



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 32nd MEETING

Chairman: Mr. ZACHMANN (German Democratic Republic)

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STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF GENERAL DEBATE
(continued)

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AGENDA ITEMS 46 TO 65 AND 144 (continued)

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. WILSKI (Poland): Today the Polish delegation would like to offer its comments on three specific disarmament agenda items. Let me begin with item 60 (e): "Study on concepts of security".

While security is perhaps not strictly a "pure" disarmament issue, the close interrelationship between the two is obvious. There can hardly be disarmament without security - at least until we achieve general and complete disarmament - and certainly there cannot be genuine security without disarmament.

Poland, with its well-known historical experiences, is consistently interested in seeing international security not only maintained but also constantly strengthened. That is why we took note with interest of the comprehensive study on concepts of security (A/40/553) and supported General Assembly resolution 40/94 E of 12 December 1985. The study attempts to describe the existing threats to security, attempting at the same time to bring more closely together different perceptions of security and the means of its consolidation. This is of particular importance in view of the present international situation with all its negative characteristics.

Conflicts and conflict-bound situations persist in various regions of the world. The arms build-up is rapidly increasing, bringing, in consequence, a corresponding increase in the significance of the military factor in international relations, with all its ensuing negative consequences in the political, economic and social spheres. State terrorism is being resorted to in violation of the

(Mr. Wilski, Poland)

fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. The net result of all this is not only a worsening of the general state of international security but also a dramatic diminishing of the sense of security of individual States and peoples. The differences between security perceptions of States likewise deepen, thus contributing additionally to the existing division of the world.

(Mr. Wilski, Poland)

The question of fundamental importance involves the reconciliation of individual national security interests with the requirements of collective security. While the general concept of security contains various components - military, economic, social, scientific and technological - its basic determinant has been the military element. That fact stems from the threats posed by the technological arms race to the international community and its security.

I wish to add at this juncture that Poland shares the view expressed in the study concerning the interdependence of the contemporary world and its implications for international security and the security of individual States, pointing to the complexity of the notion of security, which, as I said, comprises a number of elements going beyond the political and military sphere.

Looking for increased security through the development of military potential is not only not a guarantee of individual security; by increasing the risk of the outbreak of an armed conflict, with all its consequences, it constitutes a threat to international security.

Poland is strongly in favour of searching for increased security by lowering the level of military confrontation under conditions of strict respect for the principle of equal security. We similarly support the speedy introduction of effective measures aimed at stopping the arms race and eliminating existing arsenals of those particularly dangerous weapons, weapons of mass destruction. Together with our socialist allies we have submitted several specific proposals in that regard.

In our opinion, disarmament is an important element of increasing the effectiveness of the system of the maintenance of peace prescribed in the United Nations Charter, and in particular of the principles contained in Article 2, first and foremost the principle of the non-use of force. Those principles, together

(Mr. Wilski, Poland)

with the powers of the Security Council, constitute the essential elements of the collective security system envisaged in the Charter. Another fundamental condition is the peaceful settlement of international disputes and non-recourse to force for their resolution. As the study rightly stresses, undertaking appropriate measures to consolidate economic security and ensure the exclusively peaceful utilization of scientific and technological achievements is also of the utmost importance.

The Polish delegation will offer further specific remarks on the question of security at a later date in our statement on agenda item 141, "Establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security".

Today I should like to conclude my comments on agenda item 60 (e) by quoting from the Delhi Statement of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, issued on 19 January this year:

"In the nuclear age there can be no alternative to negotiation and co-operation among nations". (A/41/124, annex, para. 3)

I wish now to turn briefly to agenda item 61 (b), "Disarmament and international security". The recognition of the necessity of eliminating military sources of threats to international security, as expressed in numerous General Assembly resolutions, entails the duty of States to co-operate for peace under the provisions of Article 1 (1) and 1 (4) of the Charter. This has been described in detail, in resolution 34/88, as being based on the following assumptions: non-use of nuclear weapons; desisting from all forms of war propaganda and publicizing doctrines justifying wars; undertaking all necessary steps for slowing down and limiting the arms race and eliminating existing arsenals of weapons, in particular weapons of mass destruction; co-operating towards reaching progress in disarmament negotiations and refraining from any actions likely to affect those negotiations negatively, in particular from initiating new rounds of the arms race and extending it into new areas; and strict observance of existing disarmament agreements.

(Mr. Wilski, Poland)

Guided by a deep conviction about the necessity of urgently undertaking effective measures to stop the arms race, thus contributing to the strengthening of international peace and security, Poland continues to participate actively in all multilateral deliberating and negotiating disarmament forums, in particular within the framework of the United Nations disarmament endeavour.

For easily understandable reasons, we attach special importance to the creation of premises of security in Europe. That is why we welcomed with particular satisfaction the successful outcome of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, and why we are looking forward to the Vienna meeting providing us with at least the same amount of collaboration and progress, in particular with respect to disarmament.

I wish now to make a few comments on agenda item 62 (g), "Study on deterrence". That study is contained in document A/41/432. It is self-evident that the concept of security based on deterrence presupposes that each of the potential sides in an armed conflict has at its disposal so large a military capacity as to deter the potential aggressor from resorting to armed force, since that either would be unsuccessful or would cause it to suffer, as a result of a retaliatory strike, losses greater than those inflicted on the enemy. That concept is aggressive in its very essence, since it relies on force and on the threat of force.

Depending on the nature of the weapons to be used in a conflict we have two kinds of deterrence: conventional and nuclear. In both cases the adoption of the concept causes acceleration and loss of control of the arms race because of the need constantly to build up and refine existing arsenals, which are necessary to ensure the credibility of deterrence. The concept therefore has a destabilizing impact on international relations, as it leads to a constant increase of the level

(Mr. Wilski, Poland)

of military confrontation and to greater difficulty in concluding even partial disarmament agreements.

Nuclear deterrence is particularly dangerous for the following reasons: By stimulating both the quantitative and the qualitative development of nuclear arsenals, it objectively increases the risk of nuclear war. By its very essence it makes it impossible to reach agreement, for instance through a test-ban, on limiting the possibilities for modernizing nuclear weapons. It enhances the possibility of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And it does not insure against the outbreak of an "accidental" nuclear war caused by either human or mechanical error.

Moreover, even a hypothetical balance of force based on the concept of deterrence would have no stabilizing influence on the international situation and would bring no guarantees of security. As a matter of fact, all deterrence really does is increase mistrust and mutual suspicion. The doctrine of deterrence also causes military balance to be achieved at ever higher levels and the number of accumulated weapons to grow totally incommensurate with the aims they were supposed to serve.

The only sensible alternative to deterrence is the creation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security, as proposed by the Socialist States in document A/41/191, under agenda item 141. Such a system should be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and equal security. A first step towards the establishment of such a system should be the conclusion of disarmament agreements limiting the arms race and guaranteeing the achievement of a balance of force at ever lower levels.

Mr. I. A. CHOWDHURY (Bangladesh): The purpose of my statement is to place on record my delegation's position on agenda item 65, "Relationship between disarmament and development". For us, the item is a crucial one, and understandably so.

Bangladesh is a country of nearly 100 million people. Our resources are limited; our constraints are many and varied. Our policies focus mainly on our development efforts. Our endeavours are directed towards obtaining for our people an acceptable quality of life. Our scarce resources, therefore, need to be allocated with care and circumspection. We have but little choice on that score. Prioritization is important for us.

(Mr. I. A. Chowdhury, Bangladesh)

In this, I need hardly add, we are not alone. Many other countries and nations share this predicament: limited resources competing for the satisfaction of our ever proliferating plethora of demands.

Small wonder that we cannot endorse the global expenditure of \$900 billion annually on armaments. We cannot do it on moral grounds; we cannot do it on ethical grounds; we cannot do it on economic grounds, or simply on the grounds of pragmatism.

It is true that the Member States have differing views on disarmament. There are those who feel that we must, today, totally abjure the arms race. There are others who believe that security is not necessarily enhanced by disarmament, but only by a negotiated mutual reduction of arms.

It is also a fact that our views differ on development: its definition, modalities, the most appropriate policies, the ideological and theoretical frameworks, and so on.

But an overwhelming majority is now agreed that there is a linkage between disarmament and development.

They are linked because, first, disarmament would release funds and other resources for development; secondly, disarmament would create a harmonious international atmosphere conducive to efforts for economic uplift; and thirdly, disarmament would reduce inter-State acrimony, thereby fostering positive linkages across a spectrum of activities favouring overall development.

There is, of course, the possibility that disarmament by itself might not lead to development. Funds and resources released might not be used for development ends. Disarmament by some could inspire in others designs for domination. Abjuring armaments might reduce existing linkages between some States without increasing corresponding ones in other spheres.

All these are possible, and avoidable - avoidable, if we can muster enough political will and determination.

(Mr. I. A. Chowdhury, Bangladesh)

It is not just that disarmament creates positive factors for development; the reverse is also true. Emphasis on achievements for development at national levels would reduce the potential for domestic conflict and alleviate the need for armaments for the maintenance of order. The self-induced reduced capabilities of a State would heighten the sense of security of its neighbours, who would then de-emphasize military expenditure. A chain of positive disarmament initiatives could then ensue.

Doubtless this is a pleasing scenario. However, as in the other case, here, too, the desired goals might not be achieved. Development could spur a State on to armaments to protect its achievements. This could in turn create a chain-reaction of inflated military expenditure.

Once again the elements required to prevent the negative scenario from occurring would be political will and determination.

This is perhaps one of the greatest tasks that confronts the leaders of the contemporary world. Success in this sphere will separate the statesman from the politician.

The vigour of all societies is best preserved by a relentless pursuit of high and noble ideals. Let us then intellectually learn to accept that disarmament is not a myth, and development is a must. Rather than adding links to the chains of weapons shackling the global community and precluding their pursuit of progress, let us, in our minds and hearts, set disarmament and development as the twin goals to strive for.

It is necessary, we believe, to debunk for ever the old myth that the best thing to perk up any stagnating economy is a jolly good war. Or, if a war is not at hand, the next best thing is an arms race.

(Mr. I. A. Chowdhury, Bangladesh)

Marion Anderson in her paper The Empty Pork Barrel has argued most convincingly to the contrary. She has demonstrated that it was not just a coincidence that every time the arms expenditure went up in the United States by \$1 billion, 10,000 jobs disappeared.

The indirect costs of armed conflict are also heavy. Every minute military expenditures amount to over \$1.9 million, and during that minute 30 children die of starvation and malnutrition. Yet 75 per cent of the world trade in arms today is directed at the developing countries. Do these statistics not make us stop and ponder for a moment?

Let us recall the wise counsel of Willy Brandt:

"The threatening arsenals grow, and spending on other purposes which could make them less necessary is neglected. If military expenditures can be controlled and some of the savings related to development, the world's security can be increased, and the mass of mankind currently excluded from a decent life can have a brighter future."

It was not so long ago that nearly a million people marched from the United Nations to Central Park in New York asking the world to "Give Peace a Chance". The echoes of their fervent appeal still reverberate through these corridors.

We must take note of the demands of peace-loving peoples everywhere. To that end my delegation would like to lend its full support to the early convening of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. In this year, 1986, the Year of Peace, let us collectively pledge ourselves to making all efforts to hold the Conference by 1987. My delegation commends the work of the Preparatory Committee reflected in its report (A/41/51). We are pleased to note the contents of the Joint Declaration by the Panel of Eminent Personalities in the Field of Disarmament and Development (A/CONF.130/PC/INF/8) and are of the view that this constitutes a useful contribution to our work.

(Mr. I. A. Chowdhury, Bangladesh)

Victor Hugo once said that "there is nothing more powerful than an idea whose time has come". The concept of the linkage of disarmament and development is such an idea. It could be the motive force for building up a momentum of efforts leading to the positive chain-reactions set forth in the scenarios described above. The endeavours directed at the twin goals will lead to peace. And peace is conducive to progress.

Any logician would be hard put to detect a fallacy in that syllogism.

Mr. SALAMI (Togo) (interpretation from French): This year has been quite rightly proclaimed the International Year of Peace. The Member States of our Organization were unanimous in their view of the very alarming international situation at three levels: political, economic and social. This situation is giving rise to serious concern with regard to the safeguarding of peace and security - two objectives that are given pride of place in the Charter of the United Nations.

The ongoing accumulation of weapons of mass destruction and of other types of weapons has become a permanent threat to man's survival, and we now have to contend with the risk of a dangerous extension of the arms race into outer space. Hence one can easily understand why our Committee has decided to give all due attention to the consideration of the items on its agenda relating to disarmament and to allocate the greatest number of meetings to them.

But there can be no peace and security in a world where more than half the inhabitants have a standard of living below what is generally accepted as decent and when hundreds of millions live in total destitution and abject poverty. It seems correct, therefore, to state that development also involves peace and security.

(Mr. Salami, Togo)

That is why, in speaking once again in the Committee, the delegation of Togo would like to turn specifically to item 65, "Relationship between disarmament and development".

That the arms race is absurd no longer needs to be demonstrated. The question of disarmament has very often been tackled solely from the point of view of protecting mankind from the holocaust of a worst-case nuclear catastrophe. Hence a recent assessment of accumulated forces has led to the conclusion - which needs no comment - that in the case of nuclear war there would be neither victors nor vanquished.

(Mr. Salami, Togo)

Therefore, for as long as an effort is made to try to maintain a precarious and dangerous balance of terror, negotiations on disarmament will simply be prolonged indefinitely, mark time and get us nowhere.

But at the end of the twentieth century, as everything becomes more and more concentrated in an increasingly interdependent world, it is alarming to note the unprecedented increase in military expenditures that has been recorded in the course of the last 20 years and the rather sombre and difficult economic and social prospects for all the developing countries. In other countries the very least that can be said is that those prospects are not encouraging. Everything seems to be happening as if the overall trend towards an increase in military expenditure is unavoidably translated by an exacerbation of the world economic crisis. In this regard it is important to note that military expenditures have reached \$1,300 billion, whereas only \$20 billion has been allocated for aid to development, and the debt of the third world as a whole has reached \$1,000 billion. A world which places on an equal footing resources that have been invested for purposes of armament and the indispensable resources for the survival of two thirds of mankind is a world in which priorities have clearly been completely turned upside down.

In the same way the studies that have been carried out by the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development clearly show the adverse economic and social consequences of the arms race and how strong would be the impact of the reallocation of resources now used for armament to purposes of development. It has been unequivocally recognized that the high level of military expenditure contributes to inflationist trends and contributes to the depletion of scarce national resources.

Furthermore, since the developed countries are the main producers and exporters of weapons, the weapons trade implies the massive transfer of financial resources from the consumer developing countries, and that involves a very heavy

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burden for the meagre budgets of our countries and may thus delay or jeopardize the achievement of our political and economic and social development programmes.

In fact there cannot be fairly shared economic and social progress if 25 per cent of the world's scientific manpower and 40 per cent of world expenditure on research and development are linked to military sectors and if the world continues to devote \$1,000 billion, or 7 per cent of gross national product, to arms expenditures, when public assistance for development is regressing.

Togo believes we must proceed to ensure that all progress towards disarmament contributes to development. It must be noted that the relationship between development and disarmament is getting closer and closer. In this respect I would refer to the 1985 report on the world social situation, which states:

"Material bases for the achievement of social objectives common to a great majority of mankind exist on the world level, and failure and pessimism are linked to the bad management of resources and a misguided orientation of efforts, and that explains why the results obtained are often discouraging, if not disastrous."

That is why it is more and more urgent to hold the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in 1987. A new deferment of that Conference would be highly regrettable.

My delegation would take this opportunity to congratulate the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the members of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference on their invaluable contribution to the preparations for the Conference.

Togo, well known for its deep dedication to peace and security, is convinced that that Conference would not only outline the precise nature of the relationship between disarmament and development but also lead to concrete recommendations and conclusions.

Mr. KHANDOGY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): In this statement the Ukrainian delegation would like to address the problems of reducing armed forces and conventional arms and also the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Interest in these matters has grown considerably recently, following the meeting between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gorbachev, and United States President Reagan in Reykjavik, where, it will be recalled, the sides made a great deal of progress in the search for nuclear disarmament, which of course is the highest priority task in the building of a secure world.

Understandably, in connection with the serious improvement we have noticed along the way, justified questions have arisen about the need to find compromise decisions in other areas too, in particular in the field of conventional armaments and the prohibition of chemical means of waging war.

At the same time we cannot help being at least surprised that there are some people in the West who are attempting to cast doubt on the importance of the possible agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament and even their very advisability on the pretext that supposedly that would leave the United States and its European allies defenceless in the face of the threat allegedly posed by the conventional and chemical weapons of the Soviet Union.

The groundlessness of that kind of assertion has been repeatedly demonstrated both by the Soviet side and by independent experts. In our view the true reason why in the United States and in certain other States there has been active speculation on the linkage of questions of nuclear, conventional and chemical armaments is primarily to be found in the reluctance of certain forces to give up the nuclear weapon as a means of achieving geopolitical goals and their ambition at any price to achieve military strategic supremacy.

(Mr. Khandogy, Ukrainian SSR)

Illuminating in this regard are the words of the Supreme Commander of the NATO forces in Europe, General Rogers, quoted in The New York Times of 28 October of this year. With characteristic military straightforwardness, he states:

"No matter how large a conventional force we are able to build, I still believe that we should retain some nuclear weapons and retain a first-use option. I do not think that it is possible to reduce to a point that there are none on the face of the Earth."

Circles connected with the military-industrial complex are clearly frightened of the prospects that have opened up and are trying to mislead people and distort the essence of the foreign policy of the socialist countries. Here we find particularly wrong the attempts to suppress the fact that in the field of armed forces and conventional armaments, and indeed in all other areas, the socialist countries are ready to take the most far-reaching measures provided there is a reciprocal readiness on the part of their partners in negotiations. Proof of this is the programme of comprehensive security through disarmament put forward by the Soviet Union on 15 January 1986 based on the organic link between questions of nuclear and chemical disarmament and the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces.

Together with the elimination of nuclear weapons, the problem of the reduction of chemical weapons has become particularly urgent for the European continent now and in the future. Today in that part of the world there is a confrontation between two major armed camps equipped with the latest weapons, all individual systems of which are in their combat characteristics coming to resemble means of mass destruction ever more closely. In an attempt to improve the situation in Europe and radically to reduce the level of military confrontation there, the Warsaw Treaty Powers have addressed to the members of NATO and to all European countries a programme for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

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The socialist countries have proposed substantially to reduce all the elements of land forces and tactical attack air forces of European States and the corresponding forces and resources of the United States and Canada deployed in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. In this regard it is of fundamental importance that, along with reductions in conventional weapons, there would be reductions also in operational and tactical nuclear weapons with a range of less than 1,000 kilometres.

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With regard to reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, it is proposed that this be undertaken gradually within agreed timetables while constantly preserving the military balance at the reduced levels without detriment to the security of anyone. As a first step, a reciprocal, one-time reduction in troop strength of the States members of the opposing military-political alliances would be made to the amount of 100,000 to 150,000 men on each side. That would create the conditions necessary for further substantial reductions, as a result of which, at the beginning of the 1990s, land forces and technical attack air forces of both the alliances in Europe would be reduced by approximately 25 per cent. In effect, the strength of the armed forces of the opposing armed camps in Europe would be reduced by some one million men. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR regards these proposals as demonstrating a sweeping and bold approach to difficult international problems and as embodying a desire to act not merely in words but in concrete terms to find early solutions to them.

Serious and far-reaching measures have also been taken in the sphere of verification of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. For example, there has been a proposal to implement a broad range of monitoring procedures using both national and international technical means and including on-site inspection. In order to make verification measures effective, the socialist countries have made an important proposal for the establishment of an international consultative committee to be made up of representatives of the countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and those of the Warsaw Treaty, as well as interested neutral, non-aligned and other European countries. The Ukrainian delegation is of the view that the Budapest communiqué issued by the socialist countries at the recent meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States members of the Warsaw Treaty sets forth a solid basis for beginning negotiations on this subject. At the same time the

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socialist countries are prepared to consider in a constructive spirit any other proposals put forward in this connection. The important thing is to ensure practical and tangible results that will lead to a lowering of the level of possible military confrontation in Europe.

We also deem important and timely the initiative taken by the Socialist Unity Party of German and the Social Democratic Party of Germany in establishing principles for the creation of a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe. It would appear that the implementation of that plan could bring about a radical improvement of the political climate on the continent and help to achieve concrete agreements on disarmament, in keeping with the security interests of both European and other States as well.

In expressing its support of an agreement to reduce armed-forces strength and conventional armaments on a pan-European scale, the Ukrainian SSR also supports the initiative to lower the level of military confrontation in other parts of the world, including the Asian and Pacific area, where militarization and the threat of war are increasing dangerously. It is our fundamental belief that such initiatives are fully in keeping with the General Assembly's appeal in resolution 40/94 A.

The Ukrainian SSR wholeheartedly supports the demand expressed by the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations immediately to halt the production and deployment of chemical means of waging war and to destroy existing stockpiles of such weapons in order once and for all to banish all possibility of their use from the life of man. Today, there are real opportunities to do this. The international community greeted with satisfaction the Soviet-American agreements reached on this subject at the summit meeting at Geneva last November. In the spirit of those agreements, in April of this year the Soviet Union submitted at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament new proposals that would bring us to the verge of reaching fundamental decisions on the most difficult

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questions involved in destroying stockpiles of chemical weapons and manufacturing facilities of such weapons. It was proposed, inter alia, that the destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons begin, following a very strict timetable, no later than six months after the entry into force of the convention, and that the destruction or dismantling of facilities for their production would begin no later than one year later. Announcement of the location of production facilities for chemical weapons should be made 30 days following the entry into force of the convention. Proof of the Soviet Union's consistent and constructive approach to the question of chemical disarmament was contained in the USSR's proposals announced in the Committee yesterday, proposals designed to reach compromise decisions in the matter of the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial, civilian, chemical industries.

In our view, the important thing is the readiness of the Soviet Union to get to work on mutually acceptable procedures on challenge inspections on the basis of the United Kingdom proposal, once it has been properly refined, as well as the appeal to the United States of America to enter into a bilateral moratorium on the production and deployment of chemical weapons, including binary weapons.

In the view of the Ukrainian delegation, those proposals will, in actual fact, make it possible to overcome the differences that now exist in the positions of States and to open up real possibilities for reaching an agreement at an early date on the basic sections of a future international convention banning chemical weapons.

Unfortunately, the decisions taken at the end of May by the NATO countries to give the go-ahead for the beginning of the manufacture of a new generation of chemical, binary, weapons by the United States, have programmed for years to come not only the preservation but also the increase of the chemical threat to all mankind. Those NATO decisions run counter to the goal of eliminating chemical

(Mr. Khandogy, Ukrainian SSR)

weapons and to the Soviet-American agreements reached at the Geneva summit meeting, as well as to the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. They cannot help but do serious damage to the ongoing work in the Conference on Disarmament on reaching an agreement on a convention banning such weapons.

In setting a high priority on the task of the total prohibition on and elimination of chemical weapons, the socialist countries propose the adoption of certain partial and interim steps that can lead to the same goal. For example, we are thinking of the initiative of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia to create a chemical weapon-free zone in Central Europe, as well as the proposals of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Socialist Republic of Romania for the creation of a similar zone in the Balkans.

The Ukrainian delegation believes that carrying out those proposals would make it possible substantially to reduce the risk of chemical war and would promote the consolidation of European security and strengthen mutual trust. With regard to the early conclusion of a convention on a total ban on chemical weapons, there has also been a proposal to prevent their further proliferation. In that connection the provisions confirmed by the Soviet Government at the end of January this year with regard to the export from the USSR of dual-use chemicals - that is, chemicals that can be used for both peaceful and military purposes - make it clear that supplies and deliveries of such chemicals can be carried out only under guarantees by the importing countries that such chemicals will not be used, directly or indirectly, for the production of chemical weapons.

The ominous threat of chemical warfare is on the whole having a poisonous effect on the international atmosphere and raising the level of military confrontations. Removing chemical weapons from the arsenals of States is the business of the whole of the international community, and in this connection an important role in this decision should also be played by the General Assembly at its

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present session. The Delegation of the Ukrainian SSR is convinced that a comprehensive discussion of this urgent question in the First Committee and suitable recommendations in this connection will provide additional momentum to negotiations and help to overcome existing obstacles and to conclude, by 1987, work on the convention on the elimination of chemical weapons.

The Socialist countries, for their part, have repeatedly demonstrated that the prohibition of chemical weapons remains a priority task, and they expect other States to take a serious and businesslike approach to this problem of such importance for the fate of mankind.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): The forty-first session of the General Assembly is very different from other sessions in recent times. While we meet in this Committee, consideration is being given in other Committees to questions involving the financing and structure of the United Nations. Those questions are amongst the most serious our Organization has faced since its creation.

On this subject, I can say two things on behalf of the Australian Government. First, we place great value on this Organization. We want to see it work as efficiently and as successfully as possible. Secondly, we believe that every Member State must play its part in the search for a solution to the present crisis of the United Nations. Any contribution to that solution, large or small, is to be welcomed.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

I propose, at least for a few minutes, to try to make such a contribution.

Two weeks ago I made Australia's statement in the general debate in the First Committee. In that statement I refrained from simply taking a long walk through the agenda of the Committee. This was in spite of the fact that there are many items on our agenda which are of great interest and importance to Australia. But for reasons of economy and concern for our Organization that was our decision and we will adhere to it.

Today, instead, I wish to address briefly the question of how reform in the work and the methods of the First Committee might be able to be achieved and might be able to play their part in reasserting the irreducible value of the United Nations and indeed in answering at least some of the critics of the United Nations.

While it may not appear to be the case to many outsiders, people out on the street, the fact is that what we deal with in this Committee are among the most serious issues of our times.

One may well ask why outsiders would differ with that view. I suggest that they might do so, not because they are insensitive to the scandal of the arms race or to the relevance of the subjects on our agenda, but rather because they might have witnessed the way in which we have come to deal with those subjects.

We must respond to the seriousness of the issues that are on our agenda and we must do this in a seriously organized fashion. There are at least two reasons for this: the political reason and the economic reason.

The political reason is the credibility of the United Nations itself. If we are not seen - including by ordinary people - to be at serious work on the issues of disarmament and on the role of disarmament in the maintenance of peace and security, how could we fail to understand expressed concern, or even despair, about the nature of the United Nations as such?

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

In other words, if we in this Committee fail to address squarely and credibly what are among the key issues of our age - and most of the subjects on our agenda are such issues - then we will face a dual failure: first, the failure to deal with specific and vital problems and, secondly, the gross failure of walking away from the purposes and principles of our Organization.

There is also the economic dimension. We all pay in one measure or another for what happens in the Organization. But I think it is fair to say there is often a prevailing sense in which many seem to feel that they do not pay individually, that in some way someone else is providing.

I ask this question seriously: What would our attitude be if each of us had to pay a fee, even a small fee, for each occasion on which a given subject appeared on the agenda of the First Committee?

I strongly suspect that, if such a personal financial obligation prevailed, our rationalization of the agenda of the First Committee would take place overnight.

Why should any given issue, whether it is a nuclear-test ban, chemical weapons or any other issue, appear on our agenda more than once as such or under the umbrella of some previous resolution or the report of some other body?

Surely the rational step to take is to consolidate and rationalize our agenda so that each subject appears once and only once and is considered only once.

Of course the theoretical question I have posed regarding what our attitude would be if we had to pay personally is in fact not completely theoretical. The reality is that we do pay; in fact we all pay; and we should all have an interest in protecting the political credibility of this Committee and of the United Nations and in ensuring that it functions economically.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

By the way, the concept of efficiency in economics is not simply a concept of the lowest possible price; rather, it is that of the optimum relationship between cost and benefit. We need to find that optimum point in this Committee, because, frankly, we have lost it.

The fact is that the product of this Committee, as indeed of the Assembly as a whole, is resolutions. Those declarations are what is at issue at any session of the General Assembly. At this session in our Committee we see a truly remarkable phenomenon.

Many of us have questioned the need for an ever growing number of resolutions. Now that all of this Committee's draft resolutions have been submitted, what do we see? A greater number than last year. That raises a most serious question both in economic and political terms.

I will try to express this simply. Does greater quantity mean greater quality? Is it true that the submission of a larger number of draft resolutions will mean that, this year, we will advance the cause of disarmament to a greater degree? Sadly, the clear answer is "no".

Why is this the case? Why such clear failure? The answer can be found even by a very quick scrutiny of the resolutions themselves.

The first characteristic that such scrutiny reveals is that many draft resolutions are on exactly the same subject.

The second characteristic is that very few of them differ from each other, other than in their co-sponsorship.

The third characteristic is that many of them are not directed to practical steps in disarmament but rather to mere declaration.

Naturally, I could be accused of unacceptable subjectivity in putting forward those three judgements. But in response to such a charge I would make this point.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

The three judgements or criticisms of draft resolutions I have just voiced are not original. I did not think of them myself. They are, in fact, what so many members of this Committee say and have said. Thus they must be, at the very least, partly true.

I have already spoken of the need for us to rationalize our end-product, the draft resolutions. In our view the goal should be one draft resolution on each subject. That, under present circumstances, may sound radical; but I would argue that it is not so much radical as rational. Only if we achieve the habit of considering each subject only once and of arriving at one draft resolution on that subject, in respect of which we will all be able to choose our voting position, will we then restore the credibility and the effectiveness of this Committee.

The alternative is the one with which we are dealing now, in which we are simply floundering. It is a situation where the only currency we have - our draft resolutions - is being grossly debased by its too-frequent use and because of that it is strengthening those who would criticize and indeed question the need for multilateral work in disarmament.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Mr. Chairman, I know that you are conducting consultations on the question of reform in the First Committee. We support you entirely. In our view, you should continue those consultations as long as you hold your present position and until they produce the required results. Also, I have already stated here too that we support the wider initiative of the delegation of Cameroon towards a review of the United Nations disarmament machinery.

But a step forward can be taken at this session, indeed in the next few days, by delegations which have similar or competing draft resolutions seeking to merge those draft resolutions. I make this clear: my delegation would welcome and entertain any such proposal.

But whatever we may achieve in this Committee at this session, let us replace the proliferation of draft resolutions which are clones - or which at best represent a choice of pure indifference - by the beginning of a process of true revitalization of this Committee.

Mr. von STUELPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): Today, my delegation would like to speak on the subject of weapon-free zones, which has been mentioned during the debate in this Committee. It is a concept which has been proposed in its many-faceted aspects for different regions of the world, including Europe. As in many other regions of the world, opinion in Europe about aspects of this matter is divided. The question to be answered is whether or not such zones can contribute to more security. That is the yardstick by which they have to be measured.

The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament clearly recognized the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as an important disarmament measure. However, that assessment remains dependent upon a number of prerequisites and conditions clearly mentioned in the same document. The Final Document clearly implies that regional concepts must

(Mr. von Stuelpnagel, Federal
Republic of Germany)

serve unrestrictedly the attainment of the objective of security and that in an equitable and balanced manner they must ensure that no individual State or group of States can obtain advantages over others at any stage. Concrete proposals for nuclear and other weapon-free zones have, furthermore, to be looked at in the overall context of their contribution to the prevention of war and stability, in political as well as military terms.

Two types of weapon-free zones in Europe have recently been referred to in statements here: a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe, and a nuclear-weapon-free corridor on both sides of the dividing line between the two alliances.

The concept of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe has to be measured against the following crucial criteria: Would it guarantee an increased level of security in the area? Would it satisfy the need for effective and feasible verification? Would it strengthen the efforts for a comprehensive and world-wide ban on chemical weapons?

In answering recent suggestions on these lines from the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, my Government has come to the following appraisal. First, the concept of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe does not provide for the destruction of those weapons, but only requires their withdrawal beyond a certain geographical line. It is therefore a doubtful arms limitation measure, and certainly not one of genuine disarmament.

Secondly, in view of the high mobility of chemical weapons and their delivery systems and in view also of the fact that those weapons, once withdrawn, would not lose their capability to have an impact on the zone from outside it, the requirement of effective verification in and adjacent to a given zone cannot be met satisfactorily. A regional arrangement would therefore not contribute to more security, but would result in more distrust, instability and insecurity.

(Mr. von Stuepnel, Federal
Republic of Germany)

Thirdly, a negotiating effort in the interest of one or more regional chemical-weapon-free zones can, in our opinion, only divert us from the essential aim of negotiating a convention on the global prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their world-wide destruction, that is a convention of a decisive disarmament nature. The use of chemical weapons in recent regional conflicts underlines the necessity of coming to such a global solution to the problem.

In his statement on behalf of the 12 members of the European Community in the general debate on 14 October, Mr. Timothy Renton, Minister of State of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, emphasized the high priority attached by the European Community to the early conclusion of an effective global ban on chemical weapons. Those negotiations are progressing at an accelerating pace. As a result of the hard work done in the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament, especially in the last three years, since it received its present mandate, much common ground has been identified, to an increasing extent in the form of provisionally agreed treaty language within the basic structure of the Convention adopted in 1984. Building on that foundation, the Ad Hoc Committee has in its reports for 1985 and 1986 developed further what is called the rolling text of a draft convention, which reflects the current state of the negotiations and reports on progress to the Conference on Disarmament and to the General Assembly.

As members will have seen from this year's report, we have been able to make remarkable progress in some areas of the draft convention, notably in its articles IV, V and VI. We were also progressing towards agreement on verification by routine methods that stocks of chemical weapons and facilities for producing them are eliminated during the 10-year transitional period and that the civil chemical industry is not misused to make chemical weapons. It is generally

(Mr. von Stuelpnagel, Federal
Republic of Germany)

accepted that these routine methods of verification need to be supplemented by a system of challenge inspection, under article IX of the draft convention, as a safety net to provide the ultimate source of confidence in the convention.

Here a very basic difference of conception still seems to persist between the negotiating partners, a difference which should incite us to work even harder if we want to achieve the desired results in the course of the coming year. My delegation thinks that this could be possible. The recent acceptance in principle by the representative of the USSR of the need for mutually acceptable procedures for challenge inspections, as welcome as it may be, has still to be tested at the negotiating table against the necessary flexibility in elaborating procedures for unimpeded obligatory challenge inspections that satisfy the need for effective and speedy verification with the final aim of increasing justified confidence.

We have also heard in this Committee another proposal, made by two political parties, on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe. Partners in that concept are the governing United Socialist Party in the German Democratic Republic and the Social Democratic Party of the Federal Republic of Germany, which is not governing. Together they have elaborated so-called principles envisioning a corridor on the territories of the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany, extending 150 kilometres on each side from the line which divides the two alliances.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones have their justification where they can contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in that respect we have always supported them, provided they were accepted by all parties concerned. But in Europe the situation is different. In Europe, we find a security posture where nuclear weapons form an essential element of the military balance, thus securing an equilibrium of power that, in view of the vast conventional superiority of one side, could not be attained otherwise.

(Mr. von Stuelpnagel, Federal
Republic of Germany)

A nuclear-free corridor can certainly not solve the problem of threats from outside this corridor - and we all know that most nuclear transport systems are designed to carry their load far beyond a limited 150 kilometres. Nuclear dissuasion is therefore - till the time of true disarmament - the safeguard which ensures that it is impossible any longer to consider that war in Europe can be conducted as a means of politics.

The Atlantic Alliance has given tangible proof of its seriousness in respect of disarmament when it eliminated unilaterally 1,000 nuclear warheads at the time when it became necessary to balance Soviet long-range intermediate-range nuclear forces, and when, in addition to that, it was decided unilaterally to reduce American warheads by another 1,400 until the year 1988.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany supports all endeavours to reduce and limit nuclear armament at the lowest possible level - and here we look forward to the Soviet-American negotiations, which seem to us the most appropriate event in this respect. We do not want attention diverted from these crucial talks, which, in our opinion, have a concrete and positive perspective. A regional approach can only complicate these negotiations. The term "nuclear-free-corridor" thus creates, in our opinion, only an illusion of security when in fact what is important is not where weapons are stationed but rather where their effect can be felt.

In the view of my Government, practical use has to be made now of the constructive progress achieved at the Reykjavik meeting. In the course of the progress of possible global disarmament measures, the proposal of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe is not only of little help, but might disturb and irritate the flow of negotiations about world-wide nuclear weapons reductions and, finally, their elimination.

Mr. FREIER (Israel): My remarks bear on agenda item 144 and on draft resolution A/C.1/41/L.23 entitled "Israeli nuclear armament".

The General Assembly discussed this item on 12 December 1985 and, in its resolution 40/93, requested: "the Secretary-General to follow closely Israeli nuclear activities and to report thereon as appropriate to the General Assembly". The Permanent Representative of Oman, however, acting on behalf of the Group of Arab States, has pre-empted the Secretary-General and has called for the inclusion of this item in the agenda of the First Committee. In so doing, the Group of Arab States has slighted the judgement of the Secretary-General, who is manifestly more mindful than they of the dignity of the General Assembly and will not seize on a newspaper article of recent vintage in order to engage the General Assembly precipitately.

In his explanatory memorandum, the Permanent Representative of Oman makes reference to the latest in a long series of newspaper articles on Israeli nuclear armament, largely at variance with one another, and accuses Israel of violating the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Let me deal with these topics in reverse order.

Israel is not in violation of any undertaking. Wherever Israel has submitted to IAEA safeguards, it is certified by the IAEA as complying strictly with its undertakings. Furthermore, since Israel is not a party to the Treaty, it cannot be in violation of the Treaty's provisions.

Let me now take issue with newspaper reports and speculations on Israel's nuclear capabilities. Such reports on the nuclear capabilities of most industrialized countries have been of common occurrence throughout the years. Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the IAEA, addressed this issue squarely when he said on 20 May 1983 that:

(Mr. Freier, Israel)

"We must face the fact that the scientific knowledge and skills needed to make nuclear weapons are within reach of almost any State which has a reasonable industrial base."

In making this statement, Mr. Blix did not even exclude adherents to the NPT.

On 11 December 1981, he said:

"Neither such adherence" - to NPT - "nor full-scope safeguards are full guarantees that the State will not one day make nuclear weapons."

Such is the situation that any country with a sufficient scientific and industrial base, be it a party to the NPT or not, possesses the requisite knowledge to apply nuclear energy to any purpose. This situation may be deplorable, but the expansion of nuclear scientific and technical capability has not been presented as a threat - not in the case of India, which set off a nuclear device and would have the world believe it did so for peaceful purposes, a claim privately disbelieved by almost everyone; not in the case of Pakistan; nor in the case of Libya, which vainly shopped around for bombs, and decided to adhere to the NPT and qualify for nuclear technology transfers when it failed to secure its ends by the frontal approach.

I therefore put it to the First Committee that, in quoting newspaper reports or speculations on Israel's nuclear capability, and making these out to constitute a danger, the Group of Arab States simply seized on one more expedient in order to wage their multi-pronged campaign against Israel in this body.

There is, however, a more serious aspect to the problem of dangers and threats which ought to be looked at dispassionately. With so much knowledge, research and development around, we should ask: When does this knowledge truly become threatening? Clearly this is so if a threat is intended and spelled out. Israel, for its part, has never threatened the existence of any country, in contrast to most of its Arab neighbours, which are expressly committed to its liquidation.

(Mr. Preter, Israel)

Specifically, in the nuclear realm, Israel has declared that "it would not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East". And Israel stands by this declaration.

Neither in intent nor declaration has Israel at any time threatened the Arab countries: not in times of war, launched against it by the Arab countries; nor in the war between the wars - the terror, economic, boycott, and attempts at political delegitimization continuously waged by Arab countries against us.

Any capability by Israel to maintain itself, however, is made out by most Arabs to be a threat. Its technical competence in any realm, its economic development, the renewal of diplomatic relations with the countries of Africa, any vote not cast in its disfavour in international organs - all these are presented by Israel's enemies as threats to the Arab world.

But where do threats really emanate from, in declaration and military build-up?

Let me offer but a few quotations from what some Arab leaders say - statements which vary little, year after year. President Hussein of Iraq said:

"The Arabs must not give their signature and agreement to the recognition of the Zionist entity, even within the borders of June 1967."

His Foreign minister explained how this should be realized in practice:

"Iraq cannot agree to the existence of Zionism - neither as a movement nor as a State ... The struggle against Zionism is for us a struggle in which there can be no compromise."

The Syrian Foreign Minister declared "the liquidation of the Zionist regime is the only way to resolve the Middle East conflict". And Colonel Qaddafi said as late as last year: "Zionism in the Arab homeland, the sentence is death and destruction."

These declarations may sound familiar to you and not trouble most Member States unduly since they have become commonplace and are not directed against them. But they do trouble Israel. These are not exercises in words, but threats

(Mr. Freier, Israel)

backed up by a war-making potential of significant proportions. Let me give the First Committee a few figures. Take only Syria, Libya and Iraq, which head the list of arms importers in the third world, along with Saudi Arabia. These three countries alone - Iraq, Syria and Libya - dispose of 12,300 tanks, as against 3,800 in Israel. They have about 1,900 combat aircraft, as against the 645 of which Israel disposes. They can put in the field in wartime about 2,300,000 soldiers, as against 440,000 by Israel.

(Mr. Freier, Israel)

By way of comparison, I have looked up one North Atlantic Treaty Organization country and one Warsaw Treaty Organization country which have populations similar to that of Syria. They are Belgium and Hungary. This is what I learned from the International Institute for Strategic Studies about their conventional potential.

While Syria has 4,100 tanks, Hungary has 1,360 and Belgium 470. Syria has 650 combat aircraft, Hungary 140 and Belgium 140. Syria has a standing army of 400,000, Hungary 105,000 and Belgium 90,000.

Even if you account for the fact that all this potential is not at times available for war against Israel, all these countries have unequivocally declared their intention - I am speaking of Iraq, Syria and Libya - of eliminating Israel. They have tried to do so since 1948 on any grounds and by every means, and have shared with the General Assembly at this session their undisguised designs, and have not been alone in doing so.

In our statement in the general debate on 30 October 1986, we made two positive proposals which could remove mutual apprehensions in the Middle East.

We reiterated for the sixth year running our invitation to the Arab States to sit down and negotiate a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the lines laid down by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, commonly referred to as the Palme Commission, which says expressly:

"The Commission believes that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region or sub-region concerned constitutes an important step towards non-proliferation, common security and disarmament." (A/CN.10/38, p. 171)

Those are the words of the Commission, and such was the practice in the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the recent agreement on the South Pacific. Such, indeed, was Israel's declared position even before the Palme Commission was convened. This

(Mr. Preier, Israel)

procedure was repeatedly sanctioned by the United Nations, and as recently as April of this year in the Final Document of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned countries, as quoted in our earlier intervention in this Committee.

Other than the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which manifestly does not inhibit the recurrence of conventional wars, negotiations for a nuclear-weapon-free zone and the mutual reassurances built into it would definitely inhibit the further recourse to conventional wars, which are the curse of the Middle East, and head off arms races of all kinds.

In parallel - and as a natural corollary to a nuclear-weapon-free zone - Israel suggests that the States of the Middle East begin to negotiate a mutual and balanced reduction of forces, a Middle Eastern MBFR, as put to this Committee in our previous intervention.

These are practical and genuine suggestions. If the Arab countries refuse to negotiate with Israel even on these fateful issues for all of us, Israel must assume that the Arabs in fact perceive no threat at all and are confident they can with impunity pursue their goal of doing away with Israel.

My delegation invites the First Committee to ponder these points. If peace in the Middle East is the object, Member States should direct their efforts to persuading the Arab States to negotiate with Israel on these proposals. This would not only take the sting out of the confrontation with Israel but might also condition the other Middle Eastern States to negotiate among themselves. It would be a pity if a majority of Member States continued to yield to political and economic expediency and to give licence to unabashed hatred and unlimited threats. Such is not the way to promote peace in the Middle East and afford security to all.

(Mr. Freier, Israel)

Finally, Israel will ask the First Committee to reject the draft resolution in its entirety, for once again Israel is singled out from all other countries which have comparable scientific and technical capability. Secondly, as I said initially, last year the Secretary-General was asked to follow closely Israeli nuclear activities and to report thereon as appropriate to the General Assembly. Now, the present Arab draft resolution pre-empts the Secretary-General and questions his judgement, and it denigrates the General Assembly by compelling it to act upon newspaper reports and speculations.

At the last General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEW), the Arab States raised this very item but dropped it once they realized they could not muster sufficient votes for such a resolution. Israel believes Member States should vote against the present draft resolution, as they would have at the IAEA.

Mr. ADAN (Somalia): First of all my delegation is pleased to have this opportunity to convey to you, Sir, our sincere congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. I wish you and the other officers of the Committee every success in your important tasks.

My remarks bear on agenda item 63, "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace".

Since 1974 the major international initiative for achieving the goals of the General Assembly's Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace has continued to be efforts to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean.

My Government deeply regrets that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean has in the course of 1986 again been unable to complete the preparatory work for the convening of that important Conference. We strongly hope that better progress can be made in 1987.

(Mr. Adan, Somalia)

Presumably all those concerned are still committed to the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean region - a goal which would make a significant contribution to general and complete disarmament, to nuclear disarmament and to regional and world peace and security. If that is the case, then the objectives of the General Assembly's Indian Ocean Declaration should be steadily and vigorously pursued.

There are certainly compelling reasons for timely action on this question. There has been a steady worsening of the political and security situation in the region as a result of the escalation of the military presence of the great Powers in the context of global rivalry, the escalation of other foreign military presences, the extension of the arms race and the development of nuclear-weapon capabilities, in particular the acquisition by racist South Africa of nuclear-weapon technology. These are precisely the kinds of problems the Indian Ocean Declaration sought to preclude.

In addition to other destabilizing effects, these developments could hinder the struggle of liberation movements against colonialism, apartheid and foreign domination.

The problems that must be addressed by the Indian Ocean Conference are difficult but not insurmountable. They clearly require the exertion of strong political will by all concerned.

My Government remains committed to the seven principles of agreement which emerged from the 1979 meeting of littoral and hinterland States and which we believe must be addressed by the Conference on the Indian Ocean.

The great Powers undoubtedly have the major responsibility for halting and turning around their escalating military presence in the Indian Ocean. This responsibility should include the withdrawal of all foreign and surrogate troops from the littoral and hinterland States.

(Mr. Adan, Somalia)

For their part, the littoral and hinterland States have an obligation to refrain from collaborating with the great Powers in military activities hostile to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the peoples and States of the region.

(Mr. Adan, Somalia)

We believe that developments in those directions must be balanced by measures aimed at building confidence and mutual trust among Indian Ocean States. These States have a serious responsibility to co-operate among themselves to ensure conditions of peace and security, with particular attention to the peaceful settlement of disputes. They should certainly ensure that their resources are not squandered on a senseless arms race.

The peaceful settlement of disputes among Indian Ocean States through bilateral, regional or international negotiations, would certainly be an essential factor in the dismantling of foreign bases, the reduction of great-Power presence and the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

My Government supports the denuclearization of the Indian Ocean. If the joint responsibility of the nuclear Powers and the Indian Ocean States is faithfully carried out, a valuable contribution would be made to nuclear disarmament and to the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The acquisition by South Africa of a nuclear-weapon capability is of course a serious setback to progress towards denuclearization. We hope that the nuclear Powers will end all nuclear collaboration with the apartheid régime, which would undoubtedly be prepared to use nuclear blackmail in its unjust opposition to the liberation struggle in southern Africa.

With regard to the geographical limits of the Indian Ocean, my delegation supports the definition described in the Final Document of the Meeting of Littoral and Hinterland States. We hope that the convergence of views so far attained will be solidified in an agreement acceptable to all.

Finally, we support the right to free and unimpeded use of the Indian Ocean by the vessels and aircraft of all nations, in conformity with the norms of international law and provided that such use is not diverted to the threat or use of force against littoral or hinterland States.

(Mr. Adan, Somalia)

My delegation does not believe that all questions need to be resolved before the Indian Ocean Conference is convened. If that were the case, there would be no need for a Conference. We also do not believe that the convening of the Conference should depend on an improvement in the political and security situation in the Indian Ocean, since the purpose of the Conference is to provide remedies for that situation.

We reiterate our appeal to the permanent members of the Security Council and to the littoral and hinterland States and the major maritime users to make every effort to resolve the differences over procedure and substance which have held up the Indian Ocean Conference. For our part, we will co-operate in any way possible in order to ensure that the Conference is convened before 1988.

MR. TEJA (India): On behalf of the delegations of Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Madagascar, Romania, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and my own country, I would like to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/41/L.49, "Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear Weapons."

Last year the General Assembly adopted by an overwhelming majority resolution 40/151 F on this same subject. Two nuclear-weapon States supported that resolution. It may be recalled that at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, in 1982, India submitted a resolution containing as annex a draft convention entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons". We believe that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is of critical importance, both for prevention of nuclear war and for setting in motion a process of nuclear disarmament. We had hoped that the General Assembly would adopt the proposal by consensus. Since a consensus did not then emerge, the proposal was transmitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session later that same year. Since that time, the General Assembly has, with an increasingly larger

(Mr. Teja, India)

majority of votes, been requesting the Conference on Disarmament to conduct negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to achieve agreement on an international convention on the basis of the text annexed to the resolution. Since the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to proceed in that direction, without any convincing reason having been advanced by those who are opposed to the proposal, we are resubmitting the draft resolution in the hope that the First Committee and the General Assembly will this year provide it with an even more overwhelming endorsement than in prior years.

Although the specific proposal for a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed in draft resolution L.49 is a relatively new one, it is based on the principles established two and a half decades ago in the General Assembly, which recognized that the use of nuclear weapons would be a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations and that any State using such weapons would be considered as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind. That principle, enshrined in General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, has been reaffirmed by the General Assembly many times. Over the years, it has also come to be realized that the prevention of nuclear war is not just a moral imperative, but that it is also related to the very survival of the human race. All nuclear-weapon States now support the idea that a nuclear war must never be fought. The United States and the Soviet Union have also declared the proclaimed objective of their bilateral negotiations to be, ultimately, the elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

A legally binding commitment banning the use of nuclear weapons is a step in that direction. A binding convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons has been suggested with a view to meeting the argument that nuclear weapons have not been banned expressly by the United Nations Charter. The late Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr. Olof Palme, suggested in the General Assembly only last year the consideration

(Mr. Teja, India)

of the possibility of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons by international law as part of a process leading to general and complete disarmament.

As is mentioned in the preambular part of draft resolution L.49, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is only a step, but an important one, in the direction that will ultimately lead to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. The very existence of nuclear weapons and the prevailing doctrine of nuclear deterrence, predicated as it is on the possible use of nuclear weapons, threaten human civilization and human survival. The forswearing of the use of nuclear weapons will help in avoiding that danger and will also give credence to the commitment of nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of those weapons from their arsenals.

I should also like to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/41/L.48, entitled "Freeze on nuclear weapons", under agenda item 61 (e). This is a subject which is also very central to the objective of the prevention of nuclear war and ensuring the survival of mankind. We believe that the present stalemate in disarmament must be addressed through a bold, innovative, practical and universally applicable approach. It is our firm conviction that a nuclear-weapons freeze will serve to arrest the continuing escalation of the nuclear-arms race and help to create the atmosphere for nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Teja, India)

As in past years, the focus of L.48 is on two critical elements: first, the total stoppage of production of nuclear weapons and, secondly, the complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Our emphasis on those two critical elements of a nuclear-weapon freeze does not in any way imply that we do not recognize the need to ban the testing and the development of nuclear weapons. That, however, is a subject on which separate draft resolutions have been submitted at the current session of the General Assembly. We are also convinced that an appeal for a freeze has to be addressed to all nuclear-weapon States, not only to those with the largest military arsenals. Action on a freeze should therefore be taken simultaneously by all nuclear-weapon States.

The consideration underlying the introduction of L.48 is that a freeze should be practical and enforceable. With the stopping of production of nuclear weapons and cutting off production of fissionable material, all nuclear-weapon laboratories, reprocessing plants and enrichment facilities will be rendered peaceful, and will enable the application of non-discriminatory safeguards on a universal basis. The verification of such a freeze would not therefore present a great problem.

The motivation for singling out a proposal for a freeze from among the wide range of possible measures on nuclear disarmament rests on the understanding that the nuclear-arms race should be put to an immediate halt, without awaiting the results of protracted negotiations. A freeze thus constitutes one of the first positive steps towards the process of general and complete disarmament. We hope that L.48 will this year gain the support of an even larger majority of delegations represented in the First Committee and the General Assembly.

Ms. MAJALA (Samoa): Last year we remembered the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, vivid 20 years after the event. This year we witnessed the pain and panic resulting from the tragic Chernobyl nuclear-reactor accident, making us keenly aware of the dangers involved even with the peaceful uses of nuclear power.

(Ms. Mauala, Samoa)

The devastation nuclear misadventure can bring is thus much on our minds; and so all the more keenly did we feel the disappointment that Reykjavik brought - particularly as it seemed that some very real breakthroughs were about to be made. There is consolation, however, in the fact that both sides have said that they wish to keep on talking and that the proposals made there still remain on the table. We can only fervently hope that the talks this week in Vienna between Mr. Schultz and Mr. Shevardnadze will move the process ahead.

As members are aware, in our region, the South Pacific, the issue of nuclear testing is of particular and deep concern. We therefore welcome the undertaking given by China earlier this year to join the other nuclear-weapon States in refraining from conducting tests in the atmosphere. We recall that it was several other of the nuclear-weapon States that did indeed conduct tests in the atmosphere in our region in the past. These we look back on with regret and with relief that they no longer take place.

But our very present, urgent, and most particular concern is with the underground testing that continues in our region. The testing at Moruroa atoll, which France stubbornly persists in continuing, is continued in the face of opposition from the entire region and against the express wishes of the South Pacific forum members and without heeding the calls for it to cease from other regions of the world. Ambassador Winston Thompson of Fiji said, in his statement on behalf of the United Nations forum members in the Special Political Committee:

"We regard the use of the South Pacific for testing nuclear weapons as an outrage and an affront. We will maintain our opposition for as long as it takes for France to learn to heed the voices of the region and stop testing nuclear weapons in our part of the world."

Indeed the very real concern of the South Pacific forum countries on these issues has been demonstrated here at the United Nations both by the joint statement

(Ms. Mauala, Samoa)

on the effects of atomic radiation in the Special Political Committee and by the joint statement made on our behalf by Ambassador David McDowell of New Zealand in this Committee on nuclear-free zones, in which he pointed out our common feeling that the South Pacific nuclear-free-zone Treaty is an "expression of the deeply felt and sincerely held view of the peoples of the region that they want their part of the world to be nuclear free".

The fact is that after 40 years of being used as a testing ground by remote nuclear Powers we are fed up and we want an end to it.

The South Pacific nuclear-free-zone Treaty was adopted by the Forum last year. We are proud to announce here that Samoa ratified the Treaty on 7 October. We are also very pleased to note that New Zealand's Prime Minister, Mr. David Lange, has announced today New Zealand's intention to ratify the Treaty in the very near future. Thus there will soon be six ratifications and the Treaty will enter into force when the eighth ratification is lodged.

The Committee will be aware that at this year's Forum meeting three protocols to the Treaty were adopted. In so doing the Forum expressed the hope that all the nuclear-weapon States would sign the protocols and expressed pleasure that some of those States had given positive indications of favourable consideration of the protocols. My delegation would earnestly urge those nuclear-weapon States that have made no such response to do so, to sign the protocols when they are opened for signature and to adhere to them thereafter.

While concern about nuclear testing in our region is our most immediate concern, our aim is to see an end to all nuclear tests. We attach the highest importance to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty to end all testing, in all environments, for all time. We regard a comprehensive test ban as the most practical and immediate way of halting the arms race. We are deeply concerned therefore that work on this issue has been deadlocked for so long in the Conference

(Ms. Mauala, Samoa)

on Disarmament. We hope that next year the Conference will get down to practical work on the test-ban item. As it has done for many years, Samoa will co-sponsor the resolution entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty".

We are also co-sponsoring a draft resolution that calls for all nuclear-weapon States to notify the Secretary-General of any nuclear tests that they undertake. This, we feel, is the very least they can do to show a more responsible attitude to the welfare of the world. The rest of the world should not be left in the dark, and certainly not when the weapons they are testing could lead ultimately to the darkness of a nuclear catastrophe, if not a nuclear winter.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): I should like to give the comments of the twelve Member States of the European Community on two items on our agenda: first, item 60 (b) and 60 (c) on conventional disarmament; and, secondly, item 65 on disarmament and development. And I should like to address myself to the latter item first.

The Twelve share the concern of the international community expressed by many speakers in the general debate at the high level of military expenditure in the world. This level of expenditure places a heavy burden on all States and is difficult to reconcile with the unacceptable conditions in which a significant proportion of the population of the globe now lives, particularly in the developing countries.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

Our concern on this point is one of the reasons why we favour early negotiation of balance and verifiable arms limitation and disarmament measures.

There is a growing awareness that the relationship between disarmament and development is not as straightforward as it might once have appeared, that the question of security emerges as a central feature in any detailed analysis of that relationship. Decisions to increase or reduce military expenditure remain tied to issues of international and regional security, a point which, of course, applies equally to developing and developed countries.

The Twelve warmly welcomed the decision to hold an International Conference, which we now expect to take place in 1987, to consider the whole question of the relationship between disarmament and development in all its aspects. That Conference is being held on the initiative of a member State of the Twelve. We very much hope that participation in the Conference will be universal. The Twelve hope also that further detailed preparatory work will be done before the Conference meets in order to complement what has been done already and to make for a well ordered and substantive discussion there. More important, that would make the Conference a successful manifestation of international co-operation. Member States of the Twelve have participated actively in the Preparatory Committee for the Conference and will continue to work for a successful outcome.

We should all promote the transfer of resources released through arms control and disarmament measures for economic and social development. But disarmament measures will not automatically lead to savings, particularly in the short term. The Conference should address the question of reducing the levels of armaments and military expenditure generally. That goal can be achieved not only through disarmament agreements, but also by other means such as regional and sub-regional

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

security arrangements, economic co-operation and integration and confidence and security building agreements, as reflected, inter alia, in the Lomé Declaration of 16 August 1985.

Clearly, the above process of transfer of resources cannot be allowed to act as a brake on either disarmament or development. Equally, failure to achieve disarmament cannot of itself justify a low level of assistance on the part of States with large military budgets. Thus, lack of progress in the disarmament process can in no way justify not living up to internationally agreed commitments in the development field. The Twelve believe that any evaluation of the impact of global arms expenditure must start from a reliable data base. The need for transparency and reliable data is apparent in both the disarmament and the development fields. We hope the forthcoming Conference will also consider that issue.

The task of the Conference will not be an easy one, and the process marking its beginning is likely to be lengthy. But the Twelve are determined to work together with other participants to make the Conference a success and to produce an outcome worthy of the ideals which inspire it.

I should like now to turn to the related subject of conventional disarmament. It is a subject in which the Twelve take an active interest, especially since it is of particular importance to Europe as a region.

The Twelve have been heartened by the increased emphasis placed by Member States on the need to achieve worthwhile and verifiable measures of conventional arms limitation and disarmament. We note with interest the number of statements made on the subject by a range of countries as well as the draft resolutions put forward other than by member States of the Twelve, including those in documents A/C.1/41/L.29 and L.66, submitted respectively by China and Peru, which we are studying carefully and positively.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

Nuclear-arms reduction and disarmament remain one of the highest priorities for the Twelve. None the less, conventional weapons have been used and continue to be used in many parts of the world. Since 1945 the world has seen more than 150 conflicts in which terrible destruction and massive casualties amounting to tens of millions of lives have been visited on countries throughout the world. The Twelve recognize that there is a fundamental difference in character between nuclear and conventional weapons. However, in view of the millions of families bereaved by the use of conventional weapons, conventional arms control and disarmament undoubtedly constitute a subject ripe for consideration by the United Nations, and by the First Committee in particular.

In addition, it is expenditure on conventional weapons that constitutes the overwhelming bulk of the world's huge military budget. Nearly 90 per cent of all military budgets go on conventional armaments and forces. If major savings are to result from disarmament, they will come primarily from the reduction of the massive arsenals of conventional weapons which currently exist and to which additions are constantly being made. All the States of the world, not merely the major Powers, have to become involved in the process of conventional disarmament to release the sums needed to make a major impact on the world's social and economic problems.

The Twelve therefore believe firmly that the process of arms control and disarmament must apply in the conventional as well as in the nuclear field. Both processes could contribute to reducing the risks of war, including the danger of a conventional conflict escalating into a nuclear one.

As I noted earlier, conventional disarmament is particularly important for Europe. The largest concentration of weapons and forces in the world is in Europe. Accordingly, there is also a pressing need to achieve balance at the lowest possible level of forces. At the same time confidence must be instilled

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

that reductions in one field will not be undermined by imbalances in another or increases elsewhere. In our view, progress to achieve verifiable conventional arms control, whether in Central Europe, in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, in other regions of the world, or in a global context, is crucial.

The agreement reached in September at the Stockholm Conference was a significant step in the direction the Twelve believe the process in Europe should move. The Twelve will seek to build on that agreement, both in the field of arms control and, more widely, in the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. In the latter context, those of the Twelve that participate in the mutual and balanced force reduction talks at Vienna hope that it will now be possible to make rapid progress there on the basis of the proposal of December 1985, with which they are associated. We support the draft resolution on this subject in document A/C.1/41/L.27, which has been submitted by several member States of the Twelve.

The Twelve welcomed the recent report of the Secretary-General concerning the study on conventional disarmament, which resulted from an initiative by one of its members. The study contains a useful analysis of the current conventional-arms race, and makes a number of worthwhile proposals on how steps could be taken to curb and eventually halt it. The Twelve believe that the time is now ripe for the United Nations to begin to study those recommendations in depth in an attempt to identify which of them might be most suitable for implementation.

The Twelve consider also that it would be most valuable for the Disarmament Commission to begin examination of the whole topic of conventional disarmament with a view to identifying measures on which consensus exists for tackling the problem of the conventional-arms race. We therefore support the draft resolution in document A/C.1/41/L.17, submitted by a member State of the Twelve.

The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on those delegations wishing to exercise the right of reply, I should like to remind members once again that, in accordance with the relevant General Assembly decision, the number of interventions in exercise of the right of reply for any delegation at a given meeting should be limited to two. The first intervention should be limited to 10 minutes and the second to five.

Mr. HADDAWI (Iraq): In his statement the Zionist representative tried to distract the Committee with the habitual fabrications which have no bearing on the subject under discussion. In exercising my right to reply to what he said, I wish to stress the following facts, which we based our draft resolution (A/C.1/41/L.23).

First, ever since this item appeared on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1979, a large number of delegations have given voice to a great deal of alarm and indignation, at the rapid and colossal Zionist nuclear build-up in an area where no country at all possesses, or intends to possess, any kind of this frightful type of armament.

Secondly, having experienced the expansionist Zionist strategy and Zionism's inherent colonialism and racism, one cannot help thinking that the ultimate targets of this build-up cannot be other than the countries and peoples of the Middle East.

Thirdly, it has been established beyond any doubt that there exist systematic nuclear co-operation and co-ordination between the Zionist entity and the Pretoria régime, especially in the areas of uranium enrichment and nuclear technology.

It is revealing that the Zionist delegation has refused to vote with the large majority of nations which have shown their determination to suspend the membership of the racist Government of South Africa at the Twenty-fifth Congress of the International Red Cross last week in Geneva. That majority comprised the African, Arab, Asian, Latin American and other countries.

(Mr. Haddawi, Iraq)

Fourthly, my delegation wishes to draw attention to the notorious methods of subversion, theft, cheating and other dishonest practices through which the Zionist entity has been able to obtain its nuclear know-how, uranium, heavy water and so on. It may not be out of context to remind the Committee of the American media's disclosures of the subversive acts committed this year in the United States itself by Zionist agents and Zionist diplomats. These people have managed to steal highly confidential technological documents and data from a leading American aircraft manufacturer. Zionist diplomats in Washington, D.C., were implicated in subversive activities against the interests of the United States Government.

Fifthly, my delegation feels it is imperative to draw attention to the insolent contempt the Zionist entity has always shown towards Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the subject of the mounting Israeli nuclear build-up. The Zionists have always maintained that their conventional armaments are only for their security, but the fact is that their aim is intimidation and coercion of the peoples of the Middle East with a view to forcing them to knuckle under to the Zionist racial, expansionist philosophy.

Sixthly, the Zionist entity is adamant in its refusal to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), persists in denying that it possesses a nuclear capability and refuses to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect its reactors. The IAEA must be allowed to carry out such inspection if the world community is earnestly and sincerely desirous of safeguarding international peace.

My delegation does not intend to go on elucidating the ultimate objectives of the Zionist nuclear schemes in our area, but wishes only to remind the Committee of the grave threat which hangs over the peoples and countries of the Middle East. The General Assembly of the United Nations must be made aware of the threat and face up to it.

(Mr. Haddawi, Iraq)

My delegation, however, does not wish to lose the opportunity of urging all those who are concerned with the problem of nuclear armament and the promotion of the cause of world peace, especially the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement, to bring every possible pressure to bear and spare no effort in making the Zionist entity behave responsibly and heed the wish of the whole world to live in peace, stability and economic prosperity.

The Zionist representative spoke emotionally of peace in the area. He complained that Iraq, among others, is at the top of the list of arms importers in the third world. Iraq is a small, non-aligned, third-world country. Thus it cannot be at the top of the list of importers. The Zionist representative conveniently forgot to mention the mushrooming Zionist arms industry and build-up. The Zionist military installations, together with its nuclear might, pose a serious threat to our well-being and our very existence. It has been reported that one of the super-Powers is negotiating the purchase of a number of Levi aircraft from the Zionist entity and that many other countries have already contracted to buy tanks, fighters, bombers, rockets and missiles from the Zionist entity.

Mr. AL-HINAI (Oman) (interpretation from Arabic): We listened a few moments ago to the Israeli representative's statement. The statement marshalled a number of falsehoods. I will confine myself here to refuting some of them.

First, the Israeli representative spoke about what he called my country's "pre-empting" the Secretary-General and the United Nations by requesting that item 144 be placed on the agenda.

(Mr. Al-Atassi, Syrian Arab
Republic)

The representative of Israel mentioned the Tlatelolco Treaty. That Treaty is a treaty between the Latin American countries, where there is no invader or aggressor and no nuclear weapons. As for a Tlatelolco-style treaty in the Middle East and the negotiations between the States of the region, of which the Israeli representative spoke, I would like to ask him whether or not the Security Council and the General Assembly have adopted resolutions condemning Israel's aggression against the Arab countries and its occupation of Arab territories and have demanded that Israel withdraw from those territories? Israel must abide by those resolutions before it calls upon the other States of the region to sit at the negotiating table.

Israel's rejection of peace in the region was demonstrated when it rejected the International Conference on the Middle East, in which the participation of all the parties to the conflict was required. Yes, Israel refused to attend that Conference.

The Zionist representative alleged that the Arabs mislead the Secretary-General. The Arabs work seriously and coherently as peace-loving, non-aligned States. We work seriously in co-operation with the Secretary-General. We challenge the Zionist entity to allow any Committee within the United Nations to investigate Israeli nuclear armaments.

The Israeli representative maintains that because Israel has not signed the non-proliferation Treaty it has not been in contravention of any international instrument. This is an admission that he believes it is the right of his entity to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East region.

I should like to raise another point. The conclusions contained in the Secretary-General's report in document A/36/431 of 18 September 1981 give a detailed account of the nuclear arsenals of Israel and its nuclear might, which it

(Mr. Al-Atassi, Syrian Arab Republic)

uses constantly to threaten the Arab countries, intimidate and coerce them to accept a fait accompli situation and relinquish their legitimate rights.

In an interview published by The Washington Post on 3 December 1984, a former President of that entity said that Israel had the capacity to produce nuclear weapons and that it could do so within a reasonably short period of time. Two Minutes Over Baghdad, a book written by Israeli officials and the Israeli censors passed for publication in June 1982, contains assertions that Israel possesses a nuclear capability, and admissions that it is actively collaborating with the South African régime in that area and that it is capable of developing the delivery vehicles to reach the heartland of any Arab country. That was confirmed by the former Israeli Prime Minister when she threatened the use of nuclear weapons if the air lift from Washington to Tel Aviv in 1973 were interfered with.

The Zionist representative speaks of the military capabilities of Syria, Hungary and other countries. I should like to remind him that when Israel felt that the balance of power favoured the Arabs, it immediately resorted to an air lift from the United States. Israel's arsenal of conventional weapons and that of the United States of America are one and the flow of arms to Israel never stops.

Mr. ELHOUDERI (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (interpretation from Arabic): I am speaking at this late hour in reply to the remarks of the Zionist entity's representative.

In his statement, he referred to my country and the leader of its revolution in a desperate attempt to justify the nuclear weaponry Israel has acquired.

(Mr. ElHouderi, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya)

This desperate attempt to blind us is an exercise in mystification and a diversionary action aimed at item 144 of the agenda. Israeli nuclear armament is no illusion. Neither is it a news story. All the available evidence points to the fact that the entity possesses nuclear weapons, and that is a grave threat indeed to the Middle East region. The intransigence of that entity and its obdurate refusal to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are proof positive of its aggressive intentions and the danger it poses to the Middle East region and to the rest of the world.

My country, to which reference has been made, has signed all the treaties and conventions relating to the NPT. We have adhered to all of the relevant treaties and instruments. In contrast, the aggressive intentions of the Zionist entity have been demonstrated in a number of forums. I do not have the time to go into the details of the Zionist entity's crimes in Palestine and other Arab territories. The shooting of the Libyan civilian airliner in 1973 with many passengers on board under the pretext that it was flying close to the Dimona reactor, and the hijacking of a Libyan civilian aircraft by the Zionist entity are but two instances of the many crimes that entity has perpetrated, not only in occupied Palestine and southern Lebanon and the other occupied Arab territories, but all over the region.

All this clearly demonstrates the real intent of the Zionist entity with regard to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Collaboration between the Zionist entity and the racist South African régime reveals the true nature of the entity and the danger it poses to the African continent and the Middle East.

Mr. FREIER (Israel): I find it difficult to emulate the previous speakers, neither in the diversity of subjects about which they chose to speak here nor in the credibility of the statements they made. I will, however, make reference to some things.

(Mr. Freier, Israel)

First, I think you were all witness to the hatred about which I spoke. The Arab States that have spoken here were most forthcoming in venting their feelings with respect to Israel, even to the point of avoiding mention of it by name.

Secondly, I do wish to remind the delegations represented in the First Committee of the fact that Arab hatred does not stem from recent times. It began in 1948, and even since then no attempt has been spared to do away with Israel, irrespective of anything that happened afterwards. You hear about the Golan, you hear about Judea and Samaria, you hear about East Jerusalem - all this did not exist in 1948. All those elements have come into the conflict only as alibis for a primordial hatred of the State of Israel and a continuing threat to its existence.

Thirdly, if the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the nuclear-weapon-free zone are the issues, then I think I would, from this room, invite all the peace-loving Arab countries - Syria, Libya and Iraq - and all those countries that defer to the United Nations Charter - like Libya, Iraq and Syria - to sit down with Israel, as the United Nations has said a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be negotiated, and negotiate such a zone, because they feel a nuclear-arms race in the Middle East ought to be headed off. If they do not do that, then their intentions, in my view, ought to raise question marks for the members of this Committee.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: We have come to the end of this afternoon's meeting. The Committee has thus concluded the second phase of its work, which has been devoted to statements on specific disarmament agenda items and continuation of the general debate.

In accordance with the Committee's programme of work and timetable, tomorrow, Wednesday, 5 November, the Committee will embark on the third phase of its work devoted to consideration of and action upon draft resolutions under all disarmament

(The Chairman)

agenda items, namely, items 46 to 65 and 144. From 5 to 17 November, a total of 18 meetings have been allocated for that stage of the Committee's work, and the Committee should conclude consideration of those agenda items by Monday, 17 November 1986.

As I indicated in an earlier statement, the officers of the Committee are at present engaged in efforts to group all of the draft resolutions on disarmament items in a number of clusters, employing for that purpose the most logical and practical criteria that could be devised, as well as taking into account the pattern that has evolved during the past several years as a result of initiatives taken by my predecessors.

It is my intention to make available to the Committee a list setting out the various clusters of draft resolutions either tomorrow or on Thursday, at which time I will also be in a position to provide the pertinent explanations and guidelines concerning the subject-matter, including comprehensive information on questions related to the programme of work during the period of consideration of and action upon the draft resolutions on disarmament items. In that connection I would like to point out that the meetings scheduled for the next two days, Wednesday, 5 November, and Thursday, 6 November, will be devoted to introduction of and comment on the draft resolutions before the Committee.

In view of the large number of draft resolutions that have been submitted, I think it would be advisable if time were to be set aside for adequate consultations. Accordingly, I would propose that no meetings of the Committee should be scheduled on Friday, 7 November, in order to allow delegations to carry out the necessary consultations as well as to seek instructions, as appropriate, from their respective capitals.

(The Chairman)

Thereafter, on Monday, 10 November, the Committee will proceed to take action on the draft resolutions on the basis of the various clusters concerning which, as I have already stated, I will have more to say at a later stage.

If I may make another point, since the Committee has now completed some four weeks of general debate and statements on specific disarmament agenda items, I urge delegations to limit the number and length of their statements during the next two days.

I should also like to request delegations wishing to introduce or comment on draft resolutions to inscribe their names on the speakers' list as soon as possible.

In conclusion, I should like to inform members that the following delegations are inscribed on the list of speakers for tomorrow morning's meeting: Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Canada, Italy and Sweden. In addition, we have received informal indications that a few other speakers might wish to be heard at tomorrow morning's meeting.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.