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**IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE DENUCLEARIZATION
OF AFRICA**

South Africa's nuclear-tipped ballistic missile capability

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/46/150.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 4 December 1990, the General Assembly adopted resolution 45/56 B entitled "Nuclear capability of South Africa", in which the Assembly, inter alia, welcomed the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's nuclear-tipped ballistic missile capability (A/45/571 and Corr.1), submitted in accordance with paragraph 6 of its resolution 44/113 B; requested all Member States to submit to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions with respect to the above-mentioned report, and further requests the Secretary-General to submit a report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-sixth session; and further requested the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-sixth session on the military assistance that apartheid South Africa is receiving from Israel and any other sources in advanced missile technology as well as the supporting technical facilities.

2. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of the resolution, the Secretary-General, in a note verbale dated 25 January 1991, requested all Member States to submit their views and suggestions with respect to the report mentioned in paragraph 5 of the resolution. Pursuant to the same paragraph, the Secretary-General hereby submits to the General Assembly the replies received to date.

3. With reference to paragraph 15 of the resolution, the Secretary-General wishes to inform the General Assembly that he has nothing further to add at this stage to the information contained in his report submitted to the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

CUBA

[Original: Spanish]

[18 July 1991]

1. It is essential that every effort continue to be made to compel the Government of South Africa to take specific steps to assure to the international community that its nuclear programme is strictly peaceful in nature. One of the most appropriate measures which South Africa could take towards this end is to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

2. Measures already taken at the international level to prevent all military cooperation with South Africa should be strengthened until that country absolutely guarantees that it is using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, places all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, totally dismantles the apartheid regime and stops posing a threat to neighbouring States.

3. The adoption of a series of regional confidence-building measures should be encouraged with a view to guaranteeing a climate of détente which would stop South Africa from pursuing a policy of destabilizing neighbouring States.

Among the confidence-building measures, consideration could be given to the following:

(a) Dismantling of the apartheid regime.

(b) Renunciation of activities involving destabilization of and interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring States, including the cessation of all forms of political, military, logistic and other support for subversive or terrorist movements operating in neighbouring States.

(c) Placing all nuclear facilities situated in South African territory under IAEA safeguards.

(d) Development of relations with neighbouring States in the fields of economic cooperation, technology and science and technology with the aim of bringing about a climate of trust among States and meeting the basic needs of the neediest and most resource-poor countries in the region. Such cooperation should be carried out on the basis of mutual respect, having regard to the interests of the parties and mutual advantage.

(e) Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.

(f) Significant reductions in the military arsenals, armed forces and defence budgets of South Africa and other States in the region with the aim of preventing any one of them from possessing a military capacity which poses a threat to any other country in the region and using that capacity to engage in aggression in and occupation of territories belonging to third States.

(g) Renunciation of possession of weapons of mass destruction of any kind.

(h) Greater transparency in the most important military-related areas, which would help to eliminate misunderstandings and dispel the concerns of neighbouring States and enable such countries to adopt similar policies.

4. The United Nations must keep this issue under review in order to ensure that South Africa complies with its international obligations and ceases to pose a threat to the States of the region, and to identify in a timely manner any development relating to South Africa's nuclear and military capacities which is contrary to the objectives pursued by the international community with respect to that issue.

5. A matter which should receive special attention from the international community is the fact that South Africa is developing a long-range ballistic missile, a project which, in our view, should be cancelled.

6. Tangible and forceful measures need to be taken, including sanctions, against countries which violate the military embargo imposed against South Africa by the United Nations and against companies which independently engage in the illegal arms trade with that country.

7. With regard to the structure of the report, the following features might be introduced:

(1) Chapter I. A new paragraph should be added, to read "Additional measures may be applied".

(2) Chapter III. A paragraph could be added on the status of the negotiations with IAEA aimed at bringing South Africa's nuclear facilities under the Agency's safeguards regime.

(3) Chapter V. This chapter could be expanded to include a series of measures conducive to the establishment of détente and cooperation in the region.

(4) A chapter should be included dealing with violations of the embargo against South Africa, including the names of the countries and companies involved.

8. In preparing the Secretary-General's report referred to in resolution 45/56 B, entitled "Nuclear capability of South Africa", account should be taken of the conclusions and recommendations set forth in the report of the Disarmament Commission (A/45/42), in particular paragraphs 3, 5, 8, 9 and 10.

SENEGAL

[Original: French]

[3 July 1991]

1. Senegal would like to thank the Secretary-General for his reports on South Africa's nuclear capability (A/45/569) and South Africa's nuclear-tipped ballistic missile capability (A/45/571 and Corr.1).

2. The above documents do not establish with any degree of certainty that South Africa has the capability to develop a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile. Moreover, South Africa's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the submission of its facilities to inspection by IAEA could help to dispel the doubts that persist as to its nuclear-weapon capability.

3. As for nuclear collaboration between South Africa and Israel, the fact that the Secretary-General's investigations have thus far yielded no positive evidence that such collaboration exists makes it advisable to pursue those investigations.

SWEDEN

[Original: English]

[5 July 1991]

1. The report provides a comprehensive analysis of the capacity of South Africa in the nuclear and the ballistic missile field. Sweden notes with concern the conclusion of the report that South Africa with strong national commitment could build up a ballistic missile capability within 10 to 15 years. If foreign assistance is given, this period could be reduced to 5 to 10 years.
2. However, the Swedish Government shares the views with regard to the future scenario of the report based on current trends where apartheid is seen as a system in the process of being dismantled. In view of these trends the threat of the nuclear and ballistic missile capability is correspondingly reduced.
3. Subsequent to the Fourth Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty last year, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia have acceded to the Treaty. South Africa has recently stated its decision to accede to the Treaty.
4. The Swedish Government hopes that these positive developments will now make it possible to achieve the goal of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Africa.
