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REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION

Verification in all its aspects

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

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* A/41/150.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

[Original: English]

[15 July 1986]

1. Unswervingly advocating effective verification of disarmament, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic regards verification measures as an integral part of every contractual document on the limitation and reduction of armed forces, armament and combat technology. Its approach to this matter is based on the provision of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2), adopted by consensus in 1978, which stipulates that "the form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement".
2. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic considers that the main task of verification is to safeguard strict compliance with the agreed measures aimed at limiting and halting the arms race and strengthening mutual confidence and the security of the respective contracting parties.
3. For the purpose of implementing verification, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic calls for the use of both national and international verification procedures, including on-site inspection. This applies to limitation and elimination of nuclear weapons; prohibition of nuclear testing; prohibition of the development, testing and deployment of space-strike weapons, including accessibility of laboratories to international inspection; halting of the development and production of chemical weapons, destruction of existing stockpiles and dismantling of the facilities for their production; verification of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. Other measures can also be elaborated.
4. Measures of control and verification should in no case become an instrument of interference in internal affairs or harm the security of any of the parties concerned. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is strongly opposed to misusing the problem of verification as an impediment blocking progress and the conclusion of agreements at disarmament negotiations, or as a disguise concealing the pursuit of militarist plans and of the launching of a new round of the arms race.

FINLAND

[Original: English]

[11 August 1986]

1. Verification is an important part of disarmament and arms control agreements. It is commonly accepted that verification of arms control and disarmament should be fair, balanced, non-discriminatory and clear in its intent and procedures. While these principles are widely accepted, they are more difficult to realize in all

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equity, particularly in issues that are openly disputed and under severe political strain.

2. In their joint statement of 20 September 1961 on agreed principles for disarmament negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union have confirmed their acceptance of "strict and effective international control" implemented by an international disarmament organization "created within the framework of the United Nations". This organization should be "assured unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification".

3. This far-reaching goal should be the final objective of the endeavours of all Member States of the United Nations. It is a long-term objective that must be tackled with prudence and patience.

4. Today, the compliance of various verification measures is usually controlled by so-called national technical means. Since the technological capabilities for effective verification by national technical means are not widespread and the results - for understandable reasons - not readily shared, the international community should search for complementary alternatives on a voluntary basis. One such possibility could be the creation of a verification data base compiled and managed by the United Nations. The members would be invited to contribute to this data base a wide range of information pertaining to arms control and disarmament, starting, for example, from national military expenditures. In the future, this data could be utilized as a source on a variety of regional arms control efforts such as the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

5. The establishment of a data base centre within the auspices of the United Nations could be strengthened by the creation of an international satellite monitoring agency, already proposed by France in 1978 and supported in 1981 by the expert group set up by the Secretary-General. The opinion of the expert group was that an agency using shared international technical verification means would be a useful tool in the prevention of international crises.

6. The credibility of such a verification-supporting data base centre could be further enhanced by United Nations observers and inspection teams empowered with sufficient rights to obtain and gather relevant information wherever they might be operating. Yet another worthwhile supporting step to consider could be the conducting of United Nations-sponsored seminars and conferences on the development of verification methods and techniques. These could take the form of regular expert meetings of academics, diplomats and military specialists, or they could be undertaken on an ad hoc basis. They would fall within the generally accepted idea of increased consultations and communications between the Member States of the United Nations.

UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

[Original: Russian]

[13 August 1986]

1. The main purpose of verification in arms limitation and disarmament is to give the parties to an agreement effective assurance that the obligations they have assumed will be scrupulously respected; this will help to build confidence between the parties and thereby facilitate the implementation of measures to limit the arms race.

2. It follows that the crucial features of any such agreement are the specific measures on arms limitation and reduction. Verification plays an auxiliary role, ensuring that agreements do take effect:

3. Verification must be appropriate: it must be fully consistent with the scope and nature of the limits and other provisions in the agreement. The Ukrainian SSR fully agrees with resolution 40/152 O that "the form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement". The validity of the principle of consistency between verification measures and arms limitation measures is entirely borne out by existing agreements in the sphere of disarmament.

4. The preponderant role in verification belongs to national technical means of verification. When necessary, these can be supplemented by other measures, even on-site inspections, in order to enhance their effectiveness. These measures need to promote compliance with agreements on arms control and limitation without becoming a vehicle for interference in one party's internal affairs or jeopardizing its interests. Demanding verification by methods divorced from the real requirements of an arms control and disarmament agreement, methods having nothing to do with the task of verification under that agreement, is nothing more than a means of obstructing agreement.

5. An example of a constructive, consistent approach to the problems of verifying agreements on disarmament is the position of the socialist countries, which advocate radical arms reductions with effective verification.

6. The Soviet Union devotes a great deal of attention to verification issues in its extensive disarmament proposals. The programme for the eradication of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, proposed in the statement made by M. S. Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on 15 January 1986, suggests that verification, to be conducted by both national technical means and other methods, including on-site inspection, should offer assurances to all sides that nothing is being done to circumvent the restrictions imposed. The destruction of nuclear weapons and the dismantling, refitting or destruction of nuclear-weapon launchers, each of which will require special procedures to be devised, will be subject to effective verification, international and other.

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7. There are no insuperable obstacles to the verification of a nuclear test ban with national technical means and, where necessary, international procedures, including on-site inspection. Accumulated experience and the new Soviet proposals in this area show very clearly that references to any kind of serious verification difficulties with a ban on all nuclear-weapons tests are wholly unjustified. The well-known proposals by the New Delhi Six can also be used in the verification of a nuclear test ban; the Soviet Union is prepared to accept this.

8. Abandonment of the manufacture, testing and deployment of space strike weapons will require rigorous monitoring, including the opening of the relevant laboratories for inspection.

9. The preliminary requirements for the swift conclusion of an agreement to ban and destroy chemical weapons and dismantle the facilities where they are manufactured have all been met. Systematic international checks - the principal means of international supervision over the destruction of chemical weapons in storage, the manufacture of deadly super-toxic chemicals for permitted purposes, and the destruction and dismantling of chemical-weapon manufacturing facilities - will constitute key provisions of a future convention. Ensuring effective verification of a ban on chemical weapons was the central feature of the new proposals put forward by the USSR in April 1986 at the Conference on Disarmament.

10. Regarding the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces in central Europe, the Soviet Union in April 1986 proposed significant reductions in all segments of the Europe-based land and tactical air forces of the European States, the United States and Canada, with strict monitoring of every stage of the process by both national technical means and international checks, including, where necessary, inspection on the spot.

11. Verification of compliance with agreements on disarmament is thus one element of this process. The principal guarantee of compliance with a treaty, however, is the legal obligation incumbent on the State concluding it.
