



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 22nd MEETING

Chairman: Mr. AOKI (Acting Chairman) (Japan)

CONTENTS

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Statements were made by:

Mr. Butler (Australia)
Mr. Agstner (Austria)
Mr. Gemucio Granier (Bolivia)
Mr. Meiszter (Hungary)
Mr. Mohid-Ud-Din (Pakistan)
Mr. Rana (Nepal)
Mr. Cromartie (United Kingdom)

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

*This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned within one week of the date of publication to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-756, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee.

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 46 TO 65 AND 144 (continued)

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

The CHAIRMAN: The first speaker on my list for this afternoon's meeting is the representative of Australia to the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. Richard Butler, who will speak in his capacity as the Acting Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia) Acting Chairman, Disarmament Commission: The 1986 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission was chaired by the then Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Henning Wegener.

Ambassador Wegener did a remarkable job and this has been widely recognized. He certainly deserves on this occasion repetition of the many expressions of gratitude made at the conclusion of the work of the 1986 session of that Commission, and on behalf of all of us here I repeat those expressions of gratitude.

As Mr. Wegener has moved on to another appointment it has fallen to me to accept the job of Acting Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and it is in that capacity that I have the honour to introduce today the report of the Commission in document A/41/42.

As in the previous sessions the report consists of four chapters and annexes. They record the result of the Commission's deliberations on various disarmament subjects under the agenda of the 1986 substantive session.

In particular, chapter IV contains conclusions and recommendations which reflect the work of the Commission this year.

The 1986 substantive session was organized in accordance with the mandate of the Disarmament Commission as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, which was the first special

(Mr. Butler, Acting Chairman,
Disarmament Commission)

session devoted to disarmament, as well as the guidelines set by the thirty-seventh and fortieth sessions of the General Assembly in resolutions 37/78 H and 40/152 F, in which the Commission was requested to direct its attention, at each substantive session, to specific subjects and to make concrete recommendations on such subjects to the subsequent session of the General Assembly.

Following arduous deliberations during its 1986 substantive session, the specific recommendations made by the Commission to the forty-first session of the General Assembly were adopted by consensus, as noted in paragraph 26 of the report.

Those recommendations were either adopted by each of the three working groups and a contact group or by the informal drafting groups, which took charge of the respective substantive items of the agenda.

(Mr. Butler, Acting Chairman,
Disarmament Commission)

I should like to turn briefly to some specific issues. In this respect the Commission was able to conclude the item on guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional basis. In addition, substantive progress was also made on the item concerning reduction of military budgets. I hope that it will be finalized at the current session of the General Assembly.

On another question, that of the nuclear capability of South Africa, it was a matter of considerable concern that the Commission failed to bring that issue to a conclusion. Many delegations made the point that this issue was one of extreme concern and that it should be within the grasp of the United Nations to solve. It is certainly hoped that this subject will be brought to a conclusion at the 1987 session of the Disarmament Commission.

As a number of members of the Commission pointed out, the Commission should limit the number of items on its agenda so as to be able to make a maximum effort on those items.

With respect to the organization of work of the Commission in 1986, it was regrettable that there were some procedural and organizational difficulties. I think we all hope that the experience of this year in that regard will not be repeated in the future. Nevertheless it should be noted that despite the difficulties the Commission encountered in organizing its programme of work and subsidiary bodies, the Commission was able to arrange the limited time available to it in a balanced manner for all subsidiary bodies.

Finally, I wish to express my gratitude and that of the Chairman of the Commission to all delegations, and particularly to the officers of the Commission and the chairmen of the various working groups, for their invaluable co-operation

(Mr. Butler, Acting Chairman,
Disarmament Commission)

and assistance in fulfilling the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly and for the conclusion of the Commission's 1986 session.

I should also express gratitude for the assistance provided by the Secretariat during the 1986 session.

I conclude by commending to the Committee the report of the Commission.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure that the kind words which Mr. Butler expressed to Mr. Wegener, on his outstanding chairmanship of the last session of the Disarmament Commission, are echoed by all of us who were fortunate enough to take part in that session. I would ask the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to convey this expression of our appreciation to Mr. Wegener.

Mr. AGSTNER (Austria):

"During the course of this debate the Austrian delegation has been confirmed in its conviction that it must be the task of the present Assembly to spare no efforts in order to create the necessary conditions for a discontinuation of nuclear-weapon tests. Such a discontinuation - and let here be no doubt about it - can however only be achieved by agreement between the nuclear Powers themselves."

I have taken the liberty of beginning my delegation's statement by quoting from what the Austrian representative in the First Committee said on this subject during the thirteenth session of the General Assembly in 1958.

Since 1945 the world has witnessed nearly 1,500 explosions of nuclear devices for testing purposes, one third in the atmosphere and the rest underground. My delegation has no intention of painting nuclear testing in black and white colours only. We are aware of the contribution that nuclear deterrence has made, for better or worse, to the maintenance of international peace and security. We note

(Mr. Agstner, Austria)

that the development of new, more reliable and safer nuclear warheads has had certain merits as it has led, at least on one side, to a significant reduction in their overall number and yield. Recent proposals by the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States and the basic agreement reached in Reykjavik on a drastic reduction of nuclear weaponry and an understanding on the ultimate elimination of that type of weapon, lead us to believe, however, that we should consider bringing an end to the testing of nuclear weapons.

The call for a halt to nuclear explosions is not a new one. The issue has figured as a separate item on our agenda since 1957. We have so far adopted about 55 resolutions calling for an end to nuclear-weapon testing and we shall certainly add some more during the present session.

What has been achieved is the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. So far, the parties have not been successful in achieving

"the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances ..."

(ENDC/100/Rev.1)

In 1968 the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalled

"the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end ..."

(General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII))

(Mr. Agstner, Austria)

The Treaty stipulated in article VI that

"Each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament ..." (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex, art. VI)

In 1974 the United States and the Soviet Union concluded a Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear-Weapon Tests - the so-called threshold test-ban treaty - limiting nuclear-weapon tests to those of 150 kilotons. Two years later they concluded a treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Both of those treaties still await ratification. One has heard in this room that ratification by the United States is contingent upon adequate verification and on follow-up negotiations for further testing limitations, in association with nuclear-weapon reductions. As a considerable measure of agreement was achieved in Reykjavik on the question of ratification of the two treaties, my delegation expresses the hope that both super-Powers will find a way which will finally allow for the entry into force of both treaties. That should not, however, absolve them from actively seeking a total ban on nuclear-test explosions as soon as possible.

The past months have seen interesting events. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have come up with bold, innovative proposals aimed at a drastic reduction in the number of nuclear weapons. The leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in Reykjavik that their ultimate goal would be the total elimination of nuclear weapons. For the first time in many years we see over the horizon the dawn of a new age, a nuclear-weapon-free era which could mark the beginning of the third millennium. While in no way claiming that the total elimination of nuclear weapons would bring back the golden age of mankind, we would welcome the elimination of nuclear weapons, which would have to be accompanied by deep cuts in conventional weaponry.

(Mr. Agstner, Austria)

As the total elimination of nuclear weapons now seems to be a possibility - albeit a distant one - my Government can see no need for further nuclear-weapon testing to be continued.

The Soviet Union has already responded to the call for an end to nuclear testing when it announced, on the fortieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima, a moratorium, which has so far been extended four times, to continue until 1 January 1987. Although in our view a moratorium cannot replace a comprehensive test-ban treaty, it does constitute a step in that direction. One way to achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be the extension of the unilateral moratorium into a bilateral Soviet-United States moratorium, to be followed at a later stage by a multilateral moratorium, to include all nuclear-weapon States. That would give those States sufficient time to agree on the provisions of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

(Mr. Aqstner, Austria)

The Austrian Government shares the views expressed in the Political Declaration of the non-aligned summit in Harare, that:

"A ban on all nuclear-weapon tests would de-escalate the nuclear-arms race and greatly reduce the risk of nuclear war. The continuance of nuclear-weapon testing fuels the nuclear arms race and increases the danger of nuclear war. In this regard, ... the Heads of State or Government emphasized the pressing need to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive multilateral nuclear-test-ban treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests by all States in all environments for all time."

Several delegations have suggested here that the proposals to reduce and end nuclear testing should be linked to early results in the bilateral arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. One proposal called for both super-Powers to reduce their testing to a minimum and proceed to the exchange of information and the opening of testing sites to inspection. An international seismic detection system would be activated, which would create the necessary confidence in verification, which in turn could in the long run lead to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Although we realize that everything is linked somehow in our complex world, we have serious misgivings about linkages. In our view, a linkage between progress in the reduction of existing nuclear-weapon stocks and a ban on the testing of new nuclear-weapons systems cannot be justified. My delegation also cannot support proposals based on the concept that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is only a long-term goal.

While acknowledging the problems involved and the concerns advanced by some nuclear-weapon States, we must not ignore one fact: in 1955 efforts to negotiate an international agreement to end nuclear tests began in the Sub-Committee of Five

(Mr. Agstner, Austria)

of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. During those negotiations the negotiating Powers refrained from testing for a period of three years. The ultimate result was the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, which was negotiated within 10 days in 1967. It took eight years to arrive at a Treaty banning those tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. It should not have taken us 23 years not to agree on a treaty banning tests in the only sphere that remains. With all the expertise gained since that Treaty came into force, it is unacceptable that a comprehensive test-ban treaty should be referred to as a long-term goal; nor do we see any reason why a moratorium by the nuclear-weapon States could not come into effect immediately.

My delegation is aware that verification constitutes an essential element of any treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons. We believe, however, that a solution to this problem can be found and would like to recall that the Conference of Experts which met in Geneva in the summer of 1958 to study the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests unanimously concluded that it was technically feasible to establish an effective control system that could detect and identify nuclear explosions, including low-yield explosions of from 1 to 5 kilotons.

Twenty years later, and taking into account the technological progress, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events recommended the establishment of a global network of 50 seismological stations and the carrying out of a practical exercise to test the proposed network. That was eight years ago, and in the meantime scientists have not been idle. My delegation believes that the establishment of a reliable verification system should be possible, as the attainment of 100 per cent certainty will remain an illusory goal.

(Mr. Agstner, Austria)

Although the Conference on Disarmament has so far not been able to agree on a nuclear-test ban and has yet again failed to establish an ad hoc working group under this item, it does have a role in carrying out practical work. In this regard, we note that the role of the Group of seismic experts will be further increased when it carries out work related to transmission of level II wave form data.

We should not overlook the fact that even the most elaborate verification system will be unable to replace the essential pre-condition of the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty - that is, trust between the parties to a treaty. In the case of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which is closely related to nuclear disarmament, trust between the two super-Powers will be essential. It is our belief, that we will see in the near future arms-reduction agreements on the lines of the agreement reached in Reykjavik, substantially reducing the number of nuclear weapons. Any treaty on the reduction of the number of nuclear-weapons systems should be followed immediately by an end of nuclear testing and negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

In the meantime, we could envisage the notification of nuclear tests as proposed last year by the Australian delegation. We would underline in this respect that, while we welcome the confidence-building effect of such a measure, it should not serve as an excuse for the unabated continuation of nuclear testing or delay in achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty have already taken place between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, from 1977 to 1980. By then the parties had already agreed that a variety of verification measures should be provided to increase confidence that all parties to the treaty

(Mr. Agstner, Austria)

were in strict compliance with it, and had gone far in breaking significant new ground concerning verification procedures.

Following the regrettable breakdown of the trilateral talks, the Conference on Disarmament now carries on the important task of seeking an urgent solution to this problem. Austria, which appreciates the fact that bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union were resumed last year in Geneva on a set of issues related to nuclear disarmament, regrets, however, that so far substantial negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty have been resumed neither in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament nor in some other forum.

Arguments advanced today that verification is the one issue which prevents the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the short and medium term are not convincing, in our view. Recently, we have witnessed signs of a change in the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States as far as on-site verification is concerned. We note that the Soviet Union authorized the installation of monitoring devices by a private United States organization near its testing site at Semipalatinsk. So far, these instruments seem to have responded to expectations. Incidentally, they have so far registered only United States nuclear tests, over a distance of thousands of miles. An invitation by the United States to the Soviet Union to send a group of governmental experts to monitor United States testing at the Nevada test site has so far not received a favourable response and still seems to be the object of bilateral consultations.

At the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly the Austrian delegation fully endorsed the concept outlined in the five-continent peace initiative of 22 May 1984 by the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania. My Government also welcomed the Mexico Declaration,

(Mr. Agstner, Austria)

adopted at Ixtapa on 7 August 1986, including the highly interesting document on verification measures annexed to it. Austria has always regarded the five-continent initiative as an important, timely and realistic approach to the solution of the most urgent problem we face in the field of disarmament today.

(Mr. Agstner, Austria)

My delegation therefore listened with great interest to the introduction of the Mexico Declaration by our Dean, Mr. Garcia Robles, as we believe that the proposals outlined in the document could greatly enhance confidence in the proposed bilateral test moratorium. The Austrian Government appreciates the offer of the Six Heads of States or Governments to establish temporary monitoring stations in the United States, the Soviet Union and on their respective territories as such monitoring could help to dispel the doubts of nuclear-weapon States towards verification.

Many arguments were advanced to the effect that a comprehensive test-ban treaty will have no impact whatsoever on nuclear disarmament in the short and medium-term. We cannot agree to such a view. We are aware that nuclear arsenals as such will not be drastically cut as a result of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Their reduction will have to be agreed upon in arms-reduction agreements. A comprehensive test-ban treaty would however effectively hinder the development of new nuclear warheads and have the two effects of preventing vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon Powers while at the same time preventing horizontal proliferation.

My delegation continues to believe that the issue under consideration is not how to continue nuclear-weapon tests, nor how to conduct them at the lowest levels, nor the monitoring of tests; the issue is also not to carry out nuclear-weapon tests at the far corner of the globe or to give advance notification. The only issue we should consider is how to put an end once and for all to all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time. In 1959 United States President Eisenhower stated:

"I think that people want peace so much that one of these days Governments had better get out of the way and let them have it."

(Mr. Agstner, Austria)

Let me paraphrase his words. Today people want an end to nuclear testing, and the day has come for Governments, better let them have a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

In Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's famous ballad, the sorcerer's apprentice had a master he could call upon to rid him of the ghosts he had unleashed by his curiosity. Mankind, which in the search for a wonder weapon to end one world war and prevent any further wars opened the lid of Pandora's box in 1945, has no master to turn to in order to make the nuclear threat disappear. The only option left to us is to call on the nuclear-weapon States to put an end to nuclear testing now.

Mr. GUMUCIO GRANIER (Bolivia) (interpretation from Spanish):

Mr. Chairman, this is the first time at the present session that the Bolivian delegation addresses this Committee. Allow me, therefore, to convey to you and to the other officers of the Committee my delegation's sincere congratulations and our best wishes for success in carrying out your task.

In 1986, the international community is commemorating the International Year of Peace, and it is a coincidence that today, at the request of the Holy Father, Pope John Paul II, mankind has decided to commemorate this day as the day of peace, as a solemn dedication to the International Year of Peace. My delegation, therefore, comes before the First Committee to express Bolivia's dedication to peace and our opposition to nuclear and conventional weapons which constitute the most serious threat to the survival of all peoples and to the very future of our planet.

The main threat to mankind lies in the vast nuclear arsenals of the major Powers. It is they, therefore, who are mainly responsible for maintaining peace and international security. All that we, the smaller countries, can do is use our moral influence and call on them to discharge their responsibility and show their

(Mr. Gumucio Granier, Bolivia)

dedication to peace by engaging in sincere negotiations aimed at easing tension, increasing confidence and making total and complete disarmament possible.

During a previous term in office, the current President of Bolivia, Victor Paz Estenssoro, together with other eminent Latin American statesmen, called on 29 April 1963, for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America, thus planting the seed of the Tlatelolco Treaty, and the Additional Protocols for its full implementation. Two decades have elapsed since its adoption, yet unfortunately one nuclear Power has not ratified its accession to Additional Protocol I and therefore this First Committee should once again call on France to do so.

In keeping with its principled position, Bolivia is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and takes this opportunity to call on those States which have not done so to accede to it. In this connection, Bolivia supports declarations of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the rest of the world and in particular welcomes the initiative taken by Brazil and other countries in the area leading to the Declaration of the South Atlantic as a zone of peace and co-operation which was duly adopted by the General Assembly. The international community should do the same for the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, the Pacific and Antarctica in order to guarantee peace.

Guided by the same principles, my delegation states once again that outer space should be free from the threat of nuclear weapons and that human technology should rather be directed at the development of peoples and not the utilization of outer space for military purposes.

The stockpiling and development of nuclear weapons is cause for considerable alarm not only because it undermines the bases of the confidence needed to preserve peace, but also because the possibility of human or technical error constitutes an

(Mr. Gimucio Granier, Bolivia)

additional element which increases the risk of a conflagration. The Challenger and Chernobyl disasters are proof of this risk and therefore further strengthen the need for dealing with these issues in the most responsible manner possible.

We therefore call on the nuclear Powers to make every effort to achieve nuclear disarmament. The meeting in Reykjavik should represent not the end of all such efforts but rather the beginning of a new era for which mankind is yearning, one in which nuclear weapons are done away with so that technical and economic resources can be devoted to the development and well-being of all peoples.

My delegation welcomes the temporary suspension of nuclear tests, a measure taken by certain countries, as a confidence-building act and reiterates its support for the adoption of an international nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Furthermore, my delegation supports the Declaration made by the Six Heads of State or Government in Ixtapa, following that of New Delhi, in favour of disarmament and for the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe, in which bases are suggested for the solution of the problem of verification. The Declaration was, of course, addressed to the two super-Powers. Bolivia, a non-aligned country, also endorses the Declaration of the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Harare in September 1986, at which principles promoting peace and disarmament were reaffirmed.

As regards conventional disarmament, my delegation also voices its concern at the arms race which runs counter to the legitimate development aspirations of many peoples and which encourages or is directly responsible for regional conflicts. My delegation urges countries producing conventional weapons to reduce their sales to third world countries. In the particular case of Latin America, Bolivia reiterates its support for regional initiatives designed to achieve disarmament in our region.

(Mr. Gumucio Granier, Bolivia)

In the same context my delegation reiterates the need to achieve through multilateral negotiations agreement on prevention of the development of chemical and biological weapons, and expresses the hope that such negotiations will be successful.

In the light of the foregoing and as stated by other representatives in this Committee, it is important to stress that for the countries of the third world it is essential that the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development be convened in 1987. That Conference should lead to commitments to the benefit of all mankind and make it possible to ensure that the economies of the world work in favour of development, not destruction. This matter is directly related to the present huge imbalance and exasperating inequality in international economic relations.

The crisis that affects the developing countries has certain inhuman characteristics as reflected in the squandering of economic and scientific resources by the major Powers without any consideration for the quality of life of the majority of mankind. This situation must be analysed within the United Nations framework, and the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development is the most appropriate forum to tackle this.

Peace is indivisible, and both nuclear and conventional weapons constitute a threat to peace. This Committee, in dealing with disarmament in a broad and integrated manner, must contribute to the reaffirmation of the fundamental truths of international law and relations between peoples - that is, to international peace and security.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Certain sorrowful events of the recent past - the Challenger tragedy and the Chernobyl catastrophe - and the joint statements of the leaders of the two great Powers have stimulated a public awareness deeper and

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

wider than ever before of two fundamentally determinant factors of our age: one is the realization that a nuclear war must never be fought and can never be won; the other is the realization that the use of even a small fraction of the existing nuclear arsenals might result in disastrous consequences for the entire population of the world, irrespective of geographical location.

This explains why the Hungarian People's Republic has accorded top priority in its disarmament policy to the call for nuclear disarmament. As part of this policy, we have always considered the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests to be the foremost and decisive aspect of the nuclear disarmament process. For long years the activity of the Hungarian delegations in such disarmament forums as the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, has been directed at pressing for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, explaining its necessity and emphasizing its urgency. I shall not elaborate on this now, since the whole course of the present debate has shown that the vast majority of speakers hold similar ideas and take similar views of the situation. Nearly all speakers - and I stress the word "all" - have referred to nuclear disarmament as a top priority task for mankind and have attributed indisputable priority to a comprehensive test ban, with variations observed only in the use of modifiers such as high, utmost, first and absolute when speaking about the priority. All this boils down to the fact that world public opinion, politicians and disarmament experts concur in the view that a comprehensive test ban has a key role in nuclear disarmament.

It has a key role because an end to nuclear testing is directed at putting a stop to the most dangerous process of qualitative perfection of nuclear weapons. This universal measure in the field of disarmament can at once limit the development of all nuclear weapons, be they strategic, medium-range or tactical.

(Mr. Meisster, Hungary)

In addition, a ban on testing is at present the speediest and most radical of all the possible practical steps towards the limitation of weapons since it makes it possible to bypass a large number of problems in connection with technological, strategic, geostrategic and political disproportions.

There is widespread agreement also in that a comprehensive test ban appears to be the most urgent first step on the road to the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. It is a first step in the sense that Julius Nyerere described on 7 August at the summit meeting in Mexico in connection with the five-continent peace initiative, when he said:

"We urge a test ban because it is necessary to stop going forward before one can turn around and go in the opposite direction."

No one questions the urgency of a solution and nearly all have stressed the practical feasibility of a ban. We think that what has so far been stated in the debate has borne out our long-standing practical approach.

We have always held that priorities in solving tasks should be assigned on the basis of two criteria: urgency and feasibility. It is relying on those two criteria that we have given and give absolute priority to the question of a comprehensive test ban. It was not by accident that, in the communiqué on the Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty States, the participants, in enumerating the fields of possible and required joint efforts to end the arms race on Earth and prevent its extension to outer space, mentioned the cessation of nuclear tests in the first place as a highly significant measure that is at the same time, given the political will, comparatively easy to achieve.

We are aware that the main problem is that of prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests at the level of international law. It can be solved only through negotiations.

(Mr. Meisster, Hungary)

Every available and imaginable means must be tried in order to advance that process. Proceeding from this approach, we think that any intermediate step with prospects of success is justified and useful. I have in mind a moratorium, provided of course that it is bilateral at the very least. It is advisable to make use of every possible form of negotiation and agreement, whether bilateral, trilateral or multilateral. Search for new accords or extension of the scope of existing agreements are equally conceivable. One must not underestimate certain partial arrangements - such as interim agreements concerning the lowering of thresholds or the yields of nuclear explosions, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, setting up a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Europe, and so on - provided, of course, they form part of a process leading to a full-scale treaty on the total and definitive prohibition of nuclear explosions.

Given their nature, neither a moratorium nor other intermediate steps can be considered to be the final goal or a replacement for that, but the useful purpose that they serve cannot be disputed. On the one hand, every such step is in itself a confidence-building measure, which is indeed badly needed after the past 10-15 lean years. On the other hand, every such step can be seen as a forerunner of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, since its implementation also means putting one or another element of the treaty to a practical test.

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

In the light of the foregoing I think that the Warsaw Treaty States are fully justified in adopting the position as set forth in the Budapest communiqué, to which I have already referred, namely that

"The road to achieving their goal" - that is, a comprehensive test ban - "leads through the mutual moratorium of the Soviet Union and the United States on nuclear explosions and the immediate start of negotiations on a complete ban on nuclear tests under the strictest supervision." (A/41/411, p. 4)

This brings me to the question of verification, which those hesitant about the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests have long presented as an absolute stumbling-block to any intermediate or final measure. We duly noted the statement made by Mr. Timothy Renton, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, on 14 October, that "adequate verification is crucial now, today, and in all future agreements" (A/C.1/41/PV.4, p. 5). We do not question the correctness of that statement; we fully share that position. The fact that the opponents of a test ban denied the possibility of devising practical ways and means for such satisfactory verification or sought to establish its form in isolation from substantive talks, was a source of concern for us and impeded related efforts.

The events of recent months have been significant in this respect as well. My delegation listened with great satisfaction to the statement made by Mrs. Maj Britt Theorin, the Ambassador of Sweden, in this connection. She said:

"The Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament has clearly demonstrated that there are in this field no verification problems for which technical solutions cannot be found." (A/C.1/41/PV.4, pp. 19-20)

That was precisely our impression too. A further welcome event clarifying the possibility of adequate verification was the decision taken by the group of six and expressed in the Mexico Declaration, adopted at Ixtapa on 7 August, to contribute to the solution of the verification problem not only theoretically but very

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

practically, as outlined in the extremely interesting document on verification measures annexed to the Declaration.

The idea of an international network of monitoring stations has since gained momentum. New Zealand has signalled its readiness to contribute to the establishment of an international network with its own network of monitoring stations. We have heard that Danish experts are looking into the possibilities of establishing a seismic station in the north of Greenland for the same purpose. All this goes to show that experts are firmly convinced of the technical feasibility of correctly monitoring compliance by any State with a moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests or with a full and definitive nuclear-weapon-test ban.

Taking all these developments into account, I cannot but express the deep dissatisfaction of the Hungarian delegation at the fact that in 1986 the Geneva Conference on Disarmament has concluded a totally unsuccessful session in this respect. Though an agreement of principle was reached on the setting up of an ad hoc committee, the entire summer session was taken up by the debate over the mandate of such a committee. What was behind that apparently procedural debate was a willingness or a reluctance to make meaningful preparations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

It is a matter of regret that the Conference on Disarmament did not reach the stage of starting work on questions related to a comprehensive test ban that were ripe for negotiation on the basis of approaches and proposals that had emerged over the past period. We maintain the view that the task of the Conference on Disarmament consists in starting concrete negotiations on the basis of certain standing proposals - either a single proposal or several proposals. Such activity could be carried out along the lines of the proposed Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing, on the Mexico Declaration or on the basis of the Mexican proposal for extension of the scope of the partial test-ban treaty.

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

This year again the Hungarian delegation has submitted a draft resolution aimed at directing the activity of the Conference on Disarmament in this field towards negotiating a legally binding treaty. My delegation will return to the substance of that draft when we present it to the First Committee.

Today I wanted to outline those practical measures which, in the well-considered opinion of my delegation, could form the first steps in the process of halting the nuclear-arms race. The Reykjavik meeting, at which wide-ranging conceptions of nuclear disarmament were agreed upon, though not crowned with success in the reaching of accords, proved the feasibility of such measures. But, witnessing the international echoes of the Reykjavik meeting, I could not get rid of a growing feeling of uneasiness. One cannot close one's eyes to the fact that in certain circles intense thought is already being given to replacing the nuclear-arms race by something else, namely, an arms race in the field of conventional armaments. I was greatly surprised to learn that at the recent meeting of Defence Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), held in Gleneagles, Scotland, in the immediate aftermath of Reykjavik, it was indicated that the goal of achieving parity in conventional forces, provided nuclear disarmament became a reality, could and should be achieved by building up the NATO allied forces.

At this stage I do not wish to discuss the issue of parity. I would merely note that parity can be established, rectified or re-established, whatever the real need may be, not only by building up but also by scaling down the forces in question. If it is intended to decrease the danger our peoples are facing, the second way would appear to be the only practicable one. That is precisely the way in which the Warsaw Treaty Organization member States are approaching this problem.

It was not by accident that, during the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee held in Budapest on 10 and 11 June 1986, the Warsaw Treaty member States,

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

concerned at the particularly high concentration of troops and armaments in Europe, declared their readiness to start discussions with the aim of achieving significant reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments at both the global and the regional levels. They adopted an appeal to the States members of NATO and to all other European States outlining a detailed programme to that end. They proposed a substantial reduction in the land and tactical air forces located in the whole territory of Europe, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals.

The reduction is meant to be carried out gradually, at agreed times, the military balance being maintained at ever lower levels. As a first step we propose a one-time mutual reduction - a cut by 100,000 to 150,000 troops on each side by the two alliances within a year or two. By further significant measures we should like to achieve by the early 1990s a reduction of some 25 per cent as compared with the present levels. The programme specifies measures intended to lessen the danger of surprise attacks as well as measures of effective verification of the reduction process itself and of observation of the military activities of troops remaining after reductions.

It seems to us that, if the agreements reached at Reykjavik are not to be lost, the timeliness of those proposals is beyond all question.

Mr. MOHID-UD-DIN (Pakistan): My statement today will address agenda item 54, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The international community has repeatedly reaffirmed through resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly that outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is the common heritage of mankind, to be preserved exclusively for peaceful uses that would serve the interests of all nations equally. In recent years, however, those objectives have unfortunately been jeopardized by the extension into outer space of the military competition between the two major Powers.

(Mr. Mohid-ud-din, Pakistan)

It is clear that the development and deployment of space weapons by both sides would have dangerous consequences for international peace and security. A competition in space weaponry would undermine existing legislation relating to outer space, as well as arms limitation agreements, apart from weakening the disarmament process as a whole. At the same time, the diffusion of space weapon technologies to conventional armaments among the space Powers and their respective allies would accentuate the arms race in these weapons, thereby further compromising the security of non-aligned and neutral States. In outer space itself, the introduction of space weapons would detract from, if not render impossible, the task of promoting its use exclusively for peaceful purposes. It would also enhance the present inequitable and discriminatory use of this zone by the space Powers. Such dangerous trends need to be checked urgently before they gather an irreversible momentum.

My delegation has been encouraged by the fact that the two major Powers have been involved in bilateral negotiations which relate, in part, to preventing the weaponization of outer space. However, this issue is not the exclusive concern of the two major Powers or of those countries that possess the capabilities to utilize outer space. The non-aligned, neutral and developing countries have a major interest in preventing an arms race in this area so as to ensure its use for exclusively peaceful purposes. Although the significance of bilateral negotiations between the super-Powers is undeniable, it is clear that concurrent multilateral efforts can serve a parallel and complementary purpose, while not detracting from the bilateral process. Consequently, all relevant multilateral forums, and in particular the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body, should be enabled to make their positive contributions in formulating an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Mohid-ud-din, Pakistan)

The delegation of Pakistan believes that it is necessary in the first place to recognize certain fundamental and crucial prerequisites which are germane to any multilateral effort devoted to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. These can be identified as follows.

The first prerequisite is a genuine commitment on the part of all States, particularly the technologically advanced States, to preventing an arms race in outer space. This would involve a willingness to facilitate, as well as to engage in, substantive multilateral deliberations. In the absence of such a commitment, efforts in this regard would amount to a mere academic exercise, simply providing a smoke-screen for military competition in this sphere.

The second is recognition that space weapons will neither ensure nor enhance the security of any side. Widening the arena of arms competition into space, on the other hand, would amplify existing problems relating to arms limitation and disarmament.

The third is the attainment of a workable and effective system of verification to ensure a ban on space weapons. States should be prepared, therefore, to adopt more rigid and foolproof mechanisms than those at present available.

With regard to the more specific issues involved in the prevention of an arms race in outer space, a realistic approach would need to distinguish between the militarization and the weaponization of this zone. While considerable controversy exists on the exact nature of these concepts, an objective review would demonstrate that the concept of militarization includes the use of non-lethal or non-aggressive space objects such as reconnaissance, navigation, communications and early warning satellites. These perform functions which the space Powers consider necessary to maintain strategic stability. Indeed, existing space law implicitly sanctions the

(Mr. Mohid-ud-din, Pakistan)

deployment and use of such non-aggressive space objects. However, it must be appreciated that these satellites also perform functions that are directly linked to the military operations of the space Powers on Earth. Consequently, such satellites, though of a passive and non-lethal character, serve definite military purposes. This reality complicates the so-called stabilizing functions of such satellites in a manner that I shall address presently.

The concept of weaponization, on the other hand, implies the development, testing and deployment of dedicated or active weapons systems as well as their components for use in or from outer space. At present the most imminent threat to outer space arises from such weapons. These include anti-satellite weapons, as well as dual-purpose ballistic missile defence systems that can be adapted for use in anti-satellite modes. The threat of an arms race in outer space posed by such armaments is heightened by the fact that existing bilateral and multilateral agreements relating to outer space do not specifically prohibit the development, testing and deployment of such weapons and their component systems, since only weapons of mass destruction are prohibited in outer space and on the celestial bodies. Hence, the urgent need to evolve effective legal provisions to prohibit such weapons. This aim, in the view of my delegation, is the most urgent for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

However, from a long-term perspective, efforts to deal with the weaponization of outer space would provide only a partial remedy for the more fundamental problems that arise from the existing militarization of outer space. One such difficulty results from the fact that the space Powers and their allies alone possess the capability to use satellites in an inequitable and discriminatory manner to the detriment of the non-aligned and neutral States which do not possess

(Mr. Mohid-ud-din, Pakistan)

similar capabilities or have free access to such facilities. It must also be appreciated that even non-lethal military purpose satellites are potential targets, since they perform significant military functions. Hence, in the existing competitive military relationship between the space Powers, the very existence of such satellites provides the basic rationale for developing and deploying anti-satellite and defence satellite weaponry. In the view of my delegation, the need to extend legal provisions to deal adequately with this root cause of the arms spiral in outer space is obvious.

Efforts to deal with such a spectrum of issues may require a dual-track approach, which could be pursued simultaneously and in a mutually reinforcing manner. The first could deal with the urgent need to ban anti-satellite and dual-purpose anti-ballistic missile systems, while the second could seek ways and means to ensure that the stabilizing functions of non-lethal space satellites are conducted in a dependable manner to ensure the security of all nations equally.

The foregoing considerations, in the opinion of my delegation, clearly establish the need to supplement and reinforce existing space law. In this context, a number of useful proposals have been placed before the international community. These deserve careful consideration and should be viewed as a basis for negotiations. Some of the ideas that we consider significant from this perspective are the following.

The first concerns immediate efforts to contain anti-satellite weaponry, initially through interim measures that declare the immunity of space objects, and a commitment on the non-first-use of anti-satellite weapons and a moratorium on their development, testing and deployment. These interim measures could serve as the basis for a comprehensive ban on anti-satellite weapons as well as dual-purpose ballistic missile defence weapons and their component systems.

(Mr. Mohid-ud-din, Pakistan)

The second is that all States, and in particular the space Powers, should reaffirm their commitment to abide by their international and bilateral treaty obligations which deal in whole or in part with outer space. Where necessary and possible, the technologically advanced States should strengthen bilateral and multilateral treaty provisions relating to outer space through supplementary measures. These could serve a confidence-building purpose and provide the building blocks for more formal treaty arrangements by the international community.

(Mr. Mchid-ud-din, Pakistan)

The third is to facilitate the demilitarization of outer space as a whole, so as to promote its peaceful uses, an international space monitoring or an overall international space agency could be established with a mandate to provide the international community with a shared capability to verify arms limitation and disarmament agreements, as well as to serve the stabilizing functions currently pursued through independent means by the space Powers. Such a multilateral mechanism would not only overcome the credibility gap that characterizes the existing national technical means of verification but would also provide an international institution whose effective functioning would be in the interests of all nations.

The delegation of Pakistan sincerely hopes that the considerations placed before this Committee will contribute towards a better understanding of the problems relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and will serve the international community in its efforts to evolve the agreement or agreements that would ultimately facilitate the peaceful uses of this zone.

Mr. RANA (Nepal): As my delegation is participating in these deliberations for the first time, let me, at the very outset, congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the high office of Chairman of the First Committee and also to felicitate the other officers of the Committee. My delegation wishes you every success and assures you of our fullest co-operation.

While 1986 has been declared the International Year of Peace, disarmament continues to be the single most important global imperative for peace. Yet none can assert that 1986 has seen any major breakthrough in disarmament and arms control. We have been led to believe, in the wake of the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting earlier this month in Reykjavik, that the world was on the verge of a once-in-a-lifetime agreement on nuclear disarmament. We regret that such an

(Mr. Rana, Nepal)

agreement was not possible, but are encouraged that the two sides could come so close to what would have been a major turning point in the history of nuclear disarmament. One could, however, draw a hopeful message from Reykjavik, and it is that the elimination of nuclear weapons is not merely desirable but also feasible. We do hope that both super-Powers will soon continue their negotiations in Geneva or elsewhere along the lines and in the light of the understanding reached at Reykjavik for deep and drastic cuts in nuclear arsenals. Such talks should be conducted in all seriousness and sincerity, and should not be tied to extraneous issues, especially not to the strategic defence initiative (SDI) which, in our view, would not only undermine the atmosphere of mutual confidence but would also unleash a new and more expensive round of the arms race. Nepal is against any such linkage, as we remember too vividly that the similar concept of linkage in the past scuttled a comprehensive test-ban 20 years ago. At that time a test-ban agreement was being linked to verification when it was tantalizingly within our grasp. The parties were arguing over the number of inspections to be allowed under the treaty. One side agreed to three inspections; the other side wanted seven. And so the agreement broke down. We are also concerned that the development of SDI would ultimately result in the weaponization of space, the common heritage of mankind, in violation of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 - one of the few but precious achievements in multilateral disarmament. It is only natural, therefore, that my delegation should view with anxiety any attempt to broaden the interpretation of the type of research on the space-based systems permitted by the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

I have so far dwelt on the disarmament and security concerns that relate to the two major Powers. This is certainly not because we believe that disarmament is their exclusive domain, but only because they possess about 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons of the world. It is in this context again that we call on the two

(Mr. Rana, Nepal)

major nuclear Powers to embark on negotiations for concluding a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which, in our view, represents the most effective initial step towards halting the nuclear-arms race. We believe that the nuclear Powers could at the very least, significantly lower the ceiling of 150 kilotons for underground nuclear tests established by the threshold test-ban Treaty between them in 1974. We are convinced that a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty would mark a watershed in the history of arms control by freeing such negotiations from the constant sway of technological advances and refinement. In this connection, we wish to emphasize that it is now an accepted fact of scientific life that adequate verification of compliance with the provisions of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is possible by, inter alia, seismological observation and satellite surveillance by sophisticated remote-sensing equipment.

We welcome the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing till the end of 1986 by the Soviet Union and urge the United States to reciprocate. We are pleased to note that the third Review Conference of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 reiterated the need to comply with the provisions of the Treaty, including the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States not to transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear-explosive devices to any recipient, either directly or indirectly. We must emphasize, however, that so long as nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty circumvent their obligations to halt all nuclear-weapons testing the goal of non-proliferation will continue to elude the international community. This can lead to dangerous consequences should it serve as an example and excuse to other interested parties.

Though we are very far from where we would like to be along the road to general and complete disarmament, we feel it only proper to indicate our

(Mr. Rana, Nepal)

satisfaction at the progress attained at the recent Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures in Europe. We hope this will help to lessen the risk of war in Europe - the world's most heavily armed continent - and improve disarmament prospects there. Believing that regionalism is a visible manifestation of confidence building, we wish to bring to the notice of this Committee the significance of the establishment of the South-Asian Association for Regional Co-operation in our region.

In the view of my delegation, what also deserves concerned and concerted attention is the need for conventional disarmament. This analysis is premised on a number of basic realities. The first is that although since the establishment of the United Nations there has been no nuclear war, over 150 non-nuclear conflicts have taken place. The second relates to the fact that four fifths of the total military expenditure is absorbed by conventional weapons.

(Mr. Rana, Nepal)

Thirdly, conventional weaponry is becoming more and more devastating in its impact. Not only, funding for such weaponry all too often drains away precious resources from urgent social and human needs of the populations of developing countries. Finally, sheer common sense suggests that conflicts, sparked by an inordinate arms build-up in conventional weapons, could easily trigger a nuclear holocaust. Indeed, in some instances - as in Europe - it may be difficult to achieve the elimination of, or significant cuts in, nuclear weapons if this is not accompanied by simultaneous attention to a reduction and balancing of existing conventional forces. My delegation would like to extend support also to all measures for a reduction of military expenditure including support for means of verification.

In the context of the diversion of precious resources away from military to civilian purposes, my delegation deeply regrets that the much-awaited United Nations Conference on Disarmament and Development could not be held as originally planned. Our sense of disappointment not only stems from witnessing such an obscene waste of resources for military purposes when a full two-thirds of humanity is in dire economic straits, but also because the close interrelationship between peace and development is the guiding spirit behind Nepal's own peace-zone proposal. Our peace proposal, I must emphasize, is also greatly conditioned by our general appreciation of the importance of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones in the promotion of international peace and security. We believe such efforts assist in preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons and the enhancement of the security of the country or countries concerned and deserve, therefore, to be actively encouraged by the international community. In line with such thinking, my country has consistently supported worthy peace initiatives as they relate to the Indian Ocean, South and South-East Asia, the South Atlantic, the South Pacific, the Mediterranean and the African continent.

(Mr. Rana, Nepal)

We believe that the international community, and the nuclear-weapon States in particular, should undertake obligations to respect the status of such zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones. More generally, we believe that all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

My Delegation shares the optimism expressed here at the fact that a comprehensive chemical-weapon convention is within reach and that significant progress was made at the last session of the Conference on Disarmament on definitions, lists of chemicals, provisions for destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities, and routine verification measures. Nepal also welcomes agreement on a number of specific measures to strengthen the Convention on bacteriological (biological) weapons during the second review conference. My delegation recalls the Chernobyl accident this summer and hopes that negotiations on radiological weapons in the Conference on Disarmament will lead, inter alia, to the imposition of stricter safeguards on nuclear facilities. We have, in the meantime, noted the practical significance of the adoption at the special session of the International Atomic Energy Agency recently of instruments entitled "Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident" and "Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency".

Nepal is a small, developing country located in a sensitive part of the world that has witnessed armed conflict. It is only natural, therefore, that we should be concerned about disarmament and the global security environment as these questions inevitably - and ultimately - affect security perceptions and responses in all regions of the globe, including the region around Nepal. In that context, we reiterate that Nepal's peace-zone proposal could significantly contribute to enhancing security in our strategic vicinity.

(Mr. Rana, Nepal)

In conclusion, we wish to underline that while we must never lose sight of the urgency of concluding agreements on the more visible, broader issues of disarmament, we believe that such endeavours should not deter the international community from proceeding to achieve other limited steps in the same general direction, as that would help create an atmosphere conducive to the development of more comprehensive agreements on disarmament and security.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution entitled "Bilateral Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations" (A/C.1/41/L.3) on behalf of the delegations of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Rwanda, Spain, Swaziland, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

The subject of this draft resolution, negotiations on nuclear arms reductions by the two Powers with the largest nuclear arsenals, is of vital concern to us all. There have been important and indeed dramatic developments since I introduced a year ago the predecessor of this draft resolution, which was resoundingly adopted as resolution 40/152 B.

The most significant events have been the two meetings between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva in November 1985, and more recently in Reykjavik earlier this month, immediately before this Committee started its substantive work this year.

At the first meeting, the two leaders committed themselves personally to the already established objective of working out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth. They also agreed to accelerate their negotiations to this end. Subsequently, there was an increase in the tempo of the bilateral nuclear and space arms negotiations in Geneva which we all warmly welcomed.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

The implications of the second meeting, between the two leaders earlier this month, are still being absorbed. But it is clear that, far from being a failure, as it seemed to appear on the morrow of the meetings, considerable progress was made towards reaching agreements in a number of areas, especially in the field of arms control and disarmament which is the primary concern of all of us in the First Committee of the General Assembly. It is also evident from their statements that the two sides remain committed to following up this process in the negotiations in Geneva. We very much welcome this.

The present draft resolution is, as I have noted, the direct successor of a number of previous resolutions put forward on this subject, which the Assembly has endorsed.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

It takes note of the important developments since last year, at Geneva and at Reykjavik; it expresses satisfaction at the clear commitment given by both sides to pursue their efforts, building on what has already been achieved; it urges the two Governments to attain a successful outcome and expresses encouragement of and support for their endeavours, which we recognize are complex as well as immensely significant.

The draft resolution urges the two Governments to spare no effort in seeking the attainment of their agreed objectives, in accordance with the security interests of all States and the universal desire for progress towards disarmament; for we are all united in our desire for security and for disarmament. The draft resolution goes on to urge the two Governments to reach early agreements in those areas where common ground exists and expresses the firmest possible encouragement and support for the bilateral negotiations and for their successful outcome.

The sponsors of the draft resolution believe that it expresses the common longing of all members of the Committee and indeed of all mankind. We believe that strong and if possible united support by its adoption by consensus would make an important contribution towards the objective which we all share. We would of course welcome additional co-sponsors.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to inform delegations that tomorrow, 28 October, in the morning the First Committee will hold a special meeting in observance of Disarmament Week. On that occasion the President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the chairmen of the regional groups of States will address the Committee.

I would also remind the Committee that the Fourth United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign will be convened tomorrow at 3 p.m. in this room.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.