2.11	-0.01	0.03	0.01	
COLOMBIA	-0.01	-0.13				
COMOROS			0.01			
CONGO		-0.01	0.01			
COSTA RICA	-0.01	-0.01				
COTE D'IVOIRE	-0.01	-0.03		0.01	-0.03	-0.02
CUBA		-0.03		0.01	0.26	-0.02
CYPRUS		-0.01		0.05	0.01	
CZECHOSLOVAKIA		0.06	-0.01		0.01	
DENMARK	0.01					

Member States	Debt		Low per capita income		Floor		Ceiling		Scheme of limits		Adj hoc adjustments (mitigation)	
	col.(2)-col.(1) of annex IA	(+) (-) (1)	col.(3)-col.(2) of annex IA	(+) (-) (2)	col.(4)-col.(3) of annex IA	(+) (-) (3)	col.(5)-col.(4) of annex IA	(+) (-) (4)	col.(6)-col.(5) of annex IA	(+) (-) (5)	col.(7)-col.(6) of annex IA	(+) (-) (6)
DJIBOUTI					0.01							
DOMINICA					0.01							
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC												
ECUADOR		-0.01		-0.03			0.01				-0.01	
EGYPT		-0.03		-0.19		-0.01	0.01			-0.09	-0.01	
EL SALVADOR				-0.02								
EQUATORIAL GUINEA				-0.03		0.01						
ETHIOPIA												
FUJI												
FINLAND	0.01		0.05			-0.01	0.05		0.01			
FRANCE	0.03		0.50			-0.03	0.48		0.13			
GABON												
GAMBIA												
GERMANY	0.07		0.71		0.01	-0.03	0.68		0.52			
GHANA				-0.03								
GREECE		-0.02	0.03				0.03					
GRENADA					0.01							
GUATEMALA				-0.04								
GUINEA		-0.01		-0.01	0.01							
GUINEA-BISSAU					0.01							
												-0.01

	Debt	Low per capita income	Floor	Ceiling	Scheme of limits	Ad hoc adjustments (mitigation)
	col (1)-col (1) of annex IA	col (2)-col (2) of annex IA	col (4)-col (3) of annex IA	col (5)-col (4) of annex IA	col (6)-col (5) of annex IA	col (7)-col (6) of annex IA
	(+)(-)	(+)(-)	(+)(-)	(+)(-)	(+)(-)	(+)(-)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GUYANA			0.01			
HAITI		-0.01	0.01			
HONDURAS		-0.01			0.07	-0.01
HUNGARY		-0.04				
ICELAND						
INDIA	-0.02	-1.19		0.02		-0.01
INDONESIA	-0.03	-0.43		0.01	-0.02	-0.01
IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF)	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.04	-0.20	-0.02
IRAQ		-0.04		0.01	-0.10	-0.01
IRELAND		0.02		0.01		
ISRAEL		0.02		0.02	-0.02	
ITALY	0.02	0.42	-0.03	0.38	-0.47	
JAMAICA		-0.01				
JAPAN	0.12	1.21	-0.06	1.16	-2.44	0.50
JORDAN	-0.01	-0.01				-0.01
KENYA		-0.04				
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF		-0.08				
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF		-0.08		0.02		
KUWAIT	-0.03	-0.08		0.02		-0.01
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC		0.03	0.01			

Member State	Debt		Low per capita income		Floor	Ceiling	Scheme of limits		Ad hoc adjustments (mitigation)	
	col.(2)-col.(1) of annex IA	(+)(-)(1)	col.(3)-col.(2) of annex IA	(+)(-)(2)	col.(4)-col.(3) of annex IA	col.(5)-col.(4) of annex IA	col.(6)-col.(5) of annex IA	col.(7)-col.(6) of annex IA	(+)(-)(3)	(+)(-)(6)
LEBANON			-0.01		0.01					
LESOTHO			-0.01		0.01					
LIBERIA			-0.01		0.01					
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA			0.02		0.01	0.02				
LIECHTENSTEIN										
LUXEMBOURG						0.01				
MAADAGASCAR			-0.02		0.01					
MALAWI	-0.01		-0.01		0.01			-0.01		-0.01
MALAYSIA			-0.07		0.01					
MALDIVES										
MALI			-0.01		0.01					
MALTA										
MAURITANIA	-0.01				0.01					
MAURITIUS	-0.09					0.03	0.01			
MEXICO			-0.31							
MONGOLIA										
MOROCCO	-0.01		-0.08		0.01					-0.01
MOZAMBIQUE			-0.04							
MYANMAR	-0.01		-0.04							
NAMIBIA										

	Debt	Low per capita income	Floor	Ceiling	Scheme of limits	Ad hoc adjustments (interpretation)
	col.(1)-col.(2) of annex IA	col.(3)-col.(2) of annex IA	col.(4)-col.(3) of annex IA	col.(5)-col.(4) of annex IA	col.(6)-col.(5) of annex IA	col.(7)-col.(6) of annex IA
	(1) (-)	(2) (-)	(3) (-)	(4) (-)	(5) (-)	(6) (-)
NEPAL		-0.02	0.01			
NETHERLANDS		0.13	-0.01	0.11	0.04	
NEW ZEALAND		0.02		0.02		
NICARAGUA		-0.01	0.01			
NIGER		-0.01				
NIGERIA	-0.02	-0.32		0.01		-0.01
NORWAY	0.01	0.05	-0.01	0.04	0.01	-0.01
OMAN					-0.02	
PAKISTAN	-0.01	-0.20		0.01		
PANAMA		-0.01				
PAPUA NEW GUINEA		-0.01				
PARAGUAY		-0.02				-0.01
PERU	-0.02	-0.08		0.01		-0.01
PHILIPPINES	-0.02	-0.16				-0.01
POLAND	-0.02	-0.15	-0.01	0.02	0.12	-0.01
PORTUGAL	-0.01	-0.01		0.01		
QATAR		0.01				
ROMANIA	-0.01	-0.10	0.01	0.01		
RWANDA		-0.01	0.01			
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS			0.01			

Name of State	Debt	Low per capita income	Floor	Ceiling	Scheme of limits	Ad hoc adjustments (mitigation)
	col.(2)-col.(1) of annex IA (2) (-)	col.(3)-col.(2) of annex IA (4) (-)	col.(4)-col.(3) of annex IA (4) (-)	col.(5)-col.(4) of annex IA (4) (-)	col.(6)-col.(5) of annex IA (4) (-)	col.(7)-col.(6) of annex IA (4) (-)
SAINT LUCIA			0.01			
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES			0.01			
SAMOA			0.01			
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE			0.01			
SAUDI ARABIA		0.09	-0.01	0.08	0.01	
SENEGAL						
SEYCHELLES		-0.01	0.01			
SIEFERRA LEONE		-0.01	0.01			
SINGAPORE		0.01		0.02	-0.03	-0.01
SOLOMON ISLANDS			0.01			
SOMALIA		-0.02	0.01			
SOUTH AFRICA		-0.09	-0.01	0.01		
SPAIN	0.01	0.17	-0.01	0.16	0.02	
SRI LANKA		-0.03				
SUDAN	-0.01	-0.04				
SURINAME			0.01			
SWAZILAND		0.10	-0.01	0.09	0.01	-0.01
SWEDEN	0.01	-0.04		0.01	-0.07	-0.01
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	-0.01	-0.20		0.01	-0.01	-0.01
THAILAND						

Member State	Debt		Low per capita income		Floor		Ceiling		Scheme of limits		Ad hoc adjustments (mitigation)	
	(+)	(-)	(+)	(-)	(+)	(-)	(+)	(-)	(+)	(-)	(+)	(-)
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	col.(2)-col.(1) of annex IA		col.(3)-col.(2) of annex IA		col.(4)-col.(3) of annex IA		col.(5)-col.(4) of annex IA		col.(6)-col.(5) of annex IA		col.(7)-col.(6) of annex IA	
TGO			0.01	-0.01	0.01							
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO												
TUNISIA				-0.03								
TURKEY		-0.02		-0.22			0.01		0.04			
UGANDA				-0.02								
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	0.07		0.75		-0.04		0.72		2.26		-0.20	
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES			0.02				0.02			-0.02		
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND	0.04		0.43		-0.03		0.39		0.06			
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA				-0.03								
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	0.24		2.82		-0.14		-5.51					
URUGUAY				-0.01							-0.01	
VANUATU					0.01				0.02			
VENEZUELA		-0.03	0.04				0.03			-0.01		
VIET NAM				-0.05								
YEMEN				-0.03								
YUGOSLAVIA		-0.01		-0.04			0.01					
ZAMBIA		-0.01		-0.02	0.01							
ZIMBABWE				-0.02	0.01							
				-0.03								
TOTAL	0.71	-0.71	8.27	-8.27	0.51	-0.51	5.51	-5.51	3.82	-3.82	0.50	-0.50

ANNEX II

MACHINE SCALES BASED ON ALTERNATIVE UPPER PER CAPITA INCOME LIMITS (INCLUDING THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA)

MEMBER STATE	PRESENT OFFICIAL SCALE Income adjusted for debt (IAD), 1977-1986 average, Floor(0.01%), Ceiling(25%), \$2200/85%, scheme of limits, ad hoc adjustments	MACHINE SCALES			
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
			\$2600	\$2800	\$3000
			based on: Income adjusted for debt (IAD), 1980-1989 average, Floor(0.01%), Ceiling(25%), Gradient(85%), scheme of limits		
AFGHANISTAN	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ALBANIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ALGERIA	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.17	0.17
ANGOLA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ARGENTINA	0.66	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57
AUSTRALIA	1.57	1.52	1.52	1.54	1.54
AUSTRIA	0.74	0.75	0.75	0.76	0.76
BAHAMAS	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
BAHRAIN	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03
BANGLADESH	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BARBADOS	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BELGIUM	1.17	1.07	1.07	1.07	1.07
BELIZE	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BENIN	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BHUTAN	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BOLIVIA	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
BOTSWANA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BRAZIL	1.45	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.58
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03

MEMBER STATE	PRESENT OFFICIAL SCALE Income adjusted for debt (IAD), 1977-1986 average, Floor(0.01%), Ceiling(25%), \$2200/85%, scheme of limits, ad hoc adjustments	MACHINE SCALES			
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
			\$2600	\$2800	\$3000
			Based on: Income adjusted for debt (IAD), 1980-1989 average, Floor(0.01%), Ceiling(25%), Gradient(85%), scheme of limits		
BULGARIA	0.15	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
BURKINA FASO	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BURUNDI	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CAMBODIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CAMEROON	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
CANADA	3.09	3.13	3.16	3.18	3.18
CAPE VERDE	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CHAD	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CHILE	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.07
CHINA	0.79	0.78	0.76	0.73	0.73
COLOMBIA	0.14	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.12
COMOROS	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CONGO	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
COSTA RICA	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
COTE D'IVOIRE	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
CUBA	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11
CYPRUS	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	0.66	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57
DENMARK	0.69	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66

MEMBER STATE	PRESENT OFFICIAL SCALE	MACHINE SCALES			
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Income adjusted for debt (IAD), 1977-1989 average, Floor(0.01%), Ceiling(25%), \$2200/85%, scheme of limits, and hoc adjustments		\$2500	\$2800	\$3000
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
GUYANA		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
HAITI		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
HONDURAS		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
HUNGARY		0.21	0.19	0.19	0.19
ICELAND		0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
INDIA		0.37	0.38	0.37	0.37
INDONESIA		0.15	0.17	0.17	0.17
IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF)		0.69	0.79	0.79	0.79
IRAQ		0.12	0.14	0.14	0.14
IRELAND		0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
ISRAEL		0.21	0.23	0.23	0.23
ITALY		3.99	4.29	4.29	4.29
JAMAICA		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
JAPAN		11.38	11.95	11.95	11.95
JORDAN		0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
KENYA		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF		---	0.05	0.05	0.05
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF		---	0.24	0.24	0.24
KUWAIT		0.29	0.26	0.26	0.26
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

MEMBER STATE	PRESENT OFFICIAL SCALE	MACHINE SCALES			
		(1) Income adjusted for debt (IAD), 1977-1986 average, Floor(0.01%), Ceiling(25%), scheme of limits, ad hoc adjustments	(2) Income adjusted for debt (IAD), 1980-1989 average, Floor(0.01%), Ceiling(25%), scheme of limits	(3)	(4)
LEBANON		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
LESOTHO		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
LIBERIA		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA		0.28	0.24	0.24	0.24
LIECHTENSTEIN		---	0.01	0.01	0.01
LUXEMBOURG		0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
MADAGASCAR		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MALAWI		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MALAYSIA		0.11	0.13	0.13	0.13
MALDIVES		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MALI		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MALTA		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MAURITANIA		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MAURITIUS		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MEXICO		0.94	0.90	0.84	0.84
MONGOLIA		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MOROCCO		0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
MOZAMBIQUE		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MYANMAR		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NAMIBIA		---	0.01	0.01	0.01

	PRESENT OFFICIAL SCALE	MACHINE SCALES			
	Income adjusted for debt (MAD), 1977-1988 average, Floor(0.01%), Ceiling(25%), \$220/85%, scheme of limits, and loan adjustments	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
NEPAL	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NETHERLANDS	1.65	1.65	1.51	1.51	1.51
NEW ZEALAND	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24
NICARAGUA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NIGER	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NIGERIA	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.20	0.19
NORWAY	0.55	0.55	0.56	0.56	0.56
OMAN	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03
PAKISTAN	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.06
PANAMA	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
PARAGUAY	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
PERU	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.06
PHILIPPINES	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.07
POLAND	0.56	0.56	0.48	0.48	0.48
PORTUGAL	0.18	0.18	0.20	0.18	0.17
QATAR	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
ROMANIA	0.19	0.19	0.17	0.17	0.17
RWANDA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

MEMBER STATE	PRESENT OFFICIAL SCALE	MACHINE SCALES			
		Income adjusted for debt (IAD), 1977-1988 average, Floor(0.01%), Ceiling(25%), \$2200/85%, scheme of limits, ad hoc adjustments	based on: Income adjusted for debt (IAD), 1980-1989 average, Floor(0.01%), Ceiling(25%), Gradient(85%), scheme of limits	(2)	(3)
	(1)			(2)	(3)
				\$2600	\$2800
					\$3000
					(4)
SANT LUCIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SANT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SAUDI ARABIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SENEGAL	1.02	1.02	0.97	0.98	1.00
SEYCHELLES	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SIERRA LEONE	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SINGAPORE	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.13	0.13
SLOMON ISLANDS	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SOMALIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SOUTH AFRICA	0.45	0.45	0.42	0.40	0.40
SPAIN	1.95	1.95	1.99	2.02	2.02
SRI LANKA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SUDAN	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SWAZILAND	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SWEDEN	1.21	1.21	1.12	1.13	1.14
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05
THAILAND	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.12

ANNEX III

PRESENT OFFICIAL SCALE AND NEW SCALE (INCLUDING THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA) BASED ON COUNTRY GROUPINGS

	Present Official Scale (1988-91) Income adjusted for debt (IAD), 1977-1986 average, Floor(0.01%), Ceiling(25%), 2200/85%, scheme of limits, ad hoc adjustments	New Scale based on: Income adjusted for debt (IAD), 1980-1989 average, Floor(0.01%), Ceiling(25%), 2600/85%, scheme of limits, ad hoc adjustments
	(1)	(2)
OECD	76.84	76.26
Excluding Japan	64.46	63.80
Eastern Europe	13.35	12.41
ECA	1.18	1.11
ECLAC	4.40	4.28
ESCAP	14.06	15.92
Excluding Japan	9.47	9.47
ESCWA	1.05	1.62
OTHERS	0.67	0.66
TOTAL	100.00	100.00

GROUPINGS OF UN MEMBER STATES

OECD	ESCWA	ESCAP	ECLAC	ECA		EASTERN EUROPE	OTHERS
AUSTRALIA	BAHRAIN	AFGHANISTAN	ANTIGUA & BARBUDA	ALGERIA	NIGER	ALBANIA	ISRAEL
AUSTRIA	CYPRUS	BANGLADESH	ARGENTINA	ANGOLA	NIGERIA	BULGARIA	LIECHTENSTEIN
BELGIUM	EGYPT	BRUNAI	BAHAMAS	BENIN	RWANDA	CZECHOSLOVAKIA	MALTA
CANADA	IRAQ	BRUNEI DARUSSALAM	BARBADOS	BOTSWANA	SAO TOME & PRINCE	HUNGARY	SOUTH AFRICA
DENMARK	JORDAN	CAMBODIA	BELIZE	BURKINA FASO	SENEGAL	POLAND	
FINLAND	KUWAIT	CHINA	BOLIVIA	BURUNDI	SEYCHELLES	ROMANIA	
FRANCE	LEBANON	FIJI	BRAZIL	CAMEROON	SIERRA LEONE	UNION OF SOVIET	
GERMANY	OMAN	INDIA	CHILE	CAPE VERDE	SOMALIA	SOCIALIST REP	
GREECE	QATAR	INDONESIA	COLOMBIA	CENTRAL AFRICAN REP	SUDAN		
ICELAND	SAUDI ARABIA	IRAN (ISL. REP. OF)	COSTA RICA	CHAD	SWAZILAND		
IRELAND	SYRIAN ARAB REP.	JAPAN	CUBA	COMOROS	TOGO		
ITALY	U.N. ARAB EMIRATES	KOREA DEM. PEOP. REP.	DOMINICA	CONGO	TUNISIA		
JAPAN	YEMEN	KOREA REP. OF	DOMINICAN REP.	COTE D'IVOIRE	UGANDA		
LUXEMBOURG		LAO PEOP. DEM. REP.	ECUADOR	DJIBOUTI	UN. REP. OF TANZANIA		
NETHERLANDS		MALAYSIA	EL SALVADOR	EQUATORIAL GUINEA	ZAIRE		
NEW ZEALAND		MALDIVES	GUATEMALA	ETHIOPIA	ZAMBIA		
NORWAY		MONGOLIA	GUAYANA	GABON	ZIMBABWE		
PORTUGAL		MYANMAR	HAITI	GAMBIA			
SPAIN		NEPAL	HONDURAS	GHANA			
SWEDEN		PAKISTAN	JAMAICA	GUINEA			
TURKEY		PAPUA NEW GUINEA	MEXICO	GUINEA BISSAU			
UNITED KINGDOM		PHILIPPINES	NICARAGUA	KENYA			
UNITED STATES		SAMOA	PANAMA	LESOTHO			
YUGOSLAVIA		SINGAPORE	PARAGUAY	LIBERIA			
		SOLOMON ISLANDS	PERU	LIBYAN ARAB			
		SRI LANKA	ST. LUCIA	JAMAHIRIYA			
		THAILAND	ST. VINCENT & THE	MADAGASCAR			
		VANUATU	GRENADINES	MALAWI			
		VIETNAM	ST. KITTS & NEVIS	MAURITANIA			
			SURINAME	MAURITIUS			
			TRINIDAD & TOBAGO	MOROCCO			
			URUGUAY	MOZAMBIQUE			
			VENEZUELA	NAMIBIA			

ANNEX IV

MACHINE SCALES BASED ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL INCOME

	MACHINE SCALES		
	1977-1986 average National Income	1980-1989 average National Income	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Excluding the 2 Korean States	Including the 2 Korean States	
AFGHANISTAN	0.03	0.02	0.02
ALBANIA	0.02	0.02	0.02
ALGERIA	0.39	0.38	0.37
ANGOLA	0.03	0.04	0.04
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	0.00	0.00	0.00
ARGENTINA	0.78	0.63	0.62
AUSTRALIA	1.25	1.25	1.24
AUSTRIA	0.60	0.62	0.61
BAHAMAS	0.01	0.01	0.01
BAHRAIN	0.02	0.02	0.02
BAKGLADESH	0.13	0.12	0.12
BARBADOS	0.01	0.01	0.01
BELGIUM	0.95	0.80	0.78
BELIZE	0.00	0.00	0.00
BENIN	0.01	0.01	0.01
BHUTAN	0.00	0.00	0.00
BOLIVIA	0.05	0.04	0.04
BOTSWANA	0.01	0.01	0.01
BRAZIL	2.13	2.23	2.22
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM	0.03	0.02	0.02

Member State	MACHINE SCALES		
	1977-1988 average National Income	1980-1989 average National Income	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Including the 2 Korean States		
BULGARIA	0.16	0.15	0.15
BURKINA FASO	0.01	0.01	0.01
BURUNDI	0.01	0.01	0.01
CAMBODIA	0.01	0.00	0.00
CAMEROON	0.07	0.07	0.07
CANADA	2.52	2.58	2.56
CAPE VERDE	0.00	0.00	0.00
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	0.01	0.01	0.01
CHAD	0.01	0.01	0.01
CHILE	0.17	0.15	0.15
CHINA	2.89	2.85	2.85
COLOMBIA	0.29	0.27	0.27
COMOROS	0.00	0.00	0.00
CONGO	0.01	0.01	0.01
COSTA RICA	0.03	0.03	0.03
COTE D'IVOIRE	0.07	0.06	0.06
CUBA	0.16	0.16	0.16
CYPRUS	0.02	0.02	0.02
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	0.46	0.31	0.31
DENMARK	0.54	0.54	0.53

Member State	MACHINE SCALES		
	1977-1986 average National Income (1)	1980-1989 average National Income Excluding the 2 Korean States (2)	Including the 2 Korean States (3)
DJIBOUTI	0.00	0.00	0.00
DOMINICA	0.00	0.00	0.00
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	0.06	0.05	0.05
ECUADOR	0.10	0.08	0.08
EGYPT	0.34	0.39	0.39
EL SALVADOR	0.04	0.04	0.03
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	0.00	0.00	0.00
ETHIOPIA	0.04	0.04	0.04
FIJI	0.01	0.01	0.01
FINLAND	0.42	0.47	0.46
FRANCE	4.99	4.92	4.89
GABON	0.03	0.02	0.02
GAMBIA	0.00	0.00	0.00
GERMANY	7.19	7.05	6.98
GHANA	0.05	0.04	0.04
GREECE	0.34	0.31	0.31
GRENADA	0.00	0.00	0.00
GUATEMALA	0.08	0.07	0.07
GUINEA	0.01	0.02	0.02
GUINEA-BISSAU	0.00	0.00	0.00

Member State	MACHINE SCALES		
	1977-1980 average National income	1980-1989 average National income	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
		Excluding the 2 Korean States	Including the 2 Korean States
GUYANA	0.00	0.00	0.00
HAITI	0.01	0.01	0.01
HONDURAS	0.03	0.03	0.03
HUNGARY	0.17	0.17	0.17
ICELAND	0.02	0.03	0.03
INDIA	1.53	1.58	1.56
INDONESIA	0.68	0.64	0.64
IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF)	1.17	0.98	0.97
IRAQ	0.36	0.27	0.27
IRELAND	0.15	0.16	0.15
ISRAEL	0.19	0.21	0.21
ITALY	3.67	3.99	3.97
JAMAICA	0.02	0.02	0.02
JAPAN	10.36	12.07	11.96
JORDAN	0.03	0.04	0.04
KENYA	0.05	0.05	0.05
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	---	---	0.13
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF	---	---	0.78
KUWAIT	0.25	0.21	0.21
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	0.00	0.00	0.00

	MACHINE SCALES		
	1977-1988 average National Income	1980-1988 average National Income	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
		Excluding the 2 Korean States	Including the 2 Korean States
LEBANON	0.03	0.01	0.01
LESOTHO	0.01	0.01	0.01
LIBERIA	0.01	0.01	0.01
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA	0.25	0.20	0.20
LIECHTENSTEIN	---	0.00	0.00
LUXEMBOURG	0.05	0.05	0.05
MADAGASCAR	0.03	0.02	0.02
MALAWI	0.01	0.01	0.01
MALAYSIA	0.23	0.22	0.22
MALDIVES	0.00	0.00	0.00
MALI	0.01	0.01	0.01
MALTA	0.01	0.01	0.01
MAURITANIA	0.01	0.01	0.01
MAURITIUS	0.01	0.01	0.01
MEXICO	1.39	1.24	1.24
MONGOLIA	0.01	0.01	0.01
MOROCCO	0.13	0.13	0.13
MOZAMBIQUE	0.02	0.02	0.02
MYANMAR	0.05	0.06	0.06
NAMIBIA	---	0.01	0.01

Machine Scales	MACHINE SCALES		
	1977-1988 average National Income	1980-1989 average National Income	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Excluding the 2 Korean States	Including the 2 Korean States	
NEPAL	0.02	0.02	0.02
NETHERLANDS	1.30	1.24	1.23
NEW ZEALAND	0.19	0.20	0.20
NICARAGUA	0.03	0.02	0.02
NIGER	0.02	0.01	0.01
NIGERIA	0.67	0.54	0.54
NORWAY	0.45	0.46	0.45
OMAN	0.05	0.05	0.05
PAKISTAN	0.28	0.27	0.27
PANAMA	0.04	0.03	0.03
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	0.02	0.02	0.02
PARAGUAY	0.04	0.04	0.04
PERU	0.15	0.16	0.16
PHILIPPINES	0.29	0.27	0.26
POLAND	0.63	0.53	0.52
PORTUGAL	0.20	0.22	0.21
QATAR	0.05	0.04	0.04
ROMANIA	0.38	0.27	0.27
RWANDA	0.01	0.01	0.01
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS	0.00	0.00	0.00

Master State	MACHINE SCALES		
	1977-1986 average National Income	1980-1989 average National Income	
	(1)	Excluding the 2 Korean States (2)	Including the 2 Korean States (3)
SAINT LUCIA	0.00	0.00	0.00
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	0.00	0.00	0.00
SAMOA	0.00	0.00	0.00
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	0.00	0.00	0.00
SAUDI ARABIA	0.99	0.80	0.79
SENEGAL	0.03	0.02	0.02
SEYCHELLES	0.00	0.00	0.00
SIERRA LEONE	0.01	0.01	0.01
SINGAPORE	0.12	0.13	0.13
SOLOMON ISLANDS	0.00	0.00	0.00
SOMALIA	0.02	0.02	0.02
SOUTH AFRICA	0.52	0.51	0.50
SPAIN	1.57	1.64	1.63
SRI LANKA	0.04	0.04	0.04
SUDAN	0.08	0.06	0.06
SURINAME	0.01	0.01	0.01
SWAZILAND	0.00	0.00	0.00
SWEDEN	0.93	0.92	0.91
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	0.15	0.16	0.16
THAILAND	0.31	0.33	0.33

Machine Scales	MACHINE SCALES		
	1977-1986 average National Income	1980-1989 average National Income	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Excluding the 2 Korean States		
	including the 2 Korean States		
TOGO	0.01	0.01	0.01
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	0.06	0.04	0.04
TUNISIA	0.07	0.07	0.06
TURKEY	0.54	0.47	0.46
UGANDA	0.04	0.03	0.03
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	7.75	7.41	7.34
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	0.22	0.19	0.19
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND	3.99	4.18	4.13
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	0.05	0.04	0.04
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	27.78	27.84	27.59
URUGUAY	0.07	0.06	0.06
VANUATU	0.00	0.00	0.00
VENEZUELA	0.50	0.44	0.43
VIET NAM	0.06	0.06	0.06
YEMEN	0.05	0.05	0.05
YUGOSLAVIA	0.54	0.47	0.46
ZAIRE	0.05	0.03	0.03
ZAMBIA	0.03	0.02	0.02
ZIMBABWE	0.05	0.04	0.04
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00

ANNEX V

MACHINE SCALES BASED ON VARYING STATISTICAL BASE PERIODS
(INCLUDING THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA)

	MACHINE SCALES				
	Incomes adjusted for debt (IAD), Floor=0.01%, ceiling=26%, \$2600/85%, with scheme of limits				
	STATISTICAL BASE PERIOD				
	10 years 1980-1989 average (1)	12 years 1978-1989 average (2)	7 years 1983-1989 average (3)	5 years 1985-1989 average (4)	3 years 1987-1989 average (5)
AFGHANISTAN	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ALBANIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ALGERIA	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
ANGOLA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ARGENTINA	0.57	0.60	0.57	0.57	0.57
AUSTRALIA	1.31	1.49	1.49	1.44	1.44
AUSTRIA	0.75	0.75	0.76	0.77	0.78
BAHAMAS	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
BAHRAN	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
BANGLADESH	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BARBADOS	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BELGIUM	1.05	1.07	1.07	1.07	1.07
BELIZE	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BENIN	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BHUTAN	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BOLIVIA	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
BOTSWANA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BRAZIL	1.60	1.59	1.60	1.60	1.60
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03

Member States	MACHINE SCALES					
	Income adjusted for debt (IAD), Floor=0.01%, ceiling=25%, \$2600/65%					
	with scheme of limits					
	STATISTICAL BASE PERIOD					
	10 years 1980-1989 average (1)	12 years 1978-1989 average (2)	7 years 1983-1989 average (3)	5 years 1985-1989 average (4)	3 years 1987-1989 average (5)	
BULGARIA	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
BURKINA FASO	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BURUNDI	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CAMBODIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CAMEROON	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
CANADA	3.11	3.05	3.20	3.10	3.03	3.03
CAPE VERDE	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CHAD	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CHILE	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07
CHINA	0.77	0.75	0.79	0.78	0.80	0.80
COLOMBIA	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
COMORCS	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CONGO	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
COSTA RICA	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
COTE D'IVOIRE	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
CUBA	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11
CYPRUS	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57
DENMARK	0.65	0.66	0.66	0.67	0.67	0.67

MACHINE SCALES					
Income adjusted for debt (IAD), Floor=0.01%, ceiling=25%, \$2600/85%.					
with scheme of limits					
	STATISTICAL BASE PERIOD				
	10 years 1980-1989 average (1)	12 years 1978-1989 average (2)	7 years 1983-1989 average (3)	5 years 1985-1989 average (4)	3 years 1987-1989 average (5)
DJIBOUTI	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
DOMINICA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
ECUADOR	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.02
EGYPT	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
EL SALVADOR	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ETHIOPIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
FIJI	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
FINLAND	0.57	0.55	0.59	0.59	0.59
FRANCE	6.00	6.02	6.02	6.04	6.05
GABON	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
GAMBIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
GERMANY	6.93	8.98	8.97	9.00	8.99
GHANA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
GREECE	0.35	0.36	0.34	0.35	0.35
GRENADA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
GUATEMALA	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02
GUINEA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
GUINEA-BISSAU	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

MACHINE SCALES		Invoiced adjusted for debt (IAD), Floor=0.01%, ceiling=25%, \$2000/BS%, with scheme of limits				
		STATISTICAL BASE PERIOD				
		10 years 1960-1969 average (1)	12 years 1970-1989 average (2)	7 years 1963-1969 average (3)	5 years 1965-1969 average (4)	3 years 1967-1969 average (5)
GUYANA		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
HAITI		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
HONDURAS		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
HUNGARY		0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
ICELAND		0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
INDIA		0.37	0.36	0.38	0.37	0.36
INDONESIA		0.17	0.17	0.16	0.15	0.13
IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF)		0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.69
IRAQ		0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.12
IRELAND		0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
ISRAEL		0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23
ITALY		4.29	4.29	4.29	4.29	4.29
JAMAICA		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
JAPAN		11.95	11.95	11.95	11.95	11.95
JORDAN		0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
KENYA		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF		0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF		0.69	0.64	0.79	0.79	0.79
KUWAIT		0.26	0.26	0.24	0.24	0.24
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

Machine / Scale	MACHINE SCALES				
	Income adjusted for debt (IAD), Floor=0.01%, ceiling=25%, \$2600/85%, with scheme of limits				
	STATISTICAL BASE PERIOD				
	10 years 1980-1989 average (1)	12 years 1978-1989 average (2)	7 years 1983-1989 average (3)	5 years 1985-1989 average (4)	3 years 1987-1989 average (5)
LEBANON	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
LESOTHO	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
LIBERIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.24
LIECHTENSTEIN	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
LUXEMBOURG	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
MADAGASCAR	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MALAWI	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MALAYSIA	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
MALDIVES	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MALI	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MALTA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MAURITANIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MAURITIUS	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MEXICO	0.88	0.88	0.84	0.84	0.85
MONGOLIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MOROCCO	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04
MOZAMBIQUE	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MYANMAR	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NAMIBIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

Country	MACHINE SCALES					
	Income adjusted for debt (IAD), Floor=0.01%, ceiling=25%, \$2600/85%, with scheme of limits					
	STATISTICAL BASE PERIOD					
	10 years 1980-1989 average (1)	12 years 1978-1989 average (2)	7 years 1983-1989 average (3)	5 years 1985-1989 average (4)	3 years 1987-1989 average (5)	
NEPAL	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NETHERLANDS	1.50	1.52	1.51	1.51	1.51	1.51
NEW ZEALAND	0.24	0.23	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24
NICARAGUA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NIGER	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NIGERIA	0.21	0.22	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
NORWAY	0.55	0.54	0.55	0.55	0.53	0.53
OMAN	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
PAKISTAN	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06
PANAMA	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
PARAGUAY	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
PERU	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05
PHILIPPINES	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
POLAND	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48
PORTUGAL	0.20	0.19	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
QATAR	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
ROMANIA	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
RWANDA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

MACHINE SCALES		STATISTICAL BASE PERIOD				
Income adjusted for debt (IAD), Floor=0.01%, ceiling=25%, \$2800/65%, with scheme of limits						
		10 years 1980-1989 average (1)	12 years 1978-1989 average (2)	7 years 1983-1989 average (3)	5 years 1985-1989 average (4)	3 years 1987-1989 average (5)
SANT LUCIA		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SANT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SAMOA		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SAUDI ARABIA		0.96	0.96	0.93	0.93	0.94
SENEGAL		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SEYCHELLES		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SIERRA LEONE		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SINGAPORE		0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
SOLOMON ISLANDS		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SOMALIA		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SOUTH AFRICA		0.41	0.39	0.40	0.40	0.40
SPAIN		1.98	2.00	1.99	2.06	2.15
SRI LANKA		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SUDAN		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SURINAME		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SWAZILAND		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SWEDEN		1.11	1.12	1.10	1.12	1.13
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC		0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
THAILAND		0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12

		VARIABLES				
		SOURCE: Estimated for 1967 (1A), 1970-0.01%, 1980-0.01%, 1987-0.01%, 1987-0.01%, 1987-0.01%				
		STATISTICAL BASE PERIOD				
		10 years 1967-1980 average	12 years 1970-1980 average	7 years 1980-1987 average	5 years 1985-1989 average	3 years 1987-1989 average
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
TOGO		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO		0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04
TUNISIA		0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
TURKEY		0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27
UGANDA		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
USSR		11.10	11.14	11.14	11.18	11.20
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES		0.21	0.21	0.19	0.17	0.17
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND		5.02	4.96	4.95	4.95	4.97
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA		25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00
URUGUAY		0.05	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.04
VANUATU		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
VENEZUELA		0.49	0.50	0.49	0.49	0.49
VIET NAM		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
YEMEN		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
YUGOSLAVIA		0.42	0.47	0.41	0.41	0.47
ZAIRE		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ZAMBIA		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ZIMBABWE		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
TOTAL		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

ANNEX VI

**MACHINE SCALES BASED ON THE APPLICATION OF DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF THE SCHEME OF LIMITS
(INCLUDING THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA)**

INCOME ADJUSTED FOR DEBT (IAD); 1980-1989 average; FLOOR=0.01%; CEILING=25%; LOW PER CAPITA INCOME: \$2600/85%									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
	National income	Machine scale without scheme of limits	Machine scale with scheme of limits	Machine scale with scheme using percentage and index point limits increased by a factor of 2	Machine scale with scheme using broader limits for rate brackets below 1 per cent	Machine scale with scheme using broader limits for rate brackets below 0.51 per cent	Machine scale with scheme using alternative constraints for all rate brackets	Machine scale with scheme using progressive application over three year scale period (Year 3)	
AFGHANISTAN	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ALBANIA	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ALGERIA	0.37	0.30	0.17	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.21	0.21
ANGOLA	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ARGENTINA	0.62	0.54	0.57	0.55	0.55	0.57	0.59	0.54	0.54
AUSTRIA	1.24	1.49	1.51	1.51	1.51	1.50	1.52	1.49	1.49
AUSTRIA	0.61	0.74	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.74	0.74	0.74
BAHAMAS	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
BAHRAIN	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
BANGLADESH	0.12	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BARBADOS	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BELGIUM	0.79	0.95	1.06	0.96	1.06	1.06	1.06	0.95	0.95
BELIZE	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BENIN	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BHUTAN	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BOLIVIA	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
BOTSWANA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BRAZIL	2.21	1.73	1.60	1.74	1.60	1.60	1.67	1.73	1.73
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03

INCOME ADJUSTED FOR DEBT (IAD): 1980-1989 average: FLOOR=0.01%; CEILING=25%; LOW PER CAPITA INCOME: \$2600/85%									
Member State	National Income	Machine scale without scheme of limits	Machine scale with scheme of limits	Machine scale with scheme using percentage and index point limits increased by a factor of 2	Machine scale with scheme using broader limits for rate brackets below 1 per cent	Machine scale with scheme using broader limits for rate brackets below 0.51 per cent	Machine scale with scheme using alternative constraints for all rate brackets	Machine scale with scheme using progressive application over three year scale period (Year 3)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
BULGARIA	0.15	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.12
BURKINA FASO	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
BURUNDI	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CAMBODIA	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CAMEROON	0.07	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03
CANADA	2.56	3.08	3.11	3.12	3.11	3.11	3.13	3.08	3.08
CAPE VERDE	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CHAD	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CHILE	0.15	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
CHINA	2.85	0.76	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.76	0.76
COLOMBIA	0.27	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
COMOROS	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
CONGO	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
COSTA RICA	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
COTE D'IVOIRE	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
CUBA	0.16	0.14	0.11	0.13	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.14	0.14
CYPRUS	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	0.31	0.31	0.57	0.47	0.55	0.57	0.59	0.43	0.43
DENMARK	0.53	0.64	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.64	0.64

INCOME ADJUSTED FOR DEBT (IAD); 1980-1989 average; FLOOR=0.01%; CEILING=25%; LOW PER CAPITA INCOME: \$2600/85%							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Machine scale without scheme of limits	Machine scale with scheme of limits	Machine scale with scheme using percentage and index point limits increased by a factor of 2	Machine scale with scheme using broader limits for rate brackets below 3 per cent	Machine scale with scheme using broader limits for rate brackets below 0.51 per cent	Machine scale with scheme using alternative constraints for all rate brackets	Machine scale with scheme using progressive application over three year scale period (Year 3)
DJIBOUTI	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
DOMINICA	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
ECUADOR	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
EGYPT	0.39	0.17	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.12
EL SALVADOR	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ETHIOPIA	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
FJI	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
FINLAND	0.46	0.56	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.56
FRANCE	4.88	5.87	6.00	5.95	6.00	6.00	5.88
GABON	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
GAMBIA	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
GERMANY	6.98	8.41	8.93	8.55	8.93	8.92	8.42
GHANA	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
GREECE	0.31	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35
GRENADA	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
GUATEMALA	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
GUINEA	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
GUINEA-BISSAU	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

INCOME ADJUSTED FOR DEBT (IAD): 1980-1989 average:									
FLOOR=0.01%; CEILING=25%; LOW PER CAPITA INCOME: \$2600/85%									
Member State	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
	Machine scale without scheme of limits	Machine scale with scheme of limits	Machine scale with scheme using percentage and index point limits increased by a factor of 2	Machine scale with scheme using broader limits for rate brackets below 1 per cent	Machine scale with scheme using broader limits for rate brackets below 0.51 per cent	Machine scale with scheme using alternative constraints for all rate brackets	Machine scale with scheme using progressive application over three year scale period (Year 3)		
GUYANA	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
HAITI	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
HONDURAS	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
HUNGARY	0.17	0.12	0.19	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.19	0.15	0.15
ICELAND	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
INDIA	1.56	0.37	0.27	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.38	0.37	0.37
INDONESIA	0.64	0.19	0.17	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.19	0.19
IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF)	0.97	0.99	0.79	0.89	0.81	0.79	0.77	0.99	0.99
IRAQ	0.27	0.24	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.18	0.18
IRELAND	0.15	0.16	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
ISRAEL	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25
ITALY	3.96	4.76	4.29	4.59	4.29	4.29	4.37	4.77	4.77
JAMAICA	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
JAPAN	11.96	14.39	11.95	12.52	11.95	11.95	12.28	13.18	13.18
JORDAN	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
KENYA	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	0.13	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF	0.78	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70
KUWAIT	0.21	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

INCOME ADJUSTED FOR DEBT (IAD): 1980-1989 average:

FLOOR=0.01%; CEILING=25%; LOW PER CAPITA INCOME: \$2600/85%

Member State	(1) National income	(2) Machine scale without scheme of limits	(3) Machine scale with scheme of limits	(4) Machine scale with scheme using percentage and index point limits increased by a factor of 2	(5) Machine scale with scheme using broader limits for rate brackets below 1 per cent	(6) Machine scale with scheme using broader limits for rate brackets below 0.51 per cent	(7) Machine scale with scheme using alternative constraints for all rate brackets	(8) Machine scale with scheme using progressive application over three year scale period (Year 3)
LEBANON	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
LESOTHO	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
LIBERIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24
LIECHTENSTEIN	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
LUXEMBOURG	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
MADAGASCAR	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MALAWI	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MALAYSIA	0.22	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.14
MALDIVES	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MALI	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MALTA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MAURITANIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MAURITIUS	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MEXICO	1.23	0.87	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.89	0.87
MONGOLIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MOROCCO	0.13	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
MOZAMBIQUE	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MYANMAR	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NAMIBIA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

INCOME ADJUSTED FOR DEBT (IAD); 1980-1989 average;

FLOOR=0.01%; CEILING=25%; LOW PER CAPITA INCOME: \$2800/85%

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Machine scale without scheme of limits	Machine scale with scheme of limits	Machine scale with scheme using percentage and index points increased by a factor of 2	Machine scale with scheme using broader limits for rate brackets below 1 per cent	Machine scale with scheme using broader limits for rate brackets below 0.51 per cent	Machine scale with scheme using alternative constraints for all rate brackets	Machine scale with scheme using progressive exaggeration over three year scale period (Year 3)	
NEPAL	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NETHERLANDS	1.22	1.46	1.50	1.48	1.50	1.50	1.49	1.46
NEW ZEALAND	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24
NICARAGUA	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NIGER	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NIGERIA	0.54	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21
NORWAY	0.45	0.54	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.54	0.55	0.54
OMAN	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.05
PAKISTAN	0.27	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
PANAMA	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
PARAGUAY	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
PERU	0.16	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
PHILIPPINES	0.26	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
POLAND	0.52	0.36	0.48	0.40	0.45	0.48	0.49	0.36
PORTUGAL	0.21	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
QATAR	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
ROMANIA	0.27	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
RWANDA	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

INCOME ADJUSTED FOR DEBT (IAD): 1980-1989 average: FLOOR=0.01%; CEILING=25%; LOW PER CAPITA INCOME: \$2600/85%								
Member State	National Income	Machine scale without scheme of limits	Machine scale with scheme of limits	Machine scale with scheme using percentage and index point limits increased by a factor of 2	Machine scale with scheme using broader limits for rate brackets below 1 per cent	Machine scale with scheme using broader limits for rate brackets below 0.51 per cent	Machine scale with scheme using alternative constraints for all rate brackets	Machine scale with scheme using progressive application over three year scale period ('Year 9)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
SAINT LUCIA	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SAMOA	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SAUDI ARABIA	0.79	0.95	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.97	0.95
SENEGAL	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SEYCHELLES	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SIERRA LEONE	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SINGAPORE	0.13	0.16	0.13	0.15	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.16
SOLOMON ISLANDS	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SOMALIA	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SOUTH AFRICA	0.50	0.41	0.41	0.42	0.41	0.41	0.42	0.41
SPAIN	1.63	1.96	1.98	1.99	1.98	1.98	1.99	1.96
SRI LANKA	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SUDAN	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SURINAME	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SWAZILAND	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
SWEDEN	0.91	1.10	1.11	1.11	1.11	1.11	1.12	1.10
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	0.16	0.12	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.07
THAILAND	0.33	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.13

INCOME ADJUSTED FOR DEBT (IAD): 1980-1989 average; FLOOR=0.01%; CEILING=25%; LOW PER CAPITA INCOME: \$2500/85%									
Member State	National Income	Machine scale without scheme of limits	Machine scale with scheme of limits	Machine scale with scheme using percentage and index point limits increased by a factor of 2	Machine scale with scheme using broader limits for rate brackets below 1 per cent	Machine scale with scheme using broader limits for rate brackets below 0.51 per cent	Machine scale with scheme using alternative constraints for all rate brackets	Machine scale with scheme using progressive application over three year scale period (Year 3)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
TOGO	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
TUNISIA	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
TURKEY	0.46	0.23	0.27	0.23	0.24	0.27	0.27	0.23	0.23
UGANDA	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	7.34	8.84	11.10	10.55	11.11	11.10	10.86	10.10	10.10
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	0.19	0.23	0.21	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.23	0.23
UNITED KINGDOM									
AND NORTHERN IRELAND	4.13	4.97	5.02	5.04	5.02	5.02	5.06	4.99	4.99
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	27.59	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00
URUGUAY	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
VANUATU	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
VENEZUELA	0.43	0.47	0.49	0.48	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.47	0.47
VIET NAM	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
YEMEN	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
YUGOSLAVIA	0.46	0.42	0.42	0.43	0.42	0.42	0.43	0.42	0.42
ZAIRE	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ZAMBIA	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
ZIMBABWE	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

100

United Nations scale of assessment for the years 1961-1971

[illegible]

CHAPTER VII (continued)

1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036	2037	2038	2039	2040	2041	2042	2043	2044	2045	2046	2047	2048	2049	2050	2051	2052	2053	2054	2055	2056	2057	2058	2059	2060	2061	2062	2063	2064	2065	2066	2067	2068	2069	2070	2071	2072	2073	2074	2075	2076	2077	2078	2079	2080	2081	2082	2083	2084	2085	2086	2087	2088	2089	2090	2091	2092	2093	2094	2095	2096	2097	2098	2099	2100	2101	2102	2103	2104	2105	2106	2107	2108	2109	2110	2111	2112	2113	2114	2115	2116	2117	2118	2119	2120	2121	2122	2123	2124	2125	2126	2127	2128	2129	2130	2131	2132	2133	2134	2135	2136	2137	2138	2139	2140	2141	2142	2143	2144	2145	2146	2147	2148	2149	2150	2151	2152	2153	2154	2155	2156	2157	2158	2159	2160	2161	2162	2163	2164	2165	2166	2167	2168	2169	2170	2171	2172	2173	2174	2175	2176	2177	2178	2179	2180	2181	2182	2183	2184	2185	2186	2187	2188	2189	2190	2191	2192	2193	2194	2195	2196	2197	2198	2199	2200	2201	2202	2203	2204	2205	2206	2207	2208	2209	2210	2211	2212	2213	2214	2215	2216	2217	2218	2219	2220	2221	2222	2223	2224	2225	2226	2227	2228	2229	2230	2231	2232	2233	2234	2235	2236	2237	2238	2239	2240	2241	2242	2243	2244	2245	2246	2247	2248	2249	2250	2251	2252	2253	2254	2255	2256	2257	2258	2259	2260	2261	2262	2263	2264	2265	2266	2267	2268	2269	2270	2271	2272	2273	2274	2275	2276	2277	2278	2279	2280	2281	2282	2283	2284	2285	2286	2287	2288	2289	2290	2291	2292	2293	2294	2295	2296	2297	2298	2299	2300	2301	2302	2303	2304	2305	2306	2307	2308	2309	2310	2311	2312	2313	2314	2315	2316	2317	2318	2319	2320	2321	2322	2323	2324	2325	2326	2327	2328	2329	2330	2331	2332	2333	2334	2335	2336	2337	2338	2339	2340	2341	2342	2343	2344	2345	2346	2347	2348	2349	2350	2351	2352	2353	2354	2355	2356	2357	2358	2359	2360	2361	2362	2363	2364	2365	2366	2367	2368	2369	2370	2371	2372	2373	2374	2375	2376	2377	2378	2379	2380	2381	2382	2383	2384	2385	2386	2387	2388	2389	2390	2391	2392	2393	2394	2395	2396	2397	2398	2399	2400	2401	2402	2403	2404	2405	2406	2407	2408	2409	2410	2411	2412	2413	2414	2415	2416	2417	2418	2419	2420	2421	2422	2423	2424	2425	2426	2427	2428	2429	2430	2431	2432	2433	2434	2435	2436	2437	2438	2439	2440	2441	2442	2443	2444	2445	2446	2447	2448	2449	2450	2451	2452	2453	2454	2455	2456	2457	2458	2459	2460	2461	2462	2463	2464	2465	2466	2467	2468	2469	2470	2471	2472	2473	2474	2475	2476	2477	2478	2479	2480	2481	2482	2483	2484	2485	2486	2487	2488	2489	2490	2491	2492	2493	2494	2495	2496	2497	2498	2499	2500	2501	2502	2503	2504	2505	2506	2507	2508	2509	2510	2511	2512	2513	2514	2515	2516	2517	2518	2519	2520	2521	2522	2523	2524	2525	2526	2527	2528	2529	2530	2531	2532	2533	2534	2535	2536	2537	2538	2539	2540	2541	2542	2543	2544	2545	2546	2547	2548	2549	2550	2551	2552	2553	2554	2555	2556	2557	2558	2559	2560	2561	2562	2563	2564	2565	2566	2567	2568	2569	2570	2571	2572	2573	2574	2575	2576	2577	2578	2579	2580	2581	2582	2583	2584	2585	2586	2587	2588	2589	2590	2591	2592	2593	2594	2595	2596	2597	2598	2599	2600	2601	2602	2603	2604	2605	2606	2607	2608	2609	2610	2611	2612	2613	2614	2615	2616	2617	2618	2619	2620	2621	2622	2623	2624	2625	2626	2627	2628	2629	2630	2631	2632	2633	2634	2635	2636	2637	2638	2639	2640	2641	2642	2643	2644	2645	2646	2647	2648	2649	2650	2651	2652	2653	2654	2655	2656	2657	2658	2659	2660	2661	2662	2663	2664	2665	2666	2667	2668	2669	2670	2671	2672	2673	2674	2675	2676	2677	2678	2679	2680	2681	2682	2683	2684	2685	2686	2687	2688	2689	2690	2691	2692	2693	2694	2695	2696	2697	2698	2699	2700	2701	2702	2703	2704	2705	2706	2707	2708	2709	2710	2711	2712	2713	2714	2715	2716	2717	2718	2719	2720	2721	2722	2723	2724	2725	2726	2727	2728	2729	2730	2731	2732	2733	2734	2735	2736	2737	2738	2739	2740	2741	2742	2743	2744	2745	2746	2747	2748	2749	2750	2751	2752	2753	2754	2755	2756	2757	2758	2759	2760	2761	2762	2763	2764	2765	2766	2767	2768	2769	2770	2771	2772	2773	2774	2775	2776	2777	2778	2779	2780	2781	2782	2783	2784	2785	2786	2787	2788	2789	2790	2791	2792	2793	2794	2795	2796	2797	2798	2799	2800	2801	2802	2803	2804	2805	2806	2807	2808	2809	2810	2811	2812	2813	2814	2815	2816	2817	2818	2819	2820	2821	2822	2823	2824	2825	2826	2827	2828	2829	2830	2831	2832	2833	2834	2835	2836	2837	2838	2839	2840	2841	2842	2843	2844	2845	2846	2847	2848	2849	2850	2851	2852	2853	2854	2855	2856	2857	2858	2859	2860	2861	2862	2863	2864	2865	2866	2867	2868	2869	2870	2871	2872	2873	2874	2875	2876	2877	2878	2879	2880	2881	2882	2883	2884	2885	2886	2887	2888	2889	2890	2891	2892	2893	2894	2895	2896	2897	2898	2899	2900	2901	2902	2903	2904	2905	2906	2907	2908	2909	2910	2911	2912	2913	2914	2915	2916	2917	2918	2919	2920	2921	2922	2923	2924	2925	2926	2927	2928	2929	2930	2931	2932	2933	2934	2935	2936	2937	2938	2939	2940	2941	2942	2943	2944	2945	2946	2947	2948	2949	2950	2951	2952	2953	2954	2955	2956	2957	2958	2959	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ALBANIA	ALGERIA	ANGOLA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELARUS	BELGIUM	BENIN	BHUTAN	BOLIVIA	BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CAMBODIA	CANADA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																						

Notes

a/ The rates of assessment for Czechoslovakia and Hungary for the years 1962 and 1963 were retroactively decreased by General Assembly resolution 1927 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 to 1.04 and 0.51, respectively. These decreases were offset in 1964 against additional income arising from the admission of seven new Member States in 1962 and 1963.

b/ For the years 1959, 1960 and 1961, Egypt and Syria were assessed jointly as the United Arab Republic.

c/ Indonesia ceased to co-operate with the Organization with effect from 1 January 1965, resuming full participation on 28 September 1966.

d/ Singapore, which had formed part of Malaysia, became an independent State in August 1965.