



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 29th MEETING

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The meeting was called to order at 10.40 a.m.

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STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka): On behalf of its sponsors, I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/41/L.24 for consideration and action in the First Committee. For several years the non-aligned countries have been gravely concerned over ensuring that space is not converted into another arena for the arms race and my delegation, together with the delegation of Egypt, has been associated with an initiative which has sought to express these concerns clearly and cogently. The danger of an arms race in outer space, rather than receding has in fact become ever more imminent. We are at a crucial stage when we still have the opportunity to stop short of placing weapons in space, triggering an irreversible arms race of unprecedented proportions in its consumption of resources and dangers for the survival of mankind - a macabre world series play-off for the assured destruction of our world.

The Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries expressed deep concern over that situation at the Harare Summit, asserting that outer space is the common heritage of mankind to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and the benefit of all. The Harare Declaration called on the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiating an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space. The non-aligned leaders also:

"... stressed the urgency of halting the development of anti-satellite weapons, the dismantling of the existing systems, the prohibition of the introduction of new weapon systems into outer space and of ensuring that the

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existing treaties safeguarding the peaceful uses of outer space, as well as the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems are fully honoured, strengthened and extended as necessary in the light of recent technological advances." (A/41/697, annex, p. 26)

The Harare Declaration recognized that important bilateral negotiations were going on with the declared objective of preventing an arms race in outer space and urged the participants to achieve that objective.

In a related development which preceded the Harare Summit, the distinguished authors of the Five-Continent Peace Initiative issued the Mexico Declaration of 7 August 1986 in which they reiterated their demand that an arms race in outer space be prevented and that space should not be misused for destructive purposes. Addressing itself to specific issues in this field, the Mexico Declaration states:

"It is particularly urgent to halt the development of anti-satellite weapons, which would threaten the peaceful space activities of many nations. We urge the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union to agree on a halt to further tests of anti-satellite weapons, in order to facilitate the conclusion of an international treaty on their prohibition. Our New Delhi warning that the development of space weaponry would endanger a number of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament is already proving to be justified. We stress that the existing treaties safeguarding the peaceful uses of outer space, as well as the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems, be fully honoured, strengthened and extended as necessary in the light of more recent technological advances." (A/41/518, annex I, p. 5)

The draft resolution which I have just introduced is clearly in the mainstream of the thinking of non-aligned and neutral countries. It reiterates the basic principles set out in the Harare and Mexico Declarations. We are aware that a

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legal régime exists today, but apart from its ineffectiveness in preventing an arms race in outer space involving new weapon technologies there is also the imminent danger of some treaties being violated and the entire disarmament process being deadlocked. The continuation of bilateral negotiations, while welcome in itself, is no guarantee that we will be able to prevent the introduction of space weapons. A basic first step is therefore a ban on dedicated anti-satellite weapons developed and designed specifically for the task of destroying satellites. These are manifestly offensive weapons and there can be no reason why the stated renunciation of such weapons and the emphasis on defensive strategies should not be substantiated by support for the ban for which operative paragraph 10 of that draft resolution calls. We are glad that this is a common element in three of the four draft resolutions on this item.

The need for the Conference on Disarmament to undertake negotiations on this issue is clear and the definitional work undertaken in the Ad Hoc Committee was a useful prelude to this. It is a consistent principle of the non-aligned nations that disarmament issues are the concern of us all and that bilateral negotiations do not diminish the need for multilateral negotiations.

The non-aligned resolution on this item has become the basis of the only resolution emerging from the General Assembly in recent years. Since the thirty-ninth session it has also been adopted with no negative votes, and last year it was adopted by an impressive 151 votes. I am aware that three other draft resolutions have been submitted on this item this year. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/41/L.24 are ready to hold discussions to achieve what we sincerely hope can be a consensus resolution on this item, in order to relieve the anxieties

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of the international community and send out an honest and universally acceptable message that weapons will not be introduced in space. A resolution preserving the basic principles of the prevention of an arms race is possible, and we remain ready as in the past to make an earnest and sincere endeavour to achieve the consensus that is vital at this stage.

Mr. MARTYNOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The debate on disarmament issues is drawing to a close. With the great diversity of problems raised by delegations which have spoken, the discussion was for the most part centred on several key issues, and above all on nuclear disarmament, and the problem of preventing the arms race in space occupied a notable place among them. That is in no way surprising. Recent events, and in particular the meeting at Reykjavik, have brought to light the fact that it is precisely this very problem which serves as a switch in a circuit of other priority issues. It would perhaps be more correct to say that star wars works in a way designed to switch off and block the path to decisive steps to reduce and eliminate nuclear arms and to halt and ban nuclear tests.

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The Byelorussian delegation, in its statements at the fortieth and forty-first sessions of the General Assembly, including its special statement on the subject (A/C.1/40/PV.20, A/C.1/41/PV.15 and A/41/PV.26), has already made an extensive assessment of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), its impact and the myths which are being built up hastily around SDI to make it look appealing. The passage of time has fully confirmed the validity of those assessments. As we see it, a detailed discussion of this problem at the United Nations and developments outside have made it quite clear to everyone what SDI really means and what its consequences are likely to be. In this Conference Room too, as the results of voting on the resolutions concerning the prevention of an arms race in space clearly show, there is practically no one besides the United States who needs to be persuaded of SDI's dangerous nature. And that is why today our delegation would like to touch on only a few aspects of the problem, those which have been in especially high relief over the last few weeks.

What was SDI really intended to do? We are told that it was for defence without nuclear weapons. More precisely, that is what was being said until recently, though we could cite a whole series of statements by high-ranking officials of the United States administration and people outside the administration who both directly and indirectly testify to the opposite. But literally just a few days ago we heard a new version of the familiar formula which formerly stated that SDI would render nuclear arms unnecessary and obsolete. Everything in this formula remained unchanged except for its main component, for now the reference is not to all nuclear arms as such, but merely ballistic missiles. One does not have to be an expert to realize that there is a yawning gap between the two notions. And in addition, the substance of the new formula actually means - and this formula was proclaimed on a high administrative level - that, if nuclear arms remain, the main reason for and the primary intent behind the concept of space defence simply

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disappears. In any case, what disappears is the reasoning presented by the President of the United States in his speech of 23 March 1983. Moreover, in the same speech he stated that if defensive systems were paired with offensive systems, this could be regarded as fostering an aggressive policy. And this is precisely what is going on.

It becomes more evident every single day that SDI was thought up as an instrument for breaking through to a completely new and much higher orbit in the arms race. The aim here is to step up the race in a such a manner as to allow the United States to count on reaching a continuously elusive military superiority and on bleeding its opponent white economically in the pursuit of far-reaching political goals.

Indeed, we have continually been told that SDI was merely an innocent research programme. However, after the USSR made a proposal logically stemming from the above-mentioned assertion to confine this programme to appropriate laboratory research and testing, this immediately turned out to be unacceptable to the United States. This means that we are speaking of an unequivocal, firm intention to develop and to deploy over the heads of mankind whole new categories of weapons with the broadest range of capabilities and combat use. This spider's web of space strike systems spread out over the earth is evidently meant to become a special-purpose base for the manipulation of the fate of countries and peoples on a global level.

Some of the sponsors of SDI speak of an intention to share the future system with the opposite side. Quite apart from the doubtful validity of such promises, it is important to stress that the USSR declared its unwillingness to participate in such a "superclub" for two. There is yet another aspect to this proposal for "sharing" SDI. As the United States Secretary of Defense wrote in his letter addressed to the President on the eve of the November 1985 Soviet-United States

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summit meeting in Geneva, if the USSR were to deploy "even a probable territorial defense", such a development "would require us to increase the number of our offensive forces". Thus, the idea of encouraging the other side to acquire a defensive space system already carries within itself the embryo of a further impetus for a new round of an offensive weapons build-up.

The Reykjavik meeting resulted in the achievement of a higher level in defining the goals and framework for possible arrangements on nuclear disarmament. The possibility emerged for embarking on the road of deep reductions and subsequently the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In these circumstances it is of particularly importance to rule out any possibility for the acquisition of a unilateral military advantage - and this is precisely this possibility is offered by SDI. The 1972 Soviet-United States Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems is a valuable instrument that can be used for this purpose. Its régime must be strengthened, all the more so as article XIII of the Treaty provides for the possibility to consider "possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty". With this in mind, it is perfectly natural and by no means in contradiction with the Treaty that the USSR is proposing that there should be no withdrawals from the Treaty within a 10-year period and that research and testing should be confined to the laboratory. However, the United States attitude towards the Treaty is a source of serious concern. On more than one occasion this Treaty has been buried, doomed to early failure and unmercifully torn apart by loose interpretations on the part of American officials. This type of verbal tightrope-walking could even be amusing, if the issue at stake were not of such a serious nature. The United States attitude to compliance with its legally binding commitments is highly alarming. International treaties are not "stretch" pyjamas designed to fit everybody. We are not in favour of the type of flexibility in international relations which would allow for the Treaty on the Limitation of

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Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems to cover unlimited testing and the subsequent deployment of such systems in space. We are not in favour of the elasticity that turns the agreed objective of preventing an arms race in space into a carte blanche permitting the introduction of strike weapons there.

Article V of the Treaty explicitly states:

"Each party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based."

The fact that this Article has been worded precisely to serve this unambiguous purpose is also unanimously confirmed by those American experts who took a direct part in the elaboration of the Treaty. Moreover, the supplementary provisions of the Treaty concerning possible ABM systems based on other physical principles are not meant to become a door leading to the unimpeded deployment of such systems - this would basically contradict the spirit of the Treaty. These provisions are supposed to gather all possible technological and scientific innovations in this field under the umbrella of the ABM Treaty. This is also confirmed by the American participants in the elaboration of the Treaty.

Taking all this into account, United States intentions to go ahead at full speed and carry out all the testing planned under the SDI programme clearly go beyond the Treaty's framework. Moreover, this is not the opinion of just one side. The official report of a United States Government body, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, submitted on 31 January 1983 to the United States Congress - that is, with the current administration already in office - states in black and white that the ban on development, testing and deployment of ABM systems or space-based components provided by the Treaty also covers the directed energy technology or any other technology employed for this purpose. This acrobatic change of course in official United States circles took place only after star wars had been proclaimed.

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The main harm being done by SDI is essentially that it undermines prospects for negotiations and extends the area of mistrust. That is the problem; it is no less political than military. SDI's destructive capacity is not something that affects only the distant future; we are feeling its effects now, well before the deployment of its components. In Reykjavik, SDI wrecked a historic opportunity to achieve a major agreement on the reduction and elimination of all strategic nuclear arsenals. It is also worth considering SDI in the light of First Committee issues. It threatens to render impossible the halting of all nuclear explosions. It also jeopardizes the achievement of nuclear-disarmament goals. As to the prevention of an arms race in space, SDI makes it totally impossible. The elimination of chemical weapons, the reduction of conventional weapons, the strengthening of confidence and the spirit of international co-operation - all could be reduced to ashes in the atmosphere of global uncertainty and fear caused by the implementation of SDI. It is no exaggeration to say that SDI will render worthless decades of painstaking efforts at all stages of the disarmament mechanism.

The question is whether there is an alternative. Yes, there is. Along with the strengthening of the ABM Treaty régime, there is an urgent need to achieve agreement between the USSR and the United States on banning space strike weapons of the space-earth and space-space types. It is also extremely important to ban anti-satellite systems and to eliminate those that already exist. The parties should be open both to the solution of the whole set of these problems in general and to the search for individual agreements that would ultimately lead to the erection of a reliable barrier against the introduction of weapons into space. It is also necessary to embark upon serious negotiations at the multilateral level within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

The USSR has consistently called for progress along those lines. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,

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Mikhail S. Gorbachev, recently stressed that "for us a ban on space-strike weapons is not a problem of fear of lagging behind, but a problem of responsibility". It is important that other States, on which the settlement of the problem of the prevention of an arms race in space depends, also realize the full measure of their responsibility.

Mr. GRUNDMANN (German Democratic Republic): Permit me to introduce on behalf of Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Viet Nam the draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons" contained in document A/C.1/41/L.12.

The sponsors have in each of the previous years submitted a draft resolution on the prohibition of chemical weapons. With regard to the draft now before the Committee, I should like to emphasize the following aspects.

The first preambular paragraph recalls paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, which describes the prohibition of chemical weapons as one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently the urgency of the earliest conclusion of a convention is reaffirmed in the second preambular paragraph.

The third and fourth preambular paragraphs emphasize the need for the extension of international co-operation in the field of chemical industries for peaceful purposes, bearing in mind that the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction would contribute to the achievement of this goal.

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The ninth and tenth preambular paragraphs emphasize the need to prevent a further increase of arsenals of chemical weapons and to refrain from the deployment of such weapons, on the one hand, and to prevent the improvement and further development of chemical weapons, on the other - that is, an arms race in the field of chemical weapons should not take place, either quantitatively or qualitatively.

The eleventh preambular paragraph welcomes the agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons.

The twelfth preambular paragraph takes note of proposals and initiatives on the creation of chemical-weapon-free zones in various regions aimed at facilitating the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and at contributing to the achievement of stable regional and international security.

The sponsors of this draft resolution consider it appropriate to welcome, in the thirteenth preambular paragraph, the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, which stresses the urgency of a chemical-weapons ban.

The basic concern of this draft resolution is expressed in paragraph 2. The Geneva Conference on Disarmament is urged to intensify negotiations in order to submit a draft convention on the complete ban on chemical weapons to its forty-second session.

Paragraph 3 reaffirms the call to all States to conduct serious negotiations in good faith and to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations on the

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prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically from the production of new types of chemical weapons, as well as from deploying chemical weapons on the territory of other States.

My delegation wishes to inform the Committee that it supports the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/41/L.56 and has become a sponsor in accordance with its action last year. We consider that draft resolution L.12 complements draft resolution L.56.

My delegation expresses the hope that the draft resolution I have just introduced will continue to find broad support in the interest of an early agreement on the chemical weapons convention.

Mr. MFISZTER (Hungary): The Hungarian delegation has the honour this year, as it has repeatedly in past years, to introduce, on behalf of the delegations of Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Viet Nam and Hungary, a draft resolution on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests (A/C.1/41/L.8).

Unfortunately, our efforts and those of other delegations introducing draft resolutions with similar goals have not been crowned with success. In the meantime, the danger of a nuclear conflagration and the overall negative political, social and, above all, economic consequences of the nuclear-arms race have not diminished one iota. The task of stopping the nuclear-arms race and turning the whole process in the opposite direction remains as timely as ever.

This year's discussion in the First Committee has confirmed our opinion that the first step in that new direction can and should be the immediate cessation and prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. It is that reasoning that prompted the delegations on whose behalf I am speaking to introduce this draft resolution. The discussions and agreements in various forums since last year's General Assembly session as well as the Reykjavik meeting provide ample proof of the feasibility of such an agreement and of the possibility of verifying compliance by any State with the obligations incumbent upon it.

In our opinion, therefore, there is no need to explain in detail the reason for the present draft resolution. Nor is there any need to explain the content of the text; each paragraph speaks for itself. The only aspect to which I wish to draw attention is the change made in the operative part of the draft resolution in comparison with last year's resolution 40/88. The authors of resolution 40/88

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studied very attentively all the remarks made at the last session during the discussion of and voting on the resolution, especially those made by delegations not at that time in a position to support our resolution.

There were several delegations which, in explaining their vote, stated that a moratorium could not be verified and in general expressed scepticism concerning the whole verification issue. Since then, the problem of verification has been clarified to a great extent. Nevertheless, in the desire to accommodate those who had misgivings about the possibility of verification or about the willingness of their partners to agree on serious verification measures, we included in the present draft resolution a paragraph - paragraph 5 - dealing expressly with verification. The authors of draft resolution L.8 hope that the improved text will attract a greater number of supporters, and would also welcome any delegation wishing to do so to become an additional sponsor.

We are, of course, aware that other draft resolutions have been put forward on the same issue. We are also conscious of the fact that the more effective functioning of the United Nations requires the smallest possible number of resolutions on a given issue, preferably one single resolution on each issue - and, if possible, one adopted by consensus. If that kind of general approach is valid for any draft resolution in the field of disarmament it is more than valid for a draft resolution urging a comprehensive test-ban treaty, where a single resolution can only underline the outstanding importance attached by the international disarmament community to this issue. To meet that desire, my delegation has been authorized by the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/41/L.8 to declare their readiness to discuss an eventual merging of draft resolutions with any delegation wishing to do likewise.

Mr. MOHAMMED (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): I wish to speak on agenda item 144, "Israeli nuclear armament", which first appeared on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1979. Several delegations have pointed out the threat posed by Israel's feverish nuclear armament, whether reflected in the number, size and capacity of its nuclear facilities or in the number and magnitude of its military nuclear activities. No international body has been permitted to inspect Israeli nuclear programmes or activities.

Israel's dangerous objectives and plans are only made clear by Israel's policy of concealment and raising smokescreens. For a long time, Israel's nuclear strategy has been based on this policy of concealing its nuclear activities, even before Israel claimed to be building a textile mill when it was in fact building the largest nuclear reactor in the area, the Dimona reactor. It is the largest nuclear reactor outside the nuclear States which is not under any international safeguards.

The Dimona reactor was built to produce fissionable material for military purposes, in the service of Israel's military nuclear policy. Israel does not need it economically or industrially, but rather in connection with its policy of nuclear armament. The secrecy was such that no international body detected when and how its capacity had grown from 26 megawatts to 70 megawatts. That increase means that the reactor, once able to produce enough plutonium to manufacture one nuclear bomb, can now produce enough for three nuclear bombs per year.

These conclusions have been confirmed by the 1981 report of the Secretary-General, prepared with the assistance of a group of experts (A/36/431) and in the 1985 report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) (A/40/520).

As Israel was working to conceal its major, high-capacity nuclear installations, especially that for the plutonium extraction and enrichment of

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uranium, it also commenced an illegal chapter of the policy of nuclear armament, that is the method of thefts and illegally acquiring nuclear material and technology. There is extensive evidence of such activities, including the 1965 theft of 260 pounds of enriched uranium from the NUMEC plant, the illegal acquisition in 1968 of 200 tons of unprocessed uranium, through seizure of a shipment from Antwerp destined for the Italian port of Genoa and its diversion to Israel, and Israel's smuggling in 1985 of 800 krytons - electric components of nuclear explosive devices - from the United States of America. Israel has violated the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system by possessing 47 tons of spent uranium, a component of nuclear military production industry.

There are so many acts of piracy on the part of Israel that they have become a permanent Israeli trade mark and a constant vocation. Israel has also had recourse to other methods. It perpetrated an unprecedented act of aggression by attacking a peaceful nuclear facility in Iraq under IAEA control. Iraq has submitted its installations to IAEA safeguards and subscribes to the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty, two régimes which Israel has not hesitated for a moment to reject and disdain. The report of the the Board of Governors of IAEA (GOV/2040 of 12 June 1981) stated that Israel's military act shows that it is flouting the IAEA safeguards system and the non-proliferation Treaty.

In addition to those illegal activities, the Israeli Government has promoted strange doctrines that are alien to the region and principles of international organizations - foremost of which is the United Nations - on disarmament issues and the establishment of peace in the Middle East.

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Instead of implementing the resolutions of the United Nations and other relevant organizations concerning Israel subjecting all its nuclear installations to the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and renouncing possession of nuclear weapons, as positive steps to avert a nuclear catastrophe perpetrated by Israel, Israel is putting forward and propagating the so-called doctrine of Israeli nuclear deterrence and nuclear terror against and superiority over the Arabs in order to secure so-called Israeli security. Suffice it to recall here what has been stated by Sharon as to nuclear deterrence, and before him by Moshe Dayan, as well as the studies of Shlomo Ahronson and Shai Feldman and several other Israelis in the Government, whose statements about Israel's possession of nuclear weapons are characterized by prevarication and ambiguities.

That prevarication and those misleading statements have shown Israel's flouting of international resolutions in this regard - for example its vote on the General Assembly's resolution on the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which was unanimously adopted. But Israel circumvents the resolution and states that it understands and interprets it in a way that runs counter to the endeavours of the States of the area.

Israel's increasing nuclear capability, without international control, is a source of concern for the area. Iraq has always played an important role in highlighting the magnitude of the impending nuclear danger and always sought to keep the area free of nuclear weapons. Proceeding from its premise that it is important to remove the nuclear threat from the Middle East, Iraq believes that the only such threat in the area is reflected in the military nuclear capability possessed by Israel, which Israel is developing and expanding day by day, as confirmed by events.

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In this respect, I wish to deal with the views of certain international personalities about Israel's nuclear armament, which was stated in a programme broadcast on a BBC2 in August 1985. First, in a BBC2 interview, the former American ambassador to Saudi Arabia, James Aikins, stated: "Israel has nuclear weapons, because possessing the last button connecting the last two components to produce an atomic explosion is equivalent to the possession of an atomic bomb."

Secondly, Paul Warnke, a former Under-Secretary of the American State Department, who represented the United States in disarmament negotiations, and who is considered a friend of Israel, stated: "I am sorry, but the truth is that Israel possesses the capability to produce nuclear weapons."

Thirdly, in an interview, Richard Sayle, an American weapons expert, in answering a question about Israel's possession of nuclear weapons, declared:

"Certain American officials confirmed that Israel has intermediate nuclear missiles that were actually deployed in many parts of Israel, in the Negev and probably in the Golan Heights."

Fourthly, again in an interview Tony Crossman, another American weapons expert, stated:

"I believe that Israel has more than 100 nuclear weapons, and it can have delivery vehicles to their targets through its fighter aircraft."

About Israel's capability to carry out nuclear explosion tests, he said that Israel was the only State outside America and Europe, with the exception of Japan, that had the capability of testing a nuclear weapon by using electronic emulation, without having recourse to testing the real weapon and of producing highly advanced weapons.

Finally, the important report published in the Sunday edition of The Times of London on 5 August of this year, irrefutably revealed the secrets of the Israeli

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nuclear arsenal through statements of the Israeli expert, Mordechai Vanunu, who worked at a nuclear-weapon plant for 10 years. His statement was confirmed by an investigative technical experts group made up of British and American experts, which proved that Israel today possesses between 100 and 200 nuclear weapons and that the nuclear-weapon plant is underground in the Negev desert, next to the Dimona reactor.

As I have already stated, all the evidence and testimony show that Israel's military armaments are not only increasing but are also proven day after day, as noted in statements by international institutes and experts in this regard. And that is occurring at a time when Israel flouts the resolutions of the United Nations and rides roughshod over international goals to put an end to its efforts to push the area to a nuclear catastrophe.

Hence, given the present data and information, we believe that the United Nations and its specialized agencies should accord special importance to this issue in order to compel Israel to comply with the desire of the international community to achieve peace and to avert the threat posed by nuclear weapons. The United Nations should implement its resolutions concerning Israel's nuclear activities and installations, as well as insist on the necessary controls. Those are the only large nuclear installations in the area that are not placed under international control.

Iraq reiterates its condemnation of the Israeli nuclear armament; it recalls that it is of paramount importance to deal with the issue through an item on the agenda of the General Assembly, since Israel will not comply with the call to renounce the military nuclear option and will continue the nuclear threat, which is increasing because there is no indication that Israel intends to change its nuclear policy. On the contrary, indications have shown the gravity of the Israeli policy of nuclear armament. This has become a permanent Israeli strategy regardless of

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the dire consequences of such conduct. Proceeding from this premise, Iraq has continued its role in order to contain the Zionist nuclear danger in the region and the world at large.

We hope that Member States will hasten to support the draft resolution we are submitting, since it contains a noble call for disarmament in keeping with the aspirations of the peoples of the world to achieve nuclear-weapon-free zones as a step forward to general and complete disarmament. It is sponsored by the following delegations: Algeria, Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and, of course, my own delegation, and is contained in document A/C.1/41/L.23, under the heading, "Israeli nuclear armament".

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The preamble to the draft resolution recalls United Nations and IAEA resolutions on the question of Israeli nuclear armament calling upon Israel to agree to place all its nuclear activities and installations under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

Paragraph 1 condemns Israel's refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons, and is a legitimate appeal to denounce Israel's refusal, which is at variance with the pledge of the States of the region not to possess nuclear weapons. Security Council resolution 487 (1981), inter alia, called upon Israel urgently to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Since Israel has not complied with that resolution, paragraph 2 of the draft resolution requests once more the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to ensure that Israel complies with resolution 487 (1981).

Paragraph 3 requests the Security Council to investigate Israel's nuclear activities and the collaboration of other States and other parties and institutions in the nuclear field, for such activities and collaboration are not under the control of any international system of safeguards and Israel is thus able to increase its ability to produce fissionable materials for military purposes. If the Security Council acts upon that request, it will reveal to us and to the international community what takes place inside Israeli nuclear installations.

Paragraph 4 reiterates the request to the International Atomic Energy Agency to suspend any scientific co-operation with Israel which could contribute to its nuclear capabilities. We believe that this paragraph is a legitimate response based upon the IAEA Convention and will prevent Israel from diverting the nuclear technology provided by IAEA to facilities not under Agency control.

In order to contain Israel's increasing stockpiles of nuclear armaments, paragraph 5 calls upon all States and organizations that have not yet done so to discontinue co-operating with and giving assistance to Israel in the nuclear

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field. It would thus help to avert an Israeli-caused nuclear catastrophe in the area. Paragraph 7 condemns Israel's refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons, and is a legitimate appeal to denounce Israel's refusal, which is at variance with the pledge of the States of the region not to possess nuclear weapons.

In spite of international appeals and demands, Israel persists in maintaining its close collaboration with the Pretoria régime in the nuclear field, flouting the resolutions adopted by the international community. Paragraph 6 therefore reaffirms condemnation of the continuing nuclear collaboration between the two racist entities in Israel and South Africa.

Paragraph 7 requests the Secretary-General closely to follow up Israeli nuclear activities in the light of the latest available information, to update the study on Israeli nuclear armaments in document A/36/431 and to submit the results to the General Assembly at its forty-second session.

In the light of this review, we would hope that all States will support the draft resolution and thereby contribute to the removal of nuclear weapons from Israel in order to avoid adding another complicating factor to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Mr. MOKGOTHU (Botswana): Since my delegation is speaking for the first time in the Committee, I wish to welcome you, Mr. Chairman, to your post, as well as the other officers of the Committee to their respective portfolios. It is already evident that under your able and combined leadership our Committee's work is moving in a positive direction.

My delegation regards the question of disarmament as one of the most burning issues of our time. The invention, perfection and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and other sophisticated weapons of mass destruction have brought the world face-to-face with the frightful prospect of a nuclear war. The tragic consequences

(Mr. Mokgothu, Botswana)

of such a war and the suffering it would inflict on whatever few survivors there might be have been amply debated by eminent scientists in the field.

Even more troubling to the world should be the proliferation of nuclear technology, which has resulted in a number of countries joining the so-called nuclear club. Some of those new members are, unfortunately, not well known for their good records as peacekeepers. To them, possession of nuclear technology and the development of nuclear weapons have become a matter of national prestige. They have refused to sign the appropriate international instruments on the matter.

The vast amount of resources, running into trillions of United States dollars, spent annually on armaments could wipe out hunger and poverty from the earth if made available to the developing countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean to improve agriculture, education, drinking water and health facilities. Millions of people from all walks of life in many countries have joined peace marches to make their opposition to the unbridled arms race known to those who bear the primary responsibility for that race. How fitting it would be, in this International Year of Peace, if the super-Powers were to reduce their nuclear stocks significantly with a view to the elimination of those stocks in the not-too-distant future.

Although I have spoken in a critical vein about the actions of those nations that have brought us into the nuclear age, I should not be thought oblivious to the serious efforts being made at various levels in the world today to reduce the tensions that may lead to nuclear war. The ongoing disarmament talks in Geneva, the confidence-building and security pacts represented by the Helsinki accords, the declaration of nuclear-free zones in a number of regions, are all examples of such efforts. Botswana, whose preoccupation since independence has been the raising of the living standards of its people, commends those efforts as steps in the right direction.

(Mr. Mokgothu, Botswana)

More than this, we welcome the recent mini-summit between the leaders of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. We are naturally disappointed that no agreements were concluded by the two sides. However, we remain convinced that, given what the world has been told was on the table at that meeting, there seems to be a great potential for making significant reductions in nuclear arsenals for the first time in many years. The super-Powers ought and must take serious follow-up steps to resolve those matters that robbed them of an agreement in Iceland. The world awaits their next move with great anticipation. They hold the future of mankind in their own hands.

(Mr. Mokgothu, Botswana)

This is the truth. The dangers that are inherent in the continuing development of nuclear technology are real. Accidents that have occurred at nuclear plants in recent years are grim reminders - if we still need to be reminded - that our small world and environment are too fragile to be left to the vagaries of chance and expertise alone.

We must work vigorously for the reduction and eventually the total elimination of destructive armaments. Botswana will remain a strong advocate of total disarmament.

Mr. TINCA (Romania) (interpretation from French): My statement today will be devoted to agenda item 58, entitled "Reduction of military budgets".

The increasingly rapid increase in military expenditures which have already reached the trillion-dollar mark has continued to be of the most serious concern to a growing number of States. It is a truth conceded by practically all - except by those who derive the greatest profit from arms production - that the arms race has the most negative effects on international peace and security, on the financial and economic world situation and, in general, on all aspects of social life.

To spend a trillion dollars on weapons contrasts almost shamefully with the state of poverty that exists in many countries, with the impressive efforts that those countries are making to cope with difficulties brought about by under-development and what has already become a chronic increase in their external debt, and with the clearly-expressed determination of peoples to devote their human and material resources to their economic and social development programmes.

Although attempts are made to justify the policy of increasing military budgets by referring to the need for national security and defence, weapons of the nuclear age cannot lead to lasting peace and security; they cannot help to strengthen confidence which seems to be a panacea for international problems; and they cannot in any way contribute to the maintenance of stability in the world.

(Mr. Tinca, Romania)

The fact that the problem of military expenditures has become so serious and the urgency with which we must act to end this waste of resources have been highlighted in the debates that have taken place at every session of the General Assembly, or at other governmental, non-governmental and other meetings where matters of international peace and security, disarmament or development are discussed. Recent preparations for the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development have shown that development and the maintenance of security can be achieved only if resolute measures are adopted aimed at disarmament and a reduction in efforts to arm. No doubt that conclusion would have been one of the basic ideas discussed at the aforementioned International Conference - which, unfortunately, it was impossible to hold this year, for well-known reasons.

In the framework of its general position on disarmament problems, and above all on nuclear disarmament, Romania attaches very special importance to the reduction of military budgets. My country's concrete proposals on this subject have been submitted throughout the years to the United Nations, as well as to other bodies and meetings that deal with disarmament issues.

Romania, more than once, decided to freeze or reduce its defence expenditures, and to allocate the resources released in this way to economic and social development.

Deeply convinced of the importance of initiating a dialogue between countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty and those members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in order to put an end to the arms race, to strengthen confidence and to embark upon disarmament, my country has stated that the two military blocs should begin negotiations on the reduction of their arms expenditures. We have also appealed to the Soviet Union and the United States - because those two major Powers are responsible for most of the world's military

(Mr. Tinca, Romania)

expenditures - to undertake negotiations with a view to freezing and reducing their military budgets.

We wish to express our satisfaction that the problem of freezing and reducing military budgets is to be found to a steadily increasing extent in the context of the broad disarmament measures contained in the joint documents adopted in recent years by the countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

Last September Romania once again appealed to the European countries, the United States and Canada to reduce their conventional weapons, troops and military expenditures unilaterally. And in order to give that appeal concrete meaning and to demonstrate its desire to proceed from words to deeds, this year my country decided on a 5 per cent reduction of its arms, armed forces and military expenditures and to consult its people about that reduction by means of a national referendum. My delegation has already had the pleasure of informing the Committee in a previous statement that this referendum will take place on 23 November 1986.

I must on this occasion also emphasize the positive political impact on the situation in Europe of the adoption of unilateral measures for the reduction of arms, armed forces and military expenditures by countries members of the two military blocs. Such measures would reveal a real desire on the part of those countries to make a concrete contribution to confidence-building and the creation of a favourable climate in which to initiate the process of negotiation on real disarmament measures.

Other countries have also made proposals concerning the reduction of military budgets. I am thinking here of the well-known proposals by Sweden which have led to the consideration of complex technical problems involving the negotiation of agreements on the reduction of military budgets and confidence-building. I am thinking also of the unilateral measures on the reduction of military forces,

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expenditures or arms announced by certain States - among them China and Peru - in recent years.

At this session the delegation of the Soviet Union introduced a proposal to establish an international fund for assistance to developing countries, on the basis of the conclusion of agreements for a real reduction in the military expenditures of States. I should also like to emphasize that a large number of States - among them those which account for a major share of the world's military expenditures - recognize that it is in the common interest of the international community to agree on mutually-acceptable reductions of military budgets. We hope that their active participation in the consideration of the problem of the reduction of military expenditures in the United Nations will prove an occasion for them to show their political goodwill which is an essential condition - almost a pre-condition - for overcoming all outstanding difficulties with regard to the initiation of negotiations on the reduction of military budgets.

With a view to overcoming those difficulties, Romania and Sweden have embarked upon a process of identifying and elaborating principles which should guide the future activities of States with regard to a freeze and a reduction of military expenditures and the consideration of the whole series of technical aspects implied by measures for reducing military budgets.

This process has taken place in the Disarmament Commission and successive groups of experts. The purpose of those efforts in both cases has been to bring the positions of countries closer together, to strengthen confidence and to clarify ideas and concepts and, in sum, to facilitate the beginning and development of concrete negotiations on the reduction of military expenditures.

In the course of this year the Disarmament Commission reached a very advanced stage in the elaboration of those principles. There is practically general agreement on all the principles, except one on which alternative proposals have been submitted by various States.

(Mr. Tinca, Romania)

These principles reflect agreement among States on fundamental questions relating to the reduction of military expenditures. They are contained in the report of the Disarmament Commission (A/41/42, pp. 7-10) and I think there is no point in submitting the details here, as I have already done so at previous meetings of our Committee.

Perhaps we should, however, emphasize that these principles embody the understanding of States that agreements on the reduction of military budgets should facilitate a real reduction in the military forces and armaments of the States parties and should be concluded as soon as possible; that, pending the conclusion of these agreements, all States, and particularly those that are most heavily armed, should endeavour to reduce their military expenditures; that the reduction of military expenditures should take place gradually, based on acceptable verification by all, so that no State or group of States may achieve an advantage over others and so that the right of all States to undiminished security and sovereignty and to the adoption of necessary measures of self-defence should in no way be impaired.

These principles also state that the human and material resources which would be thus released by the reduction of military expenditures should be reallocated to economic and social development and especially to that of the developing countries.

Two other very important principles on which a consensus was reached this year have to do with the matter of the verification of agreements reached on the reduction of military budgets and with the very special responsibility borne by nuclear States, which have the greatest military arsenals and the largest military expenditures for beginning the process of negotiation on the reduction of military budgets.

I would like to say that the agreement reached on the wording of these two principles represents considerable progress in the task of finalizing this set of

(Mr. Tinca, Romania)

principles entrusted to the Disarmament Commission by the General Assembly. It also constitutes a positive development of certain parts of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Unfortunately, the Disarmament Commission was unable to agree, at its last session, on the only principle still outstanding: that relating to the problem of the publication and comparability of data on the military budgets of States, which would have made it possible to adopt the set of principles as a whole.

The proposals submitted by various delegations on this matter essentially reflect two approaches: one is that transparency (that is, the publication of even insufficient data) and comparability should be accepted before negotiations begin; the other emphasizes that the publication of data or exchanges of information on military budgets should take place during the negotiations and that such data or exchanges should be confined to the purposes of the agreements. It is also maintained, according to the latter approach, that excessive requests for information not related to the purpose of the negotiations, as well as making the agreements conditional upon such demands, could be prejudicial and should be avoided.

Proposals have also been made in an attempt to bring these two approaches closer together. On the basis of these proposals, my delegation has, at this session of our Committee, tried to initiate consultations with a view to reaching a consensus on the formulation of this single outstanding principle.

Our preliminary discussions with the delegations directly concerned have shown that the required conditions do not yet exist for the parties to make the mutual concessions necessary for a consensus.

My delegation believes that agreement on the outstanding principle could be achieved in the near future however, in the context of broader positive developments in the sphere of disarmament.

(Mr. Tinca, Romania)

This is the basic idea contained in draft resolution A/C.1/41/37 which has been submitted by my delegation and which it is my pleasure to introduce at this time.

This draft resolution in general reproduces the basic ideas and the paragraphs contained in resolutions already adopted by consensus by the General Assembly at previous sessions on the reduction of military budgets.

We express the deep concern of States about the arms race and growing military expenditures, which constitute a heavy burden for the economies of all nations as well as our conviction that the freezing and reduction of military budgets would have favourable consequences on the world economic and financial situation.

The draft resolution recalls previous resolutions of the General Assembly which have stressed the need to give new impetus to the endeavours to achieve agreements to freeze and reduce military budgets, as well as the work of the Commission on Disarmament on the identification and elaboration of the principles which should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military expenditures, the fundamental objective of which remains the wish to harmonize the views of States and to create the necessary confidence.

After having taken note of the fact that in 1986 the Commission on Disarmament finalized the set of principles except one on which various alternatives were proposed by Member States, the draft recommends the principles in their present state to States so that they might consider them in the context of new developments and new initiatives on the freezing and reduction of military budgets.

All States, and in particular the most heavily armed States, are urged to reinforce their readiness to co-operate in a constructive manner with a view to promoting practical measures on freezing and reduction of military expenditures.

(Mr. Tinca, Romania)

The draft requests that the item "Reduction of military budgets" should be included in the provisional agenda of the forty-second session of the General Assembly.

The basic idea of the draft resolution is in keeping with the consensus recommendation contained in the report of the Commission on Disarmament. The resolution we are proposing is aimed at a resumption of attempts to reach a consensus text on the single outstanding principle at the next session of the General Assembly, and fully reflects the agreement which exists in the Commission on Disarmament according to which the principles will be adopted - and I stress "adopted" - only as a complete set.

We do not think that continuation of the consideration of these principles at the next session of the Commission on Disarmament - since this in practice would mean negotiating the wording of a single principle in a working group - would be in accordance with repeated requests for rationalizing the activity of the United Nations and husbanding the Organization's already limited resources.

As I have already stated, the necessary conditions have not yet been satisfied to permit mutual concessions with a view to achieving a consensus on the wording of the principle in question, and it is our view that this situation will not change in the few months remaining before the next session of the Commission on Disarmament.

We therefore call for a brief interruption in the consideration of the problem by the Commission on Disarmament, which in no way means that efforts aimed at an agreement on the outstanding principle will cease. These efforts will be resumed at the next session of the General Assembly in conditions which, we hope, will be better.

It is our hope that the draft resolution which I have just introduced will have the necessary support so that it can be adopted without a vote.

(Mr. Tinca, Romania)

Those are the views my delegation wanted to express here on agenda item 58. We cannot conclude without stressing once again my country's special concern regarding the abnormal race in weapons expenditures and its continued interest in the adoption of real, even unilateral, measures on the freezing and reduction of military budgets.

It is our very strong conviction that halting the waste of human and material resources in the irrational and historically mistaken process of arms production is a sure way of strengthening the security of States and confidence. Above all, it would be a practical way to alleviate the economic and financial difficulties that all countries, developed and developing alike, face in one way or another.

Mr. TOMASZEWSKI (Poland): The delegation of Poland wishes to make some comments on one of the items on the Committee's agenda, namely "Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures: report of the Disarmament Commission".

Confidence-building measures have a particular role in international relations. Their primary function is the creation of conditions to strengthen peace and to facilitate disarmament. Such measures, in both their global and their regional dimensions, should also help in eliminating apprehensions due to threats resulting from the military activities of States. Their significance becomes more important in situations of growing international tensions.

Confidence constitutes an important element in co-operation among States while they solve their common international problems. That is why the problem of confidence-building measures is discussed in the United Nations and in other international forums. The role of the United Nations in this field has been stressed in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and in numerous resolutions adopted at regular sessions of the General Assembly. A separate study on confidence-building measures was also

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prepared in 1981 by a group of governmental experts appointed by the Secretary-General. This year the Disarmament Commission has produced a document entitled "Draft guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level".

Of great importance for the future confidence-building measures was the Final Document adopted at the Stockholm Conference on 22 September 1986. Poland, one of the initiators of this Conference, having taken an active part in the elaboration of that document, has welcomed its adoption with particular satisfaction, considering it proof of existing possibilities in reaching agreements involving States members of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and European neutral and non-aligned States on such a delicate subject as the reciprocal exchange of information on military activities and the introduction of means of verification of that information. It constitutes an important step towards a more secure Europe. It may facilitate, in an essential manner, further efforts concerning the reduction of military forces and armaments leading to the curbing of the arms race and the starting of disarmament, particularly at the Vienna Conference, which is just about to start.

Besides efforts in the building of confidence in the military sphere, we in Poland are doing our best to build that confidence in the political sphere as well - and not only in our bilateral relations, in which we attach particular importance to regular consultations on different political levels, but also beyond them. A good example of that is our recent regular consultations among the parliamentary groups of the Polish United Workers Party and the Socialist Democratic Party of the Federal Republic of Germany. In those consultations confidence-building measures take a prominent place.

Having learned from its own recent experience, Poland also attaches particular significance to confidence-building measures in international economic relations. The main goal of those confidence-building measures proposed a few years ago by my

(Mr. Tomaszewski, Poland)

country is to protect international economic relations from the disruptive effects of political tensions and to counteract the threat of those relations shrinking on account of fear of excessive dependence on foreign trade making a country vulnerable to pressures of a political nature.

Finally I should like to stress that, however significant they may be for better understanding and co-operation among States, confidence-building measures cannot replace effective disarmament steps. That is why, together with undertaking effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security, we should aim at equally effective and concrete disarmament.

Mr. THOMPSON-FLORES (Brazil): First of all my delegation wishes to congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of this Committee. I am confident we shall all benefit from your able and skilful guidance. Let me also extend our greetings to the other elected officers of the Committee who will be assisting you in your endeavours. At the same time our thanks go to Ambassador Ali Alatas of Indonesia for the productive work accomplished last year under his chairmanship.

I wish on behalf of my Government to express to the people of Mozambique, through their delegation, our deepest sorrow and condolences on the tragic disappearance of President Samora Machel and other government officials, among whom was the former Permanent Representative to the United Nations, our good friend José Carlos Lobo. President Samora Machel shall always be remembered and praised for his outstanding role both in the struggle that led to the independence of his country and in the historic fight against colonialism and racism.

This year has witnessed some dramatic movements in the field of disarmament and international security. Paramount among them, of course, was the recent summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev.

(Mr. Thompson-Flores, Brazil)

Brazil, as is assuredly the case with the majority of countries, attaches great importance to meetings of the leaders of the two major Powers of the world. The crucial question of disarmament and international security still depends to a large extent on their deliberations and negotiations.

(Mr. Thompson-Flores, Brazil)

We welcomed last year's resumption of bilateral talks by the super-Powers not only because it symbolized their recognition of the fact that they have a special responsibility with regard to disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament, but also because in their joint communiqués of January and November of last year there was a clear commitment on the one hand to terminating the nuclear-arms race on Earth and preventing one in space and, on the other hand, to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.

The fact that it was not possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to reach concrete agreements on these issues at Reykjavik only highlights the need for more concerted action by the whole of the international community so that new momentum can be generated collectively towards the attainment of progress in a vital area that concerns all States and peoples of the world.

Only by strengthening our common resolve will we be able to persuade the more powerful amongst us to shape their decisions and policies in a manner consistent with the higher interests of humankind.

The leaders of both the United States and the Soviet Union seemed in their meeting at Reykjavik to have come very close to agreeing on the elimination of all offensive strategic forces.

The unrelenting collective urgings and admonitions that have been addressed in this Organization and in other appropriate disarmament forums to the super-Powers have certainly played an important part in bringing about these encouraging developments. My delegation hopes that the new global awareness that appears to be taking shape concerning those vital issues will assert itself more incisively in the future so that disarmament will not continue to be a term expressing good intentions but will instead be converted into a serious, practical exercise with meaningful results, whether on a bilateral or a multilateral scale.

(Mr. Thompson-Flores, Brazil)

It goes without saying that this is not an easy task. There are still ominous trends prevailing at the moment. The nuclear-arms race, despite all our hopes, efforts and actions for its early reversal, threatens to become even fiercer than before and to invade new environments in the process. Hotbeds of tension and conflict abound. Regional situations offer a pretext for the reaffirmation of vertical patterns of hegemony, together with its corollary, which is the worsening of East-West bloc confrontation. The economic and financial plight in which developing countries find themselves is made all the harsher by the net transfer of resources to which they have been subjected due to an extremely unfair international economic framework and by the diversion of ever larger sums and resources - human, financial and material - to the already huge arsenals of the major military Powers. A widening gap of opportunities is thus perpetuated between the mighty and the dispossessed, thus creating another powerful source of frustration and conflict.

All is not lost, however. At the beginning of my statement I referred to dramatic developments in the field of disarmament which took place in 1986. Apart from the seemingly positive signs originating at the Reykjavik summit between the two super-Powers, one should acknowledge the breakthrough that developed at Stockholm with the successful outcome of the Conference on Security and Confidence Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

The agreement reached at Stockholm, the first of its kind in a very considerable number of years, between nations of the two major military blocs constitutes undeniable proof that where the political will exists multilateral negotiations and the conclusion of measures and agreements on disarmament are feasible, however difficult and arduous the process may seem at first. Moreover,

(Mr. Thompson-Flores, Brazil)

besides paving the way for more important steps to be taken in the future in Europe, the Stockholm accord has definitely encouraged disarmament efforts on a wider scale involving the whole community of nations.

Together with other important events, such as the second Review Conference of the Convention on biological weapons, the Stockholm Conference should inspire us in our quest for urgent progress in the sphere of disarmament and international security.

In the message that President José Sarney addressed to the Conference on Disarmament last April, he firmly expressed the Brazilian Government's solemn commitment to the multilateral efforts for disarmament being conducted in that forum as well as in the United Nations itself. That message was reiterated in the General Assembly on 22 September last, when the Minister of External Relations of Brazil, Mr. Roberto de Abreu Sodré, said in his statement that

"strengthening the United Nations is the best way to guarantee international peace and security". (A/41/PV.4, p. 56)

President Sarney and Mr. Sodré were giving expression to one of my country's central concerns: the realization, first, that disarmament measures and agreements, particularly in the nuclear field, are one of the highest priorities of our times and, secondly, that the process of disarmament must be an endeavour involving all nations large and small, rich and poor.

There is today a consensus that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind in all its history. For the first time ever, mankind's own survival is at stake. Only a fraction of existing nuclear weapons would, if resorted to, wipe civilization off the face of the earth.

(Mr. Thompson-Flores, Brazil)

While, objectively, scientists and statesmen alike realize the unprecedented power of destruction of nuclear weapons, the few States possessing such weapons have not hesitated to build up their nuclear arsenals, thereby increasing many times the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war, either by accident or by deliberate escalation.

The security of all nations is in jeopardy because of the continuous accumulation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, by a powerful few which predicate their own security on the threat posed by those weapons. The incongruous situation of collective security being thus endangered by such unilateral concepts of individually or group-inspired security must come to an end in a era which has been characterized by all as one of interdependence.

It will be remembered that in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament the nuclear-weapon Powers recognized the special responsibility they bear in the crucial questions of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, and international security. My delegation feels that one of our most important tasks in this Committee is to make sure that those issues remain in the forefront of our concerns and that the primary responsibility of the nuclear-weapon Powers in the field of disarmament are once more emphasized.

Accordingly, my delegation will guide its attitude and action during this session by focusing attention first and foremost on the priority issues of the disarmament agenda, namely the prevention of nuclear war, the halting of the nuclear-weapons race, nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Thompson-Flores, Brazil)

By the same token, the Brazilian delegation shall not support any attempts to condone and justify, under pretext of promoting the prevention of war, the attitudes and concepts that have been responsible for the worsening of the nuclear-arms race and for the increase of the danger of nuclear war.

Nor shall we support shifting the emphasis from nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war to collateral problems. The Brazilian delegation considers that such a diversion of concerns runs counter to the need to concentrate the best of our endeavours on the highest of priorities and is likely to weaken our common resolve, as expressed in the Final Document, to search for concrete solutions to those priorities.

There is no substitute for a most vigorous collective effort to limit, reduce and eventually do away with nuclear weapons. Removing the threat of nuclear war is, as consensually stated in the Final Document, the most acute and urgent task of the present day. We can only prevent that threat from becoming reality by removing its very source - the nuclear weapons that today far exceed any rational defence requirement and that would, even if used in small numbers, put an end to civilization.

Brazil considers it is high time to make progress in this area. What is required is a political decision on the part of the major Powers to engage in meaningful negotiations with the necessary goodwill and flexibility.

My Government advocates the early multilateral conclusion of an agreement banning all test explosions of nuclear weapons. It would be, in our view, the first practical step towards halting the nuclear-arms race, for it would stem the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and hinder the development of new types of such weapons, hopefully rendering existing stocks obsolete and discouraging their renewal. Above all, a nuclear-weapon-test ban would have a symbolic value,

(Mr. Thompson-Flores, Brazil)

as a firm commitment on the part of States possessing such arms to start taking concrete measures towards the fulfilment of disarmament goals as defined in the Final Document, which remains the most authoritative document of its kind ever endorsed by the international community.

Interim unilateral measures of restraint are welcome in this regard. However, our emphasis has always been on efforts for the conclusion of an international instrument prohibiting all nuclear-weapon test explosions. Brazil firmly supports the establishment of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament mandated fully to negotiate a nuclear-test-ban treaty, and hopes that those attitudes which in the past have prevented the ad hoc committee from being set up no longer prevail.

In the last few years, another item on our agenda has gained much prominence. I am referring to the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Additional strategic weapons, whether offensive or defensive, will increase no one's security, not even that of those who possess them. If current trends in this area are not stopped and reversed, we may be faced with an unbridled race for strategic supremacy, which, of course, would entail enormous increases in the already huge arsenals in the possession of the super-Powers. In the end, we would have more, not fewer, nuclear weapons, besides opening a whole new field in the arms race, one which until now had been reserved for more useful, scientific, technological and cultural endeavours.

The General Assembly has expressed, in unequivocal terms, the will of the international community to prevent the arms race from spilling over into outer space, and to reserve space for peaceful purposes. The re-establishment in 1986 of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space in the Conference on Disarmament is to be viewed in this context as a most encouraging development. Brazil will continue to

(Mr. Thompson-Flores, Brazil)

lend its full support to initiatives which interpret the overwhelming sentiment of the community of nations, such as resolution 40/87 of last year.

One area in which we have reason to believe the way is now open for meaningful progress in the multilateral efforts for disarmament is the prohibition of chemical weapons. This is a most welcome development, for the conclusion of a convention banning those weapons and providing for the destruction of existing stocks would not only constitute a concrete measure of disarmament, but also address one of the most urgent of such measures as expressed by the Final Document.

Brazil shall therefore continue to participate actively in the negotiations that are being pursued in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

My delegation would like to add two words of caution in this connection: first, the negotiations under way on the chemical weapons prohibition should in no way constitute a hindrance to the development of the peaceful civil chemical industry of any State; and, second, Brazil will not condone any attempts to institute, as in the case of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, partial measures applicable only to regions or countries not possessing chemical weapons. In our view, such a proposal would actually result in the delay, or even in the halt, in the multilateral process already under way, besides being unacceptably discriminatory.

Many delegations have expressed concern over the proliferation of resolutions and the resulting dispersion of efforts in the First Committee. They have also stressed the need for a rationalization of methods and for a better organization of work in this Committee. I wish to recall, in this connection, the proposals contained in document A/C.1/39/9, presented by the Chairman of the First Committee in 1984. They constitute a positive step towards solving those problems.

(Mr. Thompson-Flores, Brazil)

Almost a decade after the definition by consensus of the priority tasks of disarmament, we find ourselves almost at the starting-point, with a difference that, today, new armaments and new scenarios for their deployment and use may further worsen an international situation which can only be regarded as already too dangerous.

Brazil feels that, given the circumstances, it is more than ever incumbent upon those countries which are not directly involved in the East-West power struggle and do not accept the existing international situation in the field of security resolutely to advance their own contribution for a better world.

Based on those premises, Brazil took an initiative which is intended precisely to improve the prospects for peace, security and development in a large area of the world encompassing countries of two continents which are united in their common resolve to overcome the obstacles that have prevented them from fully applying their potential for peace, development and well-being.

The creation of the Zone of Peace and Co-operation in the South Atlantic, as approved by the plenary of the General Assembly a few days ago, in the words of our Minister of External Relations, must be considered

"... as a concrete measure in a vast programme which the community of nations has itself defined as being of the highest priority: the conversion of irrational impulses towards confrontation into constructive work of international peaceful co-operation". (A/41/PV.4, p. 58)

Mr. AGSTNER (Austria): Today, my delegation would like to elaborate on agenda items 62 (g), (l) and (f), Study on Deterrence, United Nations disarmament studies and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

You will not find the word "deterrence" in any nineteenth century dictionary of politics and diplomacy. The consultation of dictionaries and encyclopedias of the first half of our century leads to no result. Although the Romans already followed the policy of Si vis pacem para bellum - that is, "If you want peace, prepare for war" - the word "deterrence" is only a recent addition to political and diplomatic language. It is no coincidence that the word "deterrence" comes from the same root as "terror," already indicating the essence of today's political-military strategies. That "détente" should be followed by the word "deterrence" in most dictionaries is rather coincidental and should not lead to wrong conclusions.

In principle, deterrence is nothing new. It has existed through the ages. In the nuclear age, however, deterrence has led to a balance of terror and the ultimate concept of "mutual assured destruction," known by its appropriate acronym, MAD.

It was not until the end of the last century that alternatives to the concept of deterrence were developed. In 1919 the Covenant of the League of Nations set up a system of international security. The system was imperfect and did not manage to bring an end to a strategy that had served well over the centuries. The Charter of the United Nations stipulated a system of collective security and, at the same time, provided in its Article 51 for the survival of the concept of deterrence. Had all States, from the very outset, adhered to all provisions of the United Nations Charter, and in particular Article 2, paragraph 4, one could have expected a gradual erosion of deterrence.

Before commenting on the highly interesting Study on deterrence, let me recall here what the countries members of the Non-Aligned Movement had to say on the issue

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of nuclear deterrence in paragraph 33 of the Political Declaration issued following the Harare summit meeting. That paragraph reads:

"The idea that world peace can be maintained through nuclear deterrence, a doctrine that lies at the root of the continuing escalation in the quantity and quality of nuclear weapons and which has, in fact, led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations than ever before, is the most dangerous myth in existence." (A/41/697, p. 24)

My delegation believes that statement to be an over simplification, criticizing as it does only one aspect of deterrence while remaining silent on why nations came to rely on nuclear deterrence and the relation of nuclear deterrence to deterrence by conventional weapons. We should bear in mind that 80 per cent of all arms expenditure is on conventional weapons. Let us not overlook the fact that non-aligned countries, including those that criticize the concept of deterrence and that have initiated the study we now have before us, follow the same strategies of deterrence they condemn.

Austria, as is well known, is situated in Central Europe and bordered by States members of the two most powerful military alliances. Austria, as a permanently neutral country, cannot ignore those geostrategic realities. Article 1 of its Federal Constitutional Law of 26 October 1955 stipulates:

"1. For the purpose of the permanent maintenance of its external independence and for the purpose of the inviolability of its territory, Austria of its own free will declares herewith its permanent neutrality which it is resolved to maintain and defend with all the means at its disposal.

"In order to secure those purposes Austria will never in the future succeed to any military alliance nor permit the establishment of military bases of foreign States on its territory."

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As a consequence, the Federal Constitution was amended to include an Article 9 (a), which stipulates:

"Austria subscribes to universal national defence. Its task is to preserve the Federal territory's outside independence as well as its inviolability and its unity, especially as regards the maintenance and defence of permanent neutrality."

I have taken the liberty of elaborating on our Constitution, not to make my statement a little longer, but to give delegations the legal basis for my country's being bound to subscribe to a policy of conventional deterrence.

In his statement the representative of Singapore referred to Switzerland and cited it as

"an interesting example of a well-armed nation which has yet managed to live in peace with its neighbours, thus proving that it is the intention behind the arms that is most important." (A/C.1/41/PV.8, p. 11)

We can but subscribe to that statement.

My delegation believes that deterrence cannot be approached in isolation but that it must be considered in the context of the overall balance and composition of forces, as well as in that of the political situation in any given region. What little might suffice as a deterrent in one part of our globe could be an open invitation to aggression in another.

We are aware that many do not view deterrence in isolation, but create a relationship between the funds spent on deterrence and the savings that could be realized by disarmament. The question, thus, is seen in a three-dimensional manner: deterrence, disarmament and development. That approach contributes to the view that large-scale savings are to be expected as a result, in the first place, of nuclear disarmament.

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I should now like to turn to the Study on Deterrence, A/41/432. My Government appreciates the fact that the Group of Governmental Experts established in accordance with decision 39/423 included representatives of various regions of the world, thus reflecting the views of different military alliances and non-aligned positions. We believe that the Experts thoroughly studied the problem of deterrence and its implications for disarmament and the arms race, negotiated arms reductions and international security. We welcome the fact that the Group of Governmental Experts did not try to seek consensus on such a delicate issue but chose a format that differs from all previous disarmament studies undertaken. Such a method was indeed more appropriate to an in-depth view of the subject of deterrence. Rather than agreeing on the lowest common denominator and submitting a hollow paper, the Experts came up with a report which reflects the various views on deterrence.

As the study makes clear in its treatment of the subject, deterrence is not a negotiable commodity; it is a concept. One either believes in it or one does not. In its conventional form it is a concept that has been practised for countless ages, and those who continue to practise it are ill placed to award it their condemnation.

It is, however, in its nuclear dimension that deterrence gives rise to the greatest concern. Nuclear deterrence, some say, has provided four decades of uneasy peace on a continent that had earlier witnessed repeated wars and destruction. On the other hand, as the opponents of nuclear deterrence pointed out, the potential threat to human survival that lies behind the possible failure of nuclear deterrence constitutes an unacceptable condition for continued human existence. The study identifies very clearly and in terms that all readers can appreciate the dilemma posed by the sharply divided views of the nuclear deterrence

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concept. The study is therefore a valuable contribution to our understanding of and insight into this highly important issue.

There is a time and a place for everything. The past was a time for deterrence, and the same holds true in the present. Only history will tell whether there will be a place for deterrence in the future. My delegation believes that we will certainly have to live with it in the short term, for better or for worse. In the medium term, we should eliminate nuclear deterrence in order to make our planet a safer place, and my delegation sees promising signs that such a scenario will be implemented. As far as the long term is concerned, I should like to refer to the conclusions of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues and to its conclusions, as contained in the book Common Security - A Blueprint for Survival:

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"A doctrine of common security must replace the present expedient of deterrence through armaments. International peace must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than the threat of mutual destruction."

My country has always taken great interest in United Nations disarmament studies and has participated in a number of them. We have submitted our views on this issue, and they are contained in document A/41/421. We see United Nations studies as a welcome contribution facilitating identification of new areas for disarmament efforts and would have preferred to see the studies promote substantive steps in the field of disarmament. They have so far not had a major impact on disarmament negotiations, but they have played an important role in creating a general awareness of various issues in the multifaceted area of disarmament.

Austria has no preference on the question of how a study should be carried out. We believe, however, that especially in times when the Department for Disarmament Affairs is not exactly spoiled by the horn of plenty it should not only reduce the size of groups of governmental experts but also make more use of its own expertise and the opportunities offered by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Austria welcomed the establishment of UNIDIR because it offers an opportunity for in-depth research to be carried out in restricted areas at less cost and generally with results that are more quickly available.

My delegation suggests that before interested delegations request a study on a given subject they should carefully consider to whom the task should be entrusted, thereby taking into account the cost and time factors. In this respect, Austria encourages the active involvement of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies.

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In conclusion, allow me to express my delegation's view that we consider the publications of the disarmament Department - whether studies, the Disarmament Yearbook, the Disarmament Periodical Review, or others - to be of great interest. We wish that could also be said of other publications being published under the United Nations emblem.

United Nations disarmament studies are of course of different value to various peoples and nations. We could make use of them or approach them with benign neglect. What we hope to see is that one day disarmament studies are no longer needed and that they serve only as a reminder of bygone days. The disarmament studies will have achieved their purpose when our children will turn to them to learn of those days when the community of nations tackled and solved disarmament problems.

Mr. AL-SHAALI (United Arab Emirates) (interpretation from Arabic): Since this is the first time that I have spoken in the First Committee, I take pleasure in congratulating you, Mr. Chairman, on your election.

The first question that comes to mind as we discuss disarmament and the proliferation of nuclear weapons is: What results have been achieved in this field since our last session? Doubtless we all know the answer. At this time last year we were awaiting with impatience the meeting in Geneva between the two leaders of the super-Powers. We have a feeling of frustration and despair following Reykjavik.

While the States of the third world are following great-Power activity in this area, they are profoundly convinced of the close ties between their survival and the implementation of a joint agreement between the two super-Powers on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and an end to the arms race. The expenses

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incurred in the Disarmament sphere lead to nothing good. Military expenditures since the Second World War have consumed an enormous amount of resources, double the military expenditures incurred during period between the two world wars. While military expenditures have reached more than \$800 billion, those expenditures are unequally distributed among the countries of the world. In fact the nuclear-weapon States alone spend more than 80 per cent of total military allocations throughout the world.

The manufacture and stockpiling of weapons merely serve as proof of the inability of the international community to find solutions to the world's political problems. In other words, the arms race is only a symptom of a deeper evil from which international relations suffer at present. As has been stated by Hans Morgenthau, a specialist in international relations and the initiator of the doctrine of the policy of force, man does not wage war because he possesses weapons but rather acquires weapons because they seem to him to be indispensable for his struggle. The result is the arming of the opponent as well. This gives rise to what we call the "arms race".

Therefore the persistence of international and regional crises without a just and equitable solution based on objective considerations affect the world balance of power. Thus the lack of solutions and the escalation of the arms race on the international and regional levels poison relations and heighten tensions between the super-Powers. This inevitably leads to the outbreak of local wars which threaten to spread beyond the borders of those countries. That is why my country has always supported the establishment of non-nuclear zones in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa and South-East Asia. Similarly, my country attaches particular importance to guarantees that must be given to the non-nuclear States against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons against them.

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Here we must take note of the serious situation that has arisen in the Middle East and southern Africa, namely, the acquisition by Israel and South Africa of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles to launch such weapons. The acquisition by those two countries of a nuclear capability is the result of military and technological co-ordination that goes back to the beginning of 1966, the year in which Israel began manufacturing its first atomic bomb. At that time South Africa urged Israel to engage in nuclear testing in South Africa or nearby regions, but Israel preferred to keep a cloak of secrecy over its nuclear programme; however, it continued to collaborate with South Africa in the greatest secrecy. In time the United States of America and the Soviet Union, as well as the entire world, discovered that Israel possessed nuclear weapons. Once that secret was revealed Israel, together with South Africa, did not hesitate to engage in nuclear testing on the African continent.

During Vorster's visit to Israel in April 1976 he once again urged Israel to engage in nuclear testing on the African continent. Israel accepted that offer, since it was no longer able to keep its secret about the acquisition of nuclear weapons and collaboration with South Africa. Additionally, mutual explosions gave mutual advantage: South Africa could gain from Israel's experience in its nuclear programme and Israel could benefit from South African resources that gave it a testing-ground for its weapons and delivery vehicles. That shared nuclear explosion conducted by Israel and South Africa took place at 3 o'clock in the morning of 22 September 1979 near the Prince Edward Islands in the Indian Ocean.

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This nuclear explosion was the subject of an inquiry and the agents of the secret military services of the United States Department of the Navy and the CIA submitted a secret and confidential report to the National Security Council on 20 June 1980 dealing with this explosion, which in fact did take place and was the result of collaboration between Israel and South Africa.

Thus, Israel bears full responsibility before the international community for its activities in the Middle East and for the nuclear blackmail in which it engaged by introducing nuclear weapons into a region the countries of which wished to declare nuclear-free.

My country shares the conviction that there is a close relationship between disarmament and development. Enormous military expenditures on weapons and the arms race form the major obstacle impeding the use of human resources to raise living standards and contributing to the economic development of the developing countries. The countries of the third world are endangering their economic and social structure in order to cope with the demands of defence, despite the fact that they badly need those resources to carry out their own development projects. Available statistics demonstrate that those military expenditures have increased the debt of the developing countries by 20 per cent.

My country, as a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and as a coastal country on that Ocean, is deeply concerned by the obstacles encountered in holding the international conference designed to implement the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. These difficulties are due to the lack of consensus and to the lack of political will, as well as to the purely formal pretext put forward at a time when military presence is being increased in the Indian Ocean and contrary to the Declaration.

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Darwin has taught us that those beings that do not adapt to changes in the environment are threatened with extinction. Given the destructive arms which now exist in the world, we find ourselves faced with two choices: either we must adapt to the environment by eliminating those means which threaten us with destruction or we must give free rein to policies threatening civilization with extermination.

We must therefore have confidence in ourselves and in our capability to control our own inventions and, with all due sincerity, loyalty and rigour, we must continue to choose the path of freedom and survival.

Mr. HADDAWI (Iraq): In his right of reply during the Committee's 28th meeting on 31 October, a member of my delegation incorrectly stated - and I quote from page 88 of A/C.1/41/PV.28:

"Moreover, the Argentine aircraft crash two years ago" - I repeat "two years ago" - "on Soviet territory - an aircraft that was engaged in the transport of weapons from Israel to Iran - irrefutably revealed the existence of an arms link between the two régimes."

My delegation therefore requests a corrigendum to that record stating that during 1981 - not two years ago - an Argentine aircraft transporting arms and military equipment from Israel to Iran crashed over an area in the Soviet Union. The correction should be to the effect that this particular incident took place five, not two, years ago.

The CHAIRMAN: In this connection I should like to draw the attention of the representative of Iraq to the footnote on page 1 of the verbatim record of the 28th meeting of the First Committee, which reads as follows:

"This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned within one week of the date of publication to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record."

(The Chairman)

I would kindly ask the representative of Iraq to act accordingly.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to express my gratitude to Ambassador Haddawi for the correction he has just made. It is very important to my delegation that there should be no doubt as to the peace-loving work of the Constitutional Government of Argentina.

The CHAIRMAN: Before adjourning the meeting I would like to inform members that the following delegations are included in the list of speakers for this afternoon's meeting: the Federal Republic of Germany, Bulgaria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Kenya, Viet Nam, China, Pakistan, Burundi and Nigeria.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.