

UNITED NATIONS



**SECURITY COUNCIL**  
**OFFICIAL RECORDS**

UN 1187A DV

AUG 13 1991

UNISA COLLECTION

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

**2453<sup>rd</sup>**

MEETING: 15 JUNE 1983

NEW YORK

---

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2453) .....	1
Adoption of the agenda .....	1
The situation in Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/15812 and Add.1) .....	1

SECRET

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## 2453rd MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 15 June 1983, at 11 a.m.

*President:* Mr. Elleck Kufakunesu MASHINGAIDZE  
(Zimbabwe).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2453)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/158/15812 and Add.1)

*The meeting was called to order at 11.45 a.m.*

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

**The situation in Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/15812 and Add.1)**

1. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Security Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Canada, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Dountas (Greece) and Mr. Kirca (Turkey) took places at the Council table; Mr. Pelletier (Canada) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.*

2. The PRESIDENT: I should like to recall that in the course of the Council's consultations members of the Council agreed that an invitation should be extended to Mr. Nail Atalay in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. Unless I hear any objection, I shall take it that the Council decides to invite Mr. Atalay

in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure.

*It was so decided.*

3. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period 1 December 1982 to 31 May 1983 [S/15812 and Add.1]. Members also have before them a draft resolution [S/15828], which has been prepared in the course of the Council's consultations. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*The draft resolution was adopted unanimously [resolution 534 (1983)].*

4. The PRESIDENT: The first speaker is the representative of Cyprus, upon whom I now call.

5. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): Allow me, Sir, to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the high office of President of the Security Council, a development which reflects a deserved honour to your country, and to express my appreciation to you for the skilful manner in which you have conducted the proceedings of the Council on the draft resolution for the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another period of six months. It is a source of great satisfaction for our Government and our people that the presidency of this important organ of the United Nations is in the talented hands of a distinguished representative of a very friendly country with which we share excellent relations.

6. Our congratulations go also to the President of the Security Council for the month of May, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zaire, Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda, and the representative of Zaire, Mr. Umba di Lutete, for the impeccable manner in which they conducted the Council's deliberations on a number of issues, including the question of Namibia.

7. I should like to thank the members of the Council for giving me the opportunity to address them and express my Government's appreciation for the renewal of the

mandate which is essential to the peace-keeping process with regard to Cyprus.

8. I have been directed by my Government to reiterate assurances of full and constructive co-operation with the Secretary-General and to express to him deep appreciation for his untiring efforts for a just solution of the problem of Cyprus and for his dedication to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. As I recently stated before the Council on the question of Namibia [2451st meeting], the Secretary-General in these turbulent times is being increasingly called upon to take active roles in various parts of the world. This is a tribute to his excellent personal and diplomatic qualities and evidence of the high confidence and trust placed in him by the international community.

9. I should also like to commend the significant contribution made by the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Mr. Urquhart, and by his colleagues in the Secretariat and to express our warm appreciation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Mr. Hugo Gobbi, whom I welcome here, and his assistants for the dedicated and efficient manner in which they carry out their mission in Cyprus.

10. My Government's appreciation goes also to the Commander of UNFICYP, Major-General G. Greindl, whom I also welcome here, and to his officers and men for the dedicated manner in which they have performed the duties which the Council has entrusted to them. Our warm feelings of gratitude and appreciation go also to the friendly Governments which, through voluntary contributions of personnel and funds, made it possible for UNFICYP to continue rendering its valuable assistance to peace-keeping in Cyprus.

11. The Security Council meetings on the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP are of necessity occasions for examining the tragic situation prevailing in my country, a non-aligned State Member of the United Nations, situated in the strategic and volatile eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus, whose destiny is to be a bridge of co-operation and understanding between the three continents that surround it, is today going through one of the most critical periods of its long history, with 37 per cent of its territory under Turkish occupation, almost 200,000 of its people uprooted from their ancestral homes and lands and with hundreds missing since the Turkish invasion of July-August 1974. These Council meetings constitute also a sad reminder that United Nations resolutions—especially General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), adopted unanimously and later endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974)—are as far from being implemented as ever, and that as a result the problem of Cyprus continues to pose a grave threat to the peace of the region and to international peace and security in general.

12. Regrettably, not only has progress not been made during the period under consideration toward a just solution of the problem of Cyprus, but a deterioration of the situation has taken place since the last renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP on 14 December 1982, to the detri-

ment of all our people. The continued presence of the Turkish occupation troops, contrary to repeated Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, the partitionist and annexationist policies of the occupying Power and the consistent and systematic attempts to consolidate the fruits of aggression have rendered the problem more acute, and the need for a just and lasting solution even more pressing.

13. The Council is faced with a situation where the occupying power is flouting United Nations resolutions, clinging to the spoils of occupation, and, in defiance of world public opinion, proceeding to its goal by changing the demographic character of the invaded territory of the Republic and incorporating it politically, economically and socially into Turkey. In the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus, the Government in Ankara has continued to consolidate further the new series of illegalities which it initiated last year by establishing a so-called "Central Bank"—a separatist act *per se*—by issuing "Definitive Certificates of Ownership" of the properties of the refugees to people other than the rightful owners, and by introducing as of 24 May 1983 the Turkish lira as the official tender in occupied Cyprus, the latter being a striking example of the annexationist policy of Turkey.

14. A month ago, on 13 May, the General Assembly, during its resumed thirty-seventh session, adopted resolution 37/253, on the question of Cyprus, by an overwhelming majority of 103 in favour, 5 against, with 20 abstentions.

15. This fair and balanced resolution, apart from reaffirming basic United Nations positions of principle on the question of Cyprus—namely, respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus, the immediate withdrawal of the occupation forces, the return of the refugees to their ancestral homes and lands in safety and continuation of the intercommunal talks on the internal aspects of the question of Cyprus in a meaningful, result-oriented, constructive and substantive manner—contains an additional positive paragraph which welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to pursue a renewed personal involvement in the quest for a solution of the problem of Cyprus.

16. Since then, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Rauf Denktaş, reacting with utter disregard and outright contempt to this pronouncement of the international community, have embarked on new secessionist and partitionist steps directed against the territorial integrity and unity of my country, at the same time undermining the Secretary-General's initiative and the intercommunal talks. Furthermore, Mr. Denktaş has been arguing that the Turkish Cypriot community has the right to separate self-determination and that this development will meet with the approval of Turkey. One would expect more consistency from the Government of Turkey, a country that is represented in the United Nations Council for Namibia and that purports to be a supporter of that country's unity and territorial integrity.

17. The Turkish argument now for such secessionist positions is that internationalization of the question of Cyprus by my Government while negotiations are going on is contrary to the spirit of the intercommunal talks. Turkey forgets, however, or intends to forget that the talks are held to solve the internal aspects of the problem of Cyprus. The international aspects of the problem—namely, the invasion and occupation and the violation of the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus, which have been continuing since July 1974—are matters rightly to be considered by the United Nations, which has the competence to deal with international issues affecting world peace and security.

18. Furthermore, the talks are the offspring of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. To report back to the General Assembly, the body that called for the talks, could hardly be regarded as an act inconsistent with them. On the contrary, it was an appropriate and necessary act on the part of my Government to apprise that body that called for the talks of the impediments encountered and to request its further assistance in the search for a just and lasting solution, in accordance with United Nations principles. Paragraph 16 of General Assembly resolution 37/253, which welcomes the intended initiative of the Secretary-General, is a positive and constructive outcome of the debate and as such it was universally hailed.

19. It is regrettable that the Turkish side, instead of demonstrating good will and a constructive attitude, has, after the adoption of that paragraph, refused to attend the talks and has even failed to respond to the Secretary-General's call for a meeting to discuss his intention to pursue a renewed personal involvement.

20. With such unacceptable positions being propagated by Turkey, it is no wonder that no progress has been achieved on any substantive issue on the internal aspects of the question of Cyprus, a development that is much regretted by my Government. However, so long as cardinal truths are disregarded, so long as the obvious is clouded by the mist of chauvinistic sophistries, there cannot be any progress. Even the right of human beings to know the whereabouts of their loved ones, a purely humanitarian issue completely separate from the political aspects of the problem of Cyprus, is continuously being frustrated.

21. The solution of the problem of Cyprus is not difficult if universal principles and cardinal truths are recognized and applied.

22. About 100 years ago, a State that is a permanent member of the Council went through a civil war in which millions of lives were lost. Still, the principle of "one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all" emerged strengthened. Why should Cyprus be an exception? Is there any country that has not tasted internal upheaval? Must they be split because of these sad developments?

23. In Cyprus, lofty principles and universal values are at stake. The principle of the unity of the State is challenged by the Turkish policies of division based on ethnic criteria. The upholding of these principles is of vital importance to the members of the world community at large if the peoples of the world are to enjoy freely their civil, political and human rights.

24. For our part we steadfastly hold that the unity and territorial integrity of Cyprus cannot be allowed to be shattered by discredited partitionist policies. What was created as one and undivided must not be split by force of arms or outmoded partitionist policies, because division runs counter to the moral flow of the universe. To these high goals is directed the core of the peaceful endeavours of our people.

25. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has given its consent to the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP because it believes that the United Nations Force contributes to the preservation of calm and assists in the maintenance of peace, factors which have a positive effect on the intercommunal talks.

26. With regard to the talks, I have been directed by my Government to place again on record that we support the continuation of free, meaningful, constructive and result-oriented negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General. Furthermore, as Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, has stated, we welcome the intended initiative of the Secretary-General for a personal involvement in the quest for a solution, and to this end we extend the full co-operation of the Government of the Republic.

27. We hope that new, forward-looking thoughts will finally prevail on the Turkish side on the many positive elements of resolution 37/253 and that we may proceed in a constructive spirit to assist the Secretary-General in his intended initiative for a solution of this problem.

28. I wish to conclude by making an appeal to the Turkish side to abandon its present policies and to work at the negotiating table with determination and in good faith to reach speedily a just and durable solution based on relevant United Nations resolutions and high-level agreements.

29. My Government is ready for such a solution. We owe that much to the people of Cyprus as a whole. I feel that the time has come to put an end to their suffering and deprivation. The people of Cyprus fervently yearn to share their future together, as they have always done for centuries. They dream and anxiously await the moment when the imposed artificial barriers of segregation—the barbed wire and the check-points—will be removed and the military outposts will be dismantled. They pray for the moment when they will be able to embrace each other again in our island, where there will be no foreign armies, no refugees and no lines of separation.

30. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Greece, on whom I now call.

31. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): Mr. President, I should like to thank you and the other members of the Council for acceding to my request to participate in this debate. Allow me at the outset, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of June. In you we honour not only an able and experienced leader, but also the country you represent—a relatively new Member of the United Nations and one whose multi-faceted tradition guarantees a valuable contribution to the work of the Organization.

32. The perpetuation of the Cyprus problem, which has developed into a major international anomaly, has made it almost a ritual for the Security Council to hear, twice a year, on the occasion of the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP, the views of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus before it gives its consent to this renewal, as well as the views of other parties which have a concern with the developments in Cyprus. Thus, it is with regret that I have asked once again to speak on a matter so well known to Council members.

33. My Government fully concurs with the consent given by the Government of Cyprus to the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP for another six months. We believe that the conditions prevailing in the Republic of Cyprus are still such as to justify fully the presence there of the Peace-keeping Force, which greatly contributes to the maintenance of peace in the area.

34. I shall refrain from indulging in an extensive analysis of the situation in the Republic of Cyprus. The facts were recently put forward to the Members of the United Nations once more on the occasion of the debate on the question of Cyprus held at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly four weeks ago. At the Assembly's 116th meeting, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, as the representative of Cyprus has just done here, made a thorough presentation of the realities which have unfortunately been plaguing his country without any change since the Turkish aggression in 1974 and the subsequent continuing occupation of part of the territory of the Republic by Turkish troops in flagrant violation of international law. To go through these events again would indeed be redundant. I would only be taking the Council's time without adding anything new to what everybody already knows.

35. Recognizing these realities and the dangers they harbour, the General Assembly most recently adopted by an overwhelming majority—and one representing a wide spectrum—its resolution 37/253. That resolution contains, in our view, a balanced assessment of the situation, points to the major elements of the problem and requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts towards creating conditions conducive to progress in the intercommunal talks with a view to finding a just and viable solution to this long-pending problem.

36. Furthermore, in his most recent report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General states:

“I further suggested that time appeared to be closing the ‘window of opportunity’ to resolve the Cyprus problem. In an endeavour to arrest his continuing process of erosion, I have undertaken to strengthen my personal involvement within the framework of my mission of good offices.” [*See S/15812, para. 61.*]

He further states: “I also wish to appeal again to all concerned to show the utmost restraint and to assist me in my efforts.” [*Ibid., para. 63.*]

37. On behalf of my Government, Mr. President, I wish to assure you, and through you the Secretary-General, that Greece will spare no effort in lending the Secretary-General every possible assistance in order to facilitate the discharge of his difficult mission. It is our strong wish that the Government of Turkey will also show a constructive attitude in order to help him in his endeavours.

38. I have stressed our wish that Turkey would cooperate in the search for a solution because the continued personal involvement of the Secretary-General could perhaps offer a chance for an answer to the problem. Let us take advantage of this opportunity. Indeed, it is high time that an all-out effort were exerted in the direction of a solution. The world can no longer tolerate inertia. It demands a quick restoration of legality and subsequent normalcy in the Republic of Cyprus.

39. In conclusion, I should like to express our appreciation and gratitude to Major-General Greindl and the officers and men of UNFICYP for the efficiency and dedication with which they are discharging the important mission entrusted to Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, which are contributing contingents, as well as to those Governments which are helping with financial contributions. It would be an omission if I did not mention in this context the untiring and dynamic activity of Mr. Gobbi, the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the island. Last but not least I should like to reiterate once more my Government's high esteem for and trust in the Secretary-General.

40. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is Mr. Nail Atalay, to whom the Council has extended an invitation in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

41. Mr. ATALAY: I thank you, Mr. President, and through you the other members of the Council for having given me this opportunity to participate in the debate on behalf of the Turkish people of Cyprus, who, although they were partners in and co-founders of the Republic of Cyprus, have been the object of attacks by the Greek Cypriots ever since 1963. The destruction has continued to this very day, and the co-founder partner community of the island—the Turkish Cypriot com-

munity—has had to seize every opportunity to make its case known to the highest body of this world assembly.

42. I cannot promise to be brief, but this is not because of a lack of respect or because of a lack of awareness of the long and frustrating hours that have been spent trying to bring about an agreement; quite the contrary. I do feel, however, that the Turkish Cypriot cause needs to be presented with all reasonable vigour and clarity so that events from this time forward will not be considered the responsibility of the Turkish Cypriot community, which has throughout its life and its struggle in Cyprus done nothing but react to what the Greek Cypriots have tried to do to Cyprus.

43. There is no Government of Cyprus. There has been none since 21 December 1963, when the legitimate Government ceased to exist after the Greek Cypriots attacked us and expelled the Turkish Cypriot representation from the ruling body and rejected the Turkish Cypriot community as co-founder partner community. This state of affairs continues to this very day. That is why I say before this Council, on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community, that there is no Cyprus Government.

44. If there is a Cyprus problem today, it is because there is no government by consent of the two communities in Cyprus.

45. A quarter of the population of the island is under another jurisdiction, one that is not that of the Greek Cypriot administration. Yet the latter calls itself the Government of Cyprus without being in any way a binational Government as envisaged by the 1960 Constitution and the international agreements. The Greek section of this Government did arm itself and, according to plan, did launch an attack on the Turkish Cypriot people with a view to turning Cyprus into a Greek island. Twenty years later, after all the trials and tribulations endured in Cyprus, we have heard them address the General Assembly, then the Assembly's Special Political Committee and now the Security Council for and on behalf of Cyprus, trying to speak also for and on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots. My mere presence here speaking in the Council is indisputably the clearest demonstration of the fact that they do not represent, nor do they speak on behalf of, the Turkish Cypriots.

46. The Charter of the United Nations stands for democracy, for government under the rule of law and for government with the sanction of those governed. It stands for human rights and for the sanctity of international treaties. All those concepts were utterly trampled underfoot in 1963 by Greek Cypriot armed elements, under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios and directly armed by Greece, attempting to destroy the Turkish Cypriot people and the independence of Cyprus.

47. Since then, the Turkish Cypriot people has ruled itself, in defiance of the hostile Greek Cypriot administration, establishing its own jurisdiction in those areas where it had not been eliminated. It has lived cut off from all the privileges of statehood—cut off from all the rights to

which human beings are entitled. It has defied this hostile administration because it deemed it its duty to do so.

48. The facts of this recent past are recorded in newspaper archives and in earlier reports of the Secretary-General, and they are there for all to see. But they are still vividly apparent to anyone visiting Cyprus. There the past is recorded in every Turkish Cypriot household, which still mourns a dead father, or child, or aged grandparent—pathetic victims of the Greek Cypriot grim determination to unite the island with Greece. The past is recorded in the mass graves of Aloa, Maratha and Sandalari, where 16-day-old infants are buried in the arms of their mothers, grandmothers and grandfathers, where elementary schools are shut because the entire elementary school population was lined up and ruthlessly shot and then buried in crude communal graves.

49. The whole world knows the facts. Should the Turkish Cypriots really bring newspaper clippings to remind the world of these events and can the Greeks seriously allege that the Turkish Cypriots are responsible for what has befallen them during the last 20 years?

50. The Turkish Cypriot must be convinced that those on the other side of the bench are people who really have undergone a change of heart, who truly seek peace and who are not bent on furthering their policy of unilaterally dominating Cyprus by all means, fair and foul.

51. We have tried to alert the Members of the United Nations to the fact that the title of "Government of Cyprus" was being used as a tool of aggression against a quarter of the population of Cyprus and that, if a resolution along the lines desired by the Greek Cypriots emerged from the General Assembly, then further inter-communal negotiations for the solution of the problem of Cyprus would thereby be hampered rather than helped.

52. Our prediction came true. The General Assembly adopted a one-sided resolution, which the Greek and Greek Cypriot side immediately used to avoid negotiations and to poison the climate in which negotiations were to have taken place. They immediately boasted of the number of votes obtained, claimed that the General Assembly was with them and counted the resolutions of the non-aligned countries as favouring the Greeks. All this was a futile attempt to change the past. Those were one-sided resolutions and they cannot change the past.

53. As the Greek philosopher Aristotle said, "Even the gods cannot change the past". It is a fact; no one can change the past.

54. We have here a binational country where one of the national communities—the Greek Cypriot community—has tried to destroy the other—the Turkish Cypriot community—and where this victimized party finds itself barred from all assemblies, all commissions and all conferences. Indeed, this situation can be likened to a football match, where the Greek Cypriot team is free to score against an opposing team whose goalkeeper

is bound hand and foot; and then they would have the world believe that they are playing a fair game on terms of equality and that they are the winners.

55. They have to convince us that they are our partners and that they are willing to play the game with us, not to score points in the international field but to bring peace to Cyprus. Indeed, scoring points through propaganda, deceit, untruths and misstatements of facts cannot and will not bring about a lasting reconciliation of the two peoples of Cyprus. Without reconciliation, there can be no peace in Cyprus.

56. Whenever the Greek and Greek Cypriot leaders speak, they use the terms "justice" and "injustice". How unfortunate that in Cyprus these terms have different meanings for the Turks and for the Greeks. "Justice" for the Greeks means the Greek colonization of Cyprus and Greek domination in Cyprus, leaving the Turkish Cypriots without any guarantees or defence, to live at their mercy as hostages in what they call "pre-aggression conditions", meaning those that prevailed before 1974, when the Turkish Cypriots lived from hand to mouth not knowing what the next day would bring.

57. The Turkish Cypriot community has been waiting for justice for 20 years—waiting for the re-establishment of a binational Cyprus, where the security of the Turkish Cypriots would no longer be threatened, where the Greek Cypriots would no longer use us as hostages or blackmail Turkey by saying that, if it dared to come to save the threatened Turks, it would find no Turks to save in Cyprus.

58. The Greek and Greek Cypriot leaders want the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions. Who does not? Where would this world be if United Nations resolutions were not translated into reality by all those who are affected by them? But those who, by manoeuvre and propaganda, have brought about the adoption of one-sided resolutions which, if implemented, would mean the destruction of the innocent, the destruction of a binational country and even the destruction of independence have no right to claim that such resolutions should be implemented, because their implementation would spell the doom of every principle the Charter of the United Nations was meant to protect and to foster.

59. We constantly witness attempts at dividing the issue into the internal aspect of the problem, that is, the constitutional and territorial issue, and the external aspect, namely, the question of aggression and foreign interference.

60. Is it interference when, under an international treaty and under the legitimate principle of self-defence, one of the Guarantor Powers risks everything in order to honour that treaty for the purpose of saving one of the two communities that brought about the Republic of Cyprus?

61. Let us ponder for a moment what would have happened to Cyprus and to the Turkish Cypriots if Turkey had not moved. If representatives will merely ask them-

selves that question, I am sure they will see the situation in its true light. Had Turkey not moved at my community's request, the picture would have been a much broader vista of the horrors I have already mentioned: mass graves, hundreds of young people taken into the police stations for questioning and liquidation, passers-by arrested in the streets and not heard from for 20 years. Interference indeed! Stopping that kind of conduct for and on behalf of one of the communities which signed an agreement is called interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus.

62. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriots say that they have no ambitions—and this has been said many times up to today—because of the small size of the island of Cyprus. Let us be grateful for this news, because we thought that uniting Cyprus as a whole to Greece was an ambition compatible with the size of the Greek Cypriot population. Uniting Cyprus as a whole with Greece in spite of the objections of one quarter of the population, if necessary by eliminating all the Turkish Cypriots, seems to be no ambition at all.

63. I should like to refer to a statement made by the late Archbishop Makarios on 21 August 1964 in which he said:

"My ambition is to accomplish the union of Cyprus with Greece. I will unite Cyprus integrally with Greece and then the borders of Greece will extend to the shores of North Africa."

A small country with no ambitions, of course, could do no better.

64. It would seem that we should see no wrongful or harmful ambition in the attempt by the Greek Cypriot wing of this binational Government to project itself for 20 years as the Government of Cyprus. That is not ambition. They assert that they can speak for and defend the Turkish Cypriots; that is not ambition either. A small and defenceless country, we are told, was attacked by a major Power and destroyed and it is seeking justice at the hands of the Council.

65. Smallness and strength are comparative terms. When we faced more than 30,000 fully armed Greek Cypriots helped by the Greek army from the mainland for years and years, we had to contend with massive strength—tanks and all possible weapons from all over the world. Turkey came in to stop those people destroying the Turkish Cypriot people. Turkey could not come into the country with walking-sticks. It could not match those forces without arms of its own. And now we are told that Turkey used force in upholding the independence of Cyprus.

66. I should like to quote another passage by Archbishop Makarios. He said this on 29 July 1970. I quote him because the new leader of the Greek Cypriot community, Mr. Kyprianou, has repeatedly stated that his policy and his way are the policy and the way of the Archbishop. Here is the passage:



"The hearts of the Greeks of Cyprus, of Rhodes, and of all the Dodecanese Islands have a common beat. You have achieved your aspirations, but we, beset by difficulties and frustrated by foreign meddlers, are still struggling for ours. But despite all difficulties, Cyprus will march on to Hellenism."

67. A "foreign meddler" frustrated that march on to Hellenism. The "foreign meddler" is none other than Turkey. The Turkish Cypriot community, which defended its independence, its inalienable rights and the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus, is immediately labelled the agent of Turkey, and everything is done to stop it being heard in the international arena.

68. But for that "foreign meddling", Cyprus would have been a part of Greece by now. To the Greeks that is liberty, that is justice, that is freedom—that is a beautiful thing. No one asks what this is to the Turkish community of Cyprus—and this is the problem of Cyprus.

69. Furthermore, to split the problem into an internal and an external factor—as my colleague on the other side of the table has said today—which the Greeks and some other countries have tried to do, is an attempt to prevent what they call "foreign meddlers"—meaning Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots—from arresting that march forward to Hellenism. From my nine years of experience at the United Nations and the 30 years I have spent on this issue, I can tell the members of the Council that, after 20 years, there is no change of heart in the Greek Cypriot leadership, that the votes they have contrived to obtain from the General Assembly have hardened them in their march forward to Hellenism. The architects of the Akritas Plan [see S/12722, annex] have not changed their vision of Cyprus. Even the threats are the same. What is more, they are desperate, because "foreign meddlers" have stopped their spurious march forward to Hellenism, because the agents of "foreign meddlers", the Turkish Cypriots, have dared defend their rights to the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus and have refused to bow to brute force.

70. They do not even want us to talk about our plight from 1963 to 1974. During those years we lived, throughout Cyprus, among the Greek population and we suffered because of it. The same threat forms the basis of the Akritas Plan. We heard the same threat again from Archbishop Makarios, who said at Rizokarpaso on 26 May 1965:

"The whole of Cyprus is to be united with Greece, or it will become a holocaust. The road to fulfilment of national aspirations may be full of difficulties, but we shall reach the goal, *enosis*, alive or dead."

The fact that on that march to the goal Turkish Cypriots would suffer and would die was, of course, irrelevant. The Greek Cypriots do not like the fact that we objected to being killed in the name of that glorious march.

71. Now, however, such threats no longer affect us. Thanks to our redemption, thanks to the exchange of

population which, in the last phases, we carried out with the help of UNFICYP, we now live in our own sector, and if the Greek Cypriots dare attack us again, they will have to suffer the consequences much more than we shall.

72. With a deep feeling of disappointment, I should like to read out to the Council a quotation from the destructive statement Mr. Karamanlis made when, two months ago, he toasted Mr. Kyprianou, as reported in the *Athens News Agency Bulletin* dated 11 April 1983:

"The Cyprus struggle, as known, was conducted, up to 1960 in common and in agreement with Makarios. And we arrived, after many painful adventures, at the independence of the island: an independence which would allow Cyprus to develop as an exemplary State in the eastern Mediterranean, without dismissing the hope of union with Greece, under certain conditions and basically under the condition of the defining by Athens and Nicosia of a parallel foreign policy."

What a lovely statement from the President of Greece.

73. It is ironic also that Mr. Karamanlis was the leader who had signed the Zurich and London Agreements,<sup>1</sup> which ostensibly had closed the road to *enosis* and partition. It is extremely disappointing to have it confirmed that that signature by Greece was only a ruse to get power in Cyprus for use against the Turkish Cypriot partners with a view to uniting Cyprus with Greece. In this context it is worthwhile to remember this excerpt from the joint communiqué issued on 2 February 1966—and it still exists—at the end of Archbishop Makarios' visit to Athens: "The two Governments object to any solution ruling out the island's union with Greece."

74. That is why the intercommunal talks during the 1968 to 1974 period did not result in a compromise settlement—because the Turkish side insisted then, as it insists now, that *enosis* in any form with any country should continue to be outlawed. Unfortunately, the latest Athens visit by Mr. Kyprianou underlined once again the fact that the expansionist aims of Greece continue to guide the Greek Cypriot leadership. For a better appreciation of the eulogy to *enosis*—the union of Cyprus with Greece—and the treatment of the Cyprus problem as a problem of pan-Hellenism which must continue until the final consummation, Mr. Karamanlis' statement, as it appeared in the *Athens News Agency Bulletin*, was attached to my letter distributed in Security Council document S/15717 of 21 April 1983.

75. But we hope that common sense and the experience gathered during the long years of suffering will have taught them a few lessons. I hope one lesson they have learned is that Cyprus has never been and never will be a Greek Cypriot island. It is destined to become a Cypriot island on which Greeks and Turks will live side by side and co-operate on an equal basis. The two communities will live side by side and co-operate until such time as a stage is reached when trust and confidence begin to grow. Will this be understood by the Greek

Cypriot side? I do not know, but I should like to hope it will be.

76. Now I should like to refer to the statement which Mr. Rolandis, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Greek Cypriot administration, made on 10 May, at the 116th meeting of the resumed thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly. It is a typical repetition of the well-known misleading Greek Cypriot propaganda regarding the Cyprus question.

77. If, as Mr. Rolandis alleges, "the problem of Cyprus is one of the issues which tarnish the ethical infrastructure of the world", and if it is a "dark cloud in the brightness of the eastern Mediterranean", it is surely Greece and Greek Cypriots that are to blame for creating the Cyprus problem—in the first place through their age-old struggle to unite Cyprus to Greece, which goes back to the 19th century, a struggle that took a violent turn in 1955 with the activities of the underground EOKA terrorist movement that started that year.

78. If we are to believe Greek propaganda claiming that the Cyprus problem started in 1974 with the Turkish intervention and that the problem will be solved with the withdrawal of Turkish troops and the return of all refugees to their homes—that is, by putting back the clock to pre-July 1974 conditions—then presumably there was no problem before 1974. If that is the case, what has UNFICYP been doing in Cyprus since 1964? Why have hundreds of Turks been killed and thousands of Turkish Cypriots turned into refugees since 1963, and what has EOKA been doing since 1955? After all, there were no Turkish troops in Cyprus before 1974, other than the Turkish contingent, also authorized under the 1960 treaties. Are we to assume that there was no problem before 1974, and that tragic events did not take place prior to 1974?

79. Today the world knows that the Cyprus problem did not start with the Turkish action of July 1974 and that the problem will not be solved by merely going back to the pre-1974 days. The root-causes of the problem go as far back as 1821 and 1878, to the "*Megali Idea*"—the Great Idea—of Greece and the struggle for the union of Cyprus with Greece.

80. The Greek and Greek Cypriot propaganda has again today tried to project the Cyprus problem as being simply one of invasion and occupation. When one looks at the facts and events which led to Turkey's operation in 1974, it is clear that that is far from the case. Turkey exhibited remarkable restraint and patience in the face of internal pressures and a humanitarian urge to act during the preceding 11 years. It had no alternative but to intervene following the Greek and Greek Cypriot *coup* of 15 July 1974 and the assumption of the presidency by the killer Nicos Sampson. Indeed, as the late Archbishop Makarios himself pointed out in his address to the Security Council on 19 July 1974 [1780th meeting], it was that *coup* of 15 July, instigated and planned by the Government of Greece, that had in fact constituted an invasion which violated the independence and the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus.

81. Turkey's timely intervention in 1974 in exercise of its rights and obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee<sup>2</sup> and of the legitimate principle of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations not only safeguarded the independence of the Republic of Cyprus, which was in danger of coming to an end through its annexation to Greece, but saved the Turkish Cypriot community, which was in grave danger of being annihilated by Greek and Greek Cypriot armed elements.

82. Turkey's operation was therefore rather a liberation of part of Cyprus for and on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot co-founding partner of the Republic of Cyprus, entitled to equal rights in the matter of the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus. That part of Cyprus would have been completely eliminated had it not been for the Turkish intervention. By coming to Cyprus the Turkish army in fact pushed back the Greek Cypriot and Greek mainland forces of conspiracy, which had been waging a war that threatened the very existence of a binational independent Cyprus since 1963.

83. The troops of a country which is permitted and required to station personnel in the Republic of Cyprus under article IV of the 1960 Treaty of Alliance<sup>3</sup> cannot reasonably be considered as "foreign", nor as "an occupying force". To suggest that Turkish Cypriots might regard Turkish troops as "foreign" or, for that matter, that any Greek Cypriot should regard Greek troops as "foreign" is to be completely ignorant of the nature of the Cyprus problem. The Zurich and London Agreements and the 1960 Constitution based on those Agreements contain provisions that treat Turkey and Greece as the respective motherlands of the two Cypriot communities.

84. The Turkish peace-force presence in Cyprus today aims solely at providing security to the Turkish Cypriot community, thus preventing a recurrence of the fighting between the two communities, and maintaining peace and stability, pending a definitive solution of the problem.

85. The Turkish Government has repeatedly stated officially, at the highest level, that Turkey would withdraw its forces from the island once a settlement acceptable to both communities is found, within the framework of security arrangements to be agreed upon by the parties concerned. Until then, it will be appreciated that the need for protecting the Turkish Cypriot community remains. The presence of the Turkish forces today on the island, at the request of the Turkish Cypriot community, is the only effective guarantee for safeguarding the lives and property of the Turkish Cypriots, who were the victims of relentless Greek armed attacks between 1963 and 1974, a time of virtual occupation by over 20,000 Greek mainland troops, who had landed on the island clandestinely to assist the Greek Cypriots in their *enosis* campaign.

86. How very deceptive and misleading therefore it is for Mr. Rolandis, now assuming the part of a wolf in sheep's clothing, to misrepresent Turkey's legitimate and timely intervention in Cyprus as a situation where the Greek Cypriots and Cyprus are being "devoured by

a much bigger and mightier neighbour". This can hardly deceive anyone who is at all familiar with the real causes and the history of the Cyprus problem and the events that made Turkey's intervention necessary in 1974.

87. It is also distressing to hear Mr. Rolandis allege that "life was diverted from its normal course" in 1974. He assumes that the years of strife and suffering of the Turkish Cypriots between 1963 and 1974 were the "normal course". What may be normal for Mr. Rolandis and what Mr. Kyprianou described as "those happy years" was in fact a period of intense suffering for the Turkish Cypriots, whose human rights were violated by the Greek Cypriots, as part of a deliberate policy of subjugation and domination.

88. It is regrettable that Mr. Rolandis denigrated the efforts by the Turkish Cypriots in the north, when he referred to "institutions with no constitutional or legal foundation". The Turkish Cypriot administration and the institutions lawfully created by its constitutional organs are just as legal as the Greek Cypriot administration and its institutions in southern Cyprus. It should be remembered that since the Greek Cypriots were responsible for the disruption of the constitutional order in 1963, it is their administration and their institutions that dwell under a cloud of false legality. The fact is that the Greek Cypriots usurped, or "hijacked", at the end of the 1960s, the governmental machinery of the 1960 binational partnership Republic of Cyprus, by force of arms, relying on their military superiority on the island, and such actions can scarcely claim any semblance of legality.

89. Mr. Rolandis furthermore alleges that there is a "silent majority of Turkish Cypriots" in the north who do not support the just cause of the Turkish Cypriot community, as expounded by its leaders and as presented at the intercommunal talks. He cannot be deceiving anyone but himself. We hope that he and his colleagues will not be too late in facing the fact that all Turkish Cypriots are united in their determination to live in their own homeland in peace and security. If his allegation were true, how does he account for the fact that thousands of Turkish Cypriots chose to move from the south to freedom in the north during the 1974-75 period, at considerable risk to their lives, when Greek Cypriots were doing all they could to stop the flow, before the population exchange agreement of 2 August 1975 [see S/11789, annex] was implemented by UNFICYP?

90. Then Mr. Rolandis claimed that their recourse to the General Assembly was "not at all aimed at disrupting the intercommunal process". It was probably because the case was such that Mr. Rolandis felt the need to give that unconvincing explanation. It is difficult to see what advantage there can be for the Greek Cypriot side to leave the negotiating table at Nicosia and bring the issue to New York for yet another futile recourse to the General Assembly. The Cyprus problem cannot be solved by one-sided resolutions in the General Assembly or elsewhere, but, as the Secretary-General has pointed out time and again, it can only be solved and settled through direct intercommunal talks between the two parties. The only explanation can be that Mr. Rolandis, Mr. Kyprianou and other

Greek Cypriot leaders and Greek leaders of Greece prefer to engage in further propaganda, in the absence of the Turkish Cypriot side, in order to keep the issue of Cyprus alive as part of their "internationalization" campaign, instead of disposing of the matter in a definitive manner, before it is too late, at the negotiating table of the Nicosia intercommunal talks.

91. I should like to turn now to the issue of missing persons in Cyprus. This is a matter which the Turkish Cypriots consider as a humanitarian concern, yet the Greek Cypriots consider it as a political issue, and it is still unresolved because they wish to exploit the matter for propaganda purposes. This is what I stated on 14 December 1982, in this Chamber:

"The only entity competent to discuss the issue of missing persons on the island is the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP), an autonomous intercommunal body. It was not established, nor is it governed by the United Nations, but stems solely from the agreement between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities. Its autonomous character was acknowledged by the Secretary-General himself in a press release on 10 November 1981. Issue in Nicosia, it states that measures to facilitate the work of the Committee 'could be finalized only by the Committee, which functions autonomously'. All the attempts by the Greek side to raise the question of missing persons in forums other than the CMP violate its terms of reference and the agreement that served to create it.

"Therefore, any statement on the missing persons issue anywhere but in the Committee infringes the CMP's competence and is therefore totally unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriot community.

"Available evidence on the so-called missing Greek Cypriots indicates that they in fact perished during the *coup* staged in Cyprus by Greece on 15 July 1974. The Secretary General of the Greek Cypriot Communist Party, Mr. Ezakias Papaianou, revealed at a public meeting on 28 November . . . that during the armed Greek anti-Makarios *coup* many Greek Cypriots had been killed by those responsible for the *coup*, who had even buried some of them alive. This statement appeared in the Greek Cypriot newspaper *Haravgi* on 29 November 1982.

"Evidently the Greek Cypriot side does not want to solve the missing persons issue within the CMP. They have boycotted its meetings and done everything else to undermine and sabotage the CMP. Confidential CMP documents, including its terms of reference, have been disclosed. The Greek Cypriots have taken this humanitarian issue to every forum except the CMP itself.

"No solution is feasible for this humanitarian problem as long as the Greek Cypriot side continues to exploit it internationally for political propaganda." [See 2405th meeting, paras. 72-76.]

92. Today again, it has been alleged by the Greek Cypriot representative that settlers are being brought from Turkey and established in Cyprus. This is erroneous, and the object of the allegation is obviously to draw political profit from misleading public opinion into believing that Turkey is colonizing Cyprus. In fact, these are simply devious tactics designed to make everyone forget those who have really been guilty of trying to colonize Cyprus for decades, plunging the island into a bloodbath in the process.

93. Many false statements have been made also about the granting of title deeds to Greek Cypriots in the north. It is true that there is indeed a law on immovable property, and the fact is that it was designed in order to find a solution to the social and economic problems and difficulties experienced by the Greek Cypriots arriving in considerable numbers from the south as refugees. In order to meet the investment and maintenance capital needs that such large-scale arrivals created and to make them productive, persons having the required qualifications were enabled by law to transfer possession rights to such property to others. This adjustment was the result of a search for a solution and is in no way aimed at instituting any compulsory confiscation of ownership rights, nor does it contradict international law or the rules of transfer of ownership.

94. In another area requiring urgent attention, namely, the monetary and financial field, the Greek Cypriot again today has attempted grossly to distort the efforts of my authorities to establish limited banking institutions and to introduce the use of the Turkish lira. Once again these accusations need to be rebutted by the facts being stated quite clearly: the Turkish Federated State of Kibris, in fulfilment of its obligation to develop the economy and improve the people's standard of living, has decided to establish a development and central bank endowed with limited functions—it will not issue currency—and intended to implement the State's monetary and credit policies.

95. This move was made necessary by the fact that the holdings of the Greek Cypriot part-owners of the development bank in the south were peremptorily expropriated. Furthermore, the currency measures taken by the Turkish Cypriot community were also the result of arbitrary action by the Greek Cypriot-controlled Central Bank, which confiscated the Cyprus pounds deposited by Turkish Cypriots in Turkish banks. Another unit of currency had to be introduced to allow normal transactions to continue, and the Turkish lira was adopted in the north pending a final solution.

96. These unwarranted protests of the Greek Cypriots are nothing other than flagrant interference in the internal affairs of the Turkish Cypriot community. The Greek Cypriot community, which has five times the *per capita* income of the Turkish Cypriot community, protests against the Turkish Cypriot efforts at bridging this economic gap; and yet we all know that finding a social and economic balance between the two communities will be one of the bases on which to build a viable political solution of the Cyprus problem.

97. Such is the context in which the Turkish Cypriot community's decisions to establish its own central and development bank, as well as to introduce the Turkish lira, are to be seen, and attempts by the Greek Cypriot representative to make the situation appear otherwise are totally unfounded.

98. At this point I wish to state categorically that General Assembly resolution 37/253, adopted on 13 May 1983, is totally unacceptable to us. That resolution, as a whole, constitutes a serious threat to the continuation of the inter-communal talks. Therefore it is our understanding that if and when the negotiations start, that resolution will not be taken into consideration. I feel it only right that I should inform members of the Council that decisions of the United Nations and of other international bodies which ignore the rights and status of the co-founding partner Turkish Cypriot community of the Republic of Cyprus and the realities of the Cyprus problem do not, in fact, help matters and only make the finding of an agreed political settlement more difficult.

99. Therefore, if resolution 37/253, which, *inter alia*, calls upon all States to "support and help the Government of the Republic of Cyprus"—that is, the Greek Cypriot administration—to exercise sovereignty and control over the entire territory of Cyprus, were to be implemented, it would mean that the Turkish Cypriot community would completely lose all its lawful rights and partnership status which it has been defending at all costs for 20 years and be reduced to serfdom under a Greek-dominated Cyprus, in flagrant violation of all principles of natural justice and humanity. Furthermore, this mandate to the Greek Cypriots of a bicomunal State, in view of the Greek Cypriot mentality and policy regarding Cyprus, is a mandate entitling them to complete their acts of genocide attempted during the years 1963 to 1974 with absolute impunity and under the guise of implementing United Nations resolutions. To this my people will never bow.

100. The Turkish Federated State of Kibris has decided to reassess its position in the light of the gravely defective resolution 37/253. When the competent organs of the Turkish Federated State of Kibris have completed their assessment, their views will appropriately be communicated to the Secretary-General.

101. For the past 20 years the presence of UNFICYP between the two national communities has been deemed essential. Yet we have heard the Greek Cypriot and Greek representatives say that the problem in Cyprus dates back to 1974 and is therefore only nine years old. They completely ignore the period from 1963 to 1974, and we are bound to ask ourselves whether such arguments are really given in good faith.

102. Today, as members of the Council well know, I am participating in the Council's deliberations on the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP for a further six months, in order to express the views of the Turkish Cypriot people, exclusively represented by the Turkish Federated State of Kibris. In so doing I wish also to express my gratitude and that of my Government to the Secretary-General for his outstanding dedication and

for his efforts at resolving the Cyprus conflict, a matter which has been on the Council's agenda since the Greek Cypriot onslaught of 1963. Our appreciation goes also to the members of the Secretariat and to the staff in the field, particularly Mr. Urquhart, Mr. Gobbi, Major-General Greindl, Mr. Sherry, Mr. Schiittler-Silva, Mr. Holger and Mr. Picco. We also thank especially the military and civilian personnel who have discharged their important responsibilities with outstanding competence and unimpeachable impartiality.

103. I take this opportunity to express our deep gratitude to Turkey for its whole-hearted contribution to intercommunal peace in Cyprus and to the security and economic development of the Turkish community still under Greek Cypriot embargo.

104. The Security Council has just adopted its resolution 534 (1983), extending the mandate of the Force until 15 December 1983. In spite of our irrefutable objections the third preambular paragraph still carries a reference to the so-called Government of Cyprus. As I have stated, and as members of the Council know well, this is a name that the Greek Cypriot faction of the bicomunal Government of Cyprus has arrogated unto itself without any right to the title.

105. As I stated earlier, there has been no government legitimately representative of Cyprus as a whole, legally or politically, since the disruption of the bicomunal partnership Government in 1963. We object to the use of that term because it is utterly misleading, since it reflects neither the legal nor the actual reality of the situation in the island. The two national communities of the island have been the constituent elements of the Cyprus dispute since December 1963. This dispute arose as a consequence of the Greek Cypriot armed attempt to destroy the bicomunal partnership and incorporate Cyprus into Greece. Therefore, to refer to the Greek Cypriot element of the bicomunal Government of Cyprus as "the Government of Cyprus" runs counter to the Basic Articles of the 1960 Constitution. It would seem to give the Greek Cypriot side, at the expense of the Turkish Cypriot side, what the Greek Cypriots have failed to acquire by force since 1963.

106. In paragraph 3 of resolution 534 (1983), the Council requests the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices. My Government welcomes and supports this request. We shall continue to co-operate fully with the dedicated Secretary-General in his mission. As Council members know well, the intercommunal talks continue on the basis of the Secretary-General's opening statement of 9 August 1980, annexed to document S/14100, incorporating the high-level agreements of 1977 [see S/12323, para. 5] and 1979 [see S/13369, para. 51] and the bilateral intercommunity agreements, as well as on the basis of the Secretary-General's "evaluation" paper. In his current report, the Secretary-General states:

"During the period under review, I have pursued the mission of good offices entrusted to me by the Security

Council. The intercommunal talks have continued in Nicosia on a regular basis, although the frequency of the meetings was adjusted as necessary."—naturally, this was because of the Greek Cypriots—"The 'evaluation' paper submitted by my Special Representative in November 1981 continued to be used as a structured, substantive method of discussion. The Special Representative reports that the open agenda pattern adopted at the beginning of this year has been helpful in the conduct of the discussions. I continue to hold to the view, which I have consistently expressed, that the intercommunal talks represent the best available means of pursuing a concrete and effective negotiating process aimed at achieving an agreed, just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question." [S/15812, para. 60.]

107. Furthermore, the substantive paragraphs of the report of the Secretary-General, particularly paragraphs 48, 49, 51 and 60 to 63, are of a nature that underlines once again the fact that the intercommunal talks constitute the best way of resolving the question of Cyprus and that these talks are proceeding in accordance with the Security Council resolutions and on the basis of the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979, on the basis of the bilateral intercommunity agreements and on the basis of the Secretary-General's "evaluation" paper. We find the approach of the Secretary-General as expressed in these paragraphs constructive and reassuring.

108. But I am sure that the Council will agree with me that the fifth preambular paragraph and paragraph 2 of its resolution 534 (1983) do not accurately reflect the actual basis on which the talks are continuing. Nevertheless, I have been empowered to give consent, on behalf of the Government of the Turkish Cypriot community, to the extension of the mandate of the Force until 15 December 1983. We shall continue, as we have done in the past, to co-operate with the Force and to help in the successful execution of its task.

109. As I have repeatedly stressed in Security Council meetings in the past, we continue to hope that the Force's mandate and *modus operandi* will be revised in accordance with the present realities in Cyprus.

110. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriot people deplores the fact that some of the States which contribute troops to UNFICYP chose to depart from their traditional posture of maintaining equal distance and voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 37/253. We hope that those countries will return to their position of not taking sides in the dispute if they wish to retain their impartiality, which is so essential to the carrying out of peace-keeping operations in Cyprus.

111. Let me now express my Government's views in connection with the Secretary-General's report under consideration by the Council. The repeated use of the term "the Government of Cyprus" while referring to the Greek Cypriot administration is regrettable, for there exists no entity in Cyprus at present which could constitutionally or legitimately represent both the Turkish

Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot peoples of Cyprus. As Council members are fully aware, talks between the two national communities are continuing, within the context of the Secretary-General's good offices, in order to establish a legitimate Government of Cyprus representing both national communities. The treatment of the Greek Cypriot side as "the Government", therefore, at a time when the talks are under way, prejudices the outcome of these talks and prejudices the chances of their success. Furthermore, the reference to the Turkish Cypriot component of the binational Republic of Cyprus in the same context as merely "the Turkish Cypriot community" constitutes a grave injustice to the Turkish Cypriot people, which is entitled—legally, morally and legitimately—to a status equal with that of the Greek Cypriot people. This inequitable attitude is also reflected in references to the respective leaders of the two peoples of Cyprus.

112. After December 1983 Archbishop Makarios ruled the land in accordance with his whims and fancies, and never within the context of any constitution or legal authority. Pending the establishment of constitutional order, UNFICYP was sent to Cyprus in March 1964 at the request, and with the consent, of the two communities, and it is with the explicit consent of the two communities that UNFICYP continues to function in the island today.

113. Furthermore, the summit meetings between Archbishop Makarios and Mr. Denktas on 12 February 1977 and between Mr. Kyprianou and Mr. Denktas on 19 May 1979 were not meetings between the President of one side and the communal leader of the other side, respectively, but between people of equal status representing their respective communities. Archbishop Makarios lost his status as President of Cyprus when he launched his ignominious attack on the Turkish Cypriots and ousted from the legitimate Cyprus Government its Turkish Cypriot component.

114. The take-over and continuation of the office of "President of Cyprus", first in July 1974 by Mr. Glafcos Clerides and then by Archbishop Makarios, followed by Mr. Kyprianou, is as devoid of any legal and constitutional substance as the take-over of that post by the notorious killer Nicos Sampson on 15 July 1974. It is my duty to reaffirm once again, therefore, that, as far as the Turkish Cypriot people is concerned, the re-establishment of the legitimacy of the Cyprus Government, which was destroyed by the 21 December 1963 *coup* perpetrated by Archbishop Makarios, can come about only with the final agreement of the two peoples of Cyprus on the new constitution of the island.

115. In the light of the foregoing, it is our earnest wish—and we believe it is our legitimate right—to expect that one side should not be upgraded in the reports of the Secretary-General at the expense of the other.

116. With regard to the reference in paragraph 29 of the Secretary-General's latest report to complaints about

alleged "harassment of Greek Cypriots" in the north, I wish to stress once more that there is not, and there has never been, any question of anybody being subjected to any harassment in the north and that all allegations in this regard—past or present—are totally untrue.

117. Finally, concerning the report, I wish to express our full agreement with the Secretary-General's statement in paragraph 60, as follows:

"I continue to hold to the view, which I have consistently expressed, that the intercommunal talks represent the best available means of pursuing a concrete and effective negotiating process aimed at achieving an agreed, just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question."

I wish also to stress the Turkish Cypriots' determination to continue the bilateral negotiating process in a spirit of good will and with a constructive attitude.

118. The concept of equal partnership is inherent in the sovereignty and independence of Cyprus, and in view of the record of Greek violations of this basic principle since 1963, the Turkish Cypriot people will be justified in taking the necessary measures to defend its rights. The ultimate responsibility in this matter rests with the Greek Cypriot leadership.

119. I have listened to the presentation made by the Greek Cypriot representative. I simply cannot understand his behaviour and his political motive. The Greek origin of the word "diplomacy" seems to have been sadly betrayed again today when we heard extraordinary manipulations of the facts. One cannot deny the fact that Greece is the only country responsible—whether under democratically elected Governments or junta régimes—for all the calamities that have befallen the island of Cyprus since the 1880s, a century ago. The annals of the United Nations are full of the atrocities committed by the Greeks in Cyprus against my people, the Turkish Cypriot community. I shall therefore refrain from answering their baseless and false accusations in detail. Let history be the judge.

120. In concluding, I must confirm once again before this body that the sincere hope of the Turkish people in Cyprus is that the Greek Cypriot leadership will come to the negotiating table with the resolute intention of developing the bizonal federal system in Cyprus in a spirit of equal partnership and on the basis of the Secretary-General's opening statement of 9 August 1980.

121. The Turkish people of Cyprus and its Government have been doing and will continue to do their utmost in order to bring about such a solution. However, in spite of the repeated assertions by the Greek Cypriot leadership that sovereignty in Cyprus belongs exclusively to them, the Turkish Cypriot people must also assert that, in reality, the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus can be the outcome only of an equal partnership between the two communities. And I must warn all concerned that every time the Greek Cypriot people rejects this partnership by word or by deed, each time it violates the inalienable rights and status of the

Turkish people of Cyprus, my community will, as a last resort, consider itself at liberty, and even duty-bound, to do everything possible to defend its right of partnership and its inherent right to self-determination.

*The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.*

---

NOTES

<sup>1</sup> *Conference on Cyprus: Documents signed and initialled at Lancaster House on 19 February 1959*, Cmnd. 679 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959).

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5475.

<sup>3</sup> Treaty of Alliance between the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus (*ibid.*, vol. 397, No. 5712).

---

### كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة

يمكن الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة من المكتبات ودور التوزيع في جميع أنحاء العالم. استعلم عنها من المكتبة التي تتعامل معها أو كتب إلى: الأمم المتحدة، قسم البيع في نيويورك أو في جنيف.

#### 如何购取联合国出版物

联合国出版物在全世界各地的书店和经售处均有发售。请向书店询问或写信到纽约或日内瓦的联合国销售组。

#### HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

#### COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES

Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre libraire ou adressez-vous à : Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève.

#### КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ

Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех районах мира. Наводите справки об изданиях в вашем книжном магазине или пишите по адресу: Организация Объединенных Наций, Секция по продаже изданий, Нью-Йорк или Женева.

#### COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.

---