

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 24 June 1986, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. K. Tellalov

(Bulgaria)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I declare open the 364th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all I should like to welcome the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Excellency Vladimir Petrovsky. I think that he requires no introduction as his activities related to the United Nations in the field of disarmament are well known. However, we cannot fail to note that for his first statement as Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR he has seen fit to address the Conference on Disarmament, and I am certain that members will listen to his statement with great interest.

On my list of speakers for today I have the distinguished representatives of the USSR and Norway. I call on the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, His Excellency Vladimir Petrovsky.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade President, it is a pleasure for me to see you, a distinguished diplomat and political leader of the fraternal People's Republic of Bulgaria, in the post of President of the Disarmament Conference. The relations between our two countries are built on a solid foundation of friendship between fraternal countries, which have stood the test of time and are based on mutual understanding and security between our countries. I would like to express my certainty that the work of the Conference on Disarmament under your leadership will be marked by progress towards reaching understanding on the problems being examined at the Conference.

In the present situation, what are needed are resolute actions and concrete measures so as to bring about a radical change for the better in international events, put an end to the arms race and strengthen security. The alternative to this is an increase of confrontation which can result only in the world sliding towards nuclear war. In accordance with the objective set at the twenty-seventh Congress of the CPSU of establishing a comprehensive system of international security, the Soviet Union has undertaken a number of energetic new actions and initiatives. Major innovative peace proposals were recently put forward by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty at the summit meeting of its member States in Budapest. The achievement of security through disarmament in our complicated but interrelated world, full of contradictions requires concerted effort, collective wisdom and a contribution on the part of all of us -- and it also requires that the entire disarmament negotiating machinery both bilateral and multilateral be set in motion and that its efficiency be enhanced.

Today, simply no State has any means of survival except through political decisions, through agreements limiting and reducing the arsenals of destruction. No one will be able to defend himself on his own by military and technological means, by defence on Earth or in outer space. Nuclear war must never be started and can never be won. When common understanding on this was reached by the highest leaders of the USSR and the United States in Geneva last autumn, people throughout the world were given hope. Today, however, this hope has become mixed with alarm and dissatisfaction.

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The reason for this is quite clear. The military machine of the United States and the NATO bloc, instead of losing speed is actually gaining speed in all the areas of the arms build up. The Star Wars programme is going ahead at increased speed and the development of new strategic offensive weapons is being stepped up. To clear the way for them, the treaty barriers established by the SALT agreements are being thrown down, thereby opening the flood gates of an uncontrollable arms race. While the Soviet Union has since 6 August 1985 been observing its moratorium on nuclear explosions, the Nevada tests are going ahead at full speed, and in that time their number has reached the sizeable figure of 12. The conventional armaments of the North Atlantic Alliance are undergoing radical modernization. We are witnessing, if I may so put it, an armed uprising of the United States against the realities of our times.

At the same time, the United States and its closest allies have chosen to put a brake on progress in the political and diplomatic field instead of accelerating it, as was agreed upon in Geneva. In all the ongoing negotiations in Geneva, Vienna and Stockholm, we see the same picture: Washington's positions at the negotiations are not in keeping with its political declarations of readiness ultimately to eliminate nuclear weapons and the inadmissibility of seeking military superiority. As a result there is a growing and dangerous asymmetry in the arms limitation and disarmament field.

We believe that double standards in politics are unacceptable. If one is genuinely pursuing the aims of preventing nuclear war, one must confirm it with concrete deeds and translate these political declarations into the language of practical deeds.

At this difficult period it is the obligation of every State to act with the utmost responsibility and restraint, in the full realization that the watershed in the world today does not lie along the lines of alliances or ideologies but between the advocates of universal security and those who in pursuit of their narrow selfish interests are driving the world towards catastrophe.

What the peoples of the world are expecting from the Conference on Disarmament today are not eloquent words but practical deeds and tangible results in the field of disarmament. Its agenda includes items, the solutions of which are primarily linked to progress towards security for all, towards a world without weapons and wars.

We propose that we build the edifice of such a world at an accelerated pace by means of large building blocks, in keeping with the programme of disarmament put forward in the statement of Mikhail Gorbachev on 15 January 1986, and with the plan for the stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere by the year 2000, which is the nucleus of that programme. The tragedy that occurred recently in our country, the Chernobyl accident, is yet another terrible warning about the dangers inherent in the nuclear age, something which calls for particular responsibility and new political thinking.

The goal, as the Soviet Union sees it is to make the world free from the nuclear threat in all respects. Our proposals aimed at setting up a régime

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for the safe development of nuclear energy are inspired by this wish. We note with satisfaction that our proposals in this field have received wide support and work on specific components of such a régime will soon begin. At the same time I would like once again to emphasize that genuine comprehensive nuclear security is possible only under the conditions of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

I have no doubt that delegates are familiar with the contents of our nuclear disarmament programme and I would therefore like to highlight some areas where, it seems, urgent efforts, including efforts of a multilateral kind, can and must be made.

We see the cessation of nuclear tests as the top priority and we consider it entirely natural and deeply symbolic that this problem heads the agenda of the Conference. In an effort to set a good example, as was called for by the General Assembly, the Soviet Union has introduced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions which has been extended three times and will continue in effect until 6 August. These decisions were not easy to take from a political, security or economic standpoint, since peaceful explosions have also been suspended, but we have been guided by the supreme interests of mankind, by the desire jointly proclaimed by the USSR and the United States at their summit meeting to prevent nuclear war. We are confident that given the common will nuclear tests can be stopped, especially since the necessary preconditions for doing so exist.

For many years now the problem of verification has been raised. The problem simply does not exist today. National technical means of verification have become more sophisticated and can be supplemented by international procedures. The Soviet Union favours the strictest possible verification of the ban on nuclear-weapon tests, including on-site inspections and making use of all achievements in seismology. We stand ready to consider favourably all constructive proposals in this field no matter where they come from.

We are sometimes asked what we mean by saying that on-site inspection of the prohibition of nuclear tests might be carried out "if necessary". Some would like to interpret this wording as a desire on our part to preserve a loophole in order to refuse on-site verification. I want to state with the utmost responsibility that there is no loophole here at all. Should any ambiguous situation arise when, for example, an exchange of seismic data would make it difficult to determine whether or not there had been a nuclear explosion or an underground tremor due to some other reason, that would in fact be just case when an on-site inspection would be required.

In a word, there are neither technical nor negotiating problems here. The issue of a test ban has now reached the moment of truth when one can see clearly what political course is being pursued by whom.

The Soviet Union, as you know, is ready for any form of negotiations -- bilateral Soviet-United States talks, trilateral talks between the USSR, the United States and Great Britain, and multilateral talks. We are also ready to give effect to the proposal for expanding the scope of the Moscow Treaty to underground tests which are at present not covered by it.

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Today we once again call upon the Conference on Disarmament immediately to start multilateral negotiations and to work towards a draft treaty. Let us act, and let there be no question of what should be considered first, verification or prohibition. Let us solve these problems simultaneously, but the main thing is to solve them.

It cannot be permitted that the position of the United States, to the effect that tests are needed to develop new types and systems of nuclear and space weapons, should further condemn the international community to inaction on such an unresolved issue as the prohibition of nuclear tests. The determination of the Soviet Union and of the other States of the Warsaw Treaty to achieve the early, complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests has once again been solemnly reaffirmed by the Political Consultative Committee at its meeting in Budapest. We are well aware of the position of the Non-Aligned Movement and neutral States which also want to see the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. As you know the Soviet Union has responded positively to the six leaders' initiatives on this matter. Many Western countries too have expressed their readiness to pursue negotiations on this urgent question of contemporary politics. In a word, all the conditions exist to enable the Conference to pass from words to deeds.

It is only natural that the Conference, whose paramount task is to work out arrangements concerning the prevention of nuclear war and disarmament, should pay close attention to the Soviet-United States negotiations which are going on in this same city. There is no doubt that the overall situation in the field of arms reduction and disarmament as a whole is closely linked to the progress of these negotiations. It is advisable that these negotiations be conducted confidentially and that is what we for our part are doing. But the political substance of the matter must be clear, particularly because the other side, before giving a response to our most recent proposals, decided to present the world with its own interpretation of the Soviet initiatives.

We are far from satisfied with the situation, when the implementation of the agreed mandate for negotiation to seek agreement preventing an arms race in space and to end it on Earth has not budged. Firmly pursuing our line of a practical search for a mutually acceptable agreement, we have recently proposed realistic compromise solutions, though initially of a partial nature. Their substance is as follows.

We have proposed that we should reach agreement on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for at least 15 years, and in order to strengthen the régime of this Treaty to agree on where the line between permitted and prohibited activities lies. Furthermore, the Soviet side has never intended and does not intend to place any restrictions on basic research. We are simply suggesting that it should not be permitted to proceed beyond threshold laboratory research, a threshold already reached by the United States. Naturally, our proposal to ban space strike weapons right now has not been removed from the agenda.

Agreement on issues concerning not extending the arms race into outer space would open the way for radical reductions of strategic nuclear weapons. Our line here is equally active and is aimed at overcoming the difficulties which have arisen at the negotiations. We are in favour of a radical,

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fifty-per-cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons. At the same time we have proposed, as an intermediate measure, that we agree to limit ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers and submarines with long range cruise missiles to equal levels. Each side would limit the number of its nuclear charges to 8,000. This would really be a major reduction. In that case, medium-range weapons capable of reaching each other's territory would not be counted.

A separate subject of Soviet-United States negotiations is the elimination of Soviet and American medium range missiles in Europe. This would also be a major step towards real disarmament and would amount to hundreds of nuclear weapons. In an effort to move on to the practical plane, the Soviet delegation tabled at the negotiations the draft of an agreement on this issue. The American side has informed the public of this but has not shown any readiness to tackle the matter at the negotiating table.

Various artificial obstacles have been erected to the elimination of Soviet and American medium range missiles in Europe. Just take the question of Soviet medium-range missiles in Asia. Firstly, it should be noted that these medium-range missiles have nothing whatever to do with the situation in Europe. To provide better guarantees of this, the Soviet Union has stated that it would not deploy any such weapons to the west of the meridian of 80° Eastern Longitude. Further, we are prepared to undertake not to redeploy such weapons from the east to the west and not to increase their number in the east of the country, on the understanding that there would be no change in the military-strategic situation in the Asian region, and no additional deployment of United States nuclear means capable of reaching USSR territory. Ultimately, all nuclear weapons including those in Asia, would be eliminated in the process of implementing the nuclear disarmament programme proposed by the USSR.

I would like to draw your attention to another point. In proposing to eliminate Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union has made a major concession by not insisting on retaining an equivalent in these weapons to the number of nuclear missiles possessed by Great Britain and France. In this regard it is entirely justifiable to raise the question that during the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe there would be no quantitative build-up of the corresponding British and French arsenals. Thus, the stability of the strategic situation in Europe would be strengthened and the effectiveness and stability of the proposed agreement would be maintained.

An attempt has also been made to raise the problem of shorter-than-medium range missiles as an obstacle to the task of ridding Europe of Soviet and American medium-range missiles. Well, firstly, as to these shorter-range missiles our nuclear disarmament programme has provided for the most radical of measures, their total and complete elimination everywhere.

Secondly, new proposals by the Warsaw Treaty member States have opened up excellent prospects in this regard. According to these proposals, concurrently with conventional arms, operational-tactical nuclear weapons would also be subject to reductions. I would also remind you that our operational-tactical longer-range missiles deployed in response to the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe would be withdrawn from

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the territories of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic as soon as these American weapons are eliminated.

These are our new proposals aimed at accelerating Soviet-United States talks. The ball is in the United States court. To come to terms in the negotiations would be a major step forward towards the implementation of our programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Furthermore, I would like also to stress, particularly in the light of recent decisions of the Political Consultative Committee in Budapest, that in seeking to put into practice the concept of a nuclear-free world we are far from desiring to retain and further increase the mountains of conventional weapons. Here too, as in the case of nuclear weapons, we have presented a programme of action with a clearcut time-frame.

We propose mutual reductions not only of land troops but also of strike tactical aircraft applicable to the whole territory of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Already by the beginning of the 1990s, the numerical strength of troops would be reduced by not less than one-quarter, that is, the total reduction would be one million troops. A sizeable measure has also been proposed as a first step to reduce personnel on each side by 100 to 150,000 men within the next one or two years.

Our programme lays special stress on questions of verification. All the proposed measures would be carried out under strict and effective control, including international procedures, up to and including on-site inspections. In fact, even operational activities of troops remaining after the reductions would also be open to monitoring. As additional guarantees, an exchange of statistical data would be provided on the total strength of troops and tactical airforces, and on specific separate parameters.

The programme for the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe put forward by the Warsaw Treaty member States shows the groundlessness of the allegations that the Soviet Union and its allies do not want a dialogue on conventional weapons and are concentrating all attention on nuclear disarmament.

In advancing the solution for the problem of conventional arms throughout Europe, we also want to achieve as soon as possible tangible results in the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

Our goal is to reduce the level of armed confrontation between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO States to the lowest possible level. The proposed deep cuts in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, while important in their own right, particularly in terms of reducing the risk of war on that continent, are at the same time a major contribution to the programme of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere by the beginning of the twenty-first century.

This is our attitude to the bilateral and European dialogue on disarmament matters which, of course, cannot fail to have an impact on the Conference. Nevertheless, it is our belief that the Conference itself and the States participating in its work and their representatives can do a great deal to make progress towards preventing an arms race in space and ending it here on Earth.

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The Conference on Disarmament has great possibilities for practical action to prevent the arms race from reaching outer space. We cannot allow the Conference to sit idle and wait for results to be reached at neighbouring negotiations. What, in effect, prevents the starting of work on an agreement or agreements to exclude space from the sphere of the arms race, as called for by the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly in a resolution voted for by 151 States? Not only are there no contra-indications, but indeed there is every possible reason for it, particularly as all nuclear-weapon States and States with a space potential are represented here at the Conference.

Recently, the Soviet Union introduced in the United Nations a fundamentally new important proposal. The substance of this proposal is simple: to make space the theatre of Star Peace and not Star Wars. This proposal contains a number of practical considerations about how to organize international co-operation for preventing an arms race in space and for its peaceful exploration. We hope that these proposals will be given the necessary attention by participants in the Conference.

The Conference also has sizeable tasks in the field of preventing nuclear war. We believe that it is time to start negotiations on this issue within the framework of the relevant subsidiary body.

We would be ready to support the establishment of either an ad hoc committee on this subject or, if this is not acceptable to the United States and its allies, a committee of the whole to discuss all issues relating to the prevention of nuclear war. For us, the essential thing is not what name we give to such a subsidiary body but what it will be doing and what practical results it may achieve.

The Soviet Union has consistently favoured the holding, within the framework of the Conference, of multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The Soviet programme for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of this century is in our view quite a good starting point for our Conference to begin such negotiations.

The creation of a secure world is inconceivable for us without chemical disarmament. We welcome the fact that the Conference has made the objective of ridding the world of chemical weapons one of its top priorities. To speed up the solution of this problem would be facilitated by interim steps such as the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones in central Europe and in the Balkans, which is the aim of the well-known initiatives of the Governments of the German Democratic Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Socialist Republic of Romania.

At the present stage, we need more than ever fresh efforts, bold steps, to overcome the longstanding differences in positions, the stereotypes which have now become so habitual at negotiations, and to work out a multilateral convention which would outlaw chemical weapons and provide for the destruction of their stockpiles and the elimination of the very industrial base for their production.

Here again the Soviet Union is setting a good example. New approaches to the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons, contained in the statement

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of 15 January 1986 and introduced in the Conference in the form of concrete detailed proposals on 22 April, have brought us to the brink of agreement in principle on a question considered one of the most complicated issues, that is, the elimination of the industrial base for the manufacture of chemical weapons.

With regard to verification, our proposals, together with the systematic international verification of the destruction of chemical weapon stocks and of the permitted production of all supertoxic lethal chemicals as proposed earlier by the Soviet Union, constitute an integrated system ensuring the highest degree of confidence in the implementation by States of their commitments.

I would like to express my appreciation to all delegations which have welcomed the new Soviet initiatives.

But we often hear reproaches to the effect that supposedly these initiatives do not cover all the issues. I would like to say that negotiations represent a process in which all participate in the search for solutions. Furthermore, we get the impression that those who are quick to reproach the Soviet position are now trying to hide behind general statements about the importance of banning chemical weapons and about their readiness to step up work in this area. But in fact it turns out that these fine sounding declarations either do not contain any specific new proposals or refer back to documents already two years old which long ago proved that they could not lead to any agreements. This cannot be considered other than direct contradiction between words and deeds, other than a double standard.

Against the background of this diplomatic foot-dragging by Washington at the negotiations, its efforts to push forward with its programme for chemical rearmament arouse particular alarm. The NATO decisions in favour of binary weapons taken at the end of May are actually programming for many years to come not only the preservation but also an increase of the chemical threat for the whole of mankind. They are in contradiction with the objective of eliminating chemical weapons and are contrary to the Soviet-American accords reached at the highest level and cannot but seriously damage the work of the Conference on concluding a Convention banning such weapons.

In stepping up efforts to achieve security through disarmament, the Soviet Union takes as its point of departure the need radically to reconstruct the political as well as the military and strategic thinking of States and bring all this into line with the realities of the nuclear space age that has made our world too vulnerable for military rivalry. It is impossible to save and preserve civilization without making a resolute and definite break with the mentality and behaviour which have for centuries been based upon the acceptability and permissibility of war and armed conflicts. This entails the understanding that it is already impossible to win either the arms race or a nuclear war. Security cannot forever be built on the fear of retaliation, that is to say on the doctrines of deterrence and intimidation which promote the arms race and threaten to get out of control and lead to what I would call zero security, i.e., humanity's self-destruction.

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We must do away with the mutual suspicion and distrust which have been built up over the years and deal in a detailed manner with the concern about the real intentions of military and political groupings and individual States. In the interests of security, military concepts and doctrines must be based upon defensive principles. The removal of the threat of war and the creation of a stable and secure peace must be a priority goal of all States. It is precisely these principles that the Soviet Union and other member States of the Warsaw Treaty take as their point of departure. They firmly adhere to the defensive military doctrine that presupposes maintaining the balance of armed forces at the lowest possible level and reducing military potentials to the degree which is adequate and necessary for defence.

At the summit meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty, held in Budapest on 10 and 11 June 1986, it was declared with the utmost sense of responsibility that Warsaw Treaty member States will never, under any circumstances, initiate military action against any State either in Europe or other parts of the World unless they themselves are the victims of aggression.

In the current circumstances, a comprehensive approach to disarmament acquires particular importance. Today no one can confine himself to partial decisions which would slow down the arms race in some areas only to speed it up to double the pace in other areas. Experience has convinced us that programmes in the field of disarmament are useful. They steer the way, they establish clear-cut time-frames, they mobilize the efforts of those working for disarmament and make it more difficult to sabotage disarmament plans. That is why we call for the intensification of the work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament which is being done at this Conference. This comprehensive programme should include, as integral components, a programme of nuclear disarmament and a programme for the elimination of chemical weapons, as well as a programme for the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons.

Any programme and indeed any agreement only make sense if strictly complied with. This is as it were the alpha and omega of a successful programme of disarmament and indeed of the whole process of maintaining normal and civilized international relations based on law and not on force. In this regard, the line taken by the United States of undermining the system of agreements, of disregarding the United Nations consensus decisions which were so hard to reach, and particularly the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament and the decision of the United Nations to hold a Conference on Disarmament and Development, cannot fail to cause concern. In our view, the Conference on Disarmament in its report should speak out on the issue of treaties and consensus decisions. We are convinced that every agreement worked out jointly should serve not only as a reminder of the efforts invested but also as a reliable link in the international system of security and law and order.

This is precisely the job of the Conference, to create the essential parts of such a system and work out agreements in the field of disarmament. We see in the work of the Conference the embodiment of the idea of holding a world conference or a world disarmament conference, which has been the dream of mankind's most outstanding thinkers. It is precisely the convening of such

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a conference that the Soviet Government appealed for during the very first years of its existence. The United Nations has also repeatedly spoken in favour of holding such a forum. It is our sincere desire that the Conference's work should not be in vain, and should signify real progress in limiting armaments. It is quite inadmissible that the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum, should waste its efforts and resources on sterile procedural debate. Such discussions often remind us of scholastic hairsplitting and play into the hands of those who continue to think in terms of military force and do not want to see real arms limitation. Everything possible should be done to allow the Conference on Disarmament to perform the noble tasks entrusted to it: to bring about real disarmament and to strengthen the foundations of universal security.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR for his important statement and for the kind words addressed to me and to my country.

(continued in English)

In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 338th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of Norway, Ambassador Huslid.

Mr. HUSLID (Norway): My intervention will no doubt come as an anti-climax but I promise that I shall be brief, after the important statement by Mr. Petrovsky, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a country with which mine entertains good neighbourly relations. I listened to Mr. Petrovsky's important statement with great interest.

Mr. President, in thanking you for giving me the floor, I should first like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency for the month of June of this Conference, to which my country continues to attach great importance as the single negotiating forum for global disarmament questions.

The Norwegian Government appreciates the official nomination of Norway as the candidate of the Western group for membership in this Conference, announced by the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador Jessel, in his statement in the plenary meeting of 27 March. It is the hope of my Government that the Conference will intensify its consultations with a view to selecting the new members by the end of this year's session.

In her capacity as an observer Norway has already participated in the work of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for several years. In two areas -- chemical weapons and a comprehensive nuclear-test ban -- my country has initiated research programmes which are relevant to the deliberations of the Conference. My statement today concerns the first of these areas, also dealt with by Mr. Petrovsky, whereas the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban will be addressed in another intervention from our side, scheduled for 22 July.

There is full agreement, I would think, that a global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons is urgently needed. For that reason the negotiations

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on this matter in the Conference on Disarmament should be intensified. To the extent it is possible the work should continue, we think, after the end of the 1986 session at the end of August, thus enabling the Conference to increase the momentum which has been developed over the last few years. In particular, further efforts should be made to elaborate convention texts in areas where agreement now seems to exist.

An important outstanding problem is, as we know, the question of verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry. Norway is of the opinion that a solution to this problem must primarily be based on routine random on-site inspections of the relevant chemical facilities. The Workshop which was organized in the Netherlands on 4-6 June has made a significant contribution to a solution of this question. I should like through you, Mr. President, to congratulate the Dutch delegation on a most successful workshop, which has highlighted possible procedures to be utilized to monitor the non-production of chemical weapons. In this connection, I welcome the progress which has been made during the present session of the Conference in developing and refining definitions, criteria and lists of relevant chemicals, as well as appropriate régimes to which the listed chemicals would be subject.

Whereas there seems to be an emerging consensus on the principle of on-site inspection of destruction of chemical weapons and the elimination of chemical weapons production facilities, there is still major disagreement as to how to deal with requests for on-site inspections on challenge. As a rule routine inspections would seem to be sufficient to ensure that the States Parties are complying with their obligations. Only in exceptional circumstances would it be necessary to make use of an inspection procedure on challenge. Such an exceptional procedure should, however, imply an obligation by the States Parties to accept a request. We believe that it ought to be possible to work out a procedure for this to which all the countries taking part in the negotiations can agree.

It is extremely regrettable that chemical weapons have repeatedly been used in the Gulf War in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to which now more than 100 countries are parties. The Norwegian Government strongly condemns any use of chemical weapons. Such use underlines the necessity of incorporating a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in a global convention, which must also provide necessary verification provisions. It would in this connection be necessary to agree on specific provisions dealing with international verification of complaints on the use of such weapons. The Norwegian research programme on the sampling and identification of chemical warfare agents should be viewed against this background. In relation to the global convention this programme has two objectives, which are to contribute to the negotiations on such specific provisions and to provide material for the elaboration by the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary bodies of guidelines for on-site inspection concerning alleged use of chemical weapons.

In order to provide sound and realistic data the Norwegian experiments have been undertaken under field conditions. During the first five years the research programme was limited to winter conditions, but I am now able to present research results which concern investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons on an all-year basis. May I, in this regard, underline that

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the Norwegian papers which I have the honour to present today are complementary to the Canadian document CD/677 and the two Dutch Working Papers CD/306 and CD/307 which already contain concrete and valuable recommendations.

It is the ultimate objective of the Norwegian research programme to develop comprehensive procedures for identification, handling, transportation, and analysis of samples collected in the field, on which the investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons can be based. Today, I can present two new Working Papers and a research report. These papers are of necessity somewhat technical in nature and I cannot here go into any detail as to their contents. I should, however, by way of general explanation like to mention the following:

Working Paper CD/703 contains proposals for procedures for sample handling in the field on an all-year basis, to be followed by the fact-finding team in investigating alleged use. Two methods for sample handling have been developed by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. These methods are of general use in the field on an all-year basis. They supplement each other and are based on use of simple equipment. Already in 1984/85 the method of organic solvent extraction proved to be successful in such field experiments. This method gives a high recovery of all known chemical warfare agents and can easily be applied under field conditions. It requires, however, use of glassware and organic solvents in the field. An alternative method has, therefore, been explored. This method makes use of the adsorption of chemical warfare agents to columns containing porous polymers. The use of two different polymers has been tested in detail. This method of porous polymers is slightly less efficient than the extraction with organic solvent, but the columns are easy to use and are well suited for transportation and storage.

The second Working Paper, CD/704, evaluates methods for identification of arsenic containing chemical warfare agents. Little research has been undertaken on this important group of chemical weapons comprising inter alia adamsite, clark I and clark II. In brief, the Working Paper concludes that high-performance liquid chromatography with electrochemical detection is recommended as a method for identifying these strongly irritating compounds.

I hope that the two Working Papers which I have briefly introduced today and the research results on which they have been elaborated can contribute to the efficient implementation of a global and comprehensive convention on chemical weapons, which should be concluded without delay. Norway will for her part continue to take an active part in all phases of the negotiations on the convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Norway for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. KHORAMIAN (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, thank you for giving me the floor. I merely wished to point out that the distinguished Ambassador of Norway used the term "Gulf" instead of "Persian Gulf".

The PRESIDENT: Thank you. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 26 June at 10.30 a.m. sharp. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.