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# SECURITY COUNCIL

## OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-THIRD YEAR

*SUPPLEMENT FOR APRIL, MAY AND JUNE 1978*

UNITED NATIONS



# **SECURITY COUNCIL**

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***SUPPLEMENT FOR APRIL, MAY AND JUNE 1978***

**UNITED NATIONS**

**New York, 1980**

## NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

**CHECK LIST OF SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENTS ISSUED DURING THE PERIOD  
1 APRIL-30 JUNE 1978**

The titles of the documents printed in the present *Supplement* appear in bold type.

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**DOCUMENT S/12475/ADD.1**

**Note verbale dated 3 April 1978 from the representative of Israel  
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[3 April 1978]*

The Acting Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's letter of 10 November 1977 and to the note of 7 December 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Israel, which was circulated as document S/12475.

Further to that note, in which it was communicated that, in the formulation of its policy, Israel would be guided by Security Council resolution 418 (1977), the Acting Permanent Representative is authorized to state that Israel will comply with that resolution.

The Acting Permanent Representative of Israel has the honour to request that this note should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12494/ADD.1**

**Note verbale dated 28 April 1978 from the representative of the United Kingdom  
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[1 May 1978]*

The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations has the honour to refer to the note verbale of 15 December 1977 from the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General [S/12494], concerning Security Council resolution 418 (1977).

The United Kingdom has for many years operated an effective embargo on the supply of arms to South Africa through the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1970 (as amended). Apart from certain items of paramilitary police equipment, which have now been added to Group 1 of Schedule 1 of that Order (by means of amendment Order SI 1978 No. 271), the goods to which resolution 418 (1977) relates already fell within the scope of that part of the Order. No licences are granted for the export of such goods to South Africa.

An Order in Council (SI 1978 No. 277) has also been made prohibiting persons from entering into any licensing arrangements for the use in South Africa of patents, registered designs or industrial information or techniques specially devised or formulated for the manufacture or maintenance of arms or equipment specially designed

for military or paramilitary police purposes. Copies of these Orders are attached.<sup>1</sup>

These measures, which took effect on 24 March, complete the legislative arrangements for implementation in the United Kingdom of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa imposed by resolution 418 (1977). A review, pursuant to paragraph 3 of that resolution, is being undertaken of existing contractual arrangements with and licences granted to South Africa which fall within the scope of that paragraph.

The United Kingdom wishes to assure the Secretary-General of their determination to fulfil faithfully the obligations placed upon them by resolution 418 (1977) in every respect and to co-operate to the full in the operation of the sanctions Committee established by Security Council resolution 421 (1977).

The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom requests that this note should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

<sup>1</sup> The three annexes to the mimeographed version of this document are not reproduced here; they can be consulted in the Secretariat archives.

**Note verbale dated 11 April 1978 from the representative of Japan  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[14 April 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, referring to his note of 12 December 1977 [S/12495], in which he confirmed the Japanese Government's intention to implement faithfully Security Council resolution 418 (1977) and to continue to enforce strictly the arms embargo which it had voluntarily enforced against the Republic of South Africa for many years, has the honour to inform the Secretary-General of the following additional measures which the Japanese Government has taken for the strict implementation of the same resolution.

While there exists no licensing arrangement for the manufacture of arms between Japan and South Africa to the best of its knowledge, the Japanese Government has taken the following measures to ensure legally the implementation of the decision made in the same resolution with regard to grants of licensing arrangements:

1. Cabinet Order concerning Control of Foreign Exchange, which is the legal system to deal with contracts with foreigners on services, including technical assistance, has been revised so as to make an exception to the principle of the same Cabinet Order liberalizing foreign transactions, including contracts on services; as a result, technical assistance, which is covered by the

decision of the resolution is now required to be approved by the competent Ministers, who will not approve such a transaction made in relation to South Africa.

2. More specifically, the competent Ministers, in accordance with the provisions of the said Cabinet Order, have designated technical assistance concerning the manufacture of arms, such as firearms, ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, as a category of transactions requiring approval by the same Ministers, and it has been decided that the Ministers will not approve such transactions if made in relation to South Africa.

For the purpose of drawing the attention of the people to this matter, the translation of the entire text of resolution 418 (1977) was carried in the Official Gazette of 30 March 1978, and the above-mentioned measures were announced in the Official Gazette of 30 and 31 March 1978 and put into effect as of 1 April 1978.

The Japanese Government reaffirms its intention to continue its efforts in co-operation with the international community for the abolishment of the *apartheid* policy of South Africa.

The Permanent Representative of Japan has further the honour to request that this note verbale should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENTS S/12620/ADD.1-5**

**Progress reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**

**DOCUMENT S/12620/ADD.1**

[Original: English]  
[2 April 1978]

*Strength and composition of the Force*

1. As of 2 April 1978, the strength of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was as follows:

Canada	18	(temporarily detached from UNEF)
France	627	
Iran	195	(temporarily detached from UNDOF)
Norway	216	(advance party)
Sweden	224	(temporarily detached from UNEF)

2. In addition, 68 military observers of UNTSO assist UNIFIL in the performance of its tasks.

3. The airlift of the remainder of the Norwegian contingent consisting of about 530 men together with four helicopters, vehicles and a considerable amount of equipment is under way.

4. The Government of Nepal has informed the Secretary-General that the Nepalese contingent (about 600 all ranks) will be ready to proceed to the mission

area by 11 April. Arrangements are being made to airlift the contingent by that date.

5. In response to an approach by the Secretary-General, the Government of Senegal has agreed to provide a battalion of about 600 all ranks for service with UNIFIL.

6. With reference to paragraph 6 of the Secretary-General's progress report of 23 March [S/12620], I have requested the Governments of France and Norway to provide the necessary logistic elements for UNIFIL and both Governments have so agreed. Discussions have been held between the Secretariat and military representatives of the two Governments with a view to working out the detailed arrangements for the logistic component of the Force.

7. I am continuing consultations concerning additional contingents to UNIFIL, bearing in mind the principle of equitable geographical representation.

8. The Government of Iran has made available, free of charge to the United Nations, a Falcon jet aircraft for an initial period of one month.

*Deployment and activities of the Force*

9. The main body of the French battalion, about 458 all ranks, is now deployed in the Tyre area. It has set up its headquarters in the former Lebanese army camp

in the city. French troops are manning six check-points and are undertaking patrolling activities in the area.

10. The Iranian company is deployed in the central sector south of the Litani River. The company is manning the Akiya Bridge and is expanding its presence east and west of that bridge.

11. The Swedish company is deployed in the eastern sector south of the Litani. Swedish troops have set up positions at Ebel es Saqi, Rachaiya El Foukhar, Hebbariye and at the Khardala Bridge and are expanding their patrolling activities east and west of Ebel es Saqi.

12. The Canadian logistic unit consists of a movement control detachment and a signal detachment. The movement control detachment is assigned to the UNIFIL reception area at the Beirut airport to facilitate the reception of arriving units of the Force. The signal detachment is stationed at the Naqoura forward headquarters. Communication links have been established between the forward headquarters and all the contingents.

13. A Norwegian party of nine all ranks has completed its reconnaissance in the Swedish contingent sector in preparation for the deployment of the main body of the Norwegian contingent.

14. The UNTSO observers continue to man the observation posts established by UNTSO. Selected observers are assigned to staff responsibilities at the Naqoura forward headquarters. Two teams of two observers each are attached to each of the contingents for liaison and other purposes. Other observers are providing liaison with the various forces in Southern Lebanon and at Beirut.

#### *Casualties*

15. The first casualties of UNIFIL in line of duty occurred on 29 March. A member of the Swedish contingent was killed and another seriously wounded when their vehicle hit a mine near the Khardala Bridge.

#### *General situation and contacts with the parties*

16. I have maintained contact with the Government of Lebanon, the Government of Israel and with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) with a view to the rapid implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978), especially in regard to the cease-fire and the withdrawal of the Israeli Forces. The Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, has also continued his contacts with all the parties concerned for the same purpose. The Interim Force Commander, Major-General E. A. Erskine, has been in constant contact with the parties on matters concerning the deployment and functioning of the Force.

17. On 27 March, the Secretary-General issued an appeal to all the parties concerned to observe a general cease-fire in Southern Lebanon. During a meeting with the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO on the next day, General Erskine conveyed this appeal to him on behalf of the Secretary-General, and Mr. Arafat informed the Secretary-General, through General Erskine, of his acceptance of the Secretary-General's appeal for a general cease-fire.

18. General Erskine reports that the situation in Southern Lebanon has remained generally quiet. There have been, however, a number of firing incidents in certain areas.

[Original: English]  
[8 April 1978]

#### *Strength and composition of the Force*

1. As of 8 April 1978, the strength of the Force was as follows:

Canada .....	19	(temporarily detached from UNEF)
France .....	729	
Iran .....	198	(temporarily detached from UNDOF)
Norway .....	629	
Sweden .....	225	(temporarily detached from UNEF)

2. In addition, 68 military observers of UNTSO assist UNIFIL in the performance of its tasks.

3. Arrangements have been concluded to airlift the Nepalese battalion (about 650 all ranks) to the mission area, beginning with the advance party on 10 April and the main body on 11 April.

4. In response to my request [S/12620/Add.1], the Government of France has informed me that it will provide the engineering, transport, movement control, headquarters and supply and postal units of the logistic element of the Force. The first French logistic group with 300 personnel and 100 vehicles is scheduled to leave France by sea on 14 April and the remainder of the group, with about 200 personnel and 100 vehicles, on 20 April. The Government of Norway has informed me that it will make available the maintenance, air and medical units. Detailed arrangements in this connexion are being worked out.

5. I am continuing consultations concerning additional contingents to UNIFIL, bearing in mind the principle of equitable geographical representation.

#### *Deployment and activities of the Force*

6. UNIFIL is currently deployed in an area about three to four kilometres wide south of the Litani River and stretching from the vicinity of the city of Tyre to the Mount Hermon area.

7. The main body of the Norwegian battalion has arrived in the area and was deployed in the eastern sector south of the Litani River which it took over from the Swedish company on 3 April. The deployment of UNIFIL as of 7 April, including base camps and sectors, is as follows from west to east:

(a) French battalion: base camp at Tyre. It is manning seven check-points in the vicinity of Tyre and is patrolling in the area.

(b) The Swedish company is deployed in the central/western sector. It has established a base camp at Srifa and is manning four observation posts.

(c) The Iranian company is deployed in the central/western sector. The company has established its base camp at Ghanduriyah. It is manning three observation posts and is deployed at the Akiya Bridge.

(d) The Norwegian battalion is deployed in the eastern sector, with its base camp at Ebel es Saqi. It has established seven posts and, in addition, is manning the Khardala Bridge.

(e) The Canadian logistic unit continues to provide communication and movement control facilities for the Force.

(f) UNTSO military observers continue to man the existing five observation posts along the Israel-Lebanon border. Selected observers continue to serve in staff positions both at Naqoura forward headquarters and temporary UNIFIL headquarters at Jerusalem. Other observers are providing liaison with the various forces in Southern Lebanon.

#### *General situation and observance of the cease-fire*

8. The Interim Commander of UNIFIL reports that the situation in Southern Lebanon has remained generally quiet, with certain local exceptions. In the western sector (French contingent), considerable tension, with occasional exchanges of fire, has continued to prevail, especially around the city of Tyre. In the eastern sector (Norwegian contingent), there have been repeated exchanges of fire, mainly involving Christian *de facto* armed elements south of the Litani River and PLO armed elements north of the river.

9. An incident not directly involving UNIFIL occurred in the western sector on 5 April, when an Israel Defence Forces (IDF) vehicle with seven armed IDF soldiers wearing civilian clothes crossed into territory controlled by the PLO, in the vicinity of UNIFIL check-point 1-6 (AMR 1726-2928),<sup>2</sup> south-east of Tyre. The vehicle was stopped at a PLO check-point, and an exchange of fire ensued. According to the Israeli account, three Israeli soldiers were killed and two were wounded, and the remaining two soldiers returned to Israeli-occupied territory. UNIFIL was in touch with the two sides in an effort to prevent escalation and UNIFIL troops in the area undertook a search. On 6 April, the PLO liaison representative in Beirut informed UNIFIL that the bodies of the five IDF soldiers had been brought to Saida Hospital. UNIFIL is discussing with the PLO arrangements for releasing the bodies to the International Red Cross.

10. On 1 April at 1805 GMT, UNIFIL troops in the Tyre area reported receiving direct rocket-propelled grenade fire (two rounds), which impacted within 20 metres of UNIFIL position check-point 1 (AMR 1708-2906). French contingent troops returned fire with automatic weapons. The UNIFIL check-point is located inside the IDF-controlled area south of the Tyre salient. No injuries were sustained.

11. On 7 April at 0730 GMT, small arms fire was directed at a tower in the French contingent base camp at Tyre, and armed men approached the tower. PLO was warned to keep armed elements away from the UNIFIL battalion headquarters. At 1315 GMT, a camouflaged armed man approached the tower with a rocket-propelled grenade weapon. After he had disregarded repeated warnings from the sentry and two warning shots over his head, he was wounded by a third shot.

12. Exchanges of fire between the parties were reported in the general area during the period under review.

13. In the Norwegian battalion sector, on 4 April, an exchange of mortar fire occurred between PLO forces in the vicinity of Yarmaq (AMR 200-310) and Arnaqun (AMR 199-304) and Christian forces in the Marjayoun-El Qlaia area. In addition, movements by the Norwegian battalion in and around Kaoukaba (AMR 2105-3115) drew small arms and automatic fire from positions located to the east (PLO).

14. On 6 April, between 1330 and 1420 GMT, four rounds of mortar fire impacted in the UNIFIL position at Kaoukaba. One Norwegian soldier was slightly wounded.

15. On 7 April, between 0700 and 0900 GMT, the Kaoukaba position received sporadic automatic weapons fire from PLO elements 300 metres to the north, in addition to 22 mortar and 7 artillery rounds. There were no UNIFIL casualties, and protests have been filed with PLO authorities both at Beirut and locally. In a subsequent meeting between the Norwegian company commander in charge of the Kaoukaba area and a representative of PLO, held at 1745 GMT on the same day, it was agreed that the cease-fire would be observed within the Norwegian battalion sector.

16. On 6 April at 1430 GMT, a Swedish UNIFIL convoy en route to Aadeisse (AMR 2015-2955) was stopped by Christian armed elements, which fired over the heads of the convoy, forcing it to return to battalion headquarters.

#### *Contacts with the parties*

17. The Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, has continued his contacts with all the parties concerned on the steps to be taken on the speedy implementation of resolution 425 (1978), especially with regard to the cease-fire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces. The Interim Force Commander, Major-General E. A. Erskine, has been in constant contact with the parties on matters concerning the deployment and functioning of the Force.

18. On 5 April, I addressed a message to the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Menachem Begin, in which I stressed my preoccupation over ensuring the effectiveness of the United Nations operation in Southern Lebanon and in forestalling events which could lead to further conflict and bloodshed. I emphasized that resolution 425 (1978) called upon Israel to "withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory", and pointed out that there was now a significant body of United Nations troops in the area. I also expressed my view that, as long as there was no significant Israeli withdrawal, UNIFIL would not be able to perform fully its assigned task and that the situation in the area would become increasingly tense. I informed the Prime Minister that I did not consider that the withdrawal proposals hitherto submitted adequately met the requirement of the resolution and asked for his early co-operation.

19. On the evening of 6 April, the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces presented to General Siilasvuo the Israeli plan for the initial withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon. Under the plan, the withdrawal would take place in two stages—the first in the Marjayoun/Arkoub area on 11 April. This would include the Khardala Bridge and a number of villages such as Kaoukaba, El-Faradis, El-Habbariya, Ebel es Saqi, Kafr Chouba and Shabaa. The withdrawal in this area would exclude the villages of Marjayoun, El Qlaia, El Khiam, El Khirba and Deir Mimess. West of Marjayoun, the depth of the withdrawal would be approximately two to three kilometres, and between Kaoukaba and Shabaa about seven kilometres. The second stage of withdrawal, which would take place on 14 April, would cover an area from a point on the Litani River two kilometres west of Akiya Bridge to a point one kilometre west of Deir Mimess. The depth of this withdrawal would be approximately five to six kilometres and the area includes the villages of Taibe, Kantara, Randuria and

<sup>2</sup> AMR = approximate map reference.

Ferun, including the main road between Taibe and Randuria.

20. On 7 April, I issued the following statement:

"The Secretary-General is gratified that plans are being made to begin the implementation of the withdrawal provisions of resolution 425 (1978). However, he does not think that the plans so far submitted are adequate, since resolution 425 (1978) calls for the total withdrawal forthwith of Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory."

21. On the same day, I received Prime Minister Begin's reply to my message of 5 April. Mr. Begin reiterated Israel's wish to withdraw its forces from Southern Lebanon as speedily as possible and indicated that the implementation of this intention was related to the deployment of the United Nations Force in the area. Mr. Begin expressed Israel's willingness to commence the evacuation of Israeli forces prior to the completion of the deployment of the UNIFIL forces in Southern Lebanon and referred to the plan for an initial withdrawal presented to General Siilasvuo by the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces. In this connexion, he recalled that General Siilasvuo and the Chief of Staff had agreed to meet again one week later, when the first stage of the withdrawal would be completed, in order to discuss continuation of the process, and he assured me that Israel was maintaining close contact with my representatives in the area as part of the continuing effort to bring about the implementation of resolution 425 (1978).

22. I have instructed General Siilasvuo to intensify his contacts with the Israeli Government with a view to the speedy implementation of resolution 425 (1978), especially in regard to the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon. I shall also continue my own efforts with this urgent objective in mind.

### **DOCUMENT S/12620/ADD.3**

[Original: English]  
[17 April 1978]

#### *General situation and withdrawal of Israeli forces*

1. According to reports submitted by the Force, the general situation in Southern Lebanon remained quiet during the period under review, and there were no serious incidents.

2. The Israeli forces withdrew on 11 and 14 April from two areas east and south of the Litani River under the plan submitted to the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, by the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces on 6 April [S/12620/Add.2, para. 19]. The withdrawal took place without incidents and, following the withdrawal, the Israeli positions in the two areas were taken over by the troops of the Norwegian battalion.

3. Traffic of returning refugees, which began on 11 April, has continued to be heavy throughout the area of operation, particularly in the vicinity of the city of Tyre.

4. With the consent of the Security Council, I have appointed Major-General E. A. Erskine Commander of UNIFIL. General Erskine is now operating from the temporary Force headquarters at Naqoura.

#### *Strength and composition of the Force*

5. As of 17 April 1978, the strength of the Force was as follows:

Canada .....	19	(temporarily detached from UNEF)
France .....	728	
Iran .....	185	(temporarily detached from UNDOF)
Nepal .....	636	
Norway .....	718	
Sweden .....	216	(temporarily detached from UNEF)

6. In addition, 68 military observers of UNTSO assist UNIFIL in the performance of its tasks.

7. The main body of the Nepalese battalion has now arrived in the mission area. A party of three Senegalese officers arrived in the mission area to meet the Force Commander and to make the necessary preparations for the arrival of the main body of the Senegalese battalion which is to arrive by the end of April.

8. In response to my approach, the Government of Canada has agreed to increase the temporary Canadian detachment to a communications unit of about 80, all ranks, for a period not to exceed six months. This unit will be operated as an extension of and co-ordinated with the existing communications set-up of UNDOF and UNEF for reasons of efficiency and economy.

9. I am continuing consultations concerning possible additional contingents to UNIFIL, bearing in mind the principle of equitable geographical representation as well as the requirements of the Force.

10. The airlift of the Norwegian battalion and its vehicles and equipment was carried out by airlifts provided by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States and Norway itself, free of charge to the United Nations. The United States Government also provided free of charge the airlift facilities for the Nepalese contingent. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany provided, also free of charge to the United Nations, a substantial portion of the vehicles and equipment required by the Nepalese contingent. The Secretary-General wishes to express his deep appreciation to the Governments concerned for these generous voluntary contributions.

#### *Deployment and activities of the Force*

11. UNIFIL is currently deployed in an area from three to seven kilometres wide south of the Litani River and stretching from the vicinity of Tyre to the Mount Hermon area. The area of deployment has been slightly widened in its eastern sector as a result of the withdrawal of Israeli forces effected on 11 and 14 April.

12. The main body of the Nepalese battalion has now arrived in the area of operation and has been deployed in the central-eastern sector south of the Litani River. The deployment of UNIFIL as of 17 April, including base camps and sectors, is as follows from west to east:

(a) French battalion: Base camp at Tyre. It is manning seven check-points in the vicinity of Tyre and is patrolling in the area.

(b) The Swedish company is deployed in the central/western sector. It has established a base camp at Srifa and is manning four observation posts.

(c) The Iranian company is deployed in the central/western sector. The company has established its base camp at Ghanduriyah. It is manning three observation posts and is deployed at the Akiya Bridge. One post has been taken over by the Nepalese battalion.

(d) Nepalese battalion: The main body of the Nepalese battalion is deployed in the central/eastern sector between the Iranian company and the Norwegian battalion. The Nepalese battalion is now in the process of consolidating its positions. It relieved one post previously manned by the Iranians and one by the Norwegians and it has established three additional posts. Nepalese troops have also taken over the control of the Khardala Bridge (AMR 2009-3053) from the Norwegians.

(e) The Norwegian battalion is deployed in the eastern sector, with its base camp at Ebel es Saqi. It has established 16 posts.

(f) The Canadian logistic unit continues to provide communication facilities for the Force.

(g) UNTSO military observers continue to man the existing five observation posts along the Israel-Lebanon border. Selected observers continue to serve in staff positions at UNIFIL temporary headquarters at Naqoura. Other observers are providing liaison with the various forces in Southern Lebanon.

#### *Contacts with the parties*

13. The Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, has continued his contacts with all the parties concerned on the steps to be taken on the speedy implementation of resolution 425 (1978), especially with regard to the cease-fire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces. The Force Commander, Major-General E. A. Erskine, has been in constant contact with the parties on matters concerning the deployment and functioning of the Force.

14. General Siilasvuo met the Israeli Defence Minister on 11 April and discussed with him the question of further withdrawal of Israeli forces.

15. As the Security Council has been informed, I shall be visiting the area from 17 to 19 April. On that occasion, I shall be holding meetings with the parties concerned at the highest level, as well as with Generals Siilasvuo and Erskine. I shall also visit the contingents of UNIFIL in the area of operation. I shall, of course, report to the Council on the results of my visit as soon as possible.

#### **DOCUMENT S/12620/ADD.4**

[Original: English]  
[5 May 1978]

#### *General situation and withdrawal of Israeli forces*

1. According to reports submitted by the Force, the situation remained stable in the central and western sectors during the period under review, but tension increased significantly in the Tyre area.

2. The third phase of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon, to which I referred in my letter of 19 April to the President of the Security Council [S/12657], took place on 30 April. The withdrawal was carried out in three stages. Israeli forces pulled out from some 30 positions, which were taken over by UNIFIL units, most of them Senegalese, but some also French, Iranian and Swedish. The operation was completed on the same day according to schedule.

#### *Strength and composition of the Force*

3. As of 5 May 1978, the strength of the Force was as follows:

#### *Ground troops*

France .....	732	
Iran .....	190	
Nepal .....	642	
Nigeria .....	30	(Advance Party)
Norway .....	734	
Senegal .....	640	
Sweden .....	212	

#### *Logistic Component*

Canada .....	91
France .....	540
Norway .....	205

4. In addition, 23 military observers of UNTSO assisted UNIFIL in the performance of its tasks. They form the "Observer Group Lebanon".

5. The main body of the Senegalese battalion, the Canadian communications unit and the remaining French and Norwegian logistic units have now arrived in the mission area. After consulting the Security Council [S/12666 and S/12667], I accepted the offer of the Nigerian Government to provide a battalion of about 600 all ranks for service with UNIFIL. An advance group of 30 all ranks have already arrived in the mission area. Arrangements are being made in consultations with the Government with a view to airlifting the main body of the Nigerian contingent to the mission area as soon as possible.

6. By its resolution 427 (1978) of 3 May 1978, the Security Council approved the increase in the strength of UNIFIL requested by me from 4,000 to approximately 6,000 troops. After consulting the Council [S/12675 and S/12681] I have now accepted the offers of the Governments of Fiji, Iran and Ireland to provide a battalion each for service with UNIFIL. Discussions are being initiated with their Permanent Missions in this connexion.

7. The Government of France provided air and sea transport for the personnel and equipment of its logistic units to the mission area. The Government of Canada arranged for the airlift of the personnel and equipment of the Canadian communications unit. The United States Government provided the airlift of the Senegalese contingent and its equipment. All these transport facilities were made available free of charge to the United Nations. The Secretary-General wishes to record his deep gratitude to the Governments of Canada, France and the United States for their generous voluntary contributions.

#### *Deployment and activities of the Force*

8. With the completion of the third phase of Israeli withdrawal, UNIFIL is now deployed in a much more extensive area, which extends roughly from the Litani River to the north to a line running about 18 kilometres from the river in the western and central sectors and about two to seven kilometres in the eastern area.

9. The deployment of the Force as of 5 May, including base camps and sectors, is as follows, from west to east:

(a) The French battalion is deployed in the western sector with its base camp at Tyre. It continues to man seven check-points in the vicinity of Tyre and has taken over four additional positions formerly held by IDF. In addition, reconnaissance elements of the French battalion are conducting day and night patrols between the villages of Al Mantarah and Tibnin.

(b) The Senegalese battalion is deployed in the western sector between three and eight kilometres south of Tyre. It has taken over 21 former IDF positions and



is in the process of consolidating its positions in that sector.

(c) The Swedish company is deployed in the central/western sector, with its base camp at Srifa. It is manning four observation posts and has taken over two former IDF positions.

(d) The Iranian company is deployed in the central/western sector. The company has established its base camp at Ghanduriyah. It has established five observation posts and is deployed at the Akiya Bridge.

(e) The Nepalese battalion is deployed in the central/eastern sector between the Iranian company and the Norwegian battalion. It is manning 11 positions, including a check-point at the Khardala Bridge.

(f) The Norwegian battalion is deployed in the eastern sector, with its base camp at Ebel es Saqi. It has established 16 posts.

(g) The Norwegian logistic component is deployed in two locations: the maintenance company in the village of Tibnin and the air unit of four helicopters and the medical company at Naqoura.

(h) The French logistic component, less its engineer unit, is temporarily deployed at Zahrani. The engineer unit is established at the village of Al Mantarah.

(i) The Canadian signal unit continues to provide communication facilities for the Force.

(j) UNTSO military observers continue to man the existing five observation posts along the Israel-Lebanon border. Selected observers serve in staff positions at UNIFIL temporary headquarters at Naqoura. Other observers are providing liaison with the various forces in southern Lebanon.

#### *Incidents and casualties*

10. A number of serious incidents took place in the area of Tyre at the beginning of May. A brief account of these incidents and the resulting casualties is given below.

11. On 1 May, armed elements<sup>3</sup> attempted to infiltrate a UNIFIL position in the Tyre area. When challenged, they opened fire on UNIFIL troops, who returned the fire in self-defence. In the process two infiltrators were killed.

12. On 2 May at 1815 hours local time, a French contingent supply truck was ambushed on the coastal road approximately three kilometres northeast of Tyre by an unknown number of armed elements. The vehicle was damaged and the driver, its only occupant, was wounded.

13. The French UNIFIL troops immediately dispatched a light reinforcement patrol consisting of an UNTSO military observer's vehicle, an ambulance and a jeep from the Tyre barracks to the scene of the above incident. Sporadic firing continued in that area for approximately 30 minutes.

14. Coincidentally with this incident, the Commanding Officer of the French battalion, Colonel Jean Salvan, was having a meeting with PLO representatives at the battalion headquarters in the Tyre barracks. In an effort to resolve the situation, Colonel Salvan and the PLO liaison officer immediately proceeded to the scene in

the latter's vehicle. They were accompanied by one UNIFIL radio vehicle with two French soldiers. At approximately 1830 hours, a second reinforcement patrol, including light armoured vehicles, proceeded to the scene where the ambushed vehicle was still under fire. This reinforcement patrol was taken under fire by armed elements as it moved north from the barracks towards the city of Tyre. This resulted in a general exchange of fire between UNIFIL forces at Tyre barracks and the armed elements, which lasted until approximately 1930 hours and involved small arms, rocket-propelled grenades and recoilless rifles.

15. Eight UNIFIL soldiers were wounded in that exchange. One of them, who was seriously wounded, was evacuated to the UNIFIL field hospital at Naqoura, where he died of his wounds at 2130 hours.

16. At 1920 hours, the UNIFIL French battalion reported that one of its light armoured cars with a three-man crew was missing. An UNTSO military observer serving with UNIFIL, followed by an ambulance, drove to the scene at 2000 hours to locate the missing vehicle. At 2010 hours, the vehicle was discovered in flames approximately 800 metres north of Tyre. The three soldiers were located in the morning of 3 May at a Tyre hospital by a French contingent patrol, which returned them to the Tyre barracks.

17. At 2255 hours, a UNIFIL patrol located the vehicle in which the French battalion commander and a PLO representative had been travelling inside the city of Tyre. The vehicle was riddled with bullets. Colonel Salvan was missing, as were the two French soldiers who had followed him in a radio vehicle. The United Nations Liaison Officer at Beirut reported after midnight that Colonel Salvan was wounded and in the Gaza Hospital at Beirut. Later in the morning, it was found that one of the UNIFIL soldiers accompanying Colonel Salvan had been killed and the other wounded. A PLO escort travelling with the party was reported killed.

18. During the exchange of fire referred to above, a group of 11 UNIFIL Senegalese soldiers travelling from Beirut in two vehicles arrived on the scene. They were stopped by armed elements and one of the Senegalese soldiers was killed. The others were released at 0830 hours on 3 May.

19. In addition to the casualties resulting from the incidents of 2 May, five members of UNIFIL were killed and two wounded during the period under review. On 23 April, a non-commissioned officer of the French battalion was killed by a mine explosion when his unit came under fire. On 1 May, a jeep carrying members of the Senegalese battalion ran over an anti-tank mine south of Tyre; three non-commissioned officers were killed and one wounded. On 3 May, one Senegalese soldier was killed and another wounded by the accidental explosion of a grenade.

#### *Contacts with the parties*

20. The Council will recall that I visited the area from 17 to 19 April. During that time, I had conversations with the President, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Lebanon on all aspects of the situation in Southern Lebanon and on the implementation of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). I also met Chairman Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization at Beirut. In Israel I had talks with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister. I had extensive discussions with Lieutenant-General

<sup>3</sup> The non-UNIFIL armed elements in the Tyre area are associated with a variety of Lebanese and Palestinian factions. It has been difficult and in many cases impossible for UNIFIL to identify the elements involved in the incidents described in this report.

Siilasvuo and Major-General Erskine, the Commander of UNIFIL, on the deployment and functioning of UNIFIL. I also visited the UNIFIL area of operation and discussed the situation on the spot with the contingent commanders. My letters to the Council contained in documents S/12657 and S/12675 refer in more detail to this visit.

21. General Siilasvuo has continued his contacts with all the parties concerned on the steps to be taken for the speedy implementation of resolution 425 (1978), especially with regard to the withdrawal of Israeli forces. General Siilasvuo met the Defence Minister of Israel on 1 May to discuss with him the question of the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces.

22. General Erskine has been in constant contact with the parties on matters concerning the deployment and functioning of the Force.

#### *Observations*

23. During the period under review, the United Nations operation in Southern Lebanon was faced with a most serious situation. On 2 May, members of the French and Senegalese contingents came under attack by armed elements in the area of Tyre. Casualties were serious. Following these incidents, I addressed an urgent message to Mr. Arafat expressing my concern at these incidents and asking him to take all possible measures to avoid moves which might risk confrontation with the Force until the issue had been clarified. Mr. Arafat assured us of his co-operation in attempting to resolve the situation.

24. As a matter of basic principle, United Nations troops are provided only with weapons of a defensive character. They are authorized to use force only in self-defence when they are attacked or when attempts are made to prevent them from performing their duties under the mandate of the Security Council. Therefore, as indicated in my report of 19 March [S/12611] on the implementation of resolution 425 (1978), in order for the Force to be effective, it must operate with the full co-operation of all the parties concerned. I wish to appeal to all the Governments and other parties concerned in the situation in Southern Lebanon to extend to UNIFIL all possible support and co-operation in accordance with the provisions of resolutions 425 (1978) and 427 (1978).

25. In concluding this report, I wish to pay a special tribute to the memory of those members of UNIFIL who have died in the cause of peace. I wish also to express by heartfelt condolences to the bereaved families and to the Governments concerned.

### **DOCUMENT S/12620/ADD.5**

*[Original: English]  
[13 June 1978]*

#### *General situation*

1. According to reports submitted by the Force, the situation in the UNIFIL area of operation remained stable during the period under review, but there were a number of firing incidents, particularly in the eastern sector.

2. The fourth and last phase of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon took place on 13 June. The operation was completed on the same day according to schedule.

#### *Strength and composition of the Force*

3. As of 13 June 1978, the strength of the Force was as follows:

<i>Infantry units</i>	
Fiji .....	500
France .....	703
Iran .....	714 (including 190 temporarily detached from UNDOF)
Ireland .....	665
Nepal .....	642
Nigeria .....	669
Norway .....	723
Senegal .....	634
<i>Logistic units</i>	
Canada .....	102 (including 11 temporarily detached from UNEF)
France .....	541
Norway .....	207
<b>TOTAL</b> .....	<b>6,100</b> (including 201 temporarily detached personnel)

4. In addition 42 military observers of UNTSO assist UNIFIL in the performance of its tasks.

5. The remainder of the Nigerian battalion, as well as the main bodies of the Fiji, Iranian and Irish contingents, has now arrived in the mission area. Following deployment of the Nigerian battalion in the central/western sector of the area of operation, the company of the UNEF Swedish battalion, which had been temporarily assigned to UNIFIL, was returned to its parent unit in Sinai on 17 May. Similarly, the Iranian company temporarily detached from UNDOF will rejoin its parent unit on the Golan Heights on or about 15 June, when the new Iranian battalion has completed its deployment.

6. The airlift of the Iranian and Nigerian contingents was arranged by their own Governments. The United Kingdom Government provided the airlift facilities for the personnel of the Fiji contingent, and the United States Government for the Irish contingent and for some equipment of the Fiji contingent. All these airlifts were made available free of charge to the United Nations. I wish to record my deep gratitude to the above-mentioned Governments for their generous voluntary contributions.

#### *Deployment of the Force*

7. The deployment of UNIFIL forces up to 13 June was essentially as described in the previous progress report [S/12620/Add.4], with the newly arrived Fiji, Iranian and Irish troops preparing to take over positions in their assigned sections.

8. Following the withdrawal of the Israeli forces on 13 June, UNIFIL plans to redeploy its troops with a view to extending its area of operation to the armistice demarcation line in the following way:

(a) The Senegalese battalion will remain in the northern half of the western sector with its base camp at Marakah. It will also maintain a guard detachment at Zahrani.

(b) The Fiji battalion is being deployed in the southern half of the western sector, with its battalion headquarters at Qana.

(c) The Nigerian battalion continues to man the central/western sector, with its base camp at Taysr Zibna.

(d) The Iranian battalion is being deployed in the central sector, with its base camp at At Taibe. Some of

the positions previously manned by the Nepalese battalion are being taken over by the Iranians.

(e) The Nepalese battalion continues to man the central/eastern sector between the Iranian and the Norwegian battalions. It is taking over some Norwegian positions in the Kaoukaba area.

(f) The Norwegian battalion continues to man the eastern sector, with its base camp at Ebel es Saqi.

(g) The French battalion is being redeployed in the south-western sector of the area of operation, with its battalion headquarters at Tibnin.

(h) The Irish battalion is scheduled to be deployed in the south-eastern sector of the area of operation.

(i) The Canadian signal unit continues to provide communication facilities for the Force.

(j) The French logistic component, less its engineer unit, is co-located with the Force headquarters at Naqoura. The engineer unit continues to be stationed at the village of Al Mantarah.

(k) The Norwegian logistic component is deployed in two locations: the maintenance company in the village of Tibnin and the air unit and the medical company with the Force headquarters at Naqoura.

(l) UNTSO military observers continue to man the five existing observation posts along the Israel-Lebanon border. Selected observers serve in staff positions at UNIFIL headquarters at Naqoura. Other observers are providing liaison with the various forces in Southern Lebanon. A team of two observers is now stationed at Château de Beaufort north of the Litani River to ensure liaison with the Palestinian command in that locality.

(m) A composite force of about 100, all ranks, to be composed of members of all eight infantry battalions of UNIFIL, will man the Tyre barracks as from 14 June.

#### *Contacts with the parties*

9. At my request, Mr. Roberto E. Guyer, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, visited the area from 19 to 24 May to discuss with the parties concerned certain problems concerning the implementation of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) which required urgent clarification.

10. On 20 May, Mr. Guyer met President Sarkis, Prime Minister El-Hoss and Foreign and Defence Minister Boutros at Beirut. On 21 May, he proceeded to Damascus, where he had an exchange of views with the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic, Mr. Khaddam. While at Damascus he also met Chairman Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization. On 22 May, he met the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Dayan, at Jerusalem.

11. The Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, has continued his contacts with all parties concerned on the steps to be taken for the speedy implementation of resolution 425 (1978), especially with regard to the withdrawal of Israeli forces. The Force Commander, Major-General E. A. Erskine, and the contingent commanders at the local level have been in constant touch with the parties on matters concerning the deployment and functioning of the Force.

12. During their meeting of 22 May, Foreign Minister Dayan informed Mr. Guyer of the decision of the Israeli Government to withdraw its forces completely from Lebanon by 13 June. The modalities for the with-

drawal were later the subject of intensive discussions between the Israeli authorities and Generals Siilasvuo and Erskine.

13. The meetings held by Mr. Guyer with the Lebanese authorities at Beirut were helpful in clarifying certain points pertaining to the implementation of the UNIFIL mandate. President Sarkis emphasized that the objective of UNIFIL was ultimately to assist in the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government in Southern Lebanon. This presupposed total withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory and the prevention of any armed elements not under the command of the Lebanese Government from infiltrating into or undertaking hostile activities in the UNIFIL area of operation. In this context, the President stated that the implementation of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) was totally independent of the position that the Lebanese Government might finally take concerning the Cairo agreement of 3 November 1969, which dealt with the presence of Palestinians in Lebanon, and he indicated that "while reserving its future position regarding its rights and interests in that agreement, the Government of Lebanon considers that no obstacle from whatever party should hinder the implementation of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) on the terrain for whatever pretexts or justifications". The clarifications given by President Sarkis to Mr. Guyer were confirmed in a letter which the President addressed to me on 30 May.

14. During his meeting with Mr. Arafat, Mr. Guyer reviewed with him the PLO commitment to co-operate fully with UNIFIL in the fulfilment of its tasks in Southern Lebanon. This question was later pursued by General Erskine with Mr. Arafat and his advisers. Mr. Arafat confirmed that, in pursuance of the guarantees already given to the Secretary-General, PLO would co-operate with UNIFIL and that it would not initiate hostile acts against Israel from Southern Lebanon, although it would continue such acts from other areas. While the question of the PLO presence in Southern Lebanon was a matter to be settled between PLO and the Lebanese Government, PLO would facilitate UNIFIL's tasks in response to the Secretary-General's appeal. In particular, PLO would refrain from infiltrating armed elements into the UNIFIL area of operation. The assurances given by PLO are in line with a five-point agreement concluded between Prime Minister El-Hoss and Chairman Arafat. Arrangements have been worked out to improve liaison between UNIFIL and PLO in order to avoid incidents. In the context of that agreement, for humanitarian as well as practical reasons and as an *ad hoc* interim arrangement, UNIFIL has agreed to allow the delivery, under UNIFIL control, of certain non-military supplies—food, water and medicine—to limited Palestinian groups still in its area of operation.

15. Following the announcement of the Israeli decision to withdraw from the remaining occupied area by 13 June, intensive discussions were held between United Nations representatives and the Government of Lebanon regarding the deployment of UNIFIL in the area to be evacuated and, in particular, regarding its relationship with the Christian armed elements under the command of Major Haddad in that area.

16. Pending full establishment of Lebanese authority, including military forces, in the UNIFIL area of operation, the Lebanese Government has taken the following position:

(a) That Major Haddad is provisionally recognized by the Lebanese Government as *de facto* commander of the Lebanese forces in his present area for the purpose of facilitating UNIFIL's mission.

(b) That the army command will issue instructions to Major Haddad to facilitate UNIFIL's mission and deployment. To this end the Lebanese army will appoint two senior officers to liaise with UNIFIL headquarters and will, as soon as possible, take measures to regularize the situation of Lebanese regular forces in the South.

(c) That the Lebanese Government has decided to move Lebanese army units to the South as soon as possible.

(d) That all border problems shall henceforth be discussed with UNIFIL and in the framework of a re-activated Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission, a meeting of which was held on 12 June, the Lebanese Government being represented by senior military officers from Beirut.

(e) That the Government of Lebanon wishes UNIFIL to exercise its full functions under resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) and will lend all assistance and support to this end.

17. In the light of the above position of the Lebanese Government, UNIFIL is engaging in the necessary discussions in the area, with a view to working out practical arrangements for its deployment and the fulfilment of its mission throughout the area of operation.

#### *Activities of the Force*

18. Up to the withdrawal of Israeli forces on 13 June, UNIFIL was deployed in a strip of land immediately south of the Litani River, the width of which varies from some 18 kilometres in the western and central sectors to from two to seven kilometres in the eastern sector. The main activities of the Force were aimed at ensuring the peaceful character of its area of operation. In this context, UNIFIL observed and supervised the cease-fire called for by the Security Council and controlled the movement of personnel and *matériel* into and within its area of operation.

19. This control was exercised mainly by manning check-points at various points of entry in co-operation with Lebanese gendarmes. UNIFIL troops prevented the entry into the area of all armed personnel that were not under the command of the Lebanese Government. Wherever such personnel were discovered within the area of operation, efforts were made to keep them under surveillance and, through negotiations and persuasion, to get them out of the area. Thus, when a sizeable group of armed Palestinian elements were discovered south of Barish on 12 May, intensive negotiations were carried out with PLO, both at the local level and at Beirut, which led the PLO leadership to issue an order withdrawing the group.

20. There were a number of firing incidents during the period under review. Most of these were isolated cases of firing, although major exchanges of fire took place on three occasions.

21. On 9 May, the post of the Norwegian battalion at Kaoukaba came under fire from Palestinian positions

north-west of the village. One Norwegian soldier was wounded by this fire, and the Norwegian unit returned the fire in self-defence. The Norwegian battalion commander subsequently made contact with the PLO representative in the area and succeeded in restoring the cease-fire. A protest was lodged by UNIFIL headquarters with the PLO leadership at Beirut.

22. On 13 June, the Israeli forces withdrew from the remaining occupied area in Southern Lebanon. The withdrawal process was verified by six teams of United Nations military observers. By 1700 hours GMT, all Israeli positions in the area of operation had been evacuated, and the Commander of UNIFIL confirmed to me that the Israeli forces had completely withdrawn from Southern Lebanon, as called for by resolution 425 (1978). Five of the positions evacuated by the Israeli forces have been taken over by UNIFIL: two by the Irish battalion and one each by the French, Nepalese and Norwegian battalions. Previously scheduled reconnaissance patrols have been carried out by the French, Nepalese and Irish battalions in anticipation of the occupation by them of nine additional positions by early 14 June. As indicated earlier, UNIFIL is engaging in the necessary discussions in the area with a view to working out practical arrangements for its deployment and the fulfilment of its mission throughout the area of operation.

23. With the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory and its confirmation by the Force Commander, the first part of the mandate entrusted to UNIFIL by the Security Council has been fulfilled. As indicated in my report of 19 March [S/12611] on the implementation of resolution 425 (1978) which was approved by the Security Council in its resolution 426 (1978), I envisaged the responsibility of UNIFIL as a two-stage operation. In the first stage, the Force would confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory to the international border. Once this was achieved, it would establish and maintain an area of operation as defined. In that connexion, it would supervise the cessation of hostilities, ensure the peaceful character of the area of operation, control movement and take all measures deemed necessary to assure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. The second phase has now begun in the entire area of operation. The tasks that face UNIFIL in the days ahead are both extremely important and enormously complex. The Force will be able to fulfil and to carry out its tasks only with the co-operation of all parties concerned. I earnestly hope that this co-operation will be extended to UNIFIL in full measure.

24. In concluding this progress report, I wish to pay a special tribute to the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, Lieutenant-General E. Siilasvuo, to the Commander of UNIFIL, Major-General E. A. Erskine, to the officers and men of the Force and its civilian staff, as well as to the military observers of UNTSO assigned to assist UNIFIL in the fulfilment of its responsibilities. All of them have performed with efficiency, dedication and courage the important, difficult and often dangerous tasks entrusted to them by the Security Council.

**Letter dated 3 April 1978 from the representative of South Africa  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[3 April 1978]

I have the honour to enclose the text of a letter addressed to you by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa, the Honourable R. F. Botha.

I should be grateful if this letter and its enclosures could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* J. Adriaan EKSTEEN  
*Chargé d'Affaires*  
*of the Permanent Mission of South*  
*Africa to the United Nations*

**ANNEX**

**Letter dated 3 April 1978 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of South Africa to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to refer to the note verbale addressed to you on 22 February 1978 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Lesotho [see S/12582] and in which it is, *inter alia*, alleged that "South Africa has unilaterally blockaded the south-eastern border of Lesotho".

As has been indicated to you in previous communications, South Africa has no jurisdiction over matters which fall within the domestic jurisdiction of sovereign, independent States, in this case the Republic of the Transkei. Since the border posts mentioned in Lesotho's note verbale do not affect traffic between South Africa and Lesotho, the assertion that South Africa has

sealed the south-eastern border is devoid of all truth. It would, moreover, not be surprising if any mission which might in future be despatched to Lesotho to look into this matter found, as the previous mission indicated in paragraph 28 of its report [S/12315 of 30 March 1977], that the border posts were in fact not closed as is alleged.

From the attached map (appendix I) it will be noted that, as you are already aware, Lesotho's access to the sea has always been through its borders with South Africa and not through its border with the Republic of the Transkei. In this regard, statistics regarding the volume of traffic flowing through the relevant border posts are also attached (appendix II). In accordance with the Customs Union and Monetary Agreement applicable between South Africa and Lesotho, there has been no interference of any kind with the movement of goods and persons along these routes.

South Africa welcomes international and domestic efforts to develop the economies of all developing countries and especially the economy of Lesotho. South Africa is, however, opposed to any effort to secure such assistance being linked to unfounded statements and assertions villifying South Africa.

*(Signed)* R. F. BOTHA  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs*  
*of South Africa*

**APPENDIX I**

[Map. Access roads and railways to Lesotho. See p. 12]


**APPENDIX II**

*Border traffic (Jan/Dec 1977): South Africa/Lesotho (persons)*

<i>Border post</i>	<i>Arrivals in the Republic of South Africa</i>	<i>Departures from the Republic of South Africa</i>
Caledonspoort .....	42 797	39 093
Ficksburg Bridge .....	797 580	888 254
Peka Bridge .....	11 857	10 776
Maseru Bridge .....	155 240	138 691
Van Rooyenshek .....	111 087	119 165
Sepapushek .....	9 557	9 323
Makhaleen Bridge .....	46 044	24 657
Ongeluksnek .....	1 129	1 097
Boesmansknek .....	1 137	1 063
Sani Pass .....	10 185	10 003
Marseilles (Railway station) .....	74 102	59 437
	<b>TOTAL</b> <u>1 260 715</u>	<u>1 301 559</u>
	<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<u>2 562 274</u>

*Border traffic between the Republic of South Africa and Lesotho (persons): July 1975 to July  
1976 (prior to the Transkei's independence)*

Telle Bridge .....	32 766	28 275
Qacha's Nek .....	20 991	15 407
Ramatsilitososhek .....	4 916	5 358
	<b>TOTAL</b> <u>58 673</u>	<u>49 040</u>
	<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<u>107 713</u>



Director - General of Surveys 1978.  
T.S.O. Misc. 8975

**DOCUMENT S/12628**

**Note verbale dated 4 April 1978 from the Mission of Mauritania  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: French]  
[4 April 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, referring to the Secretary-General's note of 29 March 1978 concerning Security Council resolution 418 (1977), has the honour to inform him of the following.

Since it attained independence, Mauritania has always abstained from relations of any kind with the racist régime of South Africa.

This position taken by Mauritania, which is based primarily on political and moral considerations, is also justified by the unequivocal decisions taken by the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States against the racist régime of Pretoria.

Since Mauritania became a Member of the United Nations it has always endeavoured to respect in the most scrupulous manner the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council concerning the *apartheid* policy of the South African régime.

Hence, it is in the same spirit and with the same readiness that the Government of Mauritania will implement resolution 418 (1977) imposing an arms embargo against the racist régime of South Africa.

The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania requests the Secretary-General kindly to have this note circulated as a Security Council document.

**DOCUMENT S/12629**

**Note verbale dated 4 April 1978 from the representative of Ethiopia  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[5 April 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations, referring to the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977 requesting information on the measures taken by the Government of Socialist Ethiopia to implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), has the honour to advise that the Government of Socialist Ethiopia has been acting and will continue to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of resolution 418 (1977).

In this connexion, the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia is authorized to reiterate the view of the Government of Socialist Ethiopia that the arms embargo now in force is insufficient and that a mandatory comprehensive economic sanction is needed to force the racist régime of Pretoria to abandon its abhorrent policy of *apartheid*.

The Permanent Representative of Ethiopia would be grateful if this communication were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12630**

**Note verbale dated 28 March 1978 from the representative of Greece  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[5 April 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977 concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 418 (1977).

Greece, having consistently condemned the policies of *apartheid* and racial discrimination, as was highlighted during the discussions of the question of South Africa in the United Nations, fully supports the provisions of resolution 418 (1977) and is taking all necessary measures for its strict implementation.

The Permanent Representative of Greece would be grateful if the Secretary-General could arrange for the circulation of this note as a document of the Security Council.

**Note verbale dated 5 April 1978 from the representative of Austria  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[6 April 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations has the honour, in reply to the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977 concerning Security Council resolution 418 (1977), to state the following on behalf of his Government.

The Federal Government of Austria has carefully considered the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977 which referred to the request addressed to the Secretary-General in paragraph 6 of resolution 418 (1977) to report to the Security Council not later than 1 May 1978 on measures taken by Governments in accordance with the provisions of the resolution.

The Federal Government wishes to state the following.

The theory and practice of *apartheid* and racial discrimination, in whichever form they exist, have consistently been denounced by Austria. The records of the United Nations show that Austria has acted in support of the endeavours of the Organization to put an end to these practices. Accordingly, Austria has complied on a voluntary basis with the non-mandatory arms embargo against South Africa adopted by the Security Council as early as 1963 [*resolution 181 (1963)*] and the subsequent resolutions reconfirming that embargo, i.e. resolutions 191 (1964), 282 (1970) and 311 (1972). It is therefore only natural that Austria welcomes resolution 418 (1977). Austria takes note of the Council's dictum that the acquisition by South Africa of arms and related matériel constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. Consequently, the competent Austrian authorities do not authorize arms exports to South Africa. Existing legislation, in particular the Federal Law on Import, Export or Transit of Military Matériel of 18 October 1977 (Federal Law Gazette No. 540), which entered into force on 1 January 1978, provides that any import, export or transit of military equipment and matériel (as specified in the Federal Government's Ordinance of 22 November 1977, also

in force since 1 January 1978 (Federal Law Gazette No. 624)) is subject to specific permission by the Federal authorities. The Federal Government wishes to assure the Secretary-General that no such permission will be granted for the export or transit to South Africa of any military matériel, as specified in the ordinance mentioned. (As a matter of record, no such permission has been granted for South Africa in the past.)

It follows from the foregoing that the Federal Government is implementing the mandatory arms embargo imposed by the Security Council against South Africa.

The implementation of mandatory sanctions adopted by the competent organs of the United Nations has specific implications for a permanently neutral state. Therefore, the Federal Government wishes to refer to and reiterate the considerations of principle relating to the international status of Austria as a permanently neutral country set forth in the Austrian reply to the Secretary-General's note of 17 December 1966 concerning mandatory sanctions in the case of Southern Rhodesia [*see S/7781/Add.2 of 9 March 1967, annex*].

Measures to implement resolution 418 (1977) are being taken without prejudice to the question of principle, whether Austria as a permanently neutral State Member of the United Nations is automatically bound by decisions of the Security Council regarding mandatory sanctions—a question which in the opinion of the Federal Government can only be decided in each single case on the basis of the specific situation and with due regard to the obligations which result, on the one hand, from Austria's membership in the United Nations and, on the other, from its permanent neutrality, of which all Member States had previously been notified [*ibid*].

The Permanent Representative of Austria requests the Secretary-General kindly to have this note circulated as a Security Council document.

**DOCUMENT S/12633\***

**Letter dated 6 April 1978 from the representative of Cyprus  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[6 April 1978]

Upon instructions from my Government, I wish to bring to your notice and to that of the members of the Security Council that, according to reliable information, the Turkish invading forces have, as from 3 April 1978, embarked upon a renewed process of colonization of yet another part of the new town of Famagusta which, as is well known, was never occupied but was kept as a sealed-off area pending arrangements for the return of its legitimate inhabitants.

The area which is now being colonized is situated north of Eleftheria Avenue and east of the Municipal Stadium. Approximately 120 houses and stores belonging to the expelled indigenous Cypriot inhabitants have been usurped and allotted to colonist-settlers from mainland Turkey, who are massively imported by Ankara in furtherance of its sinister design of changing by force the age-long demographic character of the island.

There is, moreover, reliable information to the effect that work is now under way for completing two high-rise apartment buildings near the Constantia Hotel area,

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/76-S/12633.



the construction of which was interrupted following the expulsion of the area's indigenous inhabitants by the Turkish forces. Hundreds more alien colonist-settlers are soon expected to occupy illegally these apartment complexes.

The fact that these latest instances of colonization of the new town of Famagusta, come at a time when the Turkish side is expected to submit its proposals should serve as a sad reminder of Ankara's duplicity, which has been amply demonstrated and documented during the various phases of the intercommunal talks. These actions are also indicative of the ruthless determination of the Government of Mr. Ecevit to proceed systematically with the complete colonization of even the new town of Famagusta, a policy which was always vigorously advocated by the Turkish Prime Minister. In this respect, attention is invited to our communication addressed to you on 22 July 1977 [S/12371] denouncing this projected illegality by the then caretaker government of Mr. Ecevit.

There can be no doubt that if Turkey were to continue with this unacceptable process of colonization and the perpetration of other faits accomplis in clear violation of international law and of the repeated United Nations resolutions on Cyprus—more specifically Security Council resolution 414 (1977) adopted unanimously on 15 September 1977—any prospects for a negotiated settlement of the question of Cyprus would be negated. It should also be mentioned that the Turkish side has, prior to and following the adoption of that resolution, given assurances to the Council itself, as well as to the Secretary-General and other interested parties, to the effect that the colonization of the new town of Famagusta would not be proceeded with.

It is, therefore, saddening to note that, while the Government of Cyprus looks positively towards the development of a meaningful and constructive dialogue on the basis of the specific provisions of the relevant United Nations resolutions, the Turkish Government, on the other hand, recalcitrantly persists with its aggressive policies aimed at destroying the Republic of Cyprus and condemning its people as a whole to a lifetime of misery and degradation. In the light of this, it should not come as a surprise for anyone that Ankara has yet to convince the world community of its genuine interest in a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem.

Thus, if this unacceptable situation were to continue unchecked, it would seem incumbent upon the Security Council, which has an obvious special responsibility towards Cyprus, to take a new look at the deteriorating situation in the island with a view to adopting the necessary measures for the long overdue implementation of its mandatory resolutions on Cyprus.

On behalf of my Government, I wish strongly to protest these new aggressive manifestations by Turkey against the non-aligned Republic of Cyprus and to emphasize their ominous repercussions on the prospects for a just and peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Joseph J. STEPHANIDES  
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.,  
of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/12634

#### Note verbale dated 6 April 1978 from the Mission of Mongolia to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]  
[7 April 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations has the honour, in reply to the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977, to inform him of the following.

The Mongolian People's Republic has not had and does not have any relations with the racist régime of Pretoria.

The Mongolian People's Republic has always advocated and continues to advocate the speedy elimination of the shameful system of *apartheid* and has wholeheartedly supported the oppressed peoples of South Africa who are struggling to abolish the last hotbeds of colonialism and racism.

On the basis of this position of principle, the Mongolian People's Republic fully supports the decision of the Security Council contained in its resolution 418 (1977).

The Permanent Mission of the Mongolian People's Republic requests that this note verbale should be issued as a Security Council document.

Letter dated 7 April 1978 from the representative of Cyprus  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[10 April 1978]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the fact that the living conditions of the enclaved Greek Cypriot inhabitants in the areas of the Republic under Turkish military occupation have recently become unbearable, as a result of the unthinkable inhuman practices systematically employed by the Turkish occupation forces and the colonist-settlers from Turkey. The indigenous inhabitants are thus forced to abandon their ancestral homes and lands in order to accommodate the massive importation of alien population from Turkey in furtherance of Ankara's calculated pursuit of changing by force the demographic structure of the island.

The medieval conditions of horror, torture and continuous harassment and threats, which are now applied more intensively to the remaining indigenous Greek Cypriot people, are described in the annex hereto.

At a time when there appears to be so much interest on an international level for promoting respect for human rights, there can hardly be any justification for inaction and apathy in the face of the impartially documented and internationally verified gross violations of fundamental human rights by the Turkish army of occupation against the people of Cyprus as a whole. For it should not be overlooked that the Turkish Cypriots suffer equally from the oppressive conduct of the Turkish army of occupation and the daily reported criminal activities of the colonist-settlers imported by the thousands from mainland Turkey.

The fact that these despicable acts, coupled with further aggressive actions to colonize the new town of Famagusta, are being perpetrated at a time when the Turkish side is expected to submit its long awaited proposals raises serious doubts as to the preparedness and sincerity of the Turkish side to enter into meaningful and constructive negotiations.

It follows then clearly that a necessary prerequisite for creating an atmosphere conducive to free and meaningful negotiations—as demanded by the relevant United Nations resolutions—is the fulfilment by the Turkish side of its solemn commitments undertaken during the previous rounds of intercommunal talks, notably that of the humanitarian agreement of 2 August 1975 [see S/11789, annex]. It may be recalled that Ankara, after having cashed in its share from that agreement, chose to ignore completely its corresponding obligations to allow the Greek Cypriot inhabitants in the occupied areas to live a normal life and instead proceeded with more expulsions and intensified tactics of oppression, harassment and brute force.

It is indeed a tragic irony that Ankara seems to be emboldened into continuing its inhuman practices of racial discrimination and genocidal elimination of the indigenous Cypriot population by the seeming indifference or reluctance of the Security Council to take expeditiously the long overdue remedial action against the aggressor.

As numerous incidents in recent history indicate, appeasement or undue tolerance as a means of pacifying an aggressor have never succeeded and, as such, could not be accepted in a United Nations era as a rational policy. Far from leading to a lasting solution of a problem or even to the containment of a certain situation, the policy of appeasement or tolerance in the face of aggression has all along led to renewed aggression by the same or other sources, thus dramatically increasing the dangers to international peace and security.

It would, therefore, seem understandable that recent signs of growing anarchy and international instability should give rise to serious concern by all segments on the international scene as to the future of the United Nations security system, the best system of collective security the international community has ever been able to devise.

Undoubtedly, a major negative contributor to this alarming state of affairs is the undue delay in resolving international disputes the solution of which would seem fairly easy if only the universal principles of international law and more particularly those enunciated in the Charter of the United Nations were promptly applied.

This is especially true in the case of the question of Cyprus where, despite the fact that repeated unanimous or near unanimous Security Council and General Assembly resolutions are being contemptuously disregarded and systematically violated by Turkey, the Security Council has so far appeared reluctant to take expeditiously, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter, the necessary measures against the guilty party. And this in spite of the fact that the Assembly has, by virtue of its resolutions 31/12 of 12 November 1976 and 32/15 of 9 November 1977, overwhelmingly requested the Council to "adopt all practical means to promote the effective implementation of its relevant resolutions in all their aspects"

This is why the Government of the Republic of Cyprus has consistently supported the need for strengthening the effectiveness of the Security Council through the scrupulous application of the specific provisions of the Charter, including those providing for enforcement measures, as the only effective deterrent against the evil of aggression.

In strongly denouncing these cruel and abhorrent acts of the Turkish army of occupation, I wish, on behalf of my Government, to express the hope that you and the members of the Security Council will find it possible to intervene effectively with the Turkish Government in order to put an end to such inhuman practices against the enclaved indigenous Greek Cypriot inhabitants, whose only "offence" is that they insist on not abandoning their ancestral homes and lands.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Joseph J. STEPHANIDES  
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.,  
of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/77-S/12635.

## ANNEX

### Tactics of oppression, harassment and brute force employed by Turkey's army of invasion against the indigenous Greek Cypriot inhabitants in the occupied areas of the Republic

All information received recently from the areas occupied by the Turkish army reveals the magnitude of the racial discrimination practised against the enclaved indigenous Cypriot inhabitants remaining in this area, on the mere criterion of their being Greek in origin, and the unbearable conditions under which these unfortunate people are forced to live. They are undergoing tremendous psychological and physical pressures and are deprived of the very basic human rights. The Turkish invading forces are using every possible means to drive these people from their homes and properties.

The following are certain forms of pressure and oppressive tactics which are currently being employed by the Turkish army of occupation in order to force these inhabitants to abandon their ancestral homes and lands:

1. Curfew coupled with orders to turn off the lights is in force in the occupied areas from 9 p.m. to 6 a.m. but only so far as the Greek Cypriot inhabitants are concerned.

2. The enclaved Greek Cypriots are not allowed to move out of their villages unless they obtain special written permission from the occupation "authorities", which is very rarely given, if at all. Also, they are not allowed to go freely to their fields nor to graze their animals.

3. The male Greek Cypriots from age 18 to 50, who in the past were taken as "prisoners" to Turkey, must present themselves to the "police stations" on fixed days and, if they fail to do so, are arrested and beaten up.

4. Greek Cypriot doctors are not allowed to visit the enclaved Greek Cypriots and the medical treatment afforded to the latter is completely insufficient—sometimes criminally negligent. A characteristic case, impartially verified, was that of Maria Chrysostomou, a young girl of 18 who was left to die by an indifferent Turkish doctor.

5. The Greek Cypriots are forbidden to talk to or communicate in any way with members of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, who themselves are closely watched by the Turkish army of occupation. Also, no free communication is allowed between the enclaved Greek Cypriots and the members of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

6. Greek Cypriot teachers are not allowed to proceed to the occupied areas in order to render their services. The functioning of Greek schools is forbidden and the equipment of many of them, such as books, writing materials and various instruments, has been confiscated by the Ankara forces of invasion. In fact, the only Greek secondary school in the township of Rizokarpaso was turned into a Turkish elementary school for the children of the colonist-settlers from Turkey. The Greek elementary school of Ayia Trias had the same fate. Consequently, young Greek Cypriots in need of education are forced to leave the areas of the Republic under Turkish military occupation so as to attend schools functioning in the free areas of the Republic.

7. Every form of direct physical violence is used against Greek Cypriots to force them to sign the so-called voluntary applications to leave their homes and land. There is objective testimony confirming a series of murders and rapes committed by the colonist-settlers from Turkey against these unfortunate people. Other forms of physical violence include breaking into Greek Cypriot homes and robbing the occupants, savage beatings, detention and ill treatment of Greek Cypriots in groups for a number of days, firing in the air and stoning houses during night time, and forced labour under the command of the Turkish military.

8. The importation and settlement of colonists from Turkey continues unabated. Mainland Turks break almost daily into Greek Cypriot homes and through threats and physical violence try to force their owners to leave, telling them that all houses now belong to them. Their activities have been a source of much suffering not only for the enclaved Greek Cypriots but also for Turkish Cypriots who themselves are in many respects victims of Ankara's aggression.

## DOCUMENT S/12636

### Letter dated 10 April 1978 from the representatives of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[10 April 1978]

On instructions from our Governments we have the honour to transmit to you a proposal for the settlement of the Namibian situation and to request that it should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

The objective of our proposal is the independence of Namibia in accordance with resolution 385 (1976), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 30 January 1976. We are continuing to work towards the implementation of the proposal.

(Signed) William H. BARTON  
Permanent Representative of Canada  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Rüdiger VON WECHMAR  
Permanent Representative  
of the Federal Republic of Germany  
to the United Nations

(Signed) M. Jacques LEPRETTE  
Permanent Representative of France  
to the United Nations

(Signed) James MURRAY  
Deputy Permanent Representative  
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain  
and Northern Ireland to the United Nations

(Signed) Andrew YOUNG  
Permanent Representative  
of the United States of America  
to the United Nations

### PROPOSAL FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE NAMIBIAN SITUATION

#### I. Introduction

1. Bearing in mind their responsibilities as members of the Security Council the Governments of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States have consulted the various parties involved in the Namibian situation with a view to encouraging agreement on the transfer of authority in Namibia to an independent government in accordance with resolution 385 (1976), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 30 January 1976.

2. To this end, our Governments have drawn up a proposal for the settlement of the Namibian question designed to bring about a transition to independence during 1978 within a framework acceptable to the people of Namibia and thus to the international community. While the proposal addresses itself to all elements of resolution 385 (1976), the key to an internationally acceptable transition to independence is free elections for the whole of Namibia as one political entity with an appropriate United Nations role in accordance with resolution 385 (1976). A resolution will be required in the Security Council requesting the Secretary-General to appoint a United Nations special representative whose central task will be to make sure that conditions are established which will allow free and fair elections and an impartial electoral process. The Special Representative will be assisted by a United Nations transition assistance group.

3. The purpose of the electoral process is to elect representatives to a Namibian Constituent Assembly which will draw up and adopt the Constitution for an independent and sovereign Namibia. Authority would then be assumed during 1978 by the Government of Namibia.

4. A more detailed description of the proposal is contained below. Our Governments believe that this proposal provides an effective basis for implementing resolution 385 (1976) while taking adequate account of the interests of all parties involved. In carrying out his responsibilities, the Special Representative will work together with the official appointed by South Africa (the Administrator-General) to ensure the orderly transition to independence. This working arrangement shall in no way constitute recognition of the legality of the South African presence in and administration of Namibia.

## II. *The electoral process*

5. In accordance with resolution 385 (1976), free elections will be held, for the whole of Namibia as one political entity, to enable the people of Namibia freely and fairly to determine their own future. The elections will be under the supervision and control of the United Nations in that, as a condition to the conduct of the electoral process, the elections themselves and the certification of their results, the United Nations Special Representative will have to satisfy himself at each stage as to the fairness and appropriateness of all measures affecting the political process at all levels of administration before such measures take effect. Moreover the Special Representative may himself make proposals in regard to any aspect of the political process. He will have at his disposal a substantial civilian section of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), sufficient to carry out his duties satisfactorily. He will report to the Secretary-General, keeping him informed and making such recommendations as he considers necessary with respect to the discharge of his responsibilities. The Secretary-General, in accordance with the mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council, will keep the Council informed.

6. Elections will be held to select a Constituent Assembly which will adopt a Constitution for an independent Namibia. The Constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of government. Every adult Namibian will be eligible, without discrimination or fear of intimidation from any source, to vote, campaign and stand for election to the Constitu-

ent Assembly. Voting will be by secret ballot, with provisions made for those who cannot read or write. The date for the beginning of the electoral campaign, the date of elections, the electoral system, the preparation of voters rolls and other aspects of electoral procedures will be promptly decided upon so as to give all political parties and interested persons, without regard to their political views, a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in the electoral process. Full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and press shall be guaranteed. The official electoral campaign shall commence only after the United Nations Special Representative has satisfied himself as to the fairness and appropriateness of the electoral procedures. The implementation of the electoral process, including the proper registration of voters and the proper and timely tabulation and publication of voting results, will also have to be conducted to the satisfaction of the Special Representative.

7. The following requirements will be fulfilled to the satisfaction of the United Nations Special Representative in order to meet the objective of free and fair elections:

(a) Prior to the beginning of the electoral campaign, the Administrator-General will repeal all remaining discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations, or administrative measures which might abridge or inhibit that objective.

(b) The Administrator-General will make arrangements for the release, prior to the beginning of the electoral campaign, of all Namibian political prisoners or political detainees held by the South African authorities so that they can participate fully and freely in that process, without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. Any disputes concerning the release of political prisoners or political detainees will be resolved to the satisfaction of the Special Representative acting on the independent advice of a jurist of international standing who will be designated by the Secretary-General to be legal adviser to the Special Representative.

(c) All Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or otherwise outside the Territory of Namibia will be permitted to return peacefully and participate fully and freely in the electoral process without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. Suitable entry points will be designated for these purposes.

(d) The Special Representative, with the assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and of other appropriate international bodies, will ensure that Namibians remaining outside of Namibia will be given a free and voluntary choice whether to return. Provision will be made to attest to the voluntary nature of decisions made by Namibians who elect not to return to Namibia.

8. A comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts will be observed by all parties in order to ensure that the electoral process will be free from interference and intimidation. The annex describes provisions for the implementation of the cessation of all hostile acts, military arrangements concerning the UNTAG, the withdrawal of South African forces, and arrangements with respect to other organized forces in Namibia, and with respect to the forces of SWAPO. These provisions call for:

(a) A cessation of all hostile acts by all parties and the restriction of South African and SWAPO armed forces to base.

(b) Thereafter, a phased withdrawal from Namibia, of all but 1500 South African troops within 12 weeks and prior to the official start of the political campaign. The remaining South African force would be restricted to Grootfontein or Oshivello or both and would be withdrawn after the certification of the election.

(c) The demobilization of the citizen forces, commandos and ethnic forces, and the dismantling of their command structures.

(d) Provision will be made for SWAPO personnel outside the Territory to return peacefully to Namibia through designated entry points to participate freely in the political process.

(e) A military section of UNTAG to ensure that the provisions of the agreed solution will be observed by all parties. In establishing the military section of UNTAG, the Secretary-General will keep in mind functional and logistical requirements. The five Governments, as members of the Security Council, will support the Secretary-General's judgement in his discharge of this responsibility. The Secretary-General will, in the normal manner, include in his consultations all those concerned with the implementation of the agreement. The United Nations Special Representative will be required to satisfy himself as to the implementation of all these arrangements and will keep the Secretary-General informed of developments in this regard.

9. Primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in Namibia during the transition period will rest with the existing police forces. The Administrator-

General will ensure the good conduct of the police forces to the satisfaction of the United Nations Special Representative and take the necessary action to ensure their suitability for continued employment during the transition period. The Special Representative will make arrangements, when appropriate, for United Nations personnel to accompany the police forces in the discharge of their duties. The police forces would be limited to the carrying of small arms in the normal performance of their duties.

10. The United Nations Special Representative will take steps to guarantee against the possibility of intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter.

11. Immediately after the certification of election results, the Constituent Assembly will meet to draw up and adopt a Constitution for an independent Namibia. It will conclude its work as soon as possible so as to permit whatever additional steps may be necessary prior to the installation of an independent Government of Namibia during 1978.

12. Neighbouring countries will be requested to ensure to the best of their abilities that the provisions of the transitional arrangements, and the outcome of the election, will be respected. They will also be requested to afford the necessary facilities to the United Nations Special Representative and all United Nations personnel to carry out their assigned functions and to facilitate such measures as may be desirable for ensuring tranquillity in the border areas.

#### DOCUMENT S/12637

#### Note verbale dated 4 April 1978 from the representative of Yugoslavia to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[10 April 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977 addressed to the Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council and Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia regarding resolution 418 (1977), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 4 November 1977 on the question of South Africa.

The Permanent Representative of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been instructed by his Government to convey the following.

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, dedicated to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and to the policy of non-alignment, has always resolutely opposed and condemned the policy of *apartheid* of the South African régime. Socialist and non-aligned Yugoslavia is lending unequivocal support and assistance to the people of South Africa and its liberation movement in its legitimate struggle for the total elimination of the system of *apartheid* and racial discrimination in South Africa.

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia does not maintain any diplomatic, political, economic, social, cultural, military or any other relations or contacts with the South African racist régime. Yugoslav airplanes, ships and other means of transportation of Yugoslav origin are forbidden by law to carry passengers or goods to or from South Africa. At the same time, South African airplanes and ships are forbidden to land in Yugoslav territory or to enter Yugoslav ports.

Yugoslavia considers that the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa constitutes a step in the action against the system of *apartheid*. In this sense, Yugoslavia hopes that the Security Council will adopt stricter measures against South Africa and that the mandatory arms embargo will be fully applied by all States Members of the United Nations.

The Permanent Representative of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has the honour to request that this note verbale should be issued as a document of the Security Council.

## ANNEX

Timing

SAG

SWAPO

UN

Other action

1. At date unspecified .....

SC passes resolution authorizing SG to appoint UNSR and requesting him to submit plan for UN involvement. SG appoints UNSR and dispatches UN contingency planning group to Namibia. SG begins consultations with potential participants in UNTAG.

2. As soon as possible, preferably within one week of Security Council action .....

SG reports back to SC. SG passes further resolution adopting plan for UN involvement. Provision is made for financing.

3. Transitional period formally begins on date of SC passage of resolution adopting SG's plan .....

General cessation of hostile acts comes under UN supervision. Restriction to base of all South African forces including ethnic forces.

As soon as possible: UNSR and staff (UNTAG) arrive in Namibia to assume duties. UN military personnel commence monitoring of cessation of hostile acts and commence monitoring of both South African and SWAPO troop restrictions. Begin infiltration prevention and border surveillance. Begin monitoring of police forces. Begin monitoring of citizen forces, ethnic forces, and military personnel performing civilian functions.

UNSR makes necessary arrangements for co-ordination with neighbouring countries concerning the provisions of the transitional arrangements.

4. Within six weeks .....

Restriction to base continues. Force levels reduced to 12,000 men. Restriction to base continues.

Appropriate action by UN High Commissioner for Refugees outside Namibia to assist in return of exiles. All UN activity continues.

Release of political prisoners/deportees wherever held begins and is to be completed as soon as possible.

Establishment in Namibia of provisions to facilitate return of exiles. Establishment and publication of general rules for elections.

Completion of repeal of discriminatory laws and restrictive legislation. Dismantlement of command structures of citizen forces, commandos and ethnic forces, including the withdrawal of all

South African soldiers attached to these units. All arms, military equipment, and ammunition of citizen forces and commandos confined to drill halls under UN supervision. AG to ensure that none of these forces will drill or constitute an organized force during the transitional period except under order of the AG with the concurrence of UNSR. AG with concurrence of UNSR determines whether and under what circumstances those military personnel performing civilian functions will continue those functions.

Completion of release of political prisoners/detainees wherever held.

All UN activity continues.

Restriction to base continues. Peaceful repatriation under UN supervision starts for return through designated entry points.

All UN activity continues. Military Section of UNTAG at maximum deployment.

Restriction to base continues.

Force levels reduced to 1,500 men, restricted to Grootfontein or Oshivello or both. All military installations along northern border would by now either be deactivated or put under civilian control under UN supervision. Facilities which depend on them (e.g., hospitals, power stations) would be protected where necessary by the UN.

7. Start of thirteenth week . . . .

8. On date established by AG to satisfaction of UNSR . . . . .

9. One week after date of certification of election . . . . .

10. At date unspecified . . . . .

11. By 31 December 1978 at the latest . . . . .

Official start of election campaign of about four months' duration.

Election to Constituent Assembly.

Convening of Constituent Assembly.

Conclusion of Constituent Assembly and whatever additional steps may be necessary prior to installation of new government.

Independence.

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AG = Administrator-General; SAG = South African Government; SC = Security Council; SG = Secretary-General; SWAPO = South West Africa People's Organization; UNSR = United Nations Special Representative; UNTAG = United Nations Transition Assistance Group.

**DOCUMENT S/12638**

**Note verbale dated 10 April 1978 from the representative of Malaysia  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[11 April 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations has the honour, with reference to the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977, to inform him that Malaysia has consistently and vigorously opposed the oppressive and inhuman nature of the *apartheid* system of South Africa. In accordance with this policy, the Government of Malaysia has no relations whatsoever, diplomatic, economic or otherwise, with the racist Government. Malaysia has also never traded arms with South Africa, nor has it the intention to do so in future. Malaysia thus pledges its full support to the implementation of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) and will strictly comply with its provisions.

The Permanent Representative of Malaysia has the honour to request that this communication should be issued as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12640\***

**Letter dated 11 April 1978 from the representative of Morocco  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: French]  
[12 April 1978]

On orders from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the fate which the Israeli illegal occupation authorities in Jerusalem intend to reserve for the Zaouia Aboul Ghaouth and the mosque attached to it — which are part of the Moroccan waqf foundations — under the ignoble Israeli policy of Judaization of the Holy City.

The fact is that the above-mentioned Zaouia and mosque, situated near the west wall of the Aqsa, have constituted the main obstacle to the plan for the complete Judaization of the neighbouring Muslim quarters. The latest attempt to which the illegal occupation authorities have had recourse with a view to the realization of their criminal plan is the announcement concerning the building of a road which would run through the Zaouia and the mosque in question.

It goes without saying that the destruction of these two historic monuments which have always been a

religious refuge for Moroccan pilgrims over a period of several centuries constitutes a grave violation of international law and of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on the status of Jerusalem, as well as of the decisions of UNESCO concerning the need to safeguard the Islamic cultural aspects of the Holy City.

I request you to intervene as quickly as possible with the Government of Israel so that it will refrain from carrying out its plan to open a road through the Zaouia and the Aboul Ghaouth mosque and thus destroy these two historic monuments which are, moreover, the property of the Moroccan waqf.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohamed Saleh ZAIMI  
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.,  
of the Permanent Mission of Morocco  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/78-S/12640.

**DOCUMENT S/12641**

**Letter dated 10 April 1978 from the Secretary-General  
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]  
[12 April 1978]

I have the honour to refer to the establishment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in pursuance of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). In my letter to you of 21 March 1978 [S/12616], I informed the Council of the measures taken to establish UNIFIL as quickly as possible. I later informed the Council that I had accepted the offers of the Governments of France, Norway and Nepal to provide contingents for UNIFIL.

As indicated in my progress report of 2 April 1978 [S/12620/Add.1], the Government of Senegal has agreed to provide a contingent for the Force, and it is my intention, subject to the usual consultations, to proceed expeditiously with all the necessary arrangements for this contingent to arrive in the area of operation at the earliest possible moment. I have also approached a number of other Governments for the provision of additional contingents for service with UNIFIL. I am con-



tinuing consultations in this regard, bearing in mind the principle of equitable geographical representation.

In my report to the Security Council of 19 March 1978 on the establishment of UNIFIL [S/12611], I informed the Council that I intended to examine the possibility of building on the existing logistic arrangements in the Middle East. In the event, this has not proved to be practicable and I have therefore requested the Governments of France and Norway to provide logistic support for the Force. Discussions have been held at Headquarters with military representatives of the two countries, and agreement has been reached as to the sharing of the responsibility for this urgent and vital task. More details on this matter are to be found

in paragraph 4 of my progress report of 8 April 1978 [S/12620/Add.2].

In the above-mentioned report to the Security Council on the establishment of UNIFIL, I proposed that Major-General E. A. Erskine, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, should be appointed Interim Commander. I wish now to inform the Council that it is my intention, subject to the consent of the Council, to appoint General Erskine Commander of the Force.

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kurt WALDHEIM  
Secretary-General

#### **DOCUMENT S/12642**

##### **Letter dated 12 April 1978 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[12 April 1978]

I wish to inform you that I have brought your letter dated 10 April 1978 concerning the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon [S/12641] to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They considered the matter in informal consultations on 12 April and agreed to the proposals contained in your letter.

The Chinese representative has informed me that China, not having participated in the voting on resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), dissociates itself from this matter.

(Signed) Andrew YOUNG  
President of the Security Council

#### **DOCUMENT S/12643**

##### **Note verbale dated 11 April 1978 from the representative of Nigeria to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[12 April 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note requesting information on the measures taken by his Government in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977).

The Federal Republic of Nigeria, since its independence in 1960, has never had any relations with the racist régime in South Africa. The Government of Nigeria believes in the total isolation of South Africa in all areas.

In this regard, the Federal Military Government is in the process of taking action against companies that operate in Nigeria and have dealings with South Africa. The Nigerian Government welcomes resolution 418 (1977) as a first step in the international programme of action against *apartheid*.

The Permanent Representative of Nigeria has the honour to request that this note verbale should be issued as a document of the Security Council.

#### **DOCUMENT S/12644**

##### **Note by the Secretary-General**

[Original: French]  
[13 April 1978]

The attached note verbale, dated 13 April 1978, has been addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Observer of Switzerland to the United Nations.

## TEXT OF THE NOTE

The Permanent Observer of Switzerland to the United Nations has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977 addressed to the head of the Federal Political Department concerning resolution 418 (1977), adopted on 4 November 1977 by the Security Council on the question of South Africa.

Switzerland, which is not a Member of the United Nations, is not bound by the decisions of the Security Council. However, the Permanent Observer, on instructions from his Government, would like to inform the Secretary-General that Switzerland, on its own initiative, introduced a general embargo, as early as 6 December 1963, on Swiss exports of weapons to the Republic of South Africa. This measure was confirmed and reinforced, in 1973, by the regulations laid down in the new federal law on war *matériel*. The prohibition of exports covers weapons, munitions, explosives and other equipment and separate parts that could be used for combat purposes. All exports of war *matériel* are strictly controlled, and violations are punishable under the provisions of the Swiss law on war *matériel*. This policy will continue to be applied in accordance with the legislation in force.

## DOCUMENT S/12645

**Letter dated 13 April 1978 from the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]  
[14 April 1978]

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a consensus on the question of Namibia adopted by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples at its 1107th meeting on 13 April 1978.<sup>4</sup>

In this connexion, I should also like to draw your attention to the records of the Special Committee containing the statements made by its members on the question.<sup>5</sup>

(Signed) Anders I. THUNBORG  
Acting Chairman

*Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*

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<sup>4</sup> Not reproduced in the present document. For the text, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 23*, chap. VIII, para. 12.

<sup>5</sup> A/AC.109/PV.1103-1107.

## DOCUMENT S/12646

**Note verbale dated 4 April 1978 from the Mission of Lesotho to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[14 April 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Lesotho to the United Nations has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note of 29 March 1978 regarding Security Council resolution 418 (1977) on the question of South Africa.

It has always been the policy of the Government of Lesotho not to buy arms from South Africa and, since Lesotho does not produce or stockpile weapons, she has not sold and does not sell arms to South Africa nor does she act as an intermediary in that respect. The Government of Lesotho therefore wishes to assure the Secretary-General that it will continue to adhere to this policy to fulfil its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and primarily to meet the requirements of resolution 418 (1977).

The Permanent Mission of Lesotho would be grateful if this note could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12647**

**Note verbale dated 6 April 1978 from the Mission of Yemen  
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[14 April 1978]*

The Permanent Mission of the Yemen Arab Republic to the United Nations, referring to the Secretary-General's note of 29 March 1978 regarding Security Council resolution 418 (1977), has the honour to inform him that the Yemen Arab Republic, faithful to the principle of the Charter of the United Nations, upholds all United Nations resolutions aimed at strengthening the mandatory sanctions against South Africa.

Furthermore, Yemen believes that the scope of these sanctions should be extended to isolate the racist minority régime in South Africa. It is relevant to draw attention to the existing relationship between Pretoria and Tel Aviv in regard to the manufacture and maintenance of arms referred to in paragraph 3 of the resolution, a fact which continues to be a significant obstacle to any effective measure against the policy of massive violence and killings practised by South Africa.

The Permanent Mission of Yemen would be grateful if this note could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12648\***

**Letter dated 14 April 1978 from the representative of Turkey  
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[14 April 1978]*

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 13 April 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) İlter TÜRKMEN  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations*

**ANNEX**

**Text of the letter dated 13 April 1978 from Mr. Nail Atalay  
to the Secretary-General**

I would like to refer to documents S/12626 of 31 March, S/12633 of 6 April and S/12635 of 10 April 1978, all of which are letters from representatives of the Greek Cypriot community containing unfounded allegations directed against the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and against Turkey.

At a time when efforts are being made under your auspices with a view to reactivating the intercommunal talks, the ever-increasing malicious Greek Cypriot propaganda against the Turkish side compels me to address this communication to you.

1. During the 2026th meeting of the Security Council, the Turkish Cypriot side categorically denied that there was "mass colonization" or "resettlement of Maraş in process". Since that

time, there has not been any development in this respect. I would reiterate once again that Maraş is situated within the borders of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and is subject to the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the Turkish Cypriot authorities.

2. As far as the living conditions of Greek Cypriots in the north are concerned, the Greek Cypriot allegations in this regard are also totally unfounded. Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus are accorded the same rights as Turkish Cypriots, including freedom of movement subject only to minimal security precautions. The following quotation from a Greek Cypriot daily newspaper, *Ammohustos*, of 17 February 1977 suffices to refute this allegation:

"Now, every Greek Cypriot who wants to go to Apostolos Andreas Monastery can do so. Before, only a priest was given permission to go to the monastery. Now the inhabitants of the Karpas area can go to the sea shore for fishing and bathing. Now, Greek Cypriot farmers and shepherds can go to their fields and meadows for work without any obstacle whatsoever. The Greek elementary schools, on the other hand, have been functioning regularly since 29 October."

3. Furthermore, I should like to state that the continued distortion of facts by the Greek Cypriot Administration, which has mobilized all its means and resources to promote anti-Turkish propaganda in the international arena, is totally incompatible with the need to engage in meaningful negotiations in order to promote rapidly a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem.

I should be grateful if this letter were to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/81-S/12648.

**DOCUMENT S/12649**

**Letter dated 3 April 1978 from the representative of Costa Rica  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: Spanish]  
[14 April 1978]

I have the honour to refer to your note dated 29 March 1978 concerning Security Council resolution 418 (1977) on the question of South Africa and to convey the following message from the Minister for External Relations of my country:

"I have the honour to inform you that my Government supports Security Council resolution 418 (1977) and wishes to reaffirm its continuing support for United Nations efforts to put an end to the evil policy of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa and to eliminate racial discrimination wherever it may occur.

"I most firmly reiterate Costa Rica's irrevocable condemnation of the policy of *apartheid* practised by the Government of South Africa and all forms of racial discrimination, which is totally at variance with

the Costa Rican sense of freedom, dignity, equality and respect for human rights.

"Costa Rica does not possess, manufacture or trade in any type of arms and, under its Constitution of May 1949, the army is banned as an institutionalized means of national defence.

"Costa Rica has been fulfilling and will continue to fulfil its commitment to the strict application of resolution 418 (1977)."

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Emilia C. DE BARISH  
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.,  
of the Permanent Mission of  
Costa Rica to the United Nations

**DOCUMENT S/12650**

**Letter dated 17 April 1978 from the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic  
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]  
[17 April 1978]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring the following to your attention.

Certain Israeli elements have infiltrated through the zone disengaging the forces in the Golan Heights and planted booby-trapped mines with a receiver-transmitter radio set near the main highway that links the town of Deraa with Damascus.

Upon investigation by the Syrian experts on 1 April, it was found that the radio set had been planted with the mines about three to five days earlier. Moreover, investigation and material evidence held by the Syrian experts proved that the above-mentioned set was provided with nuclear cells made recently in the United States and operating by means of radioactive substances whose use for military purposes is prohibited owing to their damaging effect on human life. Evidence also proved that the set was connected to the telephone cable which links Damascus with Amman.

This criminal act is a flagrant violation of elementary rules of human conduct and the principles of interna-

tional law, as well as a flagrant contravention of the Disengagement Agreement.

The Syrian Arab Republic, in disclosing these facts about the criminal Israeli behaviour, considers that the use by Israel of nuclear cells working with radioactive substances represents a new and dangerous manifestation in the course of the struggle in the Middle East.

Israel will have to bear all the consequences of this new criminal act and the Security Council is requested to take all the necessary measures and to impose the sanctions provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Taher AL-HUSSAMY  
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.,  
of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic  
to the United Nations

**DOCUMENT S/12651**

**Note verbale dated 17 April 1978 from the representative of Singapore  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[17 April 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Singapore to the United Nations has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977, referring to resolution 418 (1977) adopted by the Security Council on 4 No-

vember 1977 on the question of South Africa and requesting, in furtherance of paragraph 6 of that resolution, information on the measures taken by the Singapore Government in accordance with the provisions of the resolution.

The Permanent Representative has the honour to inform the Secretary-General that the Government of the Republic of Singapore has consistently condemned the *apartheid* policies of the Government of South Africa. The Government of the Republic of Singapore categorically states that, consistent with this stand, it has never supplied arms or related material to the Government of South Africa, nor has it entered into any contractual or licensing arrangements with that Government for the manufacture of any types of weapons, military equipment or supplies. The Government of the Republic of Singapore fully supports all initiatives taken to ensure strict compliance with the provisions of resolution 418 (1977).

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Singapore has the honour to request that this note should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

#### DOCUMENT S/12652

##### Note verbale dated 18 April 1978 from the Mission of the Bahamas to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[18 April 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas to the United Nations has the honour to refer to the note dated 6 April 1978 sent directly to the Secretary-General by the Minister for External Affairs of the Bahamas, and to request that this note should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

#### TEXT OF THE NOTE

The Minister for External Affairs of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note concerning resolution 418 (1977), adopted by the Security Council on 4 November 1977 on the question of South Africa.

The Minister for External Affairs wishes to inform the Secretary-General that the Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas strongly supports the call by the Security Council for a mandatory arms embargo to be universally applied against South Africa. The Minister wishes to assure the Secretary-General that the Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas intends to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of this resolution and confirms further that at no time in the past has the Government of the Bahamas knowingly been involved in any manner in the provision, by sale or transfer, to South Africa of arms or related materials of any type.

#### DOCUMENT S/12653\*

##### Letter dated 18 April 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[18 April 1978]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention and that of the members of the Security Council to a highly provocative statement made to the press at Vienna on 17 April 1978 by Professor M. Soysal, an official from Ankara responsible for the preparation of the Turkish proposals on Cyprus which were presented to the Secretary-General.

In his statement, Mr. Soysal openly threatened that "regrettable things might happen in the immediate future if the Turkish proposals were not accepted and the inter-communal talks not resumed". This new and arrogant

statement coming from a Turkish official denotes the emboldened aggressiveness of Ankara against Cyprus and its people, and further reveals the tactics of threats and blackmail through which Turkey now seeks to impose acceptance of its oppressive terms for a partitionist solution with annexation in prospect.

It should, perhaps, be recalled that repeated General Assembly and Security Council resolutions which demand the speedy withdrawal of the foreign forces of occupation and call for negotiations on constitutional issues stipulate that such negotiations should be "freely" conducted.

However, the continued presence in Cyprus of Turkish

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/84-S/12653.

occupation forces and their aggressive activities through faits accomplis and international crimes—with a view to changing by force the demographic structure of Cyprus—have constantly undermined the very purpose of the talks and rendered them devoid of all meaning.

At this juncture, the aforesaid inflammatory statement and other threatening moves from Turkey are calculated to frustrate all efforts towards free and meaningful negotiations for a just solution.

All these illegal actions in flagrant violation of repeated resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council now take a new form, that of imposing by diktat and threats of force, Ankara's pre-planned scheme

to legalize the demolition of the territorial integrity and the very independence of Cyprus and its people.

In strongly denouncing, on behalf of my Government, the above-mentioned aggressive Turkish utterances, I wish to express the earnest hope that you and the members of the Security Council will not lose sight of the ominous implications of such statements.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES  
Permanent Representative of Cyprus  
to the United Nations*

#### **DOCUMENT S/12654**

##### **Note verbale dated 13 December 1977 from the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Samoa to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[19 April 1978]*

The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Samoa has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977 concerning resolution 418 (1977) adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 4 November 1977 on the question of South Africa.

The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Samoa further has the honour to advise that Samoa has no dealings with South Africa in the field covered by the resolution and that it intends to observe fully the provisions of the resolution.

#### **DOCUMENT S/12655\***

##### **Letter dated 18 April 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[19 April 1978]*

Upon instructions from my Government, and further to my letter of 18 April 1978 [S/12653], I have the honour to draw your attention and that of the members of the Security Council to a further and serious aggressive action by Turkey against the Republic of Cyprus.

This morning, Turkish military aircraft flying at a low altitude violated the air space of Cyprus. According to United Nations sources, these violations involved two fighter aircraft which made seven passes in the area west of Nicosia at 9 a.m. and later at 9:28 a.m. in the area north of Yerolakkos.

These Turkish military activities at this very critical moment are contrary to and flagrantly violate the Security Council resolutions on Cyprus which urge "utmost restraint" and call upon the parties to refrain "from any unilateral or other action likely to affect adversely the prospects of negotiations for a just and peaceful solution" to the Cyprus problem.

The above aggressive actions came right after the arrogant and provocative declaration of the Prime Minister, Mr. Ecevit, to the effect that 28,000 Turkish occupation troops would continue to remain on the territory of the Republic. Furthermore, they follow in sequence the threat pronounced the day before by the Turkish constitutional adviser, Mr. Soysal, to the effect that "regrettable things might happen in the immediate future if the

Turkish proposals were not accepted and intercommunal talks not resumed."

The close connexion between these three separate events clearly shows the motive behind them, namely to impose acceptance of Turkish terms through intimidation and threats of force on the eve of the Secretary-General's arrival in Cyprus for consultations. The timing of these activities and the circumstances in which they take place constitute a blackmailing of the Government during the consultations with the Secretary-General and at the same time a lack of respect for the latter's person.

Indeed, Turkey is now unabashedly following a gun-boat diplomacy—impermissible in a United Nations age—in the pursuit of its expansionist aims against Cyprus.

On behalf of my Government, I wish emphatically to protest against the above illegal Turkish military activities and strongly to denounce their sinister and disruptive purposes.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES  
Permanent Representative of Cyprus  
to the United Nations*

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/85-S/12655.

**DOCUMENT S/12656**

**Note verbale dated 18 April 1978 from the representative of Jamaica  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[19 April 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the United Nations, referring to the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977 concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), has the honour to state the following on behalf of his Government.

The Jamaican Government has consistently condemned the policies of *apartheid* and racial discrimination and fully implements all United Nations resolutions calling for sanctions against South Africa. Jamaica has no relations of any kind with the racist régime of South Africa and will continue to abide strictly by that policy.

While welcoming the adoption of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), the Government of Jamaica would like to emphasize that further action by way of the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions is necessary to force the racist Pretoria régime to abandon its criminal policy of *apartheid*.

The Permanent Representative of Jamaica would be grateful if the Secretary-General could arrange for the circulation of this note as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12657**

**Letter dated 19 April 1978 from the Secretary-General  
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]  
[20 April 1978]

On completing my visit to the area, I wish to inform the Security Council without delay of the current state of affairs concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978), especially in relation to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory. In the light of my visit to the area of operation, I shall be communicating in a separate letter my further recommendations concerning the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

During my visit to the area, I had extensive talks with the President, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Lebanon concerning the implementation of resolution 425 (1978) in all its parts. I also had talks with Mr. Arafat concerning practical arrangements for the implementation of the resolution. I shall be reporting more fully on this aspect of my visit at a later stage.

In Israel, I had talks with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister concerning the implementation of resolution 425 (1978) and especially the question of Israeli withdrawal. During these talks, I stressed the urgent need for withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978). The Prime Minister assured me of the firm intention of Israel to withdraw completely from Lebanese territory.

In this connexion, I have now been informed by the Israeli authorities of the following specific steps in this regard.

For purposes of withdrawal, Israel proposes that the

withdrawal should take place in two phases, from a central area, from which the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) will be completely withdrawn by 30 April 1978, and from a belt along the armistice demarcation line in the south and to the north, the withdrawal from which will be arranged in the near future. A map delineating this plan will be provided to the members of the Council as soon as possible.

The central area, from which the IDF will complete its withdrawal on 30 April 1978, may be described as follows: the area of withdrawal south of the Litani is bordered on the west by the Mediterranean, in the south by grid line 672 and in the east by an approximate north-south line 2 kilometres east of the villages of Majdal Silm, Jwayya and Qana. This central area covers approximately 550 square kilometres and, together with the area previously vacated by Israel on 11 and 14 April, amounts to approximately 750 square kilometres and represents approximately 65 per cent of the total territory of Southern Lebanon occupied by Israel.

I have instructed General Siilasvuo to continue, as a matter of urgency, his contacts with the Israeli authorities with a view to complete withdrawal of Israeli forces in accordance with resolution 425 (1978).

I should be grateful for the possibility of elaborating orally to the members of the Security Council on the above letter at the earliest opportunity.

(Signed) Kurt WALDHEIM  
Secretary-General

**DOCUMENT S/12658**

**Letter dated 14 April 1978 from the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]  
[20 April 1978]

On behalf of the Group of African States, I have the honour to confirm to you in writing the following.

In the light of the request of the Western members of the Security Council relating to a meeting of the Council on the situation in Namibia, the Group of African States met on Thursday 13 April 1978, to discuss this question. They unanimously agreed that such a meeting of the Council at the moment would be untimely and inopportune. The main reasons in support of this opinion are:

(a) The forthcoming special session of the General Assembly on the question;

(b) The fact that the parties directly concerned, the South African régime and SWAPO, have not yet reacted officially on the latest proposals of the Western Powers.

Taking into account the foregoing, the Group of African States has instructed me to inform you, and through you the members of the Council, of its inability to associate itself with any meeting of the Council on the situation in Namibia which would take place before the special session.

It would be appreciated if you could have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Sebastian CHALE  
Alternate Permanent Representative  
of the United Republic of Tanzania  
to the United Nations

**DOCUMENT S/12659**

**Note verbale dated 11 April 1978 from the representative of the Sudan to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[20 April 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan to the United Nations, referring to the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977 addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, has the honour to convey the following.

As is well known, the Democratic Republic of the Sudan has never had relations of any kind with the racist régime of South Africa.

The Sudan has always strongly advocated and will continue to advocate that the disgraceful system of *apartheid* should be brought to a speedy end.

The Democratic Republic of the Sudan has expressed its unequivocal support for the people of South Africa in their just struggle for liberation and national independence.

The Democratic Republic of the Sudan believes that a quick dismantling of the system of *apartheid* does not only require a mandatory military embargo but also a mandatory economic embargo.

The Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan respectfully requests that this note verbale should be circulated as a Security Council document.

**DOCUMENT S/12661\***

**Letter dated 25 April 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[25 April 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 25 April 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a

document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ilter TÜRKMEN  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/87-S/12661.



ANNEX

**Text of the letter dated 25 April 1978 from Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General**

I have been instructed by the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus to refer to the letters of Mr. Zenon Rossides, the representative of the Greek Cypriot Administration, which were circulated on 18 and 19 April 1978 as documents S/12653 and S/12655 respectively, and to inform you that the allegations contained therein are totally unfounded.

1. The following is the text of the statement made by the spokesman of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in connexion with the complaint that the Greek Cypriot air space had been violated by the Turkish Air Force:

"The Turkish peace force which is in Cyprus under the international treaties to prevent the massacre of the Turkish Cypriot community and to defend the island's independence by preventing enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) is safely guarding peace and security in the island. This force held a military exercise in the area of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus on 18 April 1978 with the prior knowledge of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and UNFICYP authorities. During this exercise, no Turkish aircraft violated the airspace under the control of the Greek Cypriot Administration. Therefore, the protest of the Greek Cypriot Administration in this respect is based on malicious lies."

2. As regards the allegation that Professor Mümtaz Soysal, the constitutional adviser to the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, had threatened the Greek Cypriot side, it is completely untrue.

Professor Soysal, in a reply to a question put forward by the press at Vienna, stated that the Turkish Cypriot proposals established a negotiating position and that it would be impossible to go further at this stage, before starting the actual discussions at the negotiating table.

He also added that, if the other side rejected this gesture of good intention on the part of the Turkish Cypriot community without proper evaluation, a good opportunity would be lost and it would constitute a rather unfortunate development. He emphasized further that no threat was ever intended.

3. Since 1974, the Greek Cypriot side has got away with the propaganda that Turkish Cypriot proposals have not been concrete and substantial. With this excuse in hand, the Greek Cypriot leadership preferred international propaganda to serious negotiations. According to it, the proposals should first be concrete and substantial and only then could the negotiating process start. Now that the Turkish Cypriot proposals have been termed by the Secretary-General to be concrete, substantial and voluminous, the Greek Cypriot leadership chooses to denigrate these proposals on the ground that they do not provide the basis for negotiations. This attitude, if maintained, can only indicate that the Greek Cypriot leadership is in any case unwilling to engage in serious negotiations and constantly looking for excuses for evasion.

I should like further to state and confirm on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community that my side is ready to resume the intercommunal talks under your auspices.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12662**

**Note verbale dated 18 April 1978 from the representative of Malta to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[25 April 1978]

The Acting Permanent Representative of Malta to the United Nations has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note dated 10 November 1977.

On instructions from his Government, and after all competent departments have been contacted, the Acting Permanent Representative of Malta wishes to advise that no relations of any nature exist between his country and the Government of South Africa and that the provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) have in the past been and will in future be strictly complied with. In addition, the Government of Malta has on all suitable occasions consistently denounced and resolutely opposed the evil policy of *apartheid*.

The Acting Permanent Representative of Malta has the honour to request that this information should be brought to the attention of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) and that this communication should be issued as a document of the Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12663**

**Note verbale dated 20 April 1978 from the representative of Nepal to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[26 April 1978]

The Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Nepal to the United Nations, referring to the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977, has the honour to inform him that Nepal has always opposed the repugnant and obnoxious system of *apartheid* which is the avowed official policy of the racist régime of South Africa. The international community is fully aware that Nepal has no relations whatsoever with the racist Government. Nepal whole-heartedly supports Security Council resolution 418 (1977) and believes that its effective implementation would be a positive step towards the total eradication of *apartheid* in South Africa.

The Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Nepal would appreciate it very much if this note could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12664**

**Note verbale dated 21 April 1978 from the representative of Somalia  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[26 April 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Somali Democratic Republic to the United Nations, referring to the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977 concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), has the honour, on behalf of the Somali Government, to communicate the following.

The Government of the Somali Democratic Republic, as a founding member of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, has continuously stood steadfast against the heinous policies of *apartheid* and racial discrimination. Accordingly, the Somali Government has consistently implemented the United Nations resolutions calling for sanctions against such inhuman practices. To this end, the Somali Government has promulgated laws prohibiting all relations with South Africa and these laws are fully enforced.

The Government of the Somali Democratic Republic strictly implements the provisions of resolution 418 (1977) and wishes to express its earnest hope that the international community will take further measures such as comprehensive economic sanctions against the *apartheid* régime in South Africa.

The Permanent Representative of the Somali Democratic Republic has the honour to request that this note verbale should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12665**

**Note verbale dated 21 April 1978 from the representative of Equatorial Guinea  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: Spanish]  
[26 April 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the United Nations has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977, in which he requested information on measures taken by the Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977).

Since attaining independence, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea has never had any relations with the racist régime of South Africa. The Government of Equatorial Guinea is in favour of the total isolation of South Africa in every sphere. Guinean legislation discriminates against the State of South Africa in matters of trade, economy, defence etc.

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea has the honour to request that this note should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12666**

**Letter dated 25 April 1978 from the Secretary-General  
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]  
[26 April 1978]

I have the honour to refer to the establishment and functioning of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in pursuance of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).

Following consultation with the Security Council [S/12641 and S/12642], I have accepted the offer of the Government of Senegal to provide a battalion for UNIFIL. When this battalion and the remainder of the logistic units arrive in the mission area by the end of April, the Force will have a total strength of about 3,500, excluding the Iranian and Swedish companies on temporary assignment with UNIFIL (about 400) which will have to return to their parent units in the near future.

In response to my approach, the Government of Nigeria has also agreed to make available a battalion for service with UNIFIL. It is my intention, subject to the usual consultations, to accept this offer. The inclusion of the Nigerian battalion would bring the Force to the total strength authorized by the Security Council, which is "of

the order of 4,000" [S/12611 of 19 March 1978, para. 9 c].

You will recall that, at its informal meeting of 20 April, I advised the Security Council that it might be necessary to increase the strength of the Force to the level of 6,000 if UNIFIL was to perform fully and effectively the tasks entrusted to it by the Council. I am following this matter closely and shall report to the Council on it in the near future.

I should be most grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kurt WALDHEIM  
Secretary-General

#### DOCUMENT S/12667

##### Letter dated 26 April 1978 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[26 April 1978]

I have brought your letter dated 25 April 1978 [S/12666] concerning the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to the attention of the members of the Security Council. I wish to inform you that I have consulted the members of the Council on the matter and that they agree with the proposal concerning the Nigerian contingent contained in your letter.

The Chinese representative has informed me that China, not having participated in the voting on resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), dissociates itself from this matter.

(Signed) Andrew YOUNG  
President of the Security Council

#### DOCUMENT S/12669\*

##### Note verbale dated 12 April 1978 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[28 April 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations has the honour to transmit to the Secretary-General, upon instructions from the Government of Jordan, the text of a communication pertaining to further Israeli actions designed to evacuate and demolish the historic premises of the Abu-Median al-Ghouth religious and historic site which is almost seven centuries old and which is adjacent to the Al Aqsa Mosque within the Holy Sanctuary. The information which I am communicating herewith is authentic beyond any shadow of doubt and is part of a plan to complete the destruction of the remaining Maghreb (Arab-North African philanthropic foundation) and to obliterate what has remained of the Arab-Islamic and religious Maghreb legacy and presence in the area.

Inspections on the spot by qualified engineers of the waqf custodians have revealed that the depths of diggings below these premises has already reached 11 metres, which could lead to a collapse of the said historic and religious premises.

Furthermore, it is the definite view of the Jordanian Government that, unless immediate measures are taken to halt forthwith the current diggings, the collapse of these historic premises will become imminent. This would constitute a changing of the historic, religious and demographic landscape of occupied Arab Jerusalem in flagrant violation of numerous resolutions on this matter of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, in addition to violating articles 53 and 55 of the Hague Convention.

It is the earnest hope of the Permanent Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan that the Secretary-General will take prompt action to ensure the cessation of the new Israeli encroachments upon the historic structures and people of the aforementioned areas.

On account of the seriousness with which the Jordanian Government views these unfolding developments, the Permanent Representative further requests that this note and the communication from the Government of Jordan should be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/88-S/12669.

It is with regret that the Permanent Representative takes this opportunity to recall that no reply has been received to his previous communication dated 21 February 1978 [S/12575] concerning a similar serious violation which is endangering the integrity of the Holy Sanctuary at Jerusalem. If Israel fails to reply positively to the present and previous complaints, the Permanent Representative will be left with no alternative but to bring up the matter before the Security Council, as he has done in the past on several occasions, and request the Council to shoulder its responsibilities, in the light of its own resolutions and its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.

#### ANNEX

##### Communication from the Government of Jordan concerning new Israeli attempts to evacuate and demolish the Zawiyah of Abu-Median al-Ghouth, adjacent to the Al Aqsa Mosque at Jerusalem

1. Irrefutable information has been received to the effect that the Zawiyah of Abu-Median al-Ghouth, an Islamic hospice located in the middle of the Magharbah Quarter adjacent to the sacred Al Aqsa Mosque, and the remaining properties of the Magharbah waqf charitable foundations adjoining it are at present threatened with demolition and with the expulsion of residents and custodians, thereby erasing the cultural and religious heritage of the Arab-Islamic Maghreb (North Africa) in the aforementioned area.

2. This structure and the mosque adjoining it have been and continue to be, in the view of the Israeli military occupation authorities, an obstacle to the complete implementation of measures to transform the remainder of the five Islamic quarters adjacent to the Western Wall of the Jerusalem Holy Sanctuary into Jewish areas. The aforementioned quarters were illegally seized by the Israeli occupation authorities on 18 April 1968, in defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

In order to dispose of the Zawiyah and the adjoining mosque, the Israeli occupation authorities have resorted to three different methods:

(a) They attempted to persuade the custodians of the Zawiyah and the Magharbah Foundation to exchange these premises for residential premises within the Old City and to transfer the custodians and residences to the new premises. These attempts were turned down by the custodians of the Magharbah Foundation.

(b) They carried out deep excavations near the site, starting in early 1976. This was a repetition of operations which the occupation authorities have undertaken with regard to the hundreds of neighbouring structures and their inhabitants over the past nine years and which has resulted in serious structural damage, followed by their demolition and, finally, the expulsion of their inhabitants. The new excavations caused deep concern to the Islamic waqf authorities at Jerusalem. They requested their engineers to carry out an on-the-spot inspection and to assess the dangers the excavations could cause to the safety of the Zawiyah and the adjoining mosque. The engineers carried out the inspection entrusted to them and submitted a report on 26 April 1976 which read as follows:

"We carried out an inspection on the site of the premises of Abu-Median al-Ghouth on 26 April 1976 and came to the following conclusion:

- "(i) The society known as The Jewish Quarter Development Corporation has already begun to demolish the structures located 20 metres east of the site, using heavy equipment. Almost half of this demolition phase has been completed.
- "(ii) The depth of the excavation has reached 11 metres below the basement of the said premises.
- "(iii) If this deep excavating should continue in the direction of the premises, it will cause the foundations to tilt, owing to the displacement of earth, thereby causing the collapse of the entire premises.
- "(iv) These operations must stop forthwith in order to preserve this structure. Precautions must be taken to prevent the disturbance of earth adjacent to the foundations of the premises and to stop the eventual collapse of the premises by building a supporting wall at an appropriate distance from the structure's frontage."

It appears that the efforts which the Waqf Department has made to resist the implementation of this phase of the plan have led to a temporary postponement of the plan;

(c) The custodians of the Zawiyah and the Islamic Waqf Department in Jerusalem were taken by surprise when the Israeli occupation authorities recently announced a plan to build a new road, under the guise of town planning, which would pierce directly through the Zawiyah and adjoining mosque. Preliminary measures have already been initiated to carry out the plan.

3. It should be noted that the Zawiyah of Abu-Median al-Ghouth—the latest prospective victim of Israeli aggression and Judaization—is one of the oldest Maghreb Islamic institutions at Jerusalem. It was founded by the Algerian ascetic scholar Sheikh Abu-Median ibn Abdullah al-Ghouth, in the Hegira year 720 (678 years ago according to the Muslim calendar). The adjoining mosque was built by the dedicated Maghreb (Moroccan) scholar Sheikh Omar al-Mujarrad, in the Hegira year 730 (668 years ago).

Since its foundation, the Zawiyah has served as a religious and scholastic sanctuary for pilgrims coming from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya to Jerusalem. Properties were bequeathed to it in order that it might carry out the following functions:

- (a) To provide Islamic religious instruction with particular emphasis on Sufism (mysticism);
- (b) To accommodate scholars and poor Muslim pilgrims from North Africa;
- (c) To provide assistance to poor Muslim families which have come from North Africa and have chosen to live in the vicinity of the Al Aqsa Mosque.

4. The Zawiyah and the mosque constitute premises for worship and charitable purposes. Their status is governed by articles 53 and 55 of the Hague Convention, according to which occupation authorities are prohibited from tampering, in any way, or by whatever means, with all structures devoted to worship, charitable works, scholarly pursuits and arts. The articles apply equally to historic premises whether these are owned by the preceding State or by institutions or individuals.

5. Reports received from Jerusalem carried appeals to the Jordanian Government to intervene promptly by transmitting this information to the United Nations and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and requesting that an on-the-spot investigation should be carried out immediately, that prompt action should be taken to stop the proposed new road and that an end should be put to the continuous acts of aggression.

**DOCUMENT S/12670**

**Letter dated 27 April 1978 from the representative of Angola  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[28 April 1978]

I have the honour to refer to your note of 29 March 1978 regarding Security Council resolution 418 (1977) and to transmit the text of a message, dated 27 April 1978, sent to you by Mr. Paulo Jorge, Minister for External Relations of the People's Republic of Angola.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the message circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Elisio DE FIGUEIREDO  
Permanent Representative of Angola  
to the United Nations

**TEXT OF THE MESSAGE**

I have the honour to inform you that my Government fully supports Security Council resolution 418 (1977)

and wishes to reaffirm its total and continuing support for all efforts aimed at eradicating the evil policy of *apartheid*, racism and racial discrimination of the minority régime of Pretoria.

True to the principles of self-determination, social justice and genuine independence which have guided the national liberation struggle of the heroic Angolan people, my Government will always support the liberation movements against imperialism and racism wherever they may occur.

Finally, I should like to reiterate that my Government has not had and does not have any dealings whatsoever, whether in the armaments field or otherwise, with the racist régime of Pretoria, and condemns such links wherever they exist.

**DOCUMENT S/12671**

**Note verbale dated 27 April 1978 from the Mission of Algeria  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: French]  
[27 April 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria to the United Nations, referring to the Secretary-General's note dated 10 November 1977 concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), by which the Security Council decided, *inter alia*, to impose an immediate and total embargo on the supplying of arms to South Africa, has the honour to state the following.

The Algerian Government wishes to reaffirm that, in accordance with its policy of struggle against colonialism and racism and of active support for the national liberation movements fighting to assert their rights to self-determination and independence, it has consistently acted in strict conformity with the provisions of the above-mentioned resolution.

In connexion specifically with the policy of *apartheid* practised by the South African régime and with particular reference to the operative part of resolution 418 (1977), the Algerian Government welcomes the progress

made within the international community towards liquidating the régime of racial discrimination and *apartheid*. In this connexion, the Algerian Government is firmly convinced that, in conformity with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, measures having binding force must be taken with a view to the full application against the racist régime of South Africa of a complete embargo on arms in order to bring about the eradication of the odious policy of *apartheid*.

In these circumstances, Algeria not only will continue and intensify its unswerving support of and its solidarity with the just struggle waged by the people of South Africa under the leadership of their national liberation movement but also will continue to work without respite in the international community for the isolation and liquidation of the régime of South Africa.

The Permanent Mission of Algeria would be grateful if the Secretary-General would have the text of this note circulated as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12672**

**Note verbale dated 24 April 1978 from the representative of the United Arab  
Emirates to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[28 April 1978]

The Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations, referring to the Secretary-General's note dated 10 November 1977 regarding the measures taken by the Government of the United Arab Emirates in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), has the honour, upon instructions from his Government, to communicate the following.

Guided by its condemnation and rejection of the policy of *apartheid* and by its adherence to and compliance with the resolutions adopted by the various organs of the United Nations on this matter, the United Arab Emirates has always maintained and applied and will continue to maintain and apply a policy of no interaction, direct or indirect, with the racist régime of South Africa. Accordingly, the United Arab Emirates has never been engaged and will never engage in any dealing, military or otherwise, with that racist régime.

Consistent with its policy on this matter and in conformity with its support for the African people in their struggle for freedom and self-determination, the United Arab Emirates whole-heartedly welcomes the adoption of resolution 418 (1977) and will faithfully adhere to and comply with its provisions.

The Chargé d'Affaires a.i. would be grateful if this note could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

## DOCUMENT S/12673

### Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 418 (1977)

[Original: English]  
[28 April 1978]

1. At its 2046th meeting on 4 November 1977, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, unanimously adopted resolution 418 (1977), which reads as follows:

*"The Security Council,*

*"Recalling its resolution 392 (1976) of 19 June 1976, strongly condemning the South African Government for its resort to massive violence against and killings of the African people, including schoolchildren and students and other opposing racial discrimination, and calling upon that Government urgently to end violence against the African people and to take urgent steps to eliminate apartheid and racial discrimination,*

*"Recognizing that the military build-up by South Africa and its persistent acts of aggression against the neighbouring States seriously disturb the security of those States,*

*"Further recognizing that the existing arms embargo must be strengthened and universally applied, without any reservations or qualifications whatsoever, in order to prevent a further aggravation of the grave situation in South Africa,*

*"Taking note of the Lagos Declaration for Action against Apartheid,*

*"Gravely concerned that South Africa is at the threshold of producing nuclear weapons,*

*"Strongly condemning the South African Government for its acts of repression, its defiant continuance of the system of apartheid and its attacks against neighbouring independent States,*

*"Considering that the policies and acts of the South African Government are fraught with danger to international peace and security,*

*"Recalling its resolution 181 (1963) of 7 August 1963 and other resolutions concerning a voluntary arms embargo against South Africa,*

*"Convinced that a mandatory arms embargo needs to be universally applied against South Africa in the first instance,*

*"Acting therefore under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,*

*"1. Determines, having regard to the policies and acts of the South African Government, that the acquisition by South Africa of arms and related matériel*

*constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security;*

*"2. Decides that all States shall cease forthwith any provision to South Africa of arms and related matériel of all types, including the sale or transfer of weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and shall cease as well the provision of all types of equipment and supplies and grants of licensing arrangements for the manufacture or maintenance of the aforementioned;*

*"3. Calls upon all States to review, having regard to the objectives of the present resolution, all existing contractual arrangements with and licences granted to South Africa relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and vehicles, with a view to terminating them;*

*"4. Further decides that all States shall refrain from any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons;*

*"5. Calls upon all States, including States non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution;*

*"6. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted not later than 1 May 1978;*

*"7. Decides to keep this item on its agenda for further action, as appropriate, in the light of developments."*

2. By a telegram dated 4 November 1977, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of all States.<sup>6</sup>

3. In a note dated 10 November 1977 [see annex I] addressed to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of all States, the Secretary-General drew attention to the fact that the Security Council, convinced that a mandatory arms embargo needed to be universally applied against South Africa in the first instance and acting therefore

<sup>6</sup> In accordance with the established practice of the Secretariat, the term "all States" refers to States Members of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency or parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, had called upon all States, including States non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of that resolution. The Secretary-General also indicated that he would appreciate receiving, as early as possible, information on the measures taken by their Governments in accordance with the provisions of resolution 418 (1977), as he was required, under paragraph 6, to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of the resolution, the first report to be submitted not later than 1 May 1978.

4. On 29 March 1978, the Secretary-General addressed a note [see annex II] to the Permanent Representatives [Permanent Observers] to the United Nations of those States which had not yet replied to his note of 10 November. As of 28 April 1978, the Secretary-General has received 90 replies. The list of those States which have replied is given in alphabetical order in annex IV below, with an indication of the symbols of the documents in which the texts are reproduced in full.

5. At its 2052nd meeting on 9 December 1977, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 421 (1977), which reads as follows:

*"The Security Council,*

*"Recalling its resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977, in which it determined, having regard to the policies and acts of the South African Government, that the acquisition by South Africa of arms and related matériel constituted a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security and established a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa,*

*"Mindful of the need to have appropriate machinery in order to examine the progress of implementation of the measures envisaged in resolution 418 (1977),*

*"Noting that it requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of resolution 418 (1977),*

*"1. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:*

*"(a) To examine the report on the progress of the implementation of resolution 418 (1977) which will be submitted by the Secretary-General;*

*"(b) To study ways and means by which the mandatory arms embargo could be made more effective against South Africa and to make recommendations to the Council;*

*"(c) To seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the provisions laid down in resolution 418 (1977);*

*"2. Calls upon all States to co-operate fully with the Committee in regard to the fulfilment of its tasks concerning the effective implementation of the provisions of resolution 418 (1977) and to supply such information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of the present resolution;*

*"3. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for that purpose, including the provision of appropriate staff for the servicing of the Committee."*

6. The Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa held its first meeting on 28 February 1978 and elected Mr. Abdalla Yaccoub Bishara (Kuwait) Chairman and Bolivia and Gabon Vice-Chairmen. The Committee has so far held three meetings.

7. In a note dated 3 April 1978 [see annex III] addressed to the Permanent Representatives [Permanent Observers] to the United Nations of all States, the Secretary-General drew attention to paragraph 2 of resolution 421 (1977) and, in accordance with the terms of the resolution, requested Governments to bring to the attention of the Secretary-General any information that might be relevant in the context of the Committee's terms of reference, to be forwarded to the Committee. No such information has yet been received by the Secretary-General.

## ANNEX I

### Note dated 10 November 1977 from the Secretary-General to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of all States

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of . . . and has the honour to refer to resolution 418 (1977) adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 4 November 1977 on the question of South Africa, which was transmitted by telegram to His Excellency on 4 November

The Secretary-General wishes to draw His Excellency's attention to the fact that the Security Council, "convinced that a mandatory arms embargo needs to be universally applied against South Africa in the first instance", and "acting therefore under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations", "calls upon all States, including States non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution".

Under paragraph 6, the Secretary-General is requested "to report to the Security Council on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted not later than 1 May 1978". The Secretary-General would, therefore, appreciate receiving, as early as possible, information on the measures taken by His Excellency's Government in accordance with the provisions of this resolution.

## ANNEX II

### Note dated 29 March 1978 from the Secretary-General to the Permanent Representatives [Permanent Observers] to the United Nations of those States which had not yet replied to his note of 10 November 1977

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative [Permanent Observer] of . . . to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to his note PO 230 SOAF of 10 November 1977 addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Excellency's Government (a copy of which is attached for easy reference), by which he transmitted Security Council resolution 418 (1977) on the question of South Africa and requested information, as early as possible, on the measures taken by His Excellency's Government in accordance with the provisions of the resolution.

In light of the requirement that the Secretary-General report to the Security Council by 1 May 1978 on the implementation of the resolution, the Secretary-General would appreciate receiving information from His Excellency's Government as soon as possible.

## ANNEX III

### Note dated 3 April 1978 from the Secretary-General to the Permanent Representatives [Permanent Observers] to the United Nations of all States

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative [Permanent Observer] of . . . to the United Nations and has the honour to draw

the attention of His Excellency's Government to paragraph 2 of resolution 421 (1977), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 9 December 1977, a copy of which is attached.

Paragraph 2 of resolution 421 (1977) reads as follows:

"Calls upon all States to co-operate fully with the Committee in regard to the fulfilment of its tasks concerning the effective implementation of the provisions of resolution 418 (1977) and to supply such information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of the present resolution."

In accordance with the terms of the resolution, the Secretary-General requests His Excellency's Government to bring to the attention of the Secretary-General any information that may be relevant in the context of the terms of reference of the Committee, to be forwarded to the Committee.

#### ANNEX IV

##### List of States which have replied to the note dated 10 November 1977 from the Secretary-General

<i>Country</i>	<i>Symbol of the document in which the text of the reply is reproduced</i>
Algeria	S/12671
Angola	S/12670
Argentina	S/12551
Australia	S/12581
Austria	S/12632
Bahamas	S/12652
Barbados	S/12552
Belgium	S/12498
Bhutan	S/12526
Bolivia	S/12449
Bulgaria	S/12496
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic	S/12473
Canada	S/12462
China	S/12501
Colombia	S/12456
Costa Rica	S/12649
Cyprus	S/12591
Czechoslovakia	S/12484
Denmark	S/12510 and Add.1
Ecuador	S/12587
Egypt	S/12481
Equatorial Guinea	S/12665
Ethiopia	S/12629
Finland	S/12511 and Add.1
France	S/12464
German Democratic Republic	S/12487
Germany, Federal Republic of	S/12493
Ghana	S/12617
Greece	S/12630
Guyana	S/12482
Hungary	S/12485
Iceland	S/12518
India	S/12467
Indonesia	S/12519
Iran	S/12596
Iraq	S/12535
Ireland	S/12525

<i>Country</i>	<i>Symbol of the document in which the text of the reply is reproduced</i>
Israel	S/12475 and Add.1
Italy	S/12451
Jamaica	S/12656
Japan	S/12495 and Add.1
Jordan	S/12542
Kuwait	S/12476
Lao People's Democratic Republic	S/12577
Lesotho	S/12646
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	S/12452 and Add.1
Luxembourg	S/12527 and Corr.1
Malaysia	S/12638
Maldives	S/12550
Mali	S/12605
Malta	S/12662
Mauritania	S/12628
Mexico	S/12505
Mongolia	S/12634
Nauru	S/12532
Nepal	S/12663
Netherlands	S/12516
New Zealand	S/12513
Nigeria	S/12643
Norway	S/12509 and Add.1
Oman	S/12561
Pakistan	S/12528
Panama	S/12472
Peru	S/12461
Philippines	S/12447
Poland	S/12507
Qatar	S/12546
Republic of Korea	S/12440
Romania	S/12488
Samoa	S/12654
Saudi Arabia	S/12549
Seychelles	S/12483
Singapore	S/12651
Somalia	S/12664
Spain	S/12613
Sudan	S/12659
Suriname	S/12556
Sweden	S/12508 and Corr.1
Switzerland	S/12644
Thailand	S/12619
Turkey	S/12490
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic	S/12474
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	S/12457
United Arab Emirates	S/12672
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	S/12494
United Republic of Tanzania	S/12530
United States of America	S/12479
Venezuela	S/12541
Yemen	S/12647
Yugoslavia	S/12637

#### DOCUMENT S/12674

##### Note verbale dated 23 April 1978 from the Mission of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[1 May 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations, referring to the Secretary-General's telegram of 4 November 1977 addressed to

the Government of Afghanistan regarding the measures taken by it in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) on the question of South



Africa, has the honour to transmit to the Secretary-General the letter dated 12 April 1978 from His Excellency Mr. Abdul Samad Ghaus, Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs of Afghanistan.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Afghanistan has the honour to request that this communication should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

#### TEXT OF THE LETTER

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram concerning Security Council resolution 418 (1977) on the question of an arms embargo against South Africa. Afghanistan has always expressed its strong opposition to colonialism, *apartheid*, racism, racial discrimination and alien domination.

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan believes that the military build-up and persistent acts of

aggression by South Africa against the neighbouring African States disturb the security of the southern part of Africa and constitute a threat to international peace and security. Afghanistan has persistently supported and continues to support any Security Council recommendation which will put into effect appropriate enforcement measures directed at the offending régime of South Africa and binding on all States to ensure the complete embargo on arms sales to South Africa, the violation of which has continued to engage the attention of the international community.

Afghanistan has never had any diplomatic, military, economic or other relation whatsoever with South Africa. Afghanistan considers the adoption of the above-mentioned Security Council resolution to be a positive measure in the right direction. The Afghan Government extends its full support to the resolution and also to all measures which will ensure strict compliance with its provisions.

#### DOCUMENT S/12675

##### Letter dated 1 May 1978 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[1 May 1978]

I have the honour to refer to the establishment and functioning of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in pursuance of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).

In my letter of 25 April 1978 [S/12666], I advised the Security Council that I was following the question of the total strength of the Force closely and would report to the Council on it in the near future.

I have already explained to the members of the Council the circumstances in which the original preliminary estimate of the desired strength of UNIFIL was arrived at. Both the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, and the Force Commander, Major-General Emmanuel A. Erskine, have informed me that, in view of the very difficult conditions on the ground and in the light of the experience so far acquired, they strongly feel that the total strength of the Force should be brought to about 6,000. As I have reported to the Council, during my recent visit to the area, I had extensive discussions with the parties concerned, as well as with General Siilasvuo and General Erskine, on the implementation of resolution 425 (1978) and I had the opportunity of seeing for myself the extreme delicacy and difficulty of the tasks to be performed by UNIFIL. Our troops must operate over extensive areas on rugged terrain and often in dangerous situations. During my tour

of the area of operation with the Force Commander, I met all the contingent Commanders and they reported to us that the present inadequate strength level of the Force resulted in an exceedingly thin deployment of their troops on the ground.

Taking all these factors into account, it is my considered opinion that it is necessary to increase the strength of UNIFIL to the level of about 6,000 for this very crucial stage of the operation if the Force is to be in a position to carry out fully and effectively the tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council under resolution 425 (1978). I therefore recommend that the Council should agree to the increase of the total strength of the Force to that level.

In this connexion, I wish to inform the Council that the Governments of Fiji, Iran and Ireland have advised me that they would be prepared to make available a battalion each for service with UNIFIL. If the Council should agree to the proposed increase in the total strength of the Force, it would be my intention to seek additional contingents from the Governments mentioned above.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the urgent attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kurt WALDHEIM  
Secretary-General

#### DOCUMENT S/12676/REV.1

##### Note verbale dated 1 May 1978 from the representative of Brazil to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[4 May 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977, regarding the request for information on the implementation of Security Council resolution 418 (1977).

Upon instructions of his Government, the Permanent Representative of Brazil wishes to reiterate the Brazilian Government's commitment to the international community's struggle against the policies of *apartheid* and to emphasize that the Brazilian Government has been implementing for a number of years a voluntary embargo on the sales of weapons and military equipment to South Africa.

This long-standing policy of the Brazilian Government will continue to be enforced, and appropriate measures to this effect, which will be communicated to the United Nations in due time, are being taken, in strict compliance with the provisions of resolution 418 (1977).

The Permanent Representative of Brazil has the honour to request that this information should be brought to the attention of the Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) and that this communication should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

## DOCUMENT S/12677\*

### Letter dated 1 May 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[2 May 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 1 May 1978, addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ilter TÜRKMEN  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

##### Text of the letter dated 1 May 1978 from Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the "Resolution on the question of Cyprus" adopted unanimously by the Ninth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Dakar, Senegal, on 28 April 1978.

I should be grateful if this letter and the resolution could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/89-S/12677.

#### RESOLUTION ON THE QUESTION OF CYPRUS

*The Ninth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Dakar, Senegal,*

*Having listened* with fraternal feelings to the statement of His Excellency President Rauf R. Denktas, who voiced the rightful cause of his people,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions on the question of Cyprus adopted at its Seventh and Eighth Conferences;

2. *Recalls* the agreement reached in February 1977 between the leaders of the two Cypriot communities, aiming at the establishment of an independent, sovereign, territorially integral, bi-communal, non-aligned federal republic of Cyprus to the satisfaction of both national communities;

3. *Welcomes* the efforts of the Muslim Turkish community of Cyprus towards the resumption of the intercommunal negotiations, through concrete and substantial proposals;

4. *Expresses the hope* that the intercommunal talks will be resumed, without further delay, in a constructive and meaningful way and yield positive results;

5. *Supports* the principle of equality for the two communities in a bi-communal federal administration which will enable them to live in peace, side by side, without one having the right to oppress or exploit the other;

6. *Urges* the members of the Islamic Conference to take all the necessary measures with a view further to strengthening effective solidarity with the Turkish Muslim community of Cyprus.

## DOCUMENT S/12678\*

### Letter dated 2 May 1978 from the representative of South Africa to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[2 May 1978]

I have the honour to attach the text of a letter addressed to you on 2 May 1978 by the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Honourable R. F. Botha, on the question of South West Africa.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the ninth special session of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) J. Adriaan EKSTEEN  
Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of  
South Africa to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/S-9/12-S/12678.

## ANNEX

### Letter dated 2 May 1978 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa to the Secretary-General

During the past 12 months South Africa has been engaged in negotiations with the five Western members of the Security Council with a view to giving practical effect to the legitimate aspirations and the expressed wishes of the people of South West Africa for self-determination and independence. Throughout these negotiations, South Africa, in a spirit of co-operation, has done everything in its power to facilitate agreement consonant with its responsibilities towards the people and in particular the security of the Territory.

On 25 April 1978, our Deputy Permanent Representative in New York handed you a copy of a statement made by the South African Prime Minister in the House of Assembly that day in which South Africa accepted the proposals put forward by the five Western members of the Security Council.

Following this acceptance, in good faith, South Africa has scrupulously refrained from further comment. While the five Western Powers have, in their considered statements, firmly adhered to their position regarding the finality and definitiveness of the proposals, a great deal has been said by others about the proposals and suggestions have been forthcoming which would change their whole basis and concept.

Some speakers have accused South Africa of intransigence in spite of our acceptance of the proposals. What is it that the international community wants? For many years the clamour has been for early independence and one-man, one-vote, free elections on a Territory-wide basis under conditions satisfactory to the international community. All these requirements have been met and, by its acceptance, South Africa had clearly demonstrated its irrevocable commitment to absolute independence for South West Africa on this very basis.

On 1 September last year, my Government, with the knowledge of the five Western Powers, appointed an Administrator-General whose task it is to create conditions for the free expression of the will of the people and to govern the Territory in the interim period leading to independence. In the execution of his task he has, *inter alia*:

—Abolished restrictions on freedom of movement and freedom of assembly which might have had an inhibiting effect on free political campaigning.

—Commenced with the abolition of legislation and other measures which were discriminatory on the grounds of colour.

—Assumed authority over 26 government departments which were formerly under the authority of the South African Government.

—At all stages invited *all* political parties—of which only one has refused—and other interested groups, such as the churches, to discuss with him their views on the political future of the Territory and the Western proposals.

—Taken steps to ensure the maintenance of law and order and to prevent the disruption or obstruction of the peaceful and orderly political and constitutional development of the Territory.

For over 30 years the United Nations has concerned itself with the question of South West Africa, a Territory whose geographic extent has through the years been clearly defined, both in documents of the League of Nations and in those of the United Nations itself. Based on treaties which also define the borders of other countries in the region, the Territory's boundaries have been internationally recognized for almost a hundred years. Furthermore, most Afro-Asian and Latin American countries have accepted that colonial boundaries must, under international law, continue to be the boundaries after independence. Moreover, paragraph 11 of the Manifesto on Southern Africa approved by the Conference of East and Central African States at Lusaka, Zambia, on 16 April 1969, and adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixth ordinary

session, held at Addis Ababa from 6 to 9 September 1969, states in part:

“As far as we are concerned the present boundaries of the States of southern Africa are the boundaries of what will be free and independent African States.”<sup>a</sup>

The Manifesto was welcomed by the General Assembly itself in resolution 2505 (XXIV) of 20 November 1969.

No entity can claim the right to add to or to diminish the area of the former Mandated Territory of South West Africa.

Under international law South Africa has sovereignty over Walvis Bay. Whatever arrangement might be reached between South Africa and a duly elected Government of an independent South West Africa is a matter for those two Governments.

Throughout the negotiations, the five Western Powers agreed that the maintenance of law and order and the safety of persons and property should not be jeopardized. South Africa assumes that the international community shares this concern. The proposals of the five Western Powers in this regard are the result of 12 months of serious negotiations. The final product is delicately balanced and cannot be disturbed without wrecking the edifice.

Similarly, the tasks and duties of the Administrator-General and of the United Nations Special Representative are balanced upon two important principles: on the one hand, that the Territory must be administered and daily life must continue while preparations for free elections are being made; on the other hand, that the international community wishes to be satisfied “at each stage as to the fairness and appropriateness of all measures affecting the political process at all levels of administration before such measures take effect” [see S/12636, para. 5] and that there would be no intimidation or interference from whatever quarter. Ideally, the Administrator-General and the Special Representative should work together in such a way as to avoid friction and disputes.

While all provisions of the proposals could obviously not satisfy the preferences of every party, South Africa, after consultation with the people of South West Africa, bent over backwards to be as accommodating as possible. It cannot go beyond this. We cannot act in defiance of the people of South West Africa and their expressed wishes.

The people of South West Africa have come to believe that by the end of 1978 they will have their own independent country. The credibility, not only of the South African Government but also of the United Nations is at stake; South Africa, for its part, will not go back on its undertaking to the inhabitants of South West Africa. If a peaceful solution is to be achieved, there cannot be another period of indecision. We are now witnessing the killing and abduction of innocent people by ruthless individuals who claim to be the representatives of the very people they murder in cold blood. No civilized community can tolerate these heinous acts. The innocent victims are demanding that they should be stopped.

All the elements which formed the basis of so many years of dispute and acrimony between South Africa and the United Nations can now be eliminated. All we ask is that the people now be allowed to elect representatives on the basis of one-man, one-vote to decide a constitution for their country in order to achieve independence peacefully and under conditions which will enable the future independent Government of the Territory to maintain order, stability and economic well-being. Whatever might have been our differences in the past, I appeal to you to urge all Members of the United Nations to co-operate unreservedly in this final process of fulfilling the national aspirations of the people of the Territory. They demand it. We owe it to them. It ought to be implemented without delay.

(Signed) R. F. BOTHA  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of South Africa

<sup>a</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes, agenda item 106, document A/7754.

**DOCUMENT S/12680\***

**Letter dated 3 May 1978 from the representative of Turkey  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[3 May 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 3 May 1978, addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ilter TÜRKMEN  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations

**ANNEX**

**Text of the letter dated 3 May 1978 from Mr. Nail Atalay  
to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the statement by the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Mr. Osman Örek, in connexion with the resumption of the intercommunal talks.

I should be grateful if this letter and its enclosure were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

**ENCLOSURE**

The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Mr. Osman Örek, made the following statement in connexion with the resumption of the intercommunal talks during a press conference on 2 May 1978:

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/90-S/12680.

"In January of this year, the Secretary-General of the United Nations visited Turkey, Greece and Cyprus with a view to discussing the possibilities for a resumption of the intercommunal talks on the Cyprus problem. It is following the extensive consultations held during these visits that the Turkish Cypriot community has elaborated a new negotiating position encompassing concrete, substantial and detailed proposals regarding both the territorial and constitutional aspects of the Cyprus problem.

"On 13, 14 and 15 April 1978, the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community handed to the Secretary-General a document setting forth the main aspects of the negotiating position of the Turkish Cypriot community at the intercommunal talks. The representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community emphasized that the proposals they were putting forward represented a serious and constructive effort by the Turkish Cypriot side with a view to providing a starting point at the intercommunal talks. They equally emphasized that the Turkish Cypriot community was willing to enter into meaningful and constructive negotiations with the Greek Cypriot side under the auspices of the Secretary-General on all important aspects, in particular issues relating to territory, constitution and settlement in Maraş (Varosha). They confirmed their genuine dedication to a rapid, just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem.

"Under these conditions, the Turkish Cypriot community considers that it has fulfilled all the prerequisites for an early resumption of the intercommunal talks.

"For this reason we call upon the distinguished Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, to set a date for the resumption of the intercommunal talks as early as possible."

**DOCUMENT S/12681**

**Letter dated 3 May 1978 from the President of the Security Council  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: Spanish]  
[3 May 1978]

I have brought your letter dated 1 May 1978 [S/12675] concerning the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to the attention of the members of the Security Council. I wish to inform you that I have consulted the members of the Council on the matter and that they agree with the proposal concerning the contingents from Fiji, Iran and Ireland contained in your letter.

The Chinese representative has informed me that China, not having participated in the voting on resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 427 (1978), dissociates itself from this matter.

(Signed) Rubén CARPIO CASTILLO  
President of the Security Council

**DOCUMENT S/12682**

**Note verbale dated 27 April 1978 from the representative of the Syrian Arab  
Republic to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[3 May 1978]

The Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations, referring to the Secretary-General's note dated 29 March 1978, has the honour to state the following.

The Syrian Arab Republic has consistently opposed the *apartheid* system and has never had relations of any kind with the racist régime of South Africa. The Syrian Arab Republic has always expressed its unequivocal support for the people of South Africa in their just struggle to put an end to the *apartheid* régime and for liberation and national independence. The Syrian Arab Republic has fully complied with all General Assembly and Security Council resolutions in this regard, welcomes resolution 418 (1977) and calls for its strict implementation by Member States. Moreover, it believes that a quick eradication of the system of *apartheid* does not only require a mandatory military embargo but also a mandatory economic embargo.

The Chargé d'Affaires a.i. would be grateful if this communication could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

#### DOCUMENT S/12683\*

##### Letter dated 3 May 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[4 May 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith excerpts from the statement made by Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, President of the Republic of Cyprus, in reference to yesterday's statement by the Prime Minister of Turkey.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES  
Permanent Representative of Cyprus  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

##### Excerpts from the statement made on 4 May 1978 by the President of Cyprus

The President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, referring to yesterday's statement by the Prime Minister of Turkey, stated, amongst other things, the following:

"The continuing and provocative effort of the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Ecevit, to distort reality is indeed amazing. He is trying to present the Government of Cyprus as being, in any case, against the talks. Mr. Ecevit knew very well our views on the substance of the Cyprus problem and, if he had really wished for a solution and substantive negotiations, he surely would have submitted proposals of a different kind and not those he finally submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which are clearly

aimed at the perpetuation and legalization of the invasion and its consequences. It is not a matter of details, but it is the very foundation of the proposals, which is such that it could not be the object of negotiations. Because, as we have repeatedly made clear, we are not prepared to accept a solution which would legalize the faits accomplis and to satisfy, directly or indirectly, Turkish expansionism.

"The spokesman of the United Nations stated yesterday on behalf of the Secretary-General that evidently there was a gap between the positions regarding the basis upon which the resumption of the talks would be discussed. And, in the light of this fact, the Secretary-General quite rightly is not convening a new round of talks, for such a new round would serve no useful purpose, since we are separated by an abyss regarding the basis for a solution of the Cyprus problem. On the other hand, any action which would render useless the role of the Secretary-General in the future would be pointless, particularly as he has a continuous role to play with regard to the Cyprus question, in accordance with United Nations resolutions and with regard to their implementation.

"Mr. Ecevit, however, has admitted that what mainly interested him was the lifting of the embargo. The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that all his noise and manoeuvring to create wrong impressions before and after the submission of the Turkish proposals were purely aimed at offering arguments to assist in the efforts to obtain from the United States Congress the lifting of the embargo..."

Mr. Kyprianou's statement concludes that a mere reading of the Turkish proposals would suffice to convince everyone that Mr. Ecevit was out to promote the consolidation of the results of the aggression and invasion and not concerned with the just and viable solution of the Cyprus problem.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/91-S/12683.

#### DOCUMENT S/12684\*

##### Letter dated 4 May 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[4 May 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 4 May 1978, addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a

document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) İler TÜRKMEN  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/92-S/12684.

## ANNEX

### Text of the letter dated 4 May 1978 from Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the resolution on Cyprus which was adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 27 April 1978.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

#### TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION

##### *The Assembly,*

1. *Having regard* to the report by its Political Affairs Committee on the situation in Cyprus (doc. 4154), giving an account of the information obtained from the parties directly concerned in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey,

2. *Recalling* its recommendation 759 (1975) and its resolution 615 (1976) concerning the situation in Cyprus,

3. *Believing* that it must spare no effort, in the exercise of its political responsibilities, in contributing to secure a just and lasting settlement of the Cypriot crisis.

4. *Considering* that the Cypriot crisis constitutes an unbearable burden:

(a) For the people of Cyprus, who should not be allowed to suffer any longer from a *de facto* division of the island,

(b) For the three countries directly concerned, which should take advantage of the neighbourly relations and of the numerous possibilities for co-operation,

(c) For all the members of the Council of Europe, whose aim it is to achieve closer unity between them,

5. *Reaffirming* its conviction, constantly repeated since 29 July 1974, that direct negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities constitute the best means of reaching a political settlement acceptable both to the Greek Cypriots and to the Turkish Cypriots and capable of serving as the basis for a just, lasting and peaceful solution, beneficial to the entire Cypriot population,

6. *Expressing* its wholehearted support for the United Nations efforts to maintain peace and provide humanitarian aid to Cyprus, and underlining in particular the important part played by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, in preparing the way for the resumption of inter-communal negotiations,

7. *Welcoming* the opening of the recent dialogue, described as friendly and sincere, between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers, Messrs. Karamanlis and Ecevit, and the assertion of the political determination of the two Governments to find peaceful and just solutions to the matters at issue,

8. *Believes* that the present political situation and the joint efforts to create a climate of mutual confidence should encourage the Cypriot communities to resume their negotiations,

9. *Invites* the States members of the Council of Europe to promote this new diplomacy of confidence which should give the two communities an opportunity to prepare together, secure from passion and public pressures, an agreement acceptable to the entire population on the future organization of an independent Cypriot State.

## DOCUMENT S/12685\* \*\*

### Letter dated 3 May 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[4 May 1978]

I have the honour to draw your attention to a new provocative statement by Professor Soysal, Ankara's official representative responsible for the preparation and presentation to you of the Turkish proposals on Cyprus.

In a broadcast by the Ankara radio on 1 May, Professor Soysal said: "If Greek Cypriots do not accept the Turkish proposals, they must also bear the consequences".

These words, coming after Mr. Soysal's previous statement to the press at Vienna on 17 April last that "regrettable things might happen in the immediate future if the Turkish proposals were not accepted and the intercommunal talks not resumed" [see S/12653], constitute a persistent policy of threats and blackmail by which Ankara seeks the subjection of Cyprus to its oppressive terms for a solution of partition.

On behalf of my Government, I wish strongly to denounce the aforesaid official threats from Ankara and the continuing aggressive conduct of Turkey towards Cyprus.

The proposals in question, as already known, have been rejected by the Government of Cyprus because they basically depart from the agreed basis for a federation in an independent, sovereign and territorially integral State. They were, in substance and effect, for two completely separate States with separate passports and, consequently, with distinct national identity and allegiance. They are, therefore, a blueprint for the disruption of the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. As such, they could not form the basis for any consideration or discussion.

It becomes increasingly obvious that a just solution of the problem can only come from the due implementation of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Cyprus by the measures fully provided for in the Charter.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES  
Permanent Representative of Cyprus  
to the United Nations

\*Incorporating document S/12685/Corr.1 of 5 May 1978.  
\*\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/93-S/12685 and Corr.1.

**DOCUMENT S/12686**

**Note verbale dated 3 May 1978 from the representative of Lebanon  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: French]  
[5 May 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations, referring to the Secretary-General's note dated 29 March 1978 relative to Security Council resolution 418 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa, which was adopted unanimously on 4 November 1977, has the honour to inform him that Lebanon maintains with South Africa none of the relations referred to in resolution 418 (1977) and intends to observe fully the provisions of that resolution.

The Permanent Representative of Lebanon would be grateful if the Secretary-General could arrange for the text of this note to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12687**

**Note verbale dated 2 May 1978 from the representative of the Ivory Coast  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: French]  
[5 May 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Ivory Coast to the United Nations, referring to the Secretary-General's note dated 10 November 1977 transmitting Security Council resolution 418 (1977), has the honour to inform him that the Government of the Republic of the Ivory Coast firmly supports the provisions of this resolution and undertakes to implement them fully and scrupulously.

The Ivory Coast reaffirms its condemnation of the policy of *apartheid* and denounces all policies of racial discrimination, wherever they are practised. It supports all the efforts of the international community to secure the elimination of this inhuman and degrading policy.

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Ivory Coast would be grateful if the Secretary-General could arrange for this note to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12688\***

**Letter dated 4 May 1978 from the representative of Sri Lanka  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[5 May 1978]

I have the honour, in my capacity as Acting Chairman of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, to transmit herewith the text of a communiqué issued today by the Bureau.

I should be grateful if you would kindly have the communiqué circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) I. B. FONSEKA  
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.,  
of the Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka  
to the United Nations

**ANNEX**

**Communiqué issued on 4 May 1978 by the Co-ordinating Bureau  
of Non-Aligned Countries condemning South Africa's invasion  
of Angola**

The Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, meeting in New York, learned with utmost indignation on Thursday, 4 May 1978, of the latest outrage of the South African racist régime: the invasion of the territory of the People's Republic of Angola. South African troops located in Namibia crossed the border into Angola and penetrated a distance of 155 miles in a blatant act of aggression against Angola.

The Co-ordinating Bureau notes that this new aggression by the racist South African régime follows almost immediately after the successful conclusion of the ninth special session, at

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/94-S/12688.

which the General Assembly adopted with an overwhelming majority an important Declaration on Namibia and Programme of Action in Support of Self-Determination and National Independence for Namibia [resolution S-9/2]. This act of aggression against Angola was also committed after the submission by Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America of a proposal for the settlement of the Namibian situation [S/12636] and a statement by the South African régime purporting to accept the proposal [S/12678].

The Co-ordinating Bureau regards this unwarranted invasion of Angola as Pretoria's contemptuous retort to the United Nations and further evidence, if that is necessary, of the racist régime's determination to perpetuate its illegal occupation of Namibia and to continue to use it as a spring-board for aggression against independent neighbouring African States. This invasion of Angola is calculated to pre-empt the efforts of the international community to terminate South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and, in particular, to undermine the support given by Angola to the people of Namibia and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), their national liberation movement. By this act of aggression, which is but one in a series, South Africa is desperately seeking to destroy SWAPO, the vanguard of the struggle for the genuine liberation

of Namibia, in order to pave the way for the imposition of its own protégés and puppets on the Namibian people under the guise of a so-called internal settlement.

The Co-ordinating Bureau particularly wishes to draw the attention of the five Western member States, which rely on the bona fides of South Africa for the success of their initiative, to this latest outrage on the part of South Africa, which must certainly cast serious doubts as to the Pretoria régime's sincerity to negotiate in good faith for its withdrawal from Namibia, in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976).

The Co-ordinating Bureau strongly condemns South Africa for this new aggression against Angola and demands the immediate withdrawal of all its forces from Angolan territory. The Co-ordinating Bureau calls upon the Security Council to take urgent measures against South Africa, in particular to impose against it comprehensive economic sanctions, an oil embargo and an arms embargo, in accordance with the Programme of Action adopted by the General Assembly at its ninth special session.

The Co-ordinating Bureau assures the Government of Angola, the people of Namibia and SWAPO of the unreserved support of the countries of the non-aligned movement in their struggle against the Pretoria régime.

## DOCUMENT S/12689

### Letter dated 5 May 1978 from the representative of Angola to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[5 May 1978]

I have the honour to transmit the text of a message sent to you by Mr. Jose Eduardo dos Santos, First Vice-Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Angola.

I should be grateful if you would kindly have this message circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Elisio DE FIGUEIREDO  
Permanent Representative of Angola  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

### Letter dated 5 May 1978 from the First Vice-Prime Minister of Angola to the Secretary-General

The Government of the People's Republic of Angola, exercising the prerogative conferred upon it as a Member of the United Nations, has the honour of bringing to the attention of the Security Council new acts of aggression against the sovereignty of the Angolan State by the racist régime of South Africa, launched from the illegally occupied Territory of Namibia.

On 4 May, at 6 a.m., troops of the regular South African army were parachuted from South African war planes after

having violated the air space of the People's Republic of Angola and bombed the area of Kassinga, causing serious material damage and victimizing Namibian refugees camped there.

During that same morning, and with extensive air support, still additional airborne forces were dropped.

The special session of the General Assembly has just taken place and adopted a programme of action to support the heroic struggle of the Namibian people for their independence and to condemn the criminal policy of *apartheid*. We are able to witness once again the desperate acts of violence of the Vorster régime against the peoples of Angola and Namibia, acts which demonstrate a total disrespect for the resolutions of the General Assembly.

The Government of the People's Republic of Angola considers the situation created as a result of this new aggression against its sovereignty and territorial integrity to be extremely grave and appeals to the Security Council to take the necessary measures to repulse these attacks and prevent further deterioration to the security of the region.

Please accept our protests made in the highest regard.

(Signed) Jose Eduardo DOS SANTOS  
First Vice-Prime Minister  
People's Republic of Angola

## DOCUMENT S/12690

### Letter dated 5 May 1978 from the representative of Angola to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[5 May 1978]

Upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to request you to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council to deal with the most recent aggression on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of my country, the People's Republic of Angola, committed by the illegal, racist, minority régime of Pretoria.



Attached is the copy of a communication from Mr. Jose Eduardo dos Santos,  
First Vice-Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Angola.

(Signed) ELISIO DE FIGUEIREDO  
Permanent Representative of Angola  
to the United Nations

**ANNEX**

**Letter dated 5 May 1978 from the First Vice Prime Minister  
of Angola to the Secretary-General**

[Same text as the annex to document S/12689.]

**DOCUMENT S/12693**

**Letter dated 5 May 1978 from the representative of Zambia  
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]  
[5 May 1978]

The Group of African States at the United Nations is gravely concerned at the premeditated persistent acts of aggression committed against the People's Republic of Angola by the South African racist régime. The African Group is indignant at the latest aggression which began on 4 May 1978 against the People's Republic of Angola.

The African Group, particularly, notes with utmost indignation that these acts of aggression took place soon after the ninth special session of the General Assembly which, *inter alia*, demanded South Africa to terminate immediately its occupation of Namibia.

In this connexion, the Security Council should not fail to note that the latest aggression was launched from the international Territory of Namibia.

On behalf of the African Group, I wish formally and firmly to support the request made by the People's Republic of Angola for the immediate convening of the Security Council to consider this latest aggression by the racist régime of Pretoria. In submitting this request, I wish, on behalf of the African Group, to underscore the urgent need for the Council to take prompt and effective measures to put an end to these acts of aggression.

I should appreciate it if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gwendoline C. KONIE  
Permanent Representative of Zambia  
to the United Nations

**DOCUMENT S/12694**

**Letter dated 5 May 1978 from the representatives of Gabon, Mauritius and Nigeria  
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]  
[5 May 1978]

We, the undersigned members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that, during its meetings devoted to consideration of the item "Complaint by Angola against South Africa", the Council extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

*Signed by the representatives of the following  
States members of the Security Council:*  
Gabon  
Mauritius  
Nigeria

**DOCUMENT S/12695**

**Letter dated 5 May 1978 from the representative of Cyprus  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[5 May 1978]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to attach hereto as annex a document containing

observations on the documents entitled "Main aspects of the Turkish Cypriot proposals" and "Explanatory

note” of these proposals for the solution of the Cyprus problem, presented by the Turkish side to the Secretary-General at Vienna on 13 April 1978.

I should be grateful if this document were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES  
Permanent Representative of Cyprus  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

Observations by the Greek Cypriot interlocutor on the documents entitled “Main aspects of the Turkish Cypriot proposals” and “Explanatory note” of these proposals for the solution of the Cyprus problem, presented by the Turkish side to the Secretary-General at Vienna on 13 April 1978

#### GENERAL

The Turkish side has failed in its undertaking, formally given to the Secretary-General in January 1978 and announced by him, to present exact and complete proposals both on the constitutional and on the territorial aspects for the solution of the Cyprus problem.

The documents presented do not afford any basis for meaningful and substantive negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus problem, as envisaged by the relevant United Nations resolutions on Cyprus.

On the constitutional aspect, the provisions of the documents presented are contrary to the obligation to submit proposals for the establishment of a federal State. The documents provide not for the creation of a federal republic but for the partitioning of the existing State of Cyprus into two separate entities. In fact, the whole aim of the Turkish provisions is, under the guise of the word “federal”, to invest the illegal Turkish Cypriot administration with legal powers.

On the territorial aspect, the Turkish documents contain no commitment for giving up any area now occupied by the Turkish forces.

#### CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECT

The Turkish documents do not provide for the establishment of a federal State. The provisions in the documents contain none of the attributes of federation, nor do they propose the creation of a federal State exercising, through its own organs, independent State power. At the very centre of the Federal State, where one expects to find the fountain of federal power and functions, there is a total and complete vacuum. Furthermore, the relationship of the Federal Government to the citizen, an essential element of federation, is non-existent. What the Turkish documents clearly provide for is the creation of two separate States.

This is evidenced by the following examples, which are by no means exhaustive:

##### 1. Sovereignty

Though the Turkish documents contain a statement that “the Federal Republic of Cyprus is to be a sovereign” federation, yet no sovereignty is allotted to the Federal State, but, on the contrary, it is expressly provided that “the sovereignty should continue to be shared equally by the two national communities through their respective federated States”.

Thus, a most basic, fundamental attribute and prerequisite of federation is lacking.

##### 2. Unity of territory

The whole effect of the provisions throughout the Turkish documents is to destroy and deny the unity of the territory of the Federal State. At the same time, numerous provisions aim at promoting and perpetuating the division and partition of the territory and the people in a consistent and glaring manner. The effect of these provisions is the establishment of two distinct and separate States, which is the obvious objective of the Turkish side.

To show that this is so, it suffices to give a few but telling examples:

(a) The individual will not be able to enjoy, irrespective of the community to which he belongs, his basic human rights throughout the territory of the Republic, and the Federal Government is not vested with any legislative, executive or judicial power for safeguarding such enjoyment.

(b) The fundamental principles of freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, right to property and right to work throughout the Federal State are ominously singled out for such special treatment as to be denied to the individual as a citizen of the federation. They are left to be decided separately by each “federated State” at its own whim, at some distant, unspecified time in the future. In addition, the rights of freedom of movement and freedom of settlement are made subject to mutual agreement (which, because of the “deadlock” provisions, either side will for ever be at liberty to withhold) and to such conditions and restrictions as to render their enjoyment impossible in perpetuity, whilst the right to property is stultified.

(c) The aims of economic and social development and the prosperity of the people are envisaged on the basis of two watertight, separate States.

(d) The suggestions regarding Famagusta are an apt illustration of the divisive concept of the provisions in the Turkish documents.

And yet unity of territory is an indispensable attribute of federation and a test whether a federation or two States are to be established.

#### 3. Federal powers and federal organs

No federal powers are conferred on the Federal State and no specific federal organs are provided to exercise such powers:

##### (a) Federal legislative power

(i) Although certain federal legislative powers are listed by their headlines in the Turkish documents to create the false impression that the federal Government will be invested with them, in fact such powers are to be exercised by the separate assemblies of the “federated States” and not by a federal legislature. It is only “in case of conflict in matters of federal legislation between the two legislative assemblies” that legislation is referred to a Federal Assembly made up of an equal number of Greek and Turkish members (10 members from each community) deciding by simple majority, inevitably resulting in deadlocks.

The deceptive provision for resolving such deadlocks through the casting vote of the President of the Assembly is nullified by the provision that whenever a casting vote is used the decision shall invariably be submitted “to a referendum to be held separately in each federated State”.

This is another glaring manifestation of separatism which pervades the Turkish documents, in furtherance of the Turkish intention to create not a federation but two separate States.

(ii) The same concept and divisive attitude permeate the provisions that for any federal law to come into force, even in the rare cases where a federal law is voted by both assemblies of the two “federated States”, there must be joint promulgation by the two presidents of the “federated States”. This gives to either of the two presidents of the “federated States” the right effectively to block all federal legislation even when enacted.

This is another indication of the lack of any intention to create a federal State. The effect of these provisions is to create deadlocks, ensuring that no legislation enabling the exercise of federal functions will ever be enacted. Conversely, each “federated State” is given by itself absolute power effectively to block the operation of the Federal State and to deny to the federal Government powers and functions which in all federal systems belong to it.

So long as no federal legislative assembly exercising independent legislative powers is created, the purported “Federal State” will be subject to the legislatures of the “federated States”.

This is against all fundamental principles of a federal State.

(b) *Federal executive power*

The Turkish documents do not provide for the creation of specific federal executive organs vested with effective executive powers.

As in the case of legislative powers, certain matters are listed as "federal executive matters", but when the substance of the relative provisions is examined, it is established that they exist only in name. As explained in the Turkish documents, the Federal Government will have "only those basic powers and functions which are considered necessary and feasible for the purpose of maintaining common services and without security risks to the life and property of the inhabitants of the member States".

As to the federal executive organs, the Turkish documents provide for "joint direction of the federal executive by the two presidents of the federated States" and for their continuous joint participation on a basis of equality in "the basic decision-making process for federal functions". The illusion of the existence of a "federal executive" exists only in the ceremonial functions to be performed on a "rotating" basis by one of the presidents of the "federated States".

As in the case of the provisions relating to the federal legislative power, the inevitable creation of deadlocks will prevent the exercise of federal executive power.

All the above unprecedented provisions are incompatible with the concept of a federal State and are only compatible with the creation of two separate States.

(c) *Federal judiciary*

The Turkish documents do not contain any concrete proposals for the establishment, composition and operation of federal courts, not even federal criminal courts, except for a proposed federal constitutional court, which would again be composed of an equal number of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots taking decisions by majority without a casting vote, thus extending the deadlock arising from the artificial equalization of the communities even to the administration of justice.

The election of a president of the court, which according to the Turkish documents should be made by its own members, will be virtually impossible since it is subject to the same deadlock provisions.

This is another serious departure from accepted federal principles.

(d) *Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms*

Although the Turkish documents purport to contain "extensive provisions relating to fundamental rights and liberties" and an effective system for their judicial protection, this is nullified by the fact that "domestic and international" responsibility in this field is given, not to the Federal Government as in all federations, but to the "federated States" within their respective jurisdictions. This provision is a twofold violation of the federal concept: the vesting of the "federated States" with international personality, a manifestation of the Turkish intention to create two separate States, and the denial of protection of the human rights of the citizen by the Federal State.

As already stated, the fundamental principles and basic human rights of freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right to property and the right to work, far from being entrenched in the federal constitution, are mentioned in the Turkish documents only to be annihilated. In particular, the right to property and its enjoyment is replaced by provisions for compensation tantamount to confiscation.

The reference in the Turkish documents to all the basic international conventions, covenants and declarations for the protection of human rights is thus exposed to be nothing but empty words.

(e) *Position of the Federal State in international law*

The Turkish documents do not provide for the creation of a federal republic of Cyprus as a separate subject of international law.

On the contrary, the Turkish documents state that the "federated States" shall also bear "international responsibility" and that the conclusion of international treaties, conventions and

agreements by the federal executive shall be "without prejudice to the right of the two federated States to enter into any agreement with any country". Even the issue of passports and citizenship certificates is allotted to the "federated States".

This gives a separate international legal personality to each "federated State" and provides another incontrovertible proof of the objective of the Turkish side to create two separate States.

(f) *Defence and security*

Contrary to all concepts of federation, no provision is made for federal defence and security. Even for external defence, the Turkish documents provide "the land forces of the federated States stationed in their respective territories". Similarly, the function of guarding the coasts, preventing smuggling and customs control is allotted to the "federated States".

This is another striking proof of the creation of two States.

(g) *Sources of revenue of the Federal State, federal finance, economic and town and country planning*

There is no provision in the Turkish documents for any sources of revenue of the Federal State, except that these will consist of the charges and fees derived from services rendered by the federation. Since the Federal State and the services to be so rendered are really non-existent, this source of revenue is only theoretical.

The subjects of federal revenues, federal finance, economic and town and country planning are conspicuously absent from the enumeration of "federal matters" set out in the documents. This is one more proof of the insubstantiality of the federal State.

Provision is made for a separate central bank for each "federated State". This would enable either "federated State" to draw on the reserves of the federation to finance its own separate and unco-ordinated private and public expenditure leading to certain collapse of the "joint currency" which no amount of "co-ordination" can remedy.

Thus, each "federated State" will be a separate economic entity with different taxation, standards and services, making economic planning impossible. It will therefore inevitably necessitate the establishment of guarded borders between the two "federated States" so as to prevent illegal trafficking and smuggling.

This is another clear proof of the intention to create two separate States.

(h) *External communications*

Other instances illustrating the lack of basic attributes of a federal State are the provisions relating to postal and telecommunication services which will obviously be the responsibility of the "federated States", only co-ordination being ensured by the federal executive. Thus, each "federated State" will have control of its own external telecommunication services, the "federated States" being thus invested with international legal personality in yet one more field.

This is contrary to all known systems of federalism and only consonant with the creation of two separate States.

The provision for the joint operation and maintenance of Nicosia International Airport "by the two communities", on the basis of equality, is so unworkable and absurd as to need no elaboration.

(i) *Miscellaneous matters*

Even matters such as standards of weights and measures, patents, trade marks, copyrights and meteorological services are to be the responsibility of the "federated States", thus rendering it possible for different standards to be adopted by each. Only co-ordination is to be ensured by the federal executive.

This is another illustration of the denial of federal personality even in such insignificant matters as these.

(j) *Composition and effectiveness of the proposed federal organs*

The Turkish documents envisage, throughout, participation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the federal organs, taking decisions on a basis of equality. Such provisions are the surest recipe for bringing about continuous and insurmountable deadlocks at all levels of the Federal State leading to perpetual intercommunal friction and culminating inevitably in partition.

This is yet another manifestation of the negative attitude of the Turkish side towards federation in the true sense.

Moreover, the proposed equalization of the Greek Cypriot community, comprising 82 per cent of the total population, with the 18 per cent Turkish Cypriot community, now extended to all federal functions, is a negation of all democratic principles to which lip-service is paid in the preamble proposed for the constitution of the new federal republic of Cyprus, set out in the Turkish documents. It is also inconsistent with the universally accepted federal concept.

#### TERRITORIAL ASPECT

The Turkish side makes no proposal on the territorial aspect beyond what was proposed in April 1976, namely a "readjustment of the line", which it now further limits by expressing its readiness "to enter into negotiations for readjusting the line".

Such "readjustments" as are shown on the map attached to the Turkish documents are a mockery: the areas proposed to be given up are areas situated in the neutral zone which is not under the occupation of the Turkish forces. The Turks are in fact offering back what is not under their occupation. On the other hand, the areas in respect of which they have indicated readiness "to enter into negotiations" for readjusting the line are isolated insignificant areas, such as Kokkina, with the obvious aim of straightening and shortening and thus strengthening the Attila line. The extent of these areas represents about 1 per cent.

It is worthy of note that the Turkish documents studiously avoid any reference to one concrete and most important criterion for the settlement of the territorial aspect, namely, land-ownership. This significant omission is no doubt due to the fact that the Turkish Cypriot land-ownership is only 12.3 per cent of the land of Cyprus.

The provisions of the Turkish documents with regard to Famagusta are so vague and incomprehensible and so hedged in by unspecified conditions that they do not amount to any kind of proposal whatsoever. In any event, the Turkish documents speak only about the possible return of some "Greek Cypriot owners" to their properties in only a specified limited part of Famagusta, subject to certain conditions, not about the return of Famagusta to its rightful owners. This is adding insult to injury when one remembers that the new town of Famagusta is an exclusively Greek Cypriot inhabited town and all property in this town is owned exclusively by Greek Cypriots.

Even presuming that some Greek Cypriot "owners" were allowed to return to that specified limited part of Famagusta, the aim would be to exploit them and their know-how, converting them to hostages, subjecting them to the humiliations and vicissitudes suffered by the Greek Cypriot population in the Turkish-occupied area and expelling them when they were no longer needed.

This is not an imaginary fear. The terrible reality is the forcible, calculated expulsion, long after the cessation of hostilities, of the Greek Cypriots who were not driven out during or immediately after the invasion. Of the 20,000 who had so remained, only 1,770 are now left in the Turkish-occupied area, living in conditions of deprivation of all basic fundamental human rights and liberties.

The provision in the Turkish documents that freedom of residence will be recognized primarily for "professional purposes" and the other conditions to which the exercise of this right will be subjected afford further insight into the true aims of the Turkish side in respect of Famagusta. Furthermore, the danger of subjecting oneself to "the laws of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" is not a theoretical danger because already in the

"Constitution" of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" the protection of human rights extends only to "Turkish citizens". Foreigners, a term which includes Greek Cypriots, are not accorded such protection.

The provisions relating to Famagusta, if they prove anything, prove the Turkish intention not to create a federal Republic, because the provisions offend against the principle of the unity of the territory of the federation and of its people. The division is extended, not only as between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, but also as between categories of citizens—some "owners" of property and others.

#### CONCLUSION

This paper mentions only some of the most glaring examples of the failure of the Turkish side to honour its solemn and express undertaking to submit concrete and comprehensive proposals for the creation of a federal Republic.

The Turkish documents themselves reiterate that the provisions are for "federation by evolution". Even this "evolutionary process", however, in addition to its unacceptability, is illusory, since it is arrested for at least seven years, during which there will be "reservations on amendments" to the constitution. After the lapse of seven years, the proposed "deadlock" provisions would again preclude any form of evolution. But it must again be stressed that "federation by evolution" is for obvious reasons totally unacceptable at its basis.

From the few examples given, it becomes evident that the Turkish approach to the solution of the Cyprus problem bears no relation to the concept of federation, and that therefore no number or extent of amendments can bring it into line with the agreed basis of establishing a federal Republic. Thus, the "proposals" contained in the Turkish documents cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered as providing any basis for negotiation and the resumption of intercommunal talks.

With regard to the most important aspect of territory, the Turks have again failed to suggest anything which could be described as proposals.

In fact, the provisions in the documents now presented (some of which are couched in identical language as the proposals presented at Vienna in April 1977) reveal even more clearly than ever before the Turkish intention to create two separate States. Therefore, if the proposals presented at Vienna last year proved in practice not to form a basis for negotiation and led to the breakdown of the talks, the proposals presented now are *a fortiori* not a basis for negotiation and the resumption of intercommunal talks.

It must also be pointed out that all the provisions in the Turkish documents are coupled with deviously phrased escape clauses allowing the Turkish side, during the actual negotiating process, to become even more intransigent than its "proposals" show it to be, and to renege even from the ostensible commitments contained in the documents.

It is obvious that the sole objective of the Turkish documents was to create the false impression that the Turkish side was honouring its obligation to submit concrete and comprehensive proposals, and thus to improve the international image of Turkey, and for other purposes, not the solution of the Cyprus problem in the interest of the people of Cyprus and of peace and security in the area. It is equally obvious that, once this objective was achieved, the Turkish side, relying on the many escape clauses contained in the documents, far from entering into negotiations with a view to improving its "proposals", would recede from them even further.

In light of the above, the Turkish proposals are considered as totally unacceptable and as such cannot under any circumstances justify the resumption of the intercommunal talks.

**Letter dated 6 May 1978 from the representative of South Africa  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[6 May 1978]

On 5 May 1978, the South African Government responded to requests for details regarding South Africa's limited military operation against SWAPO forces in southern Angola on 4 May.

The following documents are enclosed:

1. The response of the South African Government conveyed to the Governments of the five Western members of the Security Council in response to a United States request regarding South Africa's limited military operation against SWAPO forces in southern Angola, together with the attachment referred to therein [annex I].

2. The statements by the South African Minister of Defence, the Honourable P. W. Botha, issued at Cape Town on 4 May [annex II] and by the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Honourable R. F. Botha, issued at Pretoria on 5 May [annex III], concerning South Africa's limited military action in southern Angola. These statements were annexed to the above-mentioned response.

You will recall that, when I brought the different documents to your attention before the commencement of the 2077th meeting of the Security Council on 5 May, I confirmed to you on each occasion that South Africa's limited military operation had been completed and that all South African forces had been withdrawn completely from Angola. Once again I wish to reiterate these facts.

I should be grateful if this letter and its annexes could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) J. Adriaan EKSTEEN  
Chargé d'Affaires  
of the Permanent Mission of South Africa  
to the United Nations

**ANNEX I**

**Text of the message conveyed by the South African Government to the Governments of the five Western members of the Security Council in response to a United States request regarding South Africa's limited military operation against SWAPO forces in southern Angola on 4 May 1978**

1. Recently, and particularly following South Africa's acceptance of the Western proposals for an internationally recognized solution in South West Africa, the intensity of acts of violence and the frequency of border violations by terrorists had increased dangerously (see attachment). This escalation took place in spite of South Africa's efforts to secure a peaceful solution, and the South African Government was confronted by urgent appeals from the leaders of South West Africa for protection. They were further profoundly dismayed and shocked by Mr. Nujoma's concluding statement to the special session of the General Assembly on 3 May 1978 that "SWAPO... will persevere and intensify the armed liberation struggle".<sup>a</sup> South Africa could no longer continue to ignore these pleas.

The action then taken had limited objectives and was carried out with limited forces including black and white South West Africans. It was mainly directed at the two most important SWAPO headquarters used for operations against South West Africa.

<sup>a</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 15th meeting, para. 73.

2. As expected, the SWAPO base headquarters, at Cassinga, situated 15 kilometres north of the mining town of Techanutete, formerly called Cassinga, was an extensive SWAPO military installation. It contained formidable defence works such as trenches, bunkers and underground shelters. It was established beyond doubt that this base constituted SWAPO's main operational centre, responsible for over-all planning, logistics, communications and strategy.

Vast quantities of weapons and ammunition were found and destroyed and considerable documentation was found and removed.

The SWAPO personnel included women, in uniform, fully armed and actually fighting in the trenches. The dead included some of these. The personnel not killed were rounded up and disarmed. As they could not be evacuated, they were released when the South African group left. There were also a number of camp followers, including women, who apparently lived in the confines of the base. Some of them might have become casualties. A number of the children who were hijacked across the border on 23 April were found and, at their request, these were going to be taken back. Unfortunately, just as the final evacuation was in progress, an armed attack from the direction of Techanutete occurred; mortar, cannon and small arms fire was directed at the camp by this force. In these circumstances, it was not possible to evacuate the children.

The second base, Chetequera, was the centre for the hit-and-run operations against western Owambo. Here too a well-prepared communist-type military base with trenches and inter-connecting tunnels and large quantities of arms and ammunition was found. On the way back, further SWAPO elements were mopped up.

The documentary and other evidence found at these SWAPO terrorist bases is being analysed and further particulars about SWAPO involvement in acts of terrorism already committed and the planning for its future campaign of intimidation, including political murders etc., will be made available.

By way of example, the following extract from one of the documents illustrates SWAPO's real intentions:

"SWAPO WILL WIN — NAMIBIA WILL BE FREE

"ISSUED BY GREENWELL MATONGOH, CHIEF POLITICAL  
COMMISSAR, AND DIMO HAMAAMBO, COMMANDER OF THE  
ARMED FORCES

"Moscow, 14 February 1978

"Notes taken during the address of MCC and youth leader,  
Comrade Ndali Kamati, at the Parade, Cassinga,  
People's Republic of Angola

"Comrade Kamati uttered the slogan and then expressed his gratitude for having been made welcome in Cassinga for seven days.

"(a) He continued by remarking that the coming of many comrades abroad is testimony to the great momentum with which the revolutionary trend is sweeping over Namibia. The celebration of 26 August, Namibia Day, right inside, testifies that the armed liberation struggle is also lived by the non-armed comrades inside the country.

"(b) The Gang of Five — South African talks in New York

"Commander Ndali said SWAPO has also been invited to the talks. He then said that the occupation of Namibia is actually led by the Gang of Five, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. These are the same people who initiated the talks, these are the same people exploiting our mineral resources. These are supposedly now forcing South Africa to quit Namibia. Their move, however, follows realization that SWAPO would have to win. They

would not like to see what happened in Angola being repeated in Namibia, as this could be detrimental to their economic interests in Namibia. They hope to get South Africa out peacefully and win the favour of SWAPO, to continue their exploitation of our resources.

"In short, no genuine attempt can be made by imperialists to free Namibia . . .

"... It is clear that no real independence can be gained easily. Countries like Malawi, Zambia, Zaire have only false independence symbolized by flags. Their economies are run by their former colonizers. We must abide by our decision to fight even for 10 to 20 years if need be. Anyone who is not determined should go and join the Turnhalle . . ."

3. An urgent appeal is made to the international community to insist that SWAPO immediately cease further acts of violence against the Territory and the people of South West Africa. SWAPO cannot follow a dual strategy, i.e. to appear to be negotiating and at the same time delaying their reply and continuing brutal acts of violence and terror against the people whom they claim to represent.

4. In these circumstances, it is urged that finality on the implementation of the Western proposals be reached as soon as possible. The sooner this is done the sooner the international community will be in a position to keep itself fully informed on what is happening in the Territory and for the speeding up of the process leading to free democratic elections and to independence by the end of the year.

#### ATTACHMENT

##### *Summary of incidents since January 1978*

On 5 January this year, the body of an Owambo man was found after he had been shot by a gang of terrorists. The body was found on a fence and a number of AK47 cartridge cases were later discovered near the body.

On 8 January a private car with 10 civilian passengers detonated a Russian land-mine. Four of the passengers were killed outright and six were seriously injured. This and other mine incidents forced the Chief Minister of Owambo, Pastor Ndjoba, at the time to call for stronger action against the terrorists.

On 7 February the Owambo Minister of Health, Mr. Shigaya, was assassinated with a Russian-made pistol after a political meeting in Owambo.

On 21 February a group of terrorists abducted 119 children and their teacher from the St. Mary's Mission School in Owambo. Three children later escaped and could tell how they were forced over the border and taken to terrorist training camps. Once again Pastor Ndjoba called for firmer action by the security forces.

On 3 March Sub-Headman Nangola Kanyala was killed by a group of terrorists. His body was mutilated and his wife and children abducted.

On 25 March another Sub-Headman, working for the South African police, was shot by terrorists using a Russian-made pistol.

On 27 March two terrorists assassinated the leader of the Herero people, Mr. Clemens Kapuuu. The attack took place at his home in Katutura just a short while after he and his tribal council decided on asking the Administrator-General for better protection of the political leaders of South West Africa. Before his death Mr. Kapuuu was a strong supporter of the total destruction of terrorist bases across the Angolan border.

On 18 April two Owambo children were killed by a Russian hand-grenade set by terrorists for a patrol of the security forces.

On 21 April an attempt was made on the life of Owambo's Minister of Justice, Mr. Tara Imbili, when a terrorist tried to plant a mine on the road leading to his house.

On 22 April a bus was hijacked on the road between Oshakati and Ruacana. The bus with about 70 to 80 people on board was taken to Angola.

On 24 April South African forces made contact with 20 terrorists approximately 10 kilometres south of the Angola-South West African border. After a fire fight, the enemy withdrew northwards over the border.

On 24 April a vehicle of the South African forces was ambushed by SWAPO terrorists approximately six kilometres south of the Angola-South West African border. Security forces returned fire following which the terrorists withdrew to the safety of Angola territory. A South African soldier was killed in this incident.

On 28 April a South African Defence Force (SADF) patrol was attacked from a Cuca shop approximately 25 kilometres east of Ruacana.

On 29 April shots were fired at the border post at Ruacana. Fire was not returned.

On 29 and 30 April land-mines of communist origin were set to explode at the new homes built for the members of the Owambo Cabinet and the Legislative Assembly building at Ongwediva.

On 30 April an SADF patrol was attacked by approximately 10 SWAPO terrorists 45 kilometres east of Enana. One SADF member was killed.

On 1 May heavy fire was brought down on a SADF patrol approximately 43 kilometres south-east of Enana. A follow-up operation was mounted and the enemy fled over the Angolan border.

On 2 May the water pipeline running between Ondangua and Oshikango was sabotaged. This pipeline is essential for the livelihood of the local inhabitants.

On 3 May heavy fire was directed at the guard post and buildings at Ruacana, including structures of the water scheme. Several buildings were damaged. Fire was not returned.

Latest intelligence reveals that SWAPO has recently established three new bases in southern Angola close to the border. This confirms the pattern of consolidation which is a prerequisite for increased terrorist activity against South West Africa.

Over the period 1 to 3 May several land-mines had to be lifted in the border area.

#### ANNEX II

##### **Text of the statement issued by the South African Minister of Defence, the Honourable P. W. Botha, in regard to South Africa's limited military operation in Angola**

As a result of the ominous build-up of SWAPO forces in southern Angola and the extensive campaign of intimidation of the local inhabitants and the murder of political leaders in South West Africa, as well as the large number of border violations during the past few weeks, a limited military operation against SWAPO forces has been carried out over the border.

The limited operation was embarked on after large numbers of heavily armed SWAPO terrorists recently crossed the border, attacked our forces in Owambo and fled back to safety in Angola.

The Ruacana power station was also fired on and the buildings extensively damaged.

After the attack, the latest since SWAPO intensified its hostilities, we were forced to resort to follow-up actions.

I trust that the limited operation will leave those who wish to threaten us under no illusions.

We have already leaned over backwards to seek the solution along other lines and will continue to do so in the interest of peace in this subcontinent.

But the South African Government can no longer allow, with self-respect, emergency calls from peaceful leaders to remain unanswered.

We have a moral duty towards the people of South West Africa and cannot sit silently and with folded hands and see how peaceful citizens and leaders of this remote area are murdered, assaulted, kidnapped and threatened and intimidated by other methods of terrorism.

I have in the past repeatedly expressed the hope that military bases will not be made available to terrorists in southern Angola but this apparently has fallen on deaf ears.

### ANNEX III

#### Text of the statement issued by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honourable R. F. Botha, in regard to South Africa's limited military operation in Angola

In all our negotiations, the Western Powers placed great emphasis on the necessity of achieving a cessation of violence. The core of the Western proposals is that the continuing violence and intimidation should cease in order to provide the people of South West Africa with the opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination freely and without fear.

South Africa remains willing and ready to implement the Western proposals for a settlement of the South West African question, but we also insist that the terrorists cease their acts of violence.

It should be emphasized that SWAPO has not only proceeded with its preconceived programme of terror following South Africa's acceptance of the proposals, but it has expanded and intensified its violence on a broad front. SWAPO's response to our acceptance of the proposals for a peaceful settlement has been to commit more violence. Indeed, SWAPO prides itself on continuing and expanding its attacks.

I once again appeal to the Western Powers urgently to pilot their proposals through the Security Council. The people of the Territory are entitled now to embark upon and conclude the process which will lead to independence. In the meanwhile, South Africa cannot shirk its duty to provide the necessary protection to the people of the Territory. Without that protection they will be totally vulnerable and they will be the prey of ruthless repression through physical violence.

### DOCUMENT S/12698

#### Letter dated 9 May 1978 from the representatives of Romania and the United States of America to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[10 May 1978]

We have the honour to transmit to you the joint declaration of the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceaușescu, and the President of the United States of America, Jimmy Carter, signed on the occasion of the visit which President Ceaușescu paid to the United States from 12 to 17 April 1978.

We request you to have this joint declaration circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ion DATCU  
Permanent Representative  
of Romania to the  
United Nations

(Signed) Andrew YOUNG  
Permanent Representative  
of the United States  
of America  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

##### Joint declaration of the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania and the President of the United States

The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceaușescu, and the President of the United States of America, Jimmy Carter,

Having noted with satisfaction that the political, economic, scientific, cultural and other relations between the two countries have developed significantly in recent years,

Having determined to take further steps to expand bilateral relations and co-operation, to build security and develop co-operation in Europe, to strengthen international peace and security, and to seek solutions for the manifold issues confronting the world,

Agreed on the following declaration:

I. They reaffirmed the commitment to continue the development and expansion of relations between the two countries on the basis of the joint statement signed in Washington on 5 December 1973 [see S/11205 of 31 January 1974] and of the joint statement on economic, industrial and technical co-operation between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the United States of the same date. These relations are based on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, and consistent with these, particularly on the following interrelated principles:

The right of each State to existence, freedom, independence and national sovereignty;

The equal rights of all States, irrespective of their size, level of development, and political, economic and social systems;

The right of each State freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural system;

The right of each people to decide its own destiny;

Refraining from the threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

Respect for territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers;

Non-intervention, direct or indirect, for any reason whatever, in the internal affairs of any other State;

Peaceful settlement of international disputes;

Observance of and promotion of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including all the conditions required for a free, dignified and prosperous life;

Co-operation among States in order to promote world peace and security and economic and social progress.

II. They stated their joint determination:

1. To continue meetings at the highest level and consultations at other levels, and to encourage interchanges between members of legislatures and representatives of local administration.

2. To promote and facilitate the expansion of trade and economic co-operation between the two countries, taking into account Romania's present status as a developing country.

3. To promote the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in conformity with the Agreement on Trade Relations between the two countries, and to seek to increase the volume and diversify the structure of bilateral trade.

4. To seek ways to put existing non-discriminatory trade relations on a more stable and long-term basis, in particular through the renewal of the Agreement on Trade Relations.

5. To encourage the development of co-operation activities, including joint ventures and co-operation in third markets, contacts and interchanges between Romanian economic organizations and American firms, participation in specialized exhibitions in both countries, increased exchange of economic information and data, and other measures for the implementation of the Long-Term Agreement on Economic, Industrial and Technical Co-operation, signed in 1976; and to support in this respect the activities of the Joint Romanian-American Economic Commission and of the Romanian-United States Economic Council.

6. To co-operate in the settlement of humanitarian issues, including family reunification, in the spirit of mutual understanding and goodwill.

7. To promote cultural and scientific exchanges under the terms of the Agreement on Co-operation and Exchanges in the Cultural, Educational, Scientific and Technological Fields of 1974, as well as relations and contacts between institutions, organizations and citizens of the two countries, and to encourage

tourism, in order to increase mutual understanding and friendship between the two peoples.

III. They also expressed their joint determination:

1. To strengthen and make irreversible the process of détente in Europe and throughout the world.

2. To work for ensuring opportunities for all countries, big or small, to contribute to the settlement of complex world issues on the basis of equality.

3. To promote the settlement of all disputes among States by peaceful means and the elimination of the threat or use of force.

4. To contribute actively to the full implementation of all the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and to promote the multilateral process initiated by the Conference. They agreed that the Belgrade meeting provided a firm basis for continuation of this process; at the same time, they expressed disappointment that it had not been possible to reach agreement on the numerous useful proposals which had been put forward. They agreed to co-operate closely so that the 1980 Madrid meeting should take effective steps towards strengthening security and developing co-operation in Europe in the fields of economic co-operation, of cultural exchanges and humanitarian problems, and of military disengagement and disarmament. They also agreed that the development of friendly and neighbourly relations among Balkan countries will be a positive contribution to reinforcing security and expanding co-operation in Europe.

5. To act resolutely for the adoption of a wide range of disarmament measures, including nuclear disarmament, such as halting the build-up of armaments and reducing military budgets, armed forces and armaments, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. They endorsed a more effective role for the United Nations in dealing with international disarmament issues and underlined their active support for the special session on disarmament of the General Assembly.

6. To work toward a more just and equitable international economic order, which should promote the accelerated economic development of developing countries; and to intensify dialogue and co-operation among all countries, directed toward solving

major economic problems, on the basis of the principles of equality, equity and mutual benefit.

7. To encourage efforts aimed at a just, comprehensive and lasting peaceful settlement in the Middle East, based on Israel's withdrawal from territories occupied as a result of the 1967 war, respect for legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, and insurance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of all States in the region. To this end, they expressed themselves in favour of negotiations among all the interested parties, with appropriate representation of the Palestinian people.

8. To support the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples for peace, freedom and independence. They reaffirmed the inalienable right of the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia to sovereignty and independent development, and the necessity of ensuring, as soon as possible, the transfer of power to the African majority, in the spirit of pertinent United Nations resolutions. They also expressed deep concern about the South African policy of *apartheid* and racial discrimination and stood for the abolition of these practices.

9. To strengthen the role of the United Nations in the maintenance and consolidation of world peace, in the development of co-operation among all nations, and in furtherance of the principles of international law in the relations among States, through reforming and restructuring the United Nations system in order to make it stronger and more effective; and to strengthen co-operation between their two countries within the United Nations and other international organizations and conferences.

IV. The two Presidents expressed their conviction that friendly relations between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the United States of America, based on equality, mutual respect and due consideration for their respective interests, serve the cause of world peace, security and co-operation. They reaffirmed their commitment to expand and deepen, both through diplomatic channels and meetings at all levels, the consultations, contacts and exchanges that have become an important and lasting element of their co-operation.

DONE in Washington on the thirteenth of April 1978.

(Signed) Nicolae CEAUȘESCU  
President of the  
Socialist Republic of Romania

(Signed) Jimmy CARTER  
President of the  
United States of America

## DOCUMENT S/12699

### Note verbale dated 31 March 1978 from the Mission of Botswana to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[10 May 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Botswana to the United Nations has the honour to transmit to the Secretary-General the enclosed letter dated 1 February 1978 from the office of the Minister for External Affairs concerning resolution 418 (1977) adopted by the Security Council on 4 November 1977 on the question of South Africa.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Botswana has the honour to request that this communication should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

#### TEXT OF THE LETTER

I have been instructed to respond to your communication of 10 November 1977 concerning resolution

418 (1977) adopted by the Security Council on 4 November 1977 on the question of South Africa.

The Botswana Government wishes to state that Botswana has no relations whatsoever of a military nature with South Africa nor does it contemplate establishing such relations in the future so long as South Africa continues to adhere to the policy of *apartheid* and to deny the basic human rights to the majority of its citizens.

(Signed) D. RENDOH  
For the Minister for External  
Affairs of Botswana



DOCUMENT S/12700

Letter dated 25 April 1978 from the Technical Co-ordinator of the Ministry of State for External Affairs of the Comoros to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]  
[10 May 1978]

I have the honour to refer to your communication of 29 March 1978 and to Security Council resolution 418 (1977) on the question of South Africa.

Since the Comoros acceded to independence, they have come into confrontation with a founding Member of the Organization and, moreover, a permanent member of the Security Council, France, which is trying to impose itself by force through the military occupation of the Comorian island of Mayotte.

Again, it is France which, in southern Africa, is bent on maintaining the presence of racism and the policy of *apartheid* of South Africa.

The Comoros have always held the position that they must fight with the modest means at their disposal for the full and genuine liberation of Africa, and it is in keeping with this position and with the sacred principle of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity that the Comoros have decided not to have economic, trade or political relations with the racist régime of South Africa.

(Signed) Salim HALIFA  
Technical Co-ordinator of the Ministry of State  
for External Affairs of the Comoros

DOCUMENT S/12701\*

Letter dated 11 May 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[11 May 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 11 May 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if his letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ilter TÜRKMEN  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Text of the letter dated 11 May 1978 from Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, His Excellency Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, I have the honour to draw your attention and that of the members of the Security Council to the following inflammatory and provocative "order" issued on 7 May 1978 by the Commander of the Greek Cypriot National Guard in connexion with the anniversary celebrations of Greek Army Day:

*"Order of the High Command*

"This year's anniversary has found the holy race of Hellenes united and our army ready for the supreme battle. The land, air and sea of heroic Cyprus are Hellenic and they will always remain in the hands of Hellenes.

"Today's conditions require loyalty to national duties, rigid training and close adherence to the laws of the State and of the Greek National Guard. They also require spiritual and physical readiness for the final battle.

"Officers, non-commissioned officers and men should continue the great heritage of the Hellenic race. We must also create the conditions for the recovery of our lost territories and expulsion of the caricatures of Attila from our long-suffering land."

It should be noted that the aforesaid "order", reflecting the undying ideal of a Greek Cyprus cleansed of all the Turkish elements of the population, was issued by the High Command of the illegal Greek Cypriot National Guard whose Commander, General Komminos, and his senior deputies are Greek national military personnel dispatched from Athens. The following quotation from your report to the General Assembly of 25 October 1977 also confirms the presence of the mainland (Greece) military personnel on the island:

"... a number of officers, especially senior commanders and staff officers of the National Guard, appear to be Greek national military personnel. In addition, a Greek national contingent is stationed in the island. The number of Greek national personnel in Cyprus is not known accurately to UNFICYP, nor is the extent of withdrawals."<sup>a</sup>

It is, therefore, earnestly to be hoped that, in the vital interest of the two communities in Cyprus, the Greek side will refrain from endorsing such inflammatory orders and accept the equitable partnership concept proposed in good faith by the Turkish community of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/97-S/12701.

<sup>a</sup> A/32/282, para. 20.

**Letter dated 12 May 1978 from the representative of Cyprus  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[12 May 1978]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to a letter dated 26 April 1978 circulated at the request of the representative of Turkey (NV/78/36), to which was annexed a document issued by Mr. Rauf Denktaş as President of the so-called Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

Mr. Denktaş's statement starts with a deliberate misnomer. There is no Turkish State in the Republic of Cyprus and none is recognized by the international community or the United Nations.

The reality is as follows.

First, the territory on which the illogical claim for such a State is made, is none other than the 40 per cent of the territory of Cyprus invaded by Turkey in July 1974 and still under its aggressive occupation in violation of the United Nations resolutions for the withdrawal of the foreign occupation forces and the return of the refugees to their homes in safety.

Secondly, the legitimate population of this territory is, and has been over the ages, 82 per cent Greek Cypriot and 18 per cent Turkish Cypriot. The recent criminality in the genocidal expulsion of the Greek Cypriot majority from the invaded area and the forcible implanting in their usurped homes of alien population imported from Turkey cannot alter the legitimate population of the territory involved, nor wipe out their inalienable right to return to their homes in safety. How can the offspring of such a complex of international crimes claim to be a State and be tolerated by the United Nations or any civilized world society?

The Turkish proposals for a so-called solution of this grave problem of Cyprus submitted to the Secretary-General are in substance and effect but a bid for the legitimization of the aforesaid acts of aggression and faits accomplis, on a pre-planned design by Ankara for the virtual partition of the island, with annexation in prospect. The proposals are, therefore, basically different in kind from the agreed basis of a federation in an independent, sovereign and territorially integral State.

Suffice it to say that they are for two completely separate States, providing separate passports and consequently separate national identity and allegiance. In the proposals there is express division of sovereignty, which is totally incompatible with any concept of federation. The unity of the territory is denied and destroyed, while numerous provisions are clearly aimed at promoting and perpetuating the partition of the territory and the division of the people.

Such proposals do not envision even confederation. Their obvious purpose is but the legitimization of the aggression and its effects.

The President of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou, as is natural, rejected these proposals which by their nature

violate the oneness of the State, its territorial integrity and sovereign independence as well as the agreed constitutional basis for a federation.

It is true that the Secretary-General referred to these proposals as "concrete and substantial". But Mr. Denktaş bypasses the clarification, made immediately afterwards by the Secretary-General, to the effect that his statement had no relevance to the merits of the proposals and was no indication that the proposals were either positive or negative. The proposals, however, should primarily be positive on the agreed lines of a federation for the survival of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus as one State, and obviously not be "concrete and substantial" in the negative direction, as the death sentence of the Republic and the abolition of its independent existence.

The illogical insistence on the part of Ankara, expressed through Mr. Denktaş, that proposals of such kind must be accepted as a basis for negotiation is but a manifestation of the aggressor's arrogance. Characteristic also of such arrogance are the threatening statements by Ankara's official, Mr. Soysal, to the effect that, in case of non-acceptance of the proposals, "regrettable things might happen" [see S/12653].

It is ludicrous for Mr. Denktaş to suggest — unless the design is to entrap — that, after accepting to start negotiations on a particular basis, either side could in the course thereof depart from that accepted basis. Such conduct of bad faith we cannot adopt.

It should be made abundantly clear that no representative of the Government or the people of Cyprus, in whatever capacity, would be prepared to sit and discuss proposals so aggressively illogical and so ominous in their implications for the independence, territorial integrity and the very survival of his country and its people.

In reference to Mr. Denktaş's rehashing of unsubstantiated and misleading statements regarding ill-treatment allegedly suffered by the Turkish Cypriots during the period 1963-1974, they have been effectively and unanswerably refuted by my statements in the Security Council on 30 August 1974 [1795th meeting], the Special Political Committee on 29 October 1974<sup>7</sup> and the General Assembly on 8 October 1975,<sup>8</sup> where I quoted the authority of the six-monthly reports of the Secretary-General. The relevant records are available and speak for themselves.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES  
Permanent Representative of Cyprus  
to the United Nations

<sup>7</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Special Political Committee, 923rd meeting.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., Thirtieth Session, Plenary Meetings, 2380th meeting.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/98-S/12702.

**Note verbale dated 5 May 1978 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Burma to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[15 May 1978]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note dated 10 November 1977 regarding the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs wishes to inform the Secretary-General that, in pursuance of resolution 418 (1977) adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 4 November 1977 on the question of South Africa, the authorities of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma have issued the necessary directives to all departments concerned to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the resolution.

## DOCUMENT S/12704

**Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 423 (1978) in connexion with the question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia**

[Original: English]  
[1 May 1978]

1. At its 2067th meeting, held on 14 March 1978, the Security Council adopted resolution 423 (1978) in connexion with the question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia. The text of the resolution is as follows:

*"The Security Council,*

*"Recalling its resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia and in particular resolution 415 (1977) of 29 September 1977,*

*"Reaffirming that the continued existence of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia is a source of insecurity and instability in the region and constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security,*

*"Gravely concerned over the continued military operations by the illegal régime, including its acts of aggression against neighbouring independent States,*

*"Indignant at the continued executions of freedom fighters by the illegal régime,*

*"Considering the need for urgent measures to terminate the illegal régime and establish a government based on majority rule,*

*"1. Condemns all attempts and manœuvres by the illegal régime aimed at the retention of power by a racist minority and at preventing the achievement of independence by Zimbabwe;*

*"2. Declares as illegal and unacceptable any internal settlement concluded under the auspices of the illegal régime and calls upon all States not to accord any recognition to such a settlement;*

*"3. Further declares that the speedy termination of the illegal régime and the replacement of its military and police forces constitute the first prerequisite for the restoration of legality in Southern Rhodesia so that arrangements may be made for a peaceful and democratic transition to genuine majority rule and independence in 1978;*

*"4. Declares also that such arrangements as envisaged in paragraph 3 of the present resolution include the holding of free and fair elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage under United Nations supervision;*

*"5. Calls upon the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take all measures necessary to bring to an end the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and to effect the genuine decolonization of the Territory in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and other United Nations resolutions;*

*"6. Considers that, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, should enter into immediate consultations with the parties concerned in order to attain the objectives of genuine decolonization of the Territory through the implementation of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the present resolution;*

*"7. Requests the Secretary-General to report, not later than 15 April 1978, on the results of the implementation of the present resolution."*

2. In response to the request addressed to me in resolution 423 (1978), I met the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom on 27 March 1978 and informed him of my readiness to co-operate with his Government, in any way possible, for the purpose of facilitating immediate consultations between the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, and the parties concerned. The Permanent Representative informed me of the efforts planned by the United Kingdom in concert with the United States to embark on a further series of consultations with the parties concerned. I stated that my representative, Lieutenant-General Prem Chand, would be available to attend any consultations that might be arranged.

3. I have been kept informed by the administering Power, as well as by my own representative, of all pertinent developments that took place during the course of consultations. I have also had comprehensive discussions on the situation with the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. David Owen, during the course of his recent visit to United Nations Headquarters as well as during my own visit to London in April. I have also been in close touch with the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Cyrus Vance.

4. As may be seen from the developments described below, the Government of the United Kingdom, as envisaged by paragraph 6 of the above resolution, continued to consult the parties concerned with a view to convening a conference of all parties with a declared aim of bringing about "a peaceful and democratic transition to genuine majority rule and independence in 1978". As these consultations continued during March and most of April, I have, with the consent of the Security Council, delayed the submission of this report to cover all developments in that period.

5. On 27 April 1978, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom furnished me with information on the consultations that had taken place between the administering Power and the parties concerned. Before summarizing the results of those consultations, it is necessary to describe briefly some related developments that took place before the adoption of resolution 423 (1978).

6. According to the information provided by the Government of the United Kingdom, the latter, together with the Government of the United States, had, early in March 1978, invited all the parties concerned to a meeting in New York with the aim of widening areas of agreement between the parties concerned and establishing acceptable machinery to achieve common objectives. The United Kingdom Government believed, on the basis of statements by the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe and the public announcements of the parties at Salisbury, that all concerned were in agreement on some common objectives, including the attainment of independence for Zimbabwe in 1978 and the election of a parliament on the basis of universal suffrage and under conditions which would ensure that the elections were carried out freely and fairly. The administering Power had made clear that none of the parties attending the meeting would need to concede in advance any of their previous positions. I was informed, however, that the initial response by the parties concerned to this invitation had been disappointing.

7. Parallel to the renewed efforts of the United Kingdom for the resumption of consultations, a meeting attended by the Presidents of Botswana, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, together with the leaders of the Patriotic Front, took place at Dar es Salaam from 25 to 26 March 1978. At the conclusion of the meeting, the participants invited the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States to "convene, in the shortest time possible, a meeting to follow up what was agreed in Malta". This was a reference to the meetings with Mr. Joshua Nkomo and Mr. Robert Mugabe which had been held in Malta between 30 January and 1 February 1978 by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Owen, accompanied by the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, Ambassador Andrew Young, and the British Resident Commissioner designate for Southern Rhodesia, Lord Carver. My representative, General Prem Chand, also attended the Malta talks.

8. Subsequently, at a meeting at Lagos held on 3 April 1978, which was attended by Secretary of State Mr. Cyrus Vance, the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Lagos, representatives of the five front-line States and Mr. Mugabe, it was agreed that a meeting such as that proposed by the African leaders should be held as a preliminary to a meeting of all the parties concerned.

9. Continuing the consultations which had been initiated in March by the United Kingdom and the United States, preparatory meetings were held early in April by senior officials of the two Governments with the leaders of the Patriotic Front, at Maputo, and with the representatives of the other parties, at Salisbury.

10. Following these meetings, Mr. Owen and Mr. Vance met the leaders of the Patriotic Front at Dar es Salaam on 14 and 15 April. They also met the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mr. Julius Nyerere. The meetings with the leaders of the Patriotic Front were attended by my representative, General Prem Chand, and by representatives of the Governments of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Nigeria, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia.

11. At the conclusion of the meetings at Dar es Salaam, an agreed joint statement was issued on 15 April 1978 which read as follows:

"1. The Malta II Conference between the Patriotic Front and the British and American Governments was held in Dar es Salaam on 14 and 15 April 1978. The parties expressed appreciation to President Nyerere and the Tanzanian Government for their kind hospitality.

"2. The British and United States delegations were led by Mr. David Owen, the British Foreign Secretary, and Mr. Cyrus Vance, the United States Secretary of State, while the Patriotic Front delegation was led by President Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. General Prem Chand representing the Secretary-General of the United Nations also attended.

"3. Representatives of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia were present as observers.

"4. The Conference, whose purpose was to discuss military and related matters arising from the Anglo-American proposals, was held in an atmosphere of candour and seriousness.

"5. The United States and British Secretaries of State reaffirmed their support for the Anglo-American proposals. In the course of discussions, the leaders of the Patriotic Front put forward a number of proposals aimed at reaching a settlement within the principles of the Anglo-American proposals. For their part, the United States and British Secretaries of State took note of these proposals which they regarded as fundamental changes in the Anglo-American plan which would have to be negotiated. Progress was made and there was broad agreement in some important areas.

"6. It was agreed that a further Conference be held as soon as possible."

12. The United Kingdom Government has informed me that the Patriotic Front, whilst reserving its negotiating positions on a number of important points, had expressed readiness to attend the proposed round-table talks. On 17 April, Mr. Owen and Mr. Vance visited Salisbury and held meetings with the parties led by Mr. Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa, Mr. Sithole and Chief Chirau. The primary objective of the visit was to find common grounds for the proposed round-table conference. At the conclusion of the meeting, the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States were informed that their proposal would be given serious consideration. Subsequently, on 25 April, the parties at Salisbury announced that an all-party meeting "appears to be doomed to certain failure", although they did not say they would not attend.

13. I am informed that the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States have stated that for their part they will continue contacts with all the parties in order to define further the issues which could be discussed at a meeting of all the parties and thereby increase the chance that such a meeting might be successful. I have also been informed that it remains the stated intention of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States to continue the search for a negotiated settlement based on the principles of their proposals. In this regard the Governments of the United

Kingdom and the United States have decided to designate two senior officials to carry out preparatory work for the round-table talks.

14. The United Kingdom as well as the United States have stated that, should the occasion require, they will call upon the Secretary-General to make available his good offices. In this connexion, both Governments have found it valuable that my representative, General Prem Chand, has been able to participate in many of the discussions on the subject.

#### DOCUMENT S/12705

##### Note verbale dated 9 May 1978 from the Mission of Gabon to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]  
[16 May 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the Gabonese Republic to the United Nations has the honour, with reference to the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977 requesting information on measures taken by the Gabonese Government in implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), to inform him that the Gabonese Republic has never supplied or sold arms to South Africa and does not intend to deviate from that policy in the future.

The Permanent Mission of the Gabonese Republic wishes to state that the Gabonese Republic will comply with the obligations imposed on it by resolution 418 (1977) concerning the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, and would be obliged if the Secretary-General would have this note circulated as a Security Council document.

#### DOCUMENT S/12706

##### Note verbale dated 9 May 1978 from the representative of Chad to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]  
[16 May 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Chad to the United Nations, referring to the Secretary-General's note dated 10 November 1977 addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad concerning resolution 418 (1977) on the question of South Africa, adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 4 November 1977, has the honour to inform him of the following.

The Republic of Chad maintains no relations with the *apartheid* régime at Pretoria, inasmuch as one of the constants of its foreign policy is its unswerving support for the struggle of peoples still under colonial or racist domination.

In the view of the Republic of Chad, the *apartheid* practised by South Africa is an absolute scourge which should be combated with all available weapons. The Republic of Chad has always advocated and continues to advocate measures to isolate South Africa. Consequently, South African or foreign aircraft carrying cargo or passengers from or to South Africa are strictly pro-

hibited from flying over the territory of the Republic of Chad or landing at Chad airfields.

The Republic of Chad has taken a stand on behalf of the oppressed peoples of South Africa, and there will be no change in its attitude so long as the racist white minority continues to deny the inalienable rights of the African majority. On the basis of that position of principle, the Republic of Chad unreservedly supports the decision of the Security Council contained in resolution 418 (1977), which is undoubtedly a first step under the international programme of action against the *apartheid* régime in South Africa. The Republic of Chad therefore earnestly hopes that, in the near future, the Security Council may, in addition to this military embargo, also require of the international community a mandatory economic embargo.

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Chad would be obliged if the Secretary-General would have this note circulated as a Security Council document.

**Letter dated 16 May 1978 from the representative of Turkey  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[17 May 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 16 May 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) İlter TÜRKMEN  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations

**ANNEX**

**Text of the letter dated 16 May 1978 from Mr. Nail Atalay  
to the Secretary-General**

I am sure you will appreciate that the resumption of the intercommunal talks needs a calm atmosphere, forbearance and the good intentions of the parties concerned. It is a matter of regret that the Greek Cypriot leadership is doing its utmost in order to destroy all chances of reconciliation, as a matter of preconceived policy.

The daily output of anti-Turkish propaganda in the Greek press, on the radio and television and provocative statements by the Greek Cypriot leaders have reached a climax, especially after the decision of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate in favour of continuing the arms embargo against Turkey.

One indication of this came in the remarks made by Mr. Rolandis, the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister, who, in addressing a Lions Club luncheon at Larnaca on 12 May 1978, described the Turkish Cypriot proposals as being "not even worthy of throwing into a waste basket".

On the other hand, the Speaker of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives, in a message on the occasion of Mother's Day, is reported to have said: "There can be no solution, no workable solution but the creation of a unitary State". This statement is in direct contradiction to the agreement reached between President Denktaş and the late Archbishop Makarios in your presence on 12 February 1977, that a solution to the Cyprus question could be found within the framework of "a bi-communal, federal State".

You will agree that the Greek Cypriot side must realize there is no correlation between the question of Cyprus and Turkish-

American relations. This was eloquently stated in an editorial in *The New York Times* of 12 May 1978:

"Some three weeks have passed since the Turkish Cypriot community submitted new proposals for resolving the Cyprus problem. But the Greek Cypriots refuse even to come to the table to discuss them. The impression spreads that the Greeks are counting on the partial embargo on American arms shipments to Turkey to induce a still better offer. They should be dissuaded from any such calculation.

"... There is a basis for negotiation in the Turkish plan and if the Greek Cypriots persist in refusing to take it seriously, Congress should lift the embargo, as the Carter Administration has already requested."

The editorial further states:

"The Turkish Cypriots say that everything about their proposal is negotiable. But it is unlikely that they can be moved very far from the outlines of their proposed constitution. Nor should they be. There is no reason, however, why they should not be pressed to yield more territory. The Greek Cypriots will never know how much more until they engage the Turks in serious discussions. Those discussions should proceed, and if the American embargo now gets in the way, it should be removed."

*The Times* of London, in an editorial on 8 May 1978, expressed the same opinion when it stated:

"A better strategy for the Greek Cypriots would be to return to the table and see what Turkish promises of 'flexibility' are worth in practice."

Furthermore, *The Washington Post* of 13 May 1978, in an editorial, underlined that "the [Turkish Cypriot] proposals remain available as a respectable basis for negotiations".

In view of all those and other comments in the world press and statements of world statesmen, the intransigent attitude and the violent reaction of Greek Cypriot leaders against anything which comes from the Turkish side should be a cause for common concern to all those who expect the continuation of the intercommunal talks on an equal footing between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities under your auspices.

Under these conditions, the stance of Greek Cypriots leaves no room for optimism and confirms, in unequivocal terms, their determination to continue the struggle for Hellenization of Cyprus (enosis) irrespective of the bloodshed, misery and catastrophe it has brought to the island for more than a quarter of a century.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/101-S/12707.

**DOCUMENT S/12708**

**Note verbale dated 4 May 1978 from the Mission of Benin  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: French]  
[17 May 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Benin to the United Nations has the honour, with reference to the implementation of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) imposing a mandatory embargo on deliveries of arms to the racist régime of South Africa, to inform the Secretary-General of the following.

The People's Republic of Benin, at the time a non-permanent member of the Security Council, participated

in the drafting and adoption of resolution 418 (1977), which imposes a mandatory embargo on the supply of arms to the inhuman racist régime at Pretoria. For that very simple reason, the People's Republic of Benin will implement the letter and spirit of resolution 418 (1977); however, as everyone is well aware in the United Nations, there are many other reasons why the People's Republic of Benin, a free African country engaged in a constant

anti-imperialist struggle, wishes this resolution to be fully implemented and is in favour of seeking all means and other effective measures for ensuring strict compliance with the relevant provisions of resolution 418 (1977) by all Powers, including in particular those which, as a result of their economic collaboration, help to strengthen day by day the inhuman colonialist régime at Pretoria.

The impact of resolution 418 (1977) is obviously limited because it has come too late, at a time when the racist Pretoria régime has already achieved a notable

degree of self-sufficiency in the manufacture of arms, and because it makes no provision with regard to nuclear weapons, which the Pretoria régime is moving dangerously towards acquiring, thanks to the assistance of the imperialist West. Accordingly, the People's Republic of Benin, like all the States of Africa, is in favour of economic sanctions against the Pretoria racists.

The Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Benin would be obliged if the Secretary-General would have this note circulated as a Security Council document.

## DOCUMENT S/12709

### Note verbale dated 11 May 1978 from the representative of Tunisia to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]  
[17 May 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations has the honour, with reference to the Secretary-General's note of 29 March 1978, to reaffirm that the Government of Tunisia does not maintain any diplomatic, consular, economic or other relations with the South African régime.

Being true to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and that of the Organization of African Unity, Tunisia is convinced that the application of sanctions against the Pretoria régime, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, is a legal and effective means of combating the policy of *apartheid*, which constitutes a constant threat to international peace and security.

The Permanent Representative of Tunisia would be grateful if the Secretary-General would have this note circulated as a Security Council document.

## DOCUMENT S/12710

### Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the period 24 November 1977 to 17 May 1978

[Original: English]  
[17 May 1978]

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#### ANNEX

Map. UNDOF deployment as of May 1978 ... See end of volume

#### INTRODUCTION

1. The present report describes the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) for the period 24 November 1977 to 17 May 1978. Its purpose is to provide the Security Council with an account of the activities of UNDOF in pursuance of the mandate entrusted to it by the Council in resolution 350 (1974) of 31 May 1974 and extended by resolutions 363 (1974) of 29 November 1974, 369 (1975) of 28 May and 381 (1975) of 30 November 1975, 390 (1976) of 28 May and 398 (1976) of 30 November 1976, 408 (1977) of 26 May and 420 (1977) of 30 November 1977.

2. During the period covered by the report, UNDOF continued to supervise the area of separation and inspect the areas of limitation of armaments and forces in accordance with its mandate. With the co-operation of both parties, UNDOF was able to contribute to the maintenance of the cease-fire called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

## I. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE

### A. COMPOSITION AND COMMAND

3. As of 17 May 1978, the composition of UNDOF was as follows:

Austria .....	523
Canada .....	161
Iran <sup>9</sup> .....	385
Poland .....	91
United Nations Military Observers (detailed from UNTSO) .....	85
<b>TOTAL</b> .....	<b><u>1,245</u></b>

The normal strength is between 1,244 and 1,262. During rotation periods the strength rises to approximately 1,262, owing to the requirement to overlap key personnel for the handover of duties.

4. Command of UNDOF continues to be exercised by Major-General Hannes Philipp. Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo continues as the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East.

### B. DEPLOYMENT

5. The deployment of a reinforced Iranian company (strength 199 soldiers) to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) on 22 March 1978 has placed a strain on the operational capacity of UNDOF.

6. UNDOF personnel remain deployed within or close to the area of separation, with base camps and logistic support units located nearby. UNDOF headquarters is located at Damascus. The UNDOF deployment as of May 1978 is shown on the attached map.

7. Until 21 March 1978, the Austrian battalion manned 18 positions and seven outposts and mounted 19 daily patrols in the area of separation north of the Damascus-Quneitra road and the Iranian battalion manned 15 positions and three outposts and mounted 20 daily patrols in the area of separation south of that road.

8. Following the temporary transfer of an Iranian company to UNIFIL on 22 March 1978, the Austrian battalion took over nine positions previously assigned to the Iranian battalion. The Austrian battalion now mans 27 positions and eight outposts and mounts 25 daily patrols in the area of separation and the Iranian battalion mans six positions and one outpost and mounts 12 daily patrols in the southern sector of the area of separation.

9. The Austrian base camp is located near the Wadi Faouar, 8 kilometres east of the area of separation. The Iranian base camp is near the village of Ziouani, west of the area of separation. The Austrian battalion continues to share their base camp with the Polish logistic unit, while the Iranian battalion continues to share their base camp with the Canadian logistic unit. The Canadian signals unit has detachments at the two base camps, as well as at Damascus, Quneitra and Tiberias.

### C. ROTATION

10. The Austrian battalion carried out a partial rotation in February 1978. The Iranian battalion carried out a full rotation starting on 28 April 1978. The Canadian logistic unit rotates in small groups. The Polish logistic unit will carry out a full rotation in May 1978.

<sup>9</sup> On 22 March 1978, a reinforced company of 199 men of IRANBATT was temporarily detached for service with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

## II. ACCOMMODATION AND LOGISTICS

### A. ACCOMMODATION

11. Two apartments were rented at Damascus to relocate the junior ranks in order to relieve serious overcrowding in the UNDOF headquarters building and Athena Villa and to improve living conditions of the troops. A garage was also rented in the Damascus area to carry out all vehicle maintenance programmes.

12. Several minor renovation projects were completed in both camps, but emphasis was placed on the construction of shelters in Camp Faouar and Camp Ziouani. All preliminary works were completed for the provision of electric power to Camp Ziouani. A contract will be signed shortly for the provision of electric power to Camp Faouar.

13. A sentry block in position 12 was completely destroyed by fire. It has now been rebuilt. The Iranian medical inspection building in Camp Ziouani was also destroyed by fire and will be reconstructed in the near future. Progress in the renovation of position buildings in the Golan was reduced by severe weather, heavy rains and snow during the fall and winter, but work is now continuing in an effort to improve conditions at all positions.

### B. LOGISTIC SUPPORT

14. Logistic support to the Force continues to be provided by Canadian and Polish logistic units, as outlined in my report of 27 November 1974 [S/11563, paras. 25-27]. The Polish unit continues to provide two mine-clearing teams.

15. As in the past, both the Canadian and Polish logistic units, which are responsible for the provision of the Force's second line transport, have delivered water, petrol, rations, stores and mail to the main camps and the positions, in addition to ensuring the maintenance and repair of vehicles and equipment.

16. Holdings and reserve of stores and rations have been improved. New financial arrangements have been set up with the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) for the provision of third line supplies and services from UNEF.

17. Within the period under review, the Polish mine-clearing teams cleared 5,191 metres of patrol paths, 3,191 metres of road and trails, as well as 36,132 square metres of ground in positions. With the acquisition of a new Polish bulldozer, it is intended to enlarge patrol paths between positions to allow more mobile patrols by vehicles and to build a patrol road parallel to the A line.

18. Air support to UNDOF continues to be provided by the UNEF-controlled air transport unit, which operates two Buffalo DHC-5 aircraft out of Ismailia to Tel Aviv and Damascus three times a week on a regular basis and special flights as required.

19. Initial logistic support was provided to UNIFIL by units of UNDOF within their limited human and material resources.

## III. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

### A. FUNCTIONS AND GUIDELINES

20. The functions and guidelines of UNDOF, as well as its tasks, remain as outlined in the report of 27 November 1974 [*ibid.*, paras. 8-10].



21. UNDOF has been able, with the co-operation of the parties, to carry out the tasks entrusted to it. This has been facilitated by the close contact maintained by the Force Commander and his staff with the military liaison staffs of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo continues to maintain high-level contacts and, as occasion requires, holds meetings with the Force Commander of UNDOF and military representatives of Israel or the Syrian Arab Republic concerning the functions of the Force.

#### B. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

22. The existing arrangements still fall short of what is required and of what is provided for in the Protocol to the Agreement on Disengagement [see S/11302/Add.1 of 30 May 1974], since restrictions on the freedom of movement still exist. Efforts to achieve full freedom of movement for personnel of all contingents of UNDOF are being pursued.

#### C. PERSONNEL MATTERS

23. The general discipline, performance and bearing of all members of UNDOF continues to be of a high order, reflecting credit on the soldiers and their commanders, as well as on the countries contributing contingents to the Force.

#### D. MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE

24. UNDOF continues to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. The cease-fire was maintained during this reporting period. No complaints referring to the UNDOF area of operation were raised by either party in this regard.

#### E. SUPERVISION OF THE AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE AREAS OF SEPARATION AND LIMITATION

25. UNDOF, in accordance with its mandate, continues to make sure that there are no military forces within the area of separation. Observation and surveillance of the area of separation is carried out by means of static posts, which are manned 24 hours a day, and by foot and mobile patrols operating at random intervals on predetermined routes. Because of the temporary assignment of a reinforced Iranian company with UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon, UNDOF has redeployed the Austrian forces to provide complete coverage of the area of separation. In addition to the positions normally assigned, the Austrian battalion was given the task of manning the nine positions vacated by the Iranian battalion.

26. Patrolling along the area of the A line remained at a normal level, but patrolling along the B line was reduced in keeping with the reduced personnel strength of B line positions. However, United Nations Military Observer patrols in the 10 kilometre zone were increased on the B side in order to observe and report any prohibited activity or movement in that area.

27. Syrian shepherds grazing their flocks close to and west of the A line continue to be a problem for UNDOF. Thanks to the co-operation extended to UNDOF by both parties, it has been possible to avoid major incidents: however, as a result of the decreased operational strength of UNDOF, there has been an increase in violations by shepherds since 22 March 1978.

28. A shelter improvement programme continues in the Iranian battalion area of responsibility to ensure

maximum protection for UNDOF troops in the area of separation.

29. UNDOF has continued to facilitate and supervise the fortnightly meetings of Druse families living on both sides of the A line. Twelve family meetings were held during the period under review and both parties showed good co-operation in making these meetings possible.

30. The existence of mines within the area of separation continues to cause danger to members of UNDOF as well as to the civilian population. During the reporting period, several civilians were seriously injured or killed by mine explosions.

31. UNDOF has continued to carry out the bi-weekly inspections provided for in the Agreement on Disengagement. In addition, special inspections have been carried out upon the request of both parties. The inspections are conducted with the assistance of liaison officers from the parties, who accompany the UNDOF inspection teams to their respective areas. UNDOF lends its assistance and good offices in cases where one of the parties raises questions concerning the observance of the agreed limitations of armaments and forces. In carrying out these functions, UNDOF has continued to receive the co-operation of the parties, although restrictions of movement are sometimes placed upon UNDOF teams during inspections in certain areas on both sides of the area of separation. The system of follow-up inspections has been successful in overcoming most restrictions in the 10 and 20 kilometre zones.

#### IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

32. By its resolution 32/4 C of 2 December 1977, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for UNDOF at a rate not to exceed \$1,607,000 per month for the period from 1 June to 24 October 1978 inclusive, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond the period of six months authorized under its resolution 420 (1977). Accordingly, should the Council renew the UNDOF mandate beyond 31 May 1978, the costs to the United Nations for maintaining the Force up to 24 October 1978 will be within the level of the authorization to enter into commitments provided by the General Assembly in its resolution 32/4 C, assuming continuance of its existing strength and responsibilities. Appropriate financial provision will need to be made by the Assembly at its thirty-third session in respect of periods after 24 October 1978 if the period of extension determined by the Security Council goes beyond that date.

#### V. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 (1973)

33. In deciding, in its resolution 420 (1977), to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months, the Security Council also called upon the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973) and requested the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of that period, a report on developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).

34. Efforts to promote an early resumption of the negotiating process aimed at establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East have continued at various levels. For my part, I have maintained contact with the parties concerned and with the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East in this regard.

## VI. OBSERVATIONS

35. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, which was established in May 1974 to supervise the cease-fire called for by the Security Council and the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces, has continued to perform its functions effectively with the co-operation of the parties. During the period under review, the situation in the Israel-Syria sector remained quiet and there were no incidents of a serious nature.

36. The present quiet in the Israel-Syria sector is, however, basically precarious. The main elements of the Middle East problem remain unresolved and the situation in the area as a whole will continue to be unstable and dangerous unless real progress can be made towards a just and durable settlement of the problem in all its aspects. It is increasingly important and urgent that a determined effort should be made to achieve progress in the search for such a settlement and, as a first step to this end, to promote an early resumption of the negotiating process in accordance with Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

37. In the prevailing circumstances, I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential. I therefore recommend that the Security Council should extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, until 30 November 1978. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has given its assent to the proposed extension. The Government of Israel has also expressed its agreement.

38. In concluding this report, I wish to place on record my gratitude to the Governments contributing troops to UNDOF and to those which provide UNTSO military observers assigned to the Force. I take this opportunity also to pay tribute to the Commander of UNDOF, Major-General Hannes Philipp, to the officers and men of the Force and its civilian staff, as well as to the UNTSO military observers assigned to UNDOF. All of them have performed with exemplary efficiency and devotion to duty the important, difficult and sometimes dangerous tasks assigned to them by the Security Council.

### ANNEX

[Map. UNDOF deployment as of May 1978. See end of volume.]

## DOCUMENT S/12711\*

### Letter dated 16 May 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[17 May 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith some excerpts from the remarks made by His Excellency Mr. Bülent Ecevit, the Prime Minister of Turkey, at a press conference held at Bonn on 11 May 1978.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) İLTER TÜRKMEN  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations

### ANNEX

Excerpts from the remarks made by His Excellency Mr. Bülent Ecevit, the Prime Minister of Turkey, at a press conference held at Bonn on 11 May 1978

Last but not least I should like to remark briefly on the recent developments or non-developments concerning Cyprus and relations between Turkey and Greece.

We used to say, while in opposition, that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots should not wait for the lifting of the American embargo in order to take the initiative for speeding up a solution to the Cyprus question and we kept our word as soon as we came to Government and encouraged the Turkish Cypriots — and they accepted — to take the initiative and to come out with concrete proposals for a solution to Cyprus.

However, in spite of this, the Greek Cypriots have even increased their intransigence, which shows that no matter how much good will the Turkish side may show, a negotiated solution for Cyprus cannot be found as long as the embargo, the American embargo, continues, because the Greek Cypriots seem to be more concerned, more anxious to see to it that American and Western pressures over Turkey continue. They are more concerned with this than reaching a federal solution for Cyprus. They seem to have at the back of their minds and in their hearts

the dream of returning to the *status quo ante* in Cyprus. This is only a dream.

Immediately after the Turkish Cypriot side gave its proposals to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Waldheim, in the framework of his mission of good offices, the Greeks reacted by saying that the Turkish proposals could not even be considered as a starting point for negotiations.

They claimed, for instance, that Turks were considering only 1 per cent of the territory in their proposals and that they were not envisaging a real federation. However, it becomes obvious that such claims are not factual, because in effect the Turks did not include any percentages in their proposals regarding the geographical arrangements. Instead, in order to adopt a flexible attitude, they indicated six areas in the region under Turkish control, six areas in which they would be prepared to discuss the geographical arrangements. The percentage would emerge at the end of discussions on these six areas. Apart from that, they have indicated that they are willing to let the Greeks have all of the security zone, which is completely empty now and unused except for the United Nations patrols. They are prepared to let the Greeks have all this land, which alone constitutes about 3 per cent of the territory of the island.

The Turkish side, as a third item regarding the geographical arrangements, indicated their willingness to let Greeks be settled in Varosha, which means that the settlement problem for at least 30,000 Greeks, perhaps more, would be provided for in such a part of the island, whose value could not be measured by percentages because the existing and immediately useful economic potential of Varosha is worth half the island.

Apart from that, the Turkish Cypriots indicated that they would leave the political framework for Varosha open to negotiations.

As to the constitutional proposals, I am sure any specialist who would study these proposals would admit that the Turks mean real federation from the beginning. It will at the same time be an evolutionary federation, which means that in time the bi-zonal and bi-communal independent and non-aligned federal State of Cyprus, which is envisaged in that constitution, will evolve into an even more closely-knit political structure.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/102-S/12711.

The draft constitution prepared by the Turkish side also envisages several areas of joint responsibility which would ensure that the state structure to emerge will be a federal one in the real sense of the word.

In the meantime, a hopeful dialogue between Mr. Karamanlis, the Prime Minister of Greece, and myself was started in March this year, again at our initiative. We were hoping that we would be able to take up the problems between the two countries, particularly concerning the Aegean, through this dialogue, which we decided should continue and also be supplemented at high-level technical talks. The first meeting for these high-level tech-

nical talks was scheduled to take place at Ankara on 14 April. But, as soon as Mr. Carter, the President of the United States, approached the Congress asking it to lift the embargo, the Athens Government unilaterally postponed this meeting indefinitely.

I believe all these facts are sufficient to show that to allow the Cyprus problem and the problems between Turkey and Greece to be linked to Turco-American relations would render it impossible to find a negotiated settlement for Cyprus and to resolve the problems between Turkey and Greece through negotiations.

## DOCUMENT S/12712

### Letter dated 15 May 1978 from the representative of the Congo to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]  
[18 May 1978]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you a statement on the implementation of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) imposing a mandatory embargo on the provision of arms and related *matériel* to South Africa. I should be grateful if you would have this statement circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Nicolas MONDJO  
Permanent Representative of the Congo  
to the United Nations

#### TEXT OF THE STATEMENT

1. The People's Republic of the Congo, true to its convictions and prompted by the absolute exigencies of the struggle against colonialism, *apartheid* and all forms of oppression of man by man, has always resolutely joined in the unrelenting fight which the international community is waging against the reactionary régime in South Africa.

2. Accordingly, our country cannot remain aloof from anything that has a bearing on that fight, as witness the fact that, at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, the Congo co-sponsored nearly all the resolutions condemning the South African régime and calling on all States Members of the United Nations to take concerted and effective action against that régime.

3. One kind of action which the People's Republic of the Congo considers decisive — as, indeed, do all the countries that share our convictions — and which we advocate has always been the action which would result from strict application of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

4. In order to be minimally effective, such action must, in our view, include strict economic sanctions and, in particular, an oil embargo, which in the present circumstances would be the surest means of inducing the *apartheid* régime to comply with the principles of the Charter and with universal standards of values.

5. That is why the People's Republic of the Congo, for its part, maintains the scepticism with which it received the announcement by the Western members of the Security Council of an arms embargo against South Africa, originally proposed for six months but subsequently extended under pressure from other countries, as set forth in resolution 418 (1977).

6. It must be noted that the cause of this scepticism was the fact that the arms embargo came very late, and certainly long after the principal military partners of the South African régime, namely, the Western Powers which have been repeatedly denounced in the resolutions of international organizations, had taken all the time they needed to equip the South African army completely, not only with weapons but also with spare parts, licences and patents.

7. South Africa's arrogant reaction to these sanctions and the continuation — not to say the intensification — of its policies of *apartheid* and of aggression against neighbouring States are evidence of the correctness of the view stated above.

8. Nevertheless, as regards the implementation of resolution 418 (1977), although the People's Republic of the Congo regards this primarily as a test of the capacity of the Western countries, South Africa's suppliers, to carry out effective action against the *apartheid* régime, we have no problem whatever in favouring its complete success, especially since, with regard to arms as in every other respect, we maintain no relations with South Africa.

9. We therefore take this opportunity formally to reiterate that the People's Republic of the Congo is neither a manufacturer of arms nor an arms merchant.

10. Similarly, our country is not bound to any other country by any military agreement which might be invoked as a ground for connivance, direct or indirect, with the South African régime. It also goes without saying that no arms or related *matériel* destined for South Africa could pass in transit through the Congo without being categorically interdicted. In all cases, a public announcement will be made of any violation of resolution 418 (1977) that might be committed by any individual or corporation, foreign or Congolese, acting within, from or towards Congolese territory, in order that the necessary measures may be taken against the party concerned.

11. Any assertion contrary to this statement would be purely fallacious, as would any insinuation that silence on the part of the People's Republic of the Congo might weaken the effects of the mandatory embargo imposed by resolution 418 (1977) against South Africa.

12. On the contrary, once again, the People's Republic of the Congo stands ever ready to join in any real and effective sanctions the purpose and motive of which is the eradication of the South African system of *apartheid*, a crime against humanity.

DOCUMENT S/12713

Note verbale dated 19 May 1978 from the representative of Trinidad and Tobago  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[22 May 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Trinidad and Tobago to the United Nations has the honour, in response to the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977, to state the position of Trinidad and Tobago on Security Council resolution 418 (1977), adopted unanimously on 4 November 1977 on the question of South Africa.

Trinidad and Tobago is totally opposed to the policy of the *apartheid* régime in South Africa and supports all efforts to eradicate this inhuman and racist practice.

To this end, Trinidad and Tobago does not have and does not intend to entertain any political, economic, social, cultural or military relations with the *apartheid* régime of South Africa.

Trinidad and Tobago is therefore fully in compliance with resolution 418 (1977) which calls upon all States to apply a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Permanent Representative of Trinidad and Tobago would be grateful if the Secretary-General could arrange for the circulation of this note as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/12714\*

Letter dated 22 May 1978 from the representative of Turkey  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[22 May 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the statement made by Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, at his press conference on Friday, 19 May 1978.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) İter TÜRKMEN  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Statement made by Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş at a press  
conference on 19 May 1978

The problem of Cyprus is in a very sensitive stage.

Turkish Cypriot proposals for the settlement of the problem, which were found to be concrete and substantive by the Secretary-General, have been rejected by the Greek Cypriot leaders as not forming the basis for negotiations.

Our negotiating position is quite clear: the Turkish Cypriot community stands by the four-point agreement reached between myself and the late Archbishop Makarios in February 1977 [S/12323 of 30 April 1977, para. 5], and we aim at the establishment of a non-aligned, bi-zonal, bi-communal federal republic. That is what the Turkish Cypriot proposals envisage and we are open to suggestions and counter-proposals on all issues, but we cannot accept a settlement which will give the Greek Cypriots the chance and liberty of finishing off the Turkish community from Cyprus; we cannot agree to a formula which will open the way to union with Greece or with any other country in the future.

Today there exist in Cyprus two completely separate and autonomous administrations.

In 1963, Turkish Cypriots were ejected from the partnership Government of 1960 by force of arms. They have ruled themselves ever since and they never accepted the illegal Greek Cypriot Administration as the constitutional rule of Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots, by their resistance to this administration's illegalities from 1963 to 1974, prevented the colonization of the island by Greece.

Greek Cypriot leaders now want a new state of affairs to be created which will give them this chance anew! That is why they are rejecting our proposals, which aim at bringing together the two administrations as a central government in a federal State, while keeping the door to union with Greece effectively closed.

The human element in the problem, with all its psychological and social impacts, cannot be ignored in planning a new partnership with the Greek Cypriots. Time is needed for trust and confidence to be established. In this regard, Turkish Cypriot proposals tackle the problem in a realistic way.

From 1955 to 1958, Turkish Cypriots were forced to flee 33 villages. Six thousand of them were refugees until after 1960. In 1963, 30,000 Turkish Cypriots had to flee from 103 villages. They had been refugees for 11 years when the coup was staged in July 1974. As a result of the coup and its aftermath, 15,000 more Turkish Cypriots became refugees.

In July 1975, Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot representatives agreed on an exchange of population at the third round of the Vienna talks with a view to the solution of the problem on a bi-zonal federal basis and as proof of the fact that the Greek Cypriot attempts to oust the Turkish Cypriots from Cyprus could not be repeated in the future.

The events which occurred between the two communities from 1955 to 1974 are numerous and far from pleasant. The mental trauma of these events on the Turkish community is deep and the consequent feeling of mistrust is a reality which cannot be ignored.

Turkish Cypriot proposals tackle the problem in a constructive way always aiming at the future co-operation and coordination of the two communities by giving them the chance

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/104-S/12714.

to come together on a voluntary basis and by keeping the door open to further and better co-operation as the effects of the traumatic events of the 1960-1974 period recede.

I believe that the problem can be solved if we keep the intercommunal dialogue going.

I am ready to meet Mr. Kyprianou anywhere, any time and discuss the problem with him even without an agenda.

My talk with the late Archbishop Makarios (after he had shunned us for 14 years) brought about in two sessions, in January and February 1977, a formula for the settlement of the Cyprus problem.

I believe that, if we tackle the problem with Mr. Kyprianou in good will and if we keep the dialogue going, it will help us to understand each other's difficulties. We stand to gain and not to lose if we come together.

It is difficult for us to understand why we are being shunned.

Our proposals can only be understood if we talk about them.

The degree of our concessions can only be measured and appreciated if we discuss them together.

Negotiations through proxies can bring no result. We are in one and the same island. We have both said that we are aiming at the establishment of a bi-zonal federal republic. The way to bring this about is to sit and talk man to man, community to community.

We are all for the beginning of the dialogue. Help us achieve it. That is why I am here, because the Greek Cypriot leaders believe that this country (through its leaders and the Congress) is with them for the non-start of the intercommunal negotiations.

I believe that this is not so.

I believe that everyone who wishes well for Cyprus and wishes intercommunal peace in Cyprus wants the negotiations to start.

The way to start the negotiations is to sit at the table. We are ready.

## DOCUMENT S/12715\*

### Letter dated 23 May 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[23 May 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the statement by Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, which was disclosed to the press following the meeting with you on Monday, 22 May 1978.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) **İlter TÜRKMEN**  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

#### Statement by Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş issued on 22 May 1978

I had a discussion on the question of Cyprus with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kurt Waldheim.

This meeting gave me the opportunity to reconfirm in detail the position of the Turkish Cypriot community regarding the intercommunal talks.

This position can be summarized as follows.

The Turkish Cypriot community believes that sustained intensive good faith negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities with a view to reaching a just, lasting and mutually satisfactory settlement on Cyprus should not be delayed any longer. With this goal in mind, the Turkish Cypriot representatives presented to the Secretary-General, on 13 April 1978, a description of the proposals that the Turkish side is prepared to put on the table once the intercommunal talks are reconvened. These proposals, it has been stressed, represent a negotiating position that can provide a starting point for discussions. The Turkish side had made a commitment to the Secretary-General to engage in negotiations with an open mind and in a spirit of conciliation and flexibility.

The Turkish side is prepared, in short, for a genuine and productive dialogue. It is the belief of the Turkish Cypriot community that intercommunal negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be immediately resumed.

The Greek side will not contribute to a settlement of the Cyprus issue by refraining from negotiations when the Turkish Cypriot attitude is so conciliatory.

It is the Turkish Cypriot belief that the guidelines agreed upon by Archbishop Makarios and myself at our meeting in February 1977 constitute the essential framework for a Cyprus settlement, according to which Cyprus must be a sovereign, independent, non-aligned, bi-communal and bi-zonal federal State.

The federal structure should incorporate, as indicated in the constitutional proposals of the Turkish side, joint constitutional legislative and executive bodies as well as such functions as foreign affairs, external defence, banking, foreign exchange and monetary affairs, federal budget, customs duties and tariffs, external communications, federal health services, tourism and information.

In addition to such federal governmental structure and functions, the constitution must also provide satisfactory safeguards for the rights of individual Cypriots without infringing upon the bi-zonal and bi-communal character of the federal State envisaged.

The Turkish side is prepared to consider significant geographical readjustments in the light of its economic viability and security requirements which would enable a considerable number of Greek Cypriots to resettle.

It has been the long-standing position of the Turkish Government that, upon conclusion of the Cyprus settlement, all Turkish military forces will be withdrawn from the island, except those whose continued presence will be authorized under the terms of the settlement. This position has been reaffirmed since 1975. The Turkish Government has already withdrawn some 16,000 troops from Cyprus and it is my understanding that it is prepared to make further such reductions as the intercommunal negotiations progress.

As further demonstration of the forthcoming approach of the Turkish side, I announce that it is the Turkish Cypriot position that, as negotiations progress, Greek Cypriot inhabitants of the city of Varosha may commence returning to their homes and businesses. We believe that approximately 30,000 to 35,000 Greek Cypriots can eventually be accommodated in Varosha under arrangements that would meet the legitimate security concerns of the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot communities. As far as the long-term status of Varosha is concerned,

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/107-S/12715.

the Turkish Cypriot side is fully prepared to discuss alternative formulae once the intercommunal talks are resumed. It has already been stressed that the future political framework of Varosha is open to negotiations. All these are envisaged in the Turkish Cypriot proposals and were explained to the Secretary-General on 13 April 1978.

These proposals also indicate that the freedom of movement shall be fully implemented through progressive stages to be agreed upon by both sides in a way that will ensure security and that the freedom of settlement will be enlarged in time in a way that would increase co-operation between the two national communities while at the same time preserving the basic bi-zonal and bi-communal character of the federal State.

The Turkish Cypriot side is also eager to discuss with the Greek Cypriot side other practical steps to heal the wounds of the past. Discussions could be initiated under the auspices of the United Nations on reopening Nicosia Airport for civilian traffic, providing also for initial United Nations use.

It would also be productive to discuss immediate co-operative efforts in the economic areas such as the construction of a pipeline to bring water from Turkey to Cyprus for use by both communities.

It is the Turkish Cypriot view that the resumption of negotiations on a Cyprus settlement and on related issues should not be dependent on extraneous factors but should commence immediately. The Turkish Cypriot community stands ready to meet at any time with the Greek Cypriot community to work in good faith to reach a settlement of the Cyprus problem.

I understand that both Mr. Kyprianou and I will be in the United States for some time. It will be much better if, instead of working at cross purposes, we would come together in a search of a solution to the benefit of both communities.

I want to reiterate what I said to the press on Friday, 19 May 1978 [see S/12714]: I am ready to meet Mr. Kyprianou, anywhere, any time and discuss the problem with him even without an agenda.

## DOCUMENT S/12717\*

### Letter dated 25 May 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[25 May 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 25 May 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) İLTER TÜRKMEN  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

#### Text of the letter dated 25 May 1978 from Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a letter dated 10 May 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Osman Örek, the Prime Minister of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

#### TEXT OF THE LETTER DATED 10 MAY 1978 FROM MR. OSMAN ÖREK TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to refer to a letter dated 7 April 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Joseph J. Stephanides, the so-called Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Greek Cypriot delegation to the United Nations [S/12635].

I do not feel that the letter in question, which abounds with preposterous and totally unfounded allegations in customary Greek Cypriot fashion, merits a comprehensive reply or even serious consideration. Nevertheless, I would like to set the record straight with regard to certain gross misrepresentations, without, however, reciprocating in the same aggressive tenor of the representative of the Greek Cypriot Administration. Needless to say, the offensive and purely negative approach of the Greek Cypriot representatives cannot possibly contribute in the slightest degree to the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the resumption of the intercommunal talks, let alone accord with the alleged will of the Greek Cypriot side to achieve a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem. Such futile rhetoric merely repeating *ad nauseam* the same illusory allegations cannot possibly constitute a serious and sincere effort to facilitate

the solution of the Cyprus problem, but, on the contrary, serves to escalate tension and foster division.

As regards the allegations relating to the conditions of the Greek Cypriot inhabitants of northern Cyprus, it is indeed ironic that such falsities should have been uttered and recorded as an official document of the United Nations on the very day when two representatives of the International Red Cross, Miss Simonious and Mr. Grindling, were visiting the exact areas referred to, freely and unaccompanied in the usual manner. The representatives of the International Red Cross had free access to each and every area where Greek Cypriots reside in northern Cyprus, including areas where the alleged "medieval" conditions are said to prevail, and were free to contact every Greek Cypriot they wished to speak to — a fact that can no doubt be verified by the Red Cross, if called upon to do so. Indeed, such visits are made to the area by the International Red Cross on a routine basis.

Contrary to Greek Cypriot allegations, the fact is that Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus enjoy the same rights and freedoms as Turkish Cypriots, including the freedom of movement, subject only to minimum security precautions in accordance with the situation prevailing on the island. Greek Cypriots frequently travel from village to village within the Karpas area and have free access to their fields. Needless to say all security measures have been gradually relaxed parallel to normalization in the situation on the island and this process will continue with further improvement in the situation.

Greek Cypriots have access to excellent health services and well equipped schools are available for primary education in Greek. Any impartial observer visiting the areas where the Greek Cypriots are living can vouch for the existence of such facilities. Indeed the availability of impressive health services to Greek Cypriots without discrimination has been recently confirmed by the representatives of the International Red Cross who visited the area.

Moreover, the Greek Cypriot inhabitants of northern Cyprus themselves are fully satisfied with the treatment they receive from the authorities of the Turkish Federated State. In the field of agriculture, which constitutes the main occupation of Greek Cypriots living in the Karpas area, for example, they are paid good prices for their produce, equal to that paid to Turkish Cypriots, and all necessary incentives, such as advance payment for the tobacco crop, are provided to all inhabitants of the region without discrimination.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/111-S/12717.

The fact that conditions for Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus are perfectly satisfactory is evident from the number of Greek Cypriot students who apply to visit their families in the north during their holidays. Only recently 149 students crossed to the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus to spend their Easter holidays with their families. Surely if the living conditions of Greek Cypriots in northern Cyprus were as described by Mr. Stephanides, these students would not wish to spend their holidays in the Turkish Federated State.

As to the repeated Greek Cypriot allegations regarding expulsions from the north, one need only look at the most recent report of the Secretary-General which categorically states that a machinery exists under United Nations supervision to verify that all Greek Cypriots going south do so voluntarily [S/12463 of 1 December 1977, para. 25].

As to the allegations of the Greek Cypriot representative regarding so-called "colonization by Turkey", it is pertinent to point out that these allegations have been refuted time and again by the Turkish Cypriot side and duly recorded in documents of the United Nations. Surely the settlement of Turkish Cypriot displaced persons and the return of Turkish Cypriots, previously forced to leave the island by the oppressive policies of the Greek Cypriot Administration, cannot be described as "colonization". In any case the Turkish Cypriot case is not based on the numerical strength of the two communities; had it been so, there would be no need to import "alien" population, for there are no less than 300,000 Turkish Cypriots or their immediate descendants living in Turkey, over 40,000 in the United Kingdom and many thousands more in Australia, Canada and elsewhere who are always willing to return to their homeland and if and when the opportunity arises.

It is unfortunate that the Greek Cypriot side attributes more importance to the prolongation of the Cyprus issue and the continuation of external pressures on the Turkish side than it

does to the early solution of the Cyprus problem. Surely the Greek Cypriot side must realize that it can serve no useful purpose, let alone contribute to the solution of the Cyprus problem, to come up with a series of fictitious allegations merely because they desire the prolongation of the Cyprus problem for ulterior political motives, especially at a time when genuine peace initiatives have been made by the Turkish Cypriot side to bring about a settlement. Moreover, the approach of the Greek Cypriot side is incompatible with the need to engage in meaningful negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching a just and permanent solution of the Cyprus problem.

It is most discouraging that, despite the sincere efforts of the Turkish Cypriot side to achieve a lasting solution to the Cyprus problem and to reconcile the differences between the two communities through intercommunal negotiations conducted in good faith, the Greek Cypriot side has chosen to intensify its malicious propaganda warfare against the Turkish side and is doing its best to prevent the resumption of the talks. Such irresponsible actions against the Turkish side are clearly inconsistent with the professed desire of the Greek Cypriot side to settle the Cyprus problem through the process of intercommunal talks.

If the Greek Cypriot leaders genuinely desire the early solution of the Cyprus problem and sincerely wish to contribute to the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the resumption of the intercommunal talks, which are acknowledged by all circles, including the United Nations, to be the only means of achieving a solution, they should refrain from futile, senseless and destructive propaganda. They would do better to use their energy for constructive efforts aimed at creating understanding between the two communities, instead of wasting it on the fabrication of irresponsible anti-Turkish literature.

I should be grateful if this letter were to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

## DOCUMENT S/12718\*

### Letter dated 26 May 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[26 May 1978]

On instructions from my President, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, I have the honour to draw your attention and that of the representatives of States Members of the United Nations to the situation in the occupied north regarding the plight of the Turkish Cypriots living under the rule of the Turkish army of occupation and at the mercy of the settlers massively transported from the mainland of Turkey after the invasion.

The Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Fazil Küçük, former Vice-President of the Republic, in a series of articles published in the Turkish newspaper *Halkın Sesi*, describing the situation, wrote: "This paradise island has been turned into real hell".

Mr. Küçük confirmed that the settlers had been given houses, land, food and even money. He charged that they "insulted the local Turkish Cypriots, spat at policemen, strangled and robbed the people, burgled houses and raped local girls". The Turkish Cypriot population dared not go out into the streets and the situation remained, he said, the same today. Mr. Küçük declared that "the Turkish settlers gave the most unabashed example of savagery".

Describing the situation in the villages as really serious, Mr. Küçük asked the Turkish Premier Ecevit "to get them out of Cyprus". He emphasized that "the sooner the settlers are sent back, the sooner the Turkish Cypriots will find tranquillity".

According to reported estimates, over 40,000 mainland Turks are in the occupied part of Cyprus in an attempt to colonize the area and change the population structure of the island.

Bearing in mind that the Government of Cyprus is *de jure* in control over the whole territory of the Republic and responsible for the lives and well-being of all its citizens, this letter is a strong protest in defence of the basic and elementary human rights of its citizens living in the aggressively occupied north.

I confidently trust that you will take such steps in this matter as may be deemed appropriate.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES  
Permanent Representative of Cyprus  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/113-S/12718.

**Letter dated 26 May 1978 from the representative of Turkey  
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[26 May 1978]*

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 26 May 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) İtler TÜRKMEN  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations*

**ANNEX**

**Text of the letter dated 26 May 1978 from Mr. Nail Atalay  
to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a letter dated 18 April 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

**TEXT OF THE LETTER DATED 18 APRIL 1978 FROM  
MR. RAUF R. DENKTAŞ TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL**

I have the honour to refer to a communication dated 30 March 1978, addressed to you by Mr. Zenon Rossides, the so-called "Permanent Representative" of the Greek Cypriot Administration to the United Nations [S/12626].

It should be a source of great regret for all those who genuinely desire to see a peaceful solution in Cyprus to note that, at a time when Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community are making every effort to bring about such a solution, the Greek Cypriot Administration and its agents have stepped up their malicious, destructive and totally false campaign of anti-Turkish propaganda, clearly revealing their unwillingness to enter into serious negotiations with the Turkish side, let alone reach a peaceful political settlement. Surely it cannot be mere coincidence that, on the eve of the presentation of the new peace proposals by the Turkish Cypriot side for a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus, Mr. Zenon Rossides, who only recently was claiming that the Cyprus problem started with the Turkish intervention in 1974, has, in his above-mentioned communication, revived practically every issue involved in the problem since 1963, apart from repeating his well-known allegations arising from the events of 1974.

It is quite customary for Mr. Rossides to write off the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus as a "purported State fictitiously set up by Turkey" in an attempt to suppress the existence of the Turkish Cypriot community and its equal rights in Cyprus, as a co-founder partner of the Republic. There is use in pointing out, however, that the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus does not owe its existence to Mr. Rossides's recognition, but to the free and democratic will of the Turkish Cypriot people, who are entitled to a political status in Cyprus equal to that of the Greek Cypriots.

The Turkish Cypriot community does not have to resort to "elimination" of the Greek names of towns and villages in Cyprus in order to prove that Turks also exist in the island, or for any other alleged reason. Nor is there any "aggression against the age-long history and culture of Cyprus", as Mr. Rossides falsely claims in his said letter. The record shows that such devious tactics have, in the past, been typical of the Greek community, and not the Turkish community.

The reasons behind giving Turkish names to a number of villages in the Turkish region in the north have been amply and clearly explained in our communication addressed to you on 15 March 1978 [see S/12621]. As it is stated there, Cyprus has been a bi-communal, bi-lingual island since 1571, and a great number of villages enjoyed either Turkish or Greek names, depending on the people who lived in them. Some places enjoyed dual names, one in Turkish and one in Greek, reflecting the unique, bi-national nature of the heritage of Cyprus. Below are a few examples:

<i>Greek</i>	<i>Turkish</i>
Ay Dhometios	İncirli
Asha	Paşaköy
Dhyo Potami	İkîdere
Epikho	Abohor
Omorphita	Küçük Kaymaklı
Kalokhorio	Çamlıköy
Kythrea	Değirmenlik
Karavostassi	Gemikonagi
Minzelli	Ortaköy
Trakhonas	Kizilbaş

The deliberate and ill-motivated changing of village and street names, if they happened to be Turkish, was a common practice employed by the Greek Cypriot Administration during the troubled years of 1963-1974. In fact, in many instances, the places themselves were eliminated together with their names with a view to eradicating all traces of Turkish culture in the island. The historical "Bayraktar Square" in Nicosia was re-named as Heroes Square after its mosque had been bombed several times over; historical Turkish monuments and tombs were razed to the ground by bulldozers by the Greek Cypriot authorities.

A great deal has happened in Cyprus since 1963, because of Greek Cypriot attempts, aided by Greece, to "Hellenize" Cyprus. As the last stage of a steady process of intercommunal alienation rooted in the Greek agitation for enosis, the two communities regrouped in two separate regions of the island after the events triggered by the Greek coup d'état of 15 July 1974. Thus the administrative separation, which had started in 1963 with the forcible ousting of Turkish Cypriots from the administration of the State, also assumed a physical nature. The regrouping of the two communities in two separate regions of the island was finalized with the voluntary population exchange agreement reached at the third round of the intercommunal talks held at Vienna from 31 July to 2 August 1975, under your personal auspices. The resettlement and rehabilitation work that was subsequently done in the Turkish Cypriot region necessitated the adopting of Turkish names for a number of villages, which had been vacated by Greek Cypriots and which had hitherto possessed only Greek names. However, this did not mean the elimination of the Greek name of the respective village, and the question of changing traditional names, therefore, does not arise.

The question that does arise is: when are the Greek Cypriots going to accept the reality that in a bi-communal, bilingual country, certain places will have bilingual names? When, indeed, are they going to concede that a bizonal arrangement exists in Cyprus today and that Turkish Cypriots are the sole and legitimate masters of their own region until a mutually acceptable solution is found to the Cyprus problem?

It is futile for Mr. Rossides to try to play down the oppression and suffering endured by the Turkish Cypriots after 1963 and grossly to exaggerate the difficulties the Greek community is experiencing today. We challenge him to refute the following extract from a report of the United Nations and the world press:

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/114-S/12719.



#### About "unsubstantiated onslaught" and "sporadic instances"

"We went tonight into the sealed-off Turkish quarter of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people have been slaughtered in the last five days. We were the first Western reporters there and we have seen sights too frightful to be described in print and horrors so extreme that the people seemed stunned beyond tears and reduced to an hysterical and mirthless giggle that is more terrible than tears." [The Daily Express, 28 December 1963].

"... I have seen in a bathtub the bodies of a mother and of her three young children murdered just because their father was a Turkish officer..." [Le Figaro, 25-26 January 1964.]

"Silent crowds gathered tonight outside the Red Crescent hospital in the Turkish sector of Nicosia, as the bodies of nine Turks found crudely buried outside the village of Ayios Vasilios, 13 miles away, were brought to the hospital under an escort of the Parachute Regiment. Three more bodies, including one of a woman, were discovered nearby but they could not be moved. Turks guarded by paratroops are still trying to locate the bodies of 20 more believed to have been buried on the same site. All are believed to have been killed during fighting around the village at Christmas." [The Daily Telegraph, 14 January 1964.]

"The United Nations Force carried out a detailed survey of all damage to properties throughout the island during the disturbances, including the Tylliria fighting. The survey shows that in 109 villages, most of them Turkish Cypriot or mixed villages, 527 houses were destroyed while 2,000 others suffered damage from looting. In Ktima 38 houses and shops were destroyed totally and 122 partially. In the Omorphita suburb of Nicosia 50 houses were totally destroyed while a further 240 were partially destroyed there and in adjacent suburbs." [S/5950 of 10 September 1964, para. 180.]

#### About human rights

"... the conclusion seems warranted that the economic restrictions being imposed against the Turkish communities in Cyprus, which in some instances have been so severe as to amount to a veritable siege, indicate that the Government of Cyprus [Greek Cypriot] seeks to force a potential solution by economic pressure as a substitute for military action." [Ibid., para. 222.]

"... The official list of restricted goods still comprises 31 items. Most of these goods, however, have extensive civilian use, such as building materials and automobile replacement parts. In addition, other items which are not on the official list but which qualify under similar headings are often subjected to seizure at Cyprus Police [Greek Cypriot] checkpoints, giving cause for complaints." [S/7350 of 10 June 1966, para. 111.]

"Blockade sounds like a relatively agreeable substitute for outright war until it is translated into terms of degrading subhuman standards of life and the imminent threat of starvation. These conditions were found by Lt. General K. S. Thimayya, the Indian commander of the United Nations forces on Cyprus, in the Kokkina region of the Island, where 1500 Turkish Cypriots have been penned in by the Makarios government. His conclusions were confirmed by the Swiss head of the International Red Cross on the island, Max Stalder." [New York Herald Tribune, 16 September 1964.]

"Economic, social and educational inequality, as well as insecurity for personal life during the last eleven years, were the origins of inter-community mistrust and fears, of political tension and regional as well as communal isolation between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot populations... This created in the Turkish Community the feeling of being underprivileged and oppressed. Human suffering was at the origin of an eleven-year-long Cyprus crisis." [Council of Europe document 3600 of 10 April 1975, para. 11.]

#### About "self-segregation"

"When the disturbances broke out in December 1963 and continued in the first part of 1964, thousands of Turkish Cypriots fled from their homes, taking with them only what they could drive or carry, and sought refuge in what they

considered to be safer Turkish Cypriot villages and areas..." [S/8286 of 8 December 1967, para. 126.]

"Right now we are witnessing the exodus of the Turks from their villages. Thousands of people abandoning homes, lands, herds; Greek terrorism is relentless. This time, the rhetoric of the Hellenes and the busts of Plato do not suffice to cover up barbaric and ferocious behaviours. At four o'clock in the afternoon a curfew is imposed on the Turkish villages. Threats, shootings and attempts of arson start as soon as it becomes dark. After the massacre of Christmas that spared neither women nor children, it is difficult to put up any resistance." [Il Giorno, 14 January 1964.]

"The Greek Cypriots claim that many of the Turks had been driven, under the threat of their own leaders, to form large enclaves which are intended to pave the way for a separate and federal state. It is difficult to find evidence in support of this allegation. Their motive seems to be more to protect themselves against sudden attack than a calculated attempt to form a separate state." [The Daily Telegraph, 19 February 1964.]

At this juncture, I should like to remind Mr. Rossides that, even at the time when the Turkish Cypriot community was undergoing this treatment, partition was not a coveted aim of the Turkish Cypriots, but had only come up as an "antidote" for the enosis demands of the Greek Cypriot community and their ruthless campaign to that end. He may be able to quote statements from the local Turkish press of the 1964-1965 period, in a vain attempt to prove that Turks were and still are partitionists. But his argument is all too superficial. The enosis statements and activities of the Greek Cypriot leaders not only well precede any call for partition from the Turkish Cypriot side, but they also well outlast it. Only a senile mentality would claim to have forgotten the persistent enosis statements of the Greek Cypriot leaders, which continued overtly and unceasingly until 1973, and in a disguised form thereafter. A few examples will help to illustrate the point:

"I take the holy oath that I shall work for the birth of our national freedom and shall never waiver from our policy of annexing Cyprus to mother Greece." (Makarios on his election as Archbishop on 20 October 1950.)

"It is true that the goal of our struggle is to annex Cyprus to Greece." (Makarios in an interview to *Uusi Suomi* of Stockholm on 5 December 1963.)

"Real victory will be achieved when Cyprus is annexed to Greece without any concessions whatsoever." (Makarios in a statement to the Greek Cypriot daily *Ethniki* on 1 October 1964.)

"Freedom for us means only the integration of this southern outpost of Hellenism into the national entity-union of Cyprus with Greece." (Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos in a public statement on 23 October 1967 at Limassol.)

"Another essential prerequisite is the maintenance by the Greek Cypriots of their national issue as such. They should never think that the Cyprus question can be considered, even for a moment, a political matter. It is neither a political nor a party nor a personal matter. It is a national issue both for Cyprus and Greece and the solution cannot be anything else than 'enosis'.

"At this critical stage the Cyprus struggle is passing through there is a great advantage which did not exist in 1955 and that is the fact that Cyprus has now a voice of her own in the international field. In spite of a large number of disadvantages, Cyprus is now an independent and sovereign state and, therefore, her struggle for union with Greece is easier and shorter than before." (From a speech by Spyros Kyprianou at Limassol on 1 April 1967, when he was the Foreign Minister of the Greek Cypriot Administration.)

"Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus has been Greek since the dawn of its history and will remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have taken it over. Greek and undivided we shall preserve it. Greek and undivided we shall deliver it to Greece." (Makarios from a speech at Yialousa village on 14 March 1971.)

"I have always struggled for union of Cyprus with Greece... My national faith, national beliefs have never changed." (Makarios in an interview with the French magazine *Le Point* on 19 February 1973.)

Mr. Rossides has often attempted in the past to dismiss these unequivocal statements as either having been quoted out of context or having been uttered "on ceremonious occasions". But when asked publicly to denounce enosis, neither he nor any other Greek Cypriot leader could rise up to the challenge! All the same, I would like to quote here a resolution of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives which was adopted on 26 June 1967 and which is still standing, so as to remove any doubt as to the unshaken commitment of the Greek Cypriot community to the cause of enosis:

"Interpreting the age-long aspirations of the Greeks of Cyprus, the House declares that despite any adverse circumstances it would not suspend the struggle being conducted with the support of all Greeks, until this struggle ends in success through the union of the whole and undivided Cyprus with the motherland, without any intermediary stage."

In the face of this self-admitted and official enosis policy of the Greek Administration, the Turkish community does not, in the most categorical terms, entertain any ambitions about the partition of Cyprus or its annexation to Turkey. When Mr. Rossides quotes a former (now deceased) Turkish Prime Minister as having stated in the Turkish National Assembly in December 1964: "Officially, we promote the federation concept rather than the partition thesis so as to appear as though within the provisions of the Treaty," he is in fact stretching his meagre means to find evidence that the question of partition did once arise in Cyprus in the past. His attempt to resurrect this issue, however, is bound to end in vain. If he is genuinely interested in preserving the bi-communal independence of Cyprus as a single State, he should first of all try to clear the duplicity in the position of his own leadership, which has made a habit of using the terms "self-determination" and "enosis" interchangeably as the situation requires and in order not to arouse reaction in the world public opinion.

This equivocation was apparent in Greece's application to place the Cyprus question on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1954. In that application the words "self-determination" and "enosis" were used synonymously. In view of the absurdity of this approach, the application was rejected by the United Nations. From then onwards the Greek Cypriot leaders spoke more of self-determination, but only as a tactical avoidance of the use of enosis on international platforms. This tactical change is also envisaged and clearly spelled out in the well-known "Akritas Plan" aimed at the dissolution of the Republic and the destruction of the Turkish Cypriot community in the name of enosis. I would like to reproduce below the relevant part of this plan as published in the Greek Cypriot daily *Parris* on 21 April 1966:

"Generally speaking, it is obvious that today the international opinion is against any form of oppression of minorities. The Turks have so far been able to convince world public opinion that the union of Cyprus with Greece will amount to their enslavement. Under these circumstances, we stand a good chance of success in influencing world public opinion if we base our struggle not on 'enosis' but on self-determination. But in order to be able to exercise the right of self-determination fully and without hindrance we must first get rid of the agreements." (i.e. Treaty of Guarantee, Treaty of Alliance, etc.)

And here is how the late Archbishop Makarios had explained this equivocation to his own people at home, in an interview with the Greek Cypriot daily *Eleftheria* on 12 January 1966. The Archbishop was answering to criticism that the draft resolution of the non-aligned countries on Cyprus, steered through the twentieth session of the General Assembly, should have included direct reference to enosis:

"It has been said that the draft resolution ought to have spoken clearly of self-determination — enosis — and that, in other words, we ought to have gone to the United Nations with 'open books'. But the contents of our 'books', in order to be understood, had to be framed in a comprehensible language. In the language and terminology of the United

Nations the term 'self-determination' applies to non-self-governing territories, while the word enosis is unknown in the terminology of the world Organization and also a subject not coming under its jurisdiction."

The insincerity on the part of the Greek Cypriot side with regard to the enosis-partition argument is also prevalent in Mr. Rossides's allegations about the TMT (Turkish Cypriot resistance organization). As its name indicates, this organization was set up for purely defensive purposes, in order to counter the terroristic activities against the island's Turks of the underground organization EOKA, previously set up by the Greek Cypriots for the unification of Cyprus with Greece. Mr. Rossides reveals how little respect he holds for our community, rank and file or otherwise, when he insultingly states: "Turkish Cypriot leaders, in league with the TMT, terrorized the rank and file of the Turkish Cypriot community into complete submissiveness to its orders". He should be the first to know that had the Turkish community submitted to terror and intimidation the Greeks would have long succeeded in uniting the island with Greece.

It should be pointed out that virtually every move made by the Turkish Cypriot side since the beginning of the long history of the Cyprus problem was necessitated by a previous move made by the Greek Cypriot side in line with its enosis policy. Turkish Cypriots, having no other intention than to protect their existence and their legitimate rights in an independent Cyprus, have been on the defensive ever since the beginning of the Cyprus problem, against an aggressive, expansionist mentality, which has been trying to take these rights away from them by force. The setting up of the Turkish Cypriot resistance organization was no exception to this. Mr. Rossides could not have expected the Turkish community to stand idle and let the EOKA hordes slaughter them *en masse!*

We invite Mr. Rossides to listen to the voices that had then come out of the Turkish Cypriot rank and file, in protest against the inhumanity accorded to them by the Greek Cypriots, so that he may realize who "terrorized" them and tried to force them into submission:

"We are determined never to bow or to retreat before Makarios who has attempted an unparalleled savagery and terror against the Turkish community. The Turkish Cypriot youth have put heart and soul into this struggle for human rights and dignity." (Extract from the Remembrance Day Message of the Cyprus Turkish Youth Council on the second anniversary of the Greek Cypriot onslaught of 21 December 1963.)

"It is the patriotic duty of the Turkish Cypriot workers to ensure the resistance of the Turkish community against the Greek Cypriot Administration which is showing as lawful every illegality aimed at usurping their rights, lowering them to the status of second-rate citizens in their own homeland and uniting the island with Greece... Faits accomplis, pressures, methods of violence, economic restrictions, blockades and acts of oppression are the greatest means in the hands of our adversary. However, the unity, solidarity and determination of the Turkish Cypriots and the justness of their cause will, as hitherto, render ineffective the measures applied by the Greek Cypriots." (Extract from the May Day message of the Cyprus Turkish Trade Unions Federation, released on 1 May 1967.)

"The Executive Council of the Society of the Cyprus Turkish Civil Servants examined the said law (a new Public Service Commission law illegally enacted by the Greek Cypriot Administration in 1965) promulgated in an unconstitutional manner and has come to the conclusion that the law is illegal and that it is deviously designed to consolidate the arbitrary, discriminatory and unconstitutional measures the Greek Cypriot Administration has so far taken to deprive the Turkish civil servants of their vested interests and constitutional rights..."

"The Executive Council has also asked me to appeal once again, through you to the Secretary-General requesting him to take any action he may deem necessary to put an end to the sufferings of the Turkish civil servants brought about by the unconstitutional and discriminatory actions of the Greek Cypriot Administration." (Extracts from a letter sent to Mr.

C. A. Bernardes, the then Special Representative of the Secretary-General, by the President of the Society of Cyprus Turkish Civil Servants in December 1965.)

That Mr. Rossides's "self-isolation" argument and the TMT's alleged role in this isolation are but a myth is clearly evident from the above. It would in fact take a terrorist organization, such as EOKA, to pose "threats" and "inflict heavy punishment" upon its own community, particularly those among it who opposed enosis and favoured independence. It must be remembered that between 1955, when it was first established, and 1960 this organization had murdered around 400 Greek Cypriots for opposing enosis, along with many Turks and British. We hardly need to present further proof of what this organization is capable of doing than the leading role it played in the Greek coup d'état of 15 July 1974, during which thousands of Greek Cypriots were mercilessly killed by their own kinsmen. As it was openly spelled out by Makarios himself before the Security Council on 19 July 1974 [1780th meeting], it was EOKA-B, the mere extension of this organization, which had been at odds with the Archbishop's régime over the choosing of a method for the achievement of enosis that was responsible for the staging of the coup d'état in collaboration with the Junta in Greece and the Greek army officers in Cyprus:

"... The military régime of Greece has callously violated the independence of Cyprus... the Greek Junta has extended its dictatorship to Cyprus... documents came into the hands of the Cyprus police clearly proving that EOKA-B was an appendage of the Athens régime.

"..."

"I do not know as yet all the details of the Cyprus crisis caused by the Greek military régime. I am afraid that the number of casualties is large and that the material destruction is heavy."

It was under these circumstances, sufficiently explained by the late Archbishop, that Turkey was called upon to exercise her Treaty rights and obligations in order to protect the independence of Cyprus against attempted destruction and save the Turkish community from mass elimination.

The Greek Cypriots have reason to lament over the plight to which their age-long enosis agitation has brought them today. But they should realize that the Turkish Cypriot community, proportionately speaking, is by far the greater victim of the humanitarian repercussions of the Cyprus problem. It is useless, let alone counterproductive, for them to try to shift the respon-

sibility for their wrong-doings on the Turkish Cypriot side, and exploit and exaggerate their problems for political advantage. That they will be able to fool some of the people some of the time but not all of the people all of the time is apparent in the following:

"Hardly a week goes by without a visit by representatives of Congress and various charitable organizations. They are dutifully shown the 14,000 tent refugees. They interview the same heartbreaking cases. Needless to say, they are not told the refugees could be housed in some of the solid houses vacated by British troops. Makarios wants at least some refugees under tents. As it is, the authorities have a hard time keeping the 14,000 from defecting to more comfortable shelter." [Chicago Daily News, 27 January 1976.]

"As he entered a long tent used as a school for refugee children, Mr. Clifford was met by a dozen weeping, middle aged women. One pushed forward, sobbing and showed him photographs of her husband and son, who had been missing since the fighting..."

"She and others wailed as Mr. Clifford walked past and climbed into a limousine to leave. Then, her tears drying instantly, she smiled at Mr. Carter's envoy before rejoining the other women on a government bus that took them home." [United Press International, 24 February 1977.]

It is not our intention, by the above, to minimize or ignore the problems being experienced by the Greek Cypriot community today. It should be emphasized, however, that the solution of the humanitarian aspects of the Cyprus problem depends on the solution of the political aspects of the problem and that the two cannot be taken up in isolation from one another. The Turkish Cypriot community has, in this respect, done its share, as in the past, by presenting new peace proposals for a just and lasting solution of the problem through the intercommunal talks. These proposals, as you are well aware and as has been indicated in the communiqué issued at the end of your discussions with our advisers at Vienna on 15 April, "deal with the constitutional and territorial aspects of the Cyprus problem in a concrete and substantial way". It is now our earnest hope that the Greek side's response to these proposals will be positive, making possible the resumption of the intercommunal talks for a just and lasting peace in Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this communication were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

## DOCUMENT S/12722\*

### Letter dated 30 May 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[30 May 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 30 May 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) İler TÜRKMEN  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

#### Text of the letter dated 30 May 1978 from Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General

I have been instructed by my President, Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, to refer to a letter dated 26 May 1978 addressed to you by

Mr. Zenon Rossides, the so-called ambassador of the Greek Cypriot Administration to the United Nations [S/12718].

Mr. Rossides has, once again, resorted to propaganda tactics by utilizing an article in one of the local papers completely out of context and in places adding his own interpretations as part of the so-called quotations. His allegations that there are settlers in Cyprus is untrue; that there are 40,000 is propaganda. There are Turkish labourers in northern Cyprus. Two of these have recently committed a serious crime. Dr. Küçük's article is a comment on this crime and has nothing to do with the context in which Mr. Rossides is presenting it.

Mr. Rossides claims *de jure* control over the whole territory of Cyprus when he knows and the whole world knows that, as from 21 December 1963 when Greek Cypriots attacked their Turkish Cypriot counterparts by putting into effect a clandestine plan for the extermination of the Turkish Cypriots, the constitutional Government of Cyprus was divided into Greek and Turkish Administrations. From December 1963 till this day, the unconstitutional writ of the Greek Cypriot leaders did not run in or over Turkish Cypriot areas nor in respect of the

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/115-S/12722.

Turkish Cypriot population, who put up a gallant resistance to the criminal activities of Greek Cypriot "forces". For 11 years 30,000 Turkish Cypriots lived as refugees while their homes and properties in 103 villages were destroyed by the Greek Cypriot forces; hundreds of Turkish Cypriots were killed, more than 2,000 wounded and maimed; the fiscal dues of all Turkish Cypriots were usurped and Turkish Cypriots forced to live as hunted men in their own homes for 11 years. Mr. Rossides can call this period "normal and decent" and treat every police incident in the Turkish region of Cyprus as proof of an abnormal situation; but the Turkish Cypriots know too well that, but for the Turkish intervention of 1974, today there would have been no Turkish Cypriot alive in Cyprus. The total extermination of the Turkish population had already begun and the whole population of Aloa, Sandallaris and Maratha was already massacred by the time Turkish Liberating Forces reached those areas. The massacre of 1963-1967 is another proof of "paradise" in Cyprus and of the fact that Greek Cypriots had *de jure* control over Cyprus! It is significant that from 1963-1974 not a single Greek was punished for the atrocities perpetrated against Turkish Cypriots. Mr. Rossides has taken up a police case in which the culprits have been apprehended by the Turkish Cypriot police authorities and where the independent courts of the Federated State of Cyprus will deal with the culprits having regard to the evidence which will be put before them by the independent department of the Attorney-General of the Federated State.

The infamous "Akritas Plan", which formed the basis of the Greek Cypriot attack on the Turkish Cypriots in December 1963 and which was sustained until the coup of July 1974, is attached in proof of the legitimacy of Turkish Cypriot resistance to the Greek Cypriot onslaught. Mr. Rossides' claim of *de jure* control over Cyprus is an attempt to do through words of propaganda what Greek guns failed to achieve during these 11 years.

When President Denktas met the late Archbishop Makarios in your presence in February 1977, all that the Archbishop could say about the atrocious plan and the following 11 years of persecution of the Turkish Cypriots was that "it was an unfortunate accident"—yes, it would have been all the more unfortunate for the Turkish Cypriots had Turkey not intervened and saved them just in time.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

#### AKRITAS PLAN

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS

Recent public statements by Archbishop Makarios have shown the course which our national problem will take in the near future. As we have stressed in the past, national struggles cannot be concluded overnight; nor is it possible to fix definite chronological limits for the conclusion of the various stages of development in national causes. Our national problem must be viewed in the light of developments which take place and conditions that arise from time to time, and the measures to be taken, as well as their implementation and timing, must be in keeping with the internal and external political conditions. The whole process is difficult and must go through various stages because factors which will affect the final conclusion are numerous and different. It is sufficient for everyone to know, however, that every step taken constitutes the result of a study and that at the same time it forms the basis of future measures. Also, it is sufficient to know that every measure now contemplated is a first step and only constitutes a stage towards the final and unalterable national objective which is the full and unconditional application of the right of self-determination.

As the final objective remains unchanged, what must be dwelt upon is the method to be employed towards attaining that objective. This must, of necessity, be divided into internal and external (international) tactics because the methods of the presentation and the handling of our case within and outside the country are different.

##### A. Method to be used outside

In the closing stages of the (EOKA) struggle, the Cyprus problem had been presented to world public opinion and to diplomatic circles as a demand of the people of Cyprus to exercise the right of self-determination. But the question of the Turkish

minority had been introduced in circumstances that are known, intercommunal clashes had taken place and it had been tried to make it accepted that it was impossible for the two communities to live together under a united administration. Finally the problem was solved, in the eyes of many international circles, by the London and Zurich agreements, which were shown as solving the problem following negotiations and agreements between the contending parties.

(a) Consequently our first aim has been to create the impression in the international field that the Cyprus problem has not been solved and that it has to be reviewed.

(b) The creation of the following impressions has been accepted as the primary objective:

- (i) That the solution which has been found is not satisfactory and just;
- (ii) That the agreement which has been reached is not the result of the free will of the contending parties;
- (iii) That the demand for the revision of the agreements is not made because of any desire on the part of the Greeks to dishonour their signature, but because of an imperative necessity of survival for them;
- (iv) That the coexistence of the two communities is possible;
- (v) That the Greek majority, and not the Turks, constitutes the strong element on which foreigners must rely.

(c) Although it was most difficult to attain the above objectives, satisfactory results have been achieved. Many diplomatic missions have already come to believe strongly that the agreements are neither just nor satisfactory, that they were signed as a result of pressures and intimidations without real negotiations and that they were imposed after many threats. It has been an important trump card in our hands that the solution brought by the agreements was not submitted to the approval of the people; acting wisely in this respect our leadership avoided holding a referendum. Otherwise, the people would have definitely approved the agreements in the atmosphere that prevailed in 1959. Generally speaking, it has been shown that so far the administration of Cyprus has been carried out by the Greeks and that the Turks played only a negative part acting as a brake.

(d) Having completed the first stage of our activities and objectives, we must materialize the second stage on an international level. Our objective in this second stage is to show:

- (i) That the aim of the Greeks is not to oppress the Turks but only to remove the unreasonable and unjust provisions of the administrative mechanism;
- (ii) That it is necessary to remove these provisions right away because tomorrow may be too late;
- (iii) (Omitted);
- (iv) That this question of revision is a domestic issue for Cypriots and does not therefore give the right of intervention to anyone by force or otherwise;
- (v) That the proposed amendments are reasonable and just and safeguard the reasonable rights of the minority.

(e) Generally speaking, it is obvious that today international opinion is against any form of oppression and especially against the oppression of minorities. The Turks have so far been able to convince world public opinion that the union of Cyprus with Greece will amount to their enslavement. Under these circumstances we stand a good chance of success in influencing world public opinion if we base our struggle not on enosis but on self-determination. But in order to be able to exercise the right of self-determination fully and without hindrance, we must first get rid of the agreements (e.g. the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, etc.) and those provisions of the Constitution which inhibit the free and unbridled expression of the will of the people and which carry dangers of external intervention. For this reason, our first target has been the Treaty of Guarantee, which is the first agreement to be cited as not being recognized by the Greek Cypriots.

When the Treaty of Guarantee is removed, no legal or moral force will remain to obstruct us in determining our future through a plebiscite.

It will be understood from the above explanations that it is necessary to follow a chain of efforts and developments in order

to ensure the success of our plan. If these efforts and developments failed to materialize, our future actions would be legally unjustified and politically unattainable and we would be exposing Cyprus and its people to grave consequences. Actions to be taken are as follows:

(a) The amendment of the negative elements of the agreements and the consequent *de facto* nullification of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. This step is essential because the necessity of amending the negative aspects of any agreement is generally acceptable internationally and is considered reasonable (passage omitted) whereas an external intervention to prevent the amendment of such negative provisions is held unjustified and inapplicable.

(b) Once this is achieved, the Treaty of Guarantee (the right of intervention) will become legally and substantially inapplicable.

(c) Once those provisions of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance which restrict the exercise of the right of self-determination are removed, the people of Cyprus will be able freely to express and apply its will.

(d) It will be possible for the force of the State (the Police Force) and, in addition, friendly military forces, to resist legitimately any intervention internally or from outside, because we will then be completely independent.

It will be seen that it is necessary for actions from *a* to *d* to be carried out in the order indicated.

It is consequently evident that, if we ever hope to have any chance of success in the international field, we cannot and should not reveal or proclaim any stage of the struggle before the previous stage is completed. For instance, it is accepted that the above four stages constitute the necessary course to be taken, then it is obvious that it would be senseless for us to speak of amendment *a* if stage *d* is revealed, because it would then be ridiculous for us to seek the amendment of the negative points with the excuse that these amendments are necessary for the functioning of the State and of the agreements.

The above are the points regarding our targets and aims, and the procedure to be followed in the international field.

### B. *The internal aspect*

Our activities in the internal field will be regulated according to their repercussions and to interpretations to be given to them in the world and according to the effect of our actions on our national cause.

1. The only danger that can be described as insurmountable is the possibility of a forceful external intervention. This danger, which could be met partly or wholly by our forces, is important because of the political damage that it could do rather than the material losses that it could entail. If intervention took place before stage *c*, then such intervention would be legally tenable at least, if not entirely justifiable. This would be very much against us both internationally and at the United Nations. The history of many similar incidents in recent times shows us that in no case of intervention, even if legally inexcusable, has the attacker been removed by either the United Nations or the other Powers without significant concessions to the detriment of the attacked party. Even in the case of the attack on Suez by Israel, which was condemned by almost all Members of the United Nations and for which Russia threatened intervention, the Israelis were removed but, as a concession, they continued to keep the port of Elath on the Red Sea. There are, however, more serious dangers in the case of Cyprus.

If we do our work well and justify the attempt we shall make under stage *a* above, we will see, on the one hand, that intervention will not be justified and, on the other hand, we will have every support since, by the Treaty of Guarantee, intervention cannot take place before negotiations between the Guarantor Powers, that is the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. It is at this stage, i.e., at the stage of contacts (before intervention), that we shall need international support. We shall obtain this support if the amendments proposed by us seem reasonable and justified. Therefore, we have to be extremely careful in selecting the amendments that we shall propose.

The first step, therefore, would be to get rid of intervention by proposing amendments in the first stage. Tactic to be followed: (Omitted).

2. It is evident that, for intervention to be justified, there must be a more serious reason and a more immediate danger than simple constitutional amendments. Such reason can be:

(a) The declaration of enosis before actions *a* to *c*;

(b) Serious intercommunal unrest which may be shown as a massacre of Turks.

The first reason is removed as a result of the plan drawn up for the first stage, and consequently what remains is the danger of intercommunal strife. We do not intend to engage, without provocation, in massacre or attack against the Turks. Therefore, (section omitted) the Turks can react strongly and incite incidents and strife, or falsely stage massacres, clashes or bomb explosions in order to create the impression that the Greeks attacked the Turks and that intervention is imperative for their protection. Tactic to be employed: Our actions for amending the Constitution will not be secret: we would always appear to be ready for peaceful talks and our actions would not take any provocative and violent form. Any incidents that may take place will be met, at the beginning, in a legal fashion by the legal security forces, according to a plan. Our actions will have a legal form.

3. (Omitted).

4. It is, however, naïve to believe that it is possible for us to proceed to substantial actions for amending the Constitution, as a first step towards our more general plan as described above, without expecting the Turks to create or stage incidents and clashes. For this reason the existence and the strengthening of our organization is imperative because:

(a) If, in case of spontaneous resistance by the Turks, our counter-attack is not immediate, we run the risk of having a panic created among Greeks, in towns in particular. We will then be in danger of losing vast areas of vital importance to the Turks, while, if we show our strength to the Turks immediately and forcefully, they will then probably be brought to their senses and restrict their activities to insignificant, isolated incidents.

(b) In case of a planned or unplanned attack by the Turks, whether this is staged or not, it is necessary to suppress this forcefully in the shortest possible time, since, if we manage to become the masters of the situation within a day or two, outside intervention would not be possible, probable or justifiable.

(c) The forceful and decisive suppressing of any Turkish effort will greatly facilitate our subsequent actions for further constitutional amendments, and it should then be possible to apply these without the Turks being able to show any reaction, because they will learn that it is impossible for them to show any reaction without serious consequences for their community.

(d) In case of the clashes becoming widespread, we must be ready to proceed immediately through actions *a* to *d*, including the immediate declaration of enosis, because then there will be no need to wait or to engage in diplomatic activity.

5. In all these stages we must not overlook the factor of enlightening and of facing the propaganda of those who do not know or cannot be expected to know our plans, as well as of the reactionary elements. It has been shown that our struggle must go through at least four stages and that we are obliged not to reveal our plans and intentions prematurely. It is therefore more than a national duty for everyone to observe full secrecy in the matter. Secrecy is vitally essential for our success and survival.

This, however, does not prevent the reactionaries and irresponsible demagogues from indulging in false patriotic manifestations and provocations. Our plan would provide them with the possibility of putting forward accusations to the effect that the aims of our leadership are not national and that only the amendment of the Constitution is envisaged. The need for carrying out constitutional amendments in stages, and in accordance with the prevailing conditions, makes our job even more difficult. All this must not, however, be allowed to drag us to irresponsible demagoguery, street politics and a race of nationalism. Our deeds will be our undeniable justification. In any case, owing to the fact that for well known reasons, the above plan

must have been carried out and borne fruit long before the next elections, we must distinguish ourselves with self-restraint and moderation in the short time that we have. Parallel with this, we should not only maintain but reinforce the present unity and discipline of our patriotic forces. We can succeed in this only by properly enlightening our members so that they in turn enlighten the public.

Before anything else, we must expose the true identity of the reactionaries. These are petty and irresponsible demagogues and opportunists. Their recent history shows this. They are unsuccessful, negative and anti-progressive elements who attack our leadership like mad dogs but who are unable to put forward any substantive and practical solution of their own. In order to succeed in all our activities, we need a strong and stable government up to the last minute. They are known as clamorous slogan creators who are good for nothing but speech making. When it comes to taking definite actions or making sacrifices, they are soon shown to be unwilling weaklings. A typical example of this is that, even at the present stage, they have no better proposal to make than to suggest, that we should have recourse to the United Nations. It is therefore necessary that they should be isolated and kept at a distance.

We must enlighten our members about our plans and objectives *only verbally*. Meetings must be held at the subheadquarters of the organization to enlighten leaders and members so that they are properly equipped to enlighten others. *No written explanation of any sort is allowed. Loss or leakage of any document pertaining to the above is equivalent to high treason.* There can be no action that would inflict a heavier blow to our struggle than any revealing of the contents of the present document or the publication of this by the opposition.

Outside the verbal enlightenment of our members, all our activities, and our publications in the press in particular, must be most restrained and must not divulge any of the above. Only responsible persons will be allowed to make public speeches and statements and will refer to this plan only generally under their personal responsibility and under the personal responsibility of the Chief of the subheadquarters concerned. Also, any reference to the written plan should be done only after the formal approval of the Chief of the subheadquarters who will control the speech or statement. But in any case, such speech or statement *must never be allowed to appear in the press or any other publication.*

The tactic to be followed: Great effort must be made to enlighten our members and the public *verbally*. Every effort must be made to show ourselves as moderates. Any reference to our plans in writing or any reference in the press or in any document is strictly prohibited. Responsible officials and other responsible persons will continue to enlighten the public and to increase its morale and fighting spirit without ever divulging any of our plans through the press or otherwise.

*Note:* The present document should be destroyed by burning under the personal responsibility of the Chief of the subheadquarters and in the presence of all members of the staff within 10 days of its being received. It is strictly prohibited to make copies of the whole or any part of this document. Staff members of subheadquarters may have it in their possession only under the personal responsibility of Chief of subheadquarters, but in no case is anyone allowed to take it out of the office of subheadquarters.

The Chief  
AKRITAS

## DOCUMENTS S/12723 AND ADD.1

### Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period 1 December 1977 to 31 May 1978

#### DOCUMENT S/12723

#### ANNEX

[Original: English]  
[31 May 1978]

Proposals submitted by the Turkish Cypriot interlocutors on 13 April 1978

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#### INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 1 December 1977 to 31 May 1978 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to the mandate laid down in Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent resolutions of the Council concerning Cyprus including, most recently, resolution 422 (1977) of 15 December 1977.

2. The Security Council, in its resolution 422 (1977), requested me to continue the mission of good offices entrusted to me in paragraph 6 of resolution 367 (1975), to keep the Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of that resolution by 31 May 1978. Developments on this subject are summarized in section V of this report.

## I. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF UNFICYP

3. The table below shows the strength of UNFICYP as of 31 May 1978:

MILITARY PERSONNEL			
<i>Austria</i>			
HQ UNFICYP .....	6		
Infantry battalion UNAB 13 .....	320		
Military police company .....	6	332	
<i>Canada</i>			
HQ UNFICYP .....	10		
1st Battalion The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry .....	467		
Signals squadron .....	18		
Medical centre .....	7		
Military police company .....	13	515	
<i>Denmark</i>			
HQ UNFICYP .....	5		
Infantry battalion UN XXIX .....	342		
Military police company .....	13	360	
<i>Finland</i>			
HQ UNFICYP .....	7		
Military police company .....	5	12	
<i>Ireland</i>			
HQ UNFICYP .....	6	6	
<i>Sweden</i>			
HQ UNFICYP .....	6		
Infantry battalion UN 69C .....	406		
Military police company .....	15	427	
<i>United Kingdom</i>			
HQ UNFICYP .....	16		
HQ BRITCON .....	7		
Armoured reconnaissance squadron—A Squadron 9th/12th Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales) .....	119		
1st Battalion The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers .....	342		
HQ support regiment .....	39		
Engineer detachment .....	8		
Signals squadron .....	54		
Army aviation flight .....	19		
Transport squadron .....	102		
Medical centre .....	8		
Ordnance detachment .....	14		
Workshop .....	42		
Military police company .....	8		
B Flight 84 helicopter squadron, RAF .....	39	817	
	TOTAL	2,469	
CIVILIAN POLICE			
Australia .....	20		
Sweden .....	14		
	TOTAL	34	
	TOTAL UNFICYP	2,503	

4. On 28 March 1978, I informed the Security Council that I had appointed Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl my Special Representative in Cyprus [S/12623]. Mr. Galindo Pohl served as the Permanent Representative of El Salvador to the United Nations from December 1967 to June 1977. He took up his new post on 1 May 1978. Mr. Rémy Gorgé, who served as my Acting Special Representative from December 1977 until Mr. Galindo Pohl's arrival, continues in Cyprus as my Deputy Special Representative.

5. The Force remains under the command of Major-General James Joseph Quinn.

6. During the period under review, the Government of Austria, in conjunction with the United Nations Secre-

tariat, temporarily increased the number of engineers in the Austrian contingent by 20, for the period January to June 1978 only, in order to carry out some urgent repairs to the Austrian contingent base camp at Fama-gusta. In addition, on 8 May 1978, the strength of the Swedish civilian police unit was increased from 12 to 14 in order to improve its operational capability.

7. The current detailed deployment of UNFICYP is shown on the map attached to this report.

## II. UNFICYP OPERATIONS FROM 1 DECEMBER 1977 TO 31 MAY 1978

### A. MANDATE AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

8. The function of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus was originally defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) in the following terms:

“in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions”.

That mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, and between the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighters, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, most recently in its resolution 422 (1977). In connexion with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council adopted a number of resolutions, some of which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and, in some cases, have required UNFICYP to perform certain additional or modified functions.<sup>10</sup> In its resolution 422 (1977), the Council noted from the report of the Secretary-General [S/12463].

“that in existing circumstances the presence of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is essential not only to help maintain quiet in the island but also to facilitate the continued search for a peaceful settlement”.

In supervising the cease-fire lines of the National Guard and the Turkish forces and the area between those lines, UNFICYP continues to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting by persuading both parties to refrain from violations of the cease-fire by shooting, by movement forward or by construction of new defensive positions (see sect. D). Efforts also continue to provide security for farmers, shepherds and other civilians of both communities living or working in the area between the lines, as a normalization measure and in keeping with the established practice since the closing months of 1974 (see sect. E).

9. UNFICYP continues to use its best efforts to discharge its functions with regard to the security, welfare and well-being of the Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island. UNFICYP access to that area remains restricted but humanitarian work has been carried out on a reasonably satisfactory scale (see sects. C and G). The low level of Greek Cypriot transfer from north

<sup>10</sup> These include resolutions 353 (1974) of 20 July, 354 (1974) of 23 July, 355 (1974) of 1 August, 357 (1974) of 14 August, 358 (1974) and 359 (1974) of 15 August, 360 (1974) of 16 August, 361 (1974) of 30 August, 364 (1974) and 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, 367 (1975) of 12 March, 370 (1975) of 13 June and 383 (1975) of 13 December 1975, 391 (1976) of 15 June and 401 (1976) of 14 December 1976, 410 (1977) of 15 June, 414 (1977) of 15 September and 422 (1977) of 15 December 1977.

to south revealed in my report to the Council of 1 December 1977 [*ibid.*] has continued, a total of 74 having moved during the period under review.

10. In addition to humanitarian measures implemented directly by them, UNFICYP military and civilian police contingents have continued to support and assist the relief operations co-ordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in co-operation with the World Food Programme (WFP).

11. The military and civilian police contingents of UNFICYP continue to discharge tasks handed over to them by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at the time of the withdrawal of its delegation from Cyprus on 30 June 1977. The second ICRC temporary mission [see S/12342 of 7 June 1977, para. 12] took place in April 1978 when two delegates of the Committee visited the island. The delegates travelled widely throughout Cyprus and conferred with officials of the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot community.

12. UNFICYP has continued to visit on a regular basis Turkish Cypriots still residing in the south (see sect. H)

#### B. LIAISON AND CO-OPERATION

13. In accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 422 (1977), UNFICYP has continued to emphasize to both sides the essential requirement of full co-operation at all levels to enable it to carry out its role effectively. Clear channels of communication have been developed between UNFICYP and both the National Guard and the Turkish forces. Meetings between the Commander of UNFICYP and the commanders of the National Guard and the Turkish forces are held as required and on a regular basis at the Chief of Staff level. Similar meetings are regularly held between the UNFICYP Sector Commanders and their counterparts in the National Guard and the Turkish forces respectively.

#### C. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF UNFICYP

14. UNFICYP continues to have access to Greek Cypriot habitations in the north. Officers making liaison visits in performance of humanitarian tasks have enjoyed improved freedom of movement in the Karpas peninsula and also a better opportunity to speak with Greek Cypriots there in privacy.

15. Limitations are still imposed on UNFICYP access from its installations situated in the north to observation posts in the area between the lines. These limitations have an adverse effect on operational effectiveness in the hours of darkness and impose administrative difficulties.

#### D. MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE

16. UNFICYP surveillance over the area between the cease-fire lines is based upon an established system of observation posts which ensures observation and reporting of cease-fire violations. The total number of observation locations is 136, of which 71 are permanently manned. The remaining locations permit occasional observation over specific areas at certain times of the day or night. Standing patrols are deployed as necessary on a temporary basis until such time as a cease-fire violation ceases. In addition to surveillance from fixed points, UNFICYP places emphasis on conducting frequent mobile patrols by day and night along established routes throughout the length of the area between the lines.

17. As part of its role in relation to the maintenance of the cease-fire, UNFICYP keeps a careful daily check on all confirmed shooting incidents and movements forward. All such incidents are investigated and the results forwarded to both sides on a daily and weekly basis. Both sides have co-operated by deploying their own liaison officers and establishing close contact with UNFICYP headquarters as and when required. During this period, UNFICYP recorded an approximate daily average of one shooting incident, none of them serious.

18. Most of the violations by forward movement have been of a temporary nature, the personnel concerned withdrawing to their cease-fire lines shortly after entering the area between the lines and, in most cases, immediately after being informed by UNFICYP of the violation. Patrols sent by the Turkish forces on a regular basis between Pyla and Troulli Hill have become much less frequent than in periods covered by earlier reports.

19. As the cease-fire lines are now almost completely stabilized, very few encroachments by construction of new positions forward of those lines were attempted in the period under review. However, improvement of existing positions and construction of new fortifications on or very close to the cease-fire lines continue to be a source of concern, as such works can lead to an increase in tension in the area of confrontation.

#### E. MAINTENANCE OF THE *status quo*

20. The cease-fire lines of the two armies extend to a length of about 180 kilometres across the island, from Kato Pyrgos on the north-west coast to Dherinia near the east coast south of Famagusta. The area between the lines, the width of which is only 20 metres at some points in Nicosia, covers about 3 per cent of the land area of the island. The position of UNFICYP in the area between the lines is based on the requirement to maintain the cease-fire as established over three and a half years of UNFICYP practice [see S/12253 of 9 December 1976, para. 19].

21. In some areas different interpretations of the cease-fire lines still exist. Both sides have recently been provided with a trace of their respective cease-fire lines as recorded by UNFICYP.

22. Maintenance of the *status quo* in the confrontation area within urban Nicosia is a matter of some concern to UNFICYP as, owing to the proximity and irregular configuration of the lines, the slightest change can lead to increased tension or retaliatory action by the opposing side.

23. UNFICYP has endeavoured to facilitate normal farming activity, especially by providing escorts to enable Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot farmers to work their fields and orchards in sensitive areas. Currently, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot farmers work in more than 100 different locations in the area between the lines.

24. Appreciable quantities of commercial commodities and other movable properties were taken from houses and other premises in the new town of Famagusta (Varosha) during the period under review, giving rise to complaints of looting. The Turkish Cypriot authorities have indicated to UNFICYP that records are being kept and that certain properties already taken will be accounted for in the event of a political agreement.

#### F. MINES

25. Whilst no additional mine fields have been detected since my report of 1 December 1977, mine fields



continue to pose real dangers to UNFICYP personnel and unwary civilians. Despite regular requests made to both sides, comprehensive mine field records have still not been made available to UNFICYP and many mine fields remain either inadequately marked or unmarked.

26. The presence of unexploded ordnance devices in the area between the lines is also of some concern, although the number of incidents has decreased.

#### G. HUMANITARIAN AND NORMALIZATION FUNCTIONS IN THE NORTH

27. UNFICYP continues to discharge humanitarian functions and to promote normalization of the living conditions of the Greek Cypriots remaining in the north. Since my last report, UNFICYP has ascertained that the living conditions of these people have improved, particularly as far as their freedom of movement is concerned. Transfers to the south have remained at the same low level which has been in evidence since February 1977. All transfers continue to be monitored by UNFICYP to make certain that they have been undertaken voluntarily. The Greek Cypriot population in the north is now 1,731.

28. Medical care available to Greek Cypriots in the north is as good as that provided to Turkish Cypriots in the same area. Greek Cypriots may obtain permission for temporary visits to the south in order to obtain medical treatment, provided that a Turkish Cypriot medical board certifies that such treatment is not available in the north.

29. Two Greek Cypriot primary schools are operating in the north. Both are in the Karpas area, one in Ayia Trias and the other in Rizokarpaso. The school in Ayia Trias operates with one teacher for 62 pupils. In Rizokarpaso there are five teachers and 155 pupils. Since there are still no Greek Cypriot secondary schools in the north, some children were transferred during the current year in order to attend such schools in the south. Through the good offices of UNFICYP, permission was granted by the Turkish Cypriot authorities for 122 Greek Cypriot schoolchildren who are attending schools in the south to spend the Christmas holidays in their homes in the Karpas; however, boys over 16 and girls over 20 were excluded. At Easter, permission was granted to 154 children, but on this occasion girls over 18 were also excluded. During the Easter holiday period, the visiting Greek Cypriot children were allowed access to beaches in the Karpas area and to Cape Andreas, a previously restricted area at the north-western point of the peninsula.

30. The same opportunity was granted over the Christmas and Easter periods to Maronite children attending school in the south whose families live in the north. Furthermore, Maronite adults residing in the south visited their relatives in the north in significant numbers over the Easter holidays. Maronites in the north may travel to markets in the larger cities, such as Kyrenia and Nicosia, for business and domestic purposes. Contacts between members of the Maronite group residing on opposite sides of the cease-fire lines are frequent.

31. In regard to agricultural activities, the recent relaxation of restrictions on freedom of movement in the Karpas area makes it possible for Greek Cypriots to have access also to some fields which lie at a distance from their villages [see S/12463, para. 29].

32. As indicated in my last report, there appears to be no restriction on freedom of worship in the north wherever the services of a priest are available.

#### H. TURKISH CYPRIOTS IN THE SOUTH

33. In response to a request from the Vice-President of the Cyprus Red Cross, who resides in the north, UNFICYP continues to undertake the responsibility of making periodic visits to some 200 Turkish Cypriots living in the south to assess any assistance they may need and to maintain some contact with their relatives in the north. To date, these Turkish Cypriots have given UNFICYP to understand that they are satisfied with their living conditions.

#### III. LAW AND ORDER—THE CIVILIAN POLICE ELEMENT OF THE FORCE (UNCIVPOL)

34. UNCIVPOL continues to be deployed in support of military units and operates in close liaison with the Cyprus police and the Turkish Cypriot police.

35. UNCIVPOL contributes to the maintenance of law and order in the area between the lines and to the protection of the civilian population, particularly in areas where intercommunal problems exist. It assists in the control of the movement of civilians in the area between the cease-fire lines, escorts persons transferred from the north to the south, inquires into complaints of criminal activity with intercommunal content and, in the north, distributes social welfare payments to Greek Cypriots in their habitations, in addition to observing the welfare of Greek Cypriots still residing at Kyrenia. UNCIVPOL assisted the Turkish Cypriot authorities in returning to the south several Greek Cypriots who had strayed into the north.

36. UNCIVPOL continues to maintain a missing persons bureau at UNFICYP headquarters. As indicated in my report to the Commission on Human Rights,<sup>11</sup> I discussed the question of missing persons with government leaders and high officials at Ankara, Nicosia and Athens on the occasion of my visit to the area in January 1978. Agreement in principle had been reached at the high-level meeting of 12 February 1977 to set up a new investigatory machinery covering missing persons of both communities [*ibid.*, para. 39] and, following the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 32/128, both sides publicly reiterated their support for such a joint body with the participation of ICRC. Nevertheless, it has not been possible, despite intensive consultations, to reach agreement on the terms of reference of that body, particularly on the precise role of ICRC. When in Cyprus on 19 April 1978, I had the opportunity to discuss the matter again with President Kyprianou and Mr. Denktas. My Special Representative is pursuing his consultations.

#### IV. HUMANITARIAN AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

37. Since my report of 1 December 1977, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has continued at my request to assist the displaced and needy population in the island in his capacity as Co-ordinator of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus.

38. Contributions in cash and kind from Governments, non-governmental organizations and voluntary agencies enabled the Co-ordinator to complete a variety of projects during the period under review. The completion of many other projects is envisaged in the coming months. The 1978 programme, which provides \$15,076,981 for the financing of 54 projects, is now under full implementation.

39. With the support of other United Nations agencies, the Co-ordinator has been in a position to ensure

<sup>11</sup> E/CN.4/1275.

an adequate basic nutritional diet for the displaced and needy population of Cyprus by procuring food commodities, and to meet more specific priority requirements resulting from the 1974 events in Cyprus.

40. The Co-ordinator's programme has concentrated on the provision of temporary accommodation, health centres and equipment, schools, community centres and facilities for children. Funds have also been made available towards the financing of basic agricultural and reforestation projects, including procurement of specialized vehicles, and for the provision of medicaments, medical equipment, educational materials, insecticides and pesticides.

41. While the general situation of the displaced persons has improved, the latest official statistics gave a total number of 182,000 Greek Cypriots as displaced and now living in the south. At present 148,122 persons are fully supported by the Government of Cyprus, receiving food rations, allowances and other material assistance.

42. According to the Turkish Cypriot authorities, there are at present 37,407 displaced and needy Turkish Cypriots in the north whose condition is attributable to the events of 1974. These are being provided with food and other basic supplies, mainly channelled through the United Nations assistance programme. The 1,731 Greek Cypriots and some 680 Maronites in the north who are in need of assistance receive food rations and allowances, delivered on a regular basis by UNFICYP through the distribution centres.

43. UNFICYP has continued to support the Co-ordinator's relief programme by delivering food supplies and other items. A total of 2,330 tons of relief supplies was distributed or delivered during the period under review through UNFICYP facilities. This included 572 tons, representing 257 truck-loads, delivered to Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north. In addition, 8,980 tons from UNHCR/WFP sources were provided directly to the Greek Cypriot authorities in the south. Supplies provided under the aegis of UNHCR/WFP to the Turkish Cypriot community in the north totalled 1,758 tons, i.e., 219 truck-loads. Resupply to Greek Cypriots in the north consisted of foodstuffs, clothing, petrol and diesel oil. Supplies transported to the Turkish Cypriot welfare stores in the north comprised wheat grain and wheat flour, rice, cooking oil and tinned foodstuffs. Included in this total was medical equipment (approximately 13 tons) consigned to the new hospital in north Nicosia. Since August 1974, a total of 16,853 tons of relief supplies have been provided to Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north and 15,698 tons to Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north have not usually been permitted to receive deliveries directly, but only through a representative of the community.

44. During the period under review, UNCIVPOL distributed social welfare payments to the Greek Cypriots in the north amounting to £C 61,192. The total amount disbursed since January 1975 is £C 1,056,176.

45. In the medical field, UNFICYP provides emergency medical services, including medical evacuation by ambulance or helicopter. Delivery of medicines to the Turkish Cypriot community is made on a regular basis and emergency requests for medicines are met immediately.

46. As part of its involvement in economic affairs, UNFICYP continues to provide escorts for work parties, inspection teams, farmers and anti-malaria spraying teams in the area between the lines. Other economic

functions include the delivery of mail and postal parcels, delivery of spare parts and equipment for water supply and electricity installations and rendering assistance in the recovery of property of a movable nature.

## V. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

47. In pursuance of the mission of good offices entrusted to me by the Security Council in paragraph 6 of its resolution 367 (1975), I visited Turkey, Cyprus and Greece in January 1978. A main purpose of this journey was to determine the prospects of a resumption of the intercommunal talks.

48. At Ankara on 8 and 9 January, during a series of meetings with Prime Minister Ecevit and other government officials, Mr. Ecevit assured me that the Turkish Cypriot community would submit concrete proposals regarding the territorial aspect as well as revised constitutional proposals. In this context the Prime Minister also made it clear that any solution must be consistent with the principles of a bi-communal, bi-zonal, independent and non-aligned federal State, and that the existence of two separate communities and administrations could not be disregarded.

49. My talks at Nicosia with Mr. Kyprianou and Mr. Denktas centred on the negotiating process. It was agreed that the Turkish Cypriot proposals on the main aspects of the problem would be submitted to the Secretary-General so that I might study them and consult the parties on the best method of preparing for and resuming the intercommunal talks in a meaningful and effective way. The negotiating process would start with these consultations and it was hoped that it would lead to an early resumption of the intercommunal talks. The precise date of the next round would be decided at a later stage in the light of the above-mentioned consultations. Both Mr. Kyprianou and Mr. Denktas attended a luncheon I gave at Nicosia on 15 January. This provided an opportunity for an exchange of views on current matters concerning the Cyprus problem, including the question of missing persons.

50. At Athens, where I arrived on 16 January 1978, Prime Minister Karamanlis assured me that he fully supported efforts for resuming the negotiating process. Mr. Karamanlis cautioned, however, that a final judgement could only be given when the content of the Turkish Cypriot proposals was known. I also discussed the situation with the Foreign Minister and other leading officials.

51. On 13, 14 and 15 April 1978, I had a meeting at Vienna with Professor Mümtaz Soysal, who had been advising the Turkish Cypriot community on constitutional problems, and Mr. Necati Munir Ertekun, legal adviser to the Turkish Cypriot representative at the intercommunal talks. On behalf of Mr. Denktas, Mr. Ertekun and Professor Soysal handed me on 13 April documents setting forth the main aspects of the Turkish Cypriot negotiating position [see annex]. The first part, entitled "Explanatory note of the Turkish Cypriot proposals for the solution of the Cyprus problem", was released to the press the same day. The second part, entitled "Main aspects of the Turkish Cypriot proposals", with attached maps, was made public by the Greek Cypriots on 19 April, after my meeting with President Kyprianou the same day.

52. At the end of the meeting with Mr. Soysal on 15 April, I issued the following statement:

"In pursuance of his mission of good offices, the Secretary-General met in Vienna on 13, 14 and 15

April 1978 with Professor Mümtaz Soysal and Mr. Necati Munir Ertekun, Legal Adviser to the Turkish Cypriot interlocutor at the intercommunal talks. On behalf of His Excellency Mr. Denktaş, Mr. Ertekun and Professor Soysal handed to the Secretary-General on 13 April a document setting forth the main aspects of the Turkish Cypriot negotiating position. The Turkish Cypriot proposals deal with the constitutional and territorial aspects of the Cyprus problem in a concrete and substantial way.

"Professor Soysal and Mr. Ertekun explained their proposals to the Secretary-General in some detail.

"At the second and third meetings on 14 and 15 April, a number of points were further clarified and there was a discussion on the procedure to be followed in preparation for a new round of intercommunal talks. The Secretary-General informed Professor Soysal and Mr. Ertekun that it was his intention to study the Turkish Cypriot proposals carefully. He will be in touch with both sides concerning a resumption of the intercommunal talks."

I further clarified through my spokesman, in response to queries, that my statement could not be interpreted as expressing a judgement on the merits of the Turkish Cypriot proposals.

53. I personally transmitted the Turkish Cypriot proposals to President Kyprianou at Nicosia on 19 April. He informed me that these proposals were not acceptable as a basis for the resumption of the intercommunal talks. In the course of our conversation and also publicly later the same day, Mr. Kyprianou emphasized that, since the philosophy and concept of the Turkish Cypriot proposals were "totally unacceptable" to his side, neither their substance nor their basis was capable of being improved to the point of becoming negotiable. I also met Mr. Denktaş who, for his part, stressed that his side's proposals provided the basis for re-establishing an intercommunal partnership which could pave the way to harmony by a process of evolution.

54. On 22 April, the Greek Cypriot representative at the intercommunal talks, Mr. Papadopoulos, reiterated in a letter to me that his side found the Turkish Cypriot proposals "utterly unacceptable and contrary to the letter and spirit of all United Nations resolutions on Cyprus" and that the documents submitted by the Turkish Cypriot side "cannot possibly be considered to form the basis for the resumption of any meaningful and substantive negotiations between the two sides". To this letter Mr. Papadopoulos appended a document containing his observations on the Turkish Cypriot proposals [see S/12695].

55. Since my return from Nicosia, numerous statements have been issued by both sides commenting on the substance of the Turkish Cypriot proposals and on the question of a resumption of the negotiating process. Thus, on 2 May, Mr. Örek, on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community, stated that the proposals were a starting point for negotiations and that his community had thus fulfilled all the prerequisites for the resumption of intercommunal talks. He appealed to the Secretary-General to fix a date as early as possible for another round of talks [see S/12680]. At a press conference on 11 May, the Prime Minister of Turkey similarly stated his view that, following the submission of the Turkish Cypriot proposals, the Secretary-General should reconvene the intercommunal talks. Mr. Ecevit also stressed that the proposals were negotiable in every respect, in-

cluding in particular the question of the future political framework of Varosha and the size of the geographical arrangements envisaged in six areas along the buffer zone [see S/12711].

56. Following my return to Headquarters on 20 April, I undertook further consultations with all concerned. On 2 May the United Nations spokesman was authorized to issue the following statement:

"The Turkish Cypriot proposals on Cyprus, which had been handed to the Secretary-General in Vienna on 13 April 1978, were transmitted by the Secretary-General personally to President Kyprianou in Nicosia on 19 April. Mr. Kyprianou informed the Secretary-General that these proposals were not acceptable as a basis for the resumption of intercommunal talks.

"Evidently, there is a gap between the positions of the two parties as regards the basis for a resumption of the talks. In these circumstances, the Secretary-General, in pursuance of his mission of good offices entrusted to him by the Security Council under resolution 367 (1975), intends to continue his consultations in order to clarify the positions of both sides in regard to a resumption of the negotiating process."

57. On the morning of 22 May, I had a discussion with President Kyprianou when he was at United Nations Headquarters to attend the tenth special session of the General Assembly, during which he reiterated his previous position. Addressing the General Assembly on 24 May,<sup>12</sup> Mr. Kyprianou proposed the total demilitarization and disarmament of the Republic of Cyprus and implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations. He further proposed the establishment of a mixed police force of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, in accordance with the proportions of the population, and under the permanent guidance and control of an international United Nations police force.

58. During the evening of 22 May, I had a discussion at United Nations Headquarters with Mr. Denktaş. Following the meeting, Mr. Denktaş issued a statement [see S/12715] expressing the belief of his community that intercommunal negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General should be resumed immediately, and indicating that his side was prepared to consider significant geographical adjustments. Mr. Denktaş stated that, as negotiations progressed, the Greek Cypriot inhabitants of Varosha could begin returning to their homes and businesses under arrangements that would meet the legitimate security concerns of both communities. He also suggested that the parties should discuss the reopening of Nicosia International Airport for civilian traffic and for initial United Nations use.

59. During the early days of June, I expect to meet the Prime Minister of Turkey and the Prime Minister of Greece, who will be visiting United Nations Headquarters in connection with the special session of the General Assembly.

## VI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

60. Voluntary contributions in the amount of approximately \$220.1 million have been paid to the UNFICYP Special Account by 62 Member States and one non-member Government in respect of the periods from the inception of the Force on 27 March 1964 to 15 June 1978. In addition, voluntary contributions from public sources, interest earned on investment of tempo-

<sup>12</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 2nd meeting.

rarily undisbursed funds and other miscellaneous income received by the Account have totalled about \$5.8 million. Accordingly, some \$225.9 million have so far been made available to the UNFICYP Special Account towards meeting the costs of UNFICYP to the United Nations for the periods through 15 June 1978.

61. The costs to be borne by the United Nations for the operation of UNFICYP for the periods from the inception of the Force to 15 June 1978 are estimated at \$286.1 million. This figure includes the direct cost to the United Nations of maintaining the Force in Cyprus, as well as the amounts to be paid to Governments providing contingents in respect of their extra and extraordinary costs for which they seek to be reimbursed by the United Nations.

62. The amount of \$225.9 million so far received by the UNFICYP Special Account falls short of the requirement of \$286.1 million indicated above by approximately \$60.2 million. However, in addition to the voluntary contributions that have already been paid to the Account, some \$6.6 million are expected to be received in due course against pledges made by Governments but not yet paid by them.

63. If to the amount of \$225.9 million so far received the amount of \$6.6 million of anticipated receipts is added, the receipts of the UNFICYP Special Account since March 1964 can then be expected to total approximately \$232.5 million. The difference between this figure and the costs of approximately \$286.1 million to be met becomes \$53.6 million. Accordingly, unless additional contributions from existing or new pledges are received before 15 June 1978, the UNFICYP Special Account deficit as of that date will be \$53.6 million.

64. If the Security Council should decide to extend for six months beyond 15 June 1978 the period during which the Force is to be stationed in Cyprus, it is estimated that the additional cost to the Organization for the Force at approximately its present strength, assuming continuance of present reimbursement commitments, would amount to approximately \$11.4 million, as detailed below.

UNFICYP COST ESTIMATE BY MAJOR CATEGORY OF EXPENSE  
(In thousands of United States dollars)

I. <i>Operation costs incurred by the United Nations</i>	
Movement of contingents .....	177
Operational expenses .....	995
Rental of premises .....	390
Rations .....	601
Non-military personnel, salaries, travel etc. ....	1,122
Miscellaneous and contingencies .....	200
TOTAL	3,485
II. <i>Reimbursement of extra costs of Governments providing contingents</i>	
Pay and allowances .....	7,100
Contingent-owned equipment .....	700
Death and disability awards .....	100
TOTAL	7,900
GRAND TOTAL	11,385

65. The above-mentioned costs of UNFICYP for the next six-month period, which will have to be covered by voluntary contributions, do not reflect the full cost of this operation to Member and non-member States. In fact they exclude the regular cost that would be incurred by the troop-contributors if their contingents were serving at home (i.e. regular pay and allowances and normal *matériel* costs), as well as such extra and extraordinary costs as the troop-contributors have agreed to absorb at

no cost to the United Nations. The troop-contributing Governments have informed me that the costs of UNFICYP absorbed by them are of the order of \$18.2 million for each six-month mandate period. Accordingly, the full costs of UNFICYP to Member and non-member States for the next six-month period are estimated at \$29.6 million approximately.

66. In order to finance the costs to the Organization of maintaining the Force for a period of six months after 15 June 1978 and to meet all costs and outstanding claims up to that date, it will be necessary to receive voluntary contributions to the UNFICYP Special Account totalling \$65 million.

## VII. OBSERVATIONS

67. The United Nations involvement with the Cyprus problem, which has extended over a span of more than 14 years, comprises the interrelated aspects of peace-keeping and peace-making. During the period under review, the first of these continued to function with great efficiency and effectiveness, while the second continued to encounter serious obstacles.

68. Owing in great part to the vigilance of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force and to the co-operation of the parties, the situation along the cease-fire lines has remained quiet. There have been no serious breaches of the cease-fire by shooting or by movement forward. The only military activities that remain a source of concern are the continuing improvement of existing positions and the construction of new fortifications on or very close to the cease-fire lines. No acute new problems have been encountered in the buffer zone and, as indicated in paragraph 23 above, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot farmers work their land in over 100 different locations in the area between the lines. In view of the sensitive nature of that area, civilian activities of this kind depend on the provision by UNFICYP of the necessary escorts. Without these, the buffer zone, amounting to 3 per cent of the area of the island, could turn into a barren, depopulated zone.

69. I continue to keep the strength of the Force under careful review, having in mind the requirements of implementing the mandate, the situation along the cease-fire lines and between those lines, political developments and financial considerations. On the basis of the reports of my Special Representative and of the Force Commander, I consider that a further reduction at this time would be inadvisable.

70. The situation in the north, though still not entirely consonant with the agreements reached at Vienna on 2 August 1975, improved during the period under review. UNFICYP now enjoys increased freedom of movement and UNFICYP personnel have been given the opportunity to speak in privacy to Greek Cypriots in the area. There has been a relative improvement in the living conditions and the economic situation of the Greek Cypriots in the north. I have every hope that this trend will continue.

71. I regret to report that, despite intensive efforts, it has not yet been possible to establish the investigatory body for tracing and accounting for missing persons of both communities. The unresolved issues concern the terms of reference and procedure of the proposed body, especially the role which the representative of the ICRC would be asked to take on in the body's proceedings. Representatives of the International Red Cross have been taking an active part in the consultations. I feel that a practical solution of the remaining issues, one that would

be acceptable to the parties and to the ICRC, could still be reached if the parties were determined to bridge the gap remaining between their positions. My Special Representative is continuing his consultations with all concerned on this matter.

72. During the period under review, I undertook intensive efforts, within the framework of the mission of good offices entrusted to me by the Security Council, to facilitate concrete and substantive negotiations between the parties on the major aspects of the Cyprus problem. It is therefore with regret that I have to report to the Council that the results of these efforts remain disappointing for the time being. I am deeply concerned about this situation.

73. It is obvious that the cause of a just and peaceful settlement in Cyprus cannot be served by calling for talks when there is no agreement on the negotiating basis and when one or other party is not willing to proceed with meaningful negotiations. For this reason I have always made it clear to all concerned that another round of intercommunal talks could only be convened in consultation with both parties and with their consent. There are a number of factors which inevitably come into play in a situation of this kind. In this particular case, not only the substance of the proposals submitted but developments elsewhere that were thought likely to affect the Cyprus problem have created a situation in which the agreement of both parties to resume the talks has not materialized. I am therefore undertaking further consultations in an effort to establish a basis of negotiations acceptable to both sides. The presence of the leaders of all the parties concerned in New York for the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament has given me the opportunity to pursue these consultations at the highest level.

74. As long as these consultations are in progress and as long as the attention of the parties is still focused on certain proceedings outside the area, it would of course be premature to offer any definite conclusions. However, some preliminary observations may not be out of place at this stage.

75. Since the decision of the Security Council of 12 March 1975 entrusting me with a new mission of good offices, the main problem confronting the parties and me has been to generate an effective negotiating process that would lead to solutions, constituting a package deal freely acceptable to both sides, on the main aspects of the Cyprus problem. The first problem in this regard — the lack of an agreed framework — was not overcome until 12 February 1977 when the late Archbishop Makarios and Mr. Denktas, meeting in my presence, agreed on substantive guidelines for the intercommunal talks. The second problem concerned the reluctance of one or both of the parties to put on record their negotiating positions. This was dealt with in April 1977, when the Greek Cypriots submitted territorial proposals and the Turkish Cypriots submitted constitutional proposals, followed by documents on the latter issue submitted by the Greek Cypriots. Finally, the Turkish Cypriots, on 13 April 1978, put forward their territorial proposals and revised constitutional proposals. Now that the process of submitting initial proposals on the main issues has been completed, it is possible to measure with some accuracy the distance that separates the conceptions of the two sides. In this regard it is of course disappointing, though not altogether surprising, that it has still not proved possible to reach a stage where a genuine negotiating process could evolve out of their conflicting positions.

76. I hold to the belief that the setback experienced over the past weeks must not be allowed to frustrate the search for a just and peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem based on the legitimate interests of both communities. As regards the procedural aspects, there may in fact be no alternative to the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities. Both parties have stressed that they continue to accept this procedure. While one of them has suggested an interest in possible alternative approaches, it is my understanding that such approaches would not be intended to replace the talks between the principal parties concerned. Whatever the format or venue, the same substantive decisions will eventually have to be faced by the same parties, since they are the ones that will have to live with whatever solutions to these problems may be devised.

77. An agreed basis for the resumption of meaningful intercommunal talks would of necessity have to encompass the positions and fundamental interests of both parties in Cyprus, and it would have to hold out to both the prospect of a tangible improvement over the continuation of the present situation. It is evident that neither side is at present persuaded that the proposals presented by the other meet these criteria. I might add that the *status quo* must not be assumed to constitute an available viable alternative, since potentially dangerous elements of instability are inherent in the prevailing situation.

78. At the same time, I feel that the time may be ripe for a concrete attempt to deal with some important aspects of the existing stalemate on the ground, thus creating an opening for further significant steps. This approach may also serve to eliminate certain anomalous situations which have tended to put obstacles in the way of past attempts to deal with the broader problem. The status of Varosha, which obviously should not be kept in its present empty and decaying condition, may provide an opportunity of this kind. Since Varosha is situated in the immediate vicinity of the buffer zone and is patrolled by UNFICYP troops, it would seem natural to envisage United Nations assistance in this connexion.

79. Another obvious anomaly that comes to mind is the situation at Nicosia International Airport, which remains under UNFICYP control but is not open for traffic. An agreement to reopen the airport, initially for United Nations use, was reached at the third round of intercommunal talks at Vienna in August 1975, but has not been implemented. In my conversations at Vienna and Nicosia in April 1978, I suggested that the problem should be reopened. My Special Representative, Mr. Galindo Pohl, is pursuing the matter.

80. The present situation is difficult but I am convinced that the problems are not inherently insoluble. All of them, however, require the willingness of each side to acknowledge the reality of the needs and aspirations of the other, and the necessity for concessions. I am determined to continue my efforts to bring the parties closer together with a view to working out an approach to negotiations that would make it possible for me to convene another round of intercommunal talks.

81. In the light of the situation on the ground and of political developments, I have concluded once again that the continued presence of UNFICYP remains indispensable in keeping the potentially dangerous situation in the island under control, supervising the cease-fire, maintaining the *status quo* in the area between the lines and helping to resolve incidents and other

Proposals submitted by the Turkish Cypriot interlocutors  
on 13 April 1978

problems arising between the parties. In helping to maintain calm in the island, the Force also facilitates the search for a peaceful settlement. I therefore recommend to the Security Council that it should extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months. In accordance with established practice, I have undertaken consultations on this subject with the parties concerned and shall report to the Council on these consultations as soon as possible.

82. The financial situation of UNFICYP continued to be a cause for concern during the period under review. The deficit of the UNFICYP account is now of the order of \$53.6 million. The claims of troop-contributing Governments in respect of extra and extraordinary costs incurred by them for which they seek to be reimbursed by the United Nations have been paid only until May 1975. It is worth noting that the "extra and extraordinary costs" for which these Governments bill the United Nations represent in some cases only a fraction of the actual costs incurred by them in maintaining their contingents. As indicated in paragraph 65 above, the actual cost of UNFICYP for a six-month mandate period has been estimated at approximately \$29.6 million, of which only \$11.4 million is billed to the United Nations, the rest being absorbed by the troop contributors. The Governments concerned have conveyed to me their growing and very serious concern over the disproportionate financial burden they have been carrying, which has obliged some of them to review their commitments relating to their participation in UNFICYP. I am equally concerned at the inability of UNFICYP to meet its financial commitments in full and at the implications of this situation in regard to the continued functioning of this peace-keeping operation. The voluntary contributions to the UNFICYP account received in response to my semi-annual appeals still fall short of the requirements of maintaining the Force. In these circumstances, I earnestly hope that the Governments making financial contributions to UNFICYP will find it possible at least to maintain the level of their contributions and that Member States which have not contributed will now agree to reconsider their position in this important matter.

83. I wish to express once again my appreciation to the Governments contributing contingents for UNFICYP, which have continued to bear a disproportionate burden in order to make it possible to maintain this important peace-keeping operation of the United Nations. I also wish to place on record the debt of gratitude owed to those Governments which have been making voluntary financial contributions for the support of UNFICYP.

84. In concluding this report, I wish to express my warm thanks to the Force Commander, Major-General James J. Quinn, and to the officers and men of UNFICYP and its civilian staff. They have continued to discharge with exemplary efficiency and devotion the important and difficult responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council. I also wish to express my warm appreciation to Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, who took up his duties as my Special Representative in Cyprus on 1 May, and to Mr. Rémy Gorgé, who acted in that capacity with competence and efficiency from December 1977 until Mr. Galindo Pohl's arrival and who continues in Cyprus as my Deputy Special Representative.

[Map. "Deployment of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus as of 31 May 1978." See end of volume.]

A. EXPLANATORY NOTE OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS  
FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

This document has been prepared for the purpose of explaining, in a condensed form, the Turkish Cypriot proposals on the following essential aspects of the Cyprus problem:

- I. The Federal Constitution
- II. The territories of the federated States and a proposal for a joint water project
- III. Maras (Varosha)

I. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

This part includes the following essential aspects of the constitutional proposals:

- A. The common starting points of the constitutional solution
- B. Difficulties of the constitutional solution
- C. General observations on the Turkish Cypriot constitutional proposals for the establishment of a Federal Republic of Cyprus

A. *The common starting points of the constitutional solution*

A federal system of government for Cyprus is a solution which has been advocated by the Turkish Cypriot side from the very beginning of the intercommunal talks and was also accepted by the Greek Cypriot side at the second summit meeting between President Denktaş and Archbishop Makarios on 12 February 1977 in the presence of the United Nations Secretary-General Mr. Kurt Waldheim.

The first point of the agreed instructions (guidelines) referred to in the communiqué issued at the end of this meeting stated that the two sides were "seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic".

The first point of the proposals of the Greek Cypriot side submitted at the sixth round of Vienna talks (31 March-7 April 1977) on the "Basic principles which should govern the constitutional structure of the Federal Republic of Cyprus" also referred to a "federal republic consisting of the Greek Cypriot region and the Turkish Cypriot region" and thus recognized the "bi-zonal" character of the Federation.

This means that the founding of an "independent, sovereign, bi-communal and bi-zonal federal state" in Cyprus is a common starting point accepted by both sides. Furthermore, the text of the agreed instructions (guidelines) referred to in the communiqué issued at the end of the second summit meeting on 12 February 1977 embodies an agreement on the "non-aligned" character of the Federal Republic.

Consequently, there should be no difficulty in incorporating these agreed attributes in a basic definition of the new Federal Republic.

It is in this context that the Turkish Cypriot proposals contain provisions embodying these basic attributes and a preamble expressing the common will of the two communities "to live side by side in peace and security, to enjoy the benefits and blessings of a democratic system of government based on the rule of law and social justice and to enhance their social and economic development", as well as their determination to ensure the non-recurrence of the sufferings of the past.

B. *Difficulties of the constitutional solution*

In addition to obvious and well-known difficulties inherent in the formation of any federal system, such as reaching a compromise between the equality of partners, on the one hand, and the necessity of establishing a workable central government machinery, on the other, or striking a balance between the rights of the individuals and the interests of their respective communities, the "federal question" in Cyprus involves many other crucial and deep-rooted problems.

1. *Political difficulties*

(a) *This is not a simple exercise of devolution of powers from an existing central government to its component parts, as*

is the case, for instance, in the devolution bill for Scotland, administrative regionalism in France or "political decentralization" of central powers to the Walloons and the Flemish in Belgium. *On the contrary, this is an effort to bring together two different communities who have lived through two decades of intercommunal violence and bloodshed* (from 1955 when EOKA launched its terrorist campaign for enosis until 1974 when Turkey intervened under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee) and who now have their own distinct administrations, with their own legislative, executive and judicial organs, having exclusive control and authority over two distinct areas of the island.

(b) *This is not a search for a solution to a domestic "national" problem but a compromise between the conflicting "national" demands of two different national communities.* Throughout recent history, Greek Cypriots had looked upon Cyprus as a Greek land destined to be united with Greece while the Turkish Cypriots looked upon the island as an old Turkish land and adamantly refused to be colonized by Greece. To the Greek Cypriots, union of Cyprus with Greece (enosis) was "liberation and freedom"; to the Turkish Cypriots such a union was "colonization", loss of all human rights and physical elimination from Cyprus. Thus, the Greek Cypriot action for achieving enosis always brought immediate reaction from the Turkish Cypriot side. Greece, which coveted enosis, helped the Greek Cypriots by giving them arms and personnel while Turkish Cypriots sought help from Turkey in self-defence.

Through the centuries the two national communities had jealously guarded their national identity while each cherished its own "national aspiration". The Greek Orthodox Church preached enosis and anti-Turkish sentiments while Greek Cypriot schools gave this "national policy" further "cultural" backing. The Turkish Cypriots took countermeasures in order not to be eliminated or absorbed by the Greek Cypriot side.

It was inevitable, therefore, that the two communities would come into violent collision when the Greek Cypriots, under the leadership of the Greek Orthodox Church, launched their terrorist campaign for achieving enosis in 1955. Contrary to the present Greek Cypriot propaganda, this campaign, which lasted until the end of 1958, was not for independence but for enosis.

In 1960 the two communities accepted a compromise and worked out a constitution after continuous deliberations which lasted for 18 months. In short, the two national communities, which had fought for opposing political aims, agreed by the texts signed in Zurich and London to forego these aims in lieu of a "partnership republic" based on the existence of the two national communities and on their inalienable rights and partnership status. These two communities together brought about the "bi-national" State of Cyprus. They together, under agreed terms of co-operation and partnership, shared the legislative, executive, judicial and other functions. Matters which the two communities had managed on a communal basis over the centuries—like education, religion, family law, etc.—were left to the autonomy of the communal administrations which had legislative, executive, and judicial authority over such matters. In effect a "functional federative system" had been established by the two co-founder communities of the Republic.

This functional federative character of the former Republic of Cyprus is often forgotten by those who are apt to see the present search for a federal solution as an attempt to dismantle a completely "unitary" system of government which was not created or even envisaged by the 1960 Constitution.

## 2. Socio-economic difficulties

(a) *The memories of the past events are still vivid in the minds of the people from both communities. An element of mistrust and even of hostile suspicion exists on both sides.*

The Greek Cypriot leadership in the past did not accept the 1960 agreements as satisfying their "national aspirations". Soon after independence, the Greek Cypriot side, knowing that the Turkish Cypriot community would not abandon its rights and status, proposed amendments to the Constitution (November 1963) and, when the Turkish Cypriot community refused to agree to the proposed amendments, they launched their attack in order to implement a well-prepared scheme which came to be known as the "Akritas Plan".

Turkish Cypriot houses and properties in 103 villages were destroyed. Nearly 30,000 Turkish Cypriots became refugees. In all areas where the Turkish Cypriot resistance continued an inhuman blockade was mounted. All Turkish Cypriots were physically barred from taking part in the administration of the island. All constitutionality was thrown overboard. Turks of Cyprus lived at the mercy of Greek Cypriot and Greek mainland armed elements.

Turkish Cypriots lived on, resisting Greek Cypriot aggression from 1963 to 1974, never accepting the illegal Greek Cypriot rule—which claimed to be "the Government of Cyprus"—as the legitimate government of the island.

Legitimacy could only be re-established when the two communities came together under agreed terms of partnership. Greek Cypriots had, by resorting to violence, ousted the Turkish Cypriot partner from the administration.

On 26 June 1967, the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives unanimously adopted a resolution declaring that "*it will not suspend the struggle . . . until this struggle ends in success through the union of the whole and undivided Cyprus with the motherland, without any intermediary stage*" and by the end of 1967 the Greek Cypriot armed elements, who had combined to form one single task force with 20,000 Greek army personnel clandestinely brought to Cyprus, attempted to finish off the Turkish Cypriot resistance by attacking the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants of Geçitkale (Kophinou) and Boğaziçi (Ayios Theodoros). This activated Turkey to come to the aid of the Turkish Cypriots. In order to avert Turkey's intervention, the attack on Turkish Cypriots was stopped and Greek Cypriot leaders agreed to have intercommunal talks, which began in June 1968. These talks lasted—on and off—until the coup of July 1974, but although near agreements were reached, several times the Greek Cypriot leadership refused to settle the problem on the basis of an "inter-communal partnership republic guaranteed against enosis".

The events which preceded the coup of July 1974 again meant further distress for the beleaguered Turkish Cypriot community, whose members were used as political hostages by both sides of the inter-Greek conflict. In the end the coup materialized. No one doubted that the coup was a final attempt for the take-over of the island by Greece and the destruction of the independence of Cyprus. Thousands of Greeks were killed by the coupists but, as usual, Turkish Cypriots suffered at the hands of the Greeks. Most Turkish Cypriot villages had to be abandoned, thousands more Turkish Cypriots became refugees. Had Turkey failed to move under and by virtue of the Treaty of Guarantee then Cyprus as an independent State would no longer be. The coup at Nicosia would have consolidated the position of the Junta at Athens and extend its hegemony to Cyprus.

Turkey was left with no alternative but to move under the Treaty of Guarantee.

Inevitably, the Turkish intervention of 1974, with the unavoidable consequences of any such military action, brought also sufferings to the Greek Cypriot community who had to abandon their homes and emigrate. This was mainly due to the second phase of the operation on 14-16 August 1974 which, contrary to what the Greek Cypriot side would have world public opinion wrongly believe, became imperative upon the massacre of Turkish Cypriot civilians and the Greek Cypriots' refusal to fulfil the conditions of the Geneva Declaration of 30 July 1974:

—to establish a security zone at the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish armed forces;

—to evacuate immediately all the Turkish enclaves occupied by the Greek or Greek Cypriot forces;

—to exchange or release the detained military personnel and civilians.

Subsequently, contacts and negotiations between the two sides continued from 1974 to 1977. It was agreed that the parties should work for a bi-communal, bi-zonal solution.

At the third series of Vienna talks in the summer of 1975 the parties agreed to exchange their population on a voluntary basis. UNFICYP undertook to help in this exchange programme and, in the end, half of the Turkish Cypriot population which

had lived under most inhuman conditions in Greek Cypriot areas for 11 years moved north while the majority of the Greek Cypriots in the north moved into Turkish villages and properties in the south.

*A constitutional solution for Cyprus has to be evolved in the spectre of such a dramatic recent history and the main preoccupation in the minds of the people directly involved is to find ways of preventing the recurrence of the sufferings of the past.*

(b) *The two communities coming together to establish a new form of government with the hope of preventing the recurrence of the past sufferings have not yet reached the same level of economic and social development.*

The Turkish Cypriot community, having first lived under a Greek Cypriot dominated government and then in isolated enclaves and forced today to cope with international restrictions imposed on its external communications, is economically weak and in need of creating its own viable economy and promoting its human potentialities. Starting with the events in 1963, all the economic resources of the island were utilized for the development of the Greek Cypriot community, while governmental policies of customs, taxation, credit and investment were devised and implemented without any consideration of the economic development needs of the Turkish Cypriot community. By a "government" decree, sale of land to the Turkish Cypriots was prohibited while licences for building factories etc. were arbitrarily denied to them. The Turkish Cypriots were deprived of their freedom of movement and communication and lived in an economy of consumption in their enclaves at the mercy of the Greek Cypriot producers and importers.

The Greek Cypriot community, on the other hand, although having undergone the adverse effects of a recent armed conflict, lives in a stronger economy, having enjoyed for at least a decade all the benefits of an administration with wide international recognition and trade relations. In this context, it is worth recording that the Greek Cypriot administration, having deprived the Turkish Cypriot population of its rightful share of the budget, forced the Turkish Cypriot population, which was left destitute, to import hard currency as aid from Turkey to the tune of 13 million pounds sterling per year all of which enriched the Greek Cypriot Central Bank for 11 years.

Today, as a consequence of the past situations and the usurpation of the governmental machinery by force of arms, external trade is still mainly in the hands of the Greek Cypriot community, who continue to retain the monopoly of representing foreign firms and enterprises on the island; the Greek Cypriot community benefits from the privilege of signing bilateral trade agreements, and from financial and technological co-operation and extensive foreign aid at the international level; it maintains regular commercial relations with the EEC, the Commonwealth, the socialist bloc and the non-aligned countries and is in a position to attract the capital and the know-how of foreign investors. Most of the foreign aid in terms of grants, credits and goods provided for the island goes to the Greek Cypriot community.

In addition, the economic blockade imposed by the Greek Cypriots as a deliberate instrument of policy with the unwitting backing of the international community has further aggravated the economic plight of the Turkish Cypriot community.

These discrepancies and inequalities in economic and social conditions, coupled with the mistrust resulting from the vivid memories of the past, are perhaps the most important difficulties on the way to establishing a federation in Cyprus.

### 3. Legal difficulties

(a) *The federal principle implies, almost by definition, an equality of partner States.* This is the main guarantee under which different political entities agree to enter into a political partnership. Yet this principle of equality carries the risk of creating deadlocks in the effective operation of the governmental machinery established to meet the administrative needs of the people at federal or federated levels.

In decision-making, this difficulty is normally overcome by subjecting the will of a smaller number of States to the will of the greater number of States, regardless of their size and population (e.g., simple majority of States, two thirds of States, 9 out of 13, etc.).

*The difficulty in Cyprus is that the number of States to be federated is only two and the principle of equality of partners is therefore an absolute necessity imposed both by the principles of federalism and the duality of partners.*

(b) *In this given situation, the only way to reduce the risk of deadlock in the effective operation of the governmental machinery established to meet the administrative needs of the people is to reduce the number of functions to be carried out by the federal organs where this risk exists.* Therefore, there is an evident logical contradiction in the acceptance of the federal principle, on the one hand, and the insistence on creating a strong federal central administration on the other hand, in a "bi-communal" situation. Since it is clearly desirable for each equal partner to be able to run as much of its own affairs as possible without the blocking of the other, there is an obvious advantage in retaining essentially common functions as federal and leaving the residual powers to the federated States.

### C. General observations on the Turkish Cypriot constitutional proposals for the establishment of a Federal Republic of Cyprus

The Turkish Cypriot constitutional proposals for the establishment in Cyprus of an independent, sovereign, bi-communal, bi-zonal and non-aligned Federal Republic take into account the background to the Cyprus problem and the events which have taken place in Cyprus, particularly the period of violence and bloodshed during the past quarter of a century, and are designed to find a remedy for the past difficulties and to remove the obstacles in the way of a peaceful coexistence of the two national communities, side by side, in a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation.

#### 1. Basic guidelines

(a) The constitutional proposals take into account the four guidelines which were agreed at the summit meeting of 12 February 1977, between President Denktas and the late Archbishop Makarios, when the two leaders declared that they were "seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, Federal Republic". The following is the full text of the above-mentioned four guidelines:

"1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.

"2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.

"3. Questions of principles like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community.

"4. The powers and functions of the central Federal Government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the State."

(b) As explained above, there have existed in Cyprus since 1963 and, in the absence of a settlement, there still continue to exist two separate and distinct administrations representing the two national communities, the co-founders of the Republic, respectively. This fact has been recognized by the three States guaranteeing the independence of the Republic of Cyprus, namely, Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, by their Declaration of Geneva of 30 July 1974, which stated that:

"The Ministers noted the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community. Without any prejudice to the conclusions to be drawn from this situation, the Ministers agreed to consider the problems raised by their existence at their next meeting."

In fact, the intercommunal character of the conflict since 1955 and the bi-communality of the Republic which has reigned since 1960 are the underlying reality and foundation of all United Nations resolutions since 1963.

The two separate, distinct and equal administrations which exist in Cyprus today, exercise, in their respective areas, the full powers of the Republic. It follows therefore that, in the es-



establishment of the Federation, the Turkish Cypriot side is not starting off with an existing legitimate central government exercising full powers and functions over the whole Republic. The question is not which of these powers and functions should be devolved to the member states of the Federation, but, on the contrary, which of the powers and functions now being exercised by the already existing separate and distinct administrations should be transferred to the central government.

(c) It is also an indisputable fact that whenever the powers and functions of a strong central government have been in the hands of a Greek Cypriot dominated government, the Turkish Cypriots have been treated as second class citizens and their human rights have been gravely and unjustly violated. *It is, therefore, imperative that, in order to give the proposed new Federation a chance to survive, the constitutional arrangements must be such as to ensure that the tragic events of 1963-1974 will not be able to be repeated again.* This logical, realistic and basic precautionary element has also been borne in mind in the preparation of the Turkish Cypriot constitutional proposals.

The Turkish Cypriot side sincerely wishes to unite the existing separate administrations in a federation, permitting the two communities to coexist, side by side, and co-operate with each other in a spirit of mutual trust and confidence.

The Turkish Cypriot proposals endeavour to achieve a political compromise between the conflicting interests and demands of the political units which comprise the Federation.

Above all, they aim to strike a balance, as in all democratic forms of government, between the rights and liberties of individuals on the one hand and the necessities of the governmental structure created for their administrative needs on the other. The essence of the approach being the protection of the individual, the relationship between the founding communities is so regulated as to prevent the individual from becoming the victim of any settlement based on the supremacy of one community. The equality of the communities, which is the salient feature of the Turkish Cypriot proposals, is based on no other consideration than that of protecting the individual from the consequences of an uneven intercommunal situation.

## 2. Fundamental prerequisites

Any workable solution for the constitutional order in Cyprus should therefore meet the following conditions:

(a) Deterrent guarantees against the recurrence of the past bloodshed in order to secure for each individual freedom from fear;

(b) Effective guarantees and machinery for the protection of human rights and liberties of all;

(c) The protection of each individual from political, economic and social discrimination and oppression resulting from membership of a particular community;

(d) The right of the members of each community to benefit equally from the opportunities, potentialities and protection of the State;

(e) The right of the members of each community to economic and social development and to prosperity on the territory of their own community;

(f) The protection of each community as such against the domination of the other community;

(g) The right of each community to preserve and develop its cultural, economic and commercial connexions with the whole family of nations and particularly with its own motherland.

The ultimate aim of any democratic system of government being to ensure the safety of its citizens and to protect their inalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, any attempt for a constitutional solution for Cyprus can only be meaningful if it takes into account all the above considerations together and establishes a harmony between them. It is, therefore, wrong to say, for instance, that the freedom of movement, freedom of residence, the right of property and free exercise of a profession are essential for the acceptance of any solution by one side if the immediate and unconditional exercise of the same freedoms and rights are detrimental to the other fundamental prerequisites which are as essential and vital, if not more so, for the other side.

That is why the four guidelines which were agreed on at the summit meeting of 12 February 1977 between President Denktas and the late Archbishop Makarios, while referring to "questions of principles like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters" also stated that any discussion of these should take into consideration "the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community". The four guidelines also envisage the taking into account of "economic viability or productivity and land ownership" when discussing territory.

The merit of any federal solution lies exactly in the variety of the ways in which different "fundamentals" can be combined and compromised. It is equally wrong to insist upon the recognition of certain abstract principles and rules of government when such principles and rules lead to situations which create more deadlock and conflict rather than bring about practical and acceptable solutions for the welfare of the individual, from which ever community he may be.

## 3. Basis of the federal structure

The equality of the founding communities, however important, is not by itself a sufficient guarantee for the protection of the individual. That is why the Turkish Cypriot proposals put great emphasis on the judicial protection of the fundamental rights and liberties. Not only are these enumerated in an even more detailed way than in the 1960 Constitution, but a federal system of judicial review is established as a guarantee against their infringement by federal legislation. Moreover, the federated States shall bear the domestic and international responsibility resulting from the violations of fundamental rights and liberties within their respective jurisdictions.

In a federative system, the protection of the individual in any community should also be envisaged in terms of his entitlement to benefit equally from the opportunities, potentialities and protection of a State which should be capable of providing him with essential services without interference from other communities who are partners in the union. This is especially important in a federation of only two communities which, by virtue of the federal principle, have come together on a basis of equality. *In a situation of mutual mistrust where each community has reservations about the goodwill of the other side, to start with the creation of a federal system with strong central powers covering a wide range of common functions is in fact asking for frequent tensions and interminable deadlocks.* These would result in the deprivation of the individuals of the benefits of governmental activities even in the stronger and more self-confident community, because such activities may continuously be subject to disruption or interference from the other partner.

Thus, the constitutional proposals of the Turkish Cypriot side have been made having regard to the existing realities and in the light of past experience. It is, therefore, proposed that the two existing separate administrations should give up to the Federal Government only those basic powers and functions which are considered necessary and feasible for the purpose of maintaining common services and without security risks to the life and property of the inhabitants of the member States. If, in the course of time, it is proved by the conduct of all concerned that mutual trust and confidence can be built upon the initial links existing between the Federal Government and the two member States, then it is to be hoped that, with the growth of such confidence and with the elimination of mistrust and suspicion, it will be possible to strengthen such links by building upon them by the gradual transfer of additional powers and functions to the Federal Government. It is the sincere belief of the Turkish Cypriot side that the proposed federation can only work and hope to survive, in the present circumstances, by starting cautiously and then building upon and strengthening the existing links and structures with the growth of mutual confidence.

In fact, in the case of some federations, the partners have set off on the federative venture even more cautiously and, instead of starting off with a federal structure at the beginning, they have started with a confederation. Two typical examples of this natural trend may be found in the case of the United States of

America and the Swiss Federation which evolved from a confederal structure into a federation.

These two examples clearly show that when there is no confidence between the parties concerned — and this confidence is not something which can be imposed but must develop naturally and progressively between the partners — less power is given to the central authority. However, *as confidence between the parties grows, the powers of the central or federal government are increased by stages. This principle of "growth of federation by evolution" is one of the basic principles of the Turkish Cypriot constitutional proposals.*

Another example which proves the same point from a different angle is the case of Yugoslavia: the strong control that the Federal Government had over the federated Republics, a characteristic feature of the 1946 Constitution, proved inadequate and subsequent constitutions and amendments gave much greater rights and powers to the Federated Republics which provided a much sounder basis for the edification of the successful federative experience in Yugoslavia.

In the light of its own experience and the experiences of others, the Turkish Cypriot side, in its desire to commence the new partnership venture with a federation which will eventually evolve into a stronger partnership, cannot ignore the tragic events of the past and risk the breaking down of the federation by not proceeding cautiously or by imposing too much of a strain on the central government.

#### 4. *The federal structure*

For the fulfilment of the federal functions enumerated in detail in the constitutional proposals as to their content and progressive implementation, the Turkish Cypriot side proposes the following structure:

##### (a) *The federal executive*

For reasons of equality, lack of confidence between the two communities and the bitter experiences of the past which have been explained above, the joint direction of the federal executive by the two presidents of the federated States has been considered to be the fundamental basis of the smooth functioning of the executive organ. Undoubtedly the understanding, co-operation, collaboration and progressive creation of mutual trust and confidence between the two communities has been shown to be best secured when the consensus of their leaders has been possible. The continuous joint participation of the two leaders on the basis of equality in the basic decision-making process for federal functions will greatly enhance the chances of obtaining the desired consensus.

Any other conception or approach that would place the two leaders on an unequal footing or force them to perform completely separate functions for federal matters would undermine the type of federation proposed and tend to create further polarization between the two communities.

It should be noted that the equal representation of two numerically unequal communities in a joint federal executive is not a completely novel solution. Czechoslovakia gave the example where the Prime Ministers of the Czech and Slovak Federated States took part in the federal executive as Vice-Premiers on an equal basis, although their communities represented approximately 65 per cent and 29 per cent respectively of the total population.

However, even in the case of such a dual executive, there will be certain *ceremonial* and *formal* functions for which a single representation of the Federal State by the President of the Federal Republic is necessitated by the circumstances, in which case the Turkish proposals foresee a two-yearly rotation between the two presidents of the federated States. A distinction should be made, however, between the proposal made here and the concept of alternation of a strong presidential office. The alternation of purely ceremonial and formal functions would not entail any substantial inconvenience in the functioning of the federal machinery.

##### (b) *Federal legislation*

The type of federation proposed by the Turkish Cypriot side envisages separate legislative assemblies in the respective federated States which will deal with most of the legislative matters concerning life on the island. These assemblies being the elected representative organs of the two communities, will also be en-

rolled in federal legislation covering common specific functions essential for a federal system of government, which are:

- Foreign affairs;
- External defence;
- Banking, foreign exchange and monetary affairs;
- Federal budget;
- Customs duties and tariffs;
- External communications;
- Federal health services;
- Standards of weights and measures, patents, trade marks, copyrights and meteorological services;
- Tourism and information.

In case of conflict in matters of federal legislation between the two legislative assemblies, provision has been made for the creation of a Federal Assembly composed of 20 members, 10 from each legislative assembly. The system is so devised as to prevent the domination of one community by the other and to eliminate the possibility of a complete deadlock. In addition to recourse to the Federal Constitutional Court on grounds of constitutionality, provision is also made, as a last resort, for submission to a referendum to be held separately in each federated State.

##### (c) *The Federal Constitutional Court*

As pointed out above, in view of the importance attached to the protection of the rights and liberties of the individual in each community, the Federal Constitutional Court is a basic feature of the Turkish Cypriot proposals. It will be composed of six judges in equal numbers from each federated State. The Federal Constitutional Court, in addition to its jurisdiction in constitutional matters, will also act as the highest administrative court in federal matters.

#### 5. *Other basic features of the constitutional proposals*

The Turkish Cypriot side feels it imperative to include in the Federal Constitution provisions on the following matters:

(a) Reference to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Alliance, as amended, thus giving them constitutional force;

(b) Entrenchment of the basic articles guaranteeing the independence, sovereignty, non-alignment of the bi-communal and bi-zonal federal state and the unity of the country;

(c) Reservations on amendments for a period of seven years in order to give a fair chance to the new constitutional order;

(d) Establishment of a machinery for progressive implementation of federal functions on economic and social matters in accordance with the concept of "federation by evolution";

(e) Claims arising out of rights of ownership acquired prior to the Constitution shall be settled, together with all other claims between the two communities in the form of debts, dues and compensation, by agreement between the parties concerned;

(f) Rotation of certain basic federal functions between the members of the two communities in accordance with the principle of equality and in order to reduce the risks of deadlock.

## II. THE TERRITORIES OF THE FEDERATED STATES AND A PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT WATER PROJECT

It has to be recognized that the question of territory is closely related to the economic viability of both communities and to the question of security. This problem was taken up between President Denktas and Archbishop Makarios at their meeting on 12 February 1977 and it was decided that the question of territory should be discussed "in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership". "Security" was the underlying principle on which these four guidelines were based.

Therefore, it would be unrealistic to regard this problem from the viewpoint of percentages of population alone. Half the Turkish Cypriot population has moved from south to north. Greek Cypriots have moved from north to south and an agreement for a voluntary exchange of population was reached in the third round of the intercommunal talks, whereby the two parties recognized that such an exchange was inevitable for the peaceful coexistence of the two communities in Cyprus. The approach to the territorial problem, therefore, should be humanitarian and pragmatic having regard to this accepted necessity so that people who have been resettled after so many years of suffering should not be uprooted again. Where this is not fully

possible one should settle the problem in such a way that only a minimum number of people are once again uprooted. Otherwise the movement of Turkish Cypriots from south to north will have been meaningless and their security needs totally ignored.

The Turkish Cypriot side is prepared to discuss the question of territory, taking into consideration the above-mentioned facts and within the context of the aforesaid guidelines agreed upon by President Denktaş and Archbishop Makarios.

Furthermore, while considering the territorial aspect of the problem it would be appropriate to bear in mind the following:

(a) The Turkish Cypriot community is predominantly an agricultural society. Hence, the proportion of Turkish Cypriots depending on land is far greater than that of Greek Cypriots.

(b) Almost all direct or indirect foreign economic assistance given to Cyprus by international organizations since 1963 and more particularly since 1974 has almost exclusively been channelled to the Greek Cypriot community.

(c) As a result of the systematic policy of economic oppression pursued by the Greek Cypriot Administration against the Turkish Cypriot community since 1963, the economic development level of the Turkish Cypriot community has remained far below that of the Greek Cypriot community. While readjusting the existing line, caution should be exercised so that the transfer of economic resources from the economically poorer to the richer community would not further widen the economic gap and increase the tension between the two communities.

When considering the proposals for the readjustment of the existing line between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot zones, the following relevant economic facts should also be taken into account:

1. Only 22.6 per cent of forests fall within the Turkish Cypriot territory and the remaining 77.4 per cent fall within the Greek Cypriot territory. The forests in the Greek Cypriot territory have been about 95 per cent more productive than the forests of the Turkish Cypriot territory.

2. Of about 40 existing streams, only a quarter are situated in the Turkish Cypriot territory. There are only eight active dams and reservoirs in the Turkish Cypriot area with a total storage capacity of 8 million cubic metres of water compared with 45 on the Greek Cypriot side with a total storage capacity nearly six times as great.

3. The annual average rainfall is approximately three times higher on the Greek Cypriot side than on the Turkish Cypriot side.

4. As for the aquifers, two of the three main ones in the Turkish Cypriot area are already depleted and faced with destruction. Sea water has penetrated and salinized most of the Gazi Mağusa (Famagusta) aquifer and the important part of the land in the area was dried up some years ago. The Güzelyurt (Morphou) aquifer faces the prospects of total depletion in the immediate future unless serious precautions at the expense of millions of pounds are taken. On the other hand, the aquifers on the Greek side offer excellent prospects for utilization and development.

5. Approximately 90 per cent of the principal mines and quarries of economic value are situated in the Greek Cypriot region.

6. The only petroleum refinery is situated in the Greek Cypriot area.

7. The Mesarya (Mesaoria) plain is dry land giving one yield of crops on alternate basis a year so that half the area is not cultivated each year whereas in the south land is irrigated and yields crops at least twice a year.

8. With more water made available, land in both sectors can be made more productive so that the prosperity of the island as a whole is increased. A project costing about \$150-200 million for bringing water from Turkey to Cyprus is proposed by the Turkish Cypriot side as a matter for serious consideration.

With the above considerations in mind, the Turkish Cypriot side is ready to enter into negotiations with the Greek Cypriot side for readjusting the line existing between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot zones in Cyprus.

### III. MARAŞ (VAROSHA)

Owing to the fact that Greek Cypriot armed elements chose to use Maraş (Varosha) and the high buildings within it as attack posts against the Turkish Cypriot population of Gazi Mağusa (Famagusta) where 14,000 Turkish Cypriots, including women and children, were trapped within the walled city and suffered extensive casualties from 20 July to 14 August 1974, it became necessary for security reasons to extend the forward lines south of Maraş (Varosha).

Ever since, Maraş (Varosha) has remained uninhabited. Turkish Cypriot endeavours to bring back some or all of the hoteliers and other businessmen in order to activate the town and save the properties from destruction by the elements were fruitless because Greek Cypriot leaders, for political reasons, prevented these people from returning to their properties.

The Turkish Cypriot side approaches the problem in ways which will enable a great number of Greek Cypriot owners to return to their properties, subject to certain conditions, while taking care of the security requirements of the Turkish Cypriots — particularly those living in Gazi Mağusa (Famagusta), both within and outside the city walls — as well as the security requirements of the harbour, being the main commercial port of the Turkish Cypriot Community, and at the same time settling the problem within the four guidelines agreed upon by the two leaders on 12 February 1977.

#### B. MAIN ASPECTS OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS

This part comprises the main aspects of the following proposals:

- I. Constitutional proposals
- II. Proposals on the Territories of the federated States and a joint water project
- III. Proposals on Maraş (Varosha)

#### I. CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS

##### A. Basic provisions

1. The Turkish Cypriot side proposes that the basic article of the Federal Constitution should provide for an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal and bi-zonal Federal State created by the free will and agreement of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities and composed of the Turkish Cypriot federated State and the Greek Cypriot federated State.

2. The preamble reads as follows:

"The Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, co-founders of the Republic of Cyprus,

"Bearing in mind the experiences and sufferings of the past and in order to ensure their non-recurrence,

"Determined to establish an independent, bi-zonal Federal Republic composed of two federated States and to preserve the territorial integrity of Cyprus,

"Agreeing in good faith to the founding of a partnership based on equality between the two communities,

"Seeking to serve the welfare of their members by enabling them to live side by side in peace and security, to enjoy the benefits and blessings of a democratic system of government based on the rule of law and social justice and to enhance their social and economic development,

"Conscious of the fact that a democratic constitutional order based on the equal partnership of the two communities is the most effective way of guaranteeing the protection of the human rights and fundamental liberties as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocol,

"Convinced of the historic necessity of following a policy of friendship and co-operation with their motherlands and of promoting good relations with all countries in conformity with the principle of non-alignment and with a sincere desire of preserving peace and security in the region,

"Solemnly, of their own free will and agreement, adopt this Constitution."

3. The Federal Republic of Cyprus is to be a sovereign, democratic and secular federation based on the equality of the federated States, the rule of law and social justice. The sovereignty should continue to be shared equally by the two national communities, as co-founders of the Republic, through their respective federated States.

4. The integral or partial union of Cyprus with any other State is to be excluded, the bi-communal and bi-zonal character of the federation and the unity of the country being the foundations of the independent Republic.

5. The official languages, flag and national anthem shall be arranged generally along the lines of the 1960 Constitution.

6. There is to be one citizenship of the Federal Republic to be regulated by federal law.

7. Subject to and in accordance with federal laws and regulations, the federated States shall be responsible for issuing passports and citizenship certificates.

#### B. Fundamental rights and liberties

8. The Federal Constitution shall comprise extensive provisions relating to fundamental rights and liberties and an effective system of judicial protection of these rights and liberties in conformity with the international instruments mentioned in the preamble. Some examples are:

- non-discrimination against either of the two communities or any member thereof;
- the right to life and corporal integrity;
- prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment;
- the right to a decent existence and to social security;
- prohibition of slavery or servitude and forced or compulsory labour;
- the right to liberty and security of person;
- prosecution and punishment for any offence according to law, and the right to legal defence;
- prohibition of banishment of citizens;
- the right to respect for private and family life;
- the inviolability of the dwelling house;
- the right to respect for and to the secrecy of correspondence and other communication;
- the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
- the right to freedom of speech and expression;
- the right to education;
- the right to freedom of peaceful assembly;
- freedom of marriage;
- the right to enter freely into any contract;
- the right to strike;
- equality before the law;
- the right to petition;
- the right to vote.

9. An even more liberal approach to the protection of fundamental rights and liberties than in the 1960 Constitution will be noticed as in the following examples:

(a) The death penalty shall be abolished.

(b) There shall be additional guarantees for the protection of freedom of speech and expression in line with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocol on the following points in particular:

- (i) Any advocacy of national, communal, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence or to the integral or partial union of Cyprus with any other State or is prejudicial to the bi-communal and bi-zonal character of the federation and the unity of the country is to be prohibited.
- (ii) The press shall not be subjected to censorship. Newspapers and periodicals may be seized only by an order of a judge in the case of the commission of an offence under the law and by an order of the authority expressly empowered by law in cases where a delay is considered

undesirable from the point of view of safeguarding the security of the Federal Republic or of the federated States, public order or public morals. The competent authority giving the order for the seizure shall inform the court of the decision within *three hours* in the case of daily newspapers and within *twenty-four hours* in the case of other periodicals. If the court does not confirm the decision within three hours in the case of daily newspapers and within twenty-four hours in the case of other periodicals the order for the seizure shall be considered null and void.

(iii) Sound and vision broadcasting shall also benefit from added safeguards and both at the federal and federated States level these shall be run by autonomous public corporations. The administration of any federal public corporation created for this purpose shall be based on the equality of the two communities.

(iv) The same safeguards shall also apply to cinematographic films and these shall enjoy protection equal to that of the press. The production, distribution and public showing of cinematographic films may be subject to the same restrictions as those applying to the press.

(c) The right to strike is to be recognized for all except the members of the security forces and armed forces. Prohibition may be extended to the members of the federal public service by a federal law only for the purposes of safeguarding the security of the Federal Republic, the constitutional order, the public safety, the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the inhabitants or the protection of the rights and liberties guaranteed by this Constitution to any person.

10. (a) Freedom of movement throughout the territory of the Federal Republic shall be respected. The progressive stages for the implementation of this freedom shall be determined by the respective legislation or administrative acts of the federated States through mutually agreed provisions and measures as may be deemed necessary to protect public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, the security of any one of the communities or any member thereof and the public order based on the maintenance and protection of the federated States and the bi-communality and bi-zonality of the Federal Republic.

(b) Every person has the right to leave permanently or temporarily the territory of the Federal Republic subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law for public good or order.

11. Freedom of residence throughout the territory of the Federal Republic shall be recognized primarily for humanitarian and professional purposes. The progressive stages for the implementation of this freedom in clearly defined areas shall be determined by the respective legislation or administrative acts of the federated States through mutually agreed provisions and measures as may be deemed necessary for the solution of practical difficulties, the protection of public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, the security of any one of the communities or any member thereof and the public order based on the maintenance and protection of the federated States and the bi-communality and bi-zonality of the Federal Republic.

12. (a) Every person, alone or jointly with others, has the right to acquire, own, possess, enjoy or dispose of any movable or immovable property and has the right to respect for such right subject to such restrictions as may be imposed thereon by the constitutions or the laws of the federated States respectively for the maintenance or protection of the bi-zonality of the Federal Republic or for the maintenance or development of the economy of the respective federated States, having regard to the viability and productivity thereof, or for the maintenance of public order and security.

(b) The federated States shall undertake to protect the environment and preserve antiquities and nature while exploiting the forests and forest materials, fishing and fisheries, mines, quarries, mineral and quarry materials, gas and oil, water and generally all kinds of natural resources including the resources of the sea-bed and the continental shelf.

(c) Claims arising out of rights of ownership acquired prior to the Constitution shall be settled, together with all other claims between the two communities in the form of debts, dues and compensation, by agreement between the parties concerned.

(d) Provision shall be made by federal legislation for the establishment of a compensation tribunal or tribunals, on which each community shall be equally represented, for dealing with all claims for compensation in connexion with proprietary rights, debts, dues or any other matter which have arisen since December 1963.

13. Every person has the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business in every part of the Federal Republic, subject to compliance with the legislation of the federated State concerned.

14. The legislative, executive and judicial authorities of the federated States shall be bound to secure the efficient application of the provisions relating to fundamental rights and liberties within their respective States in accordance with the provisions of the federated State laws. Furthermore the federated States shall bear not only the domestic but also full international responsibility for the implementation of the fundamental rights and liberties guaranteed by the Federal Constitution within their respective States.

#### C. The federal executive

15. The federal executive, as proposed by the Turkish Cypriot side, shall be regulated as follows:

(a) The executive power of the Federal Republic shall be vested in the federal executive under the joint direction of the two presidents of the federated States assisted by federal secretaries.

(b) The presidents of the federated States shall be elected in each federated State by direct, universal suffrage and secret ballot in accordance with the constitution of the respective federated State and serve in the federal executive for the duration of their term of office prescribed by that constitution.

(c) The Federal Constitution shall incorporate detailed provisions as to the liabilities of the presidents of the federated States for the acts of the federal executive and as to their prosecution.

(d) The administration of the federal executive shall comprise a federal executive secretariat servicing the presidents of the federated States in their work for the federal executive, and federal departments headed by federal secretaries in equal number from both communities as may be determined by agreement between the two presidents.

(e) Each federal secretary shall be designated by the president of his own federated State and the appointment shall be made by an instrument signed jointly by the said two presidents.

(f) The under-secretaries of the federal secretaries shall not be of the same community as the federal secretary. The under-secretaries are to be designated by the president of their own federated State and the appointments shall be made by an instrument signed jointly by the said two presidents.

(g) However, there are certain ceremonial and formal functions of the Federal Republic, enumerated below, for which a single representation is necessitated by the circumstances, namely:

(i) Representing the Federal Republic in all ceremonial duties;

(ii) Signing the credentials of diplomatic envoys appointed in accordance with the Constitution and receiving the credentials of foreign diplomatic envoys accredited to the Federal Republic;

(iii) Signing  
— the credentials of delegates appointed in accordance with the Constitution for the negotiation of international treaties, conventions or agreements already negotiated in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Constitution;  
— the letter relating to the transmission of the instruments of ratification of any international treaties, conventions or agreements approved as provided in this Constitution;

(iv) Conferring the honours of the Federal Republic.

For the fulfilment of these functions, as President of the Federal Republic, a two-yearly rotation between the presidents of the two federated States is envisaged.

(h) The Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs shall assist the President of the Federal Republic in the fulfilment of the above functions. The Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs shall in any event not be of the same community as the current President of the Republic.

(i) Similarly, the Federal Secretary for Finance and the Federal Secretary for Economic Co-ordination shall not be both of the same community.

#### D. Federal matters

16. The executive power of the Federal Republic shall be in respect of the following specific matters:

##### (1) Foreign affairs

(a) The recognition of States, the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations with other countries and the interruption of such relations; the grant of acceptance to diplomatic representatives and of exequatur to consular representatives; the assignment of diplomatic and of consular representatives already in the diplomatic service to posts abroad and the entrusting of functions abroad to special envoys already in the diplomatic service; the appointment and the assignment of persons who are not already in the diplomatic service to any posts abroad as diplomatic or consular representatives and the entrusting of functions abroad to persons who are not already in the diplomatic service, as special envoys — without prejudice to the rights of the federated States to entertain the necessary contacts with diplomatic and consular representatives for the purposes of subparagraph (b) below;

(b) The conclusion of international treaties, conventions and agreements, without prejudice to the right of the two federated States to enter into any agreement with any country, particularly their respective motherlands, including the accordance of the most favoured nation treatment to the said motherlands. Educational, technical and cultural co-operation of any kind are excluded from "foreign affairs";

(c) The declaration of war and the conclusion of peace;

(d) The protection abroad of the citizens of the Federal Republic and of their interests;

(e) The acquisition of foreign nationality by citizens of the Federal Republic and their acceptance of employment from or their entering the service of a foreign government.

(2) *External defence* shall be secured by the land forces of each federated State conjointly. For this purpose all measures for co-ordinated action shall be taken.

(3) *Banking, foreign exchange and monetary affairs.* The Federal Republic shall have a single currency. Each federated State shall have a bank to perform the functions of a central bank. Co-ordination shall be ensured by a federal reserve board.

(4) *Federal budget.* The Federal Republic shall have its own federal budget for the purposes of meeting the expenditure necessary for carrying out its powers, functions and services. The charges and fees derived from such services shall accrue to the federal budget.

(5) *Customs duties and tariffs.* Customs duties to be levied on imports and customs tariffs shall be determined after taking fully into account the economic structure of each federated State and the principle of balanced economic development of the two federated States.

(6) *External communications.* The co-ordination of postal and telecommunication services shall be ensured by the federal executive. The joint operation and maintenance of Nicosia International Airport by the two communities for strictly non-military purposes shall be ensured on the basis of equality.

(7) *Federal health services.* The co-ordination of general health measures carried out by the health services of each federated State shall be the responsibility of the federal executive.

(8) *Standards of weights and measures, patents, trade marks, copyrights and meteorological services.* On these matters there shall be effective co-ordination by federal institutions in which the two communities shall participate on the basis of equality.

(9) *Tourism and information.* The federal executive shall provide co-ordination between the ministries of the two federated States responsible for tourism and shall assist in the prop-

aganda and marketing of tourism for the benefit of Cyprus as a whole.

17. The federal executive, in carrying out its powers and functions in the above fields, may benefit from the services of the organs of the federated States responsible for the same fields.

18. All powers and functions not specifically given to the federal executive by this Constitution shall be vested in the federated States.

#### E. Federal Legislation

19. The federal legislative power is exercised by the legislative assemblies of the two federated States and the Federal Assembly.

20. The members of the legislative assemblies of the federated States shall be elected by direct, universal suffrage and secret ballot in accordance with the constitution of the respective federated State.

21. The Federal Assembly shall be composed of 20 members, 10 from each legislative assembly of the federated States, elected from amongst their respective members for the duration of the period of the legislative assembly concerned. Each legislative assembly shall also elect five alternates to serve in the temporary absence or temporary incapacity of members from the same legislative assembly.

22. The President of the Federal Assembly shall not be of the same community as the current President of the Federal Republic.

23. Federal laws are passed upon receiving a simple majority vote in each of the legislative assemblies of the federated States.

(1) Federal bills may be introduced in either of the legislative assemblies of the federated States by any of their respective members. Such bills are first debated in the legislative assembly in which they are introduced.

(2) The presidents of the federated States, as members of the federal executive, after deliberation with the federal secretaries, may also jointly introduce federal bills simultaneously in each legislative assembly. Such bills are separately and concurrently debated in each legislative assembly.

(3) Federal bills adopted with or without amendment by one of the legislative assemblies shall be referred to the other.

(4) A federal bill rejected by one of the legislative assemblies shall be deemed to be withdrawn.

(5) If a federal bill, adopted by one legislative assembly, is also adopted by the other without amendment, it shall be transmitted to the presidents of the federated States for joint promulgation within a period of 15 days commencing from the third day of its transmission.

(6) The presidents of the federated States, before promulgation, may either separately or conjointly:

(a) Return the law or any part thereof for reconsideration to the legislative assemblies which shall pronounce on the matter so returned within 15 days of such return. If both legislative assemblies persist in their decision, the presidents of the federated States shall promulgate the text within the period referred to in paragraph 5 above. If either of the legislative assemblies persists in its decision or if the bill is readopted with differing amendments, it shall then be submitted to the Federal Assembly;

(b) Exercise the right of reference on grounds of constitutionality to the Federal Constitutional Court which shall pronounce its judgement on the matter within a period of 45 days from the date of such reference. If the Federal Constitutional Court is of the opinion that such law is repugnant to or inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution, such law shall not be promulgated.

(7) If a federal bill adopted by one of the legislative assemblies is adopted with amendments by the other legislative assembly or if a bill introduced jointly by the presidents of the federated States is adopted by both legislative assemblies with differing amendments, it shall then be submitted to the Federal Assembly where bills are adopted by the simple majority of the members. In case of equality of votes, the President of the Federal Assembly shall have a casting vote.

(8) If a federal bill is adopted by the casting vote of the President of the Federal Assembly, the president of each federated State shall submit such bill to a separate referendum in each federated State in accordance with the provisions relating to referendum in their respective constitutions. If such bill is accepted by the referendum in both federated States it shall be jointly promulgated by the presidents of the federated States.

(9) A federal bill adopted by the Federal Assembly without a casting vote shall be transmitted to the presidents of the federated States for joint promulgation within a period of 15 days commencing from the third day of its transmission. The provisions of paragraph (6) shall apply in respect of the right of return of the bill to the Federal Assembly.

#### F. Independent offices of the Federal Republic

24. The Federal Constitution shall create three independent offices of the Federal Republic, these being the Office of the Federal Attorney-General, the Office of the Federal Auditor-General, and the Federal Reserve Board, the latter being vested with the authority to administer, *inter alia*, the Federal Consolidated Fund which will be made up of revenues and moneys raised in accordance with the powers given to the Federal Executive.

#### G. The federal public service

25. The Federal Constitution shall make provision for the appointment of a public service commission by each federated State for the purpose of selecting for appointment to the federal public service the best candidate belonging to their respective communities and possessing the qualifications provided by federal law. The appointment of the candidates so selected is formulated upon the recommendation of the federal secretary concerned, the approval of the two presidents and is published in the official gazette.

#### H. Defence and security

26. The external defence of the Federal Republic shall be conjointly secured by the land forces of the federated States stationed in their respective territories. For purposes of co-ordination, the two commanders of the respective land forces of the federated States and their staffs shall meet and work together as they may deem necessary.

27. The internal security of the federated States shall be ensured by their respective security forces regulated by the federated State law. The security forces shall not be equipped with heavy arms.

28. Provision shall be made for co-ordination between the respective federated States' organizations established for the purposes of guarding the coasts, preventing smuggling and implementing customs control.

#### I. Economic co-ordination

29. There shall be established an economic co-ordination board composed of an equal number of representatives from each federated State with the purpose of co-ordinating the functions and services of the federated States in economic matters and also advising the appropriate organs with a view to ensuring progressive integration of economic and financial functions of banking, foreign exchange, monetary affairs, imposition of federal charges and fees, customs duties and tariffs, etc. The economic co-ordination board shall also serve to secure, with the growth of mutual trust, co-operation and confidence, the progressive transfer to the Federal Republic of the above powers and functions.

#### J. The Federal Constitutional Court

30. Under the Federal Constitution the Federal Constitutional Court shall be composed of six judges and two alternate judges elected in equal numbers by the highest court of each federated State from amongst its own members for a period of six years.

31. The judges so elected shall elect a judge from amongst themselves as President of the Federal Constitutional Court. The President of the Court shall not belong to the same Community as that of the President of the Federal Assembly and shall hold office as President of the Court for the duration of the term of the said President.

32. Any decision of the Federal Constitutional Court shall be taken by a simple majority.

33. The Federal Constitutional Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction:

(a) To adjudicate finally on a recourse made in connexion with any conflict or contest of power or competence arising between the organs of the federated States;

(b) To adjudicate finally on a recourse made to it on a complaint that a decision or an act or omission of any organ, authority or person exercising any federal executive or federal administrative authority is contrary to any of the provisions of the Federal Constitution or of any law or is made in excess or in abuse of powers vested in such organ, authority or person.

34. Recourse to the Federal Constitutional Court may be made:

(a) By the presidents of the federated States, separately or conjointly;

(b) By one or both of the legislative assemblies of the federated States, by majority vote, through their presidents;

(c) By any person whose existing legitimate interest, either as a person or by virtue of being a member of a community, is adversely affected by the act or omission of any organ, authority or person exercising any federal executive or federal administrative authority.

#### K. *Amendment of the Constitution*

35. Except for the two basic articles relating to the fundamental bi-communal, bi-zonal structure of the Federal Republic and the guarantee thereof, provisions will be made for the amendment of the Federal Constitution:

(a) Any provision of this Constitution can only be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal, upon a proposal separately made in each of the two legislative assemblies of the federated States by at least one third of the respective members thereof and approved separately by at least a two-thirds majority of the total number of the respective members thereof;

(b) If an amendment to the Constitution of the Federal Republic adopted by one legislative assembly is adopted with differing amendments by the other legislative assembly, it is then submitted to the Federal Assembly where it shall be adopted only by a three-fourths majority of the members.

(c) Any amendment approved as provided above shall be submitted to the free will of each community as expressed by a public referendum held separately in each federated State according to the provisions of its respective constitution and laws made thereunder relating to the holding of a public referendum.

#### L. *The guarantee of the independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Federal Republic*

The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Alliance, as amended, shall be annexed to the Federal Constitution and shall have constitutional force in order to safeguard the independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Federal Republic of Cyprus, and any other international agreement that the federated States may have concluded before the coming into force of the Federal Constitution shall not be implemented in a way that may infringe upon the independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Federal Republic of Cyprus.

## II. PROPOSALS ON THE TERRITORIES OF THE FEDERATED STATES AND A JOINT WATER PROJECT

1. The line existing between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot zones shall be readjusted.

2. The areas of

(a) Erenköy (Kokkina),

(b) Gaziler (Avlona),

(c) Akincilar (Lourijina),

(d) Tuğrullu (Turilli),

(e) Düzce (Akhnna), and

(f) The area between the south of Maraş (Varosha) and Dherinia shall be included in these readjustments.

3. Most of the areas at present falling between the forward defence lines are also to be included in these readjustments.

4. Greek Cypriots will be enabled to make use of land, factories etc., on the Greek Cypriot side of the readjusted line including the area at present falling between the forward defence lines and a substantial number of Greek Cypriots will be rehabilitated in a number of villages in these areas.

5. A separate paper has been submitted on Maraş (Varosha).

6. Subject to a settlement being reached, the proprietary rights of the Turkish Cypriots in respect of immovable property within the boundaries of the sovereign base areas shall be relinquished.

7. A project for bringing water from Turkey at a cost of \$150-200 million which will increase the productivity of land for both communities shall be submitted for discussion as a joint project and as part of the territorial settlement.

### III. PROPOSALS ON MARAŞ (VAROSHA)

Greek Cypriots and others who will return to Maraş (Varosha) will be subject to the laws and regulations of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

Special care will be taken to promote the area as a tourist resort and for this purpose, in order to enable the owners to restart their businesses, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus will consider tax and other facilities.

The Greek Cypriot owners will settle to the south of Demokratia and Asteroskopiou Avenues and east of Dherinia Avenue.

## DOCUMENT S/12723/ADD.1

[Original: English]  
[15 June 1978]

In my report of 31 May 1978 [S/12723, para. 81], I recommended that the Security Council should extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months and I indicated that I would report to the Council on my consultations with the parties concerned on this subject as soon as possible. I am now in a position to inform the Council that the parties concerned have signified their concurrence in the proposed extension,

**DOCUMENT S/12725\***

**Letter dated 31 May 1978 from the representative of Israel  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[5 June 1978]

I have the honour to refer to the notes verbales of 21 February [S/12575] and 12 April 1978 [S/12669] from the representative of Jordan and also to the letter of 11 April 1978 [S/12640] from the representative of Morocco, which make wholly unfounded and incongruous charges about the activities of Israel at Jerusalem.

The Government of Israel protects every historical site which is part of the cultural heritage of all faiths and denominations, unlike the Government of Jordan, whose authorities in Jerusalem for 19 years, between 1948 and 1967, engaged in the systematic destruction of synagogues in the Jewish quarter of the Old City, in the violation of the ancient Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives and also in the desecration of many other properties belonging to the cultural and religious heritage of the Jewish people.

Unlike Jordan which, in contravention of its international undertakings, barred Jews from all Holy Places at Jerusalem and in Judaea and Samaria, the Government of Israel respects all places held sacred by members of the different religions and also their sentiments with regard to those places. The overriding principles guiding

Israel's policy with regard to the Holy Places are to uphold and guarantee by law access by members of all faiths without discrimination to these places and to ensure complete freedom of worship there to members of all denominations.

This has been and continues to be Israel's practice as regards the site referred to in the above-mentioned Jordanian and Moroccan documents. The diggings which are cited in those documents were conducted at a distance of 20 metres from the site in question, and without any connexion with it, for the purposes of laying the foundations for another building. Had there been any grounds to suspect that the building work would cause any injury to the site nearby, the Company for the Reconstruction and Development of the Jewish Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem would have taken care to erect a supporting wall.

I have the honour to request that this letter should be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Chaim HERZOG  
Permanent Representative of Israel  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/116-S/12725.

**DOCUMENT S/12726**

**Note verbale dated 25 May 1978 from the Mission of Chile  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: Spanish]  
[1 June 1978]

The Permanent Mission of Chile to the United Nations, in reply to the Secretary-General's note of 10 November 1977 in which he brought to the notice of the Government of Chile the text of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), has the honour to inform him that the Government of Chile supports the provisions of that resolution and will comply with it. The Government of Chile also takes this opportunity to reaffirm its condemnation of the policy of *apartheid* and of every other policy of racial discrimination, in whatever country it may be applied. The Government of Chile likewise supports the efforts of the United Nations and the international community to secure the elimination of such policies.

The Permanent Mission of Chile requests that this note verbale should be distributed as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12727\***

**Letter dated 5 June 1978 from the representative of Turkey  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[5 June 1978]

I have the honour to attach herewith a letter dated 5 June 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a

document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) İter TÜRKMEN  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/119-S/12727.



ANNEX

**Text of the letter dated 5 June 1978 from  
Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to attach herewith a letter dated 1 June 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Osman Örek, the Prime Minister of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

TEXT OF THE LETTER DATED 1 JUNE 1978 FROM  
MR. OSMAN ÖREK TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to bring to your attention the following statement which was issued yesterday following a meeting between me and the Turkish Cypriot party leaders:

"The Prime Minister of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus met today with leaders of the opposition parties and discussed with them the latest developments relating to the Cyprus problem and the intercommunal talks.

"The Prime Minister and the party leaders agreed that great benefit would be derived from the resumption of the intercommunal talks on an equal footing without further delay, and reached identity of views on the need for the United Nations Secretary-General to call the two parties to the negotiating table and also on the need for the head of the Greek Cypriot Administration to abandon his intransigent attitude followed up to now and to show the flexibility necessary for the resumption of the talks."

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12728**

**Letter dated 10 April 1978 from the representative of Guatemala  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: Spanish]  
[5 June 1978]

I have the honour to refer to your note of 10 November 1977 concerning resolution 418 (1977), adopted by the Security Council on 4 November 1977.

In that connexion, I am pleased to inform you that Guatemala produces no arms or related *matériel* and consequently neither sells them nor engages in transactions concerning them in South Africa.

I should be grateful if the contents of this letter could be issued as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Julio ASENSIO-WUNDERLICH  
Permanent Representative of Guatemala  
to the United Nations

**DOCUMENT S/12729\* \*\***

**Letter dated 6 June 1978 from the representative of Cyprus  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[6 June 1978]

I have the honour to refer to a letter from the representative of Turkey [S/12714] to which was attached a statement to the press by Mr. Denктаş regarding the Turkish proposals prepared at Ankara and submitted to the Secretary-General on 13 April 1978.

These proposals run counter to the agreed constitutional basis for a federation, preserving the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus. They clearly are, in substance and effect, nothing other than proposals for the partition of the island with annexation looming in the background. No consideration, of course, could be given to such proposals as a basis for negotiations. Consequently, as you are aware, they have been rejected outright by the Government of Cyprus.

The bulk of the Cypriot people, of whatever ethnic origin, who cherish the independence and territorial integrity of their country and the freedom of its people can-

not possibly think otherwise. They cannot contemplate negotiations the purpose of which would be to legalize the results of the aggression and of all the international crimes committed by the invasion forces on the basis of a pre-planned design to force a change in the demographic structure of Cyprus. All this at the cost of the basic human rights of the people of Cyprus as a whole, namely both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

The Greek Cypriot people have been the tragic victims of the atrocities of the Turkish army of invasion, as set out in the report of the European Commission of Human Rights (Strasbourg, 1977) which, according to *The Sunday Times* of London, of 23 January 1977, amounts to a "massive indictment of the Ankara Government" and its impact "could result in the withdrawal or expulsion of Turkey from the Council of Europe".

The Turkish Cypriot people have also suffered in their basic human rights and in their very identity, ominously threatened by the massive influx of settlers from Turkey, alien to the Turkish Cypriot people and their living standards.

\* Incorporating document S/12729/Corr.1 of 7 June 1978.

\*\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/128-S/12729 and Corr.1.

The voice of Mr. Denktaş is but the echo of Ankara and its army of occupation. It has thus been all along the inimical, arrogant and dictating voice of the invader. It does not represent the true interests and feelings of the rank and file of the Turkish Cypriots. At this juncture, Mr. Denktaş has suddenly assumed a new façade. He speaks glibly of "good faith" and "flexibility" in an attempt to mislead by way of concealing the stark reality of the partition project in the proposals.

As to the genuineness of the representation of Turkish Cypriots' interests, it can be judged by the fact that the 40,000 invasion troops and the 50,000 odd settlers transported from Turkey after the invasion have been given, arbitrarily and illegally, Cypriot citizenship with voting rights. It should be recalled that the total number of the Turkish Cypriot population is 110,000 by the last census.

Mr. Denktaş's pretence of "good faith" comes up against a background of repeated instances of total lack of it in all the Turkish actions in Cyprus since the invasion. They start with the broadcast by the Turkish Prime Minister, on 20 July 1974, that Turkey was embarking upon a "purely peace operation to restore constitutional order in the interest of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot people". The broadcast, however, was immediately followed by napalm bombing of open towns and villages resulting in the agonizing death of hundreds of innocent men, women and children. Thereafter, a fierce and systematic expulsion of the indigenous Greek Cypriot majority population began. Was this consistent with the peaceful purposes expressed in the said broadcast and was it a show of good faith?

Secondly, General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) — adopted unanimously, including the vote of Turkey, and endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 365 (1974) — calls for the speedy withdrawal of the occupation forces and the cessation of all foreign interference in Cyprus. Yet the Ankara régime violated and continues to violate those resolutions and has been engaged for over three years now in illegal activities and inhuman use of force to change the demographic character of Cyprus in further violation of the said resolutions. Is this not a show of lack of good faith?

Thirdly, a solemn commitment was undertaken by Mr. Denktaş in the presence of the Secretary-General during the third round of talks, namely that the remaining 15,000 Greek Cypriots in the north "are free to stay and . . . will be given every help to lead a normal life, including facilities for education and for the practice of their religion, as well as medical care . . . and freedom of movement in the north" [S/11789 of 5 August 1975, annex, para. 2]. This agreement was renegeed in its en-

tirety by the Turkish side as soon as the corresponding commitment, to its benefit, was fully carried out by the other side. Furthermore, in sharp contrast to the agreement, the 15,000 Greek Cypriots of the north were systematically expelled from their homes through intensified harassment and threats to their very life. As a result, the figure was tragically reduced to only 1,700. What else can this be but a total absence of good faith?

Lastly, skipping all other instances, I would refer to the most recent demonstrable lack of good faith, that of submitting to the Secretary-General on 13 April 1978 proposals purportedly on the agreed basis for a federation ensuring the independence and territorial integrity of the State of Cyprus but in reality proposals to the very opposite effect, namely partition. Is there a particle of good faith or flexibility in these proposals?

Under such conditions, negotiations — on which the Ankara régime pressingly insists — would serve no useful purpose. They would merely be calculated to create misleading impressions that a search for a just solution is in progress, and thus tend to cover up the stark reality of the continuing aggressive occupation by Turkey of 40 per cent of the territory of Cyprus, with the result of one third of its population being still destitute refugees uprooted from their homes and properties.

Only through the due implementation of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions can the problem of Cyprus find its just and lasting solution. Regrettably, Ankara's stance on Cyprus and towards the United Nations is replete with insincerity and negativeness. It arises from an outdated policy of territorial expansion and domination that runs counter to the compelling demands of a closely interdependent world in a United Nations age.

So long as Ankara's régime remains steeped in such noxious parochialism, Turkey will be a negative influence in the world, causing at the same time serious damage to itself and to the true interests of its people, in a manner running parallel to the havoc it is actually causing to other nations and peoples.

The hope is expressed that saner counsel may eventually prevail for a more positive attitude in the common interest of all concerned and in that of peace in the area and in the world.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES  
Permanent Representative of Cyprus  
to the United Nations*

## DOCUMENT S/12730

### Letter dated 6 June 1978 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

*[Original: English]  
[6 June 1978]*

On instructions from my Government, I am directed to draw your attention to the blowing up of a public bus in Jerusalem on 2 June 1978, which led to the death of five Israeli children and a young visitor from abroad.

This civilian bus was on its regular run from the Damascus Gate in the Old City of Jerusalem to a resi-

dential suburb of the city. Most of the passengers aboard the bus were women and children, returning from school and from shopping in the centre of the city. In addition to the six persons who have died thus far from this outrage, 20 innocent civilians were wounded, some of them critically, including a child of 4 (whose 12-year-

old brother was killed), three teenagers (a 10-year-old girl and two youths), a pregnant woman and five other women. Shortly after the blast, the so-called "General Command for the Palestinian Revolutionary Forces", a constituent of the PLO, published a statement in Beirut taking full responsibility for it.

This atrocity is yet another in the wave of international terror which has been horrifying the world of late. On the same day, other terrorist attacks took place elsewhere. The PLO, as we have on occasion pointed out, is the linchpin of the "terrorist international". It has close operational contacts with the gangs responsible for the recent terrorist outrages in Italy, Germany and Japan, to mention but a few, providing them with training and organizational, financial and logistic support. This is the organization which purports to be the "sole representative" of the Palestinian people, which has denied the Lebanese Government the right to exercise its sovereignty over the southern part of its territory and which has terrorized Christians and members of other

minority groups living on the Lebanese border with Israel.

The outrages perpetrated by the PLO since the end of 1977, not only against men, women and children in Israel, but also against leading Arabs in the Judaea and Samaria districts of the west bank, not to speak of Egyptian targets, all flow from the PLO's ongoing commitment to destroy Israel in the fulfilment of its covenant and of what it grotesquely terms "a national duty".

Despite the obvious danger it constitutes to international peace and security, the PLO continues to enjoy observer status in the international Organization and has been accorded the opportunity to participate, with irregular privileges, in the deliberations of the Security Council.

I have the honour to request that this letter should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Chaim HERZOG  
Permanent Representative of Israel  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/12731\*

#### Letter dated 7 June 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[7 June 1978]

In reference to my letter dated 26 May 1978 [S/12718] regarding the plight of the Turkish Cypriot people in the occupied north left to the tender mercy of the illegally transported settlers from Turkey, I have the honour, on instructions from my Government, to draw your attention to a statement made at Bozkurt on 30 May 1978 by the Turkish Cypriot Hearth Association which, in criticizing the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Küçük, former Vice-President of the Republic, for his comments in the newspaper *Halkın Sesi* on the serious crimes perpetrated by the settlers from Turkey against the Turkish Cypriots, accuses him of "greatly damaging the national cause and the idea of integration with Turkey".

I wish in this respect to point out that such statements of integration with Turkey are but the echo of the expansionist policy of Ankara over Cyprus, as evidenced by a number of indications.

I need only mention the fact that the territory still under the occupation of the invasion forces is officially treated by Ankara as territory of Turkey and as part of the "Mersin district". The Turkish "lira" is the legal currency and Turkish stamps are used in the occupied area. In a circular issued by the General Manager of the Turkish Bank, Ltd., announcing the establishment of a branch of the said bank at Kyrenia, Cyprus, its address was given as follows: "Turkish Bank, Ltd., Girne, Mersin 10, Turkey". The postal administration of Turkey informed residents in the occupied territory that Cyprus

should no longer appear as their address, but instead only "Mersin 10, Turkey" must be used. Thus, in so far as the occupied territory is concerned, Cyprus, even as an existing territorial identity in the world, is intended to be abolished.

This annexationist policy looms in the background as the ultimate goal of the Turkish proposals prepared at Ankara and presented to the Secretary-General on 13 April 1978. In their abnormal partitionist provisions, such deadlocks and impasses are ingrained as would inevitably lead to the dismemberment of the island and the loss of its independent existence. As is natural, no talks on them could be at all envisaged. The presentation of these proposals, however, is an official admission of Ankara's design for participation and questions the usefulness of any resumption of negotiations, when the two sides are so basically at cross purposes.

A complete new approach is needed for a just and viable solution of the problem, one based on the unanimous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, which have to be implemented in accordance with the specific provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

I should be grateful if this letter were to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES  
Permanent Representative of Cyprus  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/130-S/12731.

**Letter dated 8 June 1978 from the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[9 June 1978]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a special message concerning recent events in Africa, delivered by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, His Excellency Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, to foreign envoys accredited to Tanzania, at State House, Dar es Salaam, on 8 June 1978.

I should be grateful if you would have this special message circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Salim Ahmed SALIM  
Permanent Representative of  
the United Republic of Tanzania  
to the United Nations

**ANNEX**

**Special message concerning recent events in Africa, delivered by  
the President of the United Republic of Tanzania to foreign  
envoys accredited to Tanzania, at State House, Dar es Salaam,  
on 8 June 1978**

I have been very concerned indeed about world reactions to recent events in Africa, and it seems to me to be necessary that I should make Tanzania's position clear, for the events of the past few weeks have once again demonstrated that, although our legal independence is officially recognized, our need and our right to develop our countries and our continent in our own interests has not yet been conceded in practice. The habit of regarding Africa as an appendage of Western Europe has not yet been broken.

*Soviet forces in Africa*

In Angola the MPLA did almost all the fighting against the Portuguese colonialists. As independence approached after the revolution in Portugal, various Western countries — led by the United States of America — decided to try to prevent the establishment of an MPLA Government in that country. They conspired with South Africa and gave undercover finance and arms to rival nationalist movements which had previously been almost inactive. Faced with this conspiracy and the consequent attacks on Angola from South Africa and across the Zaire border, the MPLA Government sought help from those who had given support to the movement during the independence struggle. Cuba and the Soviet Union responded to those requests. With their help, the Angolan Government overcame the immediate military threat to its existence, pushed South African troops back across the border into Namibia and pushed the FNLA troops back to where they had come from — Zaire.

Cuban troops are still in Angola and the Soviet Union continues to give military assistance to Angola. The Angolan Government is forced to ask for this assistance to be continued because the threat to the integrity of Angola still exists. Only last month South African troops entered southern Angola again and inflicted heavy casualties upon Namibian refugees. UNITA continues to get outside support. There have been continual attacks made across the Angolan/Zaire border by FNLA troops, who are financed and supplied with weapons by external forces and who operate with the active or tacit support of the Zaire Government. That all this is happening, and how it is happening, is known to the Secret Services of South Africa, and of the United States of America, France and some other Western countries. It would not be happening without their connivance and their involvement. It would be incredible if

the Governments of those countries did not know what their agencies were doing.

The history of the ex-Katangese gendarmes pre-dates the independence of Angola. It was not actions of the MPLA which took them to Angola, nor were they trained by MPLA. They are a living reminder to Africa of the determined and shameless attempt by the West to dismember the former Congo (Léopoldville) in their own economic interests. When that attempt was defeated, some of these gendarmes moved into Angola and remained there as refugees. Now things have changed, the West has a different view of Zaire and is using it to destabilize Angola. It would therefore not be surprising if Angola, on its part, felt forced to withdraw the restraints it had been imposing on those Zairian refugees in northern Angola.

Whether such a policy of retaliation is correct or wise is a matter of judgement; it is nevertheless understandable. But one thing is clear. There is no evidence of Cuban or Soviet involvement in this retaliation. The United States State Department was at one time reported to have said as much. The Cubans have persistently and convincingly repudiated such allegations.

So Cuba and the Soviet Union went into Angola and are still in Angola for understandable reasons, at the request of the Angolan Government. There is no evidence at all that they have been involved, directly or indirectly, in any fighting within Zaire.

Cuban and Soviet forces are also in Ethiopia, at the request of the Ethiopian Government. The reasons for their presence are well known. They have helped the Ethiopians to defend their country against external aggression. They have not — and nor has the Ethiopian Government — engaged in any fighting outside Ethiopia's borders. And there is some evidence to suggest that the Cuban Government, at any rate, makes a distinction between the fighting in the Ogaden and the fighting in Eritrea.

Apart from those two countries, where else in Africa are there Soviet or Cuban forces? There are a few Cuban and Soviet nationals, and a few Chinese nationals, helping to train the freedom fighters of southern Africa in the use of weapons. Africa gets from communist countries for the liberation struggle in Rhodesia and Namibia. Apart from vague generalities and rumours based on the jackets people wear, there is no serious suggestion that these forces are operating or stationed anywhere else in Africa.

It is, then, on the basis of Soviet and Cuban forces in two African countries that there is a great furore in the West about a so-called Soviet penetration of Africa. And those forces are in those two countries at the request of the legitimate and recognized Governments of the countries concerned, and for reasons which are well known and completely understandable to all reasonable people. Yet Western countries are objecting and are holding meetings ostensibly about how to defend the freedom of Africa against what they call Soviet penetration.

Let me make it quite clear. Tanzania does not want anyone from outside Africa to govern Africa. We regret, even while we recognize, the occasional necessity for an African Government to ask for military assistance from a non-African country when it is faced with an external threat to its national integrity. We know that a response to such a request by any of the big Powers is determined by what that big Power sees as its own interests. We have been forced to recognize that most of the countries acknowledged as world Powers do not find it beneath their dignity to exacerbate existing and genuine African problems and conflicts when they believe they can benefit by doing so. We in Tanzania believe that African countries, separately and through the Organization of African Unity, need to guard against such actions. But we need to guard Africa against being used by any other nation or group of nations. The danger

\*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/131-S/12732.

to Africa does not come just from nations in the Eastern bloc. The West still considers Africa to be within its sphere of influence and acts accordingly. Current developments show that greater immediate danger to Africa's freedom comes from nations in that Western bloc.

### *A Pan-African security force*

It might be a good thing if the Organization of African Unity were sufficiently united to establish an African High Command and a Pan-African security force. If, having done so, the Organization of African Unity then decided to ask for external support for this force, no one could legitimately object. But the Organization of African Unity has made no such decision. It is highly unlikely that the Organization of African Unity meeting at Khartoum will be able to agree unanimously on the creation of such a military force or, if it did, that it would be able to agree unanimously on which countries to ask for support if that was needed.

Yet, until Africa at the Organization of African Unity has made such a decision, there can be no Pan-African security force which will uphold the freedom of Africa. It is the height of arrogance for anyone else to talk of establishing a Pan-African force to defend Africa. It is quite obvious, moreover, that those who have put forward this idea, and those who seek to initiate such a force, are not interested in the freedom of Africa. They are interested in the domination of Africa.

It was from Paris that this talk of a Pan-African security force has emanated. It is in Paris, and later in Brussels, that there is to be a meeting to discuss this and related matters pertaining to the "freedom" of Africa. The Organization of African Unity meets at Khartoum in July, but we are told that African freedom and its defence is being discussed in Paris and Brussels in June.

There is only one reason why the idea of Europe setting up or initiating a Pan-African security force or an African peace force does not meet with immediate and world-wide amazement and consternation. It is the continuing assumption that Africa is and must always remain part of the West European "sphere of influence". This assumption is hardly being questioned yet. Even some African States take it for granted.

We all know the facts of power in the world. But we cannot all be expected to accept without question this new insult to Africa and to Africans. We may be weak, but we are human, we do know when we are being deliberately provoked and insulted.

The French have troops in many countries of Africa. In Chad, in Western Sahara, in Mauritania and now also in Zaire, French forces are engaged in combat against Africans. France continues to occupy Mayotte. But there are no meetings in Washington, or even in Moscow to discuss the threat to Africa's freedom by the French penetration of Africa. Nor should there be. But not even Africa, in Africa, discusses the question.

The reason is very simple. It is the continued assumption that it is natural for French troops or Belgian troops or British troops to be in Africa, but it is a threat for troops from any non-member of the Western bloc to be in Africa. A threat to whom? To African freedom or to the domination of Africa by ex-colonial Powers and their allies operated now through more subtle means and with the help of an Africa fifth column? The answers to those questions are very obvious. There have been continued incursions by South Africans and Rhodesia into Angola, Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique. The West has not shown much concern about these; nor have their new-found surrogates in Africa.

When the USSR sent its troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968, Tanzania was one of the many countries which protested. Is it expected that we should not protest when Western Powers send their troops into an African country? These "rescue operations" almost always result in the death of a great number of innocent people and the rescue of a Government. But that is apparently not regarded in Europe as interference in African affairs. Instead, the same country which initiated the military expedition then calls a meeting to discuss, they say, the freedom of Africa.

There should be no mistake. Whatever the official agenda, the Paris or Brussels meetings are not discussing the freedom

of Africa. They are discussing the continued domination of Africa and the continued use of Africa by Western Powers. They are intended to be, taken together, a second Berlin conference.

The real agenda, inside and outside the formal sessions of these meetings, will be concerned with two things. It will be concerned with neo-colonialism in Africa for economic purposes—the real control of Africa and African States. That will be led by the French. It will be concerned also with the use of Africa in the East-West conflict. That will be led by the Americans. These two purposes will be co-ordinated so that they are mutually supportive and the apportionment of the expected benefits—and costs—will be worked out. It is at that point—the division of the spoils—that disputes are most likely to occur.

But the costs may also be higher than the participants anticipate. Tanzania is not the only nationalist country in Africa. There are nationalists everywhere. Sooner or later and for as long as necessary Africa will fight against neo-colonialism as it has fought against colonialism. And eventually it will win. Western bloc countries which try to resist the struggle against neo-colonialism need to recognize that it will not be African countries only which will suffer in the process.

Nor will the whole of Africa acquiesce in being used in the East-West confrontation. We are weak, but weak countries have before now caused a great deal of embarrassment and some difficulty for big Powers. If the West wants to prove either to the Russians or to their own people that they are not soft on communism, they should direct their attention to where the Soviet tanks are and the Soviet front-lines. They should not invent an excuse to bring the East-West conflict into Africa. For if they succeed in doing that, Africa will suffer and African freedom will suffer. But it may also turn out to be very expensive for those who chose Africa as another site for East-West confrontation.

The African people have the same desire as every other people to be free and to use their freedom for their own benefit. They have the same determination to work and to struggle to that end. They know that no one else is interested in their freedom. This talk in Europe about a Pan-African security force is an insult to Africa and a derogation of African freedom.

It makes little difference if the European initiators of this plan find Africans to do their fighting for them. There were Africans who assisted in the enslavement of fellow Africans and there were Africans who fought against the freedom movements. But we ask those African Governments which may have agreed to participate in this plan to consider well before they go further. We have the Organization of African Unity with all its faults and its incapacities. It is the only Pan-African organization which exists and which is concerned with African freedom. Do not let us split it—and Africa—between those who are militarily allied with the West and those who may in consequence find themselves forced to seek assistance from elsewhere against the African assisted neo-colonialism.

### *The right to request assistance*

We do not deny the principle that any African State has the right to ask for assistance, either military or economic from the country of its choice. On the contrary, we assert that right. Angola, Ethiopia, Chad, Zaire and all of us have that right. It is not for the West to object when Angola asks assistance from the USSR. It is not for the East to object when Djibouti asks for assistance from France. And the requested country always has the right to decide whether to give that assistance.

We do not deny either that all African Governments can be threatened by a few malcontents, possibly financed by external elements, even while they are fully supported by the mass of their people. In such circumstances a Government is surely justified in seeking assistance to overcome a temporary crisis, and the donor country should not be accused of neo-colonialism for responding. Other Governments in Africa have inherited chaotic situations and need somewhat longer-term support while genuinely they try to bring peace to their people and to develop their country in the interests of those people.

But we must reject the principle that external Powers have the right to maintain in power African Governments which are

universally recognized to be corrupt or incompetent or a bunch of murderers, when their peoples try to make a change. Africa cannot have its present Governments frozen into position for all time by neo-colonialism or because there are cold wars or ideological conflicts between big Powers. The peoples of an individual African country have as much right to change their corrupt Government in the last half of the twentieth century as, in the past, the British, the French and Russian peoples had to overthrow their own rotten régimes. The peoples of China waged a long, historic and exemplary struggle against the lackeys and running dogs of imperialism in so-called independent China. Are African peoples to be denied that same right?

Under which category any particular African Government crisis falls may be a matter of genuine difference of opinion. But when the same Government constantly needs to make recourse to external assistance to maintain its control over the country, most people would begin to question whether it really has the backing of its citizens. Those foreign Powers which are really interested in the freedom of Africa and not dominating it will then decide that the time has come to call a halt. And if they do not do so they must not be surprised if the rest of Africa interprets their intervention as an expression of neo-colonialist domination, and as being intended to maintain their control over that part of Africa.

Western Europe and the United States of America are interested in having continued access to the minerals of Africa to sustain their own economies. But that access is not ensured by corruption or support for that corruption. It is endangered by such support. That access is not dependent either upon the ideology espoused by particular African Governments. The present realities of African politics and economics force all African countries to sell their minerals where they can get the

best price for them and where they can get in exchange the goods which they themselves need. There is much evidence for both those propositions.

### Conclusion

The purpose of this statement is to make it clear that we reject the right of West European countries to dominate Africa, just as much as we would reject attempts by Eastern bloc countries to dominate Africa. In particular, we want it to be clear that Tanzania resents the arrogance and the contempt of those who purport to set up a Pan-African security force or an African peace force on behalf of Africa. Either Africa will do that for itself, or there will be no Pan-African force defending the freedom of Africans, only something calling itself by some name which is an instrument for renewed foreign domination of this continent.

Tanzania repudiates the claim that African freedom can be defended by a security force organized or initiated by European Powers. We shall regard such a force as an instrument of neo-colonialism in our continent.

The purpose of Africa's independence struggles was the freedom of Africa and of Africans. Our independent Governments must not become the instruments through which foreign domination is maintained in a new form. Rather, they must be the instruments through which the peoples of Africa develop themselves and their countries and enlarge their freedom until it means a life of dignity for every individual African. We have a long way to go — all of us — in every African nation. But Tanzania will resist every attempt to circumscribe our development and to prevent it moving in that direction. It will resist any attempt to reassert and strengthen the domination of Africa under cover of a pretence to defend Africa.

## DOCUMENT S/12733

### Letter dated 9 June 1978 from the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[12 June 1978]

On behalf of the Special Committee against Apartheid, I wish to draw your attention to the grave situation resulting from the continued military build-up in South Africa and the plans of the *apartheid* régime to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

In pursuance of paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 32/105 F of 14 December 1977, the Special Committee has followed the developments concerning the military and nuclear collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa, especially since the adoption of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977, imposing a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. It held several hearings on the matter and devoted two meetings on 30 May 1978, with the participation of a number of experts, to review all aspects of this question.

In pursuance of a decision of the Special Committee, I am herewith transmitting, for the attention of the Security Council, the summary records of the above-mentioned meetings.<sup>13</sup>

In the light of the information and suggestions made at these meetings, the Special Committee considers it essential to draw the attention of the Security Council to the urgent need for further action to ensure the full implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa, and to prevent the *apartheid* régime from acquiring nuclear weapon capability.

It wishes to draw particular attention to the need for mandatory decisions, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to prevent all military co-operation with the *apartheid* régime and any form of co-operation with it in the nuclear field. It recalls the request by the General Assembly to the Security Council in paragraph 3 of resolution 32/105 F that it should call upon all States, under Chapter VII of the Charter and irrespective of any existing contracts:

(a) To refrain from any supply of arms, ammunition, military equipment or vehicles, or spare parts thereof, to South Africa, without any exceptions;

(b) To ensure that such supplies do not reach South Africa through other countries;

(c) To refrain from importing any military equipment or supplies manufactured by, or in collaboration with, South Africa;

(d) To cease any exchange of military, naval or air attachés with South Africa;

(e) To terminate any form of military co-operation with South Africa;

(f) To revoke all licences and terminate all technical assistance for the manufacture of military equipment and supplies in South Africa;

(g) To end all transfer of nuclear equipment or fissionable material or technology to South Africa;

(h) To prohibit companies, institutions or agencies within their jurisdiction from any co-operation with South Africa, directly or through participation in com-

<sup>13</sup> Not reproduced in the present document. For the text, see A/AC.115/SR.382 and 383.

panies registered in South Africa, in its military build-up or nuclear development;

(i) To prevent their nationals from working in South Africa in establishments producing supplies for military and police forces, or engaged in nuclear development;

(j) To deny visas to South African military and police personnel and persons engaged in nuclear research and development.

The Special Committee hopes, especially in view of the continued acts of aggression by the *apartheid* régime, that the Security Council will consider the situation and take further action to ensure the immediate termination of all military and nuclear collaboration with the *apartheid* régime.

(Signed) Leslie O. HARRIMAN  
Chairman  
Special Committee against Apartheid

## DOCUMENT S/12734\*

### Letter dated 12 June 1978 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[13 June 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 9 June 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) İlter TÜRKMEN  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

##### Text of the letter dated 9 June 1978 from Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General

Mr. Rossides' attempt in his recent letter [S/12729] to obliterate from memory the Greek Cypriot Administration's inhuman, unconstitutional activities of gross maltreatment and discrimination against the Turkish Cypriot population from 1963 to 1974 cannot impress the members of Security Council or the Members of the United Nations as a whole which have all the details of these atrocities in their hands as the periodic reports of the Secretary-General, but his attempt to speak for and on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots cannot be overlooked. At the risk of repetition, therefore, I should like to put on record the fact that Greek Cypriot leaders ceased to have anything to do with the Turkish Cypriots as from December 1963, when they ejected, by use of military force, all Turkish Cypriot elements from the constitutional Government of Cyprus, and have denied all fiscal and constitutional rights since that time. Ever since, the Turkish Cypriots have been resisting the Greek Cypriot attempt to Hellenize Cyprus by making the island a colony of Greece. This December 1963 coup by the Greek leadership was superseded by the coup of July 1974, which made Turkey's intervention unavoidable. Mr. Rossides cannot, by his eloquence, turn this legitimate intervention into an "invasion" nor can his amnesia of their 11-year treatment of the Turkish Cypriot community make the world forget the gruesome results of their deeds in Ayios Vasiliou, Aloa, Sandallaris, Maratha,

Ktima, Tokhni, Zyhihi, Mari etc., where the Turkish civilians were ruthlessly destroyed *en masse*. That this was the fate awaiting all the Turkish Cypriots, had the 1974 coup succeeded, was put on record by Archbishop Makarios himself at the 1780th meeting of the Security Council. All these and 103 other villages which were destroyed and to which Turkish Cypriots were not allowed to return for 11 years, and the denial of even social insurance benefits to aged Turkish Cypriots are not credentials for Mr. Rossides, entitling him to speak for them. Some sincerity and realism are still the foundation-stones for peace in the future. It is, for us, a disappointing picture to witness day in and day out Greek Cypriot leaders and their representatives trying to forget the past and dwell on the events of 1974 as if the Cyprus problem had begun in July 1974. It is disheartening to see them pose as protectors of the Turkish Cypriot community, trying to speak for it in complete oblivion of the realities of Cyprus.

President Denktas has repeated his call to Mr. Kyprianou for the resumption of the dialogue on television Channel 5 today. I am authorized to put this invitation on record. President Denktas is ready and willing to meet Mr. Kyprianou in order to discuss:

(a) The modalities for the resumption of the intercommunal talks;

(b) All matters for normalizing intercommunal relations including the opening of the international airport of Nicosia to traffic;

(c) Any other matter that Mr. Kyprianou would like to put on the agenda.

President Denktas believes that the resumption of the dialogue in order to proceed to the result envisaged between him and the late Archbishop Makarios, i.e. a non-aligned, bi-zonal federal republic, is the only way to peace and that there can be no substitute for intercommunal dialogue.

As the Turkish Cypriot side is giving priority to peace negotiations, I shall not attempt to reply to all the points raised by Mr. Rossides in his letter referred to above, which are a repetition, like an old gramophone record, of everything which he said before in order to distort facts and to justify a no-negotiation attitude which cannot be justified by any measure.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

\*Circulated under the double symbol A/33/135-S/12734.

**Letter dated 12 June 1978 from the representative of Turkey  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[13 June 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 12 June 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* İlter TÜRKMEN  
*Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations*

**ANNEX,**

**Text of the letter dated 12 June 1978 from  
Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General**

With reference to Mr. Rossides' letter of 7 June 1978 [S/12731], it is sad to witness new attempts by the Greek Cypriot side to distort facts and to make mountains out of molehills. My letter of 30 May [see S/12722], is sufficient answer to the first part of Mr. Rossides' above-mentioned letter.

As to that part of Mr. Rossides' letter which deals with the "Turkish lira" and the reference to the postal address of the Turkish Federated State, the record has to be put right.

Greek Cypriot administrators, ever since their well-planned attack on the Turkish Cypriots, co-founder partners of the Republic in December 1963, have wiped off all payments due to the Turkish community from the "budget of Cyprus". Turkish Cypriots were treated as non-existent in Cyprus, having no right to any fiscal claim at all. Consequently, for 11 years until the liberation of the Turkish Cypriot community from the oppressive, inhuman and unconstitutional Greek Cypriot yoke, Turkish Cypriots lived on aid which came to them from Turkey in the form of 13 million pounds sterling (nearly \$30,000,000) per year, all of which went to the Greek Cypriot-run Central

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/136-S/12735.

Bank of Cyprus, from which all Turkish Cypriot elements were driven out by Greek gunmen in 1963 and never allowed to return. Thus Turkish Cypriots, in order to get Cyprus currency at all, had to pay the Greek Cypriots hard currency which came to them as aid. The Cyprus currency so obtained had to be spent on the Greek market because all ports were under Greek Cypriot control and the economic activity of the Turkish Cypriots was absolutely curtailed. This was "good business" for the Greek Cypriots as the whole Turkish Cypriot population, which formed one fourth of the population of Cyprus, were treated as "permanent tourists" in their own country. Mr. Rossides' new laments that since July 1974 we have ceased to pay hard currency for "buying" Cyprus currency from the Greeks seem to ignore the fact that since 1963 millions of Cyprus pounds have accumulated in their hands and that they are refusing to pay us our dues.

"Mersin 10, Turkey" is the code number of all postal matter destined for the north of Cyprus. This became an absolute necessity when the Greek Cypriot Administration refused to agree on any other procedure for letting one fourth of the population of Cyprus get its letters and parcels in a reasonable way. Confiscation or censure of letters addressed to the Turkish Cypriots had been a matter for complaints ever since December 1963 to July 1974. The "Mersin 10, Turkey" code address alleviated the distress of the Turkish Cypriot community and provided it with a decent mode of communication. Mr. Rossides seems to miss this unconstitutionally assumed illegal power of censorship or rejection of all Turkish mail on the part of the "lords and masters" of Cyprus.

Mr. Rossides, who since 1954 has been the spokesman of the enosisists, is trying to confuse the issue by hiding behind fancies of partition or annexation of Cyprus by Turkey in order to avoid the beginning of the dialogue between the two communities. The Turkish Cypriot community is for the beginning of this dialogue, which is fully supported by the resolutions of the United Nations at all levels.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12736**

**Letter dated 13 June 1978 from the representative of Israel  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[13 June 1978]

On instructions of my Government, I enclose a letter addressed to you by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel.

I should be grateful if arrangements could be made to circulate this letter as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Chaim HERZOG  
*Permanent Representative of Israel  
to the United Nations*

**ANNEX**

**Letter dated 13 June 1978 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of Israel to the Secretary-General**

The withdrawal of the Israel Defence Forces from Southern Lebanon was completed today. Israel has accordingly fulfilled its part in the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978).

On the other hand, according to reliable information, hundreds of terrorists, members of the PLO, have, in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal, returned to Southern Lebanon. Moreover, it appears that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is permitting the transit of food and other supplies to the terrorists and that the latter, for their part, are clandestinely introducing arms and other military equipment into the area.

It is also known that some units of UNIFIL treat these PLO elements with indulgence and even co-operate with them; and that there are official PLO liaison officers in touch with UNIFIL.

These facts stand in contradiction with the position expressed by you at our meeting at Jerusalem on 18 April 1978, in confirmation of the position set out in my letter to you of 14 April 1978.

The present situation is not only in violation of your statement to me on this matter but also bodes ill for the future.

It is the duty of UNIFIL to ensure the full implementation of the as yet unaccomplished purposes of resolution 425 (1978).



Only strict implementation of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) will ensure that tranquillity will prevail in Southern Lebanon.

We look to you for immediate action in conformity with your

undertaking to prevent the entry into the area of elements or units of the PLO and to expel those already there.

(Signed) Moshe DAYAN  
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel

### DOCUMENT S/12737\*

#### Letter dated 13 June 1978 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[13 June 1978]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the situation arising from the malicious acts by Turks in setting fire to orange and grapefruit groves and orchards situated in the buffer zone between the two lines near the villages of Ano Zodia, Kato Kopia and Astromeritis. By these criminal acts, extensive groves have been reduced to cinders, with the result of devastating damage running into millions of dollars.

The repeated previous occasions of such fires in the buffer zone, and not anywhere else in the island, and the fact that these invariably start from the Turkish side, as well as other conclusive indications, leave no doubt that these fires are deliberate acts of arson.

I wish in this respect to protest emphatically against these criminal acts of vandalistic destruction, obviously

instigated at this juncture by Turkey's occupation forces. Regrettably, they are but part and parcel of the over-all negative policy of Ankara, the aim of which is to bring about by use of force and violence the dismemberment of the island and the demolition of the Republic of Cyprus — to the ultimate destruction of the independent existence of its people as a whole.

On behalf of my Government, I urgently request you to take the necessary steps for full inquiry into this grave matter of repeated fires in the buffer zone and for appropriate action.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES  
Permanent Representative of Cyprus  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/137-S/12737.

### DOCUMENT S/12738

#### Letter dated 14 June 1978 from the Secretary-General to the representative of Israel

[Original: English]  
[14 June 1978]

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 13 June 1978 [S/12736], under cover of which you transmitted to me a communication from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel. I would ask you to transmit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the attached reply to this communication.

In view of the fact that the Foreign Minister's letter was circulated as a document of the Security Council, this reply will also be circulated as a Council document.

(Signed) Kurt WALDHEIM  
Secretary-General

#### ANNEX

#### Letter dated 14 June 1978 from the Secretary-General addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel

I have received your letter of 13 June 1978, in which you informed me of the completion of the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon in accordance with Security Council resolution 425 (1978).

I am surprised at the allegations made in the other part of your letter, most of which, as you know, General Siilasvuo and General Erskine have already responded to in a meeting with your military authorities. As regards the transit of non-military supplies to small groups in the area, this matter is dealt with in the report that I have just issued to the Security Council [S/12620/Add.5, para. 14]. It is true that there are PLO liaison officers with UNIFIL, as indeed there are liaison officers of all

parties concerned. As you are certainly aware from public statements both by the Lebanese Government and by Mr. Arafat, PLO has undertaken to co-operate with UNIFIL in the implementation of resolution 425 (1978). I have already informed the Security Council officially of this on several occasions.

In light of the above, I must take exception to the implications and to the context of your statement that the present situation "bodes ill for the future". In extremely difficult circumstances, UNIFIL has made great efforts and will continue to make great efforts to carry out all parts of its mandate. While I do not underestimate the many difficulties to be overcome, I can assure you that UNIFIL will continue to discharge in good faith its responsibilities under resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). Its task has certainly not been facilitated by the decision of the Israeli Government not to turn over control of the remainder of the area of operation to UNIFIL, although I am making efforts to deal satisfactorily with the consequences of this development in co-operation with the Lebanese Government.

I shall continue to make all possible efforts to assure the full implementation of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), but this will require the full co-operation and understanding of all concerned at all stages. I am sure you will agree with me that, in such a situation, it would be helpful if those concerned refrained from making unsubstantiated public statements about this or that aspect of an extremely difficult operation.

(Signed) Kurt WALDHEIM  
Secretary-General

**Letter dated 15 June 1978 from the representative of Turkey  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[15 June 1978]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 15 June 1978 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Ilter TÜRKMEN  
*Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations*

## ANNEX

**Text of the letter dated 15 June 1978 from  
Mr. Nail Atalay to the Secretary-General**

Mr. Rossides's letter of 13 June 1978 [S/12737] is yet another of his planned and timed outbursts against Turkey. This time he has found the opportunity in a fire which started in open fields and spread to certain orchards in no man's land. Field fires are, unfortunately, a frequent occurrence in the dry season in Cyprus. Last year there were a great number of them deep in the territory of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus as well as in the depth of the Greek controlled south and in no man's land. But, to Mr. Rossides, every fire, no matter what its place and cause, is of Turkish origin.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/140-S/12740.

The United Nations authorities in Cyprus do not share Mr. Rossides's view and that in itself is sufficient answer to him. It is significant, however, that the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) thanked the Turkish Forces stationed in the area for their devoted service for putting out the fire. This is the text of the UNFICYP communiqué:

"10 June 1978

"UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS  
"The Area Commander

"Re: Fire fighting, Kato Kopia, 9 June 1978.

"1. The United Nations wishes to thank all members of the Turkish Army who co-operated with the United Nations soldiers in extinguishing the fire near Kato Kopia on 9 June 1978. It would have been impossible to put out the fire without the help of the Turkish soldiers.

"2. The United Nations look forward to similar co-operation in the unfortunate event of further fires.

*"(Signed)* Colonel J. G. ALDOUS"

It is relevant to state that when the Greek press reported the fire — and as if in chorus blamed the Turks for it — no mention was made of the efforts of the Turkish soldiers in putting out this fire.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

## DOCUMENT S/12741

**Note verbale dated 29 May 1978 from the representative of Costa Rica  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: Spanish]  
[20 June 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations has the honour to reply to the Secretary-General's note verbale of 18 May 1978 referring to resolution 418 (1977) on the question of South Africa, adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 4 November 1977.

With respect to paragraph 3 of that resolution, to which the Secretary-General draws the attention of Governments at the request of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa, the Permanent Representative of Costa Rica wishes to reiterate the terms of the note addressed to the Secretary-General on 3 April 1978 [S/12649], concerning the Costa Rican

Government's firm and constant support of resolution 418 (1977).

He also wishes to emphasize that Costa Rica does not have contractual arrangements of any kind with South Africa and has not granted and will not grant licences to South Africa relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and vehicles: first, because it continues co-operating and will co-operate in the commitment strictly to apply the above-mentioned resolution 418 (1977) and, secondly, because Costa Rica does not possess, manufacture or traffic in any kind of arms or military implements.

It would be greatly appreciated if this note could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12742**

**Note verbale dated 30 May 1978 from the representative of Gabon  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: French]  
[20 June 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Gabonese Republic to the United Nations, referring to the Secretary-General's note of 18 May 1978, has the honour to remind him of the content of his note of 9 May 1978 [S/12705] addressed to the Secretary-General.

In this connexion the Permanent Representative reaffirms to the Secretary-General that the Gabonese Republic has never manufactured arms, has never supplied

or sold arms to South Africa and has never served as a forwarding agency between South Africa and other States. The Gabonese Republic has no intention of departing from this policy in the future.

The Permanent Representative of the Gabonese Republic would be grateful if the Secretary-General would have this note circulated as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12743**

**Note verbale dated 25 May 1978 from the representative of the Philippines  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[20 June 1978]

The Acting Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note dated 18 May 1978 concerning Security Council resolution 418 (1977) on the question of South Africa.

The Philippines does not maintain diplomatic, economic, cultural, trade or any form of relations with South Africa and has, with strict consistency, supported, adhered to and observed all resolutions of the United Nations on the question of South Africa. Recognition or co-operation in whatever manner is not accorded by the Philippine Government to the *apartheid* régime of South Africa.

**DOCUMENT S/12744**

**Note verbale dated 30 May 1978 from the representative of Kuwait  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[20 June 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the State of Kuwait to the United Nations referring to the Secretary-General's note dated 18 May 1978 regarding implementation of paragraph 3 of resolution 418 (1977), has the honour to state that the said provisions do not apply to Kuwait, which has absolutely no contractual arrangements with and licences granted to South Africa relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and vehicles. Kuwait has absolutely no dealings with South Africa in the political, economic, consular or any other fields and will not entertain any relations with the racist régime at Pretoria so long as it maintains its odious policy of *apartheid*, which is a crime against humanity, and until it relinquishes its illegal control over Namibia.

**DOCUMENT S/12745**

**Note verbale dated 26 May 1978 from the representative of Indonesia  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[20 June 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations, referring to the Secretary-General's note of 18 May 1978, has the honour to state that the Republic of Indonesia has no contractual agreements with or licences granted to South Africa of any sort.

**DOCUMENT S/12746**

**Note verbale dated 5 June 1978 from the representative of Iran  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[20 June 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's notes dated 3 April and 18 May 1978 regarding information sought by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa.

In this connexion, the Permanent Representative of Iran wishes to reiterate the contents of the reply of the Government of Iran to the Secretary-General's note of

10 November 1977 contained in his note dated 9 March 1978 [S/12596] to the effect that:

"While stating that Iran has never engaged in arms transactions with South Africa and that it will never involve itself in such transactions in the future, the Government of Iran hereby announces its full support for all measures recommended in the aforementioned resolution and once again reiterates that it will scrupulously adhere to its provisions."

**DOCUMENT S/12747**

**Note verbale dated 9 June 1978 from the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[20 June 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations, referring to the Secretary-General's notes dated 3 April and 18 May 1978, has the honour to inform him that the Syrian Arab Republic has already made known its position on the question of South Africa in its note S/12682 of 27 April 1978, stating that the Syrian Government has consistently opposed the *apartheid* system and has never had any relations of any kind with the racist régime of South Africa. Syria has always expressed its unequivocal support for the people of South Africa in their just struggle to put an end to the *apartheid* régime and for liberation and national independence. The Syrian Arab Republic pledges, furthermore, its support for and co-operation with the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa.

**DOCUMENT S/12748**

**Note verbale dated 19 June 1978 from the representative of Portugal  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[20 June 1978]

The Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note dated 10 November 1977, transmitting the text of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) on the question of South Africa, adopted on 4 November 1977.

This matter has received the most careful consideration from the Portuguese authorities. The Portuguese Government fully supports resolution 418 (1977) and

intends to undertake all the necessary measures for its implementation.

On the other hand, the Portuguese Government will not fail to report to the Secretary-General all relevant information related to the aforementioned resolution.

The Permanent Representative of Portugal requests the Secretary-General to have this note circulated as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/12749**

**Note verbale dated 14 June 1978 from the Mission of Mauritius  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[21 June 1978]

The Permanent Mission of Mauritius to the United Nations, referring to the Secretary-General's note of

10 November 1977 concerning the implementation of resolution 418 (1977) on the question of South Africa,

has the honour to communicate the following information received in a letter from the Ministry of External Affairs of Mauritius:

"The provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) have been fully implemented by the Government. Mauritius does not have any arms dealings with South Africa.

"Furthermore, we have raised our voice in several regional and international forums against the *apartheid* policy of the South African Government and shall continue to do so."

The Permanent Mission of Mauritius has the honour to request that this note verbale should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

#### **DOCUMENT S/12750**

##### **Letter dated 14 June 1978 from the representative of Venezuela to the Secretary-General**

[Original: Spanish]  
[21 June 1978]

I have the honour to refer to paragraph 3 of resolution 418 (1977), brought to our attention at the request of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa.

The Permanent Mission of Venezuela confirms the substance of its letter of 23 January 1978 [S/12541], in which it stated that Venezuela had not maintained and would not maintain relations of any kind with the racist régime of South Africa and would continue to comply with all the decisions taken by the United Nations against that régime. Therefore, Venezuela does not have to review any contract or licence relating to the manufacture of military equipment, as mentioned in paragraph 3 of the above-mentioned resolution.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Rubén CARPIO CASTILLO  
Permanent Representative of Venezuela  
to the United Nations

#### **DOCUMENT S/12751**

##### **Note verbale dated 15 June 1978 from the Mission of Colombia to the Secretary-General**

[Original: Spanish]  
[21 June 1978]

The Permanent Mission of Colombia to the United Nations has the honour, with reference to the Secretary-General's note of 18 May 1978 concerning the question of South Africa, to state, in accordance with instructions from its Government, that Colombia has no contractual arrangements with South Africa and has granted no licences to that country relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition or military equipment and vehicles.

#### **DOCUMENT S/12752\***

##### **Letter dated 19 June 1978 from the representative of Qatar to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[21 June 1978]

On behalf of the Arab Group at the United Nations, I should like to refer to the letter sent to the President of the Security Council by the Israeli representative on 6 June 1978 [S/12730] and the letter he sent to the Secretary-General on 31 May 1978 [S/12725]. I will not try to answer the contents of his letter concerning

the Palestinian people and their rights, because those rights and the struggle of the Palestinian people to regain them have been confirmed on numerous occasions by the United Nations and its organs, but I want particularly to draw your attention to what the Israeli representative calls "the Judaea and Samaria districts of the west bank". This is yet another act consistent with the persistent Israeli policy of annexation and "change

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/33/153-S/12752.

of the status of the occupied territories", and constitutes a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and of the relevant United Nations resolutions, including General Assembly resolution 32/91C of 13 December 1977. The United Nations never recognized either the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories or the names given to them by the occupation authorities. The Arab Group takes a very serious view of the misuse of official United Nations documents by the Israeli representative in giving Israeli names to Arab territories in

total disregard of the terminology recognized and used by the United Nations and its organs. I ask you kindly to see to it that the Secretariat refrains in the future from allowing such misuse by the Israeli representative of United Nations documents.

I have the honour to request that this letter should be distributed as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jasim Yousef JAMAL  
Permanent Representative of Qatar  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/12753

##### Note verbale dated 18 June 1978 from the representative of Bulgaria to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[23 June 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's two notes dated 18 May 1978 concerning the arms embargo against South Africa.

The Permanent Representative, in forwarding his reply, wishes to recall his note of 9 December 1977 [S/12496] addressed to the Secretary-General, where the Bulgarian Government's position on the arms embargo was clearly spelled out. In this connexion, the Permanent Representative wishes to state once again that the stand of his Government regarding the arms embargo remains unaltered. The Bulgarian Government does not maintain any diplomatic or economic relations whatsoever with South Africa and does not and will not provide arms or military equipment.

#### DOCUMENT S/12754

##### Note verbale dated 21 June 1978 from the Mission of Poland to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[23 June 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the Polish People's Republic to the United Nations, has the honour, with reference to the Secretary-General's note of 18 May 1978, to state the following.

The Permanent Mission, in its note to the Secretary-General of 22 December 1977 [S/12507], already expressed Poland's full support for the Security Council decision, contained in resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977, to strengthen the embargo on the provision of arms and related material to the racist régime at Pretoria. Faithful to its policy of full support for the complete elimination of *apartheid* and all remnants of colonialism, Poland has never supplied any kind of weapons or military equipment to South Africa through

any channel, be it direct or indirect, and has no intention whatsoever of changing its consistent policy in this regard.

Therefore, Poland is in full compliance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of the said resolution, as it has never entered into any contractual arrangements with or granted any licences to South Africa relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and vehicles.

The Permanent Mission of the Polish People's Republic has the honour to request that this note verbale should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

#### DOCUMENT S/12756

##### Letter dated 8 June 1978 from the representative of Chad to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]  
[26 June 1978]

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the communiqué by the Supreme Military Council and

the Provisional Government issued at the conclusion of a joint meeting held on 7 June 1978 at N'Djamena.

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council and have the communiqué distributed as a document of the Council. I also attach a copy of the joint communiqué issued at Benghazi on 27 March 1978.

(Signed) Beadengar DESSANDE  
Permanent Representative of Chad  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX I

##### Joint communiqué by the Supreme Military Council and the Provisional Government dated 7 June 1978

Under the terms of the communiqué signed at Benghazi on 27 March 1978, a new conference of national reconciliation should have been held at Tripoli on Wednesday, 7 June 1978, with the participation of the representatives of the Sudanese, Niger, Libyan and Chad Governments as well as a delegation of FROLINAT (Goukouni faction).

Since 27 March 1978, the evolution of relations among the various protagonists has been marked by events which have rendered the situation — at the very least — unsettled. Consequently, the Chad Government leaves it to the first Vice-President of the Sudan, President of the Conference and the only person authorized to convene the Conference.

Pending such an initiative, the Chad authorities reaffirm their willingness — which has never been denied — to attend any meeting which the first Vice-President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan might wish to organize.

#### ANNEX II

##### Text of the declaration adopted at the summit meeting held at Sebha and Benghazi on 27 March 1978

###### JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ

In accordance with the provisions of the declaration adopted at the Sebha summit meeting and signed by:

- Colonel Muammar Al-Qadhafi, leader of the great revolution of 1 September;
- President Félix Malloum, President of the Supreme Military Council of the Republic of Chad;
- Aboukasssem Mohamed Ibrahim, first Vice-President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan,

Affirming the noble initiatives and lofty objectives aimed at achieving national reconciliation in the Republic of Chad,

Having faith in the ability of Africans to resolve their own problems,

The Conference, under the presidency of His Excellency Aboukasssem Mohamed Ibrahim, first Vice-President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, head of the Sudanese delegation, was held at Sebha and subsequently at Benghazi from 12 to 18 elakhir 1398, corresponding to 21 to 27 March 1978.

The following took part in the meeting:

- Major Moumouni Djermakoye Adamou, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, head of the delegation of the Niger;

— Mr. Ali Abdussalam Treiki, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, head of the delegation of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

— Colonel Djime Mamari Ngakinar, Vice-President of the Supreme Military Council, head of the delegation of the Republic of Chad;

— Mr. Goukouni Wedei, President of the National Liberation Front of Chad, head of the delegation.

They have agreed as follows:

1. Recognition of the National Liberation Front of Chad by the Supreme Military Council and the Provisional Government of the Republic of Chad.

2. The two parties have agreed to establish a cease-fire and to maintain it, and to enable the Military Committee established by the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Republic of the Niger to watch over its implementation and to refrain from taking any step that might impede the fulfilment of its duties. This cease-fire shall take effect from the date of signature of this communiqué. The Military Committee is entrusted with the task of ensuring its strict application with effect from 10 April 1978.

3. The parties decide to end the publicity campaigns and to devote them to the cause of national reconciliation.

4. The two parties agree to freedom of movement within the Republic of Chad.

5. The Chad Government and FROLINAT shall undertake to provide all facilities to the Military Committee, which is entrusted with the task of ascertaining the presence of foreign troops and military bases.

6. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Republic of the Niger guarantee the execution of this agreement and will ensure the observance of its provisions. The President of the Conference, Aboukasssem Mohamed Ibrahim, will take all the necessary measures to ensure the implementation of this communiqué and to inform the Administrative Secretary of OAU thereof.

7. The Conference has decided to hold another meeting at Tripoli on 7 June 1978 in order to review the progress achieved in the field of national reconciliation.

8. This agreement shall take effect from 18 rabi elakhir 1398, corresponding to 27 March 1978.

Done in six copies in both the Arabic and French languages, both versions being authentic.

For the President of the  
Democratic Republic of  
the Sudan:

(Signed) Aboukasssem  
Mohamed IBRAHIM  
First Vice-President

For the Socialist People's  
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya:  
(Signed) Ali Abdussalam  
TREIKI

Secretary for Foreign Affairs

For the Republic of the Niger:

(Signed) Major Moumouni  
Djermakoye ADAMOUM  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
and Co-operation

For the Republic of Chad:

(Signed) Colonel  
Djime Mamari NGAKINAR  
Vice-President of  
the Supreme Military Council

For the National Liberation  
Front of Chad:  
(Signed) Goukouni WEDEI

#### DOCUMENT S/12757

##### Note verbale dated 20 June 1978 from the representative of the United States of America to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[26 June 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations has the honor to refer to the Secretary-General's note dated 18 May 1978

concerning the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), which established a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

As stated in our note verbale of 8 December 1977 [S/12479] to the Secretary-General, there are no licensing agreements between United States companies and South Africa covering United States commodities or technical data for the manufacture of arms in that country. Naturally, no such licence would be approved in the future should the United States receive an application from a United States firm.

#### DOCUMENT S/12759

##### Note verbale dated 27 June 1978 from the representative of Czechoslovakia to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[28 June 1978]

The Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United Nations, referring to the Secretary-General's note dated 18 May 1978 concerning Security Council resolution 418 (1977) on the question of South Africa, has the honour to communicate the following position of the Czechoslovak Government.

Following the respective United Nations appeal, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic discontinued all diplomatic, consular, commercial, cultural and other contacts with South Africa as early as 1963, and it continues to fulfil consistently all its commitments resulting from the adoption by the United Nations of measures in the struggle against *apartheid*.

In this connexion, the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has the honour to assure the Secretary-General that no contractual arrangements exist between it and South Africa relating to the manufacture and delivery of arms, ammunition of all types, military equipment and vehicles and that it fully supports the decision by the Security Council to impose mandatory sanctions on deliveries of weapons and military equipment of all types to South Africa.

The Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has the honour to request that this communication should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

#### DOCUMENT S/12760

##### Note verbale dated 26 June 1978 from the Mission of Cuba to the Secretary-General

[Original: Spanish]  
[29 June 1978]

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cuba to the United Nations has the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 418 (1977) on the question of South Africa, mentioned in the Secretary-General's note dated 10 November 1977.

The Government of the Republic of Cuba has, at successive sessions of the General Assembly, vigorously condemned both the sale of weapons and related materials being supplied by some States to South Africa as well as their co-operation in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons.

One of the elements of Cuba's foreign policy is support for peoples subjected to *apartheid*, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism and racial discrimination. It accordingly repudiates and condemns the South African régime and those States that abet such practices.

Cuba has a long tradition of fighting for oppressed peoples. On the African continent, Cuba's presence be-

side its African brothers goes back to the time when the heroic Patrice Lumumba was foully murdered.

In the fight against Portuguese colonialism, Cuban blood and African blood flowed together. Angola and the other former Portuguese colonies are familiar with the solidarity of the Cuban Government and people.

During the aggression by South Africa against Angola, Cuba did not hesitate to respond to the Angolan Government's appeal. The myth of South African invincibility crumbled when the racist régime was confronted with international solidarity.

The President of the Council of State, Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro, has more than once publicly reaffirmed the Cuban Government's repudiation of régimes that, like the South African régime, subvert the inalienable right of peoples as set out in the Charter of the United Nations.



Note verbale dated 22 June 1978 from the Mission of Mexico  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: Spanish]  
[30 June 1978]

The Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's notes dated 3 April and 18 May 1978, in which the Government of Mexico was requested to provide information on the measures taken in accordance with Security Council resolution 418 (1977).


The Mission wishes to inform the Secretary-General that its note of 13 December 1977 [S/12505] provided detailed information concerning the measures taken by the Government of Mexico in connexion with the sanctions imposed against the Republic of South Africa. The competent Mexican authorities have continued to comply strictly with all United Nations resolutions concerning *apartheid* and the illegal occupation of Namibia.

However, the Mission wishes to state that, on 16 June 1978, a meeting was held at Mexico City by the Latin American and Caribbean Committee against *Apartheid*,


at which the following message was read on behalf of the Secretary for External Relations of Mexico:

"President López Portillo has stated that the history of Mexico has been a constant struggle against colonialism and its vestiges. In the struggle which we must continue to wage in the conquest of new horizons in order to bring about a better and more just Mexico, a concerted effort is needed not only from the Government but also from all sectors and all citizens acting with one accord. I should therefore like to convey to you all my most sincere congratulations for the important work that you are carrying out in the noble cause of eliminating *apartheid* and racism from the face of the earth, and I repeat that Mexico will continue, with the express agreement of the President of the Republic and with the conviction of us all, to seek, through the United Nations, the most effective means to achieve that objective."




MAP ATTACHED TO TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS SUBMITTED 13 APRIL 178





**KIBRIS**  
**(CYPRUS)**  
ÖLÇEK  
SCALE 1 : 250000



**LEGEND**

-  The Area falling between the forward defence lines
-  Main roads
-  Boundary line of the sovereign base areas





The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

一九七八年五月观察员部队的部署状况  
 UNDOF DEPLOYMENT AS OF MAY 1978  
 DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FNUOD AU MOIS DE MAI 1978  
 ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ СООННР ПО ПОЛОЖЕНИЮ НА МАЙ 1978 ГОДА  
 DESPLIEGUE DE LA FNUOS EN MAYO DE 1978

- |  |                                 |                          |
|--|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| △ 联合国观察所                                     | ○ 联合国部队的位置                      | --- 巡逻线                  |
| United Nations observation post              | United Nations position         | Patrol routes            |
| Poste d'observation de l'ONU                 | Position de l'ONU               | Parcours des patrouilles |
| Наблюдательный пункт ООН                     | Позиция ООН                     | Маршруты патрулей        |
| Puesto de observación de las Naciones Unidas | Posición de las Naciones Unidas | Rutas de patrulla        |

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