CD/PV.67 11 March 1980 ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIXTY-SEVENTH MEETING held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 11 March 1980, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. YU Pei-Wen

(China)

#### PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Mr. A. BENYAMINA Algeria: Argentina: Mr. A. DUMONT Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD Mr. C. FERNANDEZ Australia: Mr. A. BEHM Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX Mr. J-M. NOIRFALISSE Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA Brazil: Mr. I. SOTIROV Bulgaria: Mr. P. POPTCHEV Burma: U NGWE WIN Mr. J.T. SIMARD Canada: Mr. YU Pei-Wen China: Mr. YANG Hu-Shan Mr. PAN Zhen-Qiang Mr. LI Zhang-He Mr. XU Liu-Gen Mr. L. SOLA VILA Cuba: Mrs. V. BORODOWSKY JACKIEWICH Mr. P. LUKES Czechoslovakia: Mr. V. ROHÁL-ILKIV Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI Egypt: Mr. M. EL-BARADEI

Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE Mr. M. COUTHURES German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI Mr. KAULFUSS Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER Mr. H. MÜLLER Mr. I. KÖMÍVES Hungary: Mr. C. GYÖRFFY India: Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN Mr. S. SARAN Indonesia: Mr. S. DARUSMAN Mr. M. SIDIK Mr. D.B. SULEMAN Mr. HARYOMATARAM Mr. H.M.U. SILABAN Iran: Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO Mr. M. MORENO Mr. C. FRATESCHI Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA Mr. T. NONOYAMA Mr. R. ISHII Mr. K. MIYATA Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES

Mr. M.A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERLFMBILLEG

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN

Mr. H. WAGELMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. T.O. OLUMOKO

Pakistan: Mr. S. BASHIR

Peru:

Poland: Mr. B. SUJAA

Mr. H. FAĆ

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania: Mr. C. ENE

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. I.B. FONSEKA

Miss M L. NAGANATHAN

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. L. NORBERG

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Republics: Mr. THE MIN

Mr. V.H. CANJA

Mr. V.I. USTINOV

Mr. A.I. TIOUPENKOV

Mr. E.K. POTYARKIN

Mr. Y.P, KLIUKIN

United Kingdom: Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

United States of America:

Mr. A. AKALOVSKY

Mr. J. CALVERT

Mr. M. DALEY

Ms. B. MURRAY

Mr. P. SALGADO

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. KALONJI TSHIKALA KAKWAKA

Mr. NKONGO DONTONI BWANDA

Secretary to the Committee on Disarmament and Personal

Representative of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Chinese): I declare open the sixty-seventh plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Working Paper No. 6, of 7 March 1980, entitled "Draft programme of work of the Committee on Disarmament", has been circulated today by the secretariat in all languages used by the Committee.

At our last informal meeting there was general agreement concerning our programme of work for this part of the current session. The secretariat has issued the programme as revised, in the light of the discussions at our informal meeting. We have indicated at the beginning of the programme that from 5 to 15 February we occupied ourselves with statements in the plenary and consideration of the agenda and programme of work. This is actually what took place and it has been included in the programme accordingly.

I wish to state once again that the programme is indicative in nature and is flexible and subject to change. We have indicated broad periods for various items and even these periods are subject to alteration in the light of the progress we make in our business, and in the light of such new situations as may arise. This programme is no more than a pragmatic basis to begin our work in an orderly fashion. As we proceed, we shall formulate a more precise time-table, taking into account the activities of ad hoc working groups. The organization of the work of each working group will be left to the working groups themselves and their chairmen, in consultation with the Chairman of the Committee and the secretariat.

I hope we can approve the programme of work in the light of my statement. I see no objection.

# The programme of work (CD/62/Add.1) was adopted.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): Iir. Chairman, on the opening day of this Committee's spring session, I already conveyed to your country a welcome on behalf of my country. I now have the pleasure of welcoming you personally as our Chairman for this month. You can count on the co-operation of the Netherlands delegation in furthering our common task. I also wish to thank Ambassador NcPhail for his work as our Chairman last month which was all the more impressive since he was a relative newcomer to this Committee.

I have asked for the floor to give a brief reaction to the statements made by the Soviet delegation on 14 and 28 February respectively. I have no intention of taking part in a process of mutual recrimination, but I feel that those statements cannot go unanswered. The purpose of my intervention is to put the record straight.

# (IIr. Fein, Netherlands)

The gist of the Soviet delegation's observations was that the Western countries are to blame for the present unsatisfactory state of détente and that they are fanning the arms race. To sustain this claim, the Soviet delegate presented a distorted picture of Western policies, whereas the Soviet Union was made out to be the champion of peace and disarmament.

Just to give you one example: the Soviet delegate complained that the NATO countries not only decided on modernization of their theatre nuclear forces but that these countries also contended that the Soviet Union refused to engage in arms—control negotiations in this field. The Soviet delegate called this allegation turning the question inside out. He suggested in fact that his country would be ready to negotiate provided that the NATO countries repeal their decision or at least stop carrying it out. Should this Soviet condition be taken as a positive or a negative reply to the Vestern offer of negotiations? Let us look at the facts.

The Western offer is to start negotiations well before any new weapon comes from the assembly line. It is a well-known fact that it will take several years before the first of these weapons will be ready for deployment in Europe. In the meantime production and deployment of new Soviet systems will continue. In fact, the Soviet statement of 14 February confirmed this in so many words. My question is: how seriously are we to take a willingness to negotiate if the conditions are that a continuation one party should refrain from acting while the other will not be prevented from carrying out its current programme? I should say that the answer to this question is obvious.

As to the present state of international relations and the serious setback the process of world-wide détente has suffered recently, I wish to refer to what I said on this subject in my opening statement on 5 February. Let me only repeat that we for our part remain ready to pursue actively our efforts to reach agreements in the field of arms control, here and elsewhere. It is my firm conviction that we, in this Committee, should try to come to grips with the problems on our agenda, and that we should not allow ourselves to be drawn into exchanges of fruitless arguments.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Since, under the programme of work which has just been approved, today's meeting is devoted to the question of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, the Soviet delegation will state its views on that subject.

The Soviet Union attaches particular importance to a solution of the problem of safeguarding the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, which it considers to be an integral part of the broader problem of strengthening international peace and security. There is no doubt that the strengthening of international legal guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States would also help to solve other problems of restricting the nuclear arms race and of nuclear disarmament.

As you may remember, at the thirty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly the Soviet Union sponsored a proposal for the conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This proposal received broad international support.

In supporting the provision of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States under international law, the Soviet Union at the same time reiterated that it would never use nuclear weapons against States which abstained from the production or acquisition of such weapons and which had no such weapons on their territory.

The question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons figures prominently at last year's session of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee decided to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group to consider the question, and in the Working Group there was a thorough discussion of the proposals and ideas put forward in the Committee, including the proposal for the conclusion of an international convention. In its report to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, the Committee observed that there was no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention, though the difficulties involved were also pointed out. The Committee on Disarmament adopted a recommendation of the Ad Hoc Working Group to the effect that the Committee should continue its negotiations on guarantees at its 1980 session.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The question of the provision of "negative" guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States, and the results of the consideration of that question by the Committee on Disarmament, were discussed at the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

General Assembly resolution 34/84, adopted on the proposal of the socialist countries and a number of others, requested the Committee on Disarmament "to continue the negotiations on this subject on a priority basis during its 1980 session with a view to their early conclusion with the elaboration of a convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Two other resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session, resolutions 34/85 and 34/86, also refer to the continuation of negotiations in the Committee on Disrmament, although they differ in some respects from the resolution already mentioned.

It would thus appear that the question of the terms of reference of the Working Group on guarantees of security need not take up too much time this year. We all remember that last year the terms of reference of such a Working Group were agreed after considerable efforts by members of the Committee. These efforts were needed because there were different approaches to the question of guarantees of security. These differences, of course, are still there. Assuming, therefore, that the question of the terms of reference should be settled as quickly as possible, the Committee should obviously take as a basis its decision establishing the Ad Hoc Working Group on guarantees of security and renew its terms of reference, bearing in mind the fact that they had not been fully carried out.

Unfortunately, it must be observed that, although more than a month has already elapsed since the beginning of the session of the Committee on Disarmament, negotiations on the question of guarantees of security have not yet been resumed, and the Working Group is not yet in operation. One has the impression that someone has got it into his head to replace negotiations on the substance by endless and quite irrelevant talk. The USSR delegation ventures to hope, however, that the Committee will succeed this week in overcoming all the obstacles, and that the Add Hoc Working Group will soon begin negotiations.

### (Ilr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The Soviet Union delegation is prepared to play a very active part in negotiations within the Group and to make a constructive contribution to the fulfilment of the tasks with which the Group has been entrusted.

As has been pointed out, despite the fact that it was established only towards the end of the Committee's last session, the Ad Hoc Group began negotiations on the problem and did some useful work, as was noted in the Committee's annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. A number of working papers were placed before the Ad Hoc Group, including document CD/23 submitted by the socialist countries and containing the draft international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States.

The USSR delegation, which intends to make a detailed Statement of its position on the problem as a whole, and on its specific aspects, in the course of the Working Group's discussions, would like once again to emphasize that, in its view, the fullest and most effective solution of the problem of protecting non-nuclear-weapon States from the use of nuclear weapons against them might be for the nuclear Powers to begin adopting guarantees in this field under international law. The Soviet Union is therefore in favour of the elaboration of an international convention, the participants in which would be, on the one hand, nuclear-weapon States, which would undertake to give non-nuclear-weapon States appropriate guarantees of security, and, on the other hand, non-nuclear-weapon States, which would renounce the production or acquisition of nuclear weapons, and have no such weapons on their territory.

The basic undertaking as regards guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, as formulated in the socialist countries' draft, offers the most effective solution of this question. It is aimed at helping to restrict the possible sphere of use of nuclear weapons, at strengthening the non-proliferation régime and, consequently, at reducing the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war.

The Soviet delegation is prepared to co-operate with other delegations in seeking to ensure that the negotiations on the question of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States are conducted in the most constructive manner.

Mr. ENE (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, let me first express the Romanian delegation's satisfaction on seeing you preside over our work. We have already had occasion to stress the importance which Romania attaches to the participation of the People's Republic of China in the work of our Committee. I should like to wish you all success in the accomplishment of your tasks and assure you of my delegation's full co-operation. May I also express my sincerest thanks to the distinguished representative of Canada, Ambassador McPhail, for the competent way in which he conducted our work during the month of February, for his dynamism and for the consideration he showed to the opinions of all the members of the Committee.

In my statement today I would first like to comment on the agenda item for this meeting. The second part of my statement will touch on one or two points concerning the organization and progress of our work.

The Committee on Disarmament is once again engaged in discussing effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Last session, the Committee had a very useful and interesting debate on this item. Three drafts of arrangements were submitted, as well as other proposals. Through the Ad Hoc Working Group set up by the Committee it was possible to identify the basic problems which must be the subject of negotiations.

This year, the question of offering guarantees of security to non-nuclearweapon States is even more important.

On the one hand, the accumulation of nuclear weapons has gone on increasing. The security of the entire human race and particularly of the non-nuclear-weapon States, is more seriously threatened. In a period of international tension, there is growing concern over the dangers of nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, the second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is scheduled to take place this year. The fact that, since the conclusion of the Treaty, the problem of providing effective guarantees of security for the non-nuclear-weapon States in exchange for their renunciation of the nuclear option has remained unsolved means that determined action is still needed to restore the balance of obligations under the Treaty. The credibility and even the viability of this international instrument are at stake.

The three resolutions on thus subject adopted by the General Assembly last year, together with the exhortations of the first special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, make any further comment on the urgent need for such measures unnecessary.

These conditions, and the work done by the Committee so far, call for a decision of principle on the direction to be followed. In this connexion I would like to state, unequivocally, that so far as the Romanian delegation is concerned, it considers that, on the strength of the material available to it, the Committee should put a stop to inconclusive discussions which may give the impression that our work is progressing. The working group to be established should resolutely set about negotiations on the drafting of a legal instrument containing guarantees of security that are credible, effective and acceptable to all States. What is the line to be followed?

As to the solution on the substance, Romania has always maintained that humanity will never be safe from nuclear danger until nuclear weapons are totally abolished. For the time being, the most effective way to achieve international security and peace is to conclude a convention on non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war.

In resolution 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, the United Nations General Assembly decided to entrust our Committee with the consideration of this question. Unfortunately, it has not proved possible to include this item in our agenda specifically, but the understanding was that it should be discussed under another agenda item. The Romanian delegation is determined to take advantage of this opportunity.

Another course to be followed until nuclear weapons are totally eliminated from military arsenals and made illegal is one which was fully discussed during our work last year: it is to draft an international convention to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The fact that all the nuclear Powers submitted unilateral declarations on this subject at the special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, proves the existence of an objective basis for such an approach.

If, for political or practical reasons, the drafting of such a convention is considered inopportune, then our work cannot advance and the General Assembly should be so informed as soon as possible. If, on the contrary, the political

will exists and the reservations expressed regarding the convention are due to the lack of a common basis, owing to the different approaches adopted by the nuclear-weapon States in this connexion, then there is a single line to take: try to define and above all to negotiate the common elements of the obligation to be assumed in the future convention. In its statement on 26 June 1979, the delegation of the Netherlands has already demonstrated the utility of such an endeavour.

The Romanian delegation feels that the Committee on Disarmament could take this course of action if various conditions were met:

The first is that the common denominator should be based on an acceptable compromise which would give any guarantee accorded to the non-nuclear-weapon States the necessary credibility and effectiveness. A restricted convention subject to numerous conditions would only harm their security by making the use of nuclear arms legitimate in cases where the convention was not applicable.

The second condition is that any undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States should be strongly binding. We entirely endorse the view expressed on 12 February of this year by the Swedish delegation, which stressed that it is first and foremost for the nuclear-weapon States to establish a set of binding guarantees acceptable to all States (CD/PV.57).

The third condition is that no discrimination should be contemplated against States which have agreed not to acquire nuclear veapons or do not have such weapons. International equity requires that the States which have renounced the nuclear option should be assured that they will not be the victims of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States.

Fourthly, the obligation not to use nuclear weapons must be an integral part of the renunciation of force in general in international relations; and it must find its place in the legal instruments designed to give effect to the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force in relations between States.

Tifthly, if the obligation assumed by the nuclear-weapon States not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States is made subject to any special condition or qualification, the condition or qualification should be maturely considered and based on objective criteria. It should be precisely defined, having regard to the fact that any guarantee given would become effective first and foremost in cases of armed conflict, when particular situations are more difficult to define than in peace-time. Furthermore, any qualification which amounted to a threat to use nuclear weapons in the event of specified action by a non-nuclear-weapon State would be unacceptable, for it would in effect contradict the very purpose of the convention.

At the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1975, Romania, it will be remembered, together with other non-nuclear-weapon States, submitted a draft additional protocol to the Treaty with the object of imposing a legal obligation on the nuclear-weapon States never and in no circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty whose territories are completely free from nuclear weapons. This question will once again become topical in the context of the second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to be held in Geneva this year from 11 August to 5 September.

We would like to emphasize that the efforts being made in the Committee on Disarmament to prepare a universal convention on guarantees of security and the efforts being made in the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty are not incompatible. They are complementary. The advantage of an approach in the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which also has a universal purpose, is that the guarantees of security that we are seeking would be part of a contractual system and would be intended to remedy the shortcomings of that international instrument.

It is in this spirit that the Romanian delegation is resolved to make its contribution to the progress of negotiations in all forums on the basis of the principles we have just mentioned.

I would like now, with your permission, to turn to another subject relating to our work.

We have reached the middle of the first part of the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament, on which the United Nations General Assembly has placed special hopes. After a debate lasting two months, the 152 States Members of the United Nations entrusted our Committee with the main problems of disarmament, and are waiting for the results.

Yet so far, the Committee has not even managed to get beyond the organizational stage of its work. The adoption of the agenda and the establishment of the negotiating programme and structures have taken far too long.

In the opinion of the Romanian delegation, discussions on procedural matters are tending to become a real obstacle to effective and responsible activity.

We consider that the purpose of the rules of procedure of any international body is to determine also what action should be taken in specific situations which occur with some frequency in its work. The reason for having rules of procedure is that, once they have been accepted by all the members of such a body, their application in each particular case is more or less <u>automatic</u>. Our Committee always seems to start each session and part of a session with the same debate, using the same arguments.

It is our belief that we should give more consideration to making better use of the time available to us, so that the agenda, the programme of work and the negotiating structures can be established as speedily as possible at the beginning of each session, on the basis of objective criteria. For this purpose, and in accordance with the Final Document of the special session and with the rules of procedure, the starting point for the organization of each session of the Committee should in our opinion be the General Assembly's recommendations, which have themselves been negotiated by the same States as are represented in the Committee.

Of course, a State might have reservations on a resolution which was not adopted unanimously. But it must be admitted that approval of the wording of an item, or even of its being considered, in no way signifies approval of the

substance. We all know that our results do not depend on the way in which our working papers are drafted. Ultimately, the rule of consensus ensures that all interests are taken into account.

As to the work before us, we would like to think that once we have taken the decision to set up working groups, we shall try not to repeat in them the discussions and consultations which we have already held in the Committee.

As emphasized by the States members of the Group of 21, the working groups should start basic negotiations as soon as possible. We also believe that the appointment of chairmen for the working groups should be decided in accordance with the only objective criterian for a body established on the principle of the equality of all its members: namely, the interest expressed by any State individually in discharging such a function, and the agreement thereto of all the other members of the Committee.

Lastly, I would like to say a word about our methods of work. We feel that more care should be taken to ensure that in the process of our work and consultations we do not encourage methods which might divert us from the basic principle of our Committee: namely, the equality of its members. We have in mind the growing number of cases where consultations are organized on a selective basis. Although "contact groups" — a working system which incidentally is not provided for in the rules of procedure — are open to all members of the Committee, the fact that they are based on the nomination of a few delegations as a nucleus for consultations is not consistent with the equality of States.

Of course every delegation has the sovereign right to take an initiative, to submit proposals, individually or with other delegations, and to engage in consultations. But it is no longer the same thing when the Committee as such is asked to endorse them.

As before, only consultations open to all members of the Committee without distinction are acceptable to the Romanian delegation.

Having said this, the Romanian delegation considers that it is the Committee's duty to finish as soon as possible what still remains to be done in connexion with the organization of work and to proceed firmly, without further delay, to work on the substance of the items on its agenda.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. TSHIKALA KAKWAKA (Zaire) (translated from French): Nr. Chairman, almost one month ago I welcomed, on behalf of my delegation, the presence of your great country in our Committee, and I reaffirmed the importance of the role which China is called upon to play within our Committee.

I rejoice, therefore, to see you discharging, with competence and tact, the difficult tasks of the chairmanship of our Committee.

Your negotiating skills will doubtless guide our Committee to fruitful results.

I should like to express my full appreciation of the dynamism with which the Ambassador of Canada, His Excellency Mr. D.S. McPhail, conducted the work of our Committee.

'The banning of nuclear tests is a problem which has preoccupied the international community for a very long time, and the United Nations General Assembly has stressed its great urgency in its many resolutions.

In my statement of 14 February 1980, I stressed, on behalf of my delegation, the importance of the Committee's present work and the urgency of undertaking negotiations on the priority questions assigned to it by the General Assembly at its tenth special session. Among these priority items, I referred to the negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, to negotiations concerning cessation of the nuclear-arms race, and to the conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of real guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

But despite all its efforts, the Committee did not manage to institute negotiations on a wider basis. Some tripartite negotiations were indeed going on between the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, but concrete results were still awaited. It became apparent that the lack of headway in the negotiations among the three great Powers was in fact blocking the Committee's work.

The Group of 21 could not remain idle in the face of this state of affairs and submitted, last year, several proposals; at the end of the 1979 session the members of the Group of 21 issued, among other things, a highly critical statement expressing their dissatisfaction at the poor progress that was being made, and advocated a new approach whereby all the member countries of the Committee would be involved in seeking solutions to the questions which preoccupy mankind.

## (Mr. Tshikala Kakwaka, Zaire)

They stressed the importance and urgency of concluding the negotiations on a nuclear-test ban instead of leaving this task solely to the member countries involved in the trilateral negotiations (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom).

At its thirty-fourth session, the General Assembly, echoing the anxiety of the Group of 21, expressed its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continued unabated against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States.

It requested the Committee to undertake without delay negotiations on the substance of the question of the complete banning of tests, and it called upon the members of the Committee participating in the separate negotiations on such a treaty to spare no effort to bring these negotiations to a positive conclusion as soon as possible.

My delegation, which is from a country that does not even produce cartridges but aspires to peace, fully subscribes to the conclusions of the Group of 21, to which it belongs — conclusions calling for the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon testing in all environments, and taking the view that there is adequate material to initiate immediate negotiations on this subject.

My delegation is the more justified in supporting this demand in that there seems to be indications that South Africa is in the process of acquiring nuclear armaments, which would constitute a great danger and a constant threat to the States of the region.

My delegation therefore joins the other delegations in an urgent request for the establishment of political working groups, and especially a working group to consider the agenda item "Nuclear test ban", in which the three nuclear-weapon Powers to which we do not deny all merit — could take an active part by reason of their particular responsibilities.

For the delegation of Zaire, the purpose of disarmament is to create a framework of peace and security for the promotion of development.

The question of banning nuclear tests, and of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons, radiological weapons and chemical weapons, is of the highest importance.

The provision of effective guarantees of non-annihilation by nuclear weapons is vital for my country, which has other things to do than to equip itself with nuclear weapons.

### (Mr. Tshikala Kakwaka, Zaire)

We therefore wholeheartedly support the establishment of a working group with the task of preparing a suitable legal instrument.

The guarantees we require must be unconditional, real and recognized on an internationally accepted legal basis by all Powers, and by the nuclear-weapon Powers in particular.

The credibility of our Committee is at stake.

For Africa, and for Zaire in particular, the urgent need for a convention of this kind providing for unconditional and absolutely mandatory and binding guarantees is something which requires no comment.

Essentially, of course, it is for the nuclear-weapon countries to furnish these guarantees and scrupulously to observe them.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Zaire for his statement and kind words addressed to the Chair.

Since the Committee has adopted its programme of work for the first part of its 1980 session, I believe that we should now consider other organizational questions. First of all, I appeal to members of the contact groups dealing with questions relating to the mandates of ad hoc working groups to complete their work by tomorrow morning, if possible. Should they do so, we could hold an informal meeting tomorrow afternoon, at 3.00 p.m., to consider the establishment of ad hoc working groups and, hopefully, finalize our conclusions in plenary on Thursday, the 13th. With that possibility in mind, I shall schedule an informal meeting for tomorrow at 3.00 p.m. if there is no objection.

Mr. GHAREKHAN (India): Mr. Chairman, there is no objection from my delegation, but if you could kindly change the time of the informal meeting to 3.30 p.m. I think that would be more convenient for everyone.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Chinese): I think that we can all agree to holding the informal meeting tomorrow at 3.30 p.m.

It was so decided.

### (The Chairman)

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Chinese): Before adjourning the meeting, and in accordance with the programme of work we have adopted, I wish to explain that on 15 and 14 March we will discuss the question of chemical weapons and radiological weapons. I think the Committee will also agree that if delegates wish to continue their discussion of the question of negative security guarantees we shall also give them the opportunity to do so. The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Thursday, 13 March at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12 noon